diff --git a/SOURCES/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3505.patch b/SOURCES/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3505.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8716fae
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3505.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+From 2172d4f63c61922487008f42511cc6bdae9b47a0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Adam Langley <agl@imperialviolet.org>
+Date: Fri, 6 Jun 2014 14:19:21 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] Avoid double free when processing DTLS packets.
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+The |item| variable, in both of these cases, may contain a pointer to a
+|pitem| structure within |s->d1->buffered_messages|. It was being freed
+in the error case while still being in |buffered_messages|. When the
+error later caused the |SSL*| to be destroyed, the item would be double
+freed.
+
+Thanks to Wah-Teh Chang for spotting that the fix in 1632ef74 was
+inconsistent with the other error paths (but correct).
+
+Fixes CVE-2014-3505
+
+Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
+---
+ ssl/d1_both.c | 6 ++----
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/ssl/d1_both.c b/ssl/d1_both.c
+index c1eb970..cdb83b6 100644
+--- a/ssl/d1_both.c
++++ b/ssl/d1_both.c
+@@ -693,8 +693,7 @@ dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
+ return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
+
+ err:
+- if (frag != NULL) dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
+- if (item != NULL) OPENSSL_free(item);
++ if (frag != NULL && item == NULL) dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
+ *ok = 0;
+ return i;
+ }
+@@ -778,8 +777,7 @@ dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
+ return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
+
+ err:
+- if ( frag != NULL) dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
+- if ( item != NULL) OPENSSL_free(item);
++ if (frag != NULL && item == NULL) dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
+ *ok = 0;
+ return i;
+ }
+--
+1.8.3.1
+
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3506.patch b/SOURCES/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3506.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..05e364f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3506.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+From fc7804ec392fcf8051abe6bc9da9108744d2ae35 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+Date: Fri, 6 Jun 2014 14:25:52 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix DTLS handshake message size checks.
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+In |dtls1_reassemble_fragment|, the value of
+|msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len| was being checked against the maximum
+handshake message size, but then |msg_len| bytes were allocated for the
+fragment buffer. This means that so long as the fragment was within the
+allowed size, the pending handshake message could consume 16MB + 2MB
+(for the reassembly bitmap). Approx 10 outstanding handshake messages
+are allowed, meaning that an attacker could consume ~180MB per DTLS
+connection.
+
+In the non-fragmented path (in |dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message|), no
+check was applied.
+
+Fixes CVE-2014-3506
+
+Wholly based on patch by Adam Langley with one minor amendment.
+
+Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
+---
+ ssl/d1_both.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++-------------
+ 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/ssl/d1_both.c b/ssl/d1_both.c
+index 6559dfc..b9e15df 100644
+--- a/ssl/d1_both.c
++++ b/ssl/d1_both.c
+@@ -587,6 +587,16 @@ dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(SSL *s, long max, int *ok)
+ return 0;
+ }
+
++/* dtls1_max_handshake_message_len returns the maximum number of bytes
++ * permitted in a DTLS handshake message for |s|. The minimum is 16KB, but may
++ * be greater if the maximum certificate list size requires it. */
++static unsigned long dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(const SSL *s)
++ {
++ unsigned long max_len = DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH;
++ if (max_len < (unsigned long)s->max_cert_list)
++ return s->max_cert_list;
++ return max_len;
++ }
+
+ static int
+ dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
+@@ -595,20 +605,10 @@ dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
+ pitem *item = NULL;
+ int i = -1, is_complete;
+ unsigned char seq64be[8];
+- unsigned long frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len, max_len;
+-
+- if ((msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len) > msg_hdr->msg_len)
+- goto err;
+-
+- /* Determine maximum allowed message size. Depends on (user set)
+- * maximum certificate length, but 16k is minimum.
+- */
+- if (DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH < s->max_cert_list)
+- max_len = s->max_cert_list;
+- else
+- max_len = DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH;
++ unsigned long frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len;
+
+- if ((msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len) > max_len)
++ if ((msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len) > msg_hdr->msg_len ||
++ msg_hdr->msg_len > dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(s))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* Try to find item in queue */
+@@ -749,6 +749,9 @@ dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
+ if (frag_len && frag_len < msg_hdr->msg_len)
+ return dtls1_reassemble_fragment(s, msg_hdr, ok);
+
++ if (frag_len > dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(s))
++ goto err;
++
+ frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(frag_len, 0);
+ if ( frag == NULL)
+ goto err;
+--
+1.8.3.1
+
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3507.patch b/SOURCES/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3507.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0507315
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3507.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/d1_both.c.dtls-memleak openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/d1_both.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/d1_both.c.dtls-memleak 2014-08-07 17:51:18.457493922 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/d1_both.c 2014-08-07 17:58:28.478558785 +0200
+@@ -610,6 +610,9 @@ dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, struct
+ msg_hdr->msg_len > dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(s))
+ goto err;
+
++ if (frag_len == 0)
++ return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
++
+ /* Try to find item in queue */
+ memset(seq64be,0,sizeof(seq64be));
+ seq64be[6] = (unsigned char) (msg_hdr->seq>>8);
+@@ -686,7 +689,12 @@ dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, struct
+ i = -1;
+ }
+
+- pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item);
++ item = pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item);
++ /* pqueue_insert fails iff a duplicate item is inserted.
++ * However, |item| cannot be a duplicate. If it were,
++ * |pqueue_find|, above, would have returned it and control
++ * would never have reached this branch. */
++ OPENSSL_assert(item != NULL);
+ }
+
+ return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
+@@ -744,7 +752,7 @@ dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s,
+ }
+ else
+ {
+- if (frag_len && frag_len < msg_hdr->msg_len)
++ if (frag_len < msg_hdr->msg_len)
+ return dtls1_reassemble_fragment(s, msg_hdr, ok);
+
+ if (frag_len > dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(s))
+@@ -773,7 +781,15 @@ dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s,
+ if ( item == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+- pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item);
++ item = pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item);
++ /* pqueue_insert fails iff a duplicate item is inserted.
++ * However, |item| cannot be a duplicate. If it were,
++ * |pqueue_find|, above, would have returned it. Then, either
++ * |frag_len| != |msg_hdr->msg_len| in which case |item| is set
++ * to NULL and it will have been processed with
++ * |dtls1_reassemble_fragment|, above, or the record will have
++ * been discarded. */
++ OPENSSL_assert(item != NULL);
+ }
+
+ return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3508.patch b/SOURCES/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3508.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..31dd08d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3508.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,138 @@
+From 03b04ddac162c7b7fa3c57eadccc5a583a00d291 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Emilia Kasper <emilia@openssl.org>
+Date: Wed, 2 Jul 2014 19:02:33 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix OID handling:
+
+- Upon parsing, reject OIDs with invalid base-128 encoding.
+- Always NUL-terminate the destination buffer in OBJ_obj2txt printing function.
+
+CVE-2014-3508
+
+Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
+---
+ crypto/asn1/a_object.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++---------
+ crypto/objects/obj_dat.c | 16 +++++++++-------
+ 2 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/crypto/asn1/a_object.c b/crypto/asn1/a_object.c
+index 3978c91..77b2768 100644
+--- a/crypto/asn1/a_object.c
++++ b/crypto/asn1/a_object.c
+@@ -283,17 +283,29 @@ err:
+ ASN1err(ASN1_F_D2I_ASN1_OBJECT,i);
+ return(NULL);
+ }
++
+ ASN1_OBJECT *c2i_ASN1_OBJECT(ASN1_OBJECT **a, const unsigned char **pp,
+ long len)
+ {
+ ASN1_OBJECT *ret=NULL;
+ const unsigned char *p;
+ unsigned char *data;
+- int i;
+- /* Sanity check OID encoding: can't have leading 0x80 in
+- * subidentifiers, see: X.690 8.19.2
++ int i, length;
++
++ /* Sanity check OID encoding.
++ * Need at least one content octet.
++ * MSB must be clear in the last octet.
++ * can't have leading 0x80 in subidentifiers, see: X.690 8.19.2
+ */
+- for (i = 0, p = *pp; i < len; i++, p++)
++ if (len <= 0 || len > INT_MAX || pp == NULL || (p = *pp) == NULL ||
++ p[len - 1] & 0x80)
++ {
++ ASN1err(ASN1_F_C2I_ASN1_OBJECT,ASN1_R_INVALID_OBJECT_ENCODING);
++ return NULL;
++ }
++ /* Now 0 < len <= INT_MAX, so the cast is safe. */
++ length = (int)len;
++ for (i = 0; i < length; i++, p++)
+ {
+ if (*p == 0x80 && (!i || !(p[-1] & 0x80)))
+ {
+@@ -316,23 +328,23 @@ ASN1_OBJECT *c2i_ASN1_OBJECT(ASN1_OBJECT **a, const unsigned char **pp,
+ data = (unsigned char *)ret->data;
+ ret->data = NULL;
+ /* once detached we can change it */
+- if ((data == NULL) || (ret->length < len))
++ if ((data == NULL) || (ret->length < length))
+ {
+ ret->length=0;
+ if (data != NULL) OPENSSL_free(data);
+- data=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(len ? (int)len : 1);
++ data=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(length);
+ if (data == NULL)
+ { i=ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE; goto err; }
+ ret->flags|=ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC_DATA;
+ }
+- memcpy(data,p,(int)len);
++ memcpy(data,p,length);
+ /* reattach data to object, after which it remains const */
+ ret->data =data;
+- ret->length=(int)len;
++ ret->length=length;
+ ret->sn=NULL;
+ ret->ln=NULL;
+ /* ret->flags=ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC; we know it is dynamic */
+- p+=len;
++ p+=length;
+
+ if (a != NULL) (*a)=ret;
+ *pp=p;
+diff --git a/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c b/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c
+index 8a342ba..0b2f442 100644
+--- a/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c
++++ b/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c
+@@ -471,11 +471,12 @@ int OBJ_obj2txt(char *buf, int buf_len, const ASN1_OBJECT *a, int no_name)
+ const unsigned char *p;
+ char tbuf[DECIMAL_SIZE(i)+DECIMAL_SIZE(l)+2];
+
+- if ((a == NULL) || (a->data == NULL)) {
+- buf[0]='\0';
+- return(0);
+- }
++ /* Ensure that, at every state, |buf| is NUL-terminated. */
++ if (buf && buf_len > 0)
++ buf[0] = '\0';
+
++ if ((a == NULL) || (a->data == NULL))
++ return(0);
+
+ if (!no_name && (nid=OBJ_obj2nid(a)) != NID_undef)
+ {
+@@ -554,9 +555,10 @@ int OBJ_obj2txt(char *buf, int buf_len, const ASN1_OBJECT *a, int no_name)
+ i=(int)(l/40);
+ l-=(long)(i*40);
+ }
+- if (buf && (buf_len > 0))
++ if (buf && (buf_len > 1))
+ {
+ *buf++ = i + '0';
++ *buf = '\0';
+ buf_len--;
+ }
+ n++;
+@@ -571,9 +573,10 @@ int OBJ_obj2txt(char *buf, int buf_len, const ASN1_OBJECT *a, int no_name)
+ i = strlen(bndec);
+ if (buf)
+ {
+- if (buf_len > 0)
++ if (buf_len > 1)
+ {
+ *buf++ = '.';
++ *buf = '\0';
+ buf_len--;
+ }
+ BUF_strlcpy(buf,bndec,buf_len);
+@@ -807,4 +810,3 @@ err:
+ OPENSSL_free(buf);
+ return(ok);
+ }
+-
+--
+1.8.3.1
+
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3509.patch b/SOURCES/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3509.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cee4aad
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3509.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+From 86788e1ee6908a5b3a4c95fa80caa4b724a8a434 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Gabor Tyukasz <Gabor.Tyukasz@logmein.com>
+Date: Wed, 23 Jul 2014 23:42:06 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix race condition in ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext
+
+CVE-2014-3509
+Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
+---
+ ssl/t1_lib.c | 17 ++++++++++-------
+ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c
+index 8167a51..022a4fb 100644
+--- a/ssl/t1_lib.c
++++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c
+@@ -1555,15 +1555,18 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
+ *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+- s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
+- if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
+- if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
++ if (!s->hit)
+ {
+- *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+- return 0;
++ s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
++ if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
++ if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
++ {
++ *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
++ return 0;
++ }
++ s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
++ memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
+ }
+- s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
+- memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
+ #if 0
+ fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
+ sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
+--
+1.8.3.1
+
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3510.patch b/SOURCES/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3510.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4196536
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3510.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+From 88ae012c8092852f03c50f6461175271104b4c8a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Emilia=20K=C3=A4sper?= <emilia@openssl.org>
+Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2014 22:15:29 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix DTLS anonymous EC(DH) denial of service
+
+CVE-2014-3510
+
+Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
+---
+ ssl/d1_clnt.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++--
+ ssl/s3_clnt.c | 7 +++++++
+ 2 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/ssl/d1_clnt.c b/ssl/d1_clnt.c
+index 65dbb4a..fd6562c 100644
+--- a/ssl/d1_clnt.c
++++ b/ssl/d1_clnt.c
+@@ -996,6 +996,13 @@ int dtls1_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
+ RSA *rsa;
+ unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
+
++ if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
++ {
++ /* We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA. */
++ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
++ goto err;
++ }
++
+ if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL)
+ rsa=s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp;
+ else
+@@ -1186,6 +1193,13 @@ int dtls1_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
+ {
+ DH *dh_srvr,*dh_clnt;
+
++ if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
++ {
++ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
++ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
++ goto err;
++ }
++
+ if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp != NULL)
+ dh_srvr=s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp;
+ else
+@@ -1245,6 +1259,13 @@ int dtls1_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
+ int ecdh_clnt_cert = 0;
+ int field_size = 0;
+
++ if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
++ {
++ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
++ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
++ goto err;
++ }
++
+ /* Did we send out the client's
+ * ECDH share for use in premaster
+ * computation as part of client certificate?
+@@ -1720,5 +1741,3 @@ int dtls1_send_client_certificate(SSL *s)
+ /* SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D */
+ return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+ }
+-
+-
+diff --git a/ssl/s3_clnt.c b/ssl/s3_clnt.c
+index 2afb892..df05f78 100644
+--- a/ssl/s3_clnt.c
++++ b/ssl/s3_clnt.c
+@@ -2253,6 +2253,13 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
+ RSA *rsa;
+ unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
+
++ if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
++ {
++ /* We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA. */
++ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
++ goto err;
++ }
++
+ if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL)
+ rsa=s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp;
+ else
+--
+1.8.3.1
+
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3511.patch b/SOURCES/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3511.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f9cb4ea
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3511.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+From fc4f4cdb8bf9981904e652abf69b892a45bddacf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
+Date: Wed, 23 Jul 2014 22:32:21 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix protocol downgrade bug in case of fragmented packets
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+CVE-2014-3511
+
+Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Bodo Möller <bodo@openssl.org>
+---
+ ssl/s23_srvr.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++++-------
+ 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/ssl/s23_srvr.c b/ssl/s23_srvr.c
+index 4877849..2901a6b 100644
+--- a/ssl/s23_srvr.c
++++ b/ssl/s23_srvr.c
+@@ -348,23 +348,19 @@ int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
+ * Client Hello message, this would be difficult, and we'd have
+ * to read more records to find out.
+ * No known SSL 3.0 client fragments ClientHello like this,
+- * so we simply assume TLS 1.0 to avoid protocol version downgrade
+- * attacks. */
++ * so we simply reject such connections to avoid
++ * protocol version downgrade attacks. */
+ if (p[3] == 0 && p[4] < 6)
+ {
+-#if 0
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL);
+ goto err;
+-#else
+- v[1] = TLS1_VERSION_MINOR;
+-#endif
+ }
+ /* if major version number > 3 set minor to a value
+ * which will use the highest version 3 we support.
+ * If TLS 2.0 ever appears we will need to revise
+ * this....
+ */
+- else if (p[9] > SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
++ if (p[9] > SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
+ v[1]=0xff;
+ else
+ v[1]=p[10]; /* minor version according to client_version */
+@@ -444,14 +440,34 @@ int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
+ v[0] = p[3]; /* == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR */
+ v[1] = p[4];
+
++ /* An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
++ * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
++ * record. It's format is:
++ * Byte Content
++ * 0-1 msg_length
++ * 2 msg_type
++ * 3-4 version
++ * 5-6 cipher_spec_length
++ * 7-8 session_id_length
++ * 9-10 challenge_length
++ * ... ...
++ */
+ n=((p[0]&0x7f)<<8)|p[1];
+ if (n > (1024*4))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE);
+ goto err;
+ }
++ if (n < 9)
++ {
++ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
++ goto err;
++ }
+
+ j=ssl23_read_bytes(s,n+2);
++ /* We previously read 11 bytes, so if j > 0, we must have
++ * j == n+2 == s->packet_length. We have at least 11 valid
++ * packet bytes. */
+ if (j <= 0) return(j);
+
+ ssl3_finish_mac(s, s->packet+2, s->packet_length-2);
+--
+1.8.3.1
+
diff --git a/SPECS/openssl.spec b/SPECS/openssl.spec
index 886fbf2..d55dbcb 100644
--- a/SPECS/openssl.spec
+++ b/SPECS/openssl.spec
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
Summary: Utilities from the general purpose cryptography library with TLS implementation
Name: openssl
Version: 1.0.1e
-Release: 34%{?dist}.3
+Release: 34%{?dist}.4
Epoch: 1
# We have to remove certain patented algorithms from the openssl source
# tarball with the hobble-openssl script which is included below.
@@ -99,6 +99,13 @@ Patch93: openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0198.patch
Patch94: openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0221.patch
Patch95: openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0224.patch
Patch96: openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3470.patch
+Patch100: openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3505.patch
+Patch101: openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3506.patch
+Patch102: openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3507.patch
+Patch103: openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3508.patch
+Patch104: openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3509.patch
+Patch105: openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3510.patch
+Patch106: openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3511.patch
License: OpenSSL
Group: System Environment/Libraries
@@ -229,6 +236,13 @@ cp %{SOURCE12} %{SOURCE13} crypto/ec/
%patch94 -p1 -b .dtls1-dos
%patch95 -p1 -b .keying-mitm
%patch96 -p1 -b .anon-ecdh-dos
+%patch100 -p1 -b .dtls-doublefree
+%patch101 -p1 -b .dtls-sizechecks
+%patch102 -p1 -b .dtls-memleak
+%patch103 -p1 -b .oid-handling
+%patch104 -p1 -b .tlsext-race
+%patch105 -p1 -b .adh-dos
+%patch106 -p1 -b .frag-downgrade
sed -i 's/SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER "1.0.0"/SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER "%{version}"/' crypto/opensslv.h
@@ -492,6 +506,15 @@ rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_libdir}/fipscanister.*
%postun libs -p /sbin/ldconfig
%changelog
+* Fri Aug 8 2014 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> 1.0.1e-34.4
+- fix CVE-2014-3505 - doublefree in DTLS packet processing
+- fix CVE-2014-3506 - avoid memory exhaustion in DTLS
+- fix CVE-2014-3507 - avoid memory leak in DTLS
+- fix CVE-2014-3508 - fix OID handling to avoid information leak
+- fix CVE-2014-3509 - fix race condition when parsing server hello
+- fix CVE-2014-3510 - fix DoS in anonymous (EC)DH handling in DTLS
+- fix CVE-2014-3511 - disallow protocol downgrade via fragmentation
+
* Tue Jun 3 2014 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> 1.0.1e-34.3
- fix CVE-2010-5298 - possible use of memory after free
- fix CVE-2014-0195 - buffer overflow via invalid DTLS fragment