diff --git a/SOURCES/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-4000.patch b/SOURCES/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-4000.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..66dd559
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-4000.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,241 @@
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback.pod.logjam openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback.pod
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback.pod.logjam	2013-02-11 16:02:48.000000000 +0100
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback.pod	2015-05-25 11:37:08.893049771 +0200
+@@ -12,12 +12,10 @@ SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback, SSL_CTX_set
+             DH *(*tmp_dh_callback)(SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keylength));
+  long SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(SSL_CTX *ctx, DH *dh);
+ 
+- void SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
++ void SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL *ctx,
+             DH *(*tmp_dh_callback)(SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keylength));
+  long SSL_set_tmp_dh(SSL *ssl, DH *dh)
+ 
+- DH *(*tmp_dh_callback)(SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keylength));
+-
+ =head1 DESCRIPTION
+ 
+ SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback() sets the callback function for B<ctx> to be
+@@ -50,24 +48,25 @@ even if he gets hold of the normal (cert
+ only used for signing.
+ 
+ In order to perform a DH key exchange the server must use a DH group
+-(DH parameters) and generate a DH key. The server will always generate a new
+-DH key during the negotiation, when the DH parameters are supplied via
+-callback and/or when the SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE option of
+-L<SSL_CTX_set_options(3)|SSL_CTX_set_options(3)> is set. It will
+-immediately create a DH key, when DH parameters are supplied via
+-SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh() and SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE is not set. In this case,
++(DH parameters) and generate a DH key.
++The server will always generate a new DH key during the negotiation
++if either the DH parameters are supplied via callback or the
++SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE option of SSL_CTX_set_options(3) is set (or both).
++It will  immediately create a DH key if DH parameters are supplied via
++SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh() and SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE is not set.
++In this case,
+ it may happen that a key is generated on initialization without later
+ being needed, while on the other hand the computer time during the
+ negotiation is being saved.
+ 
+ If "strong" primes were used to generate the DH parameters, it is not strictly
+ necessary to generate a new key for each handshake but it does improve forward
+-secrecy. If it is not assured, that "strong" primes were used (see especially
+-the section about DSA parameters below), SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE must be used
+-in order to prevent small subgroup attacks. Always using SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE
+-has an impact on the computer time needed during negotiation, but it is not
+-very large, so application authors/users should consider to always enable
+-this option.
++secrecy. If it is not assured that "strong" primes were used,
++SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE must be used in order to prevent small subgroup
++attacks. Always using SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE has an impact on the
++computer time needed during negotiation, but it is not very large, so
++application authors/users should consider always enabling this option.
++The option is required to implement perfect forward secrecy (PFS).
+ 
+ As generating DH parameters is extremely time consuming, an application
+ should not generate the parameters on the fly but supply the parameters.
+@@ -75,82 +74,62 @@ DH parameters can be reused, as the actu
+ the negotiation. The risk in reusing DH parameters is that an attacker
+ may specialize on a very often used DH group. Applications should therefore
+ generate their own DH parameters during the installation process using the
+-openssl L<dhparam(1)|dhparam(1)> application. In order to reduce the computer
+-time needed for this generation, it is possible to use DSA parameters
+-instead (see L<dhparam(1)|dhparam(1)>), but in this case SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE
+-is mandatory.
++openssl L<dhparam(1)|dhparam(1)> application. This application
++guarantees that "strong" primes are used.
+ 
+-Application authors may compile in DH parameters. Files dh512.pem,
+-dh1024.pem, dh2048.pem, and dh4096 in the 'apps' directory of current
++Files dh2048.pem, and dh4096.pem in the 'apps' directory of the current
+ version of the OpenSSL distribution contain the 'SKIP' DH parameters,
+ which use safe primes and were generated verifiably pseudo-randomly.
+ These files can be converted into C code using the B<-C> option of the
+-L<dhparam(1)|dhparam(1)> application.
+-Authors may also generate their own set of parameters using
+-L<dhparam(1)|dhparam(1)>, but a user may not be sure how the parameters were
+-generated. The generation of DH parameters during installation is therefore
+-recommended.
++L<dhparam(1)|dhparam(1)> application. Generation of custom DH
++parameters during installation should still be preferred to stop an
++attacker from specializing on a commonly used group. Files dh1024.pem
++and dh512.pem contain old parameters that must not be used by
++applications.
+ 
+ An application may either directly specify the DH parameters or
+-can supply the DH parameters via a callback function. The callback approach
+-has the advantage, that the callback may supply DH parameters for different
+-key lengths.
+-
+-The B<tmp_dh_callback> is called with the B<keylength> needed and
+-the B<is_export> information. The B<is_export> flag is set, when the
+-ephemeral DH key exchange is performed with an export cipher.
++can supply the DH parameters via a callback function.
++
++Previous versions of the callback used B<is_export> and B<keylength>
++parameters to control parameter generation for export and non-export
++cipher suites. Modern servers that do not support export ciphersuites
++are advised to either use SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh() in combination with
++SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE, or alternatively, use the callback but ignore
++B<keylength> and B<is_export> and simply supply at least 2048-bit
++parameters in the callback.
+ 
+ =head1 EXAMPLES
+ 
+-Handle DH parameters for key lengths of 512 and 1024 bits. (Error handling
++Setup DH parameters with a key length of 2048 bits. (Error handling
+ partly left out.)
+ 
+- ...
+- /* Set up ephemeral DH stuff */
+- DH *dh_512 = NULL;
+- DH *dh_1024 = NULL;
+- FILE *paramfile;
++ Command-line parameter generation:
++ $ openssl dhparam -out dh_param_2048.pem 2048
+ 
++ Code for setting up parameters during server initialization:
++
++ ...
++ SSL_CTX ctx = SSL_CTX_new();
+  ...
+- /* "openssl dhparam -out dh_param_512.pem -2 512" */
+- paramfile = fopen("dh_param_512.pem", "r");
++
++ /* Set up ephemeral DH parameters. */
++ DH *dh_2048 = NULL;
++ FILE *paramfile;
++ paramfile = fopen("dh_param_2048.pem", "r");
+  if (paramfile) {
+-   dh_512 = PEM_read_DHparams(paramfile, NULL, NULL, NULL);
++   dh_2048 = PEM_read_DHparams(paramfile, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+    fclose(paramfile);
++ } else {
++   /* Error. */
+  }
+- /* "openssl dhparam -out dh_param_1024.pem -2 1024" */
+- paramfile = fopen("dh_param_1024.pem", "r");
+- if (paramfile) {
+-   dh_1024 = PEM_read_DHparams(paramfile, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+-   fclose(paramfile);
++ if (dh_2048 == NULL) {
++  /* Error. */
+  }
+- ...
+-
+- /* "openssl dhparam -C -2 512" etc... */
+- DH *get_dh512() { ... }
+- DH *get_dh1024() { ... }
+-
+- DH *tmp_dh_callback(SSL *s, int is_export, int keylength)
+- {
+-    DH *dh_tmp=NULL;
+-
+-    switch (keylength) {
+-    case 512:
+-      if (!dh_512)
+-        dh_512 = get_dh512();
+-      dh_tmp = dh_512;
+-      break;
+-    case 1024:
+-      if (!dh_1024) 
+-        dh_1024 = get_dh1024();
+-      dh_tmp = dh_1024;
+-      break;
+-    default:
+-      /* Generating a key on the fly is very costly, so use what is there */
+-      setup_dh_parameters_like_above();
+-    }
+-    return(dh_tmp);
++ if (SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(ctx, dh_2048) != 1) {
++   /* Error. */
+  }
++ SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE);
++ ...
+ 
+ =head1 RETURN VALUES
+ 
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl_err.c.logjam openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl_err.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl_err.c.logjam	2015-05-25 11:38:29.834858712 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl_err.c	2015-05-25 11:42:01.041578905 +0200
+@@ -361,6 +361,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_reasons[]
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG)  ,"data length too long"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED)     ,"decryption failed"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC),"decryption failed or bad record mac"},
++{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL)      ,"dh key too small"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG),"dh public value length is wrong"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED)   ,"digest check failed"},
+ {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_DTLS_MESSAGE_TOO_BIG)  ,"dtls message too big"},
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl.h.logjam openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl.h
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl.h.logjam	2015-05-25 11:38:29.834858712 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl.h	2015-05-25 11:40:42.482823220 +0200
+@@ -2289,6 +2289,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
+ #define SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG			 146
+ #define SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED				 147
+ #define SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC	 281
++#define SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL                           372
+ #define SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG		 148
+ #define SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED			 149
+ #define SSL_R_DTLS_MESSAGE_TOO_BIG			 334
+diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_clnt.c.logjam openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_clnt.c
+--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_clnt.c.logjam	2015-05-25 11:38:29.833858690 +0200
++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_clnt.c	2015-05-25 11:51:05.845754562 +0200
+@@ -3277,24 +3277,34 @@ int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s
+ 		}
+ #endif
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+-	if ((alg_k & SSL_kEDH) &&
+-		!(has_bits(i,EVP_PK_DH|EVP_PKT_EXCH) || (dh != NULL)))
++	if ((alg_k & SSL_kEDH) && dh == NULL)
+ 		{
+-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_DH_KEY);
++		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ 		goto f_err;
+ 		}
+-	else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHr) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PK_DH|EVP_PKS_RSA))
++	if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHr) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PK_DH|EVP_PKS_RSA))
+ 		{
+ 		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_DH_RSA_CERT);
+ 		goto f_err;
+ 		}
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+-	else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHd) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PK_DH|EVP_PKS_DSA))
++	if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHd) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PK_DH|EVP_PKS_DSA))
+ 		{
+ 		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_DH_DSA_CERT);
+ 		goto f_err;
+ 		}
+ #endif
++	/* Check DHE only: static DH not implemented. */
++	if (alg_k & SSL_kEDH)
++		{
++		int dh_size = BN_num_bits(dh->p);
++		if ((!SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && dh_size < 768)
++		    || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && dh_size < 512))
++			{
++			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
++			goto f_err;
++			}
++		}
+ #endif
+ 
+ 	if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PKT_EXP))
diff --git a/SPECS/openssl.spec b/SPECS/openssl.spec
index 51bf6a5..1d67839 100644
--- a/SPECS/openssl.spec
+++ b/SPECS/openssl.spec
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
 Summary: Utilities from the general purpose cryptography library with TLS implementation
 Name: openssl
 Version: 1.0.1e
-Release: 42%{?dist}.5
+Release: 42%{?dist}.6
 Epoch: 1
 # We have to remove certain patented algorithms from the openssl source
 # tarball with the hobble-openssl script which is included below.
@@ -134,6 +134,7 @@ Patch125: openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-0288.patch
 Patch126: openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-0289.patch
 Patch127: openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-0292.patch
 Patch128: openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-0293.patch
+Patch129: openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2015-4000.patch
 
 License: OpenSSL
 Group: System Environment/Libraries
@@ -298,6 +299,7 @@ cp %{SOURCE12} %{SOURCE13} crypto/ec/
 %patch126 -p1 -b .pkcs7-null-deref
 %patch127 -p1 -b .b64-underflow
 %patch128 -p1 -b .ssl2-assert
+%patch129 -p1 -b .logjam
 
 sed -i 's/SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER "1.0.0"/SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER "%{version}"/' crypto/opensslv.h
 
@@ -564,6 +566,10 @@ rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_libdir}/fipscanister.*
 %postun libs -p /sbin/ldconfig
 
 %changelog
+* Mon May 25 2015 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> 1.0.1e-42.6
+- fix CVE-2015-4000 - prevent the logjam attack on client - restrict
+  the DH key size to at least 768 bits (limit will be increased in future)
+
 * Thu Mar 26 2015 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> 1.0.1e-42.5
 - drop the AES-GCM restriction of 2^32 operations because the IV is
   always 96 bits (32 bit fixed field + 64 bit invocation field)
@@ -575,6 +581,7 @@ rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_libdir}/fipscanister.*
 - fix CVE-2015-0209 - potential use after free in d2i_ECPrivateKey()
 - fix CVE-2015-0286 - improper handling of ASN.1 boolean comparison
 - fix CVE-2015-0287 - ASN.1 structure reuse decoding memory corruption
+- fix CVE-2015-0288 - X509_to_X509_REQ NULL pointer dereference
 - fix CVE-2015-0289 - NULL dereference decoding invalid PKCS#7 data
 - fix CVE-2015-0292 - integer underflow in base64 decoder
 - fix CVE-2015-0293 - triggerable assert in SSLv2 server