From 1706439117c1574e01d1877449794284d2559f93 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: CentOS Sources Date: Oct 16 2014 14:12:47 +0000 Subject: import openssl-1.0.1e-34.el7_0.6 --- diff --git a/SOURCES/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3513.patch b/SOURCES/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3513.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0d42eec --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3513.patch @@ -0,0 +1,186 @@ +diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/d1_srtp.c.srtp-leak openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/d1_srtp.c +--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/d1_srtp.c.srtp-leak 2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/d1_srtp.c 2014-10-15 13:23:34.253040160 +0200 +@@ -168,25 +168,6 @@ static int find_profile_by_name(char *pr + return 1; + } + +-static int find_profile_by_num(unsigned profile_num, +- SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE **pptr) +- { +- SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *p; +- +- p=srtp_known_profiles; +- while(p->name) +- { +- if(p->id == profile_num) +- { +- *pptr=p; +- return 0; +- } +- p++; +- } +- +- return 1; +- } +- + static int ssl_ctx_make_profiles(const char *profiles_string,STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) **out) + { + STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *profiles; +@@ -209,11 +190,19 @@ static int ssl_ctx_make_profiles(const c + if(!find_profile_by_name(ptr,&p, + col ? col-ptr : (int)strlen(ptr))) + { ++ if (sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_find(profiles,p) >= 0) ++ { ++ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_MAKE_PROFILES,SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST); ++ sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(profiles); ++ return 1; ++ } ++ + sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_push(profiles,p); + } + else + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_MAKE_PROFILES,SSL_R_SRTP_UNKNOWN_PROTECTION_PROFILE); ++ sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(profiles); + return 1; + } + +@@ -305,13 +294,12 @@ int ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(SSL + + int ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *d, int len,int *al) + { +- SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *cprof,*sprof; +- STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt=0,*srvr; ++ SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *sprof; ++ STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *srvr; + int ct; + int mki_len; +- int i,j; +- int id; +- int ret; ++ int i, srtp_pref; ++ unsigned int id; + + /* Length value + the MKI length */ + if(len < 3) +@@ -341,22 +329,32 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(S + return 1; + } + ++ srvr=SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s); ++ s->srtp_profile = NULL; ++ /* Search all profiles for a match initially */ ++ srtp_pref = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(srvr); + +- clnt=sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_new_null(); +- + while(ct) + { + n2s(d,id); + ct-=2; + len-=2; + +- if(!find_profile_by_num(id,&cprof)) ++ /* ++ * Only look for match in profiles of higher preference than ++ * current match. ++ * If no profiles have been have been configured then this ++ * does nothing. ++ */ ++ for (i = 0; i < srtp_pref; i++) + { +- sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_push(clnt,cprof); +- } +- else +- { +- ; /* Ignore */ ++ sprof = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(srvr, i); ++ if (sprof->id == id) ++ { ++ s->srtp_profile = sprof; ++ srtp_pref = i; ++ break; ++ } + } + } + +@@ -371,36 +369,7 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(S + return 1; + } + +- srvr=SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s); +- +- /* Pick our most preferred profile. If no profiles have been +- configured then the outer loop doesn't run +- (sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num() = -1) +- and so we just return without doing anything */ +- for(i=0;iid==sprof->id) +- { +- s->srtp_profile=sprof; +- *al=0; +- ret=0; +- goto done; +- } +- } +- } +- +- ret=0; +- +-done: +- if(clnt) sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(clnt); +- +- return ret; ++ return 0; + } + + int ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, int *len, int maxlen) +diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/t1_lib.c.srtp-leak openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/t1_lib.c +--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/t1_lib.c.srtp-leak 2014-10-15 13:19:59.955202293 +0200 ++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/t1_lib.c 2014-10-15 13:23:34.254040182 +0200 +@@ -696,7 +696,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsex + #endif + + #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP +- if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) ++ if(SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) + { + int el; + +@@ -829,7 +829,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsex + #endif + + #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP +- if(s->srtp_profile) ++ if(SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) + { + int el; + +@@ -1377,7 +1377,8 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, + + /* session ticket processed earlier */ + #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP +- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) ++ else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s) ++ && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) + { + if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, + al)) +@@ -1631,7 +1632,7 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, + } + #endif + #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP +- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) ++ else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) + { + if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, + al)) diff --git a/SOURCES/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3567.patch b/SOURCES/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3567.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a01ee69 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3567.patch @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/t1_lib.c.ticket-leak openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/t1_lib.c +--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/t1_lib.c.ticket-leak 2014-10-15 13:19:26.825454374 +0200 ++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/t1_lib.c 2014-10-15 13:19:59.955202293 +0200 +@@ -2280,7 +2280,10 @@ static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, co + HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL); + HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); + if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) ++ { ++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); + return 2; ++ } + /* Attempt to decrypt session data */ + /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */ + p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); diff --git a/SOURCES/openssl-1.0.1e-fallback-scsv.patch b/SOURCES/openssl-1.0.1e-fallback-scsv.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0e28c00 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssl-1.0.1e-fallback-scsv.patch @@ -0,0 +1,466 @@ +diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/apps/s_client.c.fallback-scsv openssl-1.0.1e/apps/s_client.c +--- openssl-1.0.1e/apps/s_client.c.fallback-scsv 2014-10-15 17:06:01.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssl-1.0.1e/apps/s_client.c 2014-10-15 17:07:36.392502320 +0200 +@@ -336,6 +336,7 @@ static void sc_usage(void) + BIO_printf(bio_err," -tls1_1 - just use TLSv1.1\n"); + BIO_printf(bio_err," -tls1 - just use TLSv1\n"); + BIO_printf(bio_err," -dtls1 - just use DTLSv1\n"); ++ BIO_printf(bio_err," -fallback_scsv - send TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV\n"); + BIO_printf(bio_err," -mtu - set the link layer MTU\n"); + BIO_printf(bio_err," -no_tls1_2/-no_tls1_1/-no_tls1/-no_ssl3/-no_ssl2 - turn off that protocol\n"); + BIO_printf(bio_err," -bugs - Switch on all SSL implementation bug workarounds\n"); +@@ -616,6 +617,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv) + char *sess_out = NULL; + struct sockaddr peer; + int peerlen = sizeof(peer); ++ int fallback_scsv = 0; + int enable_timeouts = 0 ; + long socket_mtu = 0; + #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE +@@ -829,6 +831,10 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv) + socket_mtu = atol(*(++argv)); + } + #endif ++ else if (strcmp(*argv,"-fallback_scsv") == 0) ++ { ++ fallback_scsv = 1; ++ } + else if (strcmp(*argv,"-bugs") == 0) + bugs=1; + else if (strcmp(*argv,"-keyform") == 0) +@@ -1240,6 +1246,10 @@ bad: + SSL_set_session(con, sess); + SSL_SESSION_free(sess); + } ++ ++ if (fallback_scsv) ++ SSL_set_mode(con, SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV); ++ + #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + if (servername != NULL) + { +diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/doc/apps/s_client.pod.fallback-scsv openssl-1.0.1e/doc/apps/s_client.pod +--- openssl-1.0.1e/doc/apps/s_client.pod.fallback-scsv 2014-10-15 17:06:01.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssl-1.0.1e/doc/apps/s_client.pod 2014-10-15 17:08:17.354427053 +0200 +@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ B B + [B<-no_tls1>] + [B<-no_tls1_1>] + [B<-no_tls1_2>] ++[B<-fallback_scsv>] + [B<-bugs>] + [B<-cipher cipherlist>] + [B<-starttls protocol>] +@@ -200,6 +201,10 @@ cannot handle this technique and will fa + work if TLS is turned off with the B<-no_tls> option others will only + support SSL v2 and may need the B<-ssl2> option. + ++=item B<-fallback_scsv> ++ ++Send TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV in the ClientHello. ++ + =item B<-bugs> + + there are several known bug in SSL and TLS implementations. Adding this +diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_mode.pod.fallback-scsv openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_mode.pod +--- openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_mode.pod.fallback-scsv 2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_mode.pod 2014-10-15 17:09:57.577689637 +0200 +@@ -71,6 +71,12 @@ SSL_CTX->freelist_max_len, which default + save around 34k per idle SSL connection. + This flag has no effect on SSL v2 connections, or on DTLS connections. + ++=item SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV ++ ++Send TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV in the ClientHello. ++To be set by applications that reconnect with a downgraded protocol ++version; see draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-scsv-00 for details. ++ + =back + + =head1 RETURN VALUES +diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/dtls1.h.fallback-scsv openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/dtls1.h +--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/dtls1.h.fallback-scsv 2014-10-15 14:39:30.862907615 +0200 ++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/dtls1.h 2014-10-15 14:39:30.973910121 +0200 +@@ -84,6 +84,8 @@ extern "C" { + #endif + + #define DTLS1_VERSION 0xFEFF ++#define DTLS_MAX_VERSION DTLS1_VERSION ++ + #define DTLS1_BAD_VER 0x0100 + + #if 0 +@@ -284,4 +286,3 @@ typedef struct dtls1_record_data_st + } + #endif + #endif +- +diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/d1_lib.c.fallback-scsv openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/d1_lib.c +--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/d1_lib.c.fallback-scsv 2014-10-15 14:39:30.911908721 +0200 ++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/d1_lib.c 2014-10-15 14:39:30.973910121 +0200 +@@ -263,6 +263,16 @@ long dtls1_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long la + case DTLS_CTRL_LISTEN: + ret = dtls1_listen(s, parg); + break; ++ case SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION: ++ /* For library-internal use; checks that the current protocol ++ * is the highest enabled version (according to s->ctx->method, ++ * as version negotiation may have changed s->method). */ ++#if DTLS_MAX_VERSION != DTLS1_VERSION ++# error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_VERSION. ++#endif ++ /* Just one protocol version is supported so far; ++ * fail closed if the version is not as expected. */ ++ return s->version == DTLS_MAX_VERSION; + + default: + ret = ssl3_ctrl(s, cmd, larg, parg); +diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl_err.c.fallback-scsv openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl_err.c +--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl_err.c.fallback-scsv 2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl_err.c 2014-10-15 14:39:30.973910121 +0200 +@@ -382,6 +382,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_reasons[] + {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST) ,"https proxy request"}, + {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST) ,"http request"}, + {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_ILLEGAL_PADDING) ,"illegal padding"}, ++{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK),"inappropriate fallback"}, + {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION),"inconsistent compression"}, + {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_CHALLENGE_LENGTH),"invalid challenge length"}, + {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND) ,"invalid command"}, +@@ -528,6 +529,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_reasons[] + {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_DECRYPTION_FAILED),"tlsv1 alert decryption failed"}, + {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_DECRYPT_ERROR),"tlsv1 alert decrypt error"}, + {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_EXPORT_RESTRICTION),"tlsv1 alert export restriction"}, ++{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK),"tlsv1 alert inappropriate fallback"}, + {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY),"tlsv1 alert insufficient security"}, + {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INTERNAL_ERROR),"tlsv1 alert internal error"}, + {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_NO_RENEGOTIATION),"tlsv1 alert no renegotiation"}, +diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl.h.fallback-scsv openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl.h +--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl.h.fallback-scsv 2014-10-15 14:39:30.940909375 +0200 ++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl.h 2014-10-15 14:41:46.174962343 +0200 +@@ -638,6 +638,10 @@ struct ssl_session_st + * TLS only.) "Released" buffers are put onto a free-list in the context + * or just freed (depending on the context's setting for freelist_max_len). */ + #define SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS 0x00000010L ++/* Send TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV in the ClientHello. ++ * To be set by applications that reconnect with a downgraded protocol ++ * version; see draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-scsv-00 for details. */ ++#define SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV 0x00000080L + + /* Note: SSL[_CTX]_set_{options,mode} use |= op on the previous value, + * they cannot be used to clear bits. */ +@@ -1453,6 +1457,7 @@ DECLARE_PEM_rw(SSL_SESSION, SSL_SESSION) + #define SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE + #define SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE + #define SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY /* fatal */ ++#define SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK TLS1_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK /* fatal */ + + #define SSL_ERROR_NONE 0 + #define SSL_ERROR_SSL 1 +@@ -1565,6 +1570,8 @@ DECLARE_PEM_rw(SSL_SESSION, SSL_SESSION) + + #define SSL_CTRL_GET_SERVER_TMP_KEY 109 + ++#define SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION 119 ++ + #define DTLSv1_get_timeout(ssl, arg) \ + SSL_ctrl(ssl,DTLS_CTRL_GET_TIMEOUT,0, (void *)arg) + #define DTLSv1_handle_timeout(ssl) \ +@@ -2298,6 +2305,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void); + #define SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST 155 + #define SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST 156 + #define SSL_R_ILLEGAL_PADDING 283 ++#define SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK 373 + #define SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION 340 + #define SSL_R_INVALID_CHALLENGE_LENGTH 158 + #define SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND 280 +@@ -2444,6 +2452,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void); + #define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_DECRYPTION_FAILED 1021 + #define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_DECRYPT_ERROR 1051 + #define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_EXPORT_RESTRICTION 1060 ++#define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK 1086 + #define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY 1071 + #define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INTERNAL_ERROR 1080 + #define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_NO_RENEGOTIATION 1100 +diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl_lib.c.fallback-scsv openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl_lib.c +--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl_lib.c.fallback-scsv 2014-10-15 14:39:30.912908743 +0200 ++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl_lib.c 2014-10-15 14:39:30.975910166 +0200 +@@ -1383,6 +1383,8 @@ int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s,STAC + + if (sk == NULL) return(0); + q=p; ++ if (put_cb == NULL) ++ put_cb = s->method->put_cipher_by_char; + + for (i=0; ipsk_client_callback == NULL) + continue; + #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ +- j = put_cb ? put_cb(c,p) : ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,c,p); ++ j = put_cb(c,p); + p+=j; + } +- /* If p == q, no ciphers and caller indicates an error. Otherwise +- * add SCSV if not renegotiating. +- */ +- if (p != q && !s->renegotiate) ++ /* If p == q, no ciphers; caller indicates an error. ++ * Otherwise, add applicable SCSVs. */ ++ if (p != q) + { +- static SSL_CIPHER scsv = ++ if (!s->renegotiate) + { +- 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 +- }; +- j = put_cb ? put_cb(&scsv,p) : ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,&scsv,p); +- p+=j; ++ static SSL_CIPHER scsv = ++ { ++ 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 ++ }; ++ j = put_cb(&scsv,p); ++ p+=j; + #ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG +- fprintf(stderr, "SCSV sent by client\n"); ++ fprintf(stderr, "TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV sent by client\n"); + #endif +- } ++ } ++ ++ if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) ++ { ++ static SSL_CIPHER scsv = ++ { ++ 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 ++ }; ++ j = put_cb(&scsv,p); ++ p+=j; ++ } ++ } + + return(p-q); + } +@@ -1430,11 +1444,12 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_ciphe + const SSL_CIPHER *c; + STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; + int i,n; ++ + if (s->s3) + s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0; + + n=ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,NULL,NULL); +- if ((num%n) != 0) ++ if (n == 0 || (num%n) != 0) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST); + return(NULL); +@@ -1449,7 +1464,7 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_ciphe + + for (i=0; is3 && (n != 3 || !p[0]) && + (p[n-2] == ((SSL3_CK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) && + (p[n-1] == (SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xff))) +@@ -1469,6 +1484,23 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_ciphe + continue; + } + ++ /* Check for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV */ ++ if ((n != 3 || !p[0]) && ++ (p[n-2] == ((SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) && ++ (p[n-1] == (SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV & 0xff))) ++ { ++ /* The SCSV indicates that the client previously tried a higher version. ++ * Fail if the current version is an unexpected downgrade. */ ++ if (!SSL_ctrl(s, SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION, 0, NULL)) ++ { ++ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); ++ if (s->s3) ++ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); ++ goto err; ++ } ++ continue; ++ } ++ + c=ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s,p); + p+=n; + if (c != NULL) +diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl3.h.fallback-scsv openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl3.h +--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl3.h.fallback-scsv 2014-10-15 14:39:30.949909579 +0200 ++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl3.h 2014-10-15 14:39:30.975910166 +0200 +@@ -128,9 +128,14 @@ + extern "C" { + #endif + +-/* Signalling cipher suite value: from draft-ietf-tls-renegotiation-03.txt */ ++/* Signalling cipher suite value from RFC 5746 ++ * (TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV) */ + #define SSL3_CK_SCSV 0x030000FF + ++/* Signalling cipher suite value from draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-scsv-00 ++ * (TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV) */ ++#define SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV 0x03005600 ++ + #define SSL3_CK_RSA_NULL_MD5 0x03000001 + #define SSL3_CK_RSA_NULL_SHA 0x03000002 + #define SSL3_CK_RSA_RC4_40_MD5 0x03000003 +diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s2_lib.c.fallback-scsv openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s2_lib.c +--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s2_lib.c.fallback-scsv 2014-10-15 14:39:30.901908495 +0200 ++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s2_lib.c 2014-10-15 14:39:30.975910166 +0200 +@@ -391,6 +391,8 @@ long ssl2_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long lar + case SSL_CTRL_GET_SESSION_REUSED: + ret=s->hit; + break; ++ case SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION: ++ return ssl3_ctrl(s, SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION, larg, parg); + default: + break; + } +@@ -437,7 +439,7 @@ int ssl2_put_cipher_by_char(const SSL_CI + if (p != NULL) + { + l=c->id; +- if ((l & 0xff000000) != 0x02000000) return(0); ++ if ((l & 0xff000000) != 0x02000000 && l != SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV) return(0); + p[0]=((unsigned char)(l>>16L))&0xFF; + p[1]=((unsigned char)(l>> 8L))&0xFF; + p[2]=((unsigned char)(l ))&0xFF; +diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s23_clnt.c.fallback-scsv openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s23_clnt.c +--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s23_clnt.c.fallback-scsv 2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s23_clnt.c 2014-10-15 14:39:30.975910166 +0200 +@@ -715,6 +715,9 @@ static int ssl23_get_server_hello(SSL *s + goto err; + } + ++ /* ensure that TLS_MAX_VERSION is up-to-date */ ++ OPENSSL_assert(s->version <= TLS_MAX_VERSION); ++ + if (p[0] == SSL3_RT_ALERT && p[5] != SSL3_AL_WARNING) + { + /* fatal alert */ +diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s23_srvr.c.fallback-scsv openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s23_srvr.c +--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s23_srvr.c.fallback-scsv 2014-10-15 14:39:30.966909962 +0200 ++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s23_srvr.c 2014-10-15 14:39:30.976910188 +0200 +@@ -421,6 +421,9 @@ int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s) + } + } + ++ /* ensure that TLS_MAX_VERSION is up-to-date */ ++ OPENSSL_assert(s->version <= TLS_MAX_VERSION); ++ + #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS + if (FIPS_mode() && (s->version < TLS1_VERSION)) + { +diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_enc.c.fallback-scsv openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_enc.c +--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_enc.c.fallback-scsv 2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_enc.c 2014-10-15 14:39:30.976910188 +0200 +@@ -892,7 +892,7 @@ int ssl3_alert_code(int code) + case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE: return(SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE: return(SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY:return(TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY); ++ case SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK:return(TLS1_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); + default: return(-1); + } + } +- +diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_lib.c.fallback-scsv openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_lib.c +--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_lib.c.fallback-scsv 2014-10-15 14:39:30.941909398 +0200 ++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_lib.c 2014-10-15 14:39:30.976910188 +0200 +@@ -3388,6 +3388,33 @@ long ssl3_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long lar + EVP_PKEY_free(ptmp); + return 0; + } ++ ++ case SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION: ++ /* For library-internal use; checks that the current protocol ++ * is the highest enabled version (according to s->ctx->method, ++ * as version negotiation may have changed s->method). */ ++ if (s->version == s->ctx->method->version) ++ return 1; ++ /* Apparently we're using a version-flexible SSL_METHOD ++ * (not at its highest protocol version). */ ++ if (s->ctx->method->version == SSLv23_method()->version) ++ { ++#if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_2_VERSION ++# error Code needs update for SSLv23_method() support beyond TLS1_2_VERSION. ++#endif ++ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2)) ++ return s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION; ++ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1)) ++ return s->version == TLS1_1_VERSION; ++ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1)) ++ return s->version == TLS1_VERSION; ++ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3)) ++ return s->version == SSL3_VERSION; ++ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2)) ++ return s->version == SSL2_VERSION; ++ } ++ return 0; /* Unexpected state; fail closed. */ ++ + default: + break; + } +@@ -3747,6 +3774,7 @@ long ssl3_ctx_callback_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx + break; + #endif + #endif ++ + default: + return(0); + } +@@ -4317,4 +4345,3 @@ long ssl_get_algorithm2(SSL *s) + return SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256; + return alg2; + } +- +diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/tls1.h.fallback-scsv openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/tls1.h +--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/tls1.h.fallback-scsv 2014-10-15 14:39:30.775905650 +0200 ++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/tls1.h 2014-10-15 14:39:30.976910188 +0200 +@@ -159,17 +159,19 @@ extern "C" { + + #define TLS1_ALLOW_EXPERIMENTAL_CIPHERSUITES 0 + ++#define TLS1_VERSION 0x0301 ++#define TLS1_1_VERSION 0x0302 + #define TLS1_2_VERSION 0x0303 +-#define TLS1_2_VERSION_MAJOR 0x03 +-#define TLS1_2_VERSION_MINOR 0x03 ++#define TLS_MAX_VERSION TLS1_2_VERSION ++ ++#define TLS1_VERSION_MAJOR 0x03 ++#define TLS1_VERSION_MINOR 0x01 + +-#define TLS1_1_VERSION 0x0302 + #define TLS1_1_VERSION_MAJOR 0x03 + #define TLS1_1_VERSION_MINOR 0x02 + +-#define TLS1_VERSION 0x0301 +-#define TLS1_VERSION_MAJOR 0x03 +-#define TLS1_VERSION_MINOR 0x01 ++#define TLS1_2_VERSION_MAJOR 0x03 ++#define TLS1_2_VERSION_MINOR 0x03 + + #define TLS1_get_version(s) \ + ((s->version >> 8) == TLS1_VERSION_MAJOR ? s->version : 0) +@@ -187,6 +189,7 @@ extern "C" { + #define TLS1_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION 70 /* fatal */ + #define TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY 71 /* fatal */ + #define TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR 80 /* fatal */ ++#define TLS1_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK 86 /* fatal */ + #define TLS1_AD_USER_CANCELLED 90 + #define TLS1_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION 100 + /* codes 110-114 are from RFC3546 */ +diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/t1_enc.c.fallback-scsv openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/t1_enc.c +--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/t1_enc.c.fallback-scsv 2014-10-15 14:39:30.936909285 +0200 ++++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/t1_enc.c 2014-10-15 14:39:30.977910211 +0200 +@@ -1265,6 +1265,7 @@ int tls1_alert_code(int code) + case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE: return(TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE); + case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE: return(TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE); + case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY:return(TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY); ++ case SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK:return(TLS1_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); + #if 0 /* not appropriate for TLS, not used for DTLS */ + case DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE: return + (DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE); diff --git a/SPECS/openssl.spec b/SPECS/openssl.spec index d55dbcb..663e74f 100644 --- a/SPECS/openssl.spec +++ b/SPECS/openssl.spec @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ Summary: Utilities from the general purpose cryptography library with TLS implementation Name: openssl Version: 1.0.1e -Release: 34%{?dist}.4 +Release: 34%{?dist}.6 Epoch: 1 # We have to remove certain patented algorithms from the openssl source # tarball with the hobble-openssl script which is included below. @@ -106,6 +106,9 @@ Patch103: openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3508.patch Patch104: openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3509.patch Patch105: openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3510.patch Patch106: openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3511.patch +Patch110: openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3567.patch +Patch111: openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-3513.patch +Patch112: openssl-1.0.1e-fallback-scsv.patch License: OpenSSL Group: System Environment/Libraries @@ -243,6 +246,9 @@ cp %{SOURCE12} %{SOURCE13} crypto/ec/ %patch104 -p1 -b .tlsext-race %patch105 -p1 -b .adh-dos %patch106 -p1 -b .frag-downgrade +%patch110 -p1 -b .ticket-leak +%patch111 -p1 -b .srtp-leak +%patch112 -p1 -b .fallback-scsv sed -i 's/SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER "1.0.0"/SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER "%{version}"/' crypto/opensslv.h @@ -506,6 +512,12 @@ rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_libdir}/fipscanister.* %postun libs -p /sbin/ldconfig %changelog +* Wed Oct 15 2014 Tomáš Mráz 1.0.1e-34.6 +- fix CVE-2014-3567 - memory leak when handling session tickets +- fix CVE-2014-3513 - memory leak in srtp support +- add support for fallback SCSV to partially mitigate CVE-2014-3566 + (padding attack on SSL3) + * Fri Aug 8 2014 Tomáš Mráz 1.0.1e-34.4 - fix CVE-2014-3505 - doublefree in DTLS packet processing - fix CVE-2014-3506 - avoid memory exhaustion in DTLS