diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/apps/s_client.c.fallback-scsv openssl-1.0.1e/apps/s_client.c
--- openssl-1.0.1e/apps/s_client.c.fallback-scsv 2014-10-15 17:06:01.000000000 +0200
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/apps/s_client.c 2014-10-15 17:07:36.392502320 +0200
@@ -336,6 +336,7 @@ static void sc_usage(void)
BIO_printf(bio_err," -tls1_1 - just use TLSv1.1\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err," -tls1 - just use TLSv1\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err," -dtls1 - just use DTLSv1\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err," -fallback_scsv - send TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err," -mtu - set the link layer MTU\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err," -no_tls1_2/-no_tls1_1/-no_tls1/-no_ssl3/-no_ssl2 - turn off that protocol\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err," -bugs - Switch on all SSL implementation bug workarounds\n");
@@ -616,6 +617,7 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
char *sess_out = NULL;
struct sockaddr peer;
int peerlen = sizeof(peer);
+ int fallback_scsv = 0;
int enable_timeouts = 0 ;
long socket_mtu = 0;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_JPAKE
@@ -829,6 +831,10 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
socket_mtu = atol(*(++argv));
}
#endif
+ else if (strcmp(*argv,"-fallback_scsv") == 0)
+ {
+ fallback_scsv = 1;
+ }
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-bugs") == 0)
bugs=1;
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-keyform") == 0)
@@ -1240,6 +1246,10 @@ bad:
SSL_set_session(con, sess);
SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
}
+
+ if (fallback_scsv)
+ SSL_set_mode(con, SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV);
+
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
if (servername != NULL)
{
diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/doc/apps/s_client.pod.fallback-scsv openssl-1.0.1e/doc/apps/s_client.pod
--- openssl-1.0.1e/doc/apps/s_client.pod.fallback-scsv 2014-10-15 17:06:01.000000000 +0200
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/doc/apps/s_client.pod 2014-10-15 17:08:17.354427053 +0200
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ B<openssl> B<s_client>
[B<-no_tls1>]
[B<-no_tls1_1>]
[B<-no_tls1_2>]
+[B<-fallback_scsv>]
[B<-bugs>]
[B<-cipher cipherlist>]
[B<-starttls protocol>]
@@ -200,6 +201,10 @@ cannot handle this technique and will fa
work if TLS is turned off with the B<-no_tls> option others will only
support SSL v2 and may need the B<-ssl2> option.
+=item B<-fallback_scsv>
+
+Send TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV in the ClientHello.
+
=item B<-bugs>
there are several known bug in SSL and TLS implementations. Adding this
diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_mode.pod.fallback-scsv openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_mode.pod
--- openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_mode.pod.fallback-scsv 2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_mode.pod 2014-10-15 17:09:57.577689637 +0200
@@ -71,6 +71,12 @@ SSL_CTX->freelist_max_len, which default
save around 34k per idle SSL connection.
This flag has no effect on SSL v2 connections, or on DTLS connections.
+=item SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV
+
+Send TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV in the ClientHello.
+To be set by applications that reconnect with a downgraded protocol
+version; see draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-scsv-00 for details.
+
=back
=head1 RETURN VALUES
diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/dtls1.h.fallback-scsv openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/dtls1.h
--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/dtls1.h.fallback-scsv 2014-10-15 14:45:25.492913542 +0200
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/dtls1.h 2014-10-15 14:45:25.596915890 +0200
@@ -84,6 +84,8 @@ extern "C" {
#endif
#define DTLS1_VERSION 0xFEFF
+#define DTLS_MAX_VERSION DTLS1_VERSION
+
#define DTLS1_BAD_VER 0x0100
#if 0
@@ -284,4 +286,3 @@ typedef struct dtls1_record_data_st
}
#endif
#endif
-
diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/d1_lib.c.fallback-scsv openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/d1_lib.c
--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/d1_lib.c.fallback-scsv 2014-10-15 14:45:25.539914603 +0200
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/d1_lib.c 2014-10-15 14:45:25.596915890 +0200
@@ -263,6 +263,16 @@ long dtls1_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long la
case DTLS_CTRL_LISTEN:
ret = dtls1_listen(s, parg);
break;
+ case SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION:
+ /* For library-internal use; checks that the current protocol
+ * is the highest enabled version (according to s->ctx->method,
+ * as version negotiation may have changed s->method). */
+#if DTLS_MAX_VERSION != DTLS1_VERSION
+# error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_VERSION.
+#endif
+ /* Just one protocol version is supported so far;
+ * fail closed if the version is not as expected. */
+ return s->version == DTLS_MAX_VERSION;
default:
ret = ssl3_ctrl(s, cmd, larg, parg);
diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl_err.c.fallback-scsv openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl_err.c
--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl_err.c.fallback-scsv 2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl_err.c 2014-10-15 14:45:25.596915890 +0200
@@ -382,6 +382,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_reasons[]
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST) ,"https proxy request"},
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST) ,"http request"},
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_ILLEGAL_PADDING) ,"illegal padding"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK),"inappropriate fallback"},
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION),"inconsistent compression"},
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_CHALLENGE_LENGTH),"invalid challenge length"},
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND) ,"invalid command"},
@@ -528,6 +529,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_reasons[]
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_DECRYPTION_FAILED),"tlsv1 alert decryption failed"},
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_DECRYPT_ERROR),"tlsv1 alert decrypt error"},
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_EXPORT_RESTRICTION),"tlsv1 alert export restriction"},
+{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK),"tlsv1 alert inappropriate fallback"},
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY),"tlsv1 alert insufficient security"},
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INTERNAL_ERROR),"tlsv1 alert internal error"},
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_NO_RENEGOTIATION),"tlsv1 alert no renegotiation"},
diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl.h.fallback-scsv openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl.h
--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl.h.fallback-scsv 2014-10-15 14:45:25.588915709 +0200
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl.h 2014-10-15 14:47:04.423146935 +0200
@@ -638,6 +638,10 @@ struct ssl_session_st
* TLS only.) "Released" buffers are put onto a free-list in the context
* or just freed (depending on the context's setting for freelist_max_len). */
#define SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS 0x00000010L
+/* Send TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV in the ClientHello.
+ * To be set by applications that reconnect with a downgraded protocol
+ * version; see draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-scsv-00 for details. */
+#define SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV 0x00000080L
/* Note: SSL[_CTX]_set_{options,mode} use |= op on the previous value,
* they cannot be used to clear bits. */
@@ -1453,6 +1457,7 @@ DECLARE_PEM_rw(SSL_SESSION, SSL_SESSION)
#define SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE
#define SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE
#define SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY /* fatal */
+#define SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK TLS1_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK /* fatal */
#define SSL_ERROR_NONE 0
#define SSL_ERROR_SSL 1
@@ -1566,6 +1571,8 @@ DECLARE_PEM_rw(SSL_SESSION, SSL_SESSION)
#define SSL_CTRL_SET_ECDH_AUTO 94
#define SSL_CTRL_GET_SERVER_TMP_KEY 109
+#define SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION 119
+
#define DTLSv1_get_timeout(ssl, arg) \
SSL_ctrl(ssl,DTLS_CTRL_GET_TIMEOUT,0, (void *)arg)
#define DTLSv1_handle_timeout(ssl) \
@@ -2304,6 +2311,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
#define SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST 155
#define SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST 156
#define SSL_R_ILLEGAL_PADDING 283
+#define SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK 373
#define SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION 340
#define SSL_R_INVALID_CHALLENGE_LENGTH 158
#define SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND 280
@@ -2450,6 +2458,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
#define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_DECRYPTION_FAILED 1021
#define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_DECRYPT_ERROR 1051
#define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_EXPORT_RESTRICTION 1060
+#define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK 1086
#define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY 1071
#define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INTERNAL_ERROR 1080
#define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_NO_RENEGOTIATION 1100
diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl_lib.c.fallback-scsv openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl_lib.c
--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl_lib.c.fallback-scsv 2014-10-15 14:45:25.589915731 +0200
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl_lib.c 2014-10-15 14:45:25.597915912 +0200
@@ -1383,6 +1383,8 @@ int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s,STAC
if (sk == NULL) return(0);
q=p;
+ if (put_cb == NULL)
+ put_cb = s->method->put_cipher_by_char;
for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
{
@@ -1402,24 +1404,36 @@ int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s,STAC
s->psk_client_callback == NULL)
continue;
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
- j = put_cb ? put_cb(c,p) : ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,c,p);
+ j = put_cb(c,p);
p+=j;
}
- /* If p == q, no ciphers and caller indicates an error. Otherwise
- * add SCSV if not renegotiating.
- */
- if (p != q && !s->renegotiate)
+ /* If p == q, no ciphers; caller indicates an error.
+ * Otherwise, add applicable SCSVs. */
+ if (p != q)
{
- static SSL_CIPHER scsv =
+ if (!s->renegotiate)
{
- 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
- };
- j = put_cb ? put_cb(&scsv,p) : ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,&scsv,p);
- p+=j;
+ static SSL_CIPHER scsv =
+ {
+ 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
+ };
+ j = put_cb(&scsv,p);
+ p+=j;
#ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr, "SCSV sent by client\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, "TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV sent by client\n");
#endif
- }
+ }
+
+ if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV)
+ {
+ static SSL_CIPHER scsv =
+ {
+ 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
+ };
+ j = put_cb(&scsv,p);
+ p+=j;
+ }
+ }
return(p-q);
}
@@ -1430,11 +1444,12 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_ciphe
const SSL_CIPHER *c;
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
int i,n;
+
if (s->s3)
s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0;
n=ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,NULL,NULL);
- if ((num%n) != 0)
+ if (n == 0 || (num%n) != 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST);
return(NULL);
@@ -1449,7 +1464,7 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_ciphe
for (i=0; i<num; i+=n)
{
- /* Check for SCSV */
+ /* Check for TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV */
if (s->s3 && (n != 3 || !p[0]) &&
(p[n-2] == ((SSL3_CK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
(p[n-1] == (SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xff)))
@@ -1469,6 +1484,23 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_ciphe
continue;
}
+ /* Check for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV */
+ if ((n != 3 || !p[0]) &&
+ (p[n-2] == ((SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
+ (p[n-1] == (SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV & 0xff)))
+ {
+ /* The SCSV indicates that the client previously tried a higher version.
+ * Fail if the current version is an unexpected downgrade. */
+ if (!SSL_ctrl(s, SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION, 0, NULL))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
+ if (s->s3)
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ continue;
+ }
+
c=ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s,p);
p+=n;
if (c != NULL)
diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl3.h.fallback-scsv openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl3.h
--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl3.h.fallback-scsv 2014-10-15 14:45:25.570915303 +0200
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/ssl3.h 2014-10-15 14:45:25.598915935 +0200
@@ -128,9 +128,14 @@
extern "C" {
#endif
-/* Signalling cipher suite value: from draft-ietf-tls-renegotiation-03.txt */
+/* Signalling cipher suite value from RFC 5746
+ * (TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV) */
#define SSL3_CK_SCSV 0x030000FF
+/* Signalling cipher suite value from draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-scsv-00
+ * (TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV) */
+#define SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV 0x03005600
+
#define SSL3_CK_RSA_NULL_MD5 0x03000001
#define SSL3_CK_RSA_NULL_SHA 0x03000002
#define SSL3_CK_RSA_RC4_40_MD5 0x03000003
diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s2_lib.c.fallback-scsv openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s2_lib.c
--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s2_lib.c.fallback-scsv 2014-10-15 14:45:25.526914309 +0200
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s2_lib.c 2014-10-15 14:45:25.598915935 +0200
@@ -391,6 +391,8 @@ long ssl2_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long lar
case SSL_CTRL_GET_SESSION_REUSED:
ret=s->hit;
break;
+ case SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION:
+ return ssl3_ctrl(s, SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION, larg, parg);
default:
break;
}
@@ -437,7 +439,7 @@ int ssl2_put_cipher_by_char(const SSL_CI
if (p != NULL)
{
l=c->id;
- if ((l & 0xff000000) != 0x02000000) return(0);
+ if ((l & 0xff000000) != 0x02000000 && l != SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV) return(0);
p[0]=((unsigned char)(l>>16L))&0xFF;
p[1]=((unsigned char)(l>> 8L))&0xFF;
p[2]=((unsigned char)(l ))&0xFF;
diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s23_clnt.c.fallback-scsv openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s23_clnt.c
--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s23_clnt.c.fallback-scsv 2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s23_clnt.c 2014-10-15 14:45:25.598915935 +0200
@@ -715,6 +715,9 @@ static int ssl23_get_server_hello(SSL *s
goto err;
}
+ /* ensure that TLS_MAX_VERSION is up-to-date */
+ OPENSSL_assert(s->version <= TLS_MAX_VERSION);
+
if (p[0] == SSL3_RT_ALERT && p[5] != SSL3_AL_WARNING)
{
/* fatal alert */
diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s23_srvr.c.fallback-scsv openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s23_srvr.c
--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s23_srvr.c.fallback-scsv 2014-10-15 14:45:25.584915619 +0200
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s23_srvr.c 2014-10-15 14:45:25.598915935 +0200
@@ -421,6 +421,9 @@ int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
}
}
+ /* ensure that TLS_MAX_VERSION is up-to-date */
+ OPENSSL_assert(s->version <= TLS_MAX_VERSION);
+
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
if (FIPS_mode() && (s->version < TLS1_VERSION))
{
diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_enc.c.fallback-scsv openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_enc.c
--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_enc.c.fallback-scsv 2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_enc.c 2014-10-15 14:45:25.598915935 +0200
@@ -892,7 +892,7 @@ int ssl3_alert_code(int code)
case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE: return(SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE: return(SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY:return(TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY);
+ case SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK:return(TLS1_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
default: return(-1);
}
}
-
diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_lib.c.fallback-scsv openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_lib.c
--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_lib.c.fallback-scsv 2014-10-15 14:45:25.590915754 +0200
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/s3_lib.c 2014-10-15 14:45:25.599915957 +0200
@@ -3394,6 +3394,33 @@ long ssl3_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long lar
EVP_PKEY_free(ptmp);
return 0;
}
+
+ case SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION:
+ /* For library-internal use; checks that the current protocol
+ * is the highest enabled version (according to s->ctx->method,
+ * as version negotiation may have changed s->method). */
+ if (s->version == s->ctx->method->version)
+ return 1;
+ /* Apparently we're using a version-flexible SSL_METHOD
+ * (not at its highest protocol version). */
+ if (s->ctx->method->version == SSLv23_method()->version)
+ {
+#if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_2_VERSION
+# error Code needs update for SSLv23_method() support beyond TLS1_2_VERSION.
+#endif
+ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2))
+ return s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION;
+ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1))
+ return s->version == TLS1_1_VERSION;
+ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1))
+ return s->version == TLS1_VERSION;
+ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3))
+ return s->version == SSL3_VERSION;
+ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2))
+ return s->version == SSL2_VERSION;
+ }
+ return 0; /* Unexpected state; fail closed. */
+
default:
break;
}
@@ -3759,6 +3786,7 @@ long ssl3_ctx_callback_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx
break;
#endif
#endif
+
default:
return(0);
}
@@ -4337,4 +4365,3 @@ long ssl_get_algorithm2(SSL *s)
return SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256;
return alg2;
}
-
diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/tls1.h.fallback-scsv openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/tls1.h
--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/tls1.h.fallback-scsv 2014-10-15 14:45:25.382911058 +0200
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/tls1.h 2014-10-15 14:45:25.599915957 +0200
@@ -159,17 +159,19 @@ extern "C" {
#define TLS1_ALLOW_EXPERIMENTAL_CIPHERSUITES 0
+#define TLS1_VERSION 0x0301
+#define TLS1_1_VERSION 0x0302
#define TLS1_2_VERSION 0x0303
-#define TLS1_2_VERSION_MAJOR 0x03
-#define TLS1_2_VERSION_MINOR 0x03
+#define TLS_MAX_VERSION TLS1_2_VERSION
+
+#define TLS1_VERSION_MAJOR 0x03
+#define TLS1_VERSION_MINOR 0x01
-#define TLS1_1_VERSION 0x0302
#define TLS1_1_VERSION_MAJOR 0x03
#define TLS1_1_VERSION_MINOR 0x02
-#define TLS1_VERSION 0x0301
-#define TLS1_VERSION_MAJOR 0x03
-#define TLS1_VERSION_MINOR 0x01
+#define TLS1_2_VERSION_MAJOR 0x03
+#define TLS1_2_VERSION_MINOR 0x03
#define TLS1_get_version(s) \
((s->version >> 8) == TLS1_VERSION_MAJOR ? s->version : 0)
@@ -187,6 +189,7 @@ extern "C" {
#define TLS1_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION 70 /* fatal */
#define TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY 71 /* fatal */
#define TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR 80 /* fatal */
+#define TLS1_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK 86 /* fatal */
#define TLS1_AD_USER_CANCELLED 90
#define TLS1_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION 100
/* codes 110-114 are from RFC3546 */
diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/t1_enc.c.fallback-scsv openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/t1_enc.c
--- openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/t1_enc.c.fallback-scsv 2014-10-15 14:45:25.557915009 +0200
+++ openssl-1.0.1e/ssl/t1_enc.c 2014-10-15 14:45:25.599915957 +0200
@@ -1265,6 +1265,7 @@ int tls1_alert_code(int code)
case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE: return(TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE);
case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE: return(TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE);
case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY:return(TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY);
+ case SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK:return(TLS1_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
#if 0 /* not appropriate for TLS, not used for DTLS */
case DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE: return
(DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE);