diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-CVE-2016-3115.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-CVE-2016-3115.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ed6d264
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-CVE-2016-3115.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
+index 9a75c62..4859245 100644
+--- a/session.c
++++ b/session.c
+@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@
+
+ #include <arpa/inet.h>
+
++#include <ctype.h>
+ #include <errno.h>
+ #include <fcntl.h>
+ #include <grp.h>
+@@ -292,6 +293,21 @@ do_authenticated(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ do_cleanup(authctxt);
+ }
+
++/* Check untrusted xauth strings for metacharacters */
++static int
++xauth_valid_string(const char *s)
++{
++ size_t i;
++
++ for (i = 0; s[i] != '\0'; i++) {
++ if (!isalnum((u_char)s[i]) &&
++ s[i] != '.' && s[i] != ':' && s[i] != '/' &&
++ s[i] != '-' && s[i] != '_')
++ return 0;
++ }
++ return 1;
++}
++
+ /*
+ * Prepares for an interactive session. This is called after the user has
+ * been successfully authenticated. During this message exchange, pseudo
+@@ -365,7 +381,13 @@ do_authenticated1(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ s->screen = 0;
+ }
+ packet_check_eom();
+- success = session_setup_x11fwd(s);
++ if (xauth_valid_string(s->auth_proto) &&
++ xauth_valid_string(s->auth_data))
++ success = session_setup_x11fwd(s);
++ else {
++ success = 0;
++ error("Invalid X11 forwarding data");
++ }
+ if (!success) {
+ free(s->auth_proto);
+ free(s->auth_data);
+@@ -2219,7 +2241,13 @@ session_x11_req(Session *s)
+ s->screen = packet_get_int();
+ packet_check_eom();
+
+- success = session_setup_x11fwd(s);
++ if (xauth_valid_string(s->auth_proto) &&
++ xauth_valid_string(s->auth_data))
++ success = session_setup_x11fwd(s);
++ else {
++ success = 0;
++ error("Invalid X11 forwarding data");
++ }
+ if (!success) {
+ free(s->auth_proto);
+ free(s->auth_data);
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-fallback-X11-untrusted.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-fallback-X11-untrusted.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b7e7a7e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-fallback-X11-untrusted.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,387 @@
+From f98a09cacff7baad8748c9aa217afd155a4d493f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "mmcc@openbsd.org" <mmcc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue, 20 Oct 2015 03:36:35 +0000
+Subject: upstream commit
+
+Replace a function-local allocation with stack memory.
+
+ok djm@
+
+Upstream-ID: c09fbbab637053a2ab9f33ca142b4e20a4c5a17e
+---
+ clientloop.c | 9 ++-------
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/clientloop.c b/clientloop.c
+index 87ceb3d..1e05cba 100644
+--- a/clientloop.c
++++ b/clientloop.c
+@@ -311,11 +311,10 @@ client_x11_get_proto(const char *display, const char *xauth_path,
+ static char proto[512], data[512];
+ FILE *f;
+ int got_data = 0, generated = 0, do_unlink = 0, i;
+- char *xauthdir, *xauthfile;
++ char xauthdir[MAXPATHLEN] = "", xauthfile[MAXPATHLEN] = "";
+ struct stat st;
+ u_int now, x11_timeout_real;
+
+- xauthdir = xauthfile = NULL;
+ *_proto = proto;
+ *_data = data;
+ proto[0] = data[0] = '\0';
+@@ -343,8 +342,6 @@ client_x11_get_proto(const char *display, const char *xauth_path,
+ display = xdisplay;
+ }
+ if (trusted == 0) {
+- xauthdir = xmalloc(MAXPATHLEN);
+- xauthfile = xmalloc(MAXPATHLEN);
+ mktemp_proto(xauthdir, MAXPATHLEN);
+ /*
+ * The authentication cookie should briefly outlive
+@@ -407,8 +404,6 @@ client_x11_get_proto(const char *display, const char *xauth_path,
+ unlink(xauthfile);
+ rmdir(xauthdir);
+ }
+- free(xauthdir);
+- free(xauthfile);
+
+ /*
+ * If we didn't get authentication data, just make up some
+--
+cgit v0.11.2
+
+From ed4ce82dbfa8a3a3c8ea6fa0db113c71e234416c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "djm@openbsd.org" <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed, 13 Jan 2016 23:04:47 +0000
+Subject: upstream commit
+
+eliminate fallback from untrusted X11 forwarding to trusted
+ forwarding when the X server disables the SECURITY extension; Reported by
+ Thomas Hoger; ok deraadt@
+
+Upstream-ID: f76195bd2064615a63ef9674a0e4096b0713f938
+---
+ clientloop.c | 114 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------------
+ clientloop.h | 4 +--
+ mux.c | 22 ++++++------
+ ssh.c | 23 +++++-------
+ 4 files changed, 93 insertions(+), 70 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/clientloop.c b/clientloop.c
+index f555451..c0386d5 100644
+--- a/clientloop.c
++++ b/clientloop.c
+@@ -288,6 +288,9 @@ client_x11_display_valid(const char *display)
+ {
+ size_t i, dlen;
+
++ if (display == NULL)
++ return 0;
++
+ dlen = strlen(display);
+ for (i = 0; i < dlen; i++) {
+ if (!isalnum((u_char)display[i]) &&
+@@ -301,34 +304,33 @@ client_x11_display_valid(const char *display)
+
+ #define SSH_X11_PROTO "MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1"
+ #define X11_TIMEOUT_SLACK 60
+-void
++int
+ client_x11_get_proto(const char *display, const char *xauth_path,
+ u_int trusted, u_int timeout, char **_proto, char **_data)
+ {
+- char cmd[1024];
+- char line[512];
+- char xdisplay[512];
++ char cmd[1024], line[512], xdisplay[512];
++ char xauthfile[MAXPATHLEN], xauthdir[MAXPATHLEN];
+ static char proto[512], data[512];
+ FILE *f;
+- int got_data = 0, generated = 0, do_unlink = 0, i;
+- char xauthdir[MAXPATHLEN] = "", xauthfile[MAXPATHLEN] = "";
++ int got_data = 0, generated = 0, do_unlink = 0, i, r;
+ struct stat st;
+ u_int now, x11_timeout_real;
+
+ *_proto = proto;
+ *_data = data;
+- proto[0] = data[0] = '\0';
++ proto[0] = data[0] = xauthfile[0] = xauthdir[0] = '\0';
+
+- if (xauth_path == NULL ||(stat(xauth_path, &st) == -1)) {
+- debug("No xauth program.");
+- } else if (!client_x11_display_valid(display)) {
+- logit("DISPLAY '%s' invalid, falling back to fake xauth data",
++ if (!client_x11_display_valid(display)) {
++ logit("DISPLAY \"%s\" invalid; disabling X11 forwarding",
+ display);
+- } else {
+- if (display == NULL) {
+- debug("x11_get_proto: DISPLAY not set");
+- return;
+- }
++ return -1;
++ }
++ if (xauth_path != NULL && stat(xauth_path, &st) == -1) {
++ debug("No xauth program.");
++ xauth_path = NULL;
++ }
++
++ if (xauth_path != NULL) {
+ /*
+ * Handle FamilyLocal case where $DISPLAY does
+ * not match an authorization entry. For this we
+@@ -337,43 +339,60 @@ client_x11_get_proto(const char *display, const char *xauth_path,
+ * is not perfect.
+ */
+ if (strncmp(display, "localhost:", 10) == 0) {
+- snprintf(xdisplay, sizeof(xdisplay), "unix:%s",
+- display + 10);
++ if ((r = snprintf(xdisplay, sizeof(xdisplay), "unix:%s",
++ display + 10)) < 0 ||
++ (size_t)r >= sizeof(xdisplay)) {
++ error("%s: display name too long", __func__);
++ return -1;
++ }
+ display = xdisplay;
+ }
+ if (trusted == 0) {
+- mktemp_proto(xauthdir, MAXPATHLEN);
+ /*
++ * Generate an untrusted X11 auth cookie.
++ *
+ * The authentication cookie should briefly outlive
+ * ssh's willingness to forward X11 connections to
+ * avoid nasty fail-open behaviour in the X server.
+ */
++ mktemp_proto(xauthdir, sizeof(xauthdir));
++ if (mkdtemp(xauthdir) == NULL) {
++ error("%s: mkdtemp: %s",
++ __func__, strerror(errno));
++ return -1;
++ }
++ do_unlink = 1;
++ if ((r = snprintf(xauthfile, sizeof(xauthfile),
++ "%s/xauthfile", xauthdir)) < 0 ||
++ (size_t)r >= sizeof(xauthfile)) {
++ error("%s: xauthfile path too long", __func__);
++ unlink(xauthfile);
++ rmdir(xauthdir);
++ return -1;
++ }
++
+ if (timeout >= UINT_MAX - X11_TIMEOUT_SLACK)
+ x11_timeout_real = UINT_MAX;
+ else
+ x11_timeout_real = timeout + X11_TIMEOUT_SLACK;
+- if (mkdtemp(xauthdir) != NULL) {
+- do_unlink = 1;
+- snprintf(xauthfile, MAXPATHLEN, "%s/xauthfile",
+- xauthdir);
+- snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd),
+- "%s -f %s generate %s " SSH_X11_PROTO
+- " untrusted timeout %u 2>" _PATH_DEVNULL,
+- xauth_path, xauthfile, display,
+- x11_timeout_real);
+- debug2("x11_get_proto: %s", cmd);
+- if (x11_refuse_time == 0) {
+- now = monotime() + 1;
+- if (UINT_MAX - timeout < now)
+- x11_refuse_time = UINT_MAX;
+- else
+- x11_refuse_time = now + timeout;
+- channel_set_x11_refuse_time(
+- x11_refuse_time);
+- }
+- if (system(cmd) == 0)
+- generated = 1;
++ if ((r = snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd),
++ "%s -f %s generate %s " SSH_X11_PROTO
++ " untrusted timeout %u 2>" _PATH_DEVNULL,
++ xauth_path, xauthfile, display,
++ x11_timeout_real)) < 0 ||
++ (size_t)r >= sizeof(cmd))
++ fatal("%s: cmd too long", __func__);
++ debug2("%s: %s", __func__, cmd);
++ if (x11_refuse_time == 0) {
++ now = monotime() + 1;
++ if (UINT_MAX - timeout < now)
++ x11_refuse_time = UINT_MAX;
++ else
++ x11_refuse_time = now + timeout;
++ channel_set_x11_refuse_time(x11_refuse_time);
+ }
++ if (system(cmd) == 0)
++ generated = 1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+@@ -395,9 +414,7 @@ client_x11_get_proto(const char *display, const char *xauth_path,
+ got_data = 1;
+ if (f)
+ pclose(f);
+- } else
+- error("Warning: untrusted X11 forwarding setup failed: "
+- "xauth key data not generated");
++ }
+ }
+
+ if (do_unlink) {
+@@ -405,6 +422,13 @@ client_x11_get_proto(const char *display, const char *xauth_path,
+ rmdir(xauthdir);
+ }
+
++ /* Don't fall back to fake X11 data for untrusted forwarding */
++ if (!trusted && !got_data) {
++ error("Warning: untrusted X11 forwarding setup failed: "
++ "xauth key data not generated");
++ return -1;
++ }
++
+ /*
+ * If we didn't get authentication data, just make up some
+ * data. The forwarding code will check the validity of the
+@@ -427,6 +451,8 @@ client_x11_get_proto(const char *display, const char *xauth_path,
+ rnd >>= 8;
+ }
+ }
++
++ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+diff --git a/clientloop.h b/clientloop.h
+index 338d451..f4d4c69 100644
+--- a/clientloop.h
++++ b/clientloop.h
+@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@
+
+ /* Client side main loop for the interactive session. */
+ int client_loop(int, int, int);
+-void client_x11_get_proto(const char *, const char *, u_int, u_int,
++int client_x11_get_proto(const char *, const char *, u_int, u_int,
+ char **, char **);
+ void client_global_request_reply_fwd(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+ void client_session2_setup(int, int, int, const char *, struct termios *,
+diff --git a/mux.c b/mux.c
+index f9c3af6..6bf53eb 100644
+--- a/mux.c
++++ b/mux.c
+@@ -1354,16 +1354,18 @@ mux_session_confirm(int id, int success, void *arg)
+ char *proto, *data;
+
+ /* Get reasonable local authentication information. */
+- client_x11_get_proto(display, options.xauth_location,
++ if (client_x11_get_proto(display, options.xauth_location,
+ options.forward_x11_trusted, options.forward_x11_timeout,
+- &proto, &data);
+- /* Request forwarding with authentication spoofing. */
+- debug("Requesting X11 forwarding with authentication "
+- "spoofing.");
+- x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(id, display, proto,
+- data, 1);
+- client_expect_confirm(id, "X11 forwarding", CONFIRM_WARN);
+- /* XXX exit_on_forward_failure */
++ &proto, &data) == 0) {
++ /* Request forwarding with authentication spoofing. */
++ debug("Requesting X11 forwarding with authentication "
++ "spoofing.");
++ x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(id, display, proto,
++ data, 1);
++ /* XXX exit_on_forward_failure */
++ client_expect_confirm(id, "X11 forwarding",
++ CONFIRM_WARN);
++ }
+ }
+
+ if (cctx->want_agent_fwd && options.forward_agent) {
+diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c
+index 81704ab..096c5b5 100644
+--- a/ssh.c
++++ b/ssh.c
+@@ -1626,6 +1626,7 @@ ssh_session(void)
+ struct winsize ws;
+ char *cp;
+ const char *display;
++ char *proto = NULL, *data = NULL;
+
+ /* Enable compression if requested. */
+ if (options.compression) {
+@@ -1696,13 +1697,9 @@ ssh_session(void)
+ }
+ /* Request X11 forwarding if enabled and DISPLAY is set. */
+ display = getenv("DISPLAY");
+- if (options.forward_x11 && display != NULL) {
+- char *proto, *data;
+- /* Get reasonable local authentication information. */
+- client_x11_get_proto(display, options.xauth_location,
+- options.forward_x11_trusted,
+- options.forward_x11_timeout,
+- &proto, &data);
++ if (options.forward_x11 && client_x11_get_proto(display,
++ options.xauth_location, options.forward_x11_trusted,
++ options.forward_x11_timeout, &proto, &data) == 0) {
+ /* Request forwarding with authentication spoofing. */
+ debug("Requesting X11 forwarding with authentication "
+ "spoofing.");
+@@ -1792,6 +1789,7 @@ ssh_session2_setup(int id, int success, void *arg)
+ extern char **environ;
+ const char *display;
+ int interactive = tty_flag;
++ char *proto = NULL, *data = NULL;
+
+ if (!success)
+ return; /* No need for error message, channels code sens one */
+@@ -1799,12 +1797,9 @@ ssh_session2_setup(int id, int success, void *arg)
+ return; /* No need for error message, channels code sens one */
+
+ display = getenv("DISPLAY");
+- if (options.forward_x11 && display != NULL) {
+- char *proto, *data;
+- /* Get reasonable local authentication information. */
+- client_x11_get_proto(display, options.xauth_location,
+- options.forward_x11_trusted,
+- options.forward_x11_timeout, &proto, &data);
++ if (options.forward_x11 && client_x11_get_proto(display,
++ options.xauth_location, options.forward_x11_trusted,
++ options.forward_x11_timeout, &proto, &data) == 0) {
+ /* Request forwarding with authentication spoofing. */
+ debug("Requesting X11 forwarding with authentication "
+ "spoofing.");
+--
+cgit v0.11.2
+
+From 5658ef2501e785fbbdf5de2dc33b1ff7a4dca73a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "millert@openbsd.org" <millert@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon, 1 Feb 2016 21:18:17 +0000
+Subject: upstream commit
+
+Avoid ugly "DISPLAY "(null)" invalid; disabling X11
+ forwarding" message when DISPLAY is not set. This could also result in a
+ crash on systems with a printf that doesn't handle NULL. OK djm@
+
+Upstream-ID: 20ee0cfbda678a247264c20ed75362042b90b412
+---
+ clientloop.c | 7 ++++---
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/clientloop.c b/clientloop.c
+index f8f9a3f..f0a08f2 100644
+--- a/clientloop.c
++++ b/clientloop.c
+@@ -318,8 +318,9 @@ client_x11_get_proto(const char *display, const char *xauth_path,
+ proto[0] = data[0] = xauthfile[0] = xauthdir[0] = '\0';
+
+ if (!client_x11_display_valid(display)) {
+- logit("DISPLAY \"%s\" invalid; disabling X11 forwarding",
+- display);
++ if (display != NULL)
++ logit("DISPLAY \"%s\" invalid; disabling X11 forwarding",
++ display);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (xauth_path != NULL && stat(xauth_path, &st) == -1) {
+--
+cgit v0.11.2
+
+
diff --git a/SPECS/openssh.spec b/SPECS/openssh.spec
index 7bedbaf..d13eff8 100644
--- a/SPECS/openssh.spec
+++ b/SPECS/openssh.spec
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@
# Do not forget to bump pam_ssh_agent_auth release if you rewind the main package release to 1
%define openssh_ver 6.6.1p1
-%define openssh_rel 23
+%define openssh_rel 25
%define pam_ssh_agent_ver 0.9.3
%define pam_ssh_agent_rel 9
@@ -246,6 +246,10 @@ Patch929: openssh-6.6p1-security-7.0.patch
# Disable completely Roaming feature on client (#1298218) (#1298217)
# Mitigates CVE-2016-0777 and CVE-2016-0778
Patch930: openssh-6.6p1-disable-roaming.patch
+# CVE-2016-3115: missing sanitisation of input for X11 forwarding (#1316829)
+Patch931: openssh-6.6p1-CVE-2016-3115.patch
+# CVE-2016-1908: possible fallback from untrusted X11 forwarding (#1298741)
+Patch932: openssh-6.6p1-fallback-X11-untrusted.patch
License: BSD
@@ -481,6 +485,8 @@ popd
%patch928 -p1 -b .gsskexalg
%patch929 -p1 -b .security7
%patch930 -p1 -b .roaming
+%patch931 -p1 -b .xauth
+%patch932 -p1 -b .untrusted
%patch200 -p1 -b .audit
%patch201 -p1 -b .audit-fps
@@ -805,6 +811,12 @@ getent passwd sshd >/dev/null || \
%endif
%changelog
+* Wed Mar 16 2016 Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com> 6.6.1p1-25 + 0.9.3-9
+- CVE-2016-1908: possible fallback from untrusted to trusted X11 forwarding (#1298741)
+
+* Tue Mar 15 2016 Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com> 6.6.1p1-24 + 0.9.3-9
+- CVE-2016-3115: missing sanitisation of input for X11 forwarding (#1317818)
+
* Wed Jan 13 2016 Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com> 6.6.1p1-23 + 0.9.3-9
- Disable undocumented feauture Roaming for good (#1298218)
- prevents CVE-2016-0777 and CVE-2016-0778