diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/bn/bn_rand.c.fips-reqs openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/bn/bn_rand.c

--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/bn/bn_rand.c.fips-reqs	2013-02-11 16:02:47.000000000 +0100

+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/bn/bn_rand.c	2014-02-13 16:50:34.280893285 +0100

@@ -138,9 +138,12 @@ static int bnrand(int pseudorand, BIGNUM

 		goto err;

 		}

-	/* make a random number and set the top and bottom bits */

-	time(&tim);

-	RAND_add(&tim,sizeof(tim),0.0);

+	if (!FIPS_mode()) /* in FIPS mode the RNG is always properly seeded or the module fails */

+		{

+		/* make a random number and set the top and bottom bits */

+		time(&tim);

+		RAND_add(&tim,sizeof(tim),0.0);

+		}

 	if (pseudorand)

 		{

diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/dh/dh_gen.c.fips-reqs openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/dh/dh_gen.c

--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/dh/dh_gen.c.fips-reqs	2013-12-18 12:17:09.748636614 +0100

+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/dh/dh_gen.c	2013-12-18 12:17:09.798637687 +0100

@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ static int dh_builtin_genparams(DH *ret,

 		return 0;

 		}

-	if (FIPS_mode() && (prime_len < OPENSSL_DH_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS))

+	if (FIPS_mode() && (prime_len < OPENSSL_DH_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS_GEN))

 		{

 		DHerr(DH_F_DH_BUILTIN_GENPARAMS, DH_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);

 		goto err;

diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/dh/dh.h.fips-reqs openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/dh/dh.h

--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/dh/dh.h.fips-reqs	2013-12-18 12:17:09.748636614 +0100

+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/dh/dh.h	2013-12-18 12:17:09.798637687 +0100

@@ -78,6 +78,7 @@

 #endif

 #define OPENSSL_DH_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS 1024

+#define OPENSSL_DH_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS_GEN 2048

 #define DH_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P     0x01

 #define DH_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME 0x02 /* new with 0.9.7h; the built-in DH

diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/dh/dh_check.c.fips-reqs openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/dh/dh_check.c

--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/dh/dh_check.c.fips-reqs	2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100

+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/dh/dh_check.c	2013-12-18 12:17:09.799637708 +0100

@@ -134,7 +134,33 @@ int DH_check_pub_key(const DH *dh, const

 	BN_sub_word(q,1);

 	if (BN_cmp(pub_key,q)>=0)

 		*ret|=DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_TOO_LARGE;

+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS

+	if (FIPS_mode() && dh->q != NULL)

+		{

+		BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;

+		ctx = BN_CTX_new();

+		if (ctx == NULL)

+			goto err;

+

+		if (BN_mod_exp_mont(q, pub_key, dh->q, dh->p, ctx, NULL) <= 0)

+			{

+			BN_CTX_free(ctx);

+			goto err;

+			}

+		if (!BN_is_one(q))

+			{

+			/* it would be more correct to add new return flag 

+			 * for this test, but we do not want to do it

+			 * so just error out

+			 */

+			BN_CTX_free(ctx);

+			goto err;

+			}

+		

+		BN_CTX_free(ctx);

+		}

+#endif

 	ok = 1;

 err:

 	if (q != NULL) BN_free(q);

diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c.fips-reqs openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c

--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c.fips-reqs	2013-12-18 12:17:09.749636636 +0100

+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c	2013-12-18 12:17:09.799637708 +0100

@@ -159,7 +159,6 @@ int dsa_builtin_paramgen(DSA *ret, size_

 	    }

 	if (FIPS_module_mode() &&

-	    (bits != 1024 || qbits != 160) &&

 	    (bits != 2048 || qbits != 224) &&

 	    (bits != 2048 || qbits != 256) &&

 	    (bits != 3072 || qbits != 256))

diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/dsa/dsa.h.fips-reqs openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/dsa/dsa.h

--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/dsa/dsa.h.fips-reqs	2013-12-18 12:17:09.749636636 +0100

+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/dsa/dsa.h	2013-12-18 12:17:09.799637708 +0100

@@ -89,6 +89,7 @@

 #endif

 #define OPENSSL_DSA_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS 1024

+#define OPENSSL_DSA_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS_GEN 2048

 #define DSA_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P	0x01

 #define DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME       0x02 /* new with 0.9.7h; the built-in DSA

@@ -254,9 +255,9 @@ int	DSAparams_print_fp(FILE *fp, const D

 int	DSA_print_fp(FILE *bp, const DSA *x, int off);

 #endif

-#define DSS_prime_checks 50

-/* Primality test according to FIPS PUB 186[-1], Appendix 2.1:

- * 50 rounds of Rabin-Miller */

+#define DSS_prime_checks 64

+/* Primality test according to FIPS PUB 186[-4], Appendix 2.1:

+ * 64 rounds of Rabin-Miller */

 #define DSA_is_prime(n, callback, cb_arg) \

 	BN_is_prime(n, DSS_prime_checks, callback, NULL, cb_arg)

diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/dsa/dsa_key.c.fips-reqs openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/dsa/dsa_key.c

--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/dsa/dsa_key.c.fips-reqs	2013-12-18 12:17:09.797637665 +0100

+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/dsa/dsa_key.c	2013-12-18 12:17:09.799637708 +0100

@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ static int dsa_builtin_keygen(DSA *dsa)

 #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS

 	if (FIPS_mode() && !(dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW)

-		&& (BN_num_bits(dsa->p) < OPENSSL_DSA_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS))

+		&& (BN_num_bits(dsa->p) < OPENSSL_DSA_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS_GEN))

 		{

 		DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_BUILTIN_KEYGEN, DSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);

 		goto err;

diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/fips/fips_dh_selftest.c.fips-reqs openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/fips/fips_dh_selftest.c

--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/fips/fips_dh_selftest.c.fips-reqs	2013-12-18 17:06:36.575114314 +0100

+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/fips/fips_dh_selftest.c	2013-12-18 17:26:14.409036334 +0100

@@ -0,0 +1,162 @@

+/* ====================================================================

+ * Copyright (c) 2011 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.

+ * Copyright (c) 2013 Red Hat, Inc.

+ *

+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without

+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions

+ * are met:

+ *

+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright

+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 

+ *

+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright

+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in

+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the

+ *    distribution.

+ *

+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this

+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:

+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project

+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"

+ *

+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to

+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without

+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact

+ *    openssl-core@openssl.org.

+ *

+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"

+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written

+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.

+ *

+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following

+ *    acknowledgment:

+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project

+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"

+ *

+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY

+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE

+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR

+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR

+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,

+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT

+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;

+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)

+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,

+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)

+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED

+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.

+ *

+ */

+

+#include <string.h>

+#include <openssl/crypto.h>

+#include <openssl/dh.h>

+#include <openssl/fips.h>

+#include <openssl/err.h>

+#include <openssl/evp.h>

+#include <openssl/bn.h>

+#include "fips_locl.h"

+

+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS

+

+static const unsigned char dh_test_2048_p[] = {

+	0xAE,0xEC,0xEE,0x22,0xFA,0x3A,0xA5,0x22,0xC0,0xDE,0x0F,0x09,

+	0x7E,0x17,0xC0,0x05,0xF9,0xF1,0xE7,0xC6,0x87,0x14,0x6D,0x11,

+	0xE7,0xAE,0xED,0x2F,0x72,0x59,0xC5,0xA9,0x9B,0xB8,0x02,0xA5,

+	0xF3,0x69,0x70,0xD6,0xDD,0x90,0xF9,0x19,0x79,0xBE,0x60,0x8F,

+	0x25,0x92,0x30,0x1C,0x51,0x51,0x38,0x26,0x82,0x25,0xE6,0xFC,

+	0xED,0x65,0x96,0x8F,0x57,0xE5,0x53,0x8B,0x38,0x63,0xC7,0xCE,

+	0xBC,0x1B,0x4D,0x18,0x2A,0x5B,0x04,0x3F,0x6A,0x3C,0x94,0x39,

+	0xAE,0x36,0xD6,0x5E,0x0F,0xA2,0xCC,0xD0,0xD4,0xD5,0xC6,0x1E,

+	0xF6,0xA0,0xF5,0x89,0x4E,0xB4,0x0B,0xA4,0xB3,0x2B,0x3D,0xE2,

+	0x4E,0xE1,0x49,0x25,0x99,0x5F,0x32,0x16,0x33,0x32,0x1B,0x7A,

+	0xA5,0x5C,0x6B,0x34,0x0D,0x39,0x99,0xDC,0xF0,0x76,0xE5,0x5A,

+	0xD4,0x71,0x00,0xED,0x5A,0x73,0xFB,0xC8,0x01,0xAD,0x99,0xCF,

+	0x99,0x52,0x7C,0x9C,0x64,0xC6,0x76,0x40,0x57,0xAF,0x59,0xD7,

+	0x38,0x0B,0x40,0xDE,0x33,0x0D,0xB8,0x76,0xEC,0xA9,0xD8,0x73,

+	0xF8,0xEF,0x26,0x66,0x06,0x27,0xDD,0x7C,0xA4,0x10,0x9C,0xA6,

+	0xAA,0xF9,0x53,0x62,0x73,0x1D,0xBA,0x1C,0xF1,0x67,0xF4,0x35,

+	0xED,0x6F,0x37,0x92,0xE8,0x4F,0x6C,0xBA,0x52,0x6E,0xA1,0xED,

+	0xDA,0x9F,0x85,0x11,0x82,0x52,0x62,0x08,0x44,0xF1,0x30,0x03,

+	0xC3,0x38,0x2C,0x79,0xBD,0xD4,0x43,0x45,0xEE,0x8E,0x50,0xFC,

+	0x29,0x46,0x9A,0xFE,0x54,0x1A,0x19,0x8F,0x4B,0x84,0x08,0xDE,

+	0x20,0x62,0x73,0xCC,0xDD,0x7E,0xF0,0xEF,0xA2,0xFD,0x86,0x58,

+	0x4B,0xD8,0x37,0xEB

+};

+

+static const unsigned char dh_test_2048_g[] = {

+	0x02

+};

+

+static const unsigned char dh_test_2048_pub_key[] = {

+	0xA0,0x39,0x11,0x77,0x9A,0xC1,0x30,0x1F,0xBE,0x48,0xA7,0xAA,

+	0xA0,0x84,0x54,0x64,0xAD,0x1B,0x70,0xFA,0x13,0x55,0x63,0xD2,

+	0x1F,0x62,0x32,0x93,0x8E,0xC9,0x3E,0x09,0xA7,0x64,0xE4,0x12,

+	0x6E,0x1B,0xF2,0x92,0x3B,0xB9,0xCB,0x56,0xEA,0x07,0x88,0xB5,

+	0xA6,0xBC,0x16,0x1F,0x27,0xFE,0xD8,0xAA,0x40,0xB2,0xB0,0x2D,

+	0x37,0x76,0xA6,0xA4,0x82,0x2C,0x0E,0x22,0x64,0x9D,0xCB,0xD1,

+	0x00,0xB7,0x89,0x14,0x72,0x4E,0xBE,0x48,0x41,0xF8,0xB2,0x51,

+	0x11,0x09,0x4B,0x22,0x01,0x23,0x39,0x96,0xE0,0x15,0xD7,0x9F,

+	0x60,0xD1,0xB7,0xAE,0xFE,0x5F,0xDB,0xE7,0x03,0x17,0x97,0xA6,

+	0x16,0x74,0xBD,0x53,0x81,0x19,0xC5,0x47,0x5E,0xCE,0x8D,0xED,

+	0x45,0x5D,0x3C,0x00,0xA0,0x0A,0x68,0x6A,0xE0,0x8E,0x06,0x46,

+	0x6F,0xD7,0xF9,0xDF,0x31,0x7E,0x77,0x44,0x0D,0x98,0xE0,0xCA,

+	0x98,0x09,0x52,0x04,0x90,0xEA,0x6D,0xF4,0x30,0x69,0x8F,0xB1,

+	0x9B,0xC1,0x43,0xDB,0xD5,0x8D,0xC8,0x8E,0xB6,0x0B,0x05,0xBE,

+	0x0E,0xC5,0x99,0xC8,0x6E,0x4E,0xF3,0xCB,0xC3,0x5E,0x9B,0x53,

+	0xF7,0x06,0x1C,0x4F,0xC7,0xB8,0x6E,0x30,0x18,0xCA,0x9B,0xB9,

+	0xBC,0x5F,0x17,0x72,0x29,0x5A,0xE5,0xD9,0x96,0xB7,0x0B,0xF3,

+	0x2D,0x8C,0xF1,0xE1,0x0E,0x0D,0x74,0xD5,0x9D,0xF0,0x06,0xA9,

+	0xB4,0x95,0x63,0x76,0x46,0x55,0x48,0x82,0x39,0x90,0xEF,0x56,

+	0x75,0x34,0xB8,0x34,0xC3,0x18,0x6E,0x1E,0xAD,0xE3,0x48,0x7E,

+	0x93,0x2C,0x23,0xE7,0xF8,0x90,0x73,0xB1,0x77,0x80,0x67,0xA9,

+	0x36,0x9E,0xDA,0xD2

+};

+

+static const unsigned char dh_test_2048_priv_key[] = {

+	0x0C,0x4B,0x30,0x89,0xD1,0xB8,0x62,0xCB,0x3C,0x43,0x64,0x91,

+	0xF0,0x91,0x54,0x70,0xC5,0x27,0x96,0xE3,0xAC,0xBE,0xE8,0x00,

+	0xEC,0x55,0xF6,0xCC

+};

+

+int FIPS_selftest_dh()

+	{

+	DH *dh = NULL;

+	int ret = 0;

+	void *pub_key = NULL;

+	int len;

+

+	dh = DH_new();

+

+	if(dh == NULL)

+		goto err;

+

+	fips_load_key_component(dh, p, dh_test_2048);

+	fips_load_key_component(dh, g, dh_test_2048);

+	/* note that the private key is much shorter than normally used

+	 * but still g ** priv_key > p

+	 */

+	fips_load_key_component(dh, priv_key, dh_test_2048);

+

+	if (DH_generate_key(dh) <= 0)

+		goto err;

+

+	len = BN_num_bytes(dh->pub_key);

+	if ((pub_key = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL)

+		goto err;

+	BN_bn2bin(dh->pub_key, pub_key);

+

+	if (len != sizeof(dh_test_2048_pub_key) ||

+		memcmp(pub_key, dh_test_2048_pub_key, len) != 0)

+		goto err;

+

+	ret = 1;

+

+	err:

+	if (dh)

+		DH_free(dh);

+

+	OPENSSL_free(pub_key);

+	return ret;

+	}

+#endif

diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/fips/fips_drbg_rand.c.fips-reqs openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/fips/fips_drbg_rand.c

--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/fips/fips_drbg_rand.c.fips-reqs	2013-12-18 12:17:09.757636808 +0100

+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/fips/fips_drbg_rand.c	2013-12-18 18:53:33.263711297 +0100

@@ -77,7 +77,8 @@ static int fips_drbg_bytes(unsigned char

 	int rv = 0;

 	unsigned char *adin = NULL;

 	size_t adinlen = 0;

-	CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);

+	int locked;

+	locked = private_RAND_lock(1);

 	do 

 		{

 		size_t rcnt;

@@ -109,7 +110,8 @@ static int fips_drbg_bytes(unsigned char

 	while (count);

 	rv = 1;

 	err:

-	CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);

+	if (locked)

+		private_RAND_lock(0);

 	return rv;

 	}

@@ -124,35 +126,51 @@ static int fips_drbg_status(void)

 	{

 	DRBG_CTX *dctx = &ossl_dctx;

 	int rv;

-	CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);

+	int locked;

+	locked = private_RAND_lock(1);

 	rv = dctx->status == DRBG_STATUS_READY ? 1 : 0;

-	CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);

+	if (locked)

+		private_RAND_lock(0);

 	return rv;

 	}

 static void fips_drbg_cleanup(void)

 	{

 	DRBG_CTX *dctx = &ossl_dctx;

-	CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);

+	int locked;

+	locked = private_RAND_lock(1);

 	FIPS_drbg_uninstantiate(dctx);

-	CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);

+	if (locked)

+		private_RAND_lock(0);

 	}

 static int fips_drbg_seed(const void *seed, int seedlen)

 	{

 	DRBG_CTX *dctx = &ossl_dctx;

+	int locked;

+	int ret = 1;

+

+	locked = private_RAND_lock(1);

 	if (dctx->rand_seed_cb)

-		return dctx->rand_seed_cb(dctx, seed, seedlen);

-	return 1;

+		ret = dctx->rand_seed_cb(dctx, seed, seedlen);

+	if (locked)

+		private_RAND_lock(0);

+	return ret;

 	}

 static int fips_drbg_add(const void *seed, int seedlen,

 					double add_entropy)

 	{

 	DRBG_CTX *dctx = &ossl_dctx;

+	int locked;

+	int ret = 1;

+

+	locked = private_RAND_lock(1);

 	if (dctx->rand_add_cb)

-		return dctx->rand_add_cb(dctx, seed, seedlen, add_entropy);

-	return 1;

+		ret = dctx->rand_add_cb(dctx, seed, seedlen, add_entropy);

+	if (locked)

+		private_RAND_lock(0);

+	return ret;

 	}

 static const RAND_METHOD rand_drbg_meth =

diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/fips/fips.h.fips-reqs openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/fips/fips.h

--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/fips/fips.h.fips-reqs	2013-12-18 12:17:09.000000000 +0100

+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/fips/fips.h	2013-12-18 17:13:00.928586689 +0100

@@ -96,6 +96,7 @@ void FIPS_corrupt_dsa_keygen(void);

 int FIPS_selftest_dsa(void);

 int FIPS_selftest_ecdsa(void);

 int FIPS_selftest_ecdh(void);

+int FIPS_selftest_dh(void);

 void FIPS_corrupt_rng(void);

 void FIPS_rng_stick(void);

 void FIPS_x931_stick(int onoff);

diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/fips/fips_post.c.fips-reqs openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/fips/fips_post.c

--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/fips/fips_post.c.fips-reqs	2013-12-18 12:17:09.000000000 +0100

+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/fips/fips_post.c	2013-12-18 17:12:26.721832716 +0100

@@ -99,6 +99,8 @@ int FIPS_selftest(void)

 		rv = 0;

 	if (!FIPS_selftest_dsa())

 		rv = 0;

+	if (!FIPS_selftest_dh())

+		rv = 0;

 	if (!FIPS_selftest_ecdh())

 		rv = 0;

 	return rv;

diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/fips/fips_rsa_selftest.c.fips-reqs openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/fips/fips_rsa_selftest.c

--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/fips/fips_rsa_selftest.c.fips-reqs	2013-12-18 12:17:09.761636893 +0100

+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/fips/fips_rsa_selftest.c	2013-12-18 12:17:09.799637708 +0100

@@ -340,6 +340,42 @@ static const unsigned char kat_RSA_X931_

   0x60, 0x83, 0x18, 0x88, 0xA3, 0xF5, 0x59, 0xC3

 };

+static int fips_rsa_encrypt_test(RSA *rsa, const unsigned char *plaintext, int ptlen)

+	{

+	unsigned char *ctbuf = NULL, *ptbuf = NULL;

+	int ret = 0;

+	int len;

+

+	ctbuf = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa));

+	if (!ctbuf)

+		goto err;

+

+	len = RSA_public_encrypt(ptlen, plaintext, ctbuf, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);

+	if (len <= 0)

+		goto err;

+	/* Check ciphertext doesn't match plaintext */

+	if (len >= ptlen && !memcmp(plaintext, ctbuf, ptlen))

+		goto err;

+

+	ptbuf = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa));

+	if (!ptbuf)

+		goto err;

+

+	len = RSA_private_decrypt(len, ctbuf, ptbuf, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);

+	if (len != ptlen)

+		goto err;

+	if (memcmp(ptbuf, plaintext, len))

+		goto err;

+

+	ret = 1;

+

+	err:

+	if (ctbuf)

+		OPENSSL_free(ctbuf);

+	if (ptbuf)

+		OPENSSL_free(ptbuf);

+	return ret;

+	}

 int FIPS_selftest_rsa()

 	{

@@ -353,7 +389,7 @@ int FIPS_selftest_rsa()

 	if ((pk=EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL)

 		goto err;

-	EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pk, key);

+	EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pk, key);

 	if (!fips_pkey_signature_test(pk, kat_tbs, sizeof(kat_tbs) - 1,

 				kat_RSA_SHA1, sizeof(kat_RSA_SHA1),

@@ -430,13 +466,15 @@ int FIPS_selftest_rsa()

 			"RSA SHA512 X931"))

 		goto err;

+	if (!fips_rsa_encrypt_test(key, kat_tbs, sizeof(kat_tbs) - 1))

+		goto err;

 	ret = 1;

 	err:

 	if (pk)

 		EVP_PKEY_free(pk);

-	else if (key)

+	if (key)

 		RSA_free(key);

 	return ret;

 	}

diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/fips/Makefile.fips-reqs openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/fips/Makefile

--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/fips/Makefile.fips-reqs	2013-12-18 12:17:20.000000000 +0100

+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/fips/Makefile	2013-12-18 17:14:20.348337362 +0100

@@ -24,13 +24,15 @@ LIBSRC=fips_aes_selftest.c fips_des_self

     fips_rsa_selftest.c fips_sha_selftest.c fips.c fips_dsa_selftest.c  fips_rand.c \

     fips_rsa_x931g.c fips_post.c fips_drbg_ctr.c fips_drbg_hash.c fips_drbg_hmac.c \

     fips_drbg_lib.c fips_drbg_rand.c fips_drbg_selftest.c fips_rand_lib.c \

-    fips_cmac_selftest.c fips_ecdh_selftest.c fips_ecdsa_selftest.c fips_enc.c fips_md.c

+    fips_cmac_selftest.c fips_ecdh_selftest.c fips_ecdsa_selftest.c fips_enc.c fips_md.c \

+    fips_dh_selftest.c

 LIBOBJ=fips_aes_selftest.o fips_des_selftest.o fips_hmac_selftest.o fips_rand_selftest.o \

     fips_rsa_selftest.o fips_sha_selftest.o fips.o fips_dsa_selftest.o  fips_rand.o \

     fips_rsa_x931g.o fips_post.o fips_drbg_ctr.o fips_drbg_hash.o fips_drbg_hmac.o \

     fips_drbg_lib.o fips_drbg_rand.o fips_drbg_selftest.o fips_rand_lib.o \

-    fips_cmac_selftest.o fips_ecdh_selftest.o fips_ecdsa_selftest.o fips_enc.o fips_md.o

+    fips_cmac_selftest.o fips_ecdh_selftest.o fips_ecdsa_selftest.o fips_enc.o fips_md.o \

+    fips_dh_selftest.o

 LIBCRYPTO=-L.. -lcrypto

diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/modes/gcm128.c.fips-reqs openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/modes/gcm128.c

--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/modes/gcm128.c.fips-reqs	2013-02-11 16:26:04.000000000 +0100

+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/modes/gcm128.c	2013-12-18 12:17:09.800637730 +0100

@@ -898,6 +898,10 @@ int CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(GCM128_CONTEXT

 # endif

 #endif

+	ctx->totlen += len;

+	if (ctx->totlen>(U64(1)<<36) || (sizeof(len)==8 && ctx->totlen

+		return -1;

+

 #if 0

 	n = (unsigned int)mlen%16; /* alternative to ctx->mres */

 #endif

@@ -1200,6 +1204,10 @@ int CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt_ctr32(GCM128_C

 # endif

 #endif

+	ctx->totlen += len;

+	if (ctx->totlen>(U64(1)<<36) || (sizeof(len)==8 && ctx->totlen

+		return -1;

+

 	mlen += len;

 	if (mlen>((U64(1)<<36)-32) || (sizeof(len)==8 && mlen

 		return -1;

diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/modes/modes_lcl.h.fips-reqs openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/modes/modes_lcl.h

--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/modes/modes_lcl.h.fips-reqs	2013-12-18 12:17:09.388628895 +0100

+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/modes/modes_lcl.h	2013-12-18 12:17:09.800637730 +0100

@@ -115,6 +115,7 @@ struct gcm128_context {

 	unsigned int mres, ares;

 	block128_f block;

 	void *key;

+	u64 totlen;

 };

 struct xts128_context {

diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rand/md_rand.c.fips-reqs openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rand/md_rand.c

--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rand/md_rand.c.fips-reqs	2013-12-18 12:17:09.763636936 +0100

+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rand/md_rand.c	2013-12-18 12:17:09.800637730 +0100

@@ -143,12 +143,6 @@ static long md_count[2]={0,0};

 static double entropy=0;

 static int initialized=0;

-static unsigned int crypto_lock_rand = 0; /* may be set only when a thread

-                                           * holds CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND

-                                           * (to prevent double locking) */

-/* access to lockin_thread is synchronized by CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2 */

-static CRYPTO_THREADID locking_threadid; /* valid iff crypto_lock_rand is set */

-

 #ifdef PREDICT

 int rand_predictable=0;

@@ -196,7 +190,7 @@ static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *

 	long md_c[2];

 	unsigned char local_md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH];

 	EVP_MD_CTX m;

-	int do_not_lock;

+	int locked;

 	/*

 	 * (Based on the rand(3) manpage)

@@ -213,19 +207,8 @@ static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *

          * hash function.

 	 */

-	/* check if we already have the lock */

-	if (crypto_lock_rand)

-		{

-		CRYPTO_THREADID cur;

-		CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&cur);

-		CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);

-		do_not_lock = !CRYPTO_THREADID_cmp(&locking_threadid, &cur);

-		CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);

-		}

-	else

-		do_not_lock = 0;

+	locked = private_RAND_lock(1);

-	if (!do_not_lock) CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);

 	st_idx=state_index;

 	/* use our own copies of the counters so that even

@@ -257,7 +240,8 @@ static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *

 	md_count[1] += (num / MD_DIGEST_LENGTH) + (num % MD_DIGEST_LENGTH > 0);

-	if (!do_not_lock) CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);

+	if (locked)

+		private_RAND_lock(0);

 	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&m);

 	for (i=0; i

@@ -308,7 +292,7 @@ static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *

 		}

 	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&m);

-	if (!do_not_lock) CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);

+	locked = private_RAND_lock(1);

 	/* Don't just copy back local_md into md -- this could mean that

 	 * other thread's seeding remains without effect (except for

 	 * the incremented counter).  By XORing it we keep at least as

@@ -319,7 +303,8 @@ static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *

 		}

 	if (entropy < ENTROPY_NEEDED) /* stop counting when we have enough */

 	    entropy += add;

-	if (!do_not_lock) CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);

+	if (locked)

+		private_RAND_lock(0);

 #if !defined(OPENSSL_THREADS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32)

 	assert(md_c[1] == md_count[1]);

@@ -344,6 +329,7 @@ static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned ch

 	pid_t curr_pid = getpid();

 #endif

 	int do_stir_pool = 0;

+	int locked;

 #ifdef PREDICT

 	if (rand_predictable)

@@ -381,13 +367,7 @@ static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned ch

 	 * global 'md'.

 	 */

-	CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);

-

-	/* prevent ssleay_rand_bytes() from trying to obtain the lock again */

-	CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);

-	CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&locking_threadid);

-	CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);

-	crypto_lock_rand = 1;

+	locked = private_RAND_lock(1);

 	/* always poll for external entropy in FIPS mode, drbg provides the 

 	 * expansion

@@ -461,9 +441,8 @@ static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned ch

 	md_count[0] += 1;

-	/* before unlocking, we must clear 'crypto_lock_rand' */

-	crypto_lock_rand = 0;

-	CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);

+	if (locked)

+		private_RAND_lock(0);

 	while (num > 0)

 		{

@@ -515,10 +494,11 @@ static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned ch

 	MD_Init(&m);

 	MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]),sizeof(md_c));

 	MD_Update(&m,local_md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH);

-	CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);

+	locked = private_RAND_lock(1);

 	MD_Update(&m,md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH);

 	MD_Final(&m,md);

-	CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);

+	if (locked)

+		private_RAND_lock(0);

 	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&m);

 	if (ok)

@@ -548,32 +528,10 @@ static int ssleay_rand_pseudo_bytes(unsi

 static int ssleay_rand_status(void)

 	{

-	CRYPTO_THREADID cur;

 	int ret;

-	int do_not_lock;

+	int locked;

-	CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&cur);

-	/* check if we already have the lock

-	 * (could happen if a RAND_poll() implementation calls RAND_status()) */

-	if (crypto_lock_rand)

-		{

-		CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);

-		do_not_lock = !CRYPTO_THREADID_cmp(&locking_threadid, &cur);

-		CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);

-		}

-	else

-		do_not_lock = 0;

-	

-	if (!do_not_lock)

-		{

-		CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);

-		

-		/* prevent ssleay_rand_bytes() from trying to obtain the lock again */

-		CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);

-		CRYPTO_THREADID_cpy(&locking_threadid, &cur);

-		CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);

-		crypto_lock_rand = 1;

-		}

+	locked = private_RAND_lock(1);

 	if (!initialized)

 		{

@@ -583,13 +541,8 @@ static int ssleay_rand_status(void)

 	ret = entropy >= ENTROPY_NEEDED;

-	if (!do_not_lock)

-		{

-		/* before unlocking, we must clear 'crypto_lock_rand' */

-		crypto_lock_rand = 0;

-		

-		CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);

-		}

+	if (locked)

+		private_RAND_lock(0);

 	return ret;

 	}

diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rand/rand.h.fips-reqs openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rand/rand.h

--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rand/rand.h.fips-reqs	2013-12-18 12:17:09.764636958 +0100

+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rand/rand.h	2013-12-18 12:17:09.800637730 +0100

@@ -124,6 +124,8 @@ void RAND_set_fips_drbg_type(int type, i

 int RAND_init_fips(void);

 #endif

+int private_RAND_lock(int lock);

+

 /* BEGIN ERROR CODES */

 /* The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes

  * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run.

diff -up openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h.fips-reqs openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h

--- openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h.fips-reqs	2013-12-18 12:17:09.507631447 +0100

+++ openssl-1.0.1e/crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h	2013-12-18 12:17:09.800637730 +0100

@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@

 #ifndef HEADER_RAND_LCL_H