diff --git a/SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-CVE-2021-3449.patch b/SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-CVE-2021-3449.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c2032d3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-CVE-2021-3449.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,140 @@
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/ssl/statem/extensions.c.sig-alg-null-dereference openssl-1.1.1g/ssl/statem/extensions.c
+--- openssl-1.1.1g/ssl/statem/extensions.c.sig-alg-null-dereference	2021-03-25 15:04:24.781522476 +0100
++++ openssl-1.1.1g/ssl/statem/extensions.c	2021-03-25 15:04:24.792522584 +0100
+@@ -1136,6 +1136,7 @@ static int init_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigne
+     /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
+     OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
+     s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = NULL;
++    s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen = 0;
+ 
+     return 1;
+ }
+@@ -1145,6 +1146,7 @@ static int init_sig_algs_cert(SSL *s, un
+     /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
+     OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs);
+     s->s3->tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs = NULL;
++    s->s3->tmp.peer_cert_sigalgslen = 0;
+ 
+     return 1;
+ }
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/test/recipes/70-test_renegotiation.t.sig-alg-null-dereference openssl-1.1.1g/test/recipes/70-test_renegotiation.t
+--- openssl-1.1.1g/test/recipes/70-test_renegotiation.t.sig-alg-null-dereference	2021-03-25 15:59:52.226408743 +0100
++++ openssl-1.1.1g/test/recipes/70-test_renegotiation.t	2021-03-25 16:07:25.528618852 +0100
+@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ my $proxy = TLSProxy::Proxy->new(
+ $proxy->clientflags("-no_tls1_3");
+ $proxy->reneg(1);
+ $proxy->start() or plan skip_all => "Unable to start up Proxy for tests";
+-plan tests => 3;
++plan tests => 4;
+ ok(TLSProxy::Message->success(), "Basic renegotiation");
+ 
+ #Test 2: Client does not send the Reneg SCSV. Reneg should fail
+@@ -77,6 +77,20 @@ SKIP: {
+        "Check ClientHello version is the same");
+ }
+ 
++SKIP: {
++    skip "TLSv1.2 disabled", 1
++        if disabled("tls1_2");
++
++    #Test 4: Test for CVE-2021-3449. client_sig_algs instead of sig_algs in
++    #        resumption ClientHello
++    $proxy->clear();
++    $proxy->filter(\&sigalgs_filter);
++    $proxy->clientflags("-tls1_2");
++    $proxy->reneg(1);
++    $proxy->start();
++    ok(TLSProxy::Message->fail(), "client_sig_algs instead of sig_algs");
++}
++
+ sub reneg_filter
+ {
+     my $proxy = shift;
+@@ -95,4 +109,24 @@ sub reneg_filter
+             $message->repack();
+         }
+     }
++}
++
++sub sigalgs_filter
++{
++    my $proxy = shift;
++    my $cnt = 0;
++
++    # We're only interested in the second ClientHello message
++    foreach my $message (@{$proxy->message_list}) {
++        if ($message->mt == TLSProxy::Message::MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
++            next if ($cnt++ == 0);
++
++            my $sigs = pack "C10", 0x00, 0x08,
++                            # rsa_pkcs_sha{256,384,512,1}
++                            0x04, 0x01,  0x05, 0x01,  0x06, 0x01,  0x02, 0x01;
++            $message->set_extension(TLSProxy::Message::EXT_SIG_ALGS_CERT, $sigs);
++            $message->delete_extension(TLSProxy::Message::EXT_SIG_ALGS);
++            $message->repack();
++        }
++    }
+ }
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/util/perl/TLSProxy/Message.pm.sig-alg-null-dereference openssl-1.1.1g/util/perl/TLSProxy/Message.pm
+--- openssl-1.1.1g/util/perl/TLSProxy/Message.pm.sig-alg-null-dereference	2021-03-25 15:59:19.648106296 +0100
++++ openssl-1.1.1g/util/perl/TLSProxy/Message.pm	2021-03-25 16:04:25.623947880 +0100
+@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
+-# Copyright 2016-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
++# Copyright 2016-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ #
+ # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ # this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+@@ -448,7 +448,7 @@ sub ciphersuite
+ }
+ 
+ #Update all the underlying records with the modified data from this message
+-#Note: Only supports re-encrypting for TLSv1.3
++#Note: Only supports TLSv1.3 and ETM encryption.
+ sub repack
+ {
+     my $self = shift;
+@@ -490,15 +490,38 @@ sub repack
+         # (If a length override is ever needed to construct invalid packets,
+         #  use an explicit override field instead.)
+         $rec->decrypt_len(length($rec->decrypt_data));
+-        $rec->len($rec->len + length($msgdata) - $old_length);
+-        # Only support re-encryption for TLSv1.3.
+-        if (TLSProxy::Proxy->is_tls13() && $rec->encrypted()) {
+-            #Add content type (1 byte) and 16 tag bytes
+-            $rec->data($rec->decrypt_data
+-                .pack("C", TLSProxy::Record::RT_HANDSHAKE).("\0"x16));
++		# Only support re-encryption for TLSv1.3 and ETM.
++        if ($rec->encrypted()) {
++            if (TLSProxy::Proxy->is_tls13()) {
++                #Add content type (1 byte) and 16 tag bytes
++                $rec->data($rec->decrypt_data
++                    .pack("C", TLSProxy::Record::RT_HANDSHAKE).("\0"x16));
++            } elsif ($rec->etm()) {
++                my $data = $rec->decrypt_data;
++                #Add padding
++                my $padval = length($data) % 16;
++                $padval = 15 - $padval;
++                for (0..$padval) {
++                    $data .= pack("C", $padval);
++                }
++
++                #Add MAC. Assumed to be 20 bytes
++                foreach my $macval (0..19) {
++                    $data .= pack("C", $macval);
++                }
++
++                if ($rec->version() >= TLSProxy::Record::VERS_TLS_1_1) {
++                    #Explicit IV
++                    $data = ("\0"x16).$data;
++                }
++                $rec->data($data);
++            } else {
++                die "Unsupported encryption: No ETM";
++            }
+         } else {
+             $rec->data($rec->decrypt_data);
+         }
++        $rec->len(length($rec->data));
+ 
+         #Update the fragment len in case we changed it above
+         ${$self->message_frag_lens}[0] = length($msgdata)
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-CVE-2021-3450.patch b/SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-CVE-2021-3450.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a54a2f3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/openssl-1.1.1-CVE-2021-3450.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c.bypass-strict-flag openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
+--- openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c.bypass-strict-flag	2021-03-25 15:04:24.786522525 +0100
++++ openssl-1.1.1g/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c	2021-03-25 15:14:01.392910477 +0100
+@@ -509,15 +509,19 @@ static int check_chain_extensions(X509_S
+                 ret = 1;
+             break;
+         }
+-        if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) && num > 1) {
++        if (ret > 0
++            && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) && num > 1) {
+             /* Check for presence of explicit elliptic curve parameters */
+             ret = check_curve(x);
+-            if (ret < 0)
++            if (ret < 0) {
+                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
+-            else if (ret == 0)
++                ret = 0;
++            } else if (ret == 0) {
+                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_EC_KEY_EXPLICIT_PARAMS;
++            }
+         }
+-        if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) == 0
++        if (ret > 0
++            && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) == 0
+             && x->ex_pathlen != -1
+             && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)) {
+             ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
+diff -up openssl-1.1.1g/test/verify_extra_test.c.bypass-strict-flag openssl-1.1.1g/test/verify_extra_test.c
+--- openssl-1.1.1g/test/verify_extra_test.c.bypass-strict-flag	2020-04-21 14:22:39.000000000 +0200
++++ openssl-1.1.1g/test/verify_extra_test.c	2021-03-25 15:04:24.793522594 +0100
+@@ -125,10 +125,22 @@ static int test_alt_chains_cert_forgery(
+ 
+     i = X509_verify_cert(sctx);
+ 
+-    if (i == 0 && X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(sctx) == X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA) {
++    if (i != 0 || X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(sctx) != X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA)
++        goto err;
++
++    /* repeat with X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT */
++    X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(sctx);
++    X509_STORE_set_flags(store, X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT);
++
++    if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(sctx, store, x, untrusted))
++        goto err;
++
++    i = X509_verify_cert(sctx);
++
++    if (i == 0 && X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(sctx) == X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA)
+         /* This is the result we were expecting: Test passed */
+         ret = 1;
+-    }
++
+  err:
+     X509_STORE_CTX_free(sctx);
+     X509_free(x);
diff --git a/SPECS/openssl.spec b/SPECS/openssl.spec
index 99c8a73..33e26c3 100644
--- a/SPECS/openssl.spec
+++ b/SPECS/openssl.spec
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
 Summary: Utilities from the general purpose cryptography library with TLS implementation
 Name: openssl
 Version: 1.1.1g
-Release: 12%{?dist}
+Release: 15%{?dist}
 Epoch: 1
 # We have to remove certain patented algorithms from the openssl source
 # tarball with the hobble-openssl script which is included below.
@@ -79,6 +79,8 @@ Patch55: openssl-1.1.1-arm-update.patch
 Patch56: openssl-1.1.1-s390x-ecc.patch
 Patch57: openssl-1.1.1-explicit-params.patch
 Patch71: openssl-1.1.1-CVE-2020-1971.patch
+Patch72: openssl-1.1.1-CVE-2021-3449.patch
+Patch73: openssl-1.1.1-CVE-2021-3450.patch
 
 License: OpenSSL and ASL 2.0
 URL: http://www.openssl.org/
@@ -197,6 +199,8 @@ cp %{SOURCE13} test/
 %patch70 -p1 -b .rewire-fips-drbg
 %patch57 -p1 -b .explicit-params
 %patch71 -p1 -b .null-dereference
+%patch72 -p1 -b .sig-alg-null-dereference
+%patch73 -p1 -b .bypass-strict-flag
 
 
 %build
@@ -481,6 +485,16 @@ export LD_LIBRARY_PATH
 %postun libs -p /sbin/ldconfig
 
 %changelog
+* Thu Mar 25 2021 Sahana Prasad <sahana@redhat.com> 1.1.1g-15
+- version bump
+
+* Wed Mar  24 2021 Sahana Prasad <sahana@redhat.com> 1.1.1g-14
+- CVE-2021-3450 openssl: CA certificate check
+  bypass with X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT
+
+* Wed Mar  24 2021 Sahana Prasad <sahana@redhat.com> 1.1.1g-13
+- Fix CVE-2021-3449 NULL pointer deref in signature_algorithms processing
+
 * Fri Dec  4 2020 Sahana Prasad <sahana@redhat.com> 1.1.1g-12
 - Fix CVE-2020-1971 ediparty null pointer dereference