diff --git a/SOURCES/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2010-5298.patch b/SOURCES/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2010-5298.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b4f92cd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2010-5298.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+From: Ben Laurie <ben@links.org>
+Date: Wed, 23 Apr 2014 06:24:03 +0000 (+0100)
+Subject: Fix use after free.
+X-Git-Url: https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=commitdiff_plain;h=94d1f4b
+
+Fix use after free.
+---
+
+diff --git a/ssl/s3_pkt.c b/ssl/s3_pkt.c
+index b9e45c7..d601a18 100644
+--- a/ssl/s3_pkt.c
++++ b/ssl/s3_pkt.c
+@@ -1334,7 +1334,7 @@ start:
+ {
+ s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
+ rr->off=0;
+- if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS)
++ if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && s->s3->rbuf.left == 0)
+ ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
+ }
+ }
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0195.patch b/SOURCES/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0195.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..434eee2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0195.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+commit 208d54db20d58c9a5e45e856a0650caadd7d9612
+Author: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
+Date: Tue May 13 18:48:31 2014 +0100
+
+ Fix for CVE-2014-0195
+
+ A buffer overrun attack can be triggered by sending invalid DTLS fragments
+ to an OpenSSL DTLS client or server. This is potentially exploitable to
+ run arbitrary code on a vulnerable client or server.
+
+ Fixed by adding consistency check for DTLS fragments.
+
+ Thanks to Jüri Aedla for reporting this issue.
+
+diff --git a/ssl/d1_both.c b/ssl/d1_both.c
+index 2e8cf68..07f67f8 100644
+--- a/ssl/d1_both.c
++++ b/ssl/d1_both.c
+@@ -627,7 +627,16 @@ dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
+ frag->msg_header.frag_off = 0;
+ }
+ else
++ {
+ frag = (hm_fragment*) item->data;
++ if (frag->msg_header.msg_len != msg_hdr->msg_len)
++ {
++ item = NULL;
++ frag = NULL;
++ goto err;
++ }
++ }
++
+
+ /* If message is already reassembled, this must be a
+ * retransmit and can be dropped.
+
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0198.patch b/SOURCES/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0198.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2c94bca
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0198.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+Date: Sun, 11 May 2014 23:38:37 +0000 (+0100)
+Subject: Fixed NULL pointer dereference. See PR#3321
+X-Git-Url: https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=commitdiff_plain;h=b107586
+
+Fixed NULL pointer dereference. See PR#3321
+---
+
+diff --git a/ssl/s3_pkt.c b/ssl/s3_pkt.c
+index 40eb0dd..d961d12 100644
+--- a/ssl/s3_pkt.c
++++ b/ssl/s3_pkt.c
+@@ -657,9 +657,6 @@ static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
+ SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf);
+ SSL_SESSION *sess;
+
+- if (wb->buf == NULL)
+- if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s))
+- return -1;
+
+ /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written
+ * out. This will happen with non blocking IO */
+@@ -675,6 +672,10 @@ static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
+ /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
+ }
+
++ if (wb->buf == NULL)
++ if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s))
++ return -1;
++
+ if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
+ return 0;
+
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0221.patch b/SOURCES/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0221.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..deb3a8b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0221.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+commit d30e582446b027868cdabd0994681643682045a4
+Author: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
+Date: Fri May 16 13:00:45 2014 +0100
+
+ Fix CVE-2014-0221
+
+ Unnecessary recursion when receiving a DTLS hello request can be used to
+ crash a DTLS client. Fixed by handling DTLS hello request without recursion.
+
+ Thanks to Imre Rad (Search-Lab Ltd.) for discovering this issue.
+
+diff --git a/ssl/d1_both.c b/ssl/d1_both.c
+index 07f67f8..4c2fd03 100644
+--- a/ssl/d1_both.c
++++ b/ssl/d1_both.c
+@@ -793,6 +793,7 @@ dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, long max, int *ok)
+ int i,al;
+ struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
+
++ redo:
+ /* see if we have the required fragment already */
+ if ((frag_len = dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(s,max,ok)) || *ok)
+ {
+@@ -851,8 +852,7 @@ dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, long max, int *ok)
+ s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+ s->init_num = 0;
+- return dtls1_get_message_fragment(s, st1, stn,
+- max, ok);
++ goto redo;
+ }
+ else /* Incorrectly formated Hello request */
+ {
+
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0224.patch b/SOURCES/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0224.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..173f0e1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0224.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl3.h.keying-mitm openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl3.h
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl3.h.keying-mitm 2014-06-02 19:48:04.518100562 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl3.h 2014-06-02 19:48:04.642103429 +0200
+@@ -388,6 +388,7 @@ typedef struct ssl3_buffer_st
+ #define TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG 0x0008
+ #define TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY 0x0010
+ #define TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE 0x0020
++#define SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK 0x0080
+
+ /* SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE is set when we
+ * restart a handshake because of MS SGC and so prevents us
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_clnt.c.keying-mitm openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_clnt.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_clnt.c.keying-mitm 2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_clnt.c 2014-06-02 19:49:57.042701985 +0200
+@@ -559,6 +559,7 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B:
+
++ s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
+ ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A,
+ SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+@@ -916,6 +917,7 @@ int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
++ s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
+ s->hit=1;
+ }
+ else /* a miss or crap from the other end */
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_pkt.c.keying-mitm openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_pkt.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_pkt.c.keying-mitm 2014-06-02 19:48:04.640103383 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_pkt.c 2014-06-02 19:48:04.643103452 +0200
+@@ -1298,6 +1298,15 @@ start:
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
++ if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK))
++ {
++ al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
++ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
++ goto f_err;
++ }
++
++ s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
++
+ rr->length=0;
+
+ if (s->msg_callback)
+@@ -1432,7 +1441,7 @@ int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)
+
+ if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL)
+ {
+- if (s->session == NULL)
++ if (s->session == NULL || s->session->master_key_length == 0)
+ {
+ /* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_srvr.c.keying-mitm openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_srvr.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_srvr.c.keying-mitm 2014-06-02 19:48:04.630103151 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_srvr.c 2014-06-02 19:48:04.643103452 +0200
+@@ -673,6 +673,7 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
+
++ s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
+ /* we should decide if we expected this one */
+ ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+@@ -700,6 +701,7 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
++ s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
+ ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
+ SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+@@ -770,7 +772,10 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
+ s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
+ #else
+ if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
++ {
++ s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
+ s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
++ }
+ else
+ s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
+ #endif
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3470.patch b/SOURCES/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3470.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..32f4487
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3470.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+commit 4ad43d511f6cf064c66eb4bfd0fb0919b5dd8a86
+Author: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
+Date: Thu May 29 15:00:05 2014 +0100
+
+ Fix CVE-2014-3470
+
+ Check session_cert is not NULL before dereferencing it.
+
+diff --git a/ssl/s3_clnt.c b/ssl/s3_clnt.c
+index d35376d..4324f8d 100644
+--- a/ssl/s3_clnt.c
++++ b/ssl/s3_clnt.c
+@@ -2511,6 +2511,13 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
+ int ecdh_clnt_cert = 0;
+ int field_size = 0;
+
++ if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
++ {
++ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
++ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
++ goto err;
++ }
++
+ /* Did we send out the client's
+ * ECDH share for use in premaster
+ * computation as part of client certificate?
diff --git a/SPECS/openssl.spec b/SPECS/openssl.spec
index a67dd77..886fbf2 100644
--- a/SPECS/openssl.spec
+++ b/SPECS/openssl.spec
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
Summary: Utilities from the general purpose cryptography library with TLS implementation
Name: openssl
Version: 1.0.1e
-Release: 34%{?dist}
+Release: 34%{?dist}.3
Epoch: 1
# We have to remove certain patented algorithms from the openssl source
# tarball with the hobble-openssl script which is included below.
@@ -93,6 +93,12 @@ Patch87: openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2013-6450.patch
Patch88: openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2013-4353.patch
Patch89: openssl-1.0.1e-ephemeral-key-size.patch
Patch90: openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0160.patch
+Patch91: openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2010-5298.patch
+Patch92: openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0195.patch
+Patch93: openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0198.patch
+Patch94: openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0221.patch
+Patch95: openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0224.patch
+Patch96: openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3470.patch
License: OpenSSL
Group: System Environment/Libraries
@@ -217,6 +223,12 @@ cp %{SOURCE12} %{SOURCE13} crypto/ec/
%patch88 -p1 -b .handshake-crash
%patch89 -p1 -b .ephemeral
%patch90 -p1 -b .heartbeat
+%patch91 -p1 -b .freelist
+%patch92 -p1 -b .dtls1-overflow
+%patch93 -p1 -b .null-deref
+%patch94 -p1 -b .dtls1-dos
+%patch95 -p1 -b .keying-mitm
+%patch96 -p1 -b .anon-ecdh-dos
sed -i 's/SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER "1.0.0"/SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER "%{version}"/' crypto/opensslv.h
@@ -480,6 +492,14 @@ rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_libdir}/fipscanister.*
%postun libs -p /sbin/ldconfig
%changelog
+* Tue Jun 3 2014 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> 1.0.1e-34.3
+- fix CVE-2010-5298 - possible use of memory after free
+- fix CVE-2014-0195 - buffer overflow via invalid DTLS fragment
+- fix CVE-2014-0198 - possible NULL pointer dereference
+- fix CVE-2014-0221 - DoS from invalid DTLS handshake packet
+- fix CVE-2014-0224 - SSL/TLS MITM vulnerability
+- fix CVE-2014-3470 - client-side DoS when using anonymous ECDH
+
* Tue Apr 8 2014 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> 1.0.1e-34
- fix CVE-2014-0160 - information disclosure in TLS heartbeat extension