Sanity check record length before skipping explicit IV in DTLS
to fix DoS attack.
Thanks to Codenomicon for discovering this issue using Fuzz-o-Matic
fuzzing as a service testing platform.
(CVE-2012-2333)
diff -up openssl-fips-0.9.8e/ssl/d1_enc.c.reclen openssl-fips-0.9.8e/ssl/d1_enc.c
--- openssl-fips-0.9.8e/ssl/d1_enc.c.reclen	2006-02-08 20:16:32.000000000 +0100
+++ openssl-fips-0.9.8e/ssl/d1_enc.c	2012-05-15 12:14:25.510013029 +0200
@@ -252,7 +252,7 @@ int dtls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
 				}
 			/* TLS 1.0 does not bound the number of padding bytes by the block size.
 			 * All of them must have value 'padding_length'. */
-			if (i > (int)rec->length)
+			if (i + bs > (int)rec->length)
 				{
 				/* Incorrect padding. SSLerr() and ssl3_alert are done
 				 * by caller: we don't want to reveal whether this is