diff --git a/.gitignore b/.gitignore
index 5dd3f0b..9614d59 100644
--- a/.gitignore
+++ b/.gitignore
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
-SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1.tar.gz
-SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3.tar.bz2
+SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1.tar.gz
+SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3.tar.bz2
diff --git a/.openssh.metadata b/.openssh.metadata
index a78a9c0..35bfd8e 100644
--- a/.openssh.metadata
+++ b/.openssh.metadata
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
-b850fd1af704942d9b3c2eff7ef6b3a59b6a6b6e SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1.tar.gz
-5761a2d5e3ea29e0b415424338d27deaabdd75f4 SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3.tar.bz2
+2330bbf82ed08cf3ac70e0acf00186ef3eeb97e0 SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1.tar.gz
+a4482a050fdad1d012427e45799564136708cf6b SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3.tar.bz2
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-4.3p2-askpass-grab-info.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-4.3p2-askpass-grab-info.patch
index e9dc835..e9a0b0d 100644
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-4.3p2-askpass-grab-info.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-4.3p2-askpass-grab-info.patch
@@ -1,7 +1,8 @@
---- openssh-4.3p2/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.grab-info 2006-07-17 15:10:11.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-4.3p2/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c 2006-07-17 15:25:04.000000000 +0200
-@@ -65,9 +65,12 @@
- err = gtk_message_dialog_new(NULL, 0,
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.grab-info openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.grab-info 2016-12-23 13:31:22.645213115 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c 2016-12-23 13:31:40.997216691 +0100
+@@ -65,9 +65,12 @@ report_failed_grab (GtkWidget *parent_wi
+ err = gtk_message_dialog_new(GTK_WINDOW(parent_window), 0,
GTK_MESSAGE_ERROR,
GTK_BUTTONS_CLOSE,
- "Could not grab %s. "
@@ -14,5 +15,5 @@
+ "Either close the application which grabs the %s or "
+ "log out and log in again to prevent this from happening.", what, what);
gtk_window_set_position(GTK_WINDOW(err), GTK_WIN_POS_CENTER);
- gtk_label_set_line_wrap(GTK_LABEL((GTK_MESSAGE_DIALOG(err))->label),
- TRUE);
+
+ gtk_dialog_run(GTK_DIALOG(err));
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-5.1p1-askpass-progress.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-5.1p1-askpass-progress.patch
index ec93b87..6601fbf 100644
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-5.1p1-askpass-progress.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-5.1p1-askpass-progress.patch
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
-diff -up openssh-5.1p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.progress openssh-5.1p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
---- openssh-5.1p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.progress 2008-07-23 19:05:26.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-5.1p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c 2008-07-23 19:05:26.000000000 +0200
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.progress openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.progress 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c 2016-12-23 13:31:16.545211926 +0100
@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ diff -up openssh-5.1p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.progress openssh-5.1p1/contr
#include <gtk/gtk.h>
#include <gdk/gdkx.h>
-@@ -83,13 +84,24 @@ ok_dialog(GtkWidget *entry, gpointer dia
+@@ -81,13 +82,24 @@ ok_dialog(GtkWidget *entry, gpointer dia
gtk_dialog_response(GTK_DIALOG(dialog), GTK_RESPONSE_OK);
}
@@ -30,12 +30,12 @@ diff -up openssh-5.1p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.progress openssh-5.1p1/contr
const char *failed;
char *passphrase, *local;
int result, grab_tries, grab_server, grab_pointer;
-- GtkWidget *dialog, *entry;
-+ GtkWidget *dialog, *entry, *progress, *hbox;
+- GtkWidget *parent_window, *dialog, *entry;
++ GtkWidget *parent_window, *dialog, *entry, *progress, *hbox;
GdkGrabStatus status;
grab_server = (getenv("GNOME_SSH_ASKPASS_GRAB_SERVER") != NULL);
-@@ -102,13 +114,31 @@ passphrase_dialog(char *message)
+@@ -104,14 +116,32 @@ passphrase_dialog(char *message)
"%s",
message);
@@ -45,9 +45,11 @@ diff -up openssh-5.1p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.progress openssh-5.1p1/contr
+ gtk_widget_show(hbox);
+
entry = gtk_entry_new();
-- gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(GTK_DIALOG(dialog)->vbox), entry, FALSE,
-+ gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(hbox), entry, TRUE,
- FALSE, 0);
+ gtk_box_pack_start(
+- GTK_BOX(gtk_dialog_get_content_area(GTK_DIALOG(dialog))), entry,
+- FALSE, FALSE, 0);
++ GTK_BOX(hbox), entry,
++ TRUE, FALSE, 0);
+ gtk_entry_set_width_chars(GTK_ENTRY(entry), 2);
gtk_entry_set_visibility(GTK_ENTRY(entry), FALSE);
gtk_widget_grab_focus(entry);
@@ -68,7 +70,7 @@ diff -up openssh-5.1p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.progress openssh-5.1p1/contr
gtk_window_set_title(GTK_WINDOW(dialog), "OpenSSH");
gtk_window_set_position (GTK_WINDOW(dialog), GTK_WIN_POS_CENTER);
gtk_window_set_keep_above(GTK_WINDOW(dialog), TRUE);
-@@ -119,6 +149,8 @@ passphrase_dialog(char *message)
+@@ -120,6 +150,8 @@ passphrase_dialog(char *message)
gtk_dialog_set_default_response(GTK_DIALOG(dialog), GTK_RESPONSE_OK);
g_signal_connect(G_OBJECT(entry), "activate",
G_CALLBACK(ok_dialog), dialog);
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-5.5p1-x11.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-5.5p1-x11.patch
index 70a3c85..91e82ef 100644
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-5.5p1-x11.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-5.5p1-x11.patch
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
diff -up openssh-5.3p1/channels.c.bz595935 openssh-5.3p1/channels.c
--- openssh-5.3p1/channels.c.bz595935 2010-08-12 14:19:28.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-5.3p1/channels.c 2010-08-12 14:33:51.000000000 +0200
-@@ -3185,7 +3185,7 @@ x11_create_display_inet(int x11_display_
+@@ -3990,21 +3990,24 @@ x11_create_display_inet(int x11_display_
}
static int
@@ -10,14 +10,16 @@ diff -up openssh-5.3p1/channels.c.bz595935 openssh-5.3p1/channels.c
{
int sock;
struct sockaddr_un addr;
-@@ -3195,11 +3195,14 @@ connect_local_xsocket_path(const char *p
+
++ if (len <= 0)
++ return -1;
+ sock = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
+ if (sock < 0)
error("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
- strlcpy(addr.sun_path, pathname, sizeof addr.sun_path);
- if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr)) == 0)
-+ if (len <= 0)
-+ return -1;
+ if (len > sizeof addr.sun_path)
+ len = sizeof addr.sun_path;
+ memcpy(addr.sun_path, pathname, len);
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-5.8p1-packet.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-5.8p1-packet.patch
index 4951af6..7b1a985 100644
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-5.8p1-packet.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-5.8p1-packet.patch
@@ -5,8 +5,8 @@ diff -up openssh-5.8p1/packet.c.packet openssh-5.8p1/packet.c
struct sockaddr_storage from, to;
socklen_t fromlen, tolen;
-+ if (!active_state)
++ if (!state)
+ return 0;
- /* filedescriptors in and out are the same, so it's a socket */
- if (active_state->connection_in == active_state->connection_out)
- return 1;
+ if (state->connection_in == -1 || state->connection_out == -1)
+ return 0;
+
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-5618210618256bbf5f4f71b2887ff186fd451736.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-5618210618256bbf5f4f71b2887ff186fd451736.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 44da114..0000000
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-5618210618256bbf5f4f71b2887ff186fd451736.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,177 +0,0 @@
-From 5618210618256bbf5f4f71b2887ff186fd451736 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Sun, 20 Apr 2014 13:44:47 +1000
-Subject: [PATCH] - (djm) [bufaux.c compat.c compat.h sshconnect2.c sshd.c
- version.h] OpenSSH 6.5 and 6.6 sometimes encode a value used in the
- curve25519 key exchange incorrectly, causing connection failures about
- 0.2% of the time when this method is used against a peer that implements
- the method properly.
-
- Fix the problem and disable the curve25519 KEX when speaking to
- OpenSSH 6.5 or 6.6. This version will identify itself as 6.6.1
- to enable the compatability code.
----
- ChangeLog | 11 +++++++++++
- bufaux.c | 5 ++++-
- compat.c | 17 ++++++++++++++++-
- compat.h | 2 ++
- sshconnect2.c | 2 ++
- sshd.c | 3 +++
- version.h | 2 +-
- 7 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
-index 1603a07..928999d 100644
---- a/ChangeLog
-+++ b/ChangeLog
-@@ -1,13 +1,23 @@
- 20140420
-- - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/01 03:34:10
-- [sshconnect.c]
-- When using VerifyHostKeyDNS with a DNSSEC resolver, down-convert any
-- certificate keys to plain keys and attempt SSHFP resolution.
--
-- Prevents a server from skipping SSHFP lookup and forcing a new-hostkey
-- dialog by offering only certificate keys.
--
-- Reported by mcv21 AT cam.ac.uk
-+ - (djm) [bufaux.c compat.c compat.h sshconnect2.c sshd.c version.h]
-+ OpenSSH 6.5 and 6.6 sometimes encode a value used in the curve25519
-+ key exchange incorrectly, causing connection failures about 0.2% of
-+ the time when this method is used against a peer that implements
-+ the method properly.
-+
-+ Fix the problem and disable the curve25519 KEX when speaking to
-+ OpenSSH 6.5 or 6.6. This version will identify itself as 6.6.1
-+ to enable the compatability code.
-+
-+ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/01 03:34:10
-+ [sshconnect.c]
-+ When using VerifyHostKeyDNS with a DNSSEC resolver, down-convert any
-+ certificate keys to plain keys and attempt SSHFP resolution.
-+
-+ Prevents a server from skipping SSHFP lookup and forcing a new-hostkey
-+ dialog by offering only certificate keys.
-+
-+ Reported by mcv21 AT cam.ac.uk
-
- 20140313
- - (djm) Release OpenSSH 6.6
-diff --git a/bufaux.c b/bufaux.c
-index e24b5fc..f6a6f2a 100644
---- a/bufaux.c
-+++ b/bufaux.c
-@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
--/* $OpenBSD: bufaux.c,v 1.56 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */
-+/* $OpenBSD: bufaux.c,v 1.57 2014/04/16 23:22:45 djm Exp $ */
- /*
- * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
- * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
-@@ -372,6 +372,9 @@ buffer_put_bignum2_from_string(Buffer *buffer, const u_char *s, u_int l)
-
- if (l > 8 * 1024)
- fatal("%s: length %u too long", __func__, l);
-+ /* Skip leading zero bytes */
-+ for (; l > 0 && *s == 0; l--, s++)
-+ ;
- p = buf = xmalloc(l + 1);
- /*
- * If most significant bit is set then prepend a zero byte to
-diff --git a/compat.c b/compat.c
-index 9d9fabe..2709dc5 100644
---- a/compat.c
-+++ b/compat.c
-@@ -95,6 +95,9 @@ compat_datafellows(const char *version)
- { "Sun_SSH_1.0*", SSH_BUG_NOREKEY|SSH_BUG_EXTEOF},
- { "OpenSSH_4*", 0 },
- { "OpenSSH_5*", SSH_NEW_OPENSSH|SSH_BUG_DYNAMIC_RPORT},
-+ { "OpenSSH_6.6.1*", SSH_NEW_OPENSSH},
-+ { "OpenSSH_6.5*,"
-+ "OpenSSH_6.6*", SSH_NEW_OPENSSH|SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD},
- { "OpenSSH*", SSH_NEW_OPENSSH },
- { "*MindTerm*", 0 },
- { "2.1.0*", SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB|SSH_BUG_HMAC|
-@@ -251,7 +254,6 @@ compat_cipher_proposal(char *cipher_prop)
- return cipher_prop;
- }
-
--
- char *
- compat_pkalg_proposal(char *pkalg_prop)
- {
-@@ -265,3 +267,16 @@ compat_pkalg_proposal(char *pkalg_prop)
- return pkalg_prop;
- }
-
-+char *
-+compat_kex_proposal(char *kex_prop)
-+{
-+ if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD))
-+ return kex_prop;
-+ debug2("%s: original KEX proposal: %s", __func__, kex_prop);
-+ kex_prop = filter_proposal(kex_prop, "curve25519-sha256@libssh.org");
-+ debug2("%s: compat KEX proposal: %s", __func__, kex_prop);
-+ if (*kex_prop == '\0')
-+ fatal("No supported key exchange algorithms found");
-+ return kex_prop;
-+}
-+
-diff --git a/compat.h b/compat.h
-index b174fa1..a6c3f3d 100644
---- a/compat.h
-+++ b/compat.h
-@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@
- #define SSH_BUG_RFWD_ADDR 0x02000000
- #define SSH_NEW_OPENSSH 0x04000000
- #define SSH_BUG_DYNAMIC_RPORT 0x08000000
-+#define SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD 0x10000000
-
- void enable_compat13(void);
- void enable_compat20(void);
-@@ -66,6 +67,7 @@ void compat_datafellows(const char *);
- int proto_spec(const char *);
- char *compat_cipher_proposal(char *);
- char *compat_pkalg_proposal(char *);
-+char *compat_kex_proposal(char *);
-
- extern int compat13;
- extern int compat20;
-diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
-index bb9292f..b00658b 100644
---- a/sshconnect2.c
-+++ b/sshconnect2.c
-@@ -220,6 +220,8 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port)
- }
- if (options.kex_algorithms != NULL)
- myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = options.kex_algorithms;
-+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal(
-+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]);
-
- #ifdef GSSAPI
- /* If we've got GSSAPI algorithms, then we also support the
-diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
-index e4e406e..512c7ed 100644
---- a/sshd.c
-+++ b/sshd.c
-@@ -2488,6 +2488,9 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void)
- if (options.kex_algorithms != NULL)
- myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = options.kex_algorithms;
-
-+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal(
-+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]);
-+
- if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval)
- packet_set_rekey_limits((u_int32_t)options.rekey_limit,
- (time_t)options.rekey_interval);
-diff --git a/version.h b/version.h
-index a1579ac..a33e77c 100644
---- a/version.h
-+++ b/version.h
-@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
- /* $OpenBSD: version.h,v 1.70 2014/02/27 22:57:40 djm Exp $ */
-
--#define SSH_VERSION "OpenSSH_6.6"
-+#define SSH_VERSION "OpenSSH_6.6.1"
-
- #define SSH_PORTABLE "p1"
- #define SSH_RELEASE SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.1p1-askpass-ld.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.1p1-askpass-ld.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index f7a7fac..0000000
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-6.1p1-askpass-ld.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-6.1p1/contrib/Makefile.askpass-ld openssh-6.1p1/contrib/Makefile
---- openssh-6.1p1/contrib/Makefile.askpass-ld 2012-05-19 07:24:37.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.1p1/contrib/Makefile 2012-09-14 20:35:47.565704718 +0200
-@@ -4,12 +4,12 @@ all:
- @echo "Valid targets: gnome-ssh-askpass1 gnome-ssh-askpass2"
-
- gnome-ssh-askpass1: gnome-ssh-askpass1.c
-- $(CC) `gnome-config --cflags gnome gnomeui` \
-+ $(CC) ${CFLAGS} `gnome-config --cflags gnome gnomeui` \
- gnome-ssh-askpass1.c -o gnome-ssh-askpass1 \
- `gnome-config --libs gnome gnomeui`
-
- gnome-ssh-askpass2: gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
-- $(CC) `$(PKG_CONFIG) --cflags gtk+-2.0` \
-+ $(CC) ${CFLAGS} `$(PKG_CONFIG) --cflags gtk+-2.0` \
- gnome-ssh-askpass2.c -o gnome-ssh-askpass2 \
- `$(PKG_CONFIG) --libs gtk+-2.0 x11`
-
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.1p1-gssapi-canohost.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.1p1-gssapi-canohost.patch
index eb5c2e6..124ac7f 100644
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-6.1p1-gssapi-canohost.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.1p1-gssapi-canohost.patch
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ diff -up openssh-6.1p1/sshconnect2.c.canohost openssh-6.1p1/sshconnect2.c
gss_host = options.gss_server_identity;
- else if (options.gss_trust_dns)
+ else if (options.gss_trust_dns) {
- gss_host = get_canonical_hostname(1);
+ gss_host = get_canonical_hostname(active_state, 1);
+ if ( strcmp( gss_host, "UNKNOWN" ) == 0 )
+ gss_host = authctxt->host;
+ }
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.2p1-vendor.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.2p1-vendor.patch
index ddccd2c..54d08f0 100644
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-6.2p1-vendor.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.2p1-vendor.patch
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
-diff -up openssh-6.2p1/configure.ac.vendor openssh-6.2p1/configure.ac
---- openssh-6.2p1/configure.ac.vendor 2013-03-25 19:34:01.277495179 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.2p1/configure.ac 2013-03-25 19:34:01.377495818 +0100
-@@ -4420,6 +4420,12 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([lastlog],
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/configure.ac.vendor openssh-7.4p1/configure.ac
+--- openssh-7.4p1/configure.ac.vendor 2017-02-10 10:45:54.977836854 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/configure.ac 2017-02-10 10:45:54.995836725 +0100
+@@ -4930,6 +4930,12 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([lastlog],
fi
]
)
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ diff -up openssh-6.2p1/configure.ac.vendor openssh-6.2p1/configure.ac
dnl lastlog, [uw]tmpx? detection
dnl NOTE: set the paths in the platform section to avoid the
-@@ -4681,6 +4687,7 @@ echo " Translate v4 in v6 hack
+@@ -5194,6 +5200,7 @@ echo " Translate v4 in v6 hack
echo " BSD Auth support: $BSD_AUTH_MSG"
echo " Random number source: $RAND_MSG"
echo " Privsep sandbox style: $SANDBOX_STYLE"
@@ -22,10 +22,10 @@ diff -up openssh-6.2p1/configure.ac.vendor openssh-6.2p1/configure.ac
echo ""
-diff -up openssh-6.2p1/servconf.c.vendor openssh-6.2p1/servconf.c
---- openssh-6.2p1/servconf.c.vendor 2013-03-25 19:34:01.197494668 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.2p1/servconf.c 2013-03-25 19:34:01.379495831 +0100
-@@ -128,6 +128,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.vendor openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.vendor 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c 2017-02-10 10:45:54.995836725 +0100
+@@ -143,6 +143,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
options->max_authtries = -1;
options->max_sessions = -1;
options->banner = NULL;
@@ -33,26 +33,25 @@ diff -up openssh-6.2p1/servconf.c.vendor openssh-6.2p1/servconf.c
options->use_dns = -1;
options->client_alive_interval = -1;
options->client_alive_count_max = -1;
-@@ -287,6 +288,9 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
+@@ -325,6 +326,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
options->ip_qos_bulk = IPTOS_THROUGHPUT;
if (options->version_addendum == NULL)
options->version_addendum = xstrdup("");
+ if (options->show_patchlevel == -1)
+ options->show_patchlevel = 0;
-+
- /* Turn privilege separation on by default */
- if (use_privsep == -1)
- use_privsep = PRIVSEP_NOSANDBOX;
-@@ -324,7 +328,7 @@ typedef enum {
- sIgnoreUserKnownHosts, sCiphers, sMacs, sProtocol, sPidFile,
- sGatewayPorts, sPubkeyAuthentication, sXAuthLocation, sSubsystem,
- sMaxStartups, sMaxAuthTries, sMaxSessions,
+ if (options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask == (mode_t)-1)
+ options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask = 0177;
+ if (options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink == -1)
+@@ -402,7 +405,7 @@ typedef enum {
+ sIgnoreUserKnownHosts, sCiphers, sMacs, sPidFile,
+ sGatewayPorts, sPubkeyAuthentication, sPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes,
+ sXAuthLocation, sSubsystem, sMaxStartups, sMaxAuthTries, sMaxSessions,
- sBanner, sUseDNS, sHostbasedAuthentication,
+ sBanner, sShowPatchLevel, sUseDNS, sHostbasedAuthentication,
- sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, sClientAliveInterval,
- sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile,
- sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel,
-@@ -439,6 +443,7 @@ static struct {
+ sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, sHostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes,
+ sHostKeyAlgorithms,
+ sClientAliveInterval, sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile,
+@@ -528,6 +531,7 @@ static struct {
{ "maxauthtries", sMaxAuthTries, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "maxsessions", sMaxSessions, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "banner", sBanner, SSHCFG_ALL },
@@ -60,7 +59,7 @@ diff -up openssh-6.2p1/servconf.c.vendor openssh-6.2p1/servconf.c
{ "usedns", sUseDNS, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "verifyreversemapping", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "reversemappingcheck", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-@@ -1163,6 +1168,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
+@@ -1369,6 +1373,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
multistate_ptr = multistate_privsep;
goto parse_multistate;
@@ -71,18 +70,18 @@ diff -up openssh-6.2p1/servconf.c.vendor openssh-6.2p1/servconf.c
case sAllowUsers:
while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') {
if (options->num_allow_users >= MAX_ALLOW_USERS)
-@@ -1950,6 +1959,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
- dump_cfg_fmtint(sUseLogin, o->use_login);
+@@ -2269,6 +2277,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sPermitUserEnvironment, o->permit_user_env);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sCompression, o->compression);
- dump_cfg_fmtint(sGatewayPorts, o->gateway_ports);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sGatewayPorts, o->fwd_opts.gateway_ports);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sShowPatchLevel, o->show_patchlevel);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sUseDNS, o->use_dns);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sAllowTcpForwarding, o->allow_tcp_forwarding);
- dump_cfg_fmtint(sUsePrivilegeSeparation, use_privsep);
-diff -up openssh-6.2p1/servconf.h.vendor openssh-6.2p1/servconf.h
---- openssh-6.2p1/servconf.h.vendor 2013-01-09 05:56:45.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.2p1/servconf.h 2013-03-25 19:34:01.379495831 +0100
-@@ -147,6 +147,7 @@ typedef struct {
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sAllowAgentForwarding, o->allow_agent_forwarding);
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.vendor openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.vendor 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h 2017-02-10 10:45:54.995836725 +0100
+@@ -149,6 +149,7 @@ typedef struct {
int max_authtries;
int max_sessions;
char *banner; /* SSH-2 banner message */
@@ -90,39 +89,13 @@ diff -up openssh-6.2p1/servconf.h.vendor openssh-6.2p1/servconf.h
int use_dns;
int client_alive_interval; /*
* poke the client this often to
-diff -up openssh-6.2p1/sshd_config.vendor openssh-6.2p1/sshd_config
---- openssh-6.2p1/sshd_config.vendor 2013-03-25 19:34:01.380495837 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.2p1/sshd_config 2013-03-25 19:44:43.471296362 +0100
-@@ -118,6 +118,7 @@ UsePrivilegeSeparation sandbox # Defaul
- #Compression delayed
- #ClientAliveInterval 0
- #ClientAliveCountMax 3
-+#ShowPatchLevel no
- #UseDNS yes
- #PidFile /var/run/sshd.pid
- #MaxStartups 10:30:100
-diff -up openssh-6.2p1/sshd_config.0.vendor openssh-6.2p1/sshd_config.0
---- openssh-6.2p1/sshd_config.0.vendor 2013-03-25 19:34:01.361495716 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.2p1/sshd_config.0 2013-03-25 19:34:01.381495844 +0100
-@@ -595,6 +595,11 @@ DESCRIPTION
- Defines the number of bits in the ephemeral protocol version 1
- server key. The minimum value is 512, and the default is 1024.
-
-+ ShowPatchLevel
-+ Specifies whether sshd will display the specific patch level of
-+ the binary in the server identification string. The patch level
-+ is set at compile-time. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^].
-+
- StrictModes
- Specifies whether sshd(8) should check file modes and ownership
- of the user's files and home directory before accepting login.
-diff -up openssh-6.2p1/sshd_config.5.vendor openssh-6.2p1/sshd_config.5
---- openssh-6.2p1/sshd_config.5.vendor 2013-03-25 19:34:01.362495722 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.2p1/sshd_config.5 2013-03-25 19:34:01.382495850 +0100
-@@ -1019,6 +1019,14 @@ This option applies to protocol version
- .It Cm ServerKeyBits
- Defines the number of bits in the ephemeral protocol version 1 server key.
- The minimum value is 512, and the default is 1024.
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.vendor openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.vendor 2017-02-10 10:45:54.990836761 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5 2017-02-10 10:45:54.996836718 +0100
+@@ -1334,6 +1334,14 @@ an OpenSSH Key Revocation List (KRL) as
+ .Xr ssh-keygen 1 .
+ For more information on KRLs, see the KEY REVOCATION LISTS section in
+ .Xr ssh-keygen 1 .
+.It Cm ShowPatchLevel
+Specifies whether
+.Nm sshd
@@ -131,28 +104,40 @@ diff -up openssh-6.2p1/sshd_config.5.vendor openssh-6.2p1/sshd_config.5
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+This option applies to protocol version 1 only.
- .It Cm StrictModes
- Specifies whether
- .Xr sshd 8
-diff -up openssh-6.2p1/sshd.c.vendor openssh-6.2p1/sshd.c
---- openssh-6.2p1/sshd.c.vendor 2013-03-25 19:34:01.332495531 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.2p1/sshd.c 2013-03-25 19:44:11.864112092 +0100
-@@ -442,7 +442,7 @@ sshd_exchange_identification(int sock_in
- }
+ .It Cm StreamLocalBindMask
+ Sets the octal file creation mode mask
+ .Pq umask
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.vendor openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.vendor 2017-02-10 10:45:54.990836761 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config 2017-02-10 10:45:54.996836718 +0100
+@@ -105,6 +105,7 @@ X11Forwarding yes
+ #Compression delayed
+ #ClientAliveInterval 0
+ #ClientAliveCountMax 3
++#ShowPatchLevel no
+ #UseDNS no
+ #PidFile /var/run/sshd.pid
+ #MaxStartups 10:30:100
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.vendor openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.vendor 2017-02-10 10:45:54.996836718 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c 2017-02-10 10:48:41.633648667 +0100
+@@ -367,7 +367,8 @@ sshd_exchange_identification(struct ssh
+ char remote_version[256]; /* Must be at least as big as buf. */
xasprintf(&server_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s%s%s%s",
-- major, minor, SSH_VERSION,
-+ major, minor, (options.show_patchlevel == 1) ? SSH_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL : SSH_VERSION,
+- PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_VERSION,
++ PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2,
++ (options.show_patchlevel == 1) ? SSH_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL : SSH_VERSION,
*options.version_addendum == '\0' ? "" : " ",
options.version_addendum, newline);
-@@ -1675,7 +1675,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+@@ -1654,7 +1655,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
exit(1);
}
- debug("sshd version %s, %s", SSH_VERSION,
+ debug("sshd version %s, %s",
+ (options.show_patchlevel == 1) ? SSH_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL : SSH_VERSION,
- SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION));
-
- /* Store privilege separation user for later use if required. */
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION)
+ #else
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.4p1-CLOCK_BOOTTIME.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.4p1-CLOCK_BOOTTIME.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 1073a77..0000000
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-6.4p1-CLOCK_BOOTTIME.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
---- a/misc.c
-+++ b/misc.c
-@@ -865,17 +865,24 @@ ms_to_timeval(struct timeval *tv, int ms
- time_t
- monotime(void)
- {
--#if defined(HAVE_CLOCK_GETTIME) && defined(CLOCK_MONOTONIC)
-+#if defined(HAVE_CLOCK_GETTIME) && \
-+ (defined(CLOCK_MONOTONIC) || defined(CLOCK_BOOTTIME))
- struct timespec ts;
- static int gettime_failed = 0;
-
- if (!gettime_failed) {
-+#if defined(CLOCK_BOOTTIME)
-+ if (clock_gettime(CLOCK_BOOTTIME, &ts) == 0)
-+ return (ts.tv_sec);
-+#endif
-+#if defined(CLOCK_MONOTONIC)
- if (clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC, &ts) == 0)
- return (ts.tv_sec);
-+#endif
- debug3("clock_gettime: %s", strerror(errno));
- gettime_failed = 1;
- }
--#endif
-+#endif /* HAVE_CLOCK_GETTIME && (CLOCK_MONOTONIC || CLOCK_BOOTTIME */
-
- return time(NULL);
- }
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.4p1-legacy-ssh-copy-id.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.4p1-legacy-ssh-copy-id.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index ba8d949..0000000
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-6.4p1-legacy-ssh-copy-id.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,57 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-6.4p1/contrib/ssh-copy-id.1.legacy-ssh-copy-id openssh-6.4p1/contrib/ssh-copy-id.1
---- openssh-6.4p1/contrib/ssh-copy-id.1.legacy-ssh-copy-id 2013-03-22 00:17:37.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.4p1/contrib/ssh-copy-id.1 2014-01-28 17:12:49.197542425 +0100
-@@ -180,6 +180,19 @@ should prove enlightening (N.B. the mode
- .Fl W
- option, rather than
- .Xr nc 1 ) .
-+.Sh ENVIRONMENT
-+.Bl -tag -width Ds
-+.Pp
-+.It Pa SSH_COPY_ID_LEGACY
-+If the
-+.Cm SSH_COPY_ID_LEGACY
-+environment variable is set, the
-+.Nm
-+is run in a legacy mode. In this mode, the
-+.Nm
-+doesn't check an existence of a private key and doesn't do remote checks
-+of the remote server versions or if public keys are already installed.
-+.El
- .Sh "SEE ALSO"
- .Xr ssh 1 ,
- .Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
-diff -up openssh-6.4p1/contrib/ssh-copy-id.legacy-ssh-copy-id openssh-6.4p1/contrib/ssh-copy-id
---- openssh-6.4p1/contrib/ssh-copy-id.legacy-ssh-copy-id 2013-06-05 14:48:45.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.4p1/contrib/ssh-copy-id 2014-01-28 17:11:51.538833032 +0100
-@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ use_id_file() {
- PUB_ID_FILE="$L_ID_FILE.pub"
- fi
-
-- PRIV_ID_FILE=$(dirname "$PUB_ID_FILE")/$(basename "$PUB_ID_FILE" .pub)
-+ [ "x$SSH_COPY_ID_LEGACY" != "x" ] || PRIV_ID_FILE=$(dirname "$PUB_ID_FILE")/$(basename "$PUB_ID_FILE" .pub)
-
- # check that the files are readable
- for f in $PUB_ID_FILE $PRIV_ID_FILE ; do
-@@ -243,7 +243,7 @@ populate_new_ids() {
- printf '%s: INFO: %d key(s) remain to be installed -- if you are prompted now it is to install the new keys\n' "$0" "$(printf '%s\n' "$NEW_IDS" | wc -l)" >&2
- }
-
--REMOTE_VERSION=$(ssh -v -o PreferredAuthentications=',' "$@" 2>&1 |
-+[ "x$SSH_COPY_ID_LEGACY" != "x" ] || REMOTE_VERSION=$(ssh -v -o PreferredAuthentications=',' "$@" 2>&1 |
- sed -ne 's/.*remote software version //p')
-
- case "$REMOTE_VERSION" in
-@@ -268,7 +268,11 @@ case "$REMOTE_VERSION" in
- ;;
- *)
- # Assuming that the remote host treats ~/.ssh/authorized_keys as one might expect
-- populate_new_ids 0
-+ if [ "x$SSH_COPY_ID_LEGACY" != "x" ]; then
-+ NEW_IDS=`eval "$GET_ID"`
-+ else
-+ populate_new_ids 0
-+ fi
- [ "$DRY_RUN" ] || printf '%s\n' "$NEW_IDS" | ssh "$@" "
- umask 077 ;
- mkdir -p .ssh && cat >> .ssh/authorized_keys || exit 1 ;
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6.1p1-NI_MAXHOST.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6.1p1-NI_MAXHOST.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 7eeee50..0000000
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6.1p1-NI_MAXHOST.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,76 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
-index 928999d..3887495 100644
---- a/ChangeLog
-+++ b/ChangeLog
-@@ -1,3 +1,10 @@
-+20140703
-+ - OpenBSD CVS Sync
-+ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/03 03:34:09
-+ [gss-serv.c session.c ssh-keygen.c]
-+ standardise on NI_MAXHOST for gethostname() string lengths; about
-+ 1/2 the cases were using it already. Fixes bz#2239 en passant
-+
- 20140420
- - (djm) [bufaux.c compat.c compat.h sshconnect2.c sshd.c version.h]
- OpenSSH 6.5 and 6.6 sometimes encode a value used in the curve25519
-diff --git a/gss-serv.c b/gss-serv.c
-index 14f540e..29916d3 100644
---- a/gss-serv.c
-+++ b/gss-serv.c
-@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
--/* $OpenBSD: gss-serv.c,v 1.26 2014/02/26 20:28:44 djm Exp $ */
-+/* $OpenBSD: gss-serv.c,v 1.27 2014/07/03 03:34:09 djm Exp $ */
-
- /*
- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
-@@ -102,14 +102,14 @@ static OM_uint32
- ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred(Gssctxt *ctx)
- {
- OM_uint32 status;
-- char lname[MAXHOSTNAMELEN];
-+ char lname[NI_MAXHOST];
- gss_OID_set oidset;
-
- if (options.gss_strict_acceptor) {
- gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
- gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset);
-
-- if (gethostname(lname, MAXHOSTNAMELEN)) {
-+ if (gethostname(lname, sizeof(lname))) {
- gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
- return (-1);
- }
-diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
-index ba4589b..e4add93 100644
---- a/session.c
-+++ b/session.c
-@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@
- #include <errno.h>
- #include <fcntl.h>
- #include <grp.h>
-+#include <netdb.h>
- #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
- #include <paths.h>
- #endif
-@@ -2669,7 +2670,7 @@ session_setup_x11fwd(Session *s)
- {
- struct stat st;
- char display[512], auth_display[512];
-- char hostname[MAXHOSTNAMELEN];
-+ char hostname[NI_MAXHOST];
- u_int i;
-
- if (no_x11_forwarding_flag) {
-diff --git a/ssh-keygen.c b/ssh-keygen.c
-index 482dc1c..66198e6 100644
---- a/ssh-keygen.c
-+++ b/ssh-keygen.c
-@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ int rounds = 0;
- /* argv0 */
- extern char *__progname;
-
--char hostname[MAXHOSTNAMELEN];
-+char hostname[NI_MAXHOST];
-
- /* moduli.c */
- int gen_candidates(FILE *, u_int32_t, u_int32_t, BIGNUM *);
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6.1p1-audit-pfs.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6.1p1-audit-pfs.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 35be907..0000000
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6.1p1-audit-pfs.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,212 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/audit-bsm.c b/audit-bsm.c
-index 5160869..c7a1b47 100644
---- a/audit-bsm.c
-+++ b/audit-bsm.c
-@@ -481,7 +481,7 @@ audit_unsupported_body(int what)
- }
-
- void
--audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
-+audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress, char *pfs, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
- {
- /* not implemented */
- }
-diff --git a/audit-linux.c b/audit-linux.c
-index 6954fc1..6686f6a 100644
---- a/audit-linux.c
-+++ b/audit-linux.c
-@@ -297,7 +297,7 @@ audit_unsupported_body(int what)
- const static char *direction[] = { "from-server", "from-client", "both" };
-
- void
--audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress, pid_t pid,
-+audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress, char *pfs, pid_t pid,
- uid_t uid)
- {
- #ifdef AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION
-@@ -306,8 +306,8 @@ audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress, pid_t pid,
- Cipher *cipher = cipher_by_name(enc);
- char *s;
-
-- snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=start direction=%s cipher=%s ksize=%d mac=%s spid=%jd suid=%jd rport=%d laddr=%s lport=%d ",
-- direction[ctos], enc, cipher ? 8 * cipher->key_len : 0, mac,
-+ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=start direction=%s cipher=%s ksize=%d mac=%s pfs=%s spid=%jd suid=%jd rport=%d laddr=%s lport=%d ",
-+ direction[ctos], enc, cipher ? 8 * cipher->key_len : 0, mac, pfs,
- (intmax_t)pid, (intmax_t)uid,
- get_remote_port(), (s = get_local_ipaddr(packet_get_connection_in())), get_local_port());
- free(s);
-diff --git a/audit.c b/audit.c
-index 13c6849..5b49434 100644
---- a/audit.c
-+++ b/audit.c
-@@ -135,9 +135,9 @@ audit_unsupported(int what)
- }
-
- void
--audit_kex(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *comp)
-+audit_kex(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *comp, char *pfs)
- {
-- PRIVSEP(audit_kex_body(ctos, enc, mac, comp, getpid(), getuid()));
-+ PRIVSEP(audit_kex_body(ctos, enc, mac, comp, pfs, getpid(), getuid()));
- }
-
- void
-@@ -270,11 +270,11 @@ audit_unsupported_body(int what)
- * This will be called on succesfull protocol negotiation.
- */
- void
--audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress, pid_t pid,
-+audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress, char *pfs, pid_t pid,
- uid_t uid)
- {
-- debug("audit protocol negotiation euid %d direction %d cipher %s mac %s compresion %s from pid %ld uid %u",
-- (unsigned)geteuid(), ctos, enc, mac, compress, (long)pid,
-+ debug("audit protocol negotiation euid %d direction %d cipher %s mac %s compresion %s pfs %s from pid %ld uid %u",
-+ (unsigned)geteuid(), ctos, enc, mac, compress, pfs, (long)pid,
- (unsigned)uid);
- }
-
-diff --git a/audit.h b/audit.h
-index a2dc3ff..903df66 100644
---- a/audit.h
-+++ b/audit.h
-@@ -61,9 +61,9 @@ ssh_audit_event_t audit_classify_auth(const char *);
- int audit_keyusage(int, const char *, unsigned, char *, int);
- void audit_key(int, int *, const Key *);
- void audit_unsupported(int);
--void audit_kex(int, char *, char *, char *);
-+void audit_kex(int, char *, char *, char *, char *);
- void audit_unsupported_body(int);
--void audit_kex_body(int, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t);
-+void audit_kex_body(int, char *, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t);
- void audit_session_key_free(int ctos);
- void audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t, uid_t);
- void audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *, pid_t, uid_t);
-diff --git a/auditstub.c b/auditstub.c
-index 45817e0..116f460 100644
---- a/auditstub.c
-+++ b/auditstub.c
-@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ audit_unsupported(int n)
- }
-
- void
--audit_kex(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *comp)
-+audit_kex(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *comp, char *pfs)
- {
- }
-
-diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c
-index ede7b67..eb5f333 100644
---- a/kex.c
-+++ b/kex.c
-@@ -553,13 +553,12 @@ kex_choose_conf(Kex *kex)
- newkeys->enc.name,
- authlen == 0 ? newkeys->mac.name : "<implicit>",
- newkeys->comp.name);
--#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-- audit_kex(ctos, newkeys->enc.name, newkeys->mac.name, newkeys->comp.name);
--#endif
- }
-+
- choose_kex(kex, cprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS], sprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]);
- choose_hostkeyalg(kex, cprop[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
- sprop[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]);
-+
- need = dh_need = 0;
- for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) {
- newkeys = kex->newkeys[mode];
-@@ -571,11 +570,16 @@ kex_choose_conf(Kex *kex)
- dh_need = MAX(dh_need, newkeys->enc.block_size);
- dh_need = MAX(dh_need, newkeys->enc.iv_len);
- dh_need = MAX(dh_need, newkeys->mac.key_len);
-+ debug("kex: %s need=%d dh_need=%d", kex->name, need, dh_need);
-+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-+ audit_kex(mode, newkeys->enc.name, newkeys->mac.name, newkeys->comp.name, kex->name);
-+#endif
- }
- /* XXX need runden? */
- kex->we_need = need;
- kex->dh_need = dh_need;
-
-+
- /* ignore the next message if the proposals do not match */
- if (first_kex_follows && !proposals_match(my, peer) &&
- !(datafellows & SSH_BUG_FIRSTKEX)) {
-diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
-index 70b9b4c..81bc9c1 100644
---- a/monitor.c
-+++ b/monitor.c
-@@ -2396,7 +2396,7 @@ int
- mm_answer_audit_kex_body(int sock, Buffer *m)
- {
- int ctos, len;
-- char *cipher, *mac, *compress;
-+ char *cipher, *mac, *compress, *pfs;
- pid_t pid;
- uid_t uid;
-
-@@ -2404,14 +2404,16 @@ mm_answer_audit_kex_body(int sock, Buffer *m)
- cipher = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
- mac = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
- compress = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
-+ pfs = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
- pid = buffer_get_int64(m);
- uid = buffer_get_int64(m);
-
-- audit_kex_body(ctos, cipher, mac, compress, pid, uid);
-+ audit_kex_body(ctos, cipher, mac, compress, pfs, pid, uid);
-
- free(cipher);
- free(mac);
- free(compress);
-+ free(pfs);
- buffer_clear(m);
-
- mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_KEX, m);
-diff --git a/monitor_wrap.c b/monitor_wrap.c
-index 93f6535..69b29d8 100644
---- a/monitor_wrap.c
-+++ b/monitor_wrap.c
-@@ -1408,7 +1408,7 @@ mm_audit_unsupported_body(int what)
- }
-
- void
--mm_audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *cipher, char *mac, char *compress, pid_t pid,
-+mm_audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *cipher, char *mac, char *compress, char *fps, pid_t pid,
- uid_t uid)
- {
- Buffer m;
-@@ -1418,6 +1418,7 @@ mm_audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *cipher, char *mac, char *compress, pid_t pid,
- buffer_put_cstring(&m, cipher);
- buffer_put_cstring(&m, (mac ? mac : ""));
- buffer_put_cstring(&m, compress);
-+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, fps);
- buffer_put_int64(&m, pid);
- buffer_put_int64(&m, uid);
-
-diff --git a/monitor_wrap.h b/monitor_wrap.h
-index 4cf0c78..e43109f 100644
---- a/monitor_wrap.h
-+++ b/monitor_wrap.h
-@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ void mm_audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t);
- int mm_audit_run_command(const char *);
- void mm_audit_end_command(int, const char *);
- void mm_audit_unsupported_body(int);
--void mm_audit_kex_body(int, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t);
-+void mm_audit_kex_body(int, char *, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t);
- void mm_audit_session_key_free_body(int, pid_t, uid_t);
- void mm_audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *, pid_t, uid_t);
- #endif
-diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
-index ee94825..41a94a7 100644
---- a/sshd.c
-+++ b/sshd.c
-@@ -2430,7 +2430,7 @@ do_ssh1_kex(void)
- packet_disconnect("IP Spoofing check bytes do not match.");
-
- #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-- audit_kex(2, cipher_name(cipher_type), "crc", "none");
-+ audit_kex(2, cipher_name(cipher_type), "crc", "none", "none");
- #endif
-
- debug("Encryption type: %.200s", cipher_name(cipher_type));
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6.1p1-coverity.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6.1p1-coverity.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 9f71f9c..0000000
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6.1p1-coverity.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,844 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/auth-pam.c b/auth-pam.c
-index cd1a775..690711e 100644
---- a/auth-pam.c
-+++ b/auth-pam.c
-@@ -216,7 +216,12 @@ pthread_join(sp_pthread_t thread, void **value)
- if (sshpam_thread_status != -1)
- return (sshpam_thread_status);
- signal(SIGCHLD, sshpam_oldsig);
-- waitpid(thread, &status, 0);
-+ while (waitpid(thread, &status, 0) < 0) {
-+ if (errno == EINTR)
-+ continue;
-+ fatal("%s: waitpid: %s", __func__,
-+ strerror(errno));
-+ }
- return (status);
- }
- #endif
-diff --git a/channels.c b/channels.c
-index af3fdc2..39c9f89 100644
---- a/channels.c
-+++ b/channels.c
-@@ -233,11 +233,11 @@ channel_register_fds(Channel *c, int rfd, int wfd, int efd,
- channel_max_fd = MAX(channel_max_fd, wfd);
- channel_max_fd = MAX(channel_max_fd, efd);
-
-- if (rfd != -1)
-+ if (rfd >= 0)
- fcntl(rfd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
-- if (wfd != -1 && wfd != rfd)
-+ if (wfd >= 0 && wfd != rfd)
- fcntl(wfd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
-- if (efd != -1 && efd != rfd && efd != wfd)
-+ if (efd >= 0 && efd != rfd && efd != wfd)
- fcntl(efd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
-
- c->rfd = rfd;
-@@ -255,11 +255,11 @@ channel_register_fds(Channel *c, int rfd, int wfd, int efd,
-
- /* enable nonblocking mode */
- if (nonblock) {
-- if (rfd != -1)
-+ if (rfd >= 0)
- set_nonblock(rfd);
-- if (wfd != -1)
-+ if (wfd >= 0)
- set_nonblock(wfd);
-- if (efd != -1)
-+ if (efd >= 0)
- set_nonblock(efd);
- }
- }
-diff --git a/clientloop.c b/clientloop.c
-index 9c60108..d372b53 100644
---- a/clientloop.c
-+++ b/clientloop.c
-@@ -2081,14 +2081,15 @@ client_input_global_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
- char *rtype;
- int want_reply;
- int success = 0;
-+/* success is still 0 the packet is allways SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE, isn't it? */
-
- rtype = packet_get_string(NULL);
- want_reply = packet_get_char();
- debug("client_input_global_request: rtype %s want_reply %d",
- rtype, want_reply);
- if (want_reply) {
-- packet_start(success ?
-- SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS : SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE);
-+ packet_start(/*success ?
-+ SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS :*/ SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE);
- packet_send();
- packet_write_wait();
- }
-diff --git a/key.c b/key.c
-index a2050f6..6487d81 100644
---- a/key.c
-+++ b/key.c
-@@ -880,8 +880,10 @@ key_read(Key *ret, char **cpp)
- success = 1;
- /*XXXX*/
- key_free(k);
-+/*XXXX
- if (success != 1)
- break;
-+XXXX*/
- /* advance cp: skip whitespace and data */
- while (*cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t')
- cp++;
-diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
-index 3ff62b0..70b9b4c 100644
---- a/monitor.c
-+++ b/monitor.c
-@@ -472,7 +472,7 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctxt, struct monitor *pmonitor)
- mm_get_keystate(pmonitor);
-
- /* Drain any buffered messages from the child */
-- while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd != -1 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)
-+ while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd >= 0 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)
- ;
-
- close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
-@@ -1254,6 +1254,10 @@ mm_answer_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m)
- break;
- }
- }
-+
-+ debug3("%s: key %p is %s",
-+ __func__, key, allowed ? "allowed" : "not allowed");
-+
- if (key != NULL)
- key_free(key);
-
-@@ -1275,9 +1279,6 @@ mm_answer_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m)
- free(chost);
- }
-
-- debug3("%s: key %p is %s",
-- __func__, key, allowed ? "allowed" : "not allowed");
--
- buffer_clear(m);
- buffer_put_int(m, allowed);
- buffer_put_int(m, forced_command != NULL);
-diff --git a/monitor_wrap.c b/monitor_wrap.c
-index 6df236a..93f6535 100644
---- a/monitor_wrap.c
-+++ b/monitor_wrap.c
-@@ -743,10 +743,10 @@ mm_pty_allocate(int *ptyfd, int *ttyfd, char *namebuf, size_t namebuflen)
- if ((tmp1 = dup(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1 ||
- (tmp2 = dup(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1) {
- error("%s: cannot allocate fds for pty", __func__);
-- if (tmp1 > 0)
-+ if (tmp1 >= 0)
- close(tmp1);
-- if (tmp2 > 0)
-- close(tmp2);
-+ /*DEAD CODE if (tmp2 >= 0)
-+ close(tmp2);*/
- return 0;
- }
- close(tmp1);
-diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c b/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c
-index c89f214..80115c2 100644
---- a/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c
-+++ b/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c
-@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ bindresvport_sa(int sd, struct sockaddr *sa)
- struct sockaddr_in6 *in6;
- u_int16_t *portp;
- u_int16_t port;
-- socklen_t salen;
-+ socklen_t salen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage);
- int i;
-
- if (sa == NULL) {
-diff --git a/packet.c b/packet.c
-index f5b122b..1305e87 100644
---- a/packet.c
-+++ b/packet.c
-@@ -1234,6 +1234,7 @@ packet_read_poll1(void)
- case DEATTACK_DETECTED:
- packet_disconnect("crc32 compensation attack: "
- "network attack detected");
-+ break;
- case DEATTACK_DOS_DETECTED:
- packet_disconnect("deattack denial of "
- "service detected");
-diff --git a/progressmeter.c b/progressmeter.c
-index bbbc706..ae6d1aa 100644
---- a/progressmeter.c
-+++ b/progressmeter.c
-@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ static void update_progress_meter(int);
-
- static time_t start; /* start progress */
- static time_t last_update; /* last progress update */
--static char *file; /* name of the file being transferred */
-+static const char *file; /* name of the file being transferred */
- static off_t start_pos; /* initial position of transfer */
- static off_t end_pos; /* ending position of transfer */
- static off_t cur_pos; /* transfer position as of last refresh */
-@@ -248,7 +248,7 @@ update_progress_meter(int ignore)
- }
-
- void
--start_progress_meter(char *f, off_t filesize, off_t *ctr)
-+start_progress_meter(const char *f, off_t filesize, off_t *ctr)
- {
- start = last_update = monotime();
- file = f;
-diff --git a/progressmeter.h b/progressmeter.h
-index 10bab99..e9ca8f0 100644
---- a/progressmeter.h
-+++ b/progressmeter.h
-@@ -23,5 +23,5 @@
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
--void start_progress_meter(char *, off_t, off_t *);
-+void start_progress_meter(const char *, off_t, off_t *);
- void stop_progress_meter(void);
-diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c
-index 1178a07..d9bc016 100644
---- a/scp.c
-+++ b/scp.c
-@@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ killchild(int signo)
- {
- if (do_cmd_pid > 1) {
- kill(do_cmd_pid, signo ? signo : SIGTERM);
-- waitpid(do_cmd_pid, NULL, 0);
-+ (void) waitpid(do_cmd_pid, NULL, 0);
- }
-
- if (signo)
-diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
-index 3839928..d482e79 100644
---- a/servconf.c
-+++ b/servconf.c
-@@ -1382,7 +1382,7 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
- fatal("%s line %d: Missing subsystem name.",
- filename, linenum);
- if (!*activep) {
-- arg = strdelim(&cp);
-+ /*arg =*/ (void) strdelim(&cp);
- break;
- }
- for (i = 0; i < options->num_subsystems; i++)
-@@ -1473,8 +1473,9 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
- if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) {
- *charptr = tilde_expand_filename(arg, getuid());
- /* increase optional counter */
-- if (intptr != NULL)
-- *intptr = *intptr + 1;
-+ /* DEAD CODE intptr is still NULL ;)
-+ if (intptr != NULL)
-+ *intptr = *intptr + 1; */
- }
- break;
-
-diff --git a/serverloop.c b/serverloop.c
-index 2f8e3a0..e03bc6c 100644
---- a/serverloop.c
-+++ b/serverloop.c
-@@ -147,13 +147,13 @@ notify_setup(void)
- static void
- notify_parent(void)
- {
-- if (notify_pipe[1] != -1)
-+ if (notify_pipe[1] >= 0)
- (void)write(notify_pipe[1], "", 1);
- }
- static void
- notify_prepare(fd_set *readset)
- {
-- if (notify_pipe[0] != -1)
-+ if (notify_pipe[0] >= 0)
- FD_SET(notify_pipe[0], readset);
- }
- static void
-@@ -161,8 +161,8 @@ notify_done(fd_set *readset)
- {
- char c;
-
-- if (notify_pipe[0] != -1 && FD_ISSET(notify_pipe[0], readset))
-- while (read(notify_pipe[0], &c, 1) != -1)
-+ if (notify_pipe[0] >= 0 && FD_ISSET(notify_pipe[0], readset))
-+ while (read(notify_pipe[0], &c, 1) >= 0)
- debug2("notify_done: reading");
- }
-
-@@ -337,7 +337,7 @@ wait_until_can_do_something(fd_set **readsetp, fd_set **writesetp, int *maxfdp,
- * If we have buffered data, try to write some of that data
- * to the program.
- */
-- if (fdin != -1 && buffer_len(&stdin_buffer) > 0)
-+ if (fdin >= 0 && buffer_len(&stdin_buffer) > 0)
- FD_SET(fdin, *writesetp);
- }
- notify_prepare(*readsetp);
-@@ -477,7 +477,7 @@ process_output(fd_set *writeset)
- int len;
-
- /* Write buffered data to program stdin. */
-- if (!compat20 && fdin != -1 && FD_ISSET(fdin, writeset)) {
-+ if (!compat20 && fdin >= 0 && FD_ISSET(fdin, writeset)) {
- data = buffer_ptr(&stdin_buffer);
- dlen = buffer_len(&stdin_buffer);
- len = write(fdin, data, dlen);
-@@ -590,7 +590,7 @@ server_loop(pid_t pid, int fdin_arg, int fdout_arg, int fderr_arg)
- set_nonblock(fdin);
- set_nonblock(fdout);
- /* we don't have stderr for interactive terminal sessions, see below */
-- if (fderr != -1)
-+ if (fderr >= 0)
- set_nonblock(fderr);
-
- if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_IGNOREMSG) && isatty(fdin))
-@@ -614,7 +614,7 @@ server_loop(pid_t pid, int fdin_arg, int fdout_arg, int fderr_arg)
- max_fd = MAX(connection_in, connection_out);
- max_fd = MAX(max_fd, fdin);
- max_fd = MAX(max_fd, fdout);
-- if (fderr != -1)
-+ if (fderr >= 0)
- max_fd = MAX(max_fd, fderr);
- #endif
-
-@@ -644,7 +644,7 @@ server_loop(pid_t pid, int fdin_arg, int fdout_arg, int fderr_arg)
- * If we have received eof, and there is no more pending
- * input data, cause a real eof by closing fdin.
- */
-- if (stdin_eof && fdin != -1 && buffer_len(&stdin_buffer) == 0) {
-+ if (stdin_eof && fdin >= 0 && buffer_len(&stdin_buffer) == 0) {
- if (fdin != fdout)
- close(fdin);
- else
-@@ -740,15 +740,15 @@ server_loop(pid_t pid, int fdin_arg, int fdout_arg, int fderr_arg)
- buffer_free(&stderr_buffer);
-
- /* Close the file descriptors. */
-- if (fdout != -1)
-+ if (fdout >= 0)
- close(fdout);
- fdout = -1;
- fdout_eof = 1;
-- if (fderr != -1)
-+ if (fderr >= 0)
- close(fderr);
- fderr = -1;
- fderr_eof = 1;
-- if (fdin != -1)
-+ if (fdin >= 0)
- close(fdin);
- fdin = -1;
-
-@@ -947,7 +947,7 @@ server_input_window_size(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
-
- debug("Window change received.");
- packet_check_eom();
-- if (fdin != -1)
-+ if (fdin >= 0)
- pty_change_window_size(fdin, row, col, xpixel, ypixel);
- }
-
-@@ -1007,7 +1007,7 @@ server_request_tun(void)
- }
-
- tun = packet_get_int();
-- if (forced_tun_device != -1) {
-+ if (forced_tun_device >= 0) {
- if (tun != SSH_TUNID_ANY && forced_tun_device != tun)
- goto done;
- tun = forced_tun_device;
-diff --git a/sftp-client.c b/sftp-client.c
-index 2f5907c..3a2affd 100644
---- a/sftp-client.c
-+++ b/sftp-client.c
-@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ get_msg(struct sftp_conn *conn, Buffer *m)
- }
-
- static void
--send_string_request(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int id, u_int code, char *s,
-+send_string_request(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int id, u_int code, const char *s,
- u_int len)
- {
- Buffer msg;
-@@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ send_string_request(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int id, u_int code, char *s,
-
- static void
- send_string_attrs_request(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int id, u_int code,
-- char *s, u_int len, Attrib *a)
-+ const char *s, u_int len, Attrib *a)
- {
- Buffer msg;
-
-@@ -429,7 +429,7 @@ sftp_proto_version(struct sftp_conn *conn)
- }
-
- int
--do_close(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *handle, u_int handle_len)
-+do_close(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *handle, u_int handle_len)
- {
- u_int id, status;
- Buffer msg;
-@@ -454,7 +454,7 @@ do_close(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *handle, u_int handle_len)
-
-
- static int
--do_lsreaddir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, int print_flag,
-+do_lsreaddir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int print_flag,
- SFTP_DIRENT ***dir)
- {
- Buffer msg;
-@@ -577,7 +577,7 @@ do_lsreaddir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, int print_flag,
- }
-
- int
--do_readdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, SFTP_DIRENT ***dir)
-+do_readdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, SFTP_DIRENT ***dir)
- {
- return(do_lsreaddir(conn, path, 0, dir));
- }
-@@ -597,7 +597,7 @@ void free_sftp_dirents(SFTP_DIRENT **s)
- }
-
- int
--do_rm(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path)
-+do_rm(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path)
- {
- u_int status, id;
-
-@@ -612,7 +612,7 @@ do_rm(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path)
- }
-
- int
--do_mkdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, Attrib *a, int print_flag)
-+do_mkdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, Attrib *a, int print_flag)
- {
- u_int status, id;
-
-@@ -628,7 +628,7 @@ do_mkdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, Attrib *a, int print_flag)
- }
-
- int
--do_rmdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path)
-+do_rmdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path)
- {
- u_int status, id;
-
-@@ -644,7 +644,7 @@ do_rmdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path)
- }
-
- Attrib *
--do_stat(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, int quiet)
-+do_stat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int quiet)
- {
- u_int id;
-
-@@ -658,7 +658,7 @@ do_stat(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, int quiet)
- }
-
- Attrib *
--do_lstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, int quiet)
-+do_lstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int quiet)
- {
- u_int id;
-
-@@ -679,7 +679,7 @@ do_lstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, int quiet)
-
- #ifdef notyet
- Attrib *
--do_fstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *handle, u_int handle_len, int quiet)
-+do_fstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *handle, u_int handle_len, int quiet)
- {
- u_int id;
-
-@@ -692,7 +692,7 @@ do_fstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *handle, u_int handle_len, int quiet)
- #endif
-
- int
--do_setstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, Attrib *a)
-+do_setstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, Attrib *a)
- {
- u_int status, id;
-
-@@ -709,7 +709,7 @@ do_setstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, Attrib *a)
- }
-
- int
--do_fsetstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *handle, u_int handle_len,
-+do_fsetstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *handle, u_int handle_len,
- Attrib *a)
- {
- u_int status, id;
-@@ -726,7 +726,7 @@ do_fsetstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *handle, u_int handle_len,
- }
-
- char *
--do_realpath(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path)
-+do_realpath(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path)
- {
- Buffer msg;
- u_int type, expected_id, count, id;
-@@ -775,7 +775,7 @@ do_realpath(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path)
- }
-
- int
--do_rename(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *oldpath, char *newpath,
-+do_rename(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *oldpath, const char *newpath,
- int force_legacy)
- {
- Buffer msg;
-@@ -811,7 +811,7 @@ do_rename(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *oldpath, char *newpath,
- }
-
- int
--do_hardlink(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *oldpath, char *newpath)
-+do_hardlink(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *oldpath, const char *newpath)
- {
- Buffer msg;
- u_int status, id;
-@@ -844,7 +844,7 @@ do_hardlink(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *oldpath, char *newpath)
- }
-
- int
--do_symlink(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *oldpath, char *newpath)
-+do_symlink(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *oldpath, const char *newpath)
- {
- Buffer msg;
- u_int status, id;
-@@ -876,7 +876,7 @@ do_symlink(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *oldpath, char *newpath)
- }
-
- int
--do_fsync(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *handle, u_int handle_len)
-+do_fsync(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *handle, u_int handle_len)
- {
- Buffer msg;
- u_int status, id;
-@@ -907,7 +907,7 @@ do_fsync(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *handle, u_int handle_len)
-
- #ifdef notyet
- char *
--do_readlink(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path)
-+do_readlink(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path)
- {
- Buffer msg;
- u_int type, expected_id, count, id;
-@@ -1010,7 +1010,7 @@ do_fstatvfs(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *handle, u_int handle_len,
-
- static void
- send_read_request(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int id, u_int64_t offset,
-- u_int len, char *handle, u_int handle_len)
-+ u_int len, const char *handle, u_int handle_len)
- {
- Buffer msg;
-
-@@ -1026,7 +1026,7 @@ send_read_request(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int id, u_int64_t offset,
- }
-
- int
--do_download(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *remote_path, char *local_path,
-+do_download(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *remote_path, const char *local_path,
- Attrib *a, int preserve_flag, int resume_flag, int fsync_flag)
- {
- Attrib junk;
-@@ -1308,7 +1308,7 @@ do_download(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *remote_path, char *local_path,
- }
-
- static int
--download_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *src, char *dst, int depth,
-+download_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst, int depth,
- Attrib *dirattrib, int preserve_flag, int print_flag, int resume_flag,
- int fsync_flag)
- {
-@@ -1400,7 +1400,7 @@ download_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *src, char *dst, int depth,
- }
-
- int
--download_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *src, char *dst,
-+download_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst,
- Attrib *dirattrib, int preserve_flag, int print_flag,
- int resume_flag, int fsync_flag)
- {
-@@ -1419,7 +1419,7 @@ download_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *src, char *dst,
- }
-
- int
--do_upload(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *local_path, char *remote_path,
-+do_upload(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *local_path, const char *remote_path,
- int preserve_flag, int fsync_flag)
- {
- int local_fd;
-@@ -1607,7 +1607,7 @@ do_upload(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *local_path, char *remote_path,
- }
-
- static int
--upload_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *src, char *dst, int depth,
-+upload_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst, int depth,
- int preserve_flag, int print_flag, int fsync_flag)
- {
- int ret = 0, status;
-@@ -1700,7 +1700,7 @@ upload_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *src, char *dst, int depth,
- }
-
- int
--upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *src, char *dst, int preserve_flag,
-+upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst, int preserve_flag,
- int print_flag, int fsync_flag)
- {
- char *dst_canon;
-@@ -1719,7 +1719,7 @@ upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *src, char *dst, int preserve_flag,
- }
-
- char *
--path_append(char *p1, char *p2)
-+path_append(const char *p1, const char *p2)
- {
- char *ret;
- size_t len = strlen(p1) + strlen(p2) + 2;
-diff --git a/sftp-client.h b/sftp-client.h
-index ba92ad0..c085423 100644
---- a/sftp-client.h
-+++ b/sftp-client.h
-@@ -56,79 +56,79 @@ struct sftp_conn *do_init(int, int, u_int, u_int, u_int64_t);
- u_int sftp_proto_version(struct sftp_conn *);
-
- /* Close file referred to by 'handle' */
--int do_close(struct sftp_conn *, char *, u_int);
-+int do_close(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, u_int);
-
- /* Read contents of 'path' to NULL-terminated array 'dir' */
--int do_readdir(struct sftp_conn *, char *, SFTP_DIRENT ***);
-+int do_readdir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, SFTP_DIRENT ***);
-
- /* Frees a NULL-terminated array of SFTP_DIRENTs (eg. from do_readdir) */
- void free_sftp_dirents(SFTP_DIRENT **);
-
- /* Delete file 'path' */
--int do_rm(struct sftp_conn *, char *);
-+int do_rm(struct sftp_conn *, const char *);
-
- /* Create directory 'path' */
--int do_mkdir(struct sftp_conn *, char *, Attrib *, int);
-+int do_mkdir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, Attrib *, int);
-
- /* Remove directory 'path' */
--int do_rmdir(struct sftp_conn *, char *);
-+int do_rmdir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *);
-
- /* Get file attributes of 'path' (follows symlinks) */
--Attrib *do_stat(struct sftp_conn *, char *, int);
-+Attrib *do_stat(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, int);
-
- /* Get file attributes of 'path' (does not follow symlinks) */
--Attrib *do_lstat(struct sftp_conn *, char *, int);
-+Attrib *do_lstat(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, int);
-
- /* Set file attributes of 'path' */
--int do_setstat(struct sftp_conn *, char *, Attrib *);
-+int do_setstat(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, Attrib *);
-
- /* Set file attributes of open file 'handle' */
--int do_fsetstat(struct sftp_conn *, char *, u_int, Attrib *);
-+int do_fsetstat(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, u_int, Attrib *);
-
- /* Canonicalise 'path' - caller must free result */
--char *do_realpath(struct sftp_conn *, char *);
-+char *do_realpath(struct sftp_conn *, const char *);
-
- /* Get statistics for filesystem hosting file at "path" */
- int do_statvfs(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, struct sftp_statvfs *, int);
-
- /* Rename 'oldpath' to 'newpath' */
--int do_rename(struct sftp_conn *, char *, char *m, int force_legacy);
-+int do_rename(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *m, int force_legacy);
-
- /* Link 'oldpath' to 'newpath' */
--int do_hardlink(struct sftp_conn *, char *, char *);
-+int do_hardlink(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *);
-
- /* Rename 'oldpath' to 'newpath' */
--int do_symlink(struct sftp_conn *, char *, char *);
-+int do_symlink(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *);
-
- /* Call fsync() on open file 'handle' */
--int do_fsync(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *, u_int);
-+int do_fsync(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *, u_int);
-
- /*
- * Download 'remote_path' to 'local_path'. Preserve permissions and times
- * if 'pflag' is set
- */
--int do_download(struct sftp_conn *, char *, char *, Attrib *, int, int, int);
-+int do_download(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *, Attrib *, int, int, int);
-
- /*
- * Recursively download 'remote_directory' to 'local_directory'. Preserve
- * times if 'pflag' is set
- */
--int download_dir(struct sftp_conn *, char *, char *, Attrib *, int,
-+int download_dir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *, Attrib *, int,
- int, int, int);
-
- /*
- * Upload 'local_path' to 'remote_path'. Preserve permissions and times
- * if 'pflag' is set
- */
--int do_upload(struct sftp_conn *, char *, char *, int, int);
-+int do_upload(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *, int, int);
-
- /*
- * Recursively upload 'local_directory' to 'remote_directory'. Preserve
- * times if 'pflag' is set
- */
--int upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *, char *, char *, int, int, int);
-+int upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *, int, int, int);
-
- /* Concatenate paths, taking care of slashes. Caller must free result. */
--char *path_append(char *, char *);
-+char *path_append(const char *, const char *);
-
- #endif
-diff --git a/sftp.c b/sftp.c
-index ad1f8c8..3987117 100644
---- a/sftp.c
-+++ b/sftp.c
-@@ -218,7 +218,7 @@ killchild(int signo)
- {
- if (sshpid > 1) {
- kill(sshpid, SIGTERM);
-- waitpid(sshpid, NULL, 0);
-+ (void) waitpid(sshpid, NULL, 0);
- }
-
- _exit(1);
-@@ -329,7 +329,7 @@ local_do_ls(const char *args)
-
- /* Strip one path (usually the pwd) from the start of another */
- static char *
--path_strip(char *path, char *strip)
-+path_strip(const char *path, const char *strip)
- {
- size_t len;
-
-@@ -347,7 +347,7 @@ path_strip(char *path, char *strip)
- }
-
- static char *
--make_absolute(char *p, char *pwd)
-+make_absolute(char *p, const char *pwd)
- {
- char *abs_str;
-
-@@ -545,7 +545,7 @@ parse_no_flags(const char *cmd, char **argv, int argc)
- }
-
- static int
--is_dir(char *path)
-+is_dir(const char *path)
- {
- struct stat sb;
-
-@@ -557,7 +557,7 @@ is_dir(char *path)
- }
-
- static int
--remote_is_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path)
-+remote_is_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path)
- {
- Attrib *a;
-
-@@ -571,7 +571,7 @@ remote_is_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path)
-
- /* Check whether path returned from glob(..., GLOB_MARK, ...) is a directory */
- static int
--pathname_is_dir(char *pathname)
-+pathname_is_dir(const char *pathname)
- {
- size_t l = strlen(pathname);
-
-@@ -579,7 +579,7 @@ pathname_is_dir(char *pathname)
- }
-
- static int
--process_get(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *src, char *dst, char *pwd,
-+process_get(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst, const char *pwd,
- int pflag, int rflag, int resume, int fflag)
- {
- char *abs_src = NULL;
-@@ -659,7 +659,7 @@ out:
- }
-
- static int
--process_put(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *src, char *dst, char *pwd,
-+process_put(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst, const char *pwd,
- int pflag, int rflag, int fflag)
- {
- char *tmp_dst = NULL;
-@@ -765,7 +765,7 @@ sdirent_comp(const void *aa, const void *bb)
-
- /* sftp ls.1 replacement for directories */
- static int
--do_ls_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, char *strip_path, int lflag)
-+do_ls_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, const char *strip_path, int lflag)
- {
- int n;
- u_int c = 1, colspace = 0, columns = 1;
-@@ -850,7 +850,7 @@ do_ls_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, char *strip_path, int lflag)
-
- /* sftp ls.1 replacement which handles path globs */
- static int
--do_globbed_ls(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, char *strip_path,
-+do_globbed_ls(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, const char *strip_path,
- int lflag)
- {
- char *fname, *lname;
-@@ -931,7 +931,7 @@ do_globbed_ls(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, char *strip_path,
- }
-
- static int
--do_df(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, int hflag, int iflag)
-+do_df(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int hflag, int iflag)
- {
- struct sftp_statvfs st;
- char s_used[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE];
-diff --git a/ssh-agent.c b/ssh-agent.c
-index 117fdde..2b50132 100644
---- a/ssh-agent.c
-+++ b/ssh-agent.c
-@@ -1037,8 +1037,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- sanitise_stdfd();
-
- /* drop */
-- setegid(getgid());
-- setgid(getgid());
-+ (void) setegid(getgid());
-+ (void) setgid(getgid());
-
- #if defined(HAVE_PRCTL) && defined(PR_SET_DUMPABLE)
- /* Disable ptrace on Linux without sgid bit */
-diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
-index 773bb02..1eaa9f7 100644
---- a/sshd.c
-+++ b/sshd.c
-@@ -771,8 +771,10 @@ privsep_preauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
- if (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0)
- privsep_preauth_child();
- setproctitle("%s", "[net]");
-- if (box != NULL)
-+ if (box != NULL) {
- ssh_sandbox_child(box);
-+ free(box);
-+ }
-
- return 0;
- }
-@@ -1439,6 +1441,9 @@ server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *sock_out, int *newsock, int *config_s)
- if (num_listen_socks < 0)
- break;
- }
-+
-+ if (fdset != NULL)
-+ free(fdset);
- }
-
-
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6.1p1-ignore-SIGXFSZ-in-postauth.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6.1p1-ignore-SIGXFSZ-in-postauth.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 87434ce..0000000
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6.1p1-ignore-SIGXFSZ-in-postauth.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
-index 3887495..a4dc72f 100644
---- a/ChangeLog
-+++ b/ChangeLog
-@@ -1,3 +1,9 @@
-+20140823
-+ - (djm) [sshd.c] Ignore SIGXFSZ in preauth monitor child; can explode on
-+ lastlog writing on platforms with high UIDs; bz#2263
-+ - (djm) [monitor.c sshd.c] SIGXFSZ needs to be ignored in postauth
-+ monitor, not preauth; bz#2263
-+
- 20140703
- - OpenBSD CVS Sync
- - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/03 03:34:09
-diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
-index bdabe21..5a65114 100644
---- a/monitor.c
-+++ b/monitor.c
-@@ -501,6 +501,9 @@ monitor_child_postauth(struct monitor *pmonitor)
- signal(SIGHUP, &monitor_child_handler);
- signal(SIGTERM, &monitor_child_handler);
- signal(SIGINT, &monitor_child_handler);
-+#ifdef SIGXFSZ
-+ signal(SIGXFSZ, SIG_IGN);
-+#endif
-
- if (compat20) {
- mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth20;
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6.1p1-log-in-chroot.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6.1p1-log-in-chroot.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index bccf39b..0000000
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6.1p1-log-in-chroot.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,295 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/log.c b/log.c
-index 32e1d2e..d4caeb5 100644
---- a/log.c
-+++ b/log.c
-@@ -241,6 +241,11 @@ debug3(const char *fmt,...)
- void
- log_init(char *av0, LogLevel level, SyslogFacility facility, int on_stderr)
- {
-+ log_init_handler(av0, level, facility, on_stderr, 1);
-+}
-+
-+void
-+log_init_handler(char *av0, LogLevel level, SyslogFacility facility, int on_stderr, int reset_handler) {
- #if defined(HAVE_OPENLOG_R) && defined(SYSLOG_DATA_INIT)
- struct syslog_data sdata = SYSLOG_DATA_INIT;
- #endif
-@@ -264,8 +269,10 @@ log_init(char *av0, LogLevel level, SyslogFacility facility, int on_stderr)
- exit(1);
- }
-
-- log_handler = NULL;
-- log_handler_ctx = NULL;
-+ if (reset_handler) {
-+ log_handler = NULL;
-+ log_handler_ctx = NULL;
-+ }
-
- log_on_stderr = on_stderr;
- if (on_stderr)
-diff --git a/log.h b/log.h
-index ae7df25..30c3310 100644
---- a/log.h
-+++ b/log.h
-@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ typedef enum {
- typedef void (log_handler_fn)(LogLevel, const char *, void *);
-
- void log_init(char *, LogLevel, SyslogFacility, int);
-+void log_init_handler(char *, LogLevel, SyslogFacility, int, int);
- void log_change_level(LogLevel);
- int log_is_on_stderr(void);
- void log_redirect_stderr_to(const char *);
-diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
-index 7461fae..da2f766 100644
---- a/monitor.c
-+++ b/monitor.c
-@@ -364,6 +364,8 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctxt, struct monitor *pmonitor)
- close(pmonitor->m_log_sendfd);
- pmonitor->m_log_sendfd = pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1;
-
-+ pmonitor->m_state = "preauth";
-+
- authctxt = _authctxt;
- memset(authctxt, 0, sizeof(*authctxt));
-
-@@ -472,6 +474,8 @@ monitor_child_postauth(struct monitor *pmonitor)
- close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
- pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1;
-
-+ pmonitor->m_state = "postauth";
-+
- monitor_set_child_handler(pmonitor->m_pid);
- signal(SIGHUP, &monitor_child_handler);
- signal(SIGTERM, &monitor_child_handler);
-@@ -552,7 +556,7 @@ monitor_read_log(struct monitor *pmonitor)
- if (log_level_name(level) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: invalid log level %u (corrupted message?)",
- __func__, level);
-- do_log2(level, "%s [preauth]", msg);
-+ do_log2(level, "%s [%s]", msg, pmonitor->m_state);
-
- buffer_free(&logmsg);
- free(msg);
-@@ -2083,13 +2087,28 @@ monitor_init(void)
- mm_init_compression(mon->m_zlib);
- }
-
-+ mon->m_state = "";
-+
- return mon;
- }
-
- void
--monitor_reinit(struct monitor *mon)
-+monitor_reinit(struct monitor *mon, const char *chroot_dir)
- {
-- monitor_openfds(mon, 0);
-+ struct stat dev_log_stat;
-+ char *dev_log_path;
-+ int do_logfds = 0;
-+
-+ if (chroot_dir != NULL) {
-+ xasprintf(&dev_log_path, "%s/dev/log", chroot_dir);
-+
-+ if (stat(dev_log_path, &dev_log_stat) != 0) {
-+ debug("%s: /dev/log doesn't exist in %s chroot - will try to log via monitor using [postauth] suffix", __func__, chroot_dir);
-+ do_logfds = 1;
-+ }
-+ free(dev_log_path);
-+ }
-+ monitor_openfds(mon, do_logfds);
- }
-
- #ifdef GSSAPI
-diff --git a/monitor.h b/monitor.h
-index ff79fbb..00c2028 100644
---- a/monitor.h
-+++ b/monitor.h
-@@ -83,10 +83,11 @@ struct monitor {
- struct mm_master *m_zlib;
- struct Kex **m_pkex;
- pid_t m_pid;
-+ char *m_state;
- };
-
- struct monitor *monitor_init(void);
--void monitor_reinit(struct monitor *);
-+void monitor_reinit(struct monitor *, const char *);
- void monitor_sync(struct monitor *);
-
- struct Authctxt;
-diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
-index e4add93..bc4a8dd 100644
---- a/session.c
-+++ b/session.c
-@@ -160,6 +160,8 @@ login_cap_t *lc;
-
- static int is_child = 0;
-
-+static int have_dev_log = 1;
-+
- /* Name and directory of socket for authentication agent forwarding. */
- static char *auth_sock_name = NULL;
- static char *auth_sock_dir = NULL;
-@@ -523,8 +525,8 @@ do_exec_no_pty(Session *s, const char *command)
- is_child = 1;
-
- /* Child. Reinitialize the log since the pid has changed. */
-- log_init(__progname, options.log_level,
-- options.log_facility, log_stderr);
-+ log_init_handler(__progname, options.log_level,
-+ options.log_facility, log_stderr, have_dev_log);
-
- /*
- * Create a new session and process group since the 4.4BSD
-@@ -692,8 +694,8 @@ do_exec_pty(Session *s, const char *command)
- close(ptymaster);
-
- /* Child. Reinitialize the log because the pid has changed. */
-- log_init(__progname, options.log_level,
-- options.log_facility, log_stderr);
-+ log_init_handler(__progname, options.log_level,
-+ options.log_facility, log_stderr, have_dev_log);
- /* Close the master side of the pseudo tty. */
- close(ptyfd);
-
-@@ -797,6 +799,7 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
- int ret;
- const char *forced = NULL;
- char session_type[1024], *tty = NULL;
-+ struct stat dev_log_stat;
-
- if (options.adm_forced_command) {
- original_command = command;
-@@ -854,6 +857,10 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
- tty += 5;
- }
-
-+ if (lstat("/dev/log", &dev_log_stat) != 0) {
-+ have_dev_log = 0;
-+ }
-+
- verbose("Starting session: %s%s%s for %s from %.200s port %d",
- session_type,
- tty == NULL ? "" : " on ",
-@@ -1681,14 +1688,6 @@ child_close_fds(void)
- * descriptors left by system functions. They will be closed later.
- */
- endpwent();
--
-- /*
-- * Close any extra open file descriptors so that we don't have them
-- * hanging around in clients. Note that we want to do this after
-- * initgroups, because at least on Solaris 2.3 it leaves file
-- * descriptors open.
-- */
-- closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
- }
-
- /*
-@@ -1834,8 +1833,6 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command)
- exit(1);
- }
-
-- closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
--
- if (!options.use_login)
- do_rc_files(s, shell);
-
-@@ -1859,9 +1856,17 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command)
- argv[i] = NULL;
- optind = optreset = 1;
- __progname = argv[0];
-- exit(sftp_server_main(i, argv, s->pw));
-+ exit(sftp_server_main(i, argv, s->pw, have_dev_log));
- }
-
-+ /*
-+ * Close any extra open file descriptors so that we don't have them
-+ * hanging around in clients. Note that we want to do this after
-+ * initgroups, because at least on Solaris 2.3 it leaves file
-+ * descriptors open.
-+ */
-+ closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
-+
- fflush(NULL);
-
- if (options.use_login) {
-diff --git a/sftp-server-main.c b/sftp-server-main.c
-index 7e644ab..e162b7a 100644
---- a/sftp-server-main.c
-+++ b/sftp-server-main.c
-@@ -47,5 +47,5 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
- return 1;
- }
-
-- return (sftp_server_main(argc, argv, user_pw));
-+ return (sftp_server_main(argc, argv, user_pw, 0));
- }
-diff --git a/sftp-server.c b/sftp-server.c
-index b8eb59c..a0e644c 100644
---- a/sftp-server.c
-+++ b/sftp-server.c
-@@ -1437,7 +1437,7 @@ sftp_server_usage(void)
- }
-
- int
--sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw)
-+sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw, int reset_handler)
- {
- fd_set *rset, *wset;
- int i, in, out, max, ch, skipargs = 0, log_stderr = 0;
-@@ -1450,7 +1450,7 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw)
- extern char *__progname;
-
- __progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
-- log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr);
-+ log_init_handler(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr, reset_handler);
-
- pw = pwcopy(user_pw);
-
-@@ -1521,7 +1521,7 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw)
- }
- }
-
-- log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr);
-+ log_init_handler(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr, reset_handler);
-
- if ((cp = getenv("SSH_CONNECTION")) != NULL) {
- client_addr = xstrdup(cp);
-diff --git a/sftp.h b/sftp.h
-index 2bde8bb..ddf1a39 100644
---- a/sftp.h
-+++ b/sftp.h
-@@ -97,5 +97,5 @@
-
- struct passwd;
-
--int sftp_server_main(int, char **, struct passwd *);
-+int sftp_server_main(int, char **, struct passwd *, int);
- void sftp_server_cleanup_exit(int) __attribute__((noreturn));
-diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
-index 3eee75a..9c00bcb 100644
---- a/sshd.c
-+++ b/sshd.c
-@@ -745,7 +745,7 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
- }
-
- /* New socket pair */
-- monitor_reinit(pmonitor);
-+ monitor_reinit(pmonitor, options.chroot_directory);
-
- pmonitor->m_pid = fork();
- if (pmonitor->m_pid == -1)
-@@ -763,6 +763,11 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
-
- close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
- pmonitor->m_sendfd = -1;
-+ close(pmonitor->m_log_recvfd);
-+ pmonitor->m_log_recvfd = -1;
-+
-+ if (pmonitor->m_log_sendfd != -1)
-+ set_log_handler(mm_log_handler, pmonitor);
-
- /* Demote the private keys to public keys. */
- demote_sensitive_data();
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6.1p1-partial-success.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6.1p1-partial-success.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index b5c61cf..0000000
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6.1p1-partial-success.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/auth2.c b/auth2.c
-index d9b440a..ec0bf12 100644
---- a/auth2.c
-+++ b/auth2.c
-@@ -355,8 +355,9 @@ userauth_finish(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, const char *method,
- authctxt->success = 1;
- } else {
-
-- /* Allow initial try of "none" auth without failure penalty */
-- if (!authctxt->server_caused_failure &&
-+ /* Allow initial try of "none" auth without failure penalty
-+ * Partial succes is not failure */
-+ if (!authctxt->server_caused_failure && !partial &&
- (authctxt->attempt > 1 || strcmp(method, "none") != 0))
- authctxt->failures++;
- if (authctxt->failures >= options.max_authtries) {
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6.1p1-servconf-parser.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6.1p1-servconf-parser.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index b93f6f3..0000000
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6.1p1-servconf-parser.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
-index b7f3294..bc1e909 100644
---- a/servconf.c
-+++ b/servconf.c
-@@ -1550,7 +1550,7 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
- break;
-
- case sForceCommand:
-- if (cp == NULL)
-+ if (cp == NULL || *cp == '\0')
- fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename,
- linenum);
- len = strspn(cp, WHITESPACE);
-@@ -1595,7 +1595,7 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
- break;
-
- case sVersionAddendum:
-- if (cp == NULL)
-+ if (cp == NULL || *cp == '\0')
- fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename,
- linenum);
- len = strspn(cp, WHITESPACE);
-@@ -1630,6 +1630,8 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
- break;
-
- case sAuthenticationMethods:
-+ if (cp == NULL || *cp == '\0')
-+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
- if (*activep && options->num_auth_methods == 0) {
- while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') {
- if (options->num_auth_methods >=
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6.1p1-utf8-banner.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6.1p1-utf8-banner.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 1ab8ade..0000000
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6.1p1-utf8-banner.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,994 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in
-index 2ad26ff..0f0d39f 100644
---- a/Makefile.in
-+++ b/Makefile.in
-@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=authfd.o authfile.o bufaux.o bufbn.o buffer.o \
- msg.o progressmeter.o dns.o entropy.o gss-genr.o umac.o umac128.o \
- ssh-pkcs11.o krl.o smult_curve25519_ref.o \
- kexc25519.o kexc25519c.o poly1305.o chacha.o cipher-chachapoly.o \
-- ssh-ed25519.o digest-openssl.o hmac.o \
-+ ssh-ed25519.o digest-openssl.o hmac.o utf8_stringprep.o \
- sc25519.o ge25519.o fe25519.o ed25519.o verify.o hash.o blocks.o
-
- SSHOBJS= ssh.o readconf.o clientloop.o sshtty.o \
-diff --git a/misc.h b/misc.h
-index d4df619..d98b83d 100644
---- a/misc.h
-+++ b/misc.h
-@@ -106,4 +106,7 @@ char *read_passphrase(const char *, int);
- int ask_permission(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
- int read_keyfile_line(FILE *, const char *, char *, size_t, u_long *);
-
-+/* utf8_stringprep.c */
-+int utf8_stringprep(const char *, char *, size_t);
-+
- #endif /* _MISC_H */
-diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
-index b00658b..08064f4 100644
---- a/sshconnect2.c
-+++ b/sshconnect2.c
-@@ -33,6 +33,8 @@
-
- #include <errno.h>
- #include <fcntl.h>
-+#include <langinfo.h>
-+#include <locale.h>
- #include <netdb.h>
- #include <pwd.h>
- #include <signal.h>
-@@ -519,21 +521,51 @@ input_userauth_error(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
- "type %d", type);
- }
-
-+/* Check whether we can display UTF-8 safely */
-+static int
-+utf8_ok(void)
-+{
-+ static int ret = -1;
-+ char *cp;
-+
-+ if (ret == -1) {
-+ setlocale(LC_CTYPE, "");
-+ cp = nl_langinfo(CODESET);
-+ ret = strcmp(cp, "UTF-8") == 0;
-+ }
-+ return ret;
-+}
-+
- /* ARGSUSED */
- void
- input_userauth_banner(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
- {
- char *msg, *raw, *lang;
-- u_int len;
-+ u_int done, len;
-
- debug3("input_userauth_banner");
-+
- raw = packet_get_string(&len);
- lang = packet_get_string(NULL);
- if (len > 0 && options.log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO) {
- if (len > 65536)
- len = 65536;
- msg = xmalloc(len * 4 + 1); /* max expansion from strnvis() */
-- strnvis(msg, raw, len * 4 + 1, VIS_SAFE|VIS_OCTAL|VIS_NOSLASH);
-+ done = 0;
-+ if (utf8_ok()) {
-+ if (utf8_stringprep(raw, msg, len * 4 + 1) == 0)
-+ done = 1;
-+ else
-+ debug2("%s: UTF8 stringprep failed", __func__);
-+ }
-+ /*
-+ * Fallback to strnvis if UTF8 display not supported or
-+ * conversion failed.
-+ */
-+ if (!done) {
-+ strnvis(msg, raw, len * 4 + 1,
-+ VIS_SAFE|VIS_OCTAL|VIS_NOSLASH);
-+ }
- fprintf(stderr, "%s", msg);
- free(msg);
- }
-diff --git a/stringprep-tables.c b/stringprep-tables.c
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..49f4d9d
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/stringprep-tables.c
-@@ -0,0 +1,661 @@
-+/* Public domain. */
-+
-+/* $OpenBSD$ */
-+
-+/*
-+ * Tables for RFC3454 stringprep algorithm, updated with a table of allocated
-+ * characters generated from Unicode.6.2's UnicodeData.txt
-+ *
-+ * Intended to be included directly from utf8_stringprep.c
-+ */
-+
-+/* Unassigned characters in Unicode 6.2 */
-+static const struct u32_range unassigned[] = {
-+ { 0x0378, 0x0379 },
-+ { 0x037F, 0x0383 },
-+ { 0x038B, 0x038B },
-+ { 0x038D, 0x038D },
-+ { 0x03A2, 0x03A2 },
-+ { 0x0528, 0x0530 },
-+ { 0x0557, 0x0558 },
-+ { 0x0560, 0x0560 },
-+ { 0x0588, 0x0588 },
-+ { 0x058B, 0x058E },
-+ { 0x0590, 0x0590 },
-+ { 0x05C8, 0x05CF },
-+ { 0x05EB, 0x05EF },
-+ { 0x05F5, 0x05FF },
-+ { 0x0605, 0x0605 },
-+ { 0x061C, 0x061D },
-+ { 0x070E, 0x070E },
-+ { 0x074B, 0x074C },
-+ { 0x07B2, 0x07BF },
-+ { 0x07FB, 0x07FF },
-+ { 0x082E, 0x082F },
-+ { 0x083F, 0x083F },
-+ { 0x085C, 0x085D },
-+ { 0x085F, 0x089F },
-+ { 0x08A1, 0x08A1 },
-+ { 0x08AD, 0x08E3 },
-+ { 0x08FF, 0x08FF },
-+ { 0x0978, 0x0978 },
-+ { 0x0980, 0x0980 },
-+ { 0x0984, 0x0984 },
-+ { 0x098D, 0x098E },
-+ { 0x0991, 0x0992 },
-+ { 0x09A9, 0x09A9 },
-+ { 0x09B1, 0x09B1 },
-+ { 0x09B3, 0x09B5 },
-+ { 0x09BA, 0x09BB },
-+ { 0x09C5, 0x09C6 },
-+ { 0x09C9, 0x09CA },
-+ { 0x09CF, 0x09D6 },
-+ { 0x09D8, 0x09DB },
-+ { 0x09DE, 0x09DE },
-+ { 0x09E4, 0x09E5 },
-+ { 0x09FC, 0x0A00 },
-+ { 0x0A04, 0x0A04 },
-+ { 0x0A0B, 0x0A0E },
-+ { 0x0A11, 0x0A12 },
-+ { 0x0A29, 0x0A29 },
-+ { 0x0A31, 0x0A31 },
-+ { 0x0A34, 0x0A34 },
-+ { 0x0A37, 0x0A37 },
-+ { 0x0A3A, 0x0A3B },
-+ { 0x0A3D, 0x0A3D },
-+ { 0x0A43, 0x0A46 },
-+ { 0x0A49, 0x0A4A },
-+ { 0x0A4E, 0x0A50 },
-+ { 0x0A52, 0x0A58 },
-+ { 0x0A5D, 0x0A5D },
-+ { 0x0A5F, 0x0A65 },
-+ { 0x0A76, 0x0A80 },
-+ { 0x0A84, 0x0A84 },
-+ { 0x0A8E, 0x0A8E },
-+ { 0x0A92, 0x0A92 },
-+ { 0x0AA9, 0x0AA9 },
-+ { 0x0AB1, 0x0AB1 },
-+ { 0x0AB4, 0x0AB4 },
-+ { 0x0ABA, 0x0ABB },
-+ { 0x0AC6, 0x0AC6 },
-+ { 0x0ACA, 0x0ACA },
-+ { 0x0ACE, 0x0ACF },
-+ { 0x0AD1, 0x0ADF },
-+ { 0x0AE4, 0x0AE5 },
-+ { 0x0AF2, 0x0B00 },
-+ { 0x0B04, 0x0B04 },
-+ { 0x0B0D, 0x0B0E },
-+ { 0x0B11, 0x0B12 },
-+ { 0x0B29, 0x0B29 },
-+ { 0x0B31, 0x0B31 },
-+ { 0x0B34, 0x0B34 },
-+ { 0x0B3A, 0x0B3B },
-+ { 0x0B45, 0x0B46 },
-+ { 0x0B49, 0x0B4A },
-+ { 0x0B4E, 0x0B55 },
-+ { 0x0B58, 0x0B5B },
-+ { 0x0B5E, 0x0B5E },
-+ { 0x0B64, 0x0B65 },
-+ { 0x0B78, 0x0B81 },
-+ { 0x0B84, 0x0B84 },
-+ { 0x0B8B, 0x0B8D },
-+ { 0x0B91, 0x0B91 },
-+ { 0x0B96, 0x0B98 },
-+ { 0x0B9B, 0x0B9B },
-+ { 0x0B9D, 0x0B9D },
-+ { 0x0BA0, 0x0BA2 },
-+ { 0x0BA5, 0x0BA7 },
-+ { 0x0BAB, 0x0BAD },
-+ { 0x0BBA, 0x0BBD },
-+ { 0x0BC3, 0x0BC5 },
-+ { 0x0BC9, 0x0BC9 },
-+ { 0x0BCE, 0x0BCF },
-+ { 0x0BD1, 0x0BD6 },
-+ { 0x0BD8, 0x0BE5 },
-+ { 0x0BFB, 0x0C00 },
-+ { 0x0C04, 0x0C04 },
-+ { 0x0C0D, 0x0C0D },
-+ { 0x0C11, 0x0C11 },
-+ { 0x0C29, 0x0C29 },
-+ { 0x0C34, 0x0C34 },
-+ { 0x0C3A, 0x0C3C },
-+ { 0x0C45, 0x0C45 },
-+ { 0x0C49, 0x0C49 },
-+ { 0x0C4E, 0x0C54 },
-+ { 0x0C57, 0x0C57 },
-+ { 0x0C5A, 0x0C5F },
-+ { 0x0C64, 0x0C65 },
-+ { 0x0C70, 0x0C77 },
-+ { 0x0C80, 0x0C81 },
-+ { 0x0C84, 0x0C84 },
-+ { 0x0C8D, 0x0C8D },
-+ { 0x0C91, 0x0C91 },
-+ { 0x0CA9, 0x0CA9 },
-+ { 0x0CB4, 0x0CB4 },
-+ { 0x0CBA, 0x0CBB },
-+ { 0x0CC5, 0x0CC5 },
-+ { 0x0CC9, 0x0CC9 },
-+ { 0x0CCE, 0x0CD4 },
-+ { 0x0CD7, 0x0CDD },
-+ { 0x0CDF, 0x0CDF },
-+ { 0x0CE4, 0x0CE5 },
-+ { 0x0CF0, 0x0CF0 },
-+ { 0x0CF3, 0x0D01 },
-+ { 0x0D04, 0x0D04 },
-+ { 0x0D0D, 0x0D0D },
-+ { 0x0D11, 0x0D11 },
-+ { 0x0D3B, 0x0D3C },
-+ { 0x0D45, 0x0D45 },
-+ { 0x0D49, 0x0D49 },
-+ { 0x0D4F, 0x0D56 },
-+ { 0x0D58, 0x0D5F },
-+ { 0x0D64, 0x0D65 },
-+ { 0x0D76, 0x0D78 },
-+ { 0x0D80, 0x0D81 },
-+ { 0x0D84, 0x0D84 },
-+ { 0x0D97, 0x0D99 },
-+ { 0x0DB2, 0x0DB2 },
-+ { 0x0DBC, 0x0DBC },
-+ { 0x0DBE, 0x0DBF },
-+ { 0x0DC7, 0x0DC9 },
-+ { 0x0DCB, 0x0DCE },
-+ { 0x0DD5, 0x0DD5 },
-+ { 0x0DD7, 0x0DD7 },
-+ { 0x0DE0, 0x0DF1 },
-+ { 0x0DF5, 0x0E00 },
-+ { 0x0E3B, 0x0E3E },
-+ { 0x0E5C, 0x0E80 },
-+ { 0x0E83, 0x0E83 },
-+ { 0x0E85, 0x0E86 },
-+ { 0x0E89, 0x0E89 },
-+ { 0x0E8B, 0x0E8C },
-+ { 0x0E8E, 0x0E93 },
-+ { 0x0E98, 0x0E98 },
-+ { 0x0EA0, 0x0EA0 },
-+ { 0x0EA4, 0x0EA4 },
-+ { 0x0EA6, 0x0EA6 },
-+ { 0x0EA8, 0x0EA9 },
-+ { 0x0EAC, 0x0EAC },
-+ { 0x0EBA, 0x0EBA },
-+ { 0x0EBE, 0x0EBF },
-+ { 0x0EC5, 0x0EC5 },
-+ { 0x0EC7, 0x0EC7 },
-+ { 0x0ECE, 0x0ECF },
-+ { 0x0EDA, 0x0EDB },
-+ { 0x0EE0, 0x0EFF },
-+ { 0x0F48, 0x0F48 },
-+ { 0x0F6D, 0x0F70 },
-+ { 0x0F98, 0x0F98 },
-+ { 0x0FBD, 0x0FBD },
-+ { 0x0FCD, 0x0FCD },
-+ { 0x0FDB, 0x0FFF },
-+ { 0x10C6, 0x10C6 },
-+ { 0x10C8, 0x10CC },
-+ { 0x10CE, 0x10CF },
-+ { 0x1249, 0x1249 },
-+ { 0x124E, 0x124F },
-+ { 0x1257, 0x1257 },
-+ { 0x1259, 0x1259 },
-+ { 0x125E, 0x125F },
-+ { 0x1289, 0x1289 },
-+ { 0x128E, 0x128F },
-+ { 0x12B1, 0x12B1 },
-+ { 0x12B6, 0x12B7 },
-+ { 0x12BF, 0x12BF },
-+ { 0x12C1, 0x12C1 },
-+ { 0x12C6, 0x12C7 },
-+ { 0x12D7, 0x12D7 },
-+ { 0x1311, 0x1311 },
-+ { 0x1316, 0x1317 },
-+ { 0x135B, 0x135C },
-+ { 0x137D, 0x137F },
-+ { 0x139A, 0x139F },
-+ { 0x13F5, 0x13FF },
-+ { 0x169D, 0x169F },
-+ { 0x16F1, 0x16FF },
-+ { 0x170D, 0x170D },
-+ { 0x1715, 0x171F },
-+ { 0x1737, 0x173F },
-+ { 0x1754, 0x175F },
-+ { 0x176D, 0x176D },
-+ { 0x1771, 0x1771 },
-+ { 0x1774, 0x177F },
-+ { 0x17DE, 0x17DF },
-+ { 0x17EA, 0x17EF },
-+ { 0x17FA, 0x17FF },
-+ { 0x180F, 0x180F },
-+ { 0x181A, 0x181F },
-+ { 0x1878, 0x187F },
-+ { 0x18AB, 0x18AF },
-+ { 0x18F6, 0x18FF },
-+ { 0x191D, 0x191F },
-+ { 0x192C, 0x192F },
-+ { 0x193C, 0x193F },
-+ { 0x1941, 0x1943 },
-+ { 0x196E, 0x196F },
-+ { 0x1975, 0x197F },
-+ { 0x19AC, 0x19AF },
-+ { 0x19CA, 0x19CF },
-+ { 0x19DB, 0x19DD },
-+ { 0x1A1C, 0x1A1D },
-+ { 0x1A5F, 0x1A5F },
-+ { 0x1A7D, 0x1A7E },
-+ { 0x1A8A, 0x1A8F },
-+ { 0x1A9A, 0x1A9F },
-+ { 0x1AAE, 0x1AFF },
-+ { 0x1B4C, 0x1B4F },
-+ { 0x1B7D, 0x1B7F },
-+ { 0x1BF4, 0x1BFB },
-+ { 0x1C38, 0x1C3A },
-+ { 0x1C4A, 0x1C4C },
-+ { 0x1C80, 0x1CBF },
-+ { 0x1CC8, 0x1CCF },
-+ { 0x1CF7, 0x1CFF },
-+ { 0x1DE7, 0x1DFB },
-+ { 0x1F16, 0x1F17 },
-+ { 0x1F1E, 0x1F1F },
-+ { 0x1F46, 0x1F47 },
-+ { 0x1F4E, 0x1F4F },
-+ { 0x1F58, 0x1F58 },
-+ { 0x1F5A, 0x1F5A },
-+ { 0x1F5C, 0x1F5C },
-+ { 0x1F5E, 0x1F5E },
-+ { 0x1F7E, 0x1F7F },
-+ { 0x1FB5, 0x1FB5 },
-+ { 0x1FC5, 0x1FC5 },
-+ { 0x1FD4, 0x1FD5 },
-+ { 0x1FDC, 0x1FDC },
-+ { 0x1FF0, 0x1FF1 },
-+ { 0x1FF5, 0x1FF5 },
-+ { 0x1FFF, 0x1FFF },
-+ { 0x2065, 0x2069 },
-+ { 0x2072, 0x2073 },
-+ { 0x208F, 0x208F },
-+ { 0x209D, 0x209F },
-+ { 0x20BB, 0x20CF },
-+ { 0x20F1, 0x20FF },
-+ { 0x218A, 0x218F },
-+ { 0x23F4, 0x23FF },
-+ { 0x2427, 0x243F },
-+ { 0x244B, 0x245F },
-+ { 0x2700, 0x2700 },
-+ { 0x2B4D, 0x2B4F },
-+ { 0x2B5A, 0x2BFF },
-+ { 0x2C2F, 0x2C2F },
-+ { 0x2C5F, 0x2C5F },
-+ { 0x2CF4, 0x2CF8 },
-+ { 0x2D26, 0x2D26 },
-+ { 0x2D28, 0x2D2C },
-+ { 0x2D2E, 0x2D2F },
-+ { 0x2D68, 0x2D6E },
-+ { 0x2D71, 0x2D7E },
-+ { 0x2D97, 0x2D9F },
-+ { 0x2DA7, 0x2DA7 },
-+ { 0x2DAF, 0x2DAF },
-+ { 0x2DB7, 0x2DB7 },
-+ { 0x2DBF, 0x2DBF },
-+ { 0x2DC7, 0x2DC7 },
-+ { 0x2DCF, 0x2DCF },
-+ { 0x2DD7, 0x2DD7 },
-+ { 0x2DDF, 0x2DDF },
-+ { 0x2E3C, 0x2E7F },
-+ { 0x2E9A, 0x2E9A },
-+ { 0x2EF4, 0x2EFF },
-+ { 0x2FD6, 0x2FEF },
-+ { 0x2FFC, 0x2FFF },
-+ { 0x3040, 0x3040 },
-+ { 0x3097, 0x3098 },
-+ { 0x3100, 0x3104 },
-+ { 0x312E, 0x3130 },
-+ { 0x318F, 0x318F },
-+ { 0x31BB, 0x31BF },
-+ { 0x31E4, 0x31EF },
-+ { 0x321F, 0x321F },
-+ { 0x32FF, 0x32FF },
-+ { 0x4DB6, 0x4DBF },
-+ { 0x9FA6, 0x9FCB },
-+ { 0x9FCD, 0x9FFF },
-+ { 0xA48D, 0xA48F },
-+ { 0xA4C7, 0xA4CF },
-+ { 0xA62C, 0xA63F },
-+ { 0xA698, 0xA69E },
-+ { 0xA6F8, 0xA6FF },
-+ { 0xA78F, 0xA78F },
-+ { 0xA794, 0xA79F },
-+ { 0xA7AB, 0xA7F7 },
-+ { 0xA82C, 0xA82F },
-+ { 0xA83A, 0xA83F },
-+ { 0xA878, 0xA87F },
-+ { 0xA8C5, 0xA8CD },
-+ { 0xA8DA, 0xA8DF },
-+ { 0xA8FC, 0xA8FF },
-+ { 0xA954, 0xA95E },
-+ { 0xA97D, 0xA97F },
-+ { 0xA9CE, 0xA9CE },
-+ { 0xA9DA, 0xA9DD },
-+ { 0xA9E0, 0xA9FF },
-+ { 0xAA37, 0xAA3F },
-+ { 0xAA4E, 0xAA4F },
-+ { 0xAA5A, 0xAA5B },
-+ { 0xAA7C, 0xAA7F },
-+ { 0xAAC3, 0xAADA },
-+ { 0xAAF7, 0xAB00 },
-+ { 0xAB07, 0xAB08 },
-+ { 0xAB0F, 0xAB10 },
-+ { 0xAB17, 0xAB1F },
-+ { 0xAB27, 0xAB27 },
-+ { 0xAB2F, 0xABBF },
-+ { 0xABEE, 0xABEF },
-+ { 0xABFA, 0xABFF },
-+ { 0xD7A4, 0xD7AF },
-+ { 0xD7C7, 0xD7CA },
-+ { 0xD7FC, 0xD7FF },
-+ { 0xFA6E, 0xFA6F },
-+ { 0xFADA, 0xFAFF },
-+ { 0xFB07, 0xFB12 },
-+ { 0xFB18, 0xFB1C },
-+ { 0xFB37, 0xFB37 },
-+ { 0xFB3D, 0xFB3D },
-+ { 0xFB3F, 0xFB3F },
-+ { 0xFB42, 0xFB42 },
-+ { 0xFB45, 0xFB45 },
-+ { 0xFBC2, 0xFBD2 },
-+ { 0xFD40, 0xFD4F },
-+ { 0xFD90, 0xFD91 },
-+ { 0xFDC8, 0xFDCF },
-+ { 0xFDFE, 0xFDFF },
-+ { 0xFE1A, 0xFE1F },
-+ { 0xFE27, 0xFE2F },
-+ { 0xFE53, 0xFE53 },
-+ { 0xFE67, 0xFE67 },
-+ { 0xFE6C, 0xFE6F },
-+ { 0xFE75, 0xFE75 },
-+ { 0xFEFD, 0xFEFE },
-+ { 0xFF00, 0xFF00 },
-+ { 0xFFBF, 0xFFC1 },
-+ { 0xFFC8, 0xFFC9 },
-+ { 0xFFD0, 0xFFD1 },
-+ { 0xFFD8, 0xFFD9 },
-+ { 0xFFDD, 0xFFDF },
-+ { 0xFFE7, 0xFFE7 },
-+ { 0xFFEF, 0xFFF8 },
-+ { 0x1000C, 0x1000C },
-+ { 0x10027, 0x10027 },
-+ { 0x1003B, 0x1003B },
-+ { 0x1003E, 0x1003E },
-+ { 0x1004E, 0x1004F },
-+ { 0x1005E, 0x1007F },
-+ { 0x100FB, 0x100FF },
-+ { 0x10103, 0x10106 },
-+ { 0x10134, 0x10136 },
-+ { 0x1018B, 0x1018F },
-+ { 0x1019C, 0x101CF },
-+ { 0x101FE, 0x1027F },
-+ { 0x1029D, 0x1029F },
-+ { 0x102D1, 0x102FF },
-+ { 0x1031F, 0x1031F },
-+ { 0x10324, 0x1032F },
-+ { 0x1034B, 0x1037F },
-+ { 0x1039E, 0x1039E },
-+ { 0x103C4, 0x103C7 },
-+ { 0x103D6, 0x103FF },
-+ { 0x1049E, 0x1049F },
-+ { 0x104AA, 0x107FF },
-+ { 0x10806, 0x10807 },
-+ { 0x10809, 0x10809 },
-+ { 0x10836, 0x10836 },
-+ { 0x10839, 0x1083B },
-+ { 0x1083D, 0x1083E },
-+ { 0x10856, 0x10856 },
-+ { 0x10860, 0x108FF },
-+ { 0x1091C, 0x1091E },
-+ { 0x1093A, 0x1093E },
-+ { 0x10940, 0x1097F },
-+ { 0x109B8, 0x109BD },
-+ { 0x109C0, 0x109FF },
-+ { 0x10A04, 0x10A04 },
-+ { 0x10A07, 0x10A0B },
-+ { 0x10A14, 0x10A14 },
-+ { 0x10A18, 0x10A18 },
-+ { 0x10A34, 0x10A37 },
-+ { 0x10A3B, 0x10A3E },
-+ { 0x10A48, 0x10A4F },
-+ { 0x10A59, 0x10A5F },
-+ { 0x10A80, 0x10AFF },
-+ { 0x10B36, 0x10B38 },
-+ { 0x10B56, 0x10B57 },
-+ { 0x10B73, 0x10B77 },
-+ { 0x10B80, 0x10BFF },
-+ { 0x10C49, 0x10E5F },
-+ { 0x10E7F, 0x10FFF },
-+ { 0x1104E, 0x11051 },
-+ { 0x11070, 0x1107F },
-+ { 0x110C2, 0x110CF },
-+ { 0x110E9, 0x110EF },
-+ { 0x110FA, 0x110FF },
-+ { 0x11135, 0x11135 },
-+ { 0x11144, 0x1117F },
-+ { 0x111C9, 0x111CF },
-+ { 0x111DA, 0x1167F },
-+ { 0x116B8, 0x116BF },
-+ { 0x116CA, 0x11FFF },
-+ { 0x1236F, 0x123FF },
-+ { 0x12463, 0x1246F },
-+ { 0x12474, 0x12FFF },
-+ { 0x1342F, 0x167FF },
-+ { 0x16A39, 0x16EFF },
-+ { 0x16F45, 0x16F4F },
-+ { 0x16F7F, 0x16F8E },
-+ { 0x16FA0, 0x1AFFF },
-+ { 0x1B002, 0x1CFFF },
-+ { 0x1D0F6, 0x1D0FF },
-+ { 0x1D127, 0x1D128 },
-+ { 0x1D1DE, 0x1D1FF },
-+ { 0x1D246, 0x1D2FF },
-+ { 0x1D357, 0x1D35F },
-+ { 0x1D372, 0x1D3FF },
-+ { 0x1D455, 0x1D455 },
-+ { 0x1D49D, 0x1D49D },
-+ { 0x1D4A0, 0x1D4A1 },
-+ { 0x1D4A3, 0x1D4A4 },
-+ { 0x1D4A7, 0x1D4A8 },
-+ { 0x1D4AD, 0x1D4AD },
-+ { 0x1D4BA, 0x1D4BA },
-+ { 0x1D4BC, 0x1D4BC },
-+ { 0x1D4C4, 0x1D4C4 },
-+ { 0x1D506, 0x1D506 },
-+ { 0x1D50B, 0x1D50C },
-+ { 0x1D515, 0x1D515 },
-+ { 0x1D51D, 0x1D51D },
-+ { 0x1D53A, 0x1D53A },
-+ { 0x1D53F, 0x1D53F },
-+ { 0x1D545, 0x1D545 },
-+ { 0x1D547, 0x1D549 },
-+ { 0x1D551, 0x1D551 },
-+ { 0x1D6A6, 0x1D6A7 },
-+ { 0x1D7CC, 0x1D7CD },
-+ { 0x1D800, 0x1EDFF },
-+ { 0x1EE04, 0x1EE04 },
-+ { 0x1EE20, 0x1EE20 },
-+ { 0x1EE23, 0x1EE23 },
-+ { 0x1EE25, 0x1EE26 },
-+ { 0x1EE28, 0x1EE28 },
-+ { 0x1EE33, 0x1EE33 },
-+ { 0x1EE38, 0x1EE38 },
-+ { 0x1EE3A, 0x1EE3A },
-+ { 0x1EE3C, 0x1EE41 },
-+ { 0x1EE43, 0x1EE46 },
-+ { 0x1EE48, 0x1EE48 },
-+ { 0x1EE4A, 0x1EE4A },
-+ { 0x1EE4C, 0x1EE4C },
-+ { 0x1EE50, 0x1EE50 },
-+ { 0x1EE53, 0x1EE53 },
-+ { 0x1EE55, 0x1EE56 },
-+ { 0x1EE58, 0x1EE58 },
-+ { 0x1EE5A, 0x1EE5A },
-+ { 0x1EE5C, 0x1EE5C },
-+ { 0x1EE5E, 0x1EE5E },
-+ { 0x1EE60, 0x1EE60 },
-+ { 0x1EE63, 0x1EE63 },
-+ { 0x1EE65, 0x1EE66 },
-+ { 0x1EE6B, 0x1EE6B },
-+ { 0x1EE73, 0x1EE73 },
-+ { 0x1EE78, 0x1EE78 },
-+ { 0x1EE7D, 0x1EE7D },
-+ { 0x1EE7F, 0x1EE7F },
-+ { 0x1EE8A, 0x1EE8A },
-+ { 0x1EE9C, 0x1EEA0 },
-+ { 0x1EEA4, 0x1EEA4 },
-+ { 0x1EEAA, 0x1EEAA },
-+ { 0x1EEBC, 0x1EEEF },
-+ { 0x1EEF2, 0x1EFFF },
-+ { 0x1F02C, 0x1F02F },
-+ { 0x1F094, 0x1F09F },
-+ { 0x1F0AF, 0x1F0B0 },
-+ { 0x1F0BF, 0x1F0C0 },
-+ { 0x1F0D0, 0x1F0D0 },
-+ { 0x1F0E0, 0x1F0FF },
-+ { 0x1F10B, 0x1F10F },
-+ { 0x1F12F, 0x1F12F },
-+ { 0x1F16C, 0x1F16F },
-+ { 0x1F19B, 0x1F1E5 },
-+ { 0x1F203, 0x1F20F },
-+ { 0x1F23B, 0x1F23F },
-+ { 0x1F249, 0x1F24F },
-+ { 0x1F252, 0x1F2FF },
-+ { 0x1F321, 0x1F32F },
-+ { 0x1F336, 0x1F336 },
-+ { 0x1F37D, 0x1F37F },
-+ { 0x1F394, 0x1F39F },
-+ { 0x1F3C5, 0x1F3C5 },
-+ { 0x1F3CB, 0x1F3DF },
-+ { 0x1F3F1, 0x1F3FF },
-+ { 0x1F43F, 0x1F43F },
-+ { 0x1F441, 0x1F441 },
-+ { 0x1F4F8, 0x1F4F8 },
-+ { 0x1F4FD, 0x1F4FF },
-+ { 0x1F53E, 0x1F53F },
-+ { 0x1F544, 0x1F54F },
-+ { 0x1F568, 0x1F5FA },
-+ { 0x1F641, 0x1F644 },
-+ { 0x1F650, 0x1F67F },
-+ { 0x1F6C6, 0x1F6FF },
-+ { 0x1F774, 0x1FFFD },
-+ { 0x2A6D7, 0x2A6FF },
-+ { 0x2A701, 0x2B733 },
-+ { 0x2B735, 0x2B73F },
-+ { 0x2B741, 0x2B81C },
-+ { 0x2B81E, 0x2F7FF },
-+ { 0x2FA1E, 0x2FFFD },
-+ { 0x30000, 0x3FFFD },
-+ { 0x40000, 0x4FFFD },
-+ { 0x50000, 0x5FFFD },
-+ { 0x60000, 0x6FFFD },
-+ { 0x70000, 0x7FFFD },
-+ { 0x80000, 0x8FFFD },
-+ { 0x90000, 0x9FFFD },
-+ { 0xA0000, 0xAFFFD },
-+ { 0xB0000, 0xBFFFD },
-+ { 0xC0000, 0xCFFFD },
-+ { 0xD0000, 0xDFFFD },
-+ { 0xE0000, 0xE0000 },
-+ { 0xE0002, 0xE001F },
-+ { 0xE0080, 0xE00FF },
-+ { 0xE01F0, 0xEFFFD },
-+};
-+
-+/* RFC3454 Table B.1 */
-+static const struct u32_range map_to_nothing[] = {
-+ { 0x00AD, 0x00AD },
-+ { 0x034F, 0x034F },
-+ { 0x1806, 0x1806 },
-+ { 0x180B, 0x180D },
-+ { 0x200B, 0x200D },
-+ { 0x2060, 0x2060 },
-+ { 0xFE00, 0xFE0F },
-+ { 0xFEFF, 0xFEFF },
-+};
-+
-+/* Local: allow tab, CR and LF */
-+static const struct u32_range whitelist[] = {
-+ { 0x09, 0x09 },
-+ { 0x0a, 0x0a },
-+ { 0x0d, 0x0d },
-+};
-+
-+/* RFC3454 Tables in appendix C */
-+static const struct u32_range prohibited[] = {
-+ /* C.2.1 ASCII control characters */
-+ { 0x0000, 0x001F },
-+ { 0x007F, 0x007F },
-+ /* C.2.2 Non-ASCII control characters */
-+ { 0x0080, 0x009F },
-+ { 0x06DD, 0x06DD },
-+ { 0x070F, 0x070F },
-+ { 0x180E, 0x180E },
-+ { 0x200C, 0x200C },
-+ { 0x200D, 0x200D },
-+ { 0x2028, 0x2028 },
-+ { 0x2029, 0x2029 },
-+ { 0x2060, 0x2060 },
-+ { 0x2061, 0x2061 },
-+ { 0x2062, 0x2062 },
-+ { 0x2063, 0x2063 },
-+ { 0x206A, 0x206F },
-+ { 0xFEFF, 0xFEFF },
-+ { 0xFFF9, 0xFFFC },
-+ { 0x1D173, 0x1D17A },
-+ /* C.3 Private use */
-+ { 0xE000, 0xF8FF },
-+ { 0xF0000, 0xFFFFD },
-+ { 0x100000, 0x10FFFD },
-+ /* C.4 Non-character code points */
-+ { 0xFDD0, 0xFDEF },
-+ { 0xFFFE, 0xFFFF },
-+ { 0x1FFFE, 0x1FFFF },
-+ { 0x2FFFE, 0x2FFFF },
-+ { 0x3FFFE, 0x3FFFF },
-+ { 0x4FFFE, 0x4FFFF },
-+ { 0x5FFFE, 0x5FFFF },
-+ { 0x6FFFE, 0x6FFFF },
-+ { 0x7FFFE, 0x7FFFF },
-+ { 0x8FFFE, 0x8FFFF },
-+ { 0x9FFFE, 0x9FFFF },
-+ { 0xAFFFE, 0xAFFFF },
-+ { 0xBFFFE, 0xBFFFF },
-+ { 0xCFFFE, 0xCFFFF },
-+ { 0xDFFFE, 0xDFFFF },
-+ { 0xEFFFE, 0xEFFFF },
-+ { 0xFFFFE, 0xFFFFF },
-+ { 0x10FFFE, 0x10FFFF },
-+ /* C.5 Surrogate codes */
-+ { 0xD800, 0xDFFF },
-+ /* C.6 Inappropriate for plain text */
-+ { 0xFFF9, 0xFFF9 },
-+ { 0xFFFA, 0xFFFA },
-+ { 0xFFFB, 0xFFFB },
-+ { 0xFFFC, 0xFFFC },
-+ { 0xFFFD, 0xFFFD },
-+ /* C.7 Inappropriate for canonical representation */
-+ { 0x2FF0, 0x2FFB },
-+ /* C.8 Change display properties or are deprecated */
-+ { 0x0340, 0x0340 },
-+ { 0x0341, 0x0341 },
-+ { 0x200E, 0x200E },
-+ { 0x200F, 0x200F },
-+ { 0x202A, 0x202A },
-+ { 0x202B, 0x202B },
-+ { 0x202C, 0x202C },
-+ { 0x202D, 0x202D },
-+ { 0x202E, 0x202E },
-+ { 0x206A, 0x206A },
-+ { 0x206B, 0x206B },
-+ { 0x206C, 0x206C },
-+ { 0x206D, 0x206D },
-+ { 0x206E, 0x206E },
-+ { 0x206F, 0x206F },
-+ /* C.9 Tagging characters */
-+ { 0xE0001, 0xE0001 },
-+ { 0xE0020, 0xE007F },
-+};
-+
-diff --git a/utf8_stringprep.c b/utf8_stringprep.c
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..bcafae7
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/utf8_stringprep.c
-@@ -0,0 +1,229 @@
-+/*
-+ * Copyright (c) 2013 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-+ *
-+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
-+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
-+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
-+ *
-+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
-+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
-+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
-+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
-+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
-+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
-+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
-+ */
-+
-+/*
-+ * This is a simple RFC3454 stringprep profile to sanitise UTF-8 strings
-+ * from untrusted sources.
-+ *
-+ * It is intended to be used prior to display of untrusted strings only.
-+ * It should not be used for logging because of bi-di ambiguity. It
-+ * should also not be used in any case where lack of normalisation may
-+ * cause problems.
-+ *
-+ * This profile uses the prohibition and mapping tables from RFC3454
-+ * (listed below) but the unassigned character table has been updated to
-+ * Unicode 6.2. It uses a local whitelist of whitespace characters (\n,
-+ * \a and \t). Unicode normalisation and bi-di testing are not used.
-+ *
-+ * XXX: implement bi-di handling (needed for logs)
-+ * XXX: implement KC normalisation (needed for passing to libs/syscalls)
-+ */
-+
-+#include <sys/types.h>
-+#include <stdio.h>
-+#include <stdlib.h>
-+#include <string.h>
-+#include <limits.h>
-+#include <ctype.h>
-+
-+#include "misc.h"
-+
-+struct u32_range {
-+ u_int32_t lo, hi; /* Inclusive */
-+};
-+
-+#include "stringprep-tables.c"
-+
-+/* Returns 1 if code 'c' appears in the table or 0 otherwise */
-+static int
-+code_in_table(u_int32_t c, const struct u32_range *table, size_t tlen)
-+{
-+ const struct u32_range *e, *end = (void *)(tlen + (char *)table);
-+
-+ for (e = table; e < end; e++) {
-+ if (c >= e->lo && c <= e->hi)
-+ return 1;
-+ }
-+ return 0;
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Decode the next valid UCS character from a UTF-8 string, skipping past bad
-+ * codes. Returns the decoded character or 0 for end-of-string and updates
-+ * nextc to point to the start of the next character (if any).
-+ * had_error is set if an invalid code was encountered.
-+ */
-+static u_int32_t
-+decode_utf8(const char *in, const char **nextc, int *had_error)
-+{
-+ int state = 0;
-+ size_t i;
-+ u_int32_t c, e;
-+
-+ e = c = 0;
-+ for (i = 0; in[i] != '\0'; i++) {
-+ e = (u_char)in[i];
-+ /* Invalid code point state */
-+ if (state == -1) {
-+ /*
-+ * Continue eating continuation characters until
-+ * a new start character comes along.
-+ */
-+ if ((e & 0xc0) == 0x80)
-+ continue;
-+ state = 0;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* New code point state */
-+ if (state == 0) {
-+ if ((e & 0x80) == 0) { /* 7 bit code */
-+ c = e & 0x7f;
-+ goto have_code;
-+ } else if ((e & 0xe0) == 0xc0) { /* 11 bit code point */
-+ state = 1;
-+ c = (e & 0x1f) << 6;
-+ } else if ((e & 0xf0) == 0xe0) { /* 16 bit code point */
-+ state = 2;
-+ c = (e & 0xf) << 12;
-+ } else if ((e & 0xf8) == 0xf0) { /* 21 bit code point */
-+ state = 3;
-+ c = (e & 0x7) << 18;
-+ } else {
-+ /* A five or six byte header, or 0xff */
-+ goto bad_encoding;
-+ }
-+ /*
-+ * Check that the header byte has some non-zero data
-+ * after masking off the length marker. If not it is
-+ * an invalid encoding.
-+ */
-+ if (c == 0) {
-+ bad_encoding:
-+ c = 0;
-+ state = -1;
-+ if (had_error != NULL)
-+ *had_error = 1;
-+ }
-+ continue;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* Sanity check: should never happen */
-+ if (state < 1 || state > 5) {
-+ *nextc = NULL;
-+ if (had_error != NULL)
-+ *had_error = 1;
-+ return 0;
-+ }
-+ /* Multibyte code point state */
-+ state--;
-+ c |= (e & 0x3f) << (state * 6);
-+ if (state > 0)
-+ continue;
-+
-+ /* RFC3629 bans codepoints > U+10FFFF */
-+ if (c > 0x10FFFF) {
-+ if (had_error != NULL)
-+ *had_error = 1;
-+ continue;
-+ }
-+ have_code:
-+ *nextc = in + i + 1;
-+ return c;
-+ }
-+ if (state != 0 && had_error != NULL)
-+ *had_error = 1;
-+ *nextc = in + i;
-+ return 0;
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Attempt to encode a UCS character as a UTF-8 sequence. Returns the number
-+ * of characters used or -1 on error (insufficient space or bad code).
-+ */
-+static int
-+encode_utf8(u_int32_t c, char *s, size_t slen)
-+{
-+ size_t i, need;
-+ u_char h;
-+
-+ if (c < 0x80) {
-+ if (slen >= 1) {
-+ s[0] = (char)c;
-+ }
-+ return 1;
-+ } else if (c < 0x800) {
-+ need = 2;
-+ h = 0xc0;
-+ } else if (c < 0x10000) {
-+ need = 3;
-+ h = 0xe0;
-+ } else if (c < 0x200000) {
-+ need = 4;
-+ h = 0xf0;
-+ } else {
-+ /* Invalid code point > U+10FFFF */
-+ return -1;
-+ }
-+ if (need > slen)
-+ return -1;
-+ for (i = 0; i < need; i++) {
-+ s[i] = (i == 0 ? h : 0x80);
-+ s[i] |= (c >> (need - i - 1) * 6) & 0x3f;
-+ }
-+ return need;
-+}
-+
-+
-+/*
-+ * Normalise a UTF-8 string using the RFC3454 stringprep algorithm.
-+ * Returns 0 on success or -1 on failure (prohibited code or insufficient
-+ * length in the output string.
-+ * Requires an output buffer at most the same length as the input.
-+ */
-+int
-+utf8_stringprep(const char *in, char *out, size_t olen)
-+{
-+ int r;
-+ size_t o;
-+ u_int32_t c;
-+
-+ if (olen < 1)
-+ return -1;
-+
-+ for (o = 0; (c = decode_utf8(in, &in, NULL)) != 0;) {
-+ /* Mapping */
-+ if (code_in_table(c, map_to_nothing, sizeof(map_to_nothing)))
-+ continue;
-+
-+ /* Prohibitied output */
-+ if (code_in_table(c, prohibited, sizeof(prohibited)) &&
-+ !code_in_table(c, whitelist, sizeof(whitelist)))
-+ return -1;
-+
-+ /* Map unassigned code points to U+FFFD */
-+ if (code_in_table(c, unassigned, sizeof(unassigned)))
-+ c = 0xFFFD;
-+
-+ /* Encode the character */
-+ r = encode_utf8(c, out + o, olen - o - 1);
-+ if (r < 0)
-+ return -1;
-+ o += r;
-+ }
-+ out[o] = '\0';
-+ return 0;
-+}
-+
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-AuthenticationMethods.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-AuthenticationMethods.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index de7f59d..0000000
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-AuthenticationMethods.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,110 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-6.6p1/servconf.c.auth_meth openssh-6.6p1/servconf.c
---- openssh-6.6p1/servconf.c.auth_meth 2016-06-24 13:39:30.022263557 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.6p1/servconf.c 2016-06-24 13:48:35.879948274 +0200
-@@ -327,6 +327,14 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
- if (use_privsep == -1)
- use_privsep = PRIVSEP_NOSANDBOX;
-
-+ /* Similar handling for AuthenticationMethods=any */
-+ if (options->num_auth_methods == 1 &&
-+ strcmp(options->auth_methods[0], "any") == 0) {
-+ free(options->auth_methods[0]);
-+ options->auth_methods[0] = NULL;
-+ options->num_auth_methods = 0;
-+ }
-+
- #ifndef HAVE_MMAP
- if (use_privsep && options->compression == 1) {
- error("This platform does not support both privilege "
-@@ -1680,22 +1688,42 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
- break;
-
- case sAuthenticationMethods:
-- if (cp == NULL || *cp == '\0')
-- fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
-- if (*activep && options->num_auth_methods == 0) {
-+ if (options->num_auth_methods == 0) {
-+ value = 0; /* seen "any" pseudo-method */
-+ value2 = 0; /* sucessfully parsed any method */
- while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') {
- if (options->num_auth_methods >=
- MAX_AUTH_METHODS)
- fatal("%s line %d: "
- "too many authentication methods.",
- filename, linenum);
-- if (auth2_methods_valid(arg, 0) != 0)
-+ if (strcmp(arg, "any") == 0) {
-+ if (options->num_auth_methods > 0) {
-+ fatal("%s line %d: \"any\" "
-+ "must appear alone in "
-+ "AuthenticationMethods",
-+ filename, linenum);
-+ }
-+ value = 1;
-+ } else if (value) {
-+ fatal("%s line %d: \"any\" must appear "
-+ "alone in AuthenticationMethods",
-+ filename, linenum);
-+ } else if (auth2_methods_valid(arg, 0) != 0) {
- fatal("%s line %d: invalid "
- "authentication method list.",
- filename, linenum);
-+ }
-+ value2 = 1;
-+ if (!*activep)
-+ continue;
- options->auth_methods[
- options->num_auth_methods++] = xstrdup(arg);
- }
-+ if (value2 == 0) {
-+ fatal("%s line %d: no AuthenticationMethods "
-+ "specified", filename, linenum);
-+ }
- }
- return 0;
-
-@@ -2195,11 +2221,13 @@ dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(ServerOpCodes code, u_int count, char **vals)
- {
- u_int i;
-
-- if (count <= 0)
-+ if (count <= 0 && code != sAuthenticationMethods)
- return;
- printf("%s", lookup_opcode_name(code));
- for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
- printf(" %s", vals[i]);
-+ if (code == sAuthenticationMethods && count == 0)
-+ printf(" any");
- printf("\n");
- }
-
-diff -up openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config.5.auth_meth openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config.5
---- openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config.5.auth_meth 2016-06-24 13:39:30.007263566 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config.5 2016-06-24 13:39:30.021263557 +0200
-@@ -172,9 +172,12 @@ for more information on patterns.
- Specifies the authentication methods that must be successfully completed
- for a user to be granted access.
- This option must be followed by one or more comma-separated lists of
--authentication method names.
--Successful authentication requires completion of every method in at least
--one of these lists.
-+authentication method names, or by the single string
-+.Dq any
-+to indicate the default behaviour of accepting any single authentication
-+method.
-+if the default is overridden, then successful authentication requires
-+completion of every method in at least one of these lists.
- .Pp
- For example, an argument of
- .Dq publickey,password publickey,keyboard-interactive
-@@ -202,7 +205,9 @@ This option is only available for SSH pr
- error if enabled if protocol 1 is also enabled.
- Note that each authentication method listed should also be explicitly enabled
- in the configuration.
--The default is not to require multiple authentication; successful completion
-+The default
-+.Dq any
-+is not to require multiple authentication; successful completion
- of a single authentication method is sufficient.
- .It Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand
- Specifies a program to be used to look up the user's public keys.
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-CVE-2014-2653.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-CVE-2014-2653.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index c3bd0a1..0000000
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-CVE-2014-2653.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,80 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
-index 38de846..1603a07 100644
---- a/ChangeLog
-+++ b/ChangeLog
-@@ -1,3 +1,14 @@
-+20140420
-+ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/01 03:34:10
-+ [sshconnect.c]
-+ When using VerifyHostKeyDNS with a DNSSEC resolver, down-convert any
-+ certificate keys to plain keys and attempt SSHFP resolution.
-+
-+ Prevents a server from skipping SSHFP lookup and forcing a new-hostkey
-+ dialog by offering only certificate keys.
-+
-+ Reported by mcv21 AT cam.ac.uk
-+
- 20140313
- - (djm) Release OpenSSH 6.6
-
-diff --git a/sshconnect.c b/sshconnect.c
-index 394cca8..e636f33 100644
---- a/sshconnect.c
-+++ b/sshconnect.c
-@@ -1219,30 +1219,40 @@ verify_host_key(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, Key *host_key)
- {
- int flags = 0;
- char *fp;
-+ Key *plain = NULL;
-
- fp = key_selected_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_HEX);
- debug("Server host key: %s %s%s", key_type(host_key),
- key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp);
- free(fp);
-
-- /* XXX certs are not yet supported for DNS */
-- if (!key_is_cert(host_key) && options.verify_host_key_dns &&
-- verify_host_key_dns(host, hostaddr, host_key, &flags) == 0) {
-- if (flags & DNS_VERIFY_FOUND) {
--
-- if (options.verify_host_key_dns == 1 &&
-- flags & DNS_VERIFY_MATCH &&
-- flags & DNS_VERIFY_SECURE)
-- return 0;
--
-- if (flags & DNS_VERIFY_MATCH) {
-- matching_host_key_dns = 1;
-- } else {
-- warn_changed_key(host_key);
-- error("Update the SSHFP RR in DNS with the new "
-- "host key to get rid of this message.");
-+ if (options.verify_host_key_dns) {
-+ /*
-+ * XXX certs are not yet supported for DNS, so downgrade
-+ * them and try the plain key.
-+ */
-+ plain = key_from_private(host_key);
-+ if (key_is_cert(plain))
-+ key_drop_cert(plain);
-+ if (verify_host_key_dns(host, hostaddr, plain, &flags) == 0) {
-+ if (flags & DNS_VERIFY_FOUND) {
-+ if (options.verify_host_key_dns == 1 &&
-+ flags & DNS_VERIFY_MATCH &&
-+ flags & DNS_VERIFY_SECURE) {
-+ key_free(plain);
-+ return 0;
-+ }
-+ if (flags & DNS_VERIFY_MATCH) {
-+ matching_host_key_dns = 1;
-+ } else {
-+ warn_changed_key(plain);
-+ error("Update the SSHFP RR in DNS "
-+ "with the new host key to get rid "
-+ "of this message.");
-+ }
- }
- }
-+ key_free(plain);
- }
-
- return check_host_key(host, hostaddr, options.port, host_key, RDRW,
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-CVE-2015-8325.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-CVE-2015-8325.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 4224051..0000000
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-CVE-2015-8325.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
-From 85bdcd7c92fe7ff133bbc4e10a65c91810f88755 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Wed, 13 Apr 2016 10:39:57 +1000
-Subject: ignore PAM environment vars when UseLogin=yes
-
-If PAM is configured to read user-specified environment variables
-and UseLogin=yes in sshd_config, then a hostile local user may
-attack /bin/login via LD_PRELOAD or similar environment variables
-set via PAM.
-
-CVE-2015-8325, found by Shayan Sadigh, via Colin Watson
----
- session.c | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
-index 4859245..4653b09 100644
---- a/session.c
-+++ b/session.c
-@@ -1322,7 +1322,7 @@ do_setup_env(Session *s, const char *shell)
- * Pull in any environment variables that may have
- * been set by PAM.
- */
-- if (options.use_pam) {
-+ if (options.use_pam && !options.use_login) {
- char **p;
-
- p = fetch_pam_child_environment();
---
-cgit v0.11.2
-
-
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-CVE-2016-3115.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-CVE-2016-3115.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index ed6d264..0000000
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-CVE-2016-3115.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,64 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
-index 9a75c62..4859245 100644
---- a/session.c
-+++ b/session.c
-@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@
-
- #include <arpa/inet.h>
-
-+#include <ctype.h>
- #include <errno.h>
- #include <fcntl.h>
- #include <grp.h>
-@@ -292,6 +293,21 @@ do_authenticated(Authctxt *authctxt)
- do_cleanup(authctxt);
- }
-
-+/* Check untrusted xauth strings for metacharacters */
-+static int
-+xauth_valid_string(const char *s)
-+{
-+ size_t i;
-+
-+ for (i = 0; s[i] != '\0'; i++) {
-+ if (!isalnum((u_char)s[i]) &&
-+ s[i] != '.' && s[i] != ':' && s[i] != '/' &&
-+ s[i] != '-' && s[i] != '_')
-+ return 0;
-+ }
-+ return 1;
-+}
-+
- /*
- * Prepares for an interactive session. This is called after the user has
- * been successfully authenticated. During this message exchange, pseudo
-@@ -365,7 +381,13 @@ do_authenticated1(Authctxt *authctxt)
- s->screen = 0;
- }
- packet_check_eom();
-- success = session_setup_x11fwd(s);
-+ if (xauth_valid_string(s->auth_proto) &&
-+ xauth_valid_string(s->auth_data))
-+ success = session_setup_x11fwd(s);
-+ else {
-+ success = 0;
-+ error("Invalid X11 forwarding data");
-+ }
- if (!success) {
- free(s->auth_proto);
- free(s->auth_data);
-@@ -2219,7 +2241,13 @@ session_x11_req(Session *s)
- s->screen = packet_get_int();
- packet_check_eom();
-
-- success = session_setup_x11fwd(s);
-+ if (xauth_valid_string(s->auth_proto) &&
-+ xauth_valid_string(s->auth_data))
-+ success = session_setup_x11fwd(s);
-+ else {
-+ success = 0;
-+ error("Invalid X11 forwarding data");
-+ }
- if (!success) {
- free(s->auth_proto);
- free(s->auth_data);
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-ControlPersist-stderr.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-ControlPersist-stderr.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 1cffa1b..0000000
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-ControlPersist-stderr.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,53 +0,0 @@
-From d2d6bf864e52af8491a60dd507f85b74361f5da3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: "djm@openbsd.org" <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri, 29 Apr 2016 08:07:53 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH] upstream commit
-
-close ControlPersist background process stderr when not
- in debug mode or when logging to a file or syslog. bz#1988 ok dtucker
-
-Upstream-ID: 4fb726f0fdcb155ad419913cea10dc4afd409d24
----
- log.c | 4 ++--
- ssh.c | 8 +++++---
- 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/log.c b/log.c
-index ad12930..277afda 100644
---- a/log.c
-+++ b/log.c
-@@ -342,7 +342,7 @@ log_change_level(LogLevel new_log_level)
- int
- log_is_on_stderr(void)
- {
-- return log_on_stderr;
-+ return log_on_stderr && log_stderr_fd == STDERR_FILENO;
- }
-
- /* redirect what would usually get written to stderr to specified file */
-diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c
-index a999d50..a881ba1 100644
---- a/ssh.c
-+++ b/ssh.c
-@@ -1395,7 +1395,7 @@ static void
- control_persist_detach(void)
- {
- pid_t pid;
-- int devnull;
-+ int devnull, keep_stderr;
-
- debug("%s: backgrounding master process", __func__);
-
-@@ -1426,8 +1426,10 @@ control_persist_detach(void)
- error("%s: open(\"/dev/null\"): %s", __func__,
- strerror(errno));
- } else {
-+ keep_stderr = log_is_on_stderr() && debug_flag;
- if (dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1 ||
-- dup2(devnull, STDOUT_FILENO) == -1)
-+ dup2(devnull, STDOUT_FILENO) == -1 ||
-+ (!keep_stderr && dup2(devnull, STDERR_FILENO) == -1))
- error("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
- if (devnull > STDERR_FILENO)
- close(devnull);
-
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-GSSAPIEnablek5users.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-GSSAPIEnablek5users.patch
index a60d608..a48aabb 100644
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-GSSAPIEnablek5users.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-GSSAPIEnablek5users.patch
@@ -1,8 +1,7 @@
-diff --git a/gss-serv-krb5.c b/gss-serv-krb5.c
-index 0a4930e..a7c0c5f 100644
---- a/gss-serv-krb5.c
-+++ b/gss-serv-krb5.c
-@@ -260,7 +260,6 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal principal, const char *name,
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.GSSAPIEnablek5users 2017-02-09 10:10:47.403859893 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c 2017-02-09 10:10:47.414859882 +0100
+@@ -260,7 +260,6 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal pri
FILE *fp;
char file[MAXPATHLEN];
char line[BUFSIZ];
@@ -10,7 +9,7 @@ index 0a4930e..a7c0c5f 100644
struct stat st;
struct passwd *pw = the_authctxt->pw;
int found_principal = 0;
-@@ -269,7 +268,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal principal, const char *name,
+@@ -269,7 +268,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal pri
snprintf(file, sizeof(file), "%s/.k5users", pw->pw_dir);
/* If both .k5login and .k5users DNE, self-login is ok. */
@@ -19,37 +18,36 @@ index 0a4930e..a7c0c5f 100644
return ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb_context, principal, luser,
k5login_exists);
}
-diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
-index d482e79..ad5869b 100644
---- a/servconf.c
-+++ b/servconf.c
-@@ -158,6 +158,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.GSSAPIEnablek5users 2017-02-09 10:10:47.404859892 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c 2017-02-09 10:18:45.800385543 +0100
+@@ -166,6 +166,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
options->ip_qos_bulk = -1;
options->version_addendum = NULL;
options->use_kuserok = -1;
+ options->enable_k5users = -1;
+ options->fingerprint_hash = -1;
+ options->disable_forwarding = -1;
}
-
- void
-@@ -315,6 +316,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
+@@ -337,6 +338,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
options->show_patchlevel = 0;
if (options->use_kuserok == -1)
options->use_kuserok = 1;
+ if (options->enable_k5users == -1)
+ options->enable_k5users = 0;
-
- /* Turn privilege separation on by default */
- if (use_privsep == -1)
-@@ -356,7 +359,7 @@ typedef enum {
- sBanner, sShowPatchLevel, sUseDNS, sHostbasedAuthentication,
- sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, sClientAliveInterval,
- sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile,
+ if (options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask == (mode_t)-1)
+ options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask = 0177;
+ if (options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink == -1)
+@@ -418,7 +421,7 @@ typedef enum {
+ sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, sHostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes,
+ sHostKeyAlgorithms,
+ sClientAliveInterval, sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile,
- sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssStrictAcceptor,
+ sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssEnablek5users, sGssStrictAcceptor,
sGssKeyEx, sGssStoreRekey, sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel,
sMatch, sPermitOpen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory,
sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding,
-@@ -430,6 +433,7 @@ static struct {
+@@ -497,12 +500,14 @@ static struct {
{ "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sGssStrictAcceptor, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "gssapikeyexchange", sGssKeyEx, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sGssStoreRekey, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
@@ -57,7 +55,6 @@ index d482e79..ad5869b 100644
#else
{ "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-@@ -437,6 +441,7 @@ static struct {
{ "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "gssapikeyexchange", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
@@ -65,7 +62,7 @@ index d482e79..ad5869b 100644
#endif
{ "gssusesessionccache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "gssapiusesessioncredcache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-@@ -1536,6 +1541,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
+@@ -1653,6 +1658,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
intptr = &options->use_kuserok;
goto parse_flag;
@@ -76,7 +73,7 @@ index d482e79..ad5869b 100644
case sPermitOpen:
arg = strdelim(&cp);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
-@@ -1824,6 +1833,7 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *dst, ServerOptions *src, int preauth)
+@@ -2026,6 +2035,7 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *d
M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_interactive);
M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_bulk);
M_CP_INTOPT(use_kuserok);
@@ -84,19 +81,18 @@ index d482e79..ad5869b 100644
M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_limit);
M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_interval);
-@@ -2076,6 +2086,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
- dump_cfg_fmtint(sAllowTcpForwarding, o->allow_tcp_forwarding);
+@@ -2319,6 +2329,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sStreamLocalBindUnlink, o->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sUsePrivilegeSeparation, use_privsep);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosUseKuserok, o->use_kuserok);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssEnablek5users, o->enable_k5users);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sFingerprintHash, o->fingerprint_hash);
/* string arguments */
- dump_cfg_string(sPidFile, o->pid_file);
-diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
-index 5117dfa..d63cb71 100644
---- a/servconf.h
-+++ b/servconf.h
-@@ -173,7 +173,8 @@ typedef struct {
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.GSSAPIEnablek5users 2017-02-09 10:10:47.404859892 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h 2017-02-09 10:10:47.415859881 +0100
+@@ -174,7 +174,8 @@ typedef struct {
int num_permitted_opens;
@@ -106,32 +102,30 @@ index 5117dfa..d63cb71 100644
char *chroot_directory;
char *revoked_keys_file;
char *trusted_user_ca_keys;
-diff --git a/sshd_config b/sshd_config
-index 43671f6..6ab00ed 100644
---- a/sshd_config
-+++ b/sshd_config
-@@ -94,6 +94,7 @@ GSSAPIAuthentication yes
- GSSAPICleanupCredentials no
- #GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck yes
- #GSSAPIKeyExchange no
-+#GSSAPIEnablek5users no
-
- # Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing,
- # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will
-diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
-index e0e5fff..aa9525d 100644
---- a/sshd_config.5
-+++ b/sshd_config.5
-@@ -505,6 +505,12 @@ on logout.
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.GSSAPIEnablek5users 2017-02-09 10:10:47.415859881 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5 2017-02-09 10:19:29.420336796 +0100
+@@ -633,6 +633,12 @@ Specifies whether key exchange based on
+ doesn't rely on ssh keys to verify host identity.
The default is
- .Dq yes .
- Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
+ .Dq no .
+.It Cm GSSAPIEnablek5users
+Specifies whether to look at .k5users file for GSSAPI authentication
+access control. Further details are described in
+.Xr ksu 1 .
+The default is
-+.Dq no .
++.Cm no .
.It Cm GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck
- Determines whether to be strict about the identity of the GSSAPI acceptor
- a client authenticates against. If
+ Determines whether to be strict about the identity of the GSSAPI acceptor
+ a client authenticates against.
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.GSSAPIEnablek5users 2017-02-09 10:10:47.404859892 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config 2017-02-09 10:10:47.415859881 +0100
+@@ -80,6 +80,7 @@ GSSAPIAuthentication yes
+ GSSAPICleanupCredentials no
+ #GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck yes
+ #GSSAPIKeyExchange no
++#GSSAPIEnablek5users no
+
+ # Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing,
+ # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-allow-ip-opts.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-allow-ip-opts.patch
index e56d8aa..953d613 100644
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-allow-ip-opts.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-allow-ip-opts.patch
@@ -1,20 +1,19 @@
-diff --git a/canohost.c b/canohost.c
-index a61a8c9..97ce58c 100644
---- a/canohost.c
-+++ b/canohost.c
-@@ -165,12 +165,29 @@ check_ip_options(int sock, char *ipaddr)
- option_size = sizeof(options);
- if (getsockopt(sock, ipproto, IP_OPTIONS, options,
+diff -up openssh/sshd.c.ip-opts openssh/sshd.c
+--- openssh/sshd.c.ip-opts 2016-07-25 13:58:48.998507834 +0200
++++ openssh/sshd.c 2016-07-25 14:01:28.346469878 +0200
+@@ -1507,12 +1507,29 @@ check_ip_options(struct ssh *ssh)
+
+ if (getsockopt(sock_in, IPPROTO_IP, IP_OPTIONS, opts,
&option_size) >= 0 && option_size != 0) {
- text[0] = '\0';
- for (i = 0; i < option_size; i++)
- snprintf(text + i*3, sizeof(text) - i*3,
-- " %2.2x", options[i]);
-- fatal("Connection from %.100s with IP options:%.800s",
-- ipaddr, text);
+- " %2.2x", opts[i]);
+- fatal("Connection from %.100s port %d with IP opts: %.800s",
+- ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh), text);
+ i = 0;
+ do {
-+ switch (options[i]) {
++ switch (opts[i]) {
+ case 0:
+ case 1:
+ ++i;
@@ -22,7 +21,7 @@ index a61a8c9..97ce58c 100644
+ case 130:
+ case 133:
+ case 134:
-+ i += options[i + 1];
++ i += opts[i + 1];
+ break;
+ default:
+ /* Fail, fatally, if we detect either loose or strict
@@ -30,11 +29,11 @@ index a61a8c9..97ce58c 100644
+ text[0] = '\0';
+ for (i = 0; i < option_size; i++)
+ snprintf(text + i*3, sizeof(text) - i*3,
-+ " %2.2x", options[i]);
-+ fatal("Connection from %.100s with IP options:%.800s",
-+ ipaddr, text);
++ " %2.2x", opts[i]);
++ fatal("Connection from %.100s port %d with IP options:%.800s",
++ ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh), text);
+ }
+ } while (i < option_size);
}
+ return;
#endif /* IP_OPTIONS */
- }
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-audit-race-condition.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-audit-race-condition.patch
index a33187e..9bbfcb1 100644
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-audit-race-condition.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-audit-race-condition.patch
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
-diff -up openssh-7.3p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit-race openssh-7.3p1/monitor_wrap.c
---- openssh-7.3p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit-race 2016-12-15 14:27:22.376603747 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.3p1/monitor_wrap.c 2016-12-15 14:27:22.381603742 +0100
-@@ -1256,4 +1256,48 @@ mm_audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const ch
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit-race 2017-02-09 14:07:56.870994116 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c 2017-02-09 14:07:56.874994112 +0100
+@@ -1107,4 +1107,48 @@ mm_audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const ch
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, &m);
buffer_free(&m);
}
@@ -50,10 +50,10 @@ diff -up openssh-7.3p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit-race openssh-7.3p1/monitor_wrap.c
+ pmonitor->m_recvfd = fd;
+}
#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
-diff -up openssh-7.3p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit-race openssh-7.3p1/monitor_wrap.h
---- openssh-7.3p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit-race 2016-12-15 14:27:22.376603747 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.3p1/monitor_wrap.h 2016-12-15 14:27:22.381603742 +0100
-@@ -88,6 +88,8 @@ void mm_audit_unsupported_body(int);
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit-race 2017-02-09 14:07:56.870994116 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.h 2017-02-09 14:07:56.874994112 +0100
+@@ -80,6 +80,8 @@ void mm_audit_unsupported_body(int);
void mm_audit_kex_body(int, char *, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t);
void mm_audit_session_key_free_body(int, pid_t, uid_t);
void mm_audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *, pid_t, uid_t);
@@ -62,10 +62,10 @@ diff -up openssh-7.3p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit-race openssh-7.3p1/monitor_wrap.h
#endif
struct Session;
-diff -up openssh-7.3p1/session.c.audit-race openssh-7.3p1/session.c
---- openssh-7.3p1/session.c.audit-race 2016-12-15 14:27:22.378603745 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.3p1/session.c 2016-12-15 14:27:22.382603741 +0100
-@@ -164,6 +164,10 @@ static Session *sessions = NULL;
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/session.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/session.c.audit-race 2017-02-09 14:07:56.871994115 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/session.c 2017-02-09 14:09:44.710893783 +0100
+@@ -162,6 +162,10 @@ static Session *sessions = NULL;
login_cap_t *lc;
#endif
@@ -74,10 +74,10 @@ diff -up openssh-7.3p1/session.c.audit-race openssh-7.3p1/session.c
+#endif
+
static int is_child = 0;
-
+ static int in_chroot = 0;
static int have_dev_log = 1;
-@@ -457,6 +457,8 @@ do_authenticated1(Authctxt *authctxt)
- }
+@@ -289,6 +293,8 @@ xauth_valid_string(const char *s)
+ return 1;
}
+void child_destory_sensitive_data();
@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.3p1/session.c.audit-race openssh-7.3p1/session.c
#define USE_PIPES 1
/*
* This is called to fork and execute a command when we have no tty. This
-@@ -588,6 +592,8 @@ do_exec_no_pty(Session *s, const char *c
+@@ -424,6 +430,8 @@ do_exec_no_pty(Session *s, const char *c
cray_init_job(s->pw); /* set up cray jid and tmpdir */
#endif
@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.3p1/session.c.audit-race openssh-7.3p1/session.c
/* Do processing for the child (exec command etc). */
do_child(s, command);
/* NOTREACHED */
-@@ -722,6 +728,9 @@ do_exec_pty(Session *s, const char *comm
+@@ -547,6 +555,9 @@ do_exec_pty(Session *s, const char *comm
/* Close the extra descriptor for the pseudo tty. */
close(ttyfd);
@@ -102,9 +102,9 @@ diff -up openssh-7.3p1/session.c.audit-race openssh-7.3p1/session.c
+ child_destory_sensitive_data();
+
/* record login, etc. similar to login(1) */
- #ifndef HAVE_OSF_SIA
- if (!(options.use_login && command == NULL)) {
-@@ -903,6 +912,8 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
+ #ifdef _UNICOS
+ cray_init_job(s->pw); /* set up cray jid and tmpdir */
+@@ -717,6 +728,8 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
}
if (s->command != NULL && s->ptyfd == -1)
s->command_handle = PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(s->command));
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.3p1/session.c.audit-race openssh-7.3p1/session.c
#endif
if (s->ttyfd != -1)
ret = do_exec_pty(s, command);
-@@ -918,6 +929,20 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
+@@ -732,6 +745,20 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
*/
buffer_clear(&loginmsg);
@@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.3p1/session.c.audit-race openssh-7.3p1/session.c
return ret;
}
-@@ -1751,6 +1776,33 @@ child_close_fds(void)
+@@ -1542,6 +1569,33 @@ child_close_fds(void)
endpwent();
}
@@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.3p1/session.c.audit-race openssh-7.3p1/session.c
/*
* Performs common processing for the child, such as setting up the
* environment, closing extra file descriptors, setting the user and group
-@@ -1768,12 +1820,6 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command
+@@ -1558,12 +1612,6 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command
struct passwd *pw = s->pw;
int r = 0;
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-audit.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-audit.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 66f7438..0000000
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-audit.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,2305 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in
-index 0f0d39f..9d8c2eb 100644
---- a/Makefile.in
-+++ b/Makefile.in
-@@ -82,7 +82,8 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=authfd.o authfile.o bufaux.o bufbn.o buffer.o \
- ssh-pkcs11.o krl.o smult_curve25519_ref.o \
- kexc25519.o kexc25519c.o poly1305.o chacha.o cipher-chachapoly.o \
- ssh-ed25519.o digest-openssl.o hmac.o utf8_stringprep.o \
-- sc25519.o ge25519.o fe25519.o ed25519.o verify.o hash.o blocks.o
-+ sc25519.o ge25519.o fe25519.o ed25519.o verify.o hash.o blocks.o \
-+ auditstub.o
-
- SSHOBJS= ssh.o readconf.o clientloop.o sshtty.o \
- sshconnect.o sshconnect1.o sshconnect2.o mux.o \
-diff --git a/audit-bsm.c b/audit-bsm.c
-index 6135591..5160869 100644
---- a/audit-bsm.c
-+++ b/audit-bsm.c
-@@ -375,10 +375,23 @@ audit_connection_from(const char *host, int port)
- #endif
- }
-
--void
-+int
- audit_run_command(const char *command)
- {
- /* not implemented */
-+ return 0;
-+}
-+
-+void
-+audit_end_command(int handle, const char *command)
-+{
-+ /* not implemented */
-+}
-+
-+void
-+audit_count_session_open(void)
-+{
-+ /* not necessary */
- }
-
- void
-@@ -393,6 +406,12 @@ audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li)
- /* not implemented */
- }
-
-+int
-+audit_keyusage(int host_user, const char *type, unsigned bits, char *fp, int rv)
-+{
-+ /* not implemented */
-+}
-+
- void
- audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event)
- {
-@@ -454,4 +473,40 @@ audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event)
- debug("%s: unhandled event %d", __func__, event);
- }
- }
-+
-+void
-+audit_unsupported_body(int what)
-+{
-+ /* not implemented */
-+}
-+
-+void
-+audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
-+{
-+ /* not implemented */
-+}
-+
-+void
-+audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
-+{
-+ /* not implemented */
-+}
-+
-+void
-+audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *fp)
-+{
-+ /* not implemented */
-+}
-+
-+void
-+audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *fp, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
-+{
-+ /* not implemented */
-+}
-+
-+void
-+audit_generate_ephemeral_server_key(const char *fp)
-+{
-+ /* not implemented */
-+}
- #endif /* BSM */
-diff --git a/audit-linux.c b/audit-linux.c
-index b3ee2f4..946f7fa 100644
---- a/audit-linux.c
-+++ b/audit-linux.c
-@@ -35,13 +35,24 @@
-
- #include "log.h"
- #include "audit.h"
-+#include "key.h"
-+#include "hostfile.h"
-+#include "auth.h"
-+#include "servconf.h"
- #include "canohost.h"
-+#include "packet.h"
-+#include "cipher.h"
-
-+#define AUDIT_LOG_SIZE 256
-+
-+extern ServerOptions options;
-+extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
-+extern u_int utmp_len;
- const char* audit_username(void);
-
--int
--linux_audit_record_event(int uid, const char *username,
-- const char *hostname, const char *ip, const char *ttyn, int success)
-+static void
-+linux_audit_user_logxxx(int uid, const char *username,
-+ const char *hostname, const char *ip, const char *ttyn, int success, int event)
- {
- int audit_fd, rc, saved_errno;
-
-@@ -49,11 +60,11 @@ linux_audit_record_event(int uid, const char *username,
- if (audit_fd < 0) {
- if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT ||
- errno == EAFNOSUPPORT)
-- return 1; /* No audit support in kernel */
-+ return; /* No audit support in kernel */
- else
-- return 0; /* Must prevent login */
-+ goto fatal_report; /* Must prevent login */
- }
-- rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN,
-+ rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, event,
- NULL, "login", username ? username : "(unknown)",
- username == NULL ? uid : -1, hostname, ip, ttyn, success);
- saved_errno = errno;
-@@ -65,35 +76,150 @@ linux_audit_record_event(int uid, const char *username,
- if ((rc == -EPERM) && (geteuid() != 0))
- rc = 0;
- errno = saved_errno;
-- return (rc >= 0);
-+ if (rc < 0) {
-+fatal_report:
-+ fatal("linux_audit_write_entry failed: %s", strerror(errno));
-+ }
- }
-
-+static void
-+linux_audit_user_auth(int uid, const char *username,
-+ const char *hostname, const char *ip, const char *ttyn, int success, int event)
-+{
-+ int audit_fd, rc, saved_errno;
-+ static const char *event_name[] = {
-+ "maxtries exceeded",
-+ "root denied",
-+ "success",
-+ "none",
-+ "password",
-+ "challenge-response",
-+ "pubkey",
-+ "hostbased",
-+ "gssapi",
-+ "invalid user",
-+ "nologin",
-+ "connection closed",
-+ "connection abandoned",
-+ "unknown"
-+ };
-+
-+ audit_fd = audit_open();
-+ if (audit_fd < 0) {
-+ if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT ||
-+ errno == EAFNOSUPPORT)
-+ return; /* No audit support in kernel */
-+ else
-+ goto fatal_report; /* Must prevent login */
-+ }
-+
-+ if ((event < 0) || (event > SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN))
-+ event = SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN;
-+
-+ rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_AUTH,
-+ NULL, event_name[event], username ? username : "(unknown)",
-+ username == NULL ? uid : -1, hostname, ip, ttyn, success);
-+ saved_errno = errno;
-+ close(audit_fd);
-+ /*
-+ * Do not report error if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non
-+ * root user.
-+ */
-+ if ((rc == -EPERM) && (geteuid() != 0))
-+ rc = 0;
-+ errno = saved_errno;
-+ if (rc < 0) {
-+fatal_report:
-+ fatal("linux_audit_write_entry failed: %s", strerror(errno));
-+ }
-+}
-+
-+int
-+audit_keyusage(int host_user, const char *type, unsigned bits, char *fp, int rv)
-+{
-+ char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE];
-+ int audit_fd, rc, saved_errno;
-+
-+ audit_fd = audit_open();
-+ if (audit_fd < 0) {
-+ if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT ||
-+ errno == EAFNOSUPPORT)
-+ return 1; /* No audit support in kernel */
-+ else
-+ return 0; /* Must prevent login */
-+ }
-+ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s_auth rport=%d", host_user ? "pubkey" : "hostbased", get_remote_port());
-+ rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_AUTH, NULL,
-+ buf, audit_username(), -1, NULL, get_remote_ipaddr(), NULL, rv);
-+ if ((rc < 0) && ((rc != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
-+ goto out;
-+ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "key algo=%s size=%d fp=%s%s rport=%d",
-+ type, bits, key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp, get_remote_port());
-+ rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_AUTH, NULL,
-+ buf, audit_username(), -1, NULL, get_remote_ipaddr(), NULL, rv);
-+out:
-+ saved_errno = errno;
-+ audit_close(audit_fd);
-+ errno = saved_errno;
-+ /* do not report error if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */
-+ return (rc >= 0) || ((rc == -EPERM) && (getuid() != 0));
-+}
-+
-+static int user_login_count = 0;
-+
- /* Below is the sshd audit API code */
-
- void
- audit_connection_from(const char *host, int port)
- {
--}
- /* not implemented */
-+}
-
--void
-+int
- audit_run_command(const char *command)
- {
-- /* not implemented */
-+ if (!user_login_count++)
-+ linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns),
-+ NULL, "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN);
-+ linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns),
-+ NULL, "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_START);
-+ return 0;
-+}
-+
-+void
-+audit_end_command(int handle, const char *command)
-+{
-+ linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns),
-+ NULL, "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_END);
-+ if (user_login_count && !--user_login_count)
-+ linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns),
-+ NULL, "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGOUT);
-+}
-+
-+void
-+audit_count_session_open(void)
-+{
-+ user_login_count++;
- }
-
- void
- audit_session_open(struct logininfo *li)
- {
-- if (linux_audit_record_event(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname,
-- NULL, li->line, 1) == 0)
-- fatal("linux_audit_write_entry failed: %s", strerror(errno));
-+ if (!user_login_count++)
-+ linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname,
-+ NULL, li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN);
-+ linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname,
-+ NULL, li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_START);
- }
-
- void
- audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li)
- {
-- /* not implemented */
-+ linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname,
-+ NULL, li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_END);
-+ if (user_login_count && !--user_login_count)
-+ linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname,
-+ NULL, li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGOUT);
- }
-
- void
-@@ -101,21 +227,43 @@ audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event)
- {
- switch(event) {
- case SSH_AUTH_SUCCESS:
-- case SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE:
-+ linux_audit_user_auth(-1, audit_username(), NULL,
-+ get_remote_ipaddr(), "ssh", 1, event);
-+ break;
-+
- case SSH_NOLOGIN:
-- case SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES:
- case SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED:
-+ linux_audit_user_auth(-1, audit_username(), NULL,
-+ get_remote_ipaddr(), "ssh", 0, event);
-+ linux_audit_user_logxxx(-1, audit_username(), NULL,
-+ get_remote_ipaddr(), "ssh", 0, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN);
- break;
-
-+ case SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES:
- case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_NONE:
- case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD:
- case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT:
- case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY:
- case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED:
- case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI:
-+ linux_audit_user_auth(-1, audit_username(), NULL,
-+ get_remote_ipaddr(), "ssh", 0, event);
-+ break;
-+
-+ case SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE:
-+ if (user_login_count) {
-+ while (user_login_count--)
-+ linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns),
-+ NULL, "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_END);
-+ linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns),
-+ NULL, "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGOUT);
-+ }
-+ break;
-+
-+ case SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON:
- case SSH_INVALID_USER:
-- linux_audit_record_event(-1, audit_username(), NULL,
-- get_remote_ipaddr(), "sshd", 0);
-+ linux_audit_user_logxxx(-1, audit_username(), NULL,
-+ get_remote_ipaddr(), "ssh", 0, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN);
- break;
-
- default:
-@@ -123,4 +271,135 @@ audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event)
- }
- }
-
-+void
-+audit_unsupported_body(int what)
-+{
-+#ifdef AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION
-+ char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE];
-+ const static char *name[] = { "cipher", "mac", "comp" };
-+ char *s;
-+ int audit_fd;
-+
-+ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=unsupported-%s direction=? cipher=? ksize=? rport=%d laddr=%s lport=%d ",
-+ name[what], get_remote_port(), (s = get_local_ipaddr(packet_get_connection_in())),
-+ get_local_port());
-+ free(s);
-+ audit_fd = audit_open();
-+ if (audit_fd < 0)
-+ /* no problem, the next instruction will be fatal() */
-+ return;
-+ audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION,
-+ buf, NULL, get_remote_ipaddr(), NULL, 0);
-+ audit_close(audit_fd);
-+#endif
-+}
-+
-+const static char *direction[] = { "from-server", "from-client", "both" };
-+
-+void
-+audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress, pid_t pid,
-+ uid_t uid)
-+{
-+#ifdef AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION
-+ char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE];
-+ int audit_fd, audit_ok;
-+ Cipher *cipher = cipher_by_name(enc);
-+ char *s;
-+
-+ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=start direction=%s cipher=%s ksize=%d mac=%s spid=%jd suid=%jd rport=%d laddr=%s lport=%d ",
-+ direction[ctos], enc, cipher ? 8 * cipher->key_len : 0, mac,
-+ (intmax_t)pid, (intmax_t)uid,
-+ get_remote_port(), (s = get_local_ipaddr(packet_get_connection_in())), get_local_port());
-+ free(s);
-+ audit_fd = audit_open();
-+ if (audit_fd < 0) {
-+ if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT ||
-+ errno == EAFNOSUPPORT)
-+ return; /* No audit support in kernel */
-+ else
-+ fatal("cannot open audit"); /* Must prevent login */
-+ }
-+ audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION,
-+ buf, NULL, get_remote_ipaddr(), NULL, 1);
-+ audit_close(audit_fd);
-+ /* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */
-+ if ((audit_ok < 0) && ((audit_ok != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
-+ fatal("cannot write into audit"); /* Must prevent login */
-+#endif
-+}
-+
-+void
-+audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
-+{
-+ char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE];
-+ int audit_fd, audit_ok;
-+ char *s;
-+
-+ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=destroy kind=session fp=? direction=%s spid=%jd suid=%jd rport=%d laddr=%s lport=%d ",
-+ direction[ctos], (intmax_t)pid, (intmax_t)uid,
-+ get_remote_port(),
-+ (s = get_local_ipaddr(packet_get_connection_in())),
-+ get_local_port());
-+ free(s);
-+ audit_fd = audit_open();
-+ if (audit_fd < 0) {
-+ if (errno != EINVAL && errno != EPROTONOSUPPORT &&
-+ errno != EAFNOSUPPORT)
-+ error("cannot open audit");
-+ return;
-+ }
-+ audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_KEY_USER,
-+ buf, NULL, get_remote_ipaddr(), NULL, 1);
-+ audit_close(audit_fd);
-+ /* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */
-+ if ((audit_ok < 0) && ((audit_ok != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
-+ error("cannot write into audit");
-+}
-+
-+void
-+audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *fp, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
-+{
-+ char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE];
-+ int audit_fd, audit_ok;
-+
-+ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=destroy kind=server fp=%s direction=? spid=%jd suid=%jd ",
-+ fp, (intmax_t)pid, (intmax_t)uid);
-+ audit_fd = audit_open();
-+ if (audit_fd < 0) {
-+ if (errno != EINVAL && errno != EPROTONOSUPPORT &&
-+ errno != EAFNOSUPPORT)
-+ error("cannot open audit");
-+ return;
-+ }
-+ audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_KEY_USER,
-+ buf, NULL,
-+ listening_for_clients() ? NULL : get_remote_ipaddr(),
-+ NULL, 1);
-+ audit_close(audit_fd);
-+ /* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */
-+ if ((audit_ok < 0) && ((audit_ok != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
-+ error("cannot write into audit");
-+}
-+
-+void
-+audit_generate_ephemeral_server_key(const char *fp)
-+{
-+ char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE];
-+ int audit_fd, audit_ok;
-+
-+ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=create kind=server fp=%s direction=? ", fp);
-+ audit_fd = audit_open();
-+ if (audit_fd < 0) {
-+ if (errno != EINVAL && errno != EPROTONOSUPPORT &&
-+ errno != EAFNOSUPPORT)
-+ error("cannot open audit");
-+ return;
-+ }
-+ audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_KEY_USER,
-+ buf, NULL, 0, NULL, 1);
-+ audit_close(audit_fd);
-+ /* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */
-+ if ((audit_ok < 0) && ((audit_ok != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
-+ error("cannot write into audit");
-+}
- #endif /* USE_LINUX_AUDIT */
-diff --git a/audit.c b/audit.c
-index ced57fa..13c6849 100644
---- a/audit.c
-+++ b/audit.c
-@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
-
- #include <stdarg.h>
- #include <string.h>
-+#include <unistd.h>
-
- #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-
-@@ -36,6 +37,9 @@
- #include "key.h"
- #include "hostfile.h"
- #include "auth.h"
-+#include "ssh-gss.h"
-+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
-+#include "xmalloc.h"
-
- /*
- * Care must be taken when using this since it WILL NOT be initialized when
-@@ -71,13 +75,10 @@ audit_classify_auth(const char *method)
- const char *
- audit_username(void)
- {
-- static const char unknownuser[] = "(unknown user)";
-- static const char invaliduser[] = "(invalid user)";
-+ static const char unknownuser[] = "(unknown)";
-
-- if (the_authctxt == NULL || the_authctxt->user == NULL)
-+ if (the_authctxt == NULL || the_authctxt->user == NULL || !the_authctxt->valid)
- return (unknownuser);
-- if (!the_authctxt->valid)
-- return (invaliduser);
- return (the_authctxt->user);
- }
-
-@@ -111,6 +112,40 @@ audit_event_lookup(ssh_audit_event_t ev)
- return(event_lookup[i].name);
- }
-
-+void
-+audit_key(int host_user, int *rv, const Key *key)
-+{
-+ char *fp;
-+ const char *crypto_name;
-+
-+ fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+ if (key->type == KEY_RSA1)
-+ crypto_name = "ssh-rsa1";
-+ else
-+ crypto_name = key_ssh_name(key);
-+ if (audit_keyusage(host_user, crypto_name, key_size(key), fp, *rv) == 0)
-+ *rv = 0;
-+ free(fp);
-+}
-+
-+void
-+audit_unsupported(int what)
-+{
-+ PRIVSEP(audit_unsupported_body(what));
-+}
-+
-+void
-+audit_kex(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *comp)
-+{
-+ PRIVSEP(audit_kex_body(ctos, enc, mac, comp, getpid(), getuid()));
-+}
-+
-+void
-+audit_session_key_free(int ctos)
-+{
-+ PRIVSEP(audit_session_key_free_body(ctos, getpid(), getuid()));
-+}
-+
- # ifndef CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
- /*
- * Null implementations of audit functions.
-@@ -140,6 +175,17 @@ audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event)
- }
-
- /*
-+ * Called when a child process has called, or will soon call,
-+ * audit_session_open.
-+ */
-+void
-+audit_count_session_open(void)
-+{
-+ debug("audit count session open euid %d user %s", geteuid(),
-+ audit_username());
-+}
-+
-+/*
- * Called when a user session is started. Argument is the tty allocated to
- * the session, or NULL if no tty was allocated.
- *
-@@ -174,13 +220,91 @@ audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li)
- /*
- * This will be called when a user runs a non-interactive command. Note that
- * it may be called multiple times for a single connection since SSH2 allows
-- * multiple sessions within a single connection.
-+ * multiple sessions within a single connection. Returns a "handle" for
-+ * audit_end_command.
- */
--void
-+int
- audit_run_command(const char *command)
- {
- debug("audit run command euid %d user %s command '%.200s'", geteuid(),
- audit_username(), command);
-+ return 0;
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * This will be called when the non-interactive command finishes. Note that
-+ * it may be called multiple times for a single connection since SSH2 allows
-+ * multiple sessions within a single connection. "handle" should come from
-+ * the corresponding audit_run_command.
-+ */
-+void
-+audit_end_command(int handle, const char *command)
-+{
-+ debug("audit end nopty exec euid %d user %s command '%.200s'", geteuid(),
-+ audit_username(), command);
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * This will be called when user is successfully autherized by the RSA1/RSA/DSA key.
-+ *
-+ * Type is the key type, len is the key length(byte) and fp is the fingerprint of the key.
-+ */
-+int
-+audit_keyusage(int host_user, const char *type, unsigned bits, char *fp, int rv)
-+{
-+ debug("audit %s key usage euid %d user %s key type %s key length %d fingerprint %s%s, result %d",
-+ host_user ? "pubkey" : "hostbased", geteuid(), audit_username(), type, bits,
-+ key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp, rv);
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * This will be called when the protocol negotiation fails.
-+ */
-+void
-+audit_unsupported_body(int what)
-+{
-+ debug("audit unsupported protocol euid %d type %d", geteuid(), what);
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * This will be called on succesfull protocol negotiation.
-+ */
-+void
-+audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress, pid_t pid,
-+ uid_t uid)
-+{
-+ debug("audit protocol negotiation euid %d direction %d cipher %s mac %s compresion %s from pid %ld uid %u",
-+ (unsigned)geteuid(), ctos, enc, mac, compress, (long)pid,
-+ (unsigned)uid);
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * This will be called on succesfull session key discard
-+ */
-+void
-+audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
-+{
-+ debug("audit session key discard euid %u direction %d from pid %ld uid %u",
-+ (unsigned)geteuid(), ctos, (long)pid, (unsigned)uid);
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * This will be called on destroy private part of the server key
-+ */
-+void
-+audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *fp, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
-+{
-+ debug("audit destroy sensitive data euid %d fingerprint %s from pid %ld uid %u",
-+ geteuid(), fp, (long)pid, (unsigned)uid);
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * This will be called on generation of the ephemeral server key
-+ */
-+void
-+audit_generate_ephemeral_server_key(const char *)
-+{
-+ debug("audit create ephemeral server key euid %d fingerprint %s", geteuid(), fp);
- }
- # endif /* !defined CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
- #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
-diff --git a/audit.h b/audit.h
-index 92ede5b..a2dc3ff 100644
---- a/audit.h
-+++ b/audit.h
-@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
- # define _SSH_AUDIT_H
-
- #include "loginrec.h"
-+#include "key.h"
-
- enum ssh_audit_event_type {
- SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES,
-@@ -47,11 +48,25 @@ enum ssh_audit_event_type {
- };
- typedef enum ssh_audit_event_type ssh_audit_event_t;
-
-+int listening_for_clients(void);
-+
- void audit_connection_from(const char *, int);
- void audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t);
-+void audit_count_session_open(void);
- void audit_session_open(struct logininfo *);
- void audit_session_close(struct logininfo *);
--void audit_run_command(const char *);
-+int audit_run_command(const char *);
-+void audit_end_command(int, const char *);
- ssh_audit_event_t audit_classify_auth(const char *);
-+int audit_keyusage(int, const char *, unsigned, char *, int);
-+void audit_key(int, int *, const Key *);
-+void audit_unsupported(int);
-+void audit_kex(int, char *, char *, char *);
-+void audit_unsupported_body(int);
-+void audit_kex_body(int, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t);
-+void audit_session_key_free(int ctos);
-+void audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t, uid_t);
-+void audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *, pid_t, uid_t);
-+void audit_generate_ephemeral_server_key(const char *);
-
- #endif /* _SSH_AUDIT_H */
-diff --git a/auditstub.c b/auditstub.c
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..45817e0
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/auditstub.c
-@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
-+/* $Id: auditstub.c,v 1.1 jfch Exp $ */
-+
-+/*
-+ * Copyright 2010 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
-+ * Use is subject to license terms.
-+ *
-+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-+ * are met:
-+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
-+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
-+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
-+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
-+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
-+ *
-+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
-+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
-+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
-+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
-+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
-+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
-+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
-+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
-+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
-+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
-+ *
-+ * Red Hat author: Jan F. Chadima <jchadima@redhat.com>
-+ */
-+
-+#include <sys/types.h>
-+
-+void
-+audit_unsupported(int n)
-+{
-+}
-+
-+void
-+audit_kex(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *comp)
-+{
-+}
-+
-+void
-+audit_session_key_free(int ctos)
-+{
-+}
-+
-+void
-+audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
-+{
-+}
-diff --git a/auth-rsa.c b/auth-rsa.c
-index 5dad6c3..f225b0b 100644
---- a/auth-rsa.c
-+++ b/auth-rsa.c
-@@ -93,7 +93,10 @@ auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *key, BIGNUM *challenge, u_char response[16])
- {
- u_char buf[32], mdbuf[16];
- struct ssh_digest_ctx *md;
-- int len;
-+ int len, rv;
-+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-+ char *fp;
-+#endif
-
- /* don't allow short keys */
- if (BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE) {
-@@ -117,12 +120,18 @@ auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *key, BIGNUM *challenge, u_char response[16])
- ssh_digest_free(md);
-
- /* Verify that the response is the original challenge. */
-- if (timingsafe_bcmp(response, mdbuf, 16) != 0) {
-- /* Wrong answer. */
-- return (0);
-+ rv = timingsafe_bcmp(response, mdbuf, 16) == 0;
-+
-+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-+ fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+ if (audit_keyusage(1, "ssh-rsa1", RSA_size(key->rsa) * 8, fp, rv) == 0) {
-+ debug("unsuccessful audit");
-+ rv = 0;
- }
-- /* Correct answer. */
-- return (1);
-+ free(fp);
-+#endif
-+
-+ return rv;
- }
-
- /*
-diff --git a/auth.c b/auth.c
-index 420a85b..d613f8c 100644
---- a/auth.c
-+++ b/auth.c
-@@ -628,9 +628,6 @@ getpwnamallow(const char *user)
- record_failed_login(user,
- get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns), "ssh");
- #endif
--#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-- audit_event(SSH_INVALID_USER);
--#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
- return (NULL);
- }
- if (!allowed_user(pw))
-diff --git a/auth.h b/auth.h
-index 4605588..f9d191c 100644
---- a/auth.h
-+++ b/auth.h
-@@ -186,6 +186,7 @@ void abandon_challenge_response(Authctxt *);
-
- char *expand_authorized_keys(const char *, struct passwd *pw);
- char *authorized_principals_file(struct passwd *);
-+int user_key_verify(const Key *, const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int);
-
- FILE *auth_openkeyfile(const char *, struct passwd *, int);
- FILE *auth_openprincipals(const char *, struct passwd *, int);
-@@ -203,6 +204,7 @@ Key *get_hostkey_private_by_type(int);
- int get_hostkey_index(Key *);
- int ssh1_session_key(BIGNUM *);
- void sshd_hostkey_sign(Key *, Key *, u_char **, u_int *, u_char *, u_int);
-+int hostbased_key_verify(const Key *, const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int);
-
- /* debug messages during authentication */
- void auth_debug_add(const char *fmt,...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
-diff --git a/auth2-hostbased.c b/auth2-hostbased.c
-index 95d678e..48aede4 100644
---- a/auth2-hostbased.c
-+++ b/auth2-hostbased.c
-@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *authctxt)
- /* test for allowed key and correct signature */
- authenticated = 0;
- if (PRIVSEP(hostbased_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, cuser, chost, key)) &&
-- PRIVSEP(key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b),
-+ PRIVSEP(hostbased_key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b),
- buffer_len(&b))) == 1) {
- authenticated = 1;
- authctxt->last_details = pubkey;
-@@ -154,6 +154,18 @@ done:
- return authenticated;
- }
-
-+int
-+hostbased_key_verify(const Key *key, const u_char *sig, u_int slen, const u_char *data, u_int datalen)
-+{
-+ int rv;
-+
-+ rv = key_verify(key, sig, slen, data, datalen);
-+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-+ audit_key(0, &rv, key);
-+#endif
-+ return rv;
-+}
-+
- /* return 1 if given hostkey is allowed */
- int
- hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, const char *cuser, char *chost,
-diff --git a/auth2-pubkey.c b/auth2-pubkey.c
-index cb0f931..6d1c872 100644
---- a/auth2-pubkey.c
-+++ b/auth2-pubkey.c
-@@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt)
- /* test for correct signature */
- authenticated = 0;
- if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key)) &&
-- PRIVSEP(key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b),
-+ PRIVSEP(user_key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b),
- buffer_len(&b))) == 1) {
- authctxt->last_details = pubkey;
- authenticated = 1;
-@@ -231,6 +231,18 @@ pubkey_auth_info(Authctxt *authctxt, const Key *key, const char *fmt, ...)
- free(extra);
- }
-
-+int
-+user_key_verify(const Key *key, const u_char *sig, u_int slen, const u_char *data, u_int datalen)
-+{
-+ int rv;
-+
-+ rv = key_verify(key, sig, slen, data, datalen);
-+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-+ audit_key(1, &rv, key);
-+#endif
-+ return rv;
-+}
-+
- static int
- match_principals_option(const char *principal_list, struct KeyCert *cert)
- {
-diff --git a/auth2.c b/auth2.c
-index 426dcd6..436cd60 100644
---- a/auth2.c
-+++ b/auth2.c
-@@ -249,9 +249,6 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
- } else {
- logit("input_userauth_request: invalid user %s", user);
- authctxt->pw = fakepw();
--#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-- PRIVSEP(audit_event(SSH_INVALID_USER));
--#endif
- }
- #ifdef USE_PAM
- if (options.use_pam)
-diff --git a/cipher.c b/cipher.c
-index 53d9b4f..226e56d 100644
---- a/cipher.c
-+++ b/cipher.c
-@@ -57,20 +57,6 @@ extern const EVP_CIPHER *evp_ssh1_bf(void);
- extern const EVP_CIPHER *evp_ssh1_3des(void);
- extern void ssh1_3des_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int, u_char *, int);
-
--struct Cipher {
-- char *name;
-- int number; /* for ssh1 only */
-- u_int block_size;
-- u_int key_len;
-- u_int iv_len; /* defaults to block_size */
-- u_int auth_len;
-- u_int discard_len;
-- u_int flags;
--#define CFLAG_CBC (1<<0)
--#define CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY (1<<1)
-- const EVP_CIPHER *(*evptype)(void);
--};
--
- static const struct Cipher ciphers[] = {
- { "none", SSH_CIPHER_NONE, 8, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, EVP_enc_null },
- { "des", SSH_CIPHER_DES, 8, 8, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_des_cbc },
-diff --git a/cipher.h b/cipher.h
-index 133d2e7..d41758e 100644
---- a/cipher.h
-+++ b/cipher.h
-@@ -63,7 +63,20 @@
- typedef struct Cipher Cipher;
- typedef struct CipherContext CipherContext;
-
--struct Cipher;
-+struct Cipher {
-+ char *name;
-+ int number; /* for ssh1 only */
-+ u_int block_size;
-+ u_int key_len;
-+ u_int iv_len; /* defaults to block_size */
-+ u_int auth_len;
-+ u_int discard_len;
-+ u_int flags;
-+#define CFLAG_CBC (1<<0)
-+#define CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY (1<<1)
-+ const EVP_CIPHER *(*evptype)(void);
-+};
-+
- struct CipherContext {
- int plaintext;
- int encrypt;
-diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c
-index bce2ab8..bc3e53e 100644
---- a/kex.c
-+++ b/kex.c
-@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@
- #include "monitor.h"
- #include "roaming.h"
- #include "digest.h"
-+#include "audit.h"
-
- #ifdef GSSAPI
- #include "ssh-gss.h"
-@@ -366,9 +367,13 @@ static void
- choose_enc(Enc *enc, char *client, char *server)
- {
- char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL);
-- if (name == NULL)
-+ if (name == NULL) {
-+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-+ audit_unsupported(0);
-+#endif
- fatal("no matching cipher found: client %s server %s",
- client, server);
-+ }
- if ((enc->cipher = cipher_by_name(name)) == NULL)
- fatal("matching cipher is not supported: %s", name);
- enc->name = name;
-@@ -384,9 +389,13 @@ static void
- choose_mac(Mac *mac, char *client, char *server)
- {
- char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL);
-- if (name == NULL)
-+ if (name == NULL) {
-+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-+ audit_unsupported(1);
-+#endif
- fatal("no matching mac found: client %s server %s",
- client, server);
-+ }
- if (mac_setup(mac, name) < 0)
- fatal("unsupported mac %s", name);
- /* truncate the key */
-@@ -401,8 +410,12 @@ static void
- choose_comp(Comp *comp, char *client, char *server)
- {
- char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL);
-- if (name == NULL)
-+ if (name == NULL) {
-+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-+ audit_unsupported(2);
-+#endif
- fatal("no matching comp found: client %s server %s", client, server);
-+ }
- if (strcmp(name, "zlib@openssh.com") == 0) {
- comp->type = COMP_DELAYED;
- } else if (strcmp(name, "zlib") == 0) {
-@@ -517,6 +530,9 @@ kex_choose_conf(Kex *kex)
- newkeys->enc.name,
- authlen == 0 ? newkeys->mac.name : "<implicit>",
- newkeys->comp.name);
-+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-+ audit_kex(ctos, newkeys->enc.name, newkeys->mac.name, newkeys->comp.name);
-+#endif
- }
- choose_kex(kex, cprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS], sprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]);
- choose_hostkeyalg(kex, cprop[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
-@@ -702,3 +718,53 @@ dump_digest(char *msg, u_char *digest, int len)
- fprintf(stderr, "\n");
- }
- #endif
-+
-+static void
-+enc_destroy(Enc *enc)
-+{
-+ if (enc == NULL)
-+ return;
-+
-+ if (enc->key) {
-+ memset(enc->key, 0, enc->key_len);
-+ free(enc->key);
-+ }
-+
-+ if (enc->iv) {
-+ memset(enc->iv, 0, enc->block_size);
-+ free(enc->iv);
-+ }
-+
-+ memset(enc, 0, sizeof(*enc));
-+}
-+
-+void
-+newkeys_destroy(Newkeys *newkeys)
-+{
-+ if (newkeys == NULL)
-+ return;
-+
-+ free(newkeys->enc.name);
-+ enc_destroy(&newkeys->enc);
-+
-+ if (newkeys->mac.enabled) {
-+ mac_clear(&newkeys->mac);
-+ free(newkeys->mac.name);
-+ mac_destroy(&newkeys->mac);
-+ }
-+
-+ free(newkeys->comp.name);
-+
-+ memset(&newkeys->comp, 0, sizeof(newkeys->comp));
-+}
-+
-+void
-+newkeys_destroy_and_free(Newkeys *newkeys)
-+{
-+ if (newkeys == NULL)
-+ return;
-+
-+ newkeys_destroy(newkeys);
-+ free(newkeys);
-+}
-+
-diff --git a/kex.h b/kex.h
-index 313bb51..c643250 100644
---- a/kex.h
-+++ b/kex.h
-@@ -182,6 +182,9 @@ void kexgss_client(Kex *);
- void kexgss_server(Kex *);
- #endif
-
-+void newkeys_destroy(Newkeys *newkeys);
-+void newkeys_destroy_and_free(Newkeys *newkeys);
-+
- void
- kex_dh_hash(char *, char *, char *, int, char *, int, u_char *, int,
- BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, u_char **, u_int *);
-diff --git a/key.c b/key.c
-index 900b9e3..62f3edb 100644
---- a/key.c
-+++ b/key.c
-@@ -1925,6 +1925,33 @@ key_demote(const Key *k)
- }
-
- int
-+key_is_private(const Key *k)
-+{
-+ switch (k->type) {
-+ case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00:
-+ case KEY_RSA_CERT:
-+ case KEY_RSA1:
-+ case KEY_RSA:
-+ return k->rsa->d != NULL;
-+ case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00:
-+ case KEY_DSA_CERT:
-+ case KEY_DSA:
-+ return k->dsa->priv_key != NULL;
-+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
-+ case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
-+ case KEY_ECDSA:
-+ return EC_KEY_get0_private_key(k->ecdsa) != NULL;
-+#endif
-+ case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
-+ case KEY_ED25519:
-+ return (k->ed25519_pk != NULL);
-+ default:
-+ fatal("key_is_private: bad key type %d", k->type);
-+ return 1;
-+ }
-+}
-+
-+int
- key_is_cert(const Key *k)
- {
- if (k == NULL)
-diff --git a/key.h b/key.h
-index d51ed81..8f61605 100644
---- a/key.h
-+++ b/key.h
-@@ -118,6 +118,7 @@ Key *key_generate(int, u_int);
- Key *key_from_private(const Key *);
- int key_type_from_name(char *);
- int key_is_cert(const Key *);
-+int key_is_private(const Key *k);
- int key_type_is_cert(int);
- int key_type_plain(int);
- int key_to_certified(Key *, int);
-diff --git a/mac.c b/mac.c
-index 0977572..9388af4 100644
---- a/mac.c
-+++ b/mac.c
-@@ -222,6 +222,20 @@ mac_clear(Mac *mac)
- mac->umac_ctx = NULL;
- }
-
-+void
-+mac_destroy(Mac *mac)
-+{
-+ if (mac == NULL)
-+ return;
-+
-+ if (mac->key) {
-+ memset(mac->key, 0, mac->key_len);
-+ free(mac->key);
-+ }
-+
-+ memset(mac, 0, sizeof(*mac));
-+}
-+
- /* XXX copied from ciphers_valid */
- #define MAC_SEP ","
- int
-diff --git a/mac.h b/mac.h
-index fbe18c4..7dc7f43 100644
---- a/mac.h
-+++ b/mac.h
-@@ -29,3 +29,4 @@ int mac_setup(Mac *, char *);
- int mac_init(Mac *);
- u_char *mac_compute(Mac *, u_int32_t, u_char *, int);
- void mac_clear(Mac *);
-+void mac_destroy(Mac *);
-diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
-index 8b18086..5a65114 100644
---- a/monitor.c
-+++ b/monitor.c
-@@ -97,6 +97,7 @@
- #include "ssh2.h"
- #include "roaming.h"
- #include "authfd.h"
-+#include "audit.h"
-
- #ifdef GSSAPI
- static Gssctxt *gsscontext = NULL;
-@@ -113,6 +114,8 @@ extern Buffer auth_debug;
- extern int auth_debug_init;
- extern Buffer loginmsg;
-
-+extern void destroy_sensitive_data(int);
-+
- /* State exported from the child */
-
- struct {
-@@ -185,6 +188,11 @@ int mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(int, Buffer *);
- #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
- int mm_answer_audit_event(int, Buffer *);
- int mm_answer_audit_command(int, Buffer *);
-+int mm_answer_audit_end_command(int, Buffer *);
-+int mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body(int, Buffer *);
-+int mm_answer_audit_kex_body(int, Buffer *);
-+int mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body(int, Buffer *);
-+int mm_answer_audit_server_key_free(int, Buffer *);
- #endif
-
- static int monitor_read_log(struct monitor *);
-@@ -239,6 +247,10 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = {
- #endif
- #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
- {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
-+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body},
-+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body},
-+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body},
-+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_server_key_free},
- #endif
- #ifdef BSD_AUTH
- {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery},
-@@ -274,6 +286,11 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = {
- #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
- {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
- {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_command},
-+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_end_command},
-+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body},
-+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body},
-+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body},
-+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_server_key_free},
- #endif
- {0, 0, NULL}
- };
-@@ -305,6 +322,10 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto15[] = {
- #endif
- #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
- {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
-+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body},
-+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body},
-+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body},
-+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_server_key_free},
- #endif
- {0, 0, NULL}
- };
-@@ -316,6 +337,11 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth15[] = {
- #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
- {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
- {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT|MON_ONCE, mm_answer_audit_command},
-+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_end_command},
-+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body},
-+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body},
-+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body},
-+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_server_key_free},
- #endif
- {0, 0, NULL}
- };
-@@ -1393,9 +1419,11 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, Buffer *m)
- Key *key;
- u_char *signature, *data, *blob;
- u_int signaturelen, datalen, bloblen;
-+ int type = 0;
- int verified = 0;
- int valid_data = 0;
-
-+ type = buffer_get_int(m);
- blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen);
- signature = buffer_get_string(m, &signaturelen);
- data = buffer_get_string(m, &datalen);
-@@ -1403,6 +1431,8 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, Buffer *m)
- if (hostbased_cuser == NULL || hostbased_chost == NULL ||
- !monitor_allowed_key(blob, bloblen))
- fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__);
-+ if (type != key_blobtype)
-+ fatal("%s: bad key type", __func__);
-
- key = key_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
- if (key == NULL)
-@@ -1423,7 +1453,17 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, Buffer *m)
- if (!valid_data)
- fatal("%s: bad signature data blob", __func__);
-
-- verified = key_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen);
-+ switch (key_blobtype) {
-+ case MM_USERKEY:
-+ verified = user_key_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen);
-+ break;
-+ case MM_HOSTKEY:
-+ verified = hostbased_key_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen);
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ verified = 0;
-+ break;
-+ }
- debug3("%s: key %p signature %s",
- __func__, key, (verified == 1) ? "verified" : "unverified");
-
-@@ -1476,6 +1516,12 @@ mm_session_close(Session *s)
- debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d", __func__, s->tty, s->ptyfd);
- session_pty_cleanup2(s);
- }
-+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-+ if (s->command != NULL) {
-+ debug3("%s: command %d", __func__, s->command_handle);
-+ session_end_command2(s);
-+ }
-+#endif
- session_unused(s->self);
- }
-
-@@ -1756,6 +1802,8 @@ mm_answer_term(int sock, Buffer *req)
- sshpam_cleanup();
- #endif
-
-+ destroy_sensitive_data(0);
-+
- while (waitpid(pmonitor->m_pid, &status, 0) == -1)
- if (errno != EINTR)
- exit(1);
-@@ -1798,11 +1846,43 @@ mm_answer_audit_command(int socket, Buffer *m)
- {
- u_int len;
- char *cmd;
-+ Session *s;
-
- debug3("%s entering", __func__);
- cmd = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
-+
- /* sanity check command, if so how? */
-- audit_run_command(cmd);
-+ s = session_new();
-+ if (s == NULL)
-+ fatal("%s: error allocating a session", __func__);
-+ s->command = cmd;
-+ s->command_handle = audit_run_command(cmd);
-+
-+ buffer_clear(m);
-+ buffer_put_int(m, s->self);
-+
-+ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_COMMAND, m);
-+
-+ return (0);
-+}
-+
-+int
-+mm_answer_audit_end_command(int socket, Buffer *m)
-+{
-+ int handle;
-+ u_int len;
-+ char *cmd;
-+ Session *s;
-+
-+ debug3("%s entering", __func__);
-+ handle = buffer_get_int(m);
-+ cmd = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
-+
-+ s = session_by_id(handle);
-+ if (s == NULL || s->ttyfd != -1 || s->command == NULL ||
-+ strcmp(s->command, cmd) != 0)
-+ fatal("%s: invalid handle", __func__);
-+ mm_session_close(s);
- free(cmd);
- return (0);
- }
-@@ -1946,11 +2026,13 @@ mm_get_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor)
-
- blob = buffer_get_string(&m, &bloblen);
- current_keys[MODE_OUT] = mm_newkeys_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
-+ memset(blob, 0, bloblen);
- free(blob);
-
- debug3("%s: Waiting for second key", __func__);
- blob = buffer_get_string(&m, &bloblen);
- current_keys[MODE_IN] = mm_newkeys_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
-+ memset(blob, 0, bloblen);
- free(blob);
-
- /* Now get sequence numbers for the packets */
-@@ -1996,6 +2078,21 @@ mm_get_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor)
- }
-
- buffer_free(&m);
-+
-+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-+ if (compat20) {
-+ buffer_init(&m);
-+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_sendfd,
-+ MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, &m);
-+ mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body(pmonitor->m_sendfd, &m);
-+ buffer_free(&m);
-+ }
-+#endif
-+
-+ /* Drain any buffered messages from the child */
-+ while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd >= 0 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)
-+ ;
-+
- }
-
-
-@@ -2277,3 +2374,84 @@ mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(int socket, Buffer *m) {
-
- #endif /* GSSAPI */
-
-+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-+int
-+mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body(int sock, Buffer *m)
-+{
-+ int what;
-+
-+ what = buffer_get_int(m);
-+
-+ audit_unsupported_body(what);
-+
-+ buffer_clear(m);
-+
-+ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, m);
-+ return 0;
-+}
-+
-+int
-+mm_answer_audit_kex_body(int sock, Buffer *m)
-+{
-+ int ctos, len;
-+ char *cipher, *mac, *compress;
-+ pid_t pid;
-+ uid_t uid;
-+
-+ ctos = buffer_get_int(m);
-+ cipher = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
-+ mac = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
-+ compress = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
-+ pid = buffer_get_int64(m);
-+ uid = buffer_get_int64(m);
-+
-+ audit_kex_body(ctos, cipher, mac, compress, pid, uid);
-+
-+ free(cipher);
-+ free(mac);
-+ free(compress);
-+ buffer_clear(m);
-+
-+ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_KEX, m);
-+ return 0;
-+}
-+
-+int
-+mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body(int sock, Buffer *m)
-+{
-+ int ctos;
-+ pid_t pid;
-+ uid_t uid;
-+
-+ ctos = buffer_get_int(m);
-+ pid = buffer_get_int64(m);
-+ uid = buffer_get_int64(m);
-+
-+ audit_session_key_free_body(ctos, pid, uid);
-+
-+ buffer_clear(m);
-+
-+ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, m);
-+ return 0;
-+}
-+
-+int
-+mm_answer_audit_server_key_free(int sock, Buffer *m)
-+{
-+ int len;
-+ char *fp;
-+ pid_t pid;
-+ uid_t uid;
-+
-+ fp = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
-+ pid = buffer_get_int64(m);
-+ uid = buffer_get_int64(m);
-+
-+ audit_destroy_sensitive_data(fp, pid, uid);
-+
-+ free(fp);
-+ buffer_clear(m);
-+
-+ return 0;
-+}
-+#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
-diff --git a/monitor.h b/monitor.h
-index ff79fbb..6dfb234 100644
---- a/monitor.h
-+++ b/monitor.h
-@@ -69,7 +69,13 @@ enum monitor_reqtype {
- MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY = 106, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_QUERY = 107,
- MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND = 108, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_RESPOND = 109,
- MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX = 110, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX = 111,
-- MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT = 112, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND = 113,
-+ MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT = 112,
-+ MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND = 114, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_COMMAND = 115,
-+ MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND = 116,
-+ MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED = 118, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED = 119,
-+ MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX = 120, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_KEX = 121,
-+ MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE = 122, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE = 123,
-+ MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE = 124
-
- };
-
-diff --git a/monitor_wrap.c b/monitor_wrap.c
-index d1e1caa..6df236a 100644
---- a/monitor_wrap.c
-+++ b/monitor_wrap.c
-@@ -450,7 +450,7 @@ mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype type, char *user, char *host, Key *key)
- */
-
- int
--mm_key_verify(Key *key, u_char *sig, u_int siglen, u_char *data, u_int datalen)
-+mm_key_verify(enum mm_keytype type, Key *key, u_char *sig, u_int siglen, u_char *data, u_int datalen)
- {
- Buffer m;
- u_char *blob;
-@@ -464,6 +464,7 @@ mm_key_verify(Key *key, u_char *sig, u_int siglen, u_char *data, u_int datalen)
- return (0);
-
- buffer_init(&m);
-+ buffer_put_int(&m, type);
- buffer_put_string(&m, blob, len);
- buffer_put_string(&m, sig, siglen);
- buffer_put_string(&m, data, datalen);
-@@ -481,6 +482,19 @@ mm_key_verify(Key *key, u_char *sig, u_int siglen, u_char *data, u_int datalen)
- return (verified);
- }
-
-+int
-+mm_hostbased_key_verify(Key *key, u_char *sig, u_int siglen, u_char *data, u_int datalen)
-+{
-+ return mm_key_verify(MM_HOSTKEY, key, sig, siglen, data, datalen);
-+}
-+
-+int
-+mm_user_key_verify(Key *key, u_char *sig, u_int siglen, u_char *data, u_int datalen)
-+{
-+ return mm_key_verify(MM_USERKEY, key, sig, siglen, data, datalen);
-+}
-+
-+
- /* Export key state after authentication */
- Newkeys *
- mm_newkeys_from_blob(u_char *blob, int blen)
-@@ -659,12 +673,14 @@ mm_send_keystate(struct monitor *monitor)
- fatal("%s: conversion of newkeys failed", __func__);
-
- buffer_put_string(&m, blob, bloblen);
-+ memset(blob, 0, bloblen);
- free(blob);
-
- if (!mm_newkeys_to_blob(MODE_IN, &blob, &bloblen))
- fatal("%s: conversion of newkeys failed", __func__);
-
- buffer_put_string(&m, blob, bloblen);
-+ memset(blob, 0, bloblen);
- free(blob);
-
- packet_get_state(MODE_OUT, &seqnr, &blocks, &packets, &bytes);
-@@ -1208,10 +1224,11 @@ mm_audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event)
- buffer_free(&m);
- }
-
--void
-+int
- mm_audit_run_command(const char *command)
- {
- Buffer m;
-+ int handle;
-
- debug3("%s entering command %s", __func__, command);
-
-@@ -1219,6 +1236,26 @@ mm_audit_run_command(const char *command)
- buffer_put_cstring(&m, command);
-
- mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, &m);
-+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_COMMAND, &m);
-+
-+ handle = buffer_get_int(&m);
-+ buffer_free(&m);
-+
-+ return (handle);
-+}
-+
-+void
-+mm_audit_end_command(int handle, const char *command)
-+{
-+ Buffer m;
-+
-+ debug3("%s entering command %s", __func__, command);
-+
-+ buffer_init(&m);
-+ buffer_put_int(&m, handle);
-+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, command);
-+
-+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND, &m);
- buffer_free(&m);
- }
- #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
-@@ -1354,3 +1391,69 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store)
-
- #endif /* GSSAPI */
-
-+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-+void
-+mm_audit_unsupported_body(int what)
-+{
-+ Buffer m;
-+
-+ buffer_init(&m);
-+ buffer_put_int(&m, what);
-+
-+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, &m);
-+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED,
-+ &m);
-+
-+ buffer_free(&m);
-+}
-+
-+void
-+mm_audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *cipher, char *mac, char *compress, pid_t pid,
-+ uid_t uid)
-+{
-+ Buffer m;
-+
-+ buffer_init(&m);
-+ buffer_put_int(&m, ctos);
-+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, cipher);
-+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, (mac ? mac : ""));
-+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, compress);
-+ buffer_put_int64(&m, pid);
-+ buffer_put_int64(&m, uid);
-+
-+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, &m);
-+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_KEX,
-+ &m);
-+
-+ buffer_free(&m);
-+}
-+
-+void
-+mm_audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
-+{
-+ Buffer m;
-+
-+ buffer_init(&m);
-+ buffer_put_int(&m, ctos);
-+ buffer_put_int64(&m, pid);
-+ buffer_put_int64(&m, uid);
-+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, &m);
-+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE,
-+ &m);
-+ buffer_free(&m);
-+}
-+
-+void
-+mm_audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *fp, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
-+{
-+ Buffer m;
-+
-+ buffer_init(&m);
-+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, fp);
-+ buffer_put_int64(&m, pid);
-+ buffer_put_int64(&m, uid);
-+
-+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, &m);
-+ buffer_free(&m);
-+}
-+#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
-diff --git a/monitor_wrap.h b/monitor_wrap.h
-index 93929e0..4cf0c78 100644
---- a/monitor_wrap.h
-+++ b/monitor_wrap.h
-@@ -52,7 +52,8 @@ int mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype, char *, char *, Key *);
- int mm_user_key_allowed(struct passwd *, Key *);
- int mm_hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *, char *, char *, Key *);
- int mm_auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *, char *, char *, Key *);
--int mm_key_verify(Key *, u_char *, u_int, u_char *, u_int);
-+int mm_hostbased_key_verify(Key *, u_char *, u_int, u_char *, u_int);
-+int mm_user_key_verify(Key *, u_char *, u_int, u_char *, u_int);
- int mm_auth_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *, BIGNUM *, Key **);
- int mm_auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *, BIGNUM *, u_char *);
- BIGNUM *mm_auth_rsa_generate_challenge(Key *);
-@@ -79,7 +80,12 @@ void mm_sshpam_free_ctx(void *);
- #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
- #include "audit.h"
- void mm_audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t);
--void mm_audit_run_command(const char *);
-+int mm_audit_run_command(const char *);
-+void mm_audit_end_command(int, const char *);
-+void mm_audit_unsupported_body(int);
-+void mm_audit_kex_body(int, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t);
-+void mm_audit_session_key_free_body(int, pid_t, uid_t);
-+void mm_audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *, pid_t, uid_t);
- #endif
-
- struct Session;
-diff --git a/packet.c b/packet.c
-index 660a9fc..f5b122b 100644
---- a/packet.c
-+++ b/packet.c
-@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@
- #include <time.h>
-
- #include "xmalloc.h"
-+#include "audit.h"
- #include "buffer.h"
- #include "packet.h"
- #include "crc32.h"
-@@ -476,6 +477,13 @@ packet_get_connection_out(void)
- return active_state->connection_out;
- }
-
-+static int
-+packet_state_has_keys (const struct session_state *state)
-+{
-+ return state != NULL &&
-+ (state->newkeys[MODE_IN] != NULL || state->newkeys[MODE_OUT] != NULL);
-+}
-+
- /* Closes the connection and clears and frees internal data structures. */
-
- void
-@@ -484,13 +492,6 @@ packet_close(void)
- if (!active_state->initialized)
- return;
- active_state->initialized = 0;
-- if (active_state->connection_in == active_state->connection_out) {
-- shutdown(active_state->connection_out, SHUT_RDWR);
-- close(active_state->connection_out);
-- } else {
-- close(active_state->connection_in);
-- close(active_state->connection_out);
-- }
- buffer_free(&active_state->input);
- buffer_free(&active_state->output);
- buffer_free(&active_state->outgoing_packet);
-@@ -499,8 +500,18 @@ packet_close(void)
- buffer_free(&active_state->compression_buffer);
- buffer_compress_uninit();
- }
-- cipher_cleanup(&active_state->send_context);
-- cipher_cleanup(&active_state->receive_context);
-+ if (packet_state_has_keys(active_state)) {
-+ cipher_cleanup(&active_state->send_context);
-+ cipher_cleanup(&active_state->receive_context);
-+ audit_session_key_free(2);
-+ }
-+ if (active_state->connection_in == active_state->connection_out) {
-+ shutdown(active_state->connection_out, SHUT_RDWR);
-+ close(active_state->connection_out);
-+ } else {
-+ close(active_state->connection_in);
-+ close(active_state->connection_out);
-+ }
- }
-
- /* Sets remote side protocol flags. */
-@@ -761,6 +791,7 @@ set_newkeys(int mode)
- }
- if (active_state->newkeys[mode] != NULL) {
- debug("set_newkeys: rekeying");
-+ audit_session_key_free(mode);
- cipher_cleanup(cc);
- enc = &active_state->newkeys[mode]->enc;
- mac = &active_state->newkeys[mode]->mac;
-@@ -2011,6 +2042,47 @@ packet_get_newkeys(int mode)
- return (void *)active_state->newkeys[mode];
- }
-
-+static void
-+packet_destroy_state(struct session_state *state)
-+{
-+ if (state == NULL)
-+ return;
-+
-+ cipher_cleanup(&state->receive_context);
-+ cipher_cleanup(&state->send_context);
-+
-+ buffer_free(&state->input);
-+ buffer_free(&state->output);
-+ buffer_free(&state->outgoing_packet);
-+ buffer_free(&state->incoming_packet);
-+ buffer_free(&state->compression_buffer);
-+ newkeys_destroy_and_free(state->newkeys[MODE_IN]);
-+ state->newkeys[MODE_IN] = NULL;
-+ newkeys_destroy_and_free(state->newkeys[MODE_OUT]);
-+ state->newkeys[MODE_OUT] = NULL;
-+ mac_destroy(state->packet_discard_mac);
-+// TAILQ_HEAD(, packet) outgoing;
-+// memset(state, 0, sizeof(state));
-+}
-+
-+void
-+packet_destroy_all(int audit_it, int privsep)
-+{
-+ if (audit_it)
-+ audit_it = packet_state_has_keys (active_state) ||
-+ packet_state_has_keys (backup_state);
-+ packet_destroy_state(active_state);
-+ packet_destroy_state(backup_state);
-+ if (audit_it) {
-+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-+ if (privsep)
-+ audit_session_key_free(2);
-+ else
-+ audit_session_key_free_body(2, getpid(), getuid());
-+#endif
-+ }
-+}
-+
- /*
- * Save the state for the real connection, and use a separate state when
- * resuming a suspended connection.
-@@ -2018,18 +2090,12 @@ packet_get_newkeys(int mode)
- void
- packet_backup_state(void)
- {
-- struct session_state *tmp;
--
- close(active_state->connection_in);
- active_state->connection_in = -1;
- close(active_state->connection_out);
- active_state->connection_out = -1;
-- if (backup_state)
-- tmp = backup_state;
-- else
-- tmp = alloc_session_state();
- backup_state = active_state;
-- active_state = tmp;
-+ active_state = alloc_session_state();
- }
-
- /*
-@@ -2046,9 +2112,7 @@ packet_restore_state(void)
- backup_state = active_state;
- active_state = tmp;
- active_state->connection_in = backup_state->connection_in;
-- backup_state->connection_in = -1;
- active_state->connection_out = backup_state->connection_out;
-- backup_state->connection_out = -1;
- len = buffer_len(&backup_state->input);
- if (len > 0) {
- buf = buffer_ptr(&backup_state->input);
-@@ -2056,4 +2120,10 @@ packet_restore_state(void)
- buffer_clear(&backup_state->input);
- add_recv_bytes(len);
- }
-+ backup_state->connection_in = -1;
-+ backup_state->connection_out = -1;
-+ packet_destroy_state(backup_state);
-+ free(backup_state);
-+ backup_state = NULL;
- }
-+
-diff --git a/packet.h b/packet.h
-index f8edf85..c36c812 100644
---- a/packet.h
-+++ b/packet.h
-@@ -124,4 +124,5 @@ void packet_restore_state(void);
- void *packet_get_input(void);
- void *packet_get_output(void);
-
-+void packet_destroy_all(int, int);
- #endif /* PACKET_H */
-diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
-index df43592..b186ca1 100644
---- a/session.c
-+++ b/session.c
-@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ extern int log_stderr;
- extern int debug_flag;
- extern u_int utmp_len;
- extern int startup_pipe;
--extern void destroy_sensitive_data(void);
-+extern void destroy_sensitive_data(int);
- extern Buffer loginmsg;
-
- /* original command from peer. */
-@@ -746,6 +746,14 @@ do_exec_pty(Session *s, const char *command)
- /* Parent. Close the slave side of the pseudo tty. */
- close(ttyfd);
-
-+#ifndef HAVE_OSF_SIA
-+ /* do_login in the child did not affect state in this process,
-+ compensate. From an architectural standpoint, this is extremely
-+ ugly. */
-+ if (!(options.use_login && command == NULL))
-+ audit_count_session_open();
-+#endif
-+
- /* Enter interactive session. */
- s->ptymaster = ptymaster;
- packet_set_interactive(1,
-@@ -863,15 +871,19 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
- get_remote_port());
-
- #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-+ if (s->command != NULL || s->command_handle != -1)
-+ fatal("do_exec: command already set");
- if (command != NULL)
-- PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(command));
-+ s->command = xstrdup(command);
- else if (s->ttyfd == -1) {
- char *shell = s->pw->pw_shell;
-
- if (shell[0] == '\0') /* empty shell means /bin/sh */
- shell =_PATH_BSHELL;
-- PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(shell));
-+ s->command = xstrdup(shell);
- }
-+ if (s->command != NULL && s->ptyfd == -1)
-+ s->command_handle = PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(s->command));
- #endif
- if (s->ttyfd != -1)
- ret = do_exec_pty(s, command);
-@@ -1708,7 +1720,10 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command)
- int r = 0;
-
- /* remove hostkey from the child's memory */
-- destroy_sensitive_data();
-+ destroy_sensitive_data(1);
-+ /* Don't audit this - both us and the parent would be talking to the
-+ monitor over a single socket, with no synchronization. */
-+ packet_destroy_all(0, 1);
-
- /* Force a password change */
- if (s->authctxt->force_pwchange) {
-@@ -1933,6 +1948,7 @@ session_unused(int id)
- sessions[id].ttyfd = -1;
- sessions[id].ptymaster = -1;
- sessions[id].x11_chanids = NULL;
-+ sessions[id].command_handle = -1;
- sessions[id].next_unused = sessions_first_unused;
- sessions_first_unused = id;
- }
-@@ -2015,6 +2031,19 @@ session_open(Authctxt *authctxt, int chanid)
- }
-
- Session *
-+session_by_id(int id)
-+{
-+ if (id >= 0 && id < sessions_nalloc) {
-+ Session *s = &sessions[id];
-+ if (s->used)
-+ return s;
-+ }
-+ debug("session_by_id: unknown id %d", id);
-+ session_dump();
-+ return NULL;
-+}
-+
-+Session *
- session_by_tty(char *tty)
- {
- int i;
-@@ -2531,6 +2560,32 @@ session_exit_message(Session *s, int status)
- chan_write_failed(c);
- }
-
-+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-+void
-+session_end_command2(Session *s)
-+{
-+ if (s->command != NULL) {
-+ if (s->command_handle != -1)
-+ audit_end_command(s->command_handle, s->command);
-+ free(s->command);
-+ s->command = NULL;
-+ s->command_handle = -1;
-+ }
-+}
-+
-+static void
-+session_end_command(Session *s)
-+{
-+ if (s->command != NULL) {
-+ if (s->command_handle != -1)
-+ PRIVSEP(audit_end_command(s->command_handle, s->command));
-+ free(s->command);
-+ s->command = NULL;
-+ s->command_handle = -1;
-+ }
-+}
-+#endif
-+
- void
- session_close(Session *s)
- {
-@@ -2539,6 +2592,10 @@ session_close(Session *s)
- debug("session_close: session %d pid %ld", s->self, (long)s->pid);
- if (s->ttyfd != -1)
- session_pty_cleanup(s);
-+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-+ if (s->command)
-+ session_end_command(s);
-+#endif
- free(s->term);
- free(s->display);
- free(s->x11_chanids);
-@@ -2753,6 +2810,15 @@ do_authenticated2(Authctxt *authctxt)
- server_loop2(authctxt);
- }
-
-+static void
-+do_cleanup_one_session(Session *s)
-+{
-+ session_pty_cleanup2(s);
-+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-+ session_end_command2(s);
-+#endif
-+}
-+
- void
- do_cleanup(Authctxt *authctxt)
- {
-@@ -2801,5 +2867,5 @@ do_cleanup(Authctxt *authctxt)
- * or if running in monitor.
- */
- if (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor())
-- session_destroy_all(session_pty_cleanup2);
-+ session_destroy_all(do_cleanup_one_session);
- }
-diff --git a/session.h b/session.h
-index 6a2f35e..e9b312e 100644
---- a/session.h
-+++ b/session.h
-@@ -61,6 +61,12 @@ struct Session {
- char *name;
- char *val;
- } *env;
-+
-+ /* exec */
-+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-+ int command_handle;
-+ char *command;
-+#endif
- };
-
- void do_authenticated(Authctxt *);
-@@ -73,8 +79,10 @@ void session_close_by_pid(pid_t, int);
- void session_close_by_channel(int, void *);
- void session_destroy_all(void (*)(Session *));
- void session_pty_cleanup2(Session *);
-+void session_end_command2(Session *);
-
- Session *session_new(void);
-+Session *session_by_id(int);
- Session *session_by_tty(char *);
- void session_close(Session *);
- void do_setusercontext(struct passwd *);
-diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
-index 8a0740a..2813aa2 100644
---- a/sshd.c
-+++ b/sshd.c
-@@ -119,6 +119,7 @@
- #endif
- #include "monitor_wrap.h"
- #include "roaming.h"
-+#include "audit.h"
- #include "ssh-sandbox.h"
- #include "version.h"
-
-@@ -264,7 +265,7 @@ Buffer loginmsg;
- struct passwd *privsep_pw = NULL;
-
- /* Prototypes for various functions defined later in this file. */
--void destroy_sensitive_data(void);
-+void destroy_sensitive_data(int);
- void demote_sensitive_data(void);
-
- static void do_ssh1_kex(void);
-@@ -283,6 +284,15 @@ close_listen_socks(void)
- num_listen_socks = -1;
- }
-
-+/*
-+ * Is this process listening for clients (i.e. not specific to any specific
-+ * client connection?)
-+ */
-+int listening_for_clients(void)
-+{
-+ return num_listen_socks > 0;
-+}
-+
- static void
- close_startup_pipes(void)
- {
-@@ -562,22 +572,45 @@ sshd_exchange_identification(int sock_in, int sock_out)
- }
- }
-
--/* Destroy the host and server keys. They will no longer be needed. */
-+/*
-+ * Destroy the host and server keys. They will no longer be needed. Careful,
-+ * this can be called from cleanup_exit() - i.e. from just about anywhere.
-+ */
- void
--destroy_sensitive_data(void)
-+destroy_sensitive_data(int privsep)
- {
- int i;
-+ pid_t pid;
-+ uid_t uid;
-
- if (sensitive_data.server_key) {
- key_free(sensitive_data.server_key);
- sensitive_data.server_key = NULL;
- }
-+ pid = getpid();
-+ uid = getuid();
- for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
- if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) {
-+ char *fp;
-+
-+ if (key_is_private(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]))
-+ fp = key_selected_fingerprint(sensitive_data.host_keys[i], SSH_FP_HEX);
-+ else
-+ fp = NULL;
- key_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]);
- sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL;
-+ if (fp != NULL) {
-+ if (privsep)
-+ PRIVSEP(audit_destroy_sensitive_data(fp,
-+ pid, uid));
-+ else
-+ audit_destroy_sensitive_data(fp,
-+ pid, uid);
-+ free(fp);
-+ }
- }
-- if (sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]) {
-+ if (sensitive_data.host_certificates
-+ && sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]) {
- key_free(sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]);
- sensitive_data.host_certificates[i] = NULL;
- }
-@@ -591,6 +624,8 @@ void
- demote_sensitive_data(void)
- {
- Key *tmp;
-+ pid_t pid;
-+ uid_t uid;
- int i;
-
- if (sensitive_data.server_key) {
-@@ -599,13 +634,25 @@ demote_sensitive_data(void)
- sensitive_data.server_key = tmp;
- }
-
-+ pid = getpid();
-+ uid = getuid();
- for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
- if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) {
-+ char *fp;
-+
-+ if (key_is_private(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]))
-+ fp = key_selected_fingerprint(sensitive_data.host_keys[i], SSH_FP_HEX);
-+ else
-+ fp = NULL;
- tmp = key_demote(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]);
- key_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]);
- sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = tmp;
- if (tmp->type == KEY_RSA1)
- sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = tmp;
-+ if (fp != NULL) {
-+ audit_destroy_sensitive_data(fp, pid, uid);
-+ free(fp);
-+ }
- }
- /* Certs do not need demotion */
- }
-@@ -675,7 +722,7 @@ privsep_preauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
-
- if (use_privsep == PRIVSEP_ON)
- box = ssh_sandbox_init(pmonitor);
-- pid = fork();
-+ pmonitor->m_pid = pid = fork();
- if (pid == -1) {
- fatal("fork of unprivileged child failed");
- } else if (pid != 0) {
-@@ -729,6 +776,8 @@ privsep_preauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
- }
- }
-
-+extern Newkeys *current_keys[];
-+
- static void
- privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
- {
-@@ -753,6 +802,10 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
- else if (pmonitor->m_pid != 0) {
- verbose("User child is on pid %ld", (long)pmonitor->m_pid);
- buffer_clear(&loginmsg);
-+ newkeys_destroy(current_keys[MODE_OUT]);
-+ newkeys_destroy(current_keys[MODE_IN]);
-+ audit_session_key_free_body(2, getpid(), getuid());
-+ packet_destroy_all(0, 0);
- monitor_child_postauth(pmonitor);
-
- /* NEVERREACHED */
-@@ -1211,6 +1264,7 @@ server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *sock_out, int *newsock, int *config_s)
- if (received_sigterm) {
- logit("Received signal %d; terminating.",
- (int) received_sigterm);
-+ destroy_sensitive_data(0);
- close_listen_socks();
- unlink(options.pid_file);
- exit(received_sigterm == SIGTERM ? 0 : 255);
-@@ -2134,6 +2188,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- */
- if (use_privsep) {
- mm_send_keystate(pmonitor);
-+ packet_destroy_all(1, 1);
- exit(0);
- }
-
-@@ -2179,7 +2234,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- privsep_postauth(authctxt);
- /* the monitor process [priv] will not return */
- if (!compat20)
-- destroy_sensitive_data();
-+ destroy_sensitive_data(0);
- }
-
- packet_set_timeout(options.client_alive_interval,
-@@ -2189,6 +2244,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- do_authenticated(authctxt);
-
- /* The connection has been terminated. */
-+ packet_destroy_all(1, 1);
-+ destroy_sensitive_data(1);
-+
- packet_get_state(MODE_IN, NULL, NULL, NULL, &ibytes);
- packet_get_state(MODE_OUT, NULL, NULL, NULL, &obytes);
- verbose("Transferred: sent %llu, received %llu bytes",
-@@ -2346,6 +2404,10 @@ do_ssh1_kex(void)
- if (cookie[i] != packet_get_char())
- packet_disconnect("IP Spoofing check bytes do not match.");
-
-+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-+ audit_kex(2, cipher_name(cipher_type), "crc", "none");
-+#endif
-+
- debug("Encryption type: %.200s", cipher_name(cipher_type));
-
- /* Get the encrypted integer. */
-@@ -2418,7 +2480,7 @@ do_ssh1_kex(void)
- session_id[i] = session_key[i] ^ session_key[i + 16];
- }
- /* Destroy the private and public keys. No longer. */
-- destroy_sensitive_data();
-+ destroy_sensitive_data(0);
-
- if (use_privsep)
- mm_ssh1_session_id(session_id);
-@@ -2584,6 +2646,16 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void)
- void
- cleanup_exit(int i)
- {
-+ static int in_cleanup = 0;
-+ int is_privsep_child;
-+
-+ /* cleanup_exit can be called at the very least from the privsep
-+ wrappers used for auditing. Make sure we don't recurse
-+ indefinitely. */
-+ if (in_cleanup)
-+ _exit(i);
-+ in_cleanup = 1;
-+
- if (the_authctxt) {
- do_cleanup(the_authctxt);
- if (use_privsep && privsep_is_preauth && pmonitor->m_pid > 1) {
-@@ -2594,9 +2666,14 @@ cleanup_exit(int i)
- pmonitor->m_pid, strerror(errno));
- }
- }
-+ is_privsep_child = use_privsep && pmonitor != NULL && pmonitor->m_pid == 0;
-+ if (sensitive_data.host_keys != NULL)
-+ destroy_sensitive_data(is_privsep_child);
-+ packet_destroy_all(1, is_privsep_child);
- #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
- /* done after do_cleanup so it can cancel the PAM auth 'thread' */
-- if (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor())
-+ if ((the_authctxt == NULL || !the_authctxt->authenticated) &&
-+ (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()))
- audit_event(SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON);
- #endif
- _exit(i);
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-authentication-limits-bypass.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-authentication-limits-bypass.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 10bde94..0000000
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-authentication-limits-bypass.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
-From 5b64f85bb811246c59ebab70aed331f26ba37b18 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: "djm@openbsd.org" <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat, 18 Jul 2015 07:57:14 +0000
-Subject: upstream commit
-
-only query each keyboard-interactive device once per
- authentication request regardless of how many times it is listed; ok markus@
-
-Upstream-ID: d73fafba6e86030436ff673656ec1f33d9ffeda1
----
- auth2-chall.c | 11 ++++++++---
- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/auth2-chall.c b/auth2-chall.c
-index ddabe1a..4aff09d 100644
---- a/auth2-chall.c
-+++ b/auth2-chall.c
-@@ -83,6 +83,7 @@ struct KbdintAuthctxt
- void *ctxt;
- KbdintDevice *device;
- u_int nreq;
-+ u_int devices_done;
- };
-
- #ifdef USE_PAM
-@@ -169,11 +170,15 @@ kbdint_next_device(Authctxt *authctxt, KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt)
- if (len == 0)
- break;
- for (i = 0; devices[i]; i++) {
-- if (!auth2_method_allowed(authctxt,
-+ if ((kbdintctxt->devices_done & (1 << i)) != 0 ||
-+ !auth2_method_allowed(authctxt,
- "keyboard-interactive", devices[i]->name))
- continue;
-- if (strncmp(kbdintctxt->devices, devices[i]->name, len) == 0)
-+ if (strncmp(kbdintctxt->devices, devices[i]->name,
-+ len) == 0) {
- kbdintctxt->device = devices[i];
-+ kbdintctxt->devices_done |= 1 << i;
-+ }
- }
- t = kbdintctxt->devices;
- kbdintctxt->devices = t[len] ? xstrdup(t+len+1) : NULL;
---
-cgit v0.11.2
-
-
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-chroot-capabilities.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-chroot-capabilities.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 2b58b97..0000000
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-chroot-capabilities.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,101 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-6.6p1/configure.ac.chroot-cap openssh-6.6p1/configure.ac
---- openssh-6.6p1/configure.ac.chroot-cap 2016-07-28 10:08:11.183483309 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.6p1/configure.ac 2016-07-28 10:08:11.273483277 +0200
-@@ -4783,6 +4783,37 @@ if test -n "$conf_lastlog_location"; the
- [Define if you want to specify the path to your lastlog file])
- fi
-
-+AC_ARG_WITH(libcap-ng,
-+ [ --with-libcap-ng=[auto/yes/no] Add Libcap-ng support [default=auto]],,
-+ with_libcap_ng=auto)
-+
-+dnl libcap-ng detection
-+if test x$with_libcap_ng = xno ; then
-+ have_libcap_ng=no;
-+else
-+ # Start by checking for header file
-+ AC_CHECK_HEADER(cap-ng.h, capng_headers=yes, capng_headers=no)
-+
-+ # See if we have libcap-ng library
-+ AC_CHECK_LIB(cap-ng, capng_clear, CAPNG_LDADD=-lcap-ng,)
-+
-+ # Check results are usable
-+ if test x$with_libcap_ng = xyes -a x$CAPNG_LDADD = x ; then
-+ AC_MSG_ERROR(libcap-ng support was requested and the library was not found)
-+ fi
-+ if test x$CAPNG_LDADD != x -a $capng_headers = no ; then
-+ AC_MSG_ERROR(libcap-ng libraries found but headers are missing)
-+ fi
-+fi
-+AC_MSG_CHECKING(whether to use libcap-ng)
-+if test x$CAPNG_LDADD != x ; then
-+ AC_DEFINE(HAVE_LIBCAP_NG,1,[libcap-ng support])
-+ SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lcap-ng"
-+ AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)
-+else
-+ AC_MSG_RESULT(no)
-+fi
-+
- dnl utmp detection
- AC_MSG_CHECKING([if your system defines UTMP_FILE])
- AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
-diff -up openssh-6.6p1/session.c.chroot-cap openssh-6.6p1/session.c
---- openssh-6.6p1/session.c.chroot-cap 2016-07-28 10:08:11.269483278 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.6p1/session.c 2016-07-28 10:09:10.458455211 +0200
-@@ -95,6 +95,10 @@
- #include "monitor_wrap.h"
- #include "sftp.h"
-
-+#ifdef HAVE_LIBCAP_NG
-+#include <cap-ng.h>
-+#endif
-+
- #if defined(KRB5) && defined(USE_AFS)
- #include <kafs.h>
- #endif
-@@ -1569,6 +1573,7 @@ void
- do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
- {
- char *chroot_path, *tmp;
-+ int dropped_suid = -1;
-
- platform_setusercontext(pw);
-
-@@ -1602,10 +1607,25 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
- pw->pw_uid);
- chroot_path = percent_expand(tmp, "h", pw->pw_dir,
- "u", pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL);
-+#ifdef HAVE_LIBCAP_NG
-+ /* drop suid soon, retain SYS_CHROOT capability */
-+ capng_clear(CAPNG_SELECT_BOTH);
-+ capng_update(CAPNG_ADD, CAPNG_EFFECTIVE|CAPNG_PERMITTED, CAP_SYS_CHROOT);
-+ if (pw->pw_uid != 0 &&
-+ (dropped_suid = capng_change_id(pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_gid, CAPNG_INIT_SUPP_GRP)) != 0)
-+ logit("capng_change_id() = %d (failure): Try to drop UID later", dropped_suid);
-+#endif
- #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
- sshd_selinux_copy_context();
- #endif
- safely_chroot(chroot_path, pw->pw_uid);
-+#ifdef HAVE_LIBCAP_NG
-+ /* Drop chroot capability. Already used */
-+ if (dropped_suid == 0) {
-+ capng_clear(CAPNG_SELECT_BOTH);
-+ capng_apply(CAPNG_SELECT_BOTH);
-+ }
-+#endif
- free(tmp);
- free(chroot_path);
- /* Make sure we don't attempt to chroot again */
-@@ -1629,8 +1648,9 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
- fatal("set_id(%s) Failed", pw->pw_name);
- }
- # endif /* USE_LIBIAF */
-- /* Permanently switch to the desired uid. */
-- permanently_set_uid(pw);
-+ /* Permanently switch to the desired uid if not yet done. */
-+ if (dropped_suid != 0)
-+ permanently_set_uid(pw);
- #endif
-
- #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-ctr-cavstest.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-ctr-cavstest.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 3b0d744..0000000
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-ctr-cavstest.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,253 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in
-index 4ab6717..581b121 100644
---- a/Makefile.in
-+++ b/Makefile.in
-@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ SSH_KEYSIGN=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keysign
- SSH_LDAP_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-ldap-helper
- SSH_LDAP_WRAPPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-ldap-wrapper
- SSH_KEYCAT=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat
-+CTR_CAVSTEST=$(libexecdir)/ctr-cavstest
- SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-pkcs11-helper
- PRIVSEP_PATH=@PRIVSEP_PATH@
- SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=@SSH_PRIVSEP_USER@
-@@ -65,7 +66,7 @@ EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@
- MANFMT=@MANFMT@
- INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER=@INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER@
-
--TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT)
-+TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT)
-
- LIBSSH_OBJS=authfd.o authfile.o bufaux.o bufbn.o buffer.o \
- canohost.o channels.o cipher.o cipher-aes.o \
-@@ -180,6 +181,9 @@ ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ldapconf.o ldapbody.o ldapmisc.o
- ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHDOBJS) libssh.a ssh-keycat.o
- $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keycat.o bufaux.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(KEYCATLIBS) $(SSHLIBS)
-
-+ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ctr-cavstest.o
-+ $(LD) -o $@ ctr-cavstest.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lfipscheck $(LIBS)
-+
- ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keyscan.o roaming_dummy.o
- $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o roaming_dummy.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
-
-@@ -288,6 +292,7 @@ install-files:
- $(INSTALL) -m 0700 ssh-ldap-wrapper $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_LDAP_WRAPPER) ; \
- fi
- $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT)
-+ $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT)
- $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT)
- $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT)
- $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1
-diff --git a/ctr-cavstest.c b/ctr-cavstest.c
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..bbcbe8a
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/ctr-cavstest.c
-@@ -0,0 +1,208 @@
-+/*
-+ *
-+ * invocation (all of the following are equal):
-+ * ./ctr-cavstest --algo aes128-ctr --key 987212980144b6a632e864031f52dacc --mode encrypt --data a6deca405eef2e8e4609abf3c3ccf4a6
-+ * ./ctr-cavstest --algo aes128-ctr --key 987212980144b6a632e864031f52dacc --mode encrypt --data a6deca405eef2e8e4609abf3c3ccf4a6 --iv 00000000000000000000000000000000
-+ * echo -n a6deca405eef2e8e4609abf3c3ccf4a6 | ./ctr-cavstest --algo aes128-ctr --key 987212980144b6a632e864031f52dacc --mode encrypt
-+ */
-+
-+#include "includes.h"
-+
-+#include <sys/types.h>
-+#include <sys/param.h>
-+#include <stdarg.h>
-+#include <stdio.h>
-+#include <stdlib.h>
-+#include <string.h>
-+#include <ctype.h>
-+
-+#include "xmalloc.h"
-+#include "log.h"
-+#include "cipher.h"
-+
-+/* compatibility with old or broken OpenSSL versions */
-+#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
-+
-+void usage(void) {
-+ fprintf(stderr, "Usage: ctr-cavstest --algo <ssh-crypto-algorithm>\n"
-+ " --key <hexadecimal-key> --mode <encrypt|decrypt>\n"
-+ " [--iv <hexadecimal-iv>] --data <hexadecimal-data>\n\n"
-+ "Hexadecimal output is printed to stdout.\n"
-+ "Hexadecimal input data can be alternatively read from stdin.\n");
-+ exit(1);
-+}
-+
-+void *fromhex(char *hex, size_t *len)
-+{
-+ unsigned char *bin;
-+ char *p;
-+ size_t n = 0;
-+ int shift = 4;
-+ unsigned char out = 0;
-+ unsigned char *optr;
-+
-+ bin = xmalloc(strlen(hex)/2);
-+ optr = bin;
-+
-+ for (p = hex; *p != '\0'; ++p) {
-+ unsigned char c;
-+
-+ c = *p;
-+ if (isspace(c))
-+ continue;
-+
-+ if (c >= '0' && c <= '9') {
-+ c = c - '0';
-+ } else if (c >= 'A' && c <= 'F') {
-+ c = c - 'A' + 10;
-+ } else if (c >= 'a' && c <= 'f') {
-+ c = c - 'a' + 10;
-+ } else {
-+ /* truncate on nonhex cipher */
-+ break;
-+ }
-+
-+ out |= c << shift;
-+ shift = (shift + 4) % 8;
-+
-+ if (shift) {
-+ *(optr++) = out;
-+ out = 0;
-+ ++n;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ *len = n;
-+ return bin;
-+}
-+
-+#define READ_CHUNK 4096
-+#define MAX_READ_SIZE 1024*1024*100
-+char *read_stdin(void)
-+{
-+ char *buf;
-+ size_t n, total = 0;
-+
-+ buf = xmalloc(READ_CHUNK);
-+
-+ do {
-+ n = fread(buf + total, 1, READ_CHUNK, stdin);
-+ if (n < READ_CHUNK) /* terminate on short read */
-+ break;
-+
-+ total += n;
-+ buf = xrealloc(buf, total + READ_CHUNK, 1);
-+ } while(total < MAX_READ_SIZE);
-+ return buf;
-+}
-+
-+int main (int argc, char *argv[])
-+{
-+
-+ const Cipher *c;
-+ CipherContext cc;
-+ char *algo = "aes128-ctr";
-+ char *hexkey = NULL;
-+ char *hexiv = "00000000000000000000000000000000";
-+ char *hexdata = NULL;
-+ char *p;
-+ int i;
-+ int encrypt = 1;
-+ void *key;
-+ size_t keylen;
-+ void *iv;
-+ size_t ivlen;
-+ void *data;
-+ size_t datalen;
-+ void *outdata;
-+
-+ for (i = 1; i < argc; ++i) {
-+ if (strcmp(argv[i], "--algo") == 0) {
-+ algo = argv[++i];
-+ } else if (strcmp(argv[i], "--key") == 0) {
-+ hexkey = argv[++i];
-+ } else if (strcmp(argv[i], "--mode") == 0) {
-+ ++i;
-+ if (argv[i] == NULL) {
-+ usage();
-+ }
-+ if (strncmp(argv[i], "enc", 3) == 0) {
-+ encrypt = 1;
-+ } else if (strncmp(argv[i], "dec", 3) == 0) {
-+ encrypt = 0;
-+ } else {
-+ usage();
-+ }
-+ } else if (strcmp(argv[i], "--iv") == 0) {
-+ hexiv = argv[++i];
-+ } else if (strcmp(argv[i], "--data") == 0) {
-+ hexdata = argv[++i];
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ if (hexkey == NULL || algo == NULL) {
-+ usage();
-+ }
-+
-+ SSLeay_add_all_algorithms();
-+
-+ c = cipher_by_name(algo);
-+ if (c == NULL) {
-+ fprintf(stderr, "Error: unknown algorithm\n");
-+ return 2;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (hexdata == NULL) {
-+ hexdata = read_stdin();
-+ } else {
-+ hexdata = xstrdup(hexdata);
-+ }
-+
-+ key = fromhex(hexkey, &keylen);
-+
-+ if (keylen != 16 && keylen != 24 && keylen == 32) {
-+ fprintf(stderr, "Error: unsupported key length\n");
-+ return 2;
-+ }
-+
-+ iv = fromhex(hexiv, &ivlen);
-+
-+ if (ivlen != 16) {
-+ fprintf(stderr, "Error: unsupported iv length\n");
-+ return 2;
-+ }
-+
-+ data = fromhex(hexdata, &datalen);
-+
-+ if (data == NULL || datalen == 0) {
-+ fprintf(stderr, "Error: no data to encrypt/decrypt\n");
-+ return 2;
-+ }
-+
-+ cipher_init(&cc, c, key, keylen, iv, ivlen, encrypt);
-+
-+ free(key);
-+ free(iv);
-+
-+ outdata = malloc(datalen);
-+ if(outdata == NULL) {
-+ fprintf(stderr, "Error: memory allocation failure\n");
-+ return 2;
-+ }
-+
-+ cipher_crypt(&cc, 0, outdata, data, datalen, 0, 0);
-+
-+ free(data);
-+
-+ cipher_cleanup(&cc);
-+
-+ for (p = outdata; datalen > 0; ++p, --datalen) {
-+ printf("%02X", (unsigned char)*p);
-+ }
-+
-+ free(outdata);
-+
-+ printf("\n");
-+ return 0;
-+}
-+
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-disable-roaming.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-disable-roaming.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 0e71113..0000000
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-disable-roaming.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-6.6p1/readconf.c.roaming openssh-6.6p1/readconf.c
---- openssh-6.6p1/readconf.c.roaming 2016-01-13 15:42:00.423573980 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.6p1/readconf.c 2016-01-13 15:43:03.565529448 +0100
-@@ -1608,7 +1608,7 @@ initialize_options(Options * options)
- options->tun_remote = -1;
- options->local_command = NULL;
- options->permit_local_command = -1;
-- options->use_roaming = -1;
-+ options->use_roaming = 0;
- options->visual_host_key = -1;
- options->ip_qos_interactive = -1;
- options->ip_qos_bulk = -1;
-@@ -1783,8 +1783,7 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
- options->tun_remote = SSH_TUNID_ANY;
- if (options->permit_local_command == -1)
- options->permit_local_command = 0;
-- if (options->use_roaming == -1)
-- options->use_roaming = 1;
-+ options->use_roaming = 0;
- if (options->visual_host_key == -1)
- options->visual_host_key = 0;
- if (options->ip_qos_interactive == -1)
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-document-TERM-env.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-document-TERM-env.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 66445d9..0000000
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-document-TERM-env.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
-index e7accd6..c95fda6 100644
---- a/ssh_config.5
-+++ b/ssh_config.5
-@@ -1253,6 +1253,10 @@ should be sent to the server.
- Note that environment passing is only supported for protocol 2.
- The server must also support it, and the server must be configured to
- accept these environment variables.
-+Note that the
-+.Ev TERM
-+environment variable is always sent whenever a
-+pseudo-terminal is requested as it is required by the protocol.
- Refer to
- .Cm AcceptEnv
- in
-diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
-index aa9525d..2320128 100644
---- a/sshd_config.5
-+++ b/sshd_config.5
-@@ -70,7 +70,11 @@ See
- in
- .Xr ssh_config 5
- for how to configure the client.
--Note that environment passing is only supported for protocol 2.
-+Note that environment passing is only supported for protocol 2, and
-+that the
-+.Ev TERM
-+environment variable is always sent whenever the client
-+requests a pseudo-terminal as it is required by the protocol.
- Variables are specified by name, which may contain the wildcard characters
- .Ql *
- and
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-entropy.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-entropy.patch
index 67bd30f..6dcd38a 100644
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-entropy.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-entropy.patch
@@ -18,13 +18,23 @@ index b912dbe..9206337 100644
+++ b/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ OPENBSD=base64.o basename.o bcrypt_pbkdf.o bindresvport.o blowfish.o daemon.o di
- COMPAT=arc4random.o bsd-asprintf.o bsd-closefrom.o bsd-cray.o bsd-cygwin_util.o bsd-getpeereid.o getrrsetbyname-ldns.o bsd-misc.o bsd-nextstep.o bsd-openpty.o bsd-poll.o bsd-setres_id.o bsd-snprintf.o bsd-statvfs.o bsd-waitpid.o fake-rfc2553.o openssl-compat.o xmmap.o xcrypt.o
+ COMPAT=arc4random.o bsd-asprintf.o bsd-closefrom.o bsd-cray.o bsd-cygwin_util.o bsd-getpeereid.o getrrsetbyname-ldns.o bsd-err.o bsd-misc.o bsd-nextstep.o bsd-openpty.o bsd-poll.o bsd-setres_id.o bsd-snprintf.o bsd-statvfs.o bsd-waitpid.o fake-rfc2553.o openssl-compat.o xcrypt.o kludge-fd_set.o
-PORTS=port-aix.o port-irix.o port-linux.o port-linux-sshd.o port-solaris.o port-tun.o port-uw.o
+PORTS=port-aix.o port-irix.o port-linux.o port-linux-sshd.o port-linux-prng.o port-solaris.o port-tun.o port-uw.o
.c.o:
$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $<
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.entropy openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.entropy 2016-12-23 18:34:27.747753563 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h 2016-12-23 18:34:27.769753570 +0100
+@@ -34,4 +34,6 @@ void oom_adjust_restore(void);
+ void oom_adjust_setup(void);
+ #endif
+
++void linux_seed(void);
++
+ #endif /* ! _PORT_LINUX_H */
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux-prng.c b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-prng.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..92a617c
@@ -63,6 +73,7 @@ index 0000000..92a617c
+
+#include "log.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
++#include "misc.h" /* servconf.h needs misc.h for struct ForwardOptions */
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "port-linux.h"
+#include "key.h"
@@ -72,10 +83,9 @@ index 0000000..92a617c
+void
+linux_seed(void)
+{
-+ int len;
+ char *env = getenv("SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG");
+ char *random = "/dev/random";
-+ size_t ienv, randlen = 14;
++ size_t len, ienv, randlen = 14;
+
+ if (!env || !strcmp(env, "0"))
+ random = "/dev/urandom";
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-expose-auth-information.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-expose-auth-information.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index ed508fd..0000000
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-expose-auth-information.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,512 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-6.6p1/auth2.c.expose-auth openssh-6.6p1/auth2.c
---- openssh-6.6p1/auth2.c.expose-auth 2016-06-27 12:19:39.134443822 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.6p1/auth2.c 2016-06-27 12:19:39.178443747 +0200
-@@ -309,6 +309,7 @@ userauth_finish(Authctxt *authctxt, int
- const char *submethod)
- {
- char *methods;
-+ char *prev_auth_details;
- int partial = 0;
-
- if (!authctxt->valid && authenticated)
-@@ -339,6 +340,18 @@ userauth_finish(Authctxt *authctxt, int
- if (authctxt->postponed)
- return;
-
-+ if (authenticated || partial) {
-+ prev_auth_details = authctxt->auth_details;
-+ xasprintf(&authctxt->auth_details, "%s%s%s%s%s",
-+ prev_auth_details ? prev_auth_details : "",
-+ prev_auth_details ? ", " : "", method,
-+ authctxt->last_details ? ": " : "",
-+ authctxt->last_details ? authctxt->last_details : "");
-+ free(authctxt->last_details);
-+ authctxt->last_details = NULL;
-+ free(prev_auth_details);
-+ }
-+
- #ifdef USE_PAM
- if (options.use_pam && authenticated) {
- if (!PRIVSEP(do_pam_account())) {
-diff -up openssh-6.6p1/auth2-gss.c.expose-auth openssh-6.6p1/auth2-gss.c
---- openssh-6.6p1/auth2-gss.c.expose-auth 2016-06-27 12:19:39.102443877 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.6p1/auth2-gss.c 2016-06-27 12:19:39.179443745 +0200
-@@ -272,6 +272,9 @@ input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type,
- authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
- authctxt->pw));
-
-+ if (authenticated)
-+ authctxt->last_details = ssh_gssapi_get_displayname();
-+
- authctxt->postponed = 0;
- dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
- dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK, NULL);
-@@ -317,6 +320,9 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple
- else
- logit("GSSAPI MIC check failed");
-
-+ if (authenticated)
-+ authctxt->last_details = ssh_gssapi_get_displayname();
-+
- buffer_free(&b);
- if (micuser != authctxt->user)
- free(micuser);
-diff -up openssh-6.6p1/auth2-hostbased.c.expose-auth openssh-6.6p1/auth2-hostbased.c
---- openssh-6.6p1/auth2-hostbased.c.expose-auth 2016-06-27 12:19:39.051443964 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.6p1/auth2-hostbased.c 2016-06-27 12:19:39.179443745 +0200
-@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *authctxt)
- {
- Buffer b;
- Key *key = NULL;
-- char *pkalg, *cuser, *chost, *service;
-+ char *pkalg, *cuser, *chost, *service, *pubkey;
- u_char *pkblob, *sig;
- u_int alen, blen, slen;
- int pktype;
-@@ -131,15 +131,21 @@ userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *authctxt)
- buffer_dump(&b);
- #endif
-
-- pubkey_auth_info(authctxt, key,
-- "client user \"%.100s\", client host \"%.100s\"", cuser, chost);
-+ pubkey = key_format_oneline(key);
-+ auth_info(authctxt,
-+ "%s, client user \"%.100s\", client host \"%.100s\"",
-+ pubkey, cuser, chost);
-
- /* test for allowed key and correct signature */
- authenticated = 0;
- if (PRIVSEP(hostbased_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, cuser, chost, key)) &&
- PRIVSEP(key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b),
-- buffer_len(&b))) == 1)
-+ buffer_len(&b))) == 1) {
- authenticated = 1;
-+ authctxt->last_details = pubkey;
-+ } else {
-+ free(pubkey);
-+ }
-
- buffer_free(&b);
- done:
-diff -up openssh-6.6p1/auth2-pubkey.c.expose-auth openssh-6.6p1/auth2-pubkey.c
---- openssh-6.6p1/auth2-pubkey.c.expose-auth 2016-06-27 12:19:39.068443935 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.6p1/auth2-pubkey.c 2016-06-27 12:19:39.179443745 +0200
-@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt)
- {
- Buffer b;
- Key *key = NULL;
-- char *pkalg, *userstyle;
-+ char *pkalg, *userstyle, *pubkey;
- u_char *pkblob, *sig;
- u_int alen, blen, slen;
- int have_sig, pktype;
-@@ -155,14 +155,19 @@ userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt)
- #ifdef DEBUG_PK
- buffer_dump(&b);
- #endif
-- pubkey_auth_info(authctxt, key, NULL);
-+ pubkey = key_format_oneline(key);
-+ auth_info(authctxt, "%s", pubkey);
-
- /* test for correct signature */
- authenticated = 0;
- if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key)) &&
- PRIVSEP(key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b),
-- buffer_len(&b))) == 1)
-+ buffer_len(&b))) == 1) {
-+ authctxt->last_details = pubkey;
- authenticated = 1;
-+ } else {
-+ free(pubkey);
-+ }
- buffer_free(&b);
- free(sig);
- } else {
-@@ -200,7 +205,7 @@ done:
- void
- pubkey_auth_info(Authctxt *authctxt, const Key *key, const char *fmt, ...)
- {
-- char *fp, *extra;
-+ char *extra, *pubkey;
- va_list ap;
- int i;
-
-@@ -210,24 +215,13 @@ pubkey_auth_info(Authctxt *authctxt, con
- i = vasprintf(&extra, fmt, ap);
- va_end(ap);
- if (i < 0 || extra == NULL)
-- fatal("%s: vasprintf failed", __func__);
-+ fatal("%s: vasprintf failed", __func__);
- }
-
-- if (key_is_cert(key)) {
-- fp = key_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,
-- SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
-- auth_info(authctxt, "%s ID %s (serial %llu) CA %s %s%s%s",
-- key_type(key), key->cert->key_id,
-- (unsigned long long)key->cert->serial,
-- key_type(key->cert->signature_key), fp,
-- extra == NULL ? "" : ", ", extra == NULL ? "" : extra);
-- free(fp);
-- } else {
-- fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
-- auth_info(authctxt, "%s %s%s%s", key_type(key), fp,
-- extra == NULL ? "" : ", ", extra == NULL ? "" : extra);
-- free(fp);
-- }
-+ pubkey = key_format_oneline(key);
-+ auth_info(authctxt, "%s%s%s", pubkey, extra == NULL ? "" : ", ",
-+ extra == NULL ? "" : extra);
-+ free(pubkey);
- free(extra);
- }
-
-diff -up openssh-6.6p1/auth.h.expose-auth openssh-6.6p1/auth.h
---- openssh-6.6p1/auth.h.expose-auth 2016-06-27 12:19:39.144443805 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.6p1/auth.h 2016-06-27 12:19:39.179443745 +0200
-@@ -78,6 +78,9 @@ struct Authctxt {
- #endif
- Buffer *loginmsg;
- void *methoddata;
-+
-+ char *last_details;
-+ char *auth_details;
- };
- /*
- * Every authentication method has to handle authentication requests for
-diff -up openssh-6.6p1/auth-pam.c.expose-auth openssh-6.6p1/auth-pam.c
---- openssh-6.6p1/auth-pam.c.expose-auth 2016-06-27 12:19:39.049443967 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.6p1/auth-pam.c 2016-06-27 12:19:39.179443745 +0200
-@@ -688,6 +688,11 @@ sshpam_init_ctx(Authctxt *authctxt)
- return (NULL);
- }
-
-+ /* Notify PAM about any already successful auth methods */
-+ if (options.expose_auth_methods >= EXPOSE_AUTHMETH_PAMONLY &&
-+ authctxt->auth_details)
-+ do_pam_putenv("SSH_USER_AUTH", authctxt->auth_details);
-+
- ctxt = xcalloc(1, sizeof *ctxt);
-
- /* Start the authentication thread */
-diff -up openssh-6.6p1/gss-serv.c.expose-auth openssh-6.6p1/gss-serv.c
---- openssh-6.6p1/gss-serv.c.expose-auth 2016-06-27 12:19:39.160443778 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.6p1/gss-serv.c 2016-06-27 12:19:39.180443743 +0200
-@@ -471,6 +471,16 @@ ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct pas
- return (0);
- }
-
-+/* Privileged */
-+char*
-+ssh_gssapi_get_displayname(void)
-+{
-+ if (gssapi_client.displayname.length != 0 &&
-+ gssapi_client.displayname.value != NULL)
-+ return strdup((char *)gssapi_client.displayname.value);
-+ return NULL;
-+}
-+
- /* These bits are only used for rekeying. The unpriviledged child is running
- * as the user, the monitor is root.
- *
-diff -up openssh-6.6p1/key.c.expose-auth openssh-6.6p1/key.c
---- openssh-6.6p1/key.c.expose-auth 2016-06-27 12:19:39.105443872 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.6p1/key.c 2016-06-27 12:19:39.180443743 +0200
-@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@
- #include "misc.h"
- #include "ssh2.h"
- #include "digest.h"
-+#include "xmalloc.h"
-
- static int to_blob(const Key *, u_char **, u_int *, int);
- static Key *key_from_blob2(const u_char *, u_int, int);
-@@ -628,6 +629,30 @@ key_fingerprint(const Key *k, enum fp_ty
- return retval;
- }
-
-+char *
-+key_format_oneline(const Key *key)
-+{
-+ char *fp, *result;
-+
-+ if (key_is_cert(key)) {
-+ fp = key_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key, SSH_FP_MD5,
-+ SSH_FP_HEX);
-+ xasprintf(&result, "%s ID %s (serial %llu) CA %s %s",
-+ key_type(key), key->cert->key_id,
-+ (unsigned long long)key->cert->serial,
-+ key_type(key->cert->signature_key),
-+ fp == NULL ? "(null)" : fp);
-+ free(fp);
-+ } else {
-+ fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+ xasprintf(&result, "%s %s", key_type(key),
-+ fp == NULL ? "(null)" : fp);
-+ free(fp);
-+ }
-+
-+ return result;
-+}
-+
- enum fp_type
- key_fingerprint_selection(void)
- {
-diff -up openssh-6.6p1/key.h.expose-auth openssh-6.6p1/key.h
---- openssh-6.6p1/key.h.expose-auth 2016-06-27 12:19:43.322436657 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.6p1/key.h 2016-06-27 12:20:25.898363835 +0200
-@@ -108,6 +108,7 @@ u_char *key_fingerprint_raw(const Key *
- enum fp_type key_fingerprint_selection(void);
- char *key_selected_fingerprint(Key *, enum fp_rep);
- char *key_fingerprint_prefix(void);
-+char *key_format_oneline(const Key *k);
- const char *key_type(const Key *);
- const char *key_cert_type(const Key *);
- int key_write(const Key *, FILE *);
-diff -up openssh-6.6p1/monitor.c.expose-auth openssh-6.6p1/monitor.c
---- openssh-6.6p1/monitor.c.expose-auth 2016-06-27 12:19:39.165443769 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.6p1/monitor.c 2016-06-27 12:19:39.180443743 +0200
-@@ -357,6 +357,7 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctx
- {
- struct mon_table *ent;
- int authenticated = 0, partial = 0;
-+ char *prev_auth_details;
-
- debug3("preauth child monitor started");
-
-@@ -394,6 +395,18 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctx
- auth_submethod = NULL;
- authenticated = (monitor_read(pmonitor, mon_dispatch, &ent) == 1);
-
-+ if (authenticated) {
-+ prev_auth_details = authctxt->auth_details;
-+ xasprintf(&authctxt->auth_details, "%s%s%s%s%s",
-+ prev_auth_details ? prev_auth_details : "",
-+ prev_auth_details ? ", " : "", auth_method,
-+ authctxt->last_details ? ": " : "",
-+ authctxt->last_details ? authctxt->last_details : "");
-+ free(authctxt->last_details);
-+ authctxt->last_details = NULL;
-+ free(prev_auth_details);
-+ }
-+
- /* Special handling for multiple required authentications */
- if (options.num_auth_methods != 0) {
- if (!compat20)
-@@ -1432,6 +1445,9 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, Buffer *m)
- debug3("%s: key %p signature %s",
- __func__, key, (verified == 1) ? "verified" : "unverified");
-
-+ if (verified == 1)
-+ authctxt->last_details = key_format_oneline(key);
-+
- key_free(key);
- free(blob);
- free(signature);
-@@ -2224,6 +2240,9 @@ mm_answer_gss_userok(int sock, Buffer *m
-
- auth_method = "gssapi-with-mic";
-
-+ if (authenticated)
-+ authctxt->last_details = ssh_gssapi_get_displayname();
-+
- /* Monitor loop will terminate if authenticated */
- return (authenticated);
- }
-diff -up openssh-6.6p1/servconf.c.expose-auth openssh-6.6p1/servconf.c
---- openssh-6.6p1/servconf.c.expose-auth 2016-06-27 12:19:39.177443748 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.6p1/servconf.c 2016-06-27 12:19:39.181443742 +0200
-@@ -161,6 +161,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
- options->version_addendum = NULL;
- options->use_kuserok = -1;
- options->enable_k5users = -1;
-+ options->expose_auth_methods = -1;
- }
-
- void
-@@ -322,6 +323,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
- options->use_kuserok = 1;
- if (options->enable_k5users == -1)
- options->enable_k5users = 0;
-+ if (options->expose_auth_methods == -1)
-+ options->expose_auth_methods = EXPOSE_AUTHMETH_NEVER;
-
- /* Turn privilege separation on by default */
- if (use_privsep == -1)
-@@ -380,6 +383,7 @@ typedef enum {
- sKexAlgorithms, sIPQoS, sVersionAddendum,
- sAuthorizedKeysCommand, sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser,
- sAuthenticationMethods, sHostKeyAgent,
-+ sExposeAuthenticationMethods,
- sDeprecated, sUnsupported
- } ServerOpCodes;
-
-@@ -523,6 +527,7 @@ static struct {
- { "authorizedkeyscommanduser", sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser, SSHCFG_ALL },
- { "versionaddendum", sVersionAddendum, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- { "authenticationmethods", sAuthenticationMethods, SSHCFG_ALL },
-+ { "exposeauthenticationmethods", sExposeAuthenticationMethods, SSHCFG_ALL },
- { NULL, sBadOption, 0 }
- };
-
-@@ -869,6 +874,12 @@ static const struct multistate multistat
- { "local", FORWARD_LOCAL },
- { NULL, -1 }
- };
-+static const struct multistate multistate_exposeauthmeth[] = {
-+ { "never", EXPOSE_AUTHMETH_NEVER },
-+ { "pam-only", EXPOSE_AUTHMETH_PAMONLY },
-+ { "pam-and-env", EXPOSE_AUTHMETH_PAMENV },
-+ { NULL, -1}
-+};
-
- int
- process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
-@@ -1727,6 +1738,11 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
- }
- return 0;
-
-+ case sExposeAuthenticationMethods:
-+ intptr = &options->expose_auth_methods;
-+ multistate_ptr = multistate_exposeauthmeth;
-+ goto parse_multistate;
-+
- case sDeprecated:
- logit("%s line %d: Deprecated option %s",
- filename, linenum, arg);
-@@ -1883,6 +1899,7 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *d
- M_CP_INTOPT(enable_k5users);
- M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_limit);
- M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_interval);
-+ M_CP_INTOPT(expose_auth_methods);
-
- /* M_CP_STROPT and M_CP_STRARRAYOPT should not appear before here */
- #define M_CP_STROPT(n) do {\
-@@ -1971,6 +1988,8 @@ fmt_intarg(ServerOpCodes code, int val)
- return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_privsep);
- case sAllowTcpForwarding:
- return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_tcpfwd);
-+ case sExposeAuthenticationMethods:
-+ return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_exposeauthmeth);
- case sProtocol:
- switch (val) {
- case SSH_PROTO_1:
-@@ -2182,6 +2201,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
- dump_cfg_strarray(sAcceptEnv, o->num_accept_env, o->accept_env);
- dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(sAuthenticationMethods,
- o->num_auth_methods, o->auth_methods);
-+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sExposeAuthenticationMethods, o->expose_auth_methods);
-
- /* other arguments */
- for (i = 0; i < o->num_subsystems; i++)
-diff -up openssh-6.6p1/servconf.h.expose-auth openssh-6.6p1/servconf.h
---- openssh-6.6p1/servconf.h.expose-auth 2016-06-27 12:19:39.162443774 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.6p1/servconf.h 2016-06-27 12:19:39.181443742 +0200
-@@ -48,6 +48,11 @@
- #define FORWARD_LOCAL (1<<1)
- #define FORWARD_ALLOW (FORWARD_REMOTE|FORWARD_LOCAL)
-
-+/* Expose AuthenticationMethods */
-+#define EXPOSE_AUTHMETH_NEVER 0
-+#define EXPOSE_AUTHMETH_PAMONLY 1
-+#define EXPOSE_AUTHMETH_PAMENV 2
-+
- #define DEFAULT_AUTH_FAIL_MAX 6 /* Default for MaxAuthTries */
- #define DEFAULT_SESSIONS_MAX 10 /* Default for MaxSessions */
-
-@@ -190,6 +195,8 @@ typedef struct {
-
- u_int num_auth_methods;
- char *auth_methods[MAX_AUTH_METHODS];
-+
-+ int expose_auth_methods; /* EXPOSE_AUTHMETH_* above */
- } ServerOptions;
-
- /* Information about the incoming connection as used by Match */
-diff -up openssh-6.6p1/session.c.expose-auth openssh-6.6p1/session.c
---- openssh-6.6p1/session.c.expose-auth 2016-06-27 12:19:39.171443759 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.6p1/session.c 2016-06-27 12:19:39.181443742 +0200
-@@ -1196,6 +1196,12 @@ copy_environment(char **source, char ***
- }
- *var_val++ = '\0';
-
-+ if (options.expose_auth_methods < EXPOSE_AUTHMETH_PAMENV &&
-+ strcmp(var_name, "SSH_USER_AUTH") == 0) {
-+ free(var_name);
-+ continue;
-+ }
-+
- debug3("Copy environment: %s=%s", var_name, var_val);
- child_set_env(env, envsize, var_name, var_val);
-
-@@ -1375,6 +1381,11 @@ do_setup_env(Session *s, const char *she
- }
- #endif /* USE_PAM */
-
-+ if (options.expose_auth_methods >= EXPOSE_AUTHMETH_PAMENV &&
-+ s->authctxt->auth_details)
-+ child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_USER_AUTH",
-+ s->authctxt->auth_details);
-+
- if (auth_sock_name != NULL)
- child_set_env(&env, &envsize, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME,
- auth_sock_name);
-@@ -2805,6 +2816,9 @@ do_cleanup(Authctxt *authctxt)
- if (authctxt == NULL)
- return;
-
-+ free(authctxt->auth_details);
-+ authctxt->auth_details = NULL;
-+
- #ifdef USE_PAM
- if (options.use_pam) {
- sshpam_cleanup();
-diff -up openssh-6.6p1/ssh.1.expose-auth openssh-6.6p1/ssh.1
---- openssh-6.6p1/ssh.1.expose-auth 2016-06-27 12:19:39.163443772 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.6p1/ssh.1 2016-06-27 12:19:39.181443742 +0200
-@@ -1289,6 +1289,10 @@ server IP address, and server port numbe
- This variable contains the original command line if a forced command
- is executed.
- It can be used to extract the original arguments.
-+.It Ev SSH_USER_AUTH
-+This variable contains, for SSH2 only, a comma-separated list of authentication
-+methods that were successfuly used to authenticate. When possible, these
-+methods are extended with detailed information on the credential used.
- .It Ev SSH_TTY
- This is set to the name of the tty (path to the device) associated
- with the current shell or command.
-diff -up openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config.5.expose-auth openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config.5
---- openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config.5.expose-auth 2016-06-27 12:19:39.177443748 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config.5 2016-06-27 12:19:39.182443740 +0200
-@@ -466,6 +466,21 @@ is allowed to log in.
- See PATTERNS in
- .Xr ssh_config 5
- for more information on patterns.
-+.It Cm ExposeAuthenticationMethods
-+When using SSH2, this option controls the exposure of the list of
-+successful authentication methods to PAM during the authentication
-+and to the shell environment via the
-+.Cm SSH_USER_AUTH
-+variable. See the description of this variable for more details.
-+Valid options are:
-+.Dq never
-+(Do not expose successful authentication methods),
-+.Dq pam-only
-+(Only expose them to PAM during authentication, not afterwards),
-+.Dq pam-and-env
-+(Expose them to PAM and keep them in the shell environment).
-+The default is
-+.Dq never .
- .It Cm ForceCommand
- Forces the execution of the command specified by
- .Cm ForceCommand ,
-diff -up openssh-6.6p1/ssh-gss.h.expose-auth openssh-6.6p1/ssh-gss.h
---- openssh-6.6p1/ssh-gss.h.expose-auth 2016-06-27 12:19:39.163443772 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.6p1/ssh-gss.h 2016-06-27 12:19:39.182443740 +0200
-@@ -160,6 +160,7 @@ int ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt
- const char *);
- OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID);
- int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name, struct passwd *);
-+char* ssh_gssapi_get_displayname(void);
- OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
- void ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***, u_int *);
- void ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void);
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-fallback-X11-untrusted.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-fallback-X11-untrusted.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index b7e7a7e..0000000
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-fallback-X11-untrusted.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,387 +0,0 @@
-From f98a09cacff7baad8748c9aa217afd155a4d493f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: "mmcc@openbsd.org" <mmcc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue, 20 Oct 2015 03:36:35 +0000
-Subject: upstream commit
-
-Replace a function-local allocation with stack memory.
-
-ok djm@
-
-Upstream-ID: c09fbbab637053a2ab9f33ca142b4e20a4c5a17e
----
- clientloop.c | 9 ++-------
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/clientloop.c b/clientloop.c
-index 87ceb3d..1e05cba 100644
---- a/clientloop.c
-+++ b/clientloop.c
-@@ -311,11 +311,10 @@ client_x11_get_proto(const char *display, const char *xauth_path,
- static char proto[512], data[512];
- FILE *f;
- int got_data = 0, generated = 0, do_unlink = 0, i;
-- char *xauthdir, *xauthfile;
-+ char xauthdir[MAXPATHLEN] = "", xauthfile[MAXPATHLEN] = "";
- struct stat st;
- u_int now, x11_timeout_real;
-
-- xauthdir = xauthfile = NULL;
- *_proto = proto;
- *_data = data;
- proto[0] = data[0] = '\0';
-@@ -343,8 +342,6 @@ client_x11_get_proto(const char *display, const char *xauth_path,
- display = xdisplay;
- }
- if (trusted == 0) {
-- xauthdir = xmalloc(MAXPATHLEN);
-- xauthfile = xmalloc(MAXPATHLEN);
- mktemp_proto(xauthdir, MAXPATHLEN);
- /*
- * The authentication cookie should briefly outlive
-@@ -407,8 +404,6 @@ client_x11_get_proto(const char *display, const char *xauth_path,
- unlink(xauthfile);
- rmdir(xauthdir);
- }
-- free(xauthdir);
-- free(xauthfile);
-
- /*
- * If we didn't get authentication data, just make up some
---
-cgit v0.11.2
-
-From ed4ce82dbfa8a3a3c8ea6fa0db113c71e234416c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: "djm@openbsd.org" <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed, 13 Jan 2016 23:04:47 +0000
-Subject: upstream commit
-
-eliminate fallback from untrusted X11 forwarding to trusted
- forwarding when the X server disables the SECURITY extension; Reported by
- Thomas Hoger; ok deraadt@
-
-Upstream-ID: f76195bd2064615a63ef9674a0e4096b0713f938
----
- clientloop.c | 114 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------------
- clientloop.h | 4 +--
- mux.c | 22 ++++++------
- ssh.c | 23 +++++-------
- 4 files changed, 93 insertions(+), 70 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/clientloop.c b/clientloop.c
-index f555451..c0386d5 100644
---- a/clientloop.c
-+++ b/clientloop.c
-@@ -288,6 +288,9 @@ client_x11_display_valid(const char *display)
- {
- size_t i, dlen;
-
-+ if (display == NULL)
-+ return 0;
-+
- dlen = strlen(display);
- for (i = 0; i < dlen; i++) {
- if (!isalnum((u_char)display[i]) &&
-@@ -301,34 +304,33 @@ client_x11_display_valid(const char *display)
-
- #define SSH_X11_PROTO "MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1"
- #define X11_TIMEOUT_SLACK 60
--void
-+int
- client_x11_get_proto(const char *display, const char *xauth_path,
- u_int trusted, u_int timeout, char **_proto, char **_data)
- {
-- char cmd[1024];
-- char line[512];
-- char xdisplay[512];
-+ char cmd[1024], line[512], xdisplay[512];
-+ char xauthfile[MAXPATHLEN], xauthdir[MAXPATHLEN];
- static char proto[512], data[512];
- FILE *f;
-- int got_data = 0, generated = 0, do_unlink = 0, i;
-- char xauthdir[MAXPATHLEN] = "", xauthfile[MAXPATHLEN] = "";
-+ int got_data = 0, generated = 0, do_unlink = 0, i, r;
- struct stat st;
- u_int now, x11_timeout_real;
-
- *_proto = proto;
- *_data = data;
-- proto[0] = data[0] = '\0';
-+ proto[0] = data[0] = xauthfile[0] = xauthdir[0] = '\0';
-
-- if (xauth_path == NULL ||(stat(xauth_path, &st) == -1)) {
-- debug("No xauth program.");
-- } else if (!client_x11_display_valid(display)) {
-- logit("DISPLAY '%s' invalid, falling back to fake xauth data",
-+ if (!client_x11_display_valid(display)) {
-+ logit("DISPLAY \"%s\" invalid; disabling X11 forwarding",
- display);
-- } else {
-- if (display == NULL) {
-- debug("x11_get_proto: DISPLAY not set");
-- return;
-- }
-+ return -1;
-+ }
-+ if (xauth_path != NULL && stat(xauth_path, &st) == -1) {
-+ debug("No xauth program.");
-+ xauth_path = NULL;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (xauth_path != NULL) {
- /*
- * Handle FamilyLocal case where $DISPLAY does
- * not match an authorization entry. For this we
-@@ -337,43 +339,60 @@ client_x11_get_proto(const char *display, const char *xauth_path,
- * is not perfect.
- */
- if (strncmp(display, "localhost:", 10) == 0) {
-- snprintf(xdisplay, sizeof(xdisplay), "unix:%s",
-- display + 10);
-+ if ((r = snprintf(xdisplay, sizeof(xdisplay), "unix:%s",
-+ display + 10)) < 0 ||
-+ (size_t)r >= sizeof(xdisplay)) {
-+ error("%s: display name too long", __func__);
-+ return -1;
-+ }
- display = xdisplay;
- }
- if (trusted == 0) {
-- mktemp_proto(xauthdir, MAXPATHLEN);
- /*
-+ * Generate an untrusted X11 auth cookie.
-+ *
- * The authentication cookie should briefly outlive
- * ssh's willingness to forward X11 connections to
- * avoid nasty fail-open behaviour in the X server.
- */
-+ mktemp_proto(xauthdir, sizeof(xauthdir));
-+ if (mkdtemp(xauthdir) == NULL) {
-+ error("%s: mkdtemp: %s",
-+ __func__, strerror(errno));
-+ return -1;
-+ }
-+ do_unlink = 1;
-+ if ((r = snprintf(xauthfile, sizeof(xauthfile),
-+ "%s/xauthfile", xauthdir)) < 0 ||
-+ (size_t)r >= sizeof(xauthfile)) {
-+ error("%s: xauthfile path too long", __func__);
-+ unlink(xauthfile);
-+ rmdir(xauthdir);
-+ return -1;
-+ }
-+
- if (timeout >= UINT_MAX - X11_TIMEOUT_SLACK)
- x11_timeout_real = UINT_MAX;
- else
- x11_timeout_real = timeout + X11_TIMEOUT_SLACK;
-- if (mkdtemp(xauthdir) != NULL) {
-- do_unlink = 1;
-- snprintf(xauthfile, MAXPATHLEN, "%s/xauthfile",
-- xauthdir);
-- snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd),
-- "%s -f %s generate %s " SSH_X11_PROTO
-- " untrusted timeout %u 2>" _PATH_DEVNULL,
-- xauth_path, xauthfile, display,
-- x11_timeout_real);
-- debug2("x11_get_proto: %s", cmd);
-- if (x11_refuse_time == 0) {
-- now = monotime() + 1;
-- if (UINT_MAX - timeout < now)
-- x11_refuse_time = UINT_MAX;
-- else
-- x11_refuse_time = now + timeout;
-- channel_set_x11_refuse_time(
-- x11_refuse_time);
-- }
-- if (system(cmd) == 0)
-- generated = 1;
-+ if ((r = snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd),
-+ "%s -f %s generate %s " SSH_X11_PROTO
-+ " untrusted timeout %u 2>" _PATH_DEVNULL,
-+ xauth_path, xauthfile, display,
-+ x11_timeout_real)) < 0 ||
-+ (size_t)r >= sizeof(cmd))
-+ fatal("%s: cmd too long", __func__);
-+ debug2("%s: %s", __func__, cmd);
-+ if (x11_refuse_time == 0) {
-+ now = monotime() + 1;
-+ if (UINT_MAX - timeout < now)
-+ x11_refuse_time = UINT_MAX;
-+ else
-+ x11_refuse_time = now + timeout;
-+ channel_set_x11_refuse_time(x11_refuse_time);
- }
-+ if (system(cmd) == 0)
-+ generated = 1;
- }
-
- /*
-@@ -395,9 +414,7 @@ client_x11_get_proto(const char *display, const char *xauth_path,
- got_data = 1;
- if (f)
- pclose(f);
-- } else
-- error("Warning: untrusted X11 forwarding setup failed: "
-- "xauth key data not generated");
-+ }
- }
-
- if (do_unlink) {
-@@ -405,6 +422,13 @@ client_x11_get_proto(const char *display, const char *xauth_path,
- rmdir(xauthdir);
- }
-
-+ /* Don't fall back to fake X11 data for untrusted forwarding */
-+ if (!trusted && !got_data) {
-+ error("Warning: untrusted X11 forwarding setup failed: "
-+ "xauth key data not generated");
-+ return -1;
-+ }
-+
- /*
- * If we didn't get authentication data, just make up some
- * data. The forwarding code will check the validity of the
-@@ -427,6 +451,8 @@ client_x11_get_proto(const char *display, const char *xauth_path,
- rnd >>= 8;
- }
- }
-+
-+ return 0;
- }
-
- /*
-diff --git a/clientloop.h b/clientloop.h
-index 338d451..f4d4c69 100644
---- a/clientloop.h
-+++ b/clientloop.h
-@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@
-
- /* Client side main loop for the interactive session. */
- int client_loop(int, int, int);
--void client_x11_get_proto(const char *, const char *, u_int, u_int,
-+int client_x11_get_proto(const char *, const char *, u_int, u_int,
- char **, char **);
- void client_global_request_reply_fwd(int, u_int32_t, void *);
- void client_session2_setup(int, int, int, const char *, struct termios *,
-diff --git a/mux.c b/mux.c
-index f9c3af6..6bf53eb 100644
---- a/mux.c
-+++ b/mux.c
-@@ -1354,16 +1354,18 @@ mux_session_confirm(int id, int success, void *arg)
- char *proto, *data;
-
- /* Get reasonable local authentication information. */
-- client_x11_get_proto(display, options.xauth_location,
-+ if (client_x11_get_proto(display, options.xauth_location,
- options.forward_x11_trusted, options.forward_x11_timeout,
-- &proto, &data);
-- /* Request forwarding with authentication spoofing. */
-- debug("Requesting X11 forwarding with authentication "
-- "spoofing.");
-- x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(id, display, proto,
-- data, 1);
-- client_expect_confirm(id, "X11 forwarding", CONFIRM_WARN);
-- /* XXX exit_on_forward_failure */
-+ &proto, &data) == 0) {
-+ /* Request forwarding with authentication spoofing. */
-+ debug("Requesting X11 forwarding with authentication "
-+ "spoofing.");
-+ x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(id, display, proto,
-+ data, 1);
-+ /* XXX exit_on_forward_failure */
-+ client_expect_confirm(id, "X11 forwarding",
-+ CONFIRM_WARN);
-+ }
- }
-
- if (cctx->want_agent_fwd && options.forward_agent) {
-diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c
-index 81704ab..096c5b5 100644
---- a/ssh.c
-+++ b/ssh.c
-@@ -1626,6 +1626,7 @@ ssh_session(void)
- struct winsize ws;
- char *cp;
- const char *display;
-+ char *proto = NULL, *data = NULL;
-
- /* Enable compression if requested. */
- if (options.compression) {
-@@ -1696,13 +1697,9 @@ ssh_session(void)
- }
- /* Request X11 forwarding if enabled and DISPLAY is set. */
- display = getenv("DISPLAY");
-- if (options.forward_x11 && display != NULL) {
-- char *proto, *data;
-- /* Get reasonable local authentication information. */
-- client_x11_get_proto(display, options.xauth_location,
-- options.forward_x11_trusted,
-- options.forward_x11_timeout,
-- &proto, &data);
-+ if (options.forward_x11 && client_x11_get_proto(display,
-+ options.xauth_location, options.forward_x11_trusted,
-+ options.forward_x11_timeout, &proto, &data) == 0) {
- /* Request forwarding with authentication spoofing. */
- debug("Requesting X11 forwarding with authentication "
- "spoofing.");
-@@ -1792,6 +1789,7 @@ ssh_session2_setup(int id, int success, void *arg)
- extern char **environ;
- const char *display;
- int interactive = tty_flag;
-+ char *proto = NULL, *data = NULL;
-
- if (!success)
- return; /* No need for error message, channels code sens one */
-@@ -1799,12 +1797,9 @@ ssh_session2_setup(int id, int success, void *arg)
- return; /* No need for error message, channels code sens one */
-
- display = getenv("DISPLAY");
-- if (options.forward_x11 && display != NULL) {
-- char *proto, *data;
-- /* Get reasonable local authentication information. */
-- client_x11_get_proto(display, options.xauth_location,
-- options.forward_x11_trusted,
-- options.forward_x11_timeout, &proto, &data);
-+ if (options.forward_x11 && client_x11_get_proto(display,
-+ options.xauth_location, options.forward_x11_trusted,
-+ options.forward_x11_timeout, &proto, &data) == 0) {
- /* Request forwarding with authentication spoofing. */
- debug("Requesting X11 forwarding with authentication "
- "spoofing.");
---
-cgit v0.11.2
-
-From 5658ef2501e785fbbdf5de2dc33b1ff7a4dca73a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: "millert@openbsd.org" <millert@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon, 1 Feb 2016 21:18:17 +0000
-Subject: upstream commit
-
-Avoid ugly "DISPLAY "(null)" invalid; disabling X11
- forwarding" message when DISPLAY is not set. This could also result in a
- crash on systems with a printf that doesn't handle NULL. OK djm@
-
-Upstream-ID: 20ee0cfbda678a247264c20ed75362042b90b412
----
- clientloop.c | 7 ++++---
- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/clientloop.c b/clientloop.c
-index f8f9a3f..f0a08f2 100644
---- a/clientloop.c
-+++ b/clientloop.c
-@@ -318,8 +318,9 @@ client_x11_get_proto(const char *display, const char *xauth_path,
- proto[0] = data[0] = xauthfile[0] = xauthdir[0] = '\0';
-
- if (!client_x11_display_valid(display)) {
-- logit("DISPLAY \"%s\" invalid; disabling X11 forwarding",
-- display);
-+ if (display != NULL)
-+ logit("DISPLAY \"%s\" invalid; disabling X11 forwarding",
-+ display);
- return -1;
- }
- if (xauth_path != NULL && stat(xauth_path, &st) == -1) {
---
-cgit v0.11.2
-
-
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-fingerprint.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-fingerprint.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index c5332fb..0000000
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-fingerprint.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,415 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/auth.c b/auth.c
-index 9a36f1d..420a85b 100644
---- a/auth.c
-+++ b/auth.c
-@@ -685,9 +685,10 @@ auth_key_is_revoked(Key *key)
- case 1:
- revoked:
- /* Key revoked */
-- key_fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+ key_fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HEX);
- error("WARNING: authentication attempt with a revoked "
-- "%s key %s ", key_type(key), key_fp);
-+ "%s key %s%s ", key_type(key),
-+ key_fingerprint_prefix(), key_fp);
- free(key_fp);
- return 1;
- }
-diff --git a/auth2-hostbased.c b/auth2-hostbased.c
-index 488008f..eca0069 100644
---- a/auth2-hostbased.c
-+++ b/auth2-hostbased.c
-@@ -206,16 +206,18 @@ hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, const char *cuser, char *chost,
-
- if (host_status == HOST_OK) {
- if (key_is_cert(key)) {
-- fp = key_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,
-- SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+ fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,
-+ SSH_FP_HEX);
- verbose("Accepted certificate ID \"%s\" signed by "
-- "%s CA %s from %s@%s", key->cert->key_id,
-- key_type(key->cert->signature_key), fp,
-+ "%s CA %s%s from %s@%s", key->cert->key_id,
-+ key_type(key->cert->signature_key),
-+ key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp,
- cuser, lookup);
- } else {
-- fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
-- verbose("Accepted %s public key %s from %s@%s",
-- key_type(key), fp, cuser, lookup);
-+ fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+ verbose("Accepted %s public key %s%s from %s@%s",
-+ key_type(key), key_fingerprint_prefix(),
-+ fp, cuser, lookup);
- }
- free(fp);
- }
-diff --git a/auth2-pubkey.c b/auth2-pubkey.c
-index 0fd27bb..749b11a 100644
---- a/auth2-pubkey.c
-+++ b/auth2-pubkey.c
-@@ -365,10 +365,10 @@ check_authkeys_file(FILE *f, char *file, Key* key, struct passwd *pw)
- continue;
- if (!key_is_cert_authority)
- continue;
-- fp = key_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_MD5,
-- SSH_FP_HEX);
-- debug("matching CA found: file %s, line %lu, %s %s",
-- file, linenum, key_type(found), fp);
-+ fp = key_selected_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+ debug("matching CA found: file %s, line %lu, %s %s%s",
-+ file, linenum, key_type(found),
-+ key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp);
- /*
- * If the user has specified a list of principals as
- * a key option, then prefer that list to matching
-@@ -406,9 +406,9 @@ check_authkeys_file(FILE *f, char *file, Key* key, struct passwd *pw)
- if (key_is_cert_authority)
- continue;
- found_key = 1;
-- fp = key_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
-- debug("matching key found: file %s, line %lu %s %s",
-- file, linenum, key_type(found), fp);
-+ fp = key_selected_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+ verbose("Found matching %s key: %s%s",
-+ key_type(found), key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp);
- free(fp);
- break;
- }
-@@ -431,13 +431,13 @@ user_cert_trusted_ca(struct passwd *pw, Key *key)
- if (!key_is_cert(key) || options.trusted_user_ca_keys == NULL)
- return 0;
-
-- ca_fp = key_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,
-- SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+ ca_fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key, SSH_FP_HEX);
-
- if (key_in_file(key->cert->signature_key,
- options.trusted_user_ca_keys, 1) != 1) {
-- debug2("%s: CA %s %s is not listed in %s", __func__,
-- key_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp,
-+ debug2("%s: CA %s%s %s is not listed in %s", __func__,
-+ key_type(key->cert->signature_key),
-+ key_fingerprint_prefix(), ca_fp,
- options.trusted_user_ca_keys);
- goto out;
- }
-diff --git a/key.c b/key.c
-index 168e1b7..eb98ea8 100644
---- a/key.c
-+++ b/key.c
-@@ -628,6 +628,34 @@ key_fingerprint(const Key *k, enum fp_type dgst_type, enum fp_rep dgst_rep)
- return retval;
- }
-
-+enum fp_type
-+key_fingerprint_selection(void)
-+{
-+ static enum fp_type rv;
-+ static char rv_defined = 0;
-+ char *env;
-+
-+ if (!rv_defined) {
-+ env = getenv("SSH_FINGERPRINT_TYPE");
-+ rv = (env && !strcmp (env, "sha")) ?
-+ SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5;
-+ rv_defined = 1;
-+ }
-+ return rv;
-+}
-+
-+char *
-+key_selected_fingerprint(Key *k, enum fp_rep dgst_rep)
-+{
-+ return key_fingerprint(k, key_fingerprint_selection(), dgst_rep);
-+}
-+
-+char *
-+key_fingerprint_prefix(void)
-+{
-+ return key_fingerprint_selection() == SSH_FP_SHA1 ? "sha1:" : "";
-+}
-+
- /*
- * Reads a multiple-precision integer in decimal from the buffer, and advances
- * the pointer. The integer must already be initialized. This function is
-diff --git a/key.h b/key.h
-index d8ad13d..0e3eea5 100644
---- a/key.h
-+++ b/key.h
-@@ -104,6 +104,9 @@ int key_equal_public(const Key *, const Key *);
- int key_equal(const Key *, const Key *);
- char *key_fingerprint(const Key *, enum fp_type, enum fp_rep);
- u_char *key_fingerprint_raw(const Key *, enum fp_type, u_int *);
-+enum fp_type key_fingerprint_selection(void);
-+char *key_selected_fingerprint(Key *, enum fp_rep);
-+char *key_fingerprint_prefix(void);
- const char *key_type(const Key *);
- const char *key_cert_type(const Key *);
- int key_write(const Key *, FILE *);
-diff --git a/ssh-add.c b/ssh-add.c
-index 3421452..691949f 100644
---- a/ssh-add.c
-+++ b/ssh-add.c
-@@ -330,10 +330,10 @@ list_identities(AuthenticationConnection *ac, int do_fp)
- key = ssh_get_next_identity(ac, &comment, version)) {
- had_identities = 1;
- if (do_fp) {
-- fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5,
-- SSH_FP_HEX);
-- printf("%d %s %s (%s)\n",
-- key_size(key), fp, comment, key_type(key));
-+ fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+ printf("%d %s%s %s (%s)\n",
-+ key_size(key), key_fingerprint_prefix(),
-+ fp, comment, key_type(key));
- free(fp);
- } else {
- if (!key_write(key, stdout))
-diff --git a/ssh-agent.c b/ssh-agent.c
-index ba24612..117fdde 100644
---- a/ssh-agent.c
-+++ b/ssh-agent.c
-@@ -198,9 +198,9 @@ confirm_key(Identity *id)
- char *p;
- int ret = -1;
-
-- p = key_fingerprint(id->key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
-- if (ask_permission("Allow use of key %s?\nKey fingerprint %s.",
-- id->comment, p))
-+ p = key_selected_fingerprint(id->key, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+ if (ask_permission("Allow use of key %s?\nKey fingerprint %s%s.",
-+ id->comment, key_fingerprint_prefix(), p))
- ret = 0;
- free(p);
-
-diff --git a/ssh-keygen.c b/ssh-keygen.c
-index 2a316bc..482dc1c 100644
---- a/ssh-keygen.c
-+++ b/ssh-keygen.c
-@@ -783,13 +783,14 @@ do_fingerprint(struct passwd *pw)
- {
- FILE *f;
- Key *public;
-- char *comment = NULL, *cp, *ep, line[16*1024], *fp, *ra;
-+ char *comment = NULL, *cp, *ep, line[16*1024], *fp, *ra, *pfx;
- int i, skip = 0, num = 0, invalid = 1;
- enum fp_rep rep;
- enum fp_type fptype;
- struct stat st;
-
-- fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5;
-+ fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : key_fingerprint_selection();
-+ pfx = print_bubblebabble ? "" : key_fingerprint_prefix();
- rep = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE : SSH_FP_HEX;
-
- if (!have_identity)
-@@ -801,8 +802,8 @@ do_fingerprint(struct passwd *pw)
- public = key_load_public(identity_file, &comment);
- if (public != NULL) {
- fp = key_fingerprint(public, fptype, rep);
-- ra = key_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
-- printf("%u %s %s (%s)\n", key_size(public), fp, comment,
-+ ra = key_selected_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
-+ printf("%u %s%s %s (%s)\n", key_size(public), pfx, fp, comment,
- key_type(public));
- if (log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE)
- printf("%s\n", ra);
-@@ -867,8 +868,8 @@ do_fingerprint(struct passwd *pw)
- }
- comment = *cp ? cp : comment;
- fp = key_fingerprint(public, fptype, rep);
-- ra = key_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
-- printf("%u %s %s (%s)\n", key_size(public), fp,
-+ ra = key_selected_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
-+ printf("%u %s%s %s (%s)\n", key_size(public), pfx, fp,
- comment ? comment : "no comment", key_type(public));
- if (log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE)
- printf("%s\n", ra);
-@@ -986,13 +987,15 @@ printhost(FILE *f, const char *name, Key *public, int ca, int hash)
- if (print_fingerprint) {
- enum fp_rep rep;
- enum fp_type fptype;
-- char *fp, *ra;
-+ char *fp, *ra, *pfx;
-
-- fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5;
-+ fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : key_fingerprint_selection();
-+ pfx = print_bubblebabble ? "" : key_fingerprint_prefix();
- rep = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE : SSH_FP_HEX;
-+
- fp = key_fingerprint(public, fptype, rep);
-- ra = key_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
-- printf("%u %s %s (%s)\n", key_size(public), fp, name,
-+ ra = key_selected_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
-+ printf("%u %s%s %s (%s)\n", key_size(public), pfx, fp, name,
- key_type(public));
- if (log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE)
- printf("%s\n", ra);
-@@ -1878,16 +1881,17 @@ do_show_cert(struct passwd *pw)
- fatal("%s is not a certificate", identity_file);
- v00 = key->type == KEY_RSA_CERT_V00 || key->type == KEY_DSA_CERT_V00;
-
-- key_fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
-- ca_fp = key_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,
-- SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+ key_fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+ ca_fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key, SSH_FP_HEX);
-
- printf("%s:\n", identity_file);
- printf(" Type: %s %s certificate\n", key_ssh_name(key),
- key_cert_type(key));
-- printf(" Public key: %s %s\n", key_type(key), key_fp);
-- printf(" Signing CA: %s %s\n",
-- key_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp);
-+ printf(" Public key: %s %s%s\n", key_type(key),
-+ key_fingerprint_prefix(), key_fp);
-+ printf(" Signing CA: %s %s%s\n",
-+ key_type(key->cert->signature_key),
-+ key_fingerprint_prefix(), ca_fp);
- printf(" Key ID: \"%s\"\n", key->cert->key_id);
- if (!v00) {
- printf(" Serial: %llu\n",
-@@ -2686,13 +2690,12 @@ passphrase_again:
- fclose(f);
-
- if (!quiet) {
-- char *fp = key_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
-- char *ra = key_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_MD5,
-- SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
-+ char *fp = key_selected_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+ char *ra = key_selected_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
- printf("Your public key has been saved in %s.\n",
- identity_file);
- printf("The key fingerprint is:\n");
-- printf("%s %s\n", fp, comment);
-+ printf("%s%s %s\n", key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp, comment);
- printf("The key's randomart image is:\n");
- printf("%s\n", ra);
- free(ra);
-diff --git a/sshconnect.c b/sshconnect.c
-index 573d7a8..394cca8 100644
---- a/sshconnect.c
-+++ b/sshconnect.c
-@@ -914,10 +914,10 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
- "key for IP address '%.128s' to the list "
- "of known hosts.", type, ip);
- } else if (options.visual_host_key) {
-- fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
-- ra = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5,
-- SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
-- logit("Host key fingerprint is %s\n%s\n", fp, ra);
-+ fp = key_selected_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+ ra = key_selected_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
-+ logit("Host key fingerprint is %s%s\n%s\n",
-+ key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp, ra);
- free(ra);
- free(fp);
- }
-@@ -955,9 +955,8 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
- else
- snprintf(msg1, sizeof(msg1), ".");
- /* The default */
-- fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
-- ra = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5,
-- SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
-+ fp = key_selected_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+ ra = key_selected_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
- msg2[0] = '\0';
- if (options.verify_host_key_dns) {
- if (matching_host_key_dns)
-@@ -972,10 +971,11 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
- snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg),
- "The authenticity of host '%.200s (%s)' can't be "
- "established%s\n"
-- "%s key fingerprint is %s.%s%s\n%s"
-+ "%s key fingerprint is %s%s.%s%s\n%s"
- "Are you sure you want to continue connecting "
- "(yes/no)? ",
-- host, ip, msg1, type, fp,
-+ host, ip, msg1, type,
-+ key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp,
- options.visual_host_key ? "\n" : "",
- options.visual_host_key ? ra : "",
- msg2);
-@@ -1220,8 +1220,9 @@ verify_host_key(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, Key *host_key)
- int flags = 0;
- char *fp;
-
-- fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
-- debug("Server host key: %s %s", key_type(host_key), fp);
-+ fp = key_selected_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+ debug("Server host key: %s %s%s", key_type(host_key),
-+ key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp);
- free(fp);
-
- /* XXX certs are not yet supported for DNS */
-@@ -1327,14 +1328,15 @@ show_other_keys(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, Key *key)
- continue;
- if (!lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type(hostkeys, type[i], &found))
- continue;
-- fp = key_fingerprint(found->key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
-- ra = key_fingerprint(found->key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
-+ fp = key_selected_fingerprint(found->key, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+ ra = key_selected_fingerprint(found->key, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
- logit("WARNING: %s key found for host %s\n"
- "in %s:%lu\n"
-- "%s key fingerprint %s.",
-+ "%s key fingerprint %s%s.",
- key_type(found->key),
- found->host, found->file, found->line,
-- key_type(found->key), fp);
-+ key_type(found->key),
-+ key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp);
- if (options.visual_host_key)
- logit("%s", ra);
- free(ra);
-@@ -1349,7 +1351,7 @@ warn_changed_key(Key *host_key)
- {
- char *fp;
-
-- fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+ fp = key_selected_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_HEX);
-
- error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
- error("@ WARNING: REMOTE HOST IDENTIFICATION HAS CHANGED! @");
-@@ -1357,8 +1359,8 @@ warn_changed_key(Key *host_key)
- error("IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SOMEONE IS DOING SOMETHING NASTY!");
- error("Someone could be eavesdropping on you right now (man-in-the-middle attack)!");
- error("It is also possible that a host key has just been changed.");
-- error("The fingerprint for the %s key sent by the remote host is\n%s.",
-- key_type(host_key), fp);
-+ error("The fingerprint for the %s key sent by the remote host is\n%s%s.",
-+ key_type(host_key),key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp);
- error("Please contact your system administrator.");
-
- free(fp);
-diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
-index 7f4ff41..adbbfc7 100644
---- a/sshconnect2.c
-+++ b/sshconnect2.c
-@@ -577,8 +577,9 @@ input_userauth_pk_ok(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
- key->type, pktype);
- goto done;
- }
-- fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
-- debug2("input_userauth_pk_ok: fp %s", fp);
-+ fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+ debug2("input_userauth_pk_ok: fp %s%s",
-+ key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp);
- free(fp);
-
- /*
-@@ -986,8 +987,9 @@ sign_and_send_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt, Identity *id)
- int have_sig = 1;
- char *fp;
-
-- fp = key_fingerprint(id->key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
-- debug3("sign_and_send_pubkey: %s %s", key_type(id->key), fp);
-+ fp = key_selected_fingerprint(id->key, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+ debug3("sign_and_send_pubkey: %s %s%s", key_type(id->key),
-+ key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp);
- free(fp);
-
- if (key_to_blob(id->key, &blob, &bloblen) == 0) {
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-fips.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-fips.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index a9a3145..0000000
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-fips.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,832 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-6.6p1/Makefile.in.fips openssh-6.6p1/Makefile.in
---- openssh-6.6p1/Makefile.in.fips 2015-08-13 15:09:43.343350136 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.6p1/Makefile.in 2015-08-13 15:09:43.356350114 +0200
-@@ -154,25 +154,25 @@ libssh.a: $(LIBSSH_OBJS)
- $(RANLIB) $@
-
- ssh$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SSHOBJS)
-- $(LD) -o $@ $(SSHOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(SSHLIBS) $(LIBS) $(GSSLIBS)
-+ $(LD) -o $@ $(SSHOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(SSHLIBS) $(LIBS) $(GSSLIBS)
-
- sshd$(EXEEXT): libssh.a $(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHDOBJS)
-- $(LD) -o $@ $(SSHDOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(SSHDLIBS) $(LIBS) $(GSSLIBS) $(K5LIBS)
-+ $(LD) -o $@ $(SSHDOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(SSHDLIBS) $(LIBS) $(GSSLIBS) $(K5LIBS)
-
- scp$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a scp.o progressmeter.o
- $(LD) -o $@ scp.o progressmeter.o bufaux.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
-
- ssh-add$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-add.o
-- $(LD) -o $@ ssh-add.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
-+ $(LD) -o $@ ssh-add.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(LIBS)
-
- ssh-agent$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-agent.o ssh-pkcs11-client.o
-- $(LD) -o $@ ssh-agent.o ssh-pkcs11-client.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
-+ $(LD) -o $@ ssh-agent.o ssh-pkcs11-client.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(LIBS)
-
- ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keygen.o
-- $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keygen.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
-+ $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keygen.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(LIBS)
-
- ssh-keysign$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keysign.o roaming_dummy.o readconf.o
-- $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keysign.o readconf.o roaming_dummy.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
-+ $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keysign.o readconf.o roaming_dummy.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(LIBS)
-
- ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-pkcs11-helper.o ssh-pkcs11.o
- $(LD) -o $@ ssh-pkcs11-helper.o ssh-pkcs11.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
-@@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libs
- $(LD) -o $@ ctr-cavstest.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lfipscheck $(LIBS)
-
- ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keyscan.o roaming_dummy.o
-- $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o roaming_dummy.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
-+ $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o roaming_dummy.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lfipscheck $(LIBS)
-
- sftp-server$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a sftp.o sftp-common.o sftp-server.o sftp-server-main.o
- $(LD) -o $@ sftp-server.o sftp-common.o sftp-server-main.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
-diff -up openssh-6.6p1/auth-rsa.c.fips openssh-6.6p1/auth-rsa.c
---- openssh-6.6p1/auth-rsa.c.fips 2015-08-13 15:09:43.344350134 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.6p1/auth-rsa.c 2015-08-13 15:09:43.354350118 +0200
-@@ -244,7 +244,7 @@ rsa_key_allowed_in_file(struct passwd *p
- "actual %d vs. announced %d.",
- file, linenum, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n), bits);
-
-- fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+ fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HEX);
- debug("matching key found: file %s, line %lu %s %s",
- file, linenum, key_type(key), fp);
- free(fp);
-diff -up openssh-6.6p1/auth2-pubkey.c.fips openssh-6.6p1/auth2-pubkey.c
-diff -up openssh-6.6p1/authfile.c.fips openssh-6.6p1/authfile.c
---- openssh-6.6p1/authfile.c.fips 2016-06-27 09:51:39.334362038 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.6p1/authfile.c 2016-06-27 09:51:39.443361948 +0200
-@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@
- #include <openssl/err.h>
- #include <openssl/evp.h>
- #include <openssl/pem.h>
-+#include <openssl/fips.h>
-
- /* compatibility with old or broken OpenSSL versions */
- #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
-@@ -1008,7 +1009,10 @@ key_parse_private_type(Buffer *blob, int
-
- switch (type) {
- case KEY_RSA1:
-- return key_parse_private_rsa1(blob, passphrase, commentp);
-+ if (! FIPS_mode())
-+ return key_parse_private_rsa1(blob, passphrase, commentp);
-+ error("%s: cannot parse rsa1 key in FIPS mode", __func__);
-+ break;
- case KEY_DSA:
- case KEY_ECDSA:
- case KEY_RSA:
-@@ -1068,7 +1072,7 @@ Key *
- key_parse_private(Buffer *buffer, const char *filename,
- const char *passphrase, char **commentp)
- {
-- Key *pub, *prv;
-+ Key *pub, *prv = NULL;
-
- /* it's a SSH v1 key if the public key part is readable */
- pub = key_parse_public_rsa1(buffer, commentp);
-@@ -1080,9 +1084,10 @@ key_parse_private(Buffer *buffer, const
- *commentp = xstrdup(filename);
- } else {
- key_free(pub);
-- /* key_parse_public_rsa1() has already loaded the comment */
-- prv = key_parse_private_type(buffer, KEY_RSA1, passphrase,
-- NULL);
-+ if (! FIPS_mode())
-+ /* key_parse_public_rsa1() has already loaded the comment */
-+ prv = key_parse_private_type(buffer, KEY_RSA1, passphrase,
-+ NULL);
- }
- return prv;
- }
-diff -up openssh-6.6p1/cipher-ctr.c.fips openssh-6.6p1/cipher-ctr.c
---- openssh-6.6p1/cipher-ctr.c.fips 2015-08-13 15:09:43.254350286 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.6p1/cipher-ctr.c 2015-08-13 15:09:43.354350118 +0200
-@@ -179,7 +179,8 @@ evp_aes_128_ctr(void)
- aes_ctr.do_cipher = ssh_aes_ctr;
- #ifndef SSH_OLD_EVP
- aes_ctr.flags = EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE | EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH |
-- EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV;
-+ EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV |
-+ EVP_CIPH_FLAG_FIPS;
- #endif
- return (&aes_ctr);
- }
-diff -up openssh-6.6p1/cipher.c.fips openssh-6.6p1/cipher.c
---- openssh-6.6p1/cipher.c.fips 2015-08-13 15:09:43.345350133 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.6p1/cipher.c 2015-08-13 15:09:43.354350118 +0200
-@@ -39,6 +39,8 @@
-
- #include <sys/types.h>
-
-+#include <openssl/fips.h>
-+
- #include <string.h>
- #include <stdarg.h>
- #include <stdio.h>
-@@ -90,6 +92,25 @@ static const struct Cipher ciphers[] = {
- { NULL, SSH_CIPHER_INVALID, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, NULL }
- };
-
-+static const struct Cipher fips_ciphers[] = {
-+ { "none", SSH_CIPHER_NONE, 8, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, EVP_enc_null },
-+ { "3des-cbc", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 24, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_des_ede3_cbc },
-+ { "aes128-cbc", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 16, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_aes_128_cbc },
-+ { "aes192-cbc", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 24, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_aes_192_cbc },
-+ { "aes256-cbc", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_aes_256_cbc },
-+ { "rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se",
-+ SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_aes_256_cbc },
-+ { "aes128-ctr", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 16, 0, 0, 0, 0, EVP_aes_128_ctr },
-+ { "aes192-ctr", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 24, 0, 0, 0, 0, EVP_aes_192_ctr },
-+ { "aes256-ctr", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 0, 0, 0, 0, EVP_aes_256_ctr },
-+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPGCM
-+ { "aes128-gcm@openssh.com",
-+ SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 16, 12, 16, 0, 0, EVP_aes_128_gcm },
-+ { "aes256-gcm@openssh.com",
-+ SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 12, 16, 0, 0, EVP_aes_256_gcm },
-+#endif
-+ { NULL, SSH_CIPHER_INVALID, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, NULL }
-+};
- /*--*/
-
- /* Returns a list of supported ciphers separated by the specified char. */
-@@ -100,7 +121,7 @@ cipher_alg_list(char sep, int auth_only)
- size_t nlen, rlen = 0;
- const Cipher *c;
-
-- for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++) {
-+ for (c = FIPS_mode() ? fips_ciphers : ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++) {
- if (c->number != SSH_CIPHER_SSH2)
- continue;
- if (auth_only && c->auth_len == 0)
-@@ -180,7 +201,7 @@ const Cipher *
- cipher_by_name(const char *name)
- {
- const Cipher *c;
-- for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++)
-+ for (c = FIPS_mode() ? fips_ciphers : ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++)
- if (strcmp(c->name, name) == 0)
- return c;
- return NULL;
-@@ -190,7 +211,7 @@ const Cipher *
- cipher_by_number(int id)
- {
- const Cipher *c;
-- for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++)
-+ for (c = FIPS_mode() ? fips_ciphers : ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++)
- if (c->number == id)
- return c;
- return NULL;
-@@ -232,7 +253,7 @@ cipher_number(const char *name)
- const Cipher *c;
- if (name == NULL)
- return -1;
-- for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++)
-+ for (c = FIPS_mode() ? fips_ciphers : ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++)
- if (strcasecmp(c->name, name) == 0)
- return c->number;
- return -1;
-diff -up openssh-6.6p1/dh.h.fips openssh-6.6p1/dh.h
---- openssh-6.6p1/dh.h.fips 2013-10-10 01:32:40.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.6p1/dh.h 2015-08-13 15:09:43.354350118 +0200
-@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ int dh_estimate(int);
-
- /* Min and max values from RFC4419. */
- #define DH_GRP_MIN 1024
-+#define DH_GRP_MIN_FIPS 2048
- #define DH_GRP_MAX 8192
-
- /*
-diff -up openssh-6.6p1/entropy.c.fips openssh-6.6p1/entropy.c
---- openssh-6.6p1/entropy.c.fips 2015-08-13 15:09:43.238350313 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.6p1/entropy.c 2015-08-13 15:09:43.355350116 +0200
-@@ -222,6 +222,9 @@ seed_rng(void)
- fatal("OpenSSL version mismatch. Built against %lx, you "
- "have %lx", (u_long)OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER, SSLeay());
-
-+ /* clean the PRNG status when exiting the program */
-+ atexit(RAND_cleanup);
-+
- #ifndef OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY
- if (RAND_status() == 1) {
- debug3("RNG is ready, skipping seeding");
-diff -up openssh-6.6p1/kex.c.fips openssh-6.6p1/kex.c
---- openssh-6.6p1/kex.c.fips 2015-08-13 15:09:43.350350124 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.6p1/kex.c 2015-08-13 15:09:43.355350116 +0200
-@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
- #include <string.h>
-
- #include <openssl/crypto.h>
-+#include <openssl/fips.h>
-
- #include "xmalloc.h"
- #include "ssh2.h"
-@@ -103,6 +104,25 @@ static const struct kexalg kexalgs[] = {
- { NULL, -1, -1, -1},
- };
-
-+static const struct kexalg kexalgs_fips[] = {
-+ { KEX_DH14, KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
-+ { KEX_DHGEX_SHA1, KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
-+#ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256
-+ { KEX_DHGEX_SHA256, KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 },
-+#endif
-+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
-+ { KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP256, KEX_ECDH_SHA2,
-+ NID_X9_62_prime256v1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 },
-+ { KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP384, KEX_ECDH_SHA2, NID_secp384r1,
-+ SSH_DIGEST_SHA384 },
-+# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521
-+ { KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP521, KEX_ECDH_SHA2, NID_secp521r1,
-+ SSH_DIGEST_SHA512 },
-+# endif
-+#endif
-+ { NULL, -1, -1, NULL},
-+};
-+
- char *
- kex_alg_list(char sep)
- {
-@@ -126,7 +146,7 @@ kex_alg_by_name(const char *name)
- {
- const struct kexalg *k;
-
-- for (k = kexalgs; k->name != NULL; k++) {
-+ for (k = (FIPS_mode() ? kexalgs_fips : kexalgs); k->name != NULL; k++) {
- if (strcmp(k->name, name) == 0)
- return k;
- #ifdef GSSAPI
-@@ -151,7 +171,10 @@ kex_names_valid(const char *names)
- for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0';
- (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
- if (kex_alg_by_name(p) == NULL) {
-- error("Unsupported KEX algorithm \"%.100s\"", p);
-+ if (FIPS_mode())
-+ error("\"%.100s\" is not allowed in FIPS mode", p);
-+ else
-+ error("Unsupported KEX algorithm \"%.100s\"", p);
- free(s);
- return 0;
- }
-diff -up openssh-6.6p1/kexecdhc.c.fips openssh-6.6p1/kexecdhc.c
---- openssh-6.6p1/kexecdhc.c.fips 2014-02-04 01:20:15.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.6p1/kexecdhc.c 2015-08-13 15:09:43.355350116 +0200
-@@ -154,6 +154,7 @@ kexecdh_client(Kex *kex)
-
- kex_derive_keys_bn(kex, hash, hashlen, shared_secret);
- BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
-+ memset(hash, 0, hashlen);
- kex_finish(kex);
- }
- #else /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
-diff -up openssh-6.6p1/kexecdhs.c.fips openssh-6.6p1/kexecdhs.c
---- openssh-6.6p1/kexecdhs.c.fips 2014-02-04 01:20:15.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.6p1/kexecdhs.c 2015-08-13 15:09:43.355350116 +0200
-@@ -150,6 +150,7 @@ kexecdh_server(Kex *kex)
-
- kex_derive_keys_bn(kex, hash, hashlen, shared_secret);
- BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
-+ memset(hash, 0, hashlen);
- kex_finish(kex);
- }
- #else /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
-diff -up openssh-6.6p1/kexgexc.c.fips openssh-6.6p1/kexgexc.c
---- openssh-6.6p1/kexgexc.c.fips 2014-02-04 01:20:15.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.6p1/kexgexc.c 2015-08-13 15:09:43.355350116 +0200
-@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@
-
- #include "includes.h"
-
-+#include <openssl/fips.h>
-+
- #include <sys/types.h>
-
- #include <openssl/dh.h>
-@@ -64,13 +66,13 @@ kexgex_client(Kex *kex)
- /* Old GEX request */
- packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST_OLD);
- packet_put_int(nbits);
-- min = DH_GRP_MIN;
-+ min = FIPS_mode() ? DH_GRP_MIN_FIPS : DH_GRP_MIN;
- max = DH_GRP_MAX;
-
- debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST_OLD(%u) sent", nbits);
- } else {
- /* New GEX request */
-- min = DH_GRP_MIN;
-+ min = FIPS_mode() ? DH_GRP_MIN_FIPS : DH_GRP_MIN;
- max = DH_GRP_MAX;
- packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST);
- packet_put_int(min);
-diff -up openssh-6.6p1/kexgexs.c.fips openssh-6.6p1/kexgexs.c
---- openssh-6.6p1/kexgexs.c.fips 2014-02-04 01:20:15.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.6p1/kexgexs.c 2015-08-13 15:09:43.355350116 +0200
-@@ -76,16 +76,16 @@ kexgex_server(Kex *kex)
- omin = min = packet_get_int();
- onbits = nbits = packet_get_int();
- omax = max = packet_get_int();
-- min = MAX(DH_GRP_MIN, min);
-+ min = MAX(FIPS_mode() ? DH_GRP_MIN_FIPS : DH_GRP_MIN, min);
- max = MIN(DH_GRP_MAX, max);
-- nbits = MAX(DH_GRP_MIN, nbits);
-+ nbits = MAX(FIPS_mode() ? DH_GRP_MIN_FIPS : DH_GRP_MIN, nbits);
- nbits = MIN(DH_GRP_MAX, nbits);
- break;
- case SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST_OLD:
- debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST_OLD received");
- onbits = nbits = packet_get_int();
- /* unused for old GEX */
-- omin = min = DH_GRP_MIN;
-+ omin = min = FIPS_mode() ? DH_GRP_MIN_FIPS : DH_GRP_MIN;
- omax = max = DH_GRP_MAX;
- break;
- default:
-diff -up openssh-6.6p1/key.c.fips openssh-6.6p1/key.c
---- openssh-6.6p1/key.c.fips 2015-08-13 15:09:43.345350133 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.6p1/key.c 2015-08-13 15:09:43.356350114 +0200
-@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@
- #include "crypto_api.h"
-
- #include <openssl/evp.h>
-+#include <openssl/fips.h>
- #include <openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h>
-
- #include <stdarg.h>
-@@ -635,7 +636,7 @@ sshkey_format_oneline(const struct sshke
- char *fp, *result;
-
- if (key_is_cert(key)) {
-- fp = key_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key, SSH_FP_MD5,
-+ fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,
- SSH_FP_HEX);
- xasprintf(&result, "%s ID %s (serial %llu) CA %s %s",
- key_type(key), key->cert->key_id,
-@@ -644,7 +645,7 @@ sshkey_format_oneline(const struct sshke
- fp == NULL ? "(null)" : fp);
- free(fp);
- } else {
-- fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+ fp = key_selected_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HEX);
- xasprintf(&result, "%s %s", key_type(key),
- fp == NULL ? "(null)" : fp);
- free(fp);
-@@ -661,9 +662,13 @@ key_fingerprint_selection(void)
- char *env;
-
- if (!rv_defined) {
-- env = getenv("SSH_FINGERPRINT_TYPE");
-- rv = (env && !strcmp (env, "sha")) ?
-- SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5;
-+ if (FIPS_mode())
-+ rv = SSH_FP_SHA1;
-+ else {
-+ env = getenv("SSH_FINGERPRINT_TYPE");
-+ rv = (env && !strcmp (env, "sha")) ?
-+ SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5;
-+ }
- rv_defined = 1;
- }
- return rv;
-@@ -1168,8 +1173,11 @@ rsa_generate_private_key(u_int bits)
- fatal("%s: BN_new failed", __func__);
- if (!BN_set_word(f4, RSA_F4))
- fatal("%s: BN_new failed", __func__);
-- if (!RSA_generate_key_ex(private, bits, f4, NULL))
-+ if (!RSA_generate_key_ex(private, bits, f4, NULL)) {
-+ if (FIPS_mode())
-+ logit("%s: the key length might be unsupported by FIPS mode approved key generation method", __func__);
- fatal("%s: key generation failed.", __func__);
-+ }
- BN_free(f4);
- return private;
- }
-diff -up openssh-6.6p1/mac.c.fips openssh-6.6p1/mac.c
---- openssh-6.6p1/mac.c.fips 2015-08-13 15:09:43.346350131 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.6p1/mac.c 2015-08-13 15:09:43.356350114 +0200
-@@ -27,6 +27,8 @@
-
- #include <sys/types.h>
-
-+#include <openssl/fips.h>
-+
- #include <stdarg.h>
- #include <string.h>
- #include <signal.h>
-@@ -60,7 +62,7 @@ struct macalg {
- int etm; /* Encrypt-then-MAC */
- };
-
--static const struct macalg macs[] = {
-+static const struct macalg all_macs[] = {
- /* Encrypt-and-MAC (encrypt-and-authenticate) variants */
- { "hmac-sha1", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, 0, 0, 0, 0 },
- { "hmac-sha1-96", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, 96, 0, 0, 0 },
-@@ -91,6 +93,24 @@ static const struct macalg macs[] = {
- { NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }
- };
-
-+static const struct macalg fips_macs[] = {
-+ /* Encrypt-and-MAC (encrypt-and-authenticate) variants */
-+ { "hmac-sha1", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, 0, 0, 0, 0 },
-+#ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256
-+ { "hmac-sha2-256", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, 0, 0, 0, 0 },
-+ { "hmac-sha2-512", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA512, 0, 0, 0, 0 },
-+#endif
-+
-+ /* Encrypt-then-MAC variants */
-+ { "hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, 0, 0, 0, 1 },
-+#ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256
-+ { "hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, 0, 0, 0, 1 },
-+ { "hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA512, 0, 0, 0, 1 },
-+#endif
-+
-+ { NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }
-+};
-+
- /* Returns a list of supported MACs separated by the specified char. */
- char *
- mac_alg_list(char sep)
-@@ -99,7 +119,7 @@ mac_alg_list(char sep)
- size_t nlen, rlen = 0;
- const struct macalg *m;
-
-- for (m = macs; m->name != NULL; m++) {
-+ for (m = FIPS_mode() ? fips_macs : all_macs; m->name != NULL; m++) {
- if (ret != NULL)
- ret[rlen++] = sep;
- nlen = strlen(m->name);
-@@ -133,7 +153,7 @@ mac_setup(Mac *mac, char *name)
- {
- const struct macalg *m;
-
-- for (m = macs; m->name != NULL; m++) {
-+ for (m = FIPS_mode() ? fips_macs : all_macs; m->name != NULL; m++) {
- if (strcmp(name, m->name) != 0)
- continue;
- if (mac != NULL) {
-diff -up openssh-6.6p1/myproposal.h.fips openssh-6.6p1/myproposal.h
---- openssh-6.6p1/myproposal.h.fips 2013-12-07 01:24:02.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.6p1/myproposal.h 2015-08-13 15:10:30.288271102 +0200
-@@ -88,6 +88,12 @@
- "diffie-hellman-group14-sha1," \
- "diffie-hellman-group1-sha1"
-
-+#define KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS \
-+ KEX_ECDH_METHODS \
-+ KEX_SHA256_METHODS \
-+ "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1," \
-+ "diffie-hellman-group14-sha1"
-+
- #define KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG \
- HOSTKEY_ECDSA_CERT_METHODS \
- "ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
-@@ -133,6 +139,22 @@
- #define KEX_DEFAULT_COMP "none,zlib@openssh.com,zlib"
- #define KEX_DEFAULT_LANG ""
-
-+#define KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT \
-+ "aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr," \
-+ "aes128-cbc,3des-cbc," \
-+ "aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc,rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se"
-+#ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256
-+#define KEX_FIPS_MAC \
-+ "hmac-sha1," \
-+ "hmac-sha2-256," \
-+ "hmac-sha2-512," \
-+ "hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com," \
-+ "hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com," \
-+ "hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com"
-+#else
-+#define KEX_FIPS_MAC \
-+ "hmac-sha1"
-+#endif
-
- static char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = {
- KEX_DEFAULT_KEX,
-diff -up openssh-6.6p1/ssh-keygen.c.fips openssh-6.6p1/ssh-keygen.c
---- openssh-6.6p1/ssh-keygen.c.fips 2015-08-13 15:09:43.296350215 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.6p1/ssh-keygen.c 2015-08-13 15:09:43.360350107 +0200
-@@ -195,6 +195,12 @@ type_bits_valid(int type, u_int32_t *bit
- fprintf(stderr, "key bits exceeds maximum %d\n", maxbits);
- exit(1);
- }
-+ if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+ if (type == KEY_DSA)
-+ fatal("DSA keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
-+ if (type == KEY_ED25519)
-+ fatal("ED25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
-+ }
- if (type == KEY_DSA && *bitsp != 1024)
- fatal("DSA keys must be 1024 bits");
- else if (type != KEY_ECDSA && type != KEY_ED25519 && *bitsp < 768)
-@@ -746,7 +752,7 @@ do_download(struct passwd *pw)
- enum fp_type fptype;
- char *fp, *ra;
-
-- fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5;
-+ fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : key_fingerprint_selection();
- rep = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE : SSH_FP_HEX;
-
- pkcs11_init(0);
-@@ -756,8 +762,7 @@ do_download(struct passwd *pw)
- for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) {
- if (print_fingerprint) {
- fp = key_fingerprint(keys[i], fptype, rep);
-- ra = key_fingerprint(keys[i], SSH_FP_MD5,
-- SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
-+ ra = key_selected_fingerprint(keys[i], SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
- printf("%u %s %s (PKCS11 key)\n", key_size(keys[i]),
- fp, key_type(keys[i]));
- if (log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE)
-diff -up openssh-6.6p1/ssh.c.fips openssh-6.6p1/ssh.c
---- openssh-6.6p1/ssh.c.fips 2014-02-27 00:17:13.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.6p1/ssh.c 2015-08-13 15:09:43.357350112 +0200
-@@ -73,6 +73,8 @@
-
- #include <openssl/evp.h>
- #include <openssl/err.h>
-+#include <openssl/fips.h>
-+#include <fipscheck.h>
- #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
- #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
-
-@@ -427,6 +429,13 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- sanitise_stdfd();
-
- __progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]);
-+ SSLeay_add_all_algorithms();
-+ if (access("/etc/system-fips", F_OK) == 0)
-+ if (! FIPSCHECK_verify(NULL, NULL))
-+ if (FIPS_mode())
-+ fatal("FIPS integrity verification test failed.");
-+ else
-+ logit("FIPS integrity verification test failed.");
-
- #ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE
- /* Prepare for later setproctitle emulation */
-@@ -504,6 +513,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- "ACD:E:F:I:KL:MNO:PQ:R:S:TVw:W:XYy")) != -1) {
- switch (opt) {
- case '1':
-+ if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+ fatal("Protocol 1 not allowed in the FIPS mode.");
-+ }
- options.protocol = SSH_PROTO_1;
- break;
- case '2':
-@@ -828,7 +840,6 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
-
- host_arg = xstrdup(host);
-
-- OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
- ERR_load_crypto_strings();
-
- /* Initialize the command to execute on remote host. */
-@@ -973,6 +984,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
-
- seed_rng();
-
-+ if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+ logit("FIPS mode initialized");
-+ }
-+
- if (options.user == NULL)
- options.user = xstrdup(pw->pw_name);
-
-@@ -1020,6 +1035,12 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
-
- timeout_ms = options.connection_timeout * 1000;
-
-+ if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+ options.protocol &= SSH_PROTO_2;
-+ if (options.protocol == 0)
-+ fatal("Protocol 2 disabled by configuration but required in the FIPS mode.");
-+ }
-+
- /* Open a connection to the remote host. */
- if (ssh_connect(host, addrs, &hostaddr, options.port,
- options.address_family, options.connection_attempts,
-diff -up openssh-6.6p1/sshconnect2.c.fips openssh-6.6p1/sshconnect2.c
---- openssh-6.6p1/sshconnect2.c.fips 2015-08-13 15:09:43.342350138 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.6p1/sshconnect2.c 2015-08-13 15:09:43.357350112 +0200
-@@ -46,6 +46,8 @@
- #include <vis.h>
- #endif
-
-+#include <openssl/fips.h>
-+
- #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
-
- #include "xmalloc.h"
-@@ -170,21 +172,26 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *ho
-
- #ifdef GSSAPI
- if (options.gss_keyex) {
-- /* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this
-- * client to the key exchange algorithm proposal */
-- orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
--
-- if (options.gss_trust_dns)
-- gss_host = (char *)get_canonical_hostname(1);
-- else
-- gss_host = host;
--
-- gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host,
-- options.gss_client_identity, options.gss_kex_algorithms);
-- if (gss) {
-- debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss);
-- xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
-- "%s,%s", gss, orig);
-+ if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+ logit("Disabling GSSAPIKeyExchange. Not usable in FIPS mode");
-+ options.gss_keyex = 0;
-+ } else {
-+ /* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this
-+ * client to the key exchange algorithm proposal */
-+ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
-+
-+ if (options.gss_trust_dns)
-+ gss_host = (char *)get_canonical_hostname(1);
-+ else
-+ gss_host = host;
-+
-+ gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host,
-+ options.gss_client_identity, options.gss_kex_algorithms);
-+ if (gss) {
-+ debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss);
-+ xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
-+ "%s,%s", gss, orig);
-+ }
- }
- }
- #endif
-@@ -196,6 +203,10 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *ho
- if (options.ciphers != NULL) {
- myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
- myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = options.ciphers;
-+ } else if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
-+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT;
-+
- }
- myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
- compat_cipher_proposal(myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS]);
-@@ -211,7 +222,11 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *ho
- if (options.macs != NULL) {
- myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] =
- myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = options.macs;
-+ } else if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] =
-+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = KEX_FIPS_MAC;
- }
-+
- if (options.hostkeyalgorithms != NULL)
- myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] =
- compat_pkalg_proposal(options.hostkeyalgorithms);
-@@ -223,9 +238,11 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *ho
- }
- if (options.kex_algorithms != NULL)
- myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = options.kex_algorithms;
-+ else if (FIPS_mode())
-+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS;
-+
- myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal(
- myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]);
--
- #ifdef GSSAPI
- /* If we've got GSSAPI algorithms, then we also support the
- * 'null' hostkey, as a last resort */
-diff -up openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c.fips openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c
---- openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c.fips 2015-08-13 15:09:43.352350121 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.6p1/sshd.c 2015-08-13 15:09:43.359350109 +0200
-@@ -75,6 +75,8 @@
- #include <openssl/dh.h>
- #include <openssl/bn.h>
- #include <openssl/rand.h>
-+#include <openssl/fips.h>
-+#include <fipscheck.h>
- #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
-
- #ifdef HAVE_SECUREWARE
-@@ -1473,6 +1475,18 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- #endif
- __progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]);
-
-+ SSLeay_add_all_algorithms();
-+ if (access("/etc/system-fips", F_OK) == 0)
-+ if (! FIPSCHECK_verify(NULL, NULL)) {
-+ openlog(__progname, LOG_PID, LOG_AUTHPRIV);
-+ if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+ syslog(LOG_CRIT, "FIPS integrity verification test failed.");
-+ cleanup_exit(255);
-+ }
-+ else
-+ syslog(LOG_INFO, "FIPS integrity verification test failed.");
-+ closelog();
-+ }
- /* Save argv. Duplicate so setproctitle emulation doesn't clobber it */
- saved_argc = ac;
- rexec_argc = ac;
-@@ -1624,8 +1638,6 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- else
- closefrom(REEXEC_DEVCRYPTO_RESERVED_FD);
-
-- OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
--
- /* If requested, redirect the logs to the specified logfile. */
- if (logfile != NULL) {
- log_redirect_stderr_to(logfile);
-@@ -1803,6 +1815,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- debug("private host key: #%d type %d %s", i, keytype,
- key_type(key ? key : pubkey));
- }
-+ if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) && FIPS_mode()) {
-+ logit("Disabling protocol version 1. Not allowed in the FIPS mode.");
-+ options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_1;
-+ }
- if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) && !sensitive_data.have_ssh1_key) {
- logit("Disabling protocol version 1. Could not load host key");
- options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_1;
-@@ -1966,6 +1982,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- /* Reinitialize the log (because of the fork above). */
- log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr);
-
-+ if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+ logit("FIPS mode initialized");
-+ }
-+
- /* Chdir to the root directory so that the current disk can be
- unmounted if desired. */
- if (chdir("/") == -1)
-@@ -2537,6 +2557,9 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void)
- if (options.ciphers != NULL) {
- myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
- myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = options.ciphers;
-+ } else if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
-+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT;
- }
- myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
- compat_cipher_proposal(myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS]);
-@@ -2546,6 +2569,9 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void)
- if (options.macs != NULL) {
- myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] =
- myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = options.macs;
-+ } else if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] =
-+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = KEX_FIPS_MAC;
- }
- if (options.compression == COMP_NONE) {
- myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] =
-@@ -2556,6 +2582,8 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void)
- }
- if (options.kex_algorithms != NULL)
- myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = options.kex_algorithms;
-+ else if (FIPS_mode())
-+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS;
-
- myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal(
- myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]);
-@@ -2582,10 +2610,14 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void)
- if (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]) == 0)
- orig = NULL;
-
-- if (options.gss_keyex)
-- gss = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms();
-- else
-- gss = NULL;
-+ if (options.gss_keyex) {
-+ if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+ logit("Disabling GSSAPIKeyExchange. Not usable in FIPS mode");
-+ options.gss_keyex = 0;
-+ } else {
-+ gss = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms();
-+ }
-+ }
-
- if (gss && orig)
- xasprintf(&newstr, "%s,%s", gss, orig);
-diff --git a/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/pam_user_key_allowed2.c b/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/pam_user_key_allowed2.c
-index 13b0a6f..3ec2454 100644
---- a/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/pam_user_key_allowed2.c
-+++ b/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/pam_user_key_allowed2.c
-@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@
- #include "secure_filename.h"
- #include "uidswap.h"
- #include <unistd.h>
-+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
-
- #include "identity.h"
-
-@@ -103,7 +104,8 @@ pamsshagentauth_check_authkeys_file(FILE * f, char *file, Key * key)
- found_key = 1;
- logit("matching key found: file/command %s, line %lu", file,
- linenum);
-- fp = key_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+ fp = key_fingerprint(found, FIPS_mode() ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5,
-+ SSH_FP_HEX);
- logit("Found matching %s key: %s",
- key_type(found), fp);
- free(fp);
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-fix-ssh-copy-id-on-non-sh-shell.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-fix-ssh-copy-id-on-non-sh-shell.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 358986b..0000000
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-fix-ssh-copy-id-on-non-sh-shell.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/contrib/ssh-copy-id b/contrib/ssh-copy-id
-index 8e1091c..4bba5d6 100644
---- a/contrib/ssh-copy-id
-+++ b/contrib/ssh-copy-id
-@@ -274,9 +274,7 @@ case "$REMOTE_VERSION" in
- populate_new_ids 0
- fi
- [ "$DRY_RUN" ] || printf '%s\n' "$NEW_IDS" | ssh "$@" "
-- umask 077 ;
-+ exec sh -c 'umask 077; mkdir -p .ssh && cat >> .ssh/authorized_keys || exit 1; if type restorecon >/dev/null 2>&1; then restorecon -F .ssh .ssh/authorized_keys; fi'" \
-- mkdir -p .ssh && cat >> .ssh/authorized_keys || exit 1 ;
-- if type restorecon >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then restorecon -F .ssh .ssh/authorized_keys ; fi" \
- || exit 1
- ADDED=$(printf '%s\n' "$NEW_IDS" | wc -l)
- ;;
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-force_krb.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-force_krb.patch
index a242394..7055e10 100644
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-force_krb.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-force_krb.patch
@@ -12,12 +12,7 @@ index 42de994..60de320 100644
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "key.h"
-@@ -40,10 +42,12 @@
- #include "auth.h"
- #include "log.h"
- #include "servconf.h"
-+#include "misc.h"
-
+@@ -40,6 +42,7 @@
#include "buffer.h"
#include "ssh-gss.h"
@@ -168,7 +163,7 @@ index 42de994..60de320 100644
+ k5users_allowed_cmds[ncommands-1] =
+ xstrdup(pw->pw_shell);
+ k5users_allowed_cmds =
-+ xrealloc(k5users_allowed_cmds, ++ncommands,
++ xreallocarray(k5users_allowed_cmds, ++ncommands,
+ sizeof(*k5users_allowed_cmds));
+ break;
+ }
@@ -181,7 +176,7 @@ index 42de994..60de320 100644
+ k5users_allowed_cmds[ncommands-1] =
+ xstrdup(token);
+ k5users_allowed_cmds =
-+ xrealloc(k5users_allowed_cmds, ++ncommands,
++ xreallocarray(k5users_allowed_cmds, ++ncommands,
+ sizeof(*k5users_allowed_cmds));
+ token = strtok(NULL, " \t\n");
+ }
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-gssKexAlgorithms.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-gssKexAlgorithms.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 3854b40..0000000
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-gssKexAlgorithms.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,410 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-6.6p1/gss-genr.c.gsskexalg openssh-6.6p1/gss-genr.c
---- openssh-6.6p1/gss-genr.c.gsskexalg 2015-08-14 16:07:33.271343064 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.6p1/gss-genr.c 2015-08-14 16:07:33.338342936 +0200
-@@ -76,7 +76,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok() {
- */
-
- char *
--ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *host, const char *client) {
-+ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *host, const char *client,
-+ const char *kex) {
- gss_OID_set gss_supported;
- OM_uint32 min_status;
-
-@@ -84,12 +85,12 @@ ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char
- return NULL;
-
- return(ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_supported, ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism,
-- host, client));
-+ host, client, kex));
- }
-
- char *
- ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set gss_supported, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *check,
-- const char *host, const char *client) {
-+ const char *host, const char *client, const char *kex) {
- Buffer buf;
- size_t i;
- int oidpos, enclen;
-@@ -98,6 +99,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set gss_sup
- char deroid[2];
- const EVP_MD *evp_md = EVP_md5();
- EVP_MD_CTX md;
-+ char *s, *cp, *p;
-
- if (gss_enc2oid != NULL) {
- for (i = 0; gss_enc2oid[i].encoded != NULL; i++)
-@@ -111,6 +113,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set gss_sup
- buffer_init(&buf);
-
- oidpos = 0;
-+ s = cp = xstrdup(kex);
- for (i = 0; i < gss_supported->count; i++) {
- if (gss_supported->elements[i].length < 128 &&
- (*check)(NULL, &(gss_supported->elements[i]), host, client)) {
-@@ -129,26 +132,22 @@ ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set gss_sup
- enclen = __b64_ntop(digest, EVP_MD_size(evp_md),
- encoded, EVP_MD_size(evp_md) * 2);
-
-- if (oidpos != 0)
-- buffer_put_char(&buf, ',');
--
-- buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID,
-- sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID) - 1);
-- buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen);
-- buffer_put_char(&buf, ',');
-- buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID,
-- sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID) - 1);
-- buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen);
-- buffer_put_char(&buf, ',');
-- buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID,
-- sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID) - 1);
-- buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen);
-+ cp = strncpy(s, kex, strlen(kex));
-+ for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0';
-+ (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
-+ if (buffer_len(&buf) != 0)
-+ buffer_put_char(&buf, ',');
-+ buffer_append(&buf, p,
-+ strlen(p));
-+ buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen);
-+ }
-
- gss_enc2oid[oidpos].oid = &(gss_supported->elements[i]);
- gss_enc2oid[oidpos].encoded = encoded;
- oidpos++;
- }
- }
-+ free(s);
- gss_enc2oid[oidpos].oid = NULL;
- gss_enc2oid[oidpos].encoded = NULL;
-
-diff -up openssh-6.6p1/gss-serv.c.gsskexalg openssh-6.6p1/gss-serv.c
---- openssh-6.6p1/gss-serv.c.gsskexalg 2015-08-14 16:07:33.296343016 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.6p1/gss-serv.c 2015-08-14 16:07:33.338342936 +0200
-@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms() {
-
- ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(&supported);
- return (ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(supported, &ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech,
-- NULL, NULL));
-+ NULL, NULL, options.gss_kex_algorithms));
- }
-
- /* Unprivileged */
-diff -up openssh-6.6p1/kex.c.gsskexalg openssh-6.6p1/kex.c
---- openssh-6.6p1/kex.c.gsskexalg 2015-08-14 16:07:33.271343064 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.6p1/kex.c 2015-08-14 16:07:33.339342935 +0200
-@@ -160,6 +160,29 @@ kex_names_valid(const char *names)
- return 1;
- }
-
-+/* Validate GSS KEX method name list */
-+int
-+gss_kex_names_valid(const char *names)
-+{
-+ char *s, *cp, *p;
-+
-+ if (names == NULL || *names == '\0')
-+ return 0;
-+ s = cp = xstrdup(names);
-+ for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0';
-+ (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
-+ if (strncmp(p, "gss-", 4) != 0
-+ || kex_alg_by_name(p) == NULL) {
-+ error("Unsupported KEX algorithm \"%.100s\"", p);
-+ free(s);
-+ return 0;
-+ }
-+ }
-+ debug3("gss kex names ok: [%s]", names);
-+ free(s);
-+ return 1;
-+}
-+
- /* put algorithm proposal into buffer */
- static void
- kex_prop2buf(Buffer *b, char *proposal[PROPOSAL_MAX])
-diff -up openssh-6.6p1/readconf.c.gsskexalg openssh-6.6p1/readconf.c
---- openssh-6.6p1/readconf.c.gsskexalg 2015-08-14 16:07:33.274343058 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.6p1/readconf.c 2015-08-14 16:14:17.600574919 +0200
-@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@
- #include "kex.h"
- #include "mac.h"
- #include "uidswap.h"
-+#include "ssh-gss.h"
-
- /* Format of the configuration file:
-
-@@ -142,7 +143,7 @@ typedef enum {
- oEnableSSHKeysign, oRekeyLimit, oVerifyHostKeyDNS, oConnectTimeout,
- oAddressFamily, oGssAuthentication, oGssDelegateCreds,
- oGssTrustDns, oGssKeyEx, oGssClientIdentity, oGssRenewalRekey,
-- oGssServerIdentity,
-+ oGssServerIdentity, oGssKexAlgorithms,
- oServerAliveInterval, oServerAliveCountMax, oIdentitiesOnly,
- oSendEnv, oControlPath, oControlMaster, oControlPersist,
- oHashKnownHosts,
-@@ -191,6 +192,7 @@ static struct {
- { "gssapiclientidentity", oGssClientIdentity },
- { "gssapiserveridentity", oGssServerIdentity },
- { "gssapirenewalforcesrekey", oGssRenewalRekey },
-+ { "gssapikexalgorithms", oGssKexAlgorithms },
- #else
- { "gssapiauthentication", oUnsupported },
- { "gssapikeyexchange", oUnsupported },
-@@ -198,6 +200,7 @@ static struct {
- { "gssapitrustdns", oUnsupported },
- { "gssapiclientidentity", oUnsupported },
- { "gssapirenewalforcesrekey", oUnsupported },
-+ { "gssapikexalgorithms", oUnsupported },
- #endif
- { "fallbacktorsh", oDeprecated },
- { "usersh", oDeprecated },
-@@ -876,6 +879,18 @@ parse_time:
- intptr = &options->gss_renewal_rekey;
- goto parse_flag;
-
-+ case oGssKexAlgorithms:
-+ arg = strdelim(&s);
-+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
-+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.",
-+ filename, linenum);
-+ if (!gss_kex_names_valid(arg))
-+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad GSSAPI KexAlgorithms '%s'.",
-+ filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
-+ if (*activep && options->gss_kex_algorithms == NULL)
-+ options->gss_kex_algorithms = xstrdup(arg);
-+ break;
-+
- case oBatchMode:
- intptr = &options->batch_mode;
- goto parse_flag;
-@@ -1534,6 +1549,7 @@ initialize_options(Options * options)
- options->gss_renewal_rekey = -1;
- options->gss_client_identity = NULL;
- options->gss_server_identity = NULL;
-+ options->gss_kex_algorithms = NULL;
- options->password_authentication = -1;
- options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
- options->kbd_interactive_devices = NULL;
-@@ -1660,6 +1676,8 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
- options->gss_trust_dns = 0;
- if (options->gss_renewal_rekey == -1)
- options->gss_renewal_rekey = 0;
-+ if (options->gss_kex_algorithms == NULL)
-+ options->gss_kex_algorithms = strdup(GSS_KEX_DEFAULT_KEX);
- if (options->password_authentication == -1)
- options->password_authentication = 1;
- if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
-diff -up openssh-6.6p1/readconf.h.gsskexalg openssh-6.6p1/readconf.h
---- openssh-6.6p1/readconf.h.gsskexalg 2015-08-14 16:07:33.274343058 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.6p1/readconf.h 2015-08-14 16:07:33.339342935 +0200
-@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ typedef struct {
- int gss_renewal_rekey; /* Credential renewal forces rekey */
- char *gss_client_identity; /* Principal to initiate GSSAPI with */
- char *gss_server_identity; /* GSSAPI target principal */
-+ char *gss_kex_algorithms; /* GSSAPI kex methods to be offered by client. */
- int password_authentication; /* Try password
- * authentication. */
- int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* Try keyboard-interactive auth. */
-diff -up openssh-6.6p1/servconf.c.gsskexalg openssh-6.6p1/servconf.c
---- openssh-6.6p1/servconf.c.gsskexalg 2015-08-14 16:07:45.704319443 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.6p1/servconf.c 2015-08-14 16:14:15.306579277 +0200
-@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@
- #include "packet.h"
- #include "hostfile.h"
- #include "auth.h"
-+#include "ssh-gss.h"
-
- static void add_listen_addr(ServerOptions *, char *, int);
- static void add_one_listen_addr(ServerOptions *, char *, int);
-@@ -112,6 +113,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
- options->gss_cleanup_creds = -1;
- options->gss_strict_acceptor = -1;
- options->gss_store_rekey = -1;
-+ options->gss_kex_algorithms = NULL;
- options->password_authentication = -1;
- options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
- options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
-@@ -258,6 +260,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
- options->gss_strict_acceptor = 1;
- if (options->gss_store_rekey == -1)
- options->gss_store_rekey = 0;
-+ if (options->gss_kex_algorithms == NULL)
-+ options->gss_kex_algorithms = strdup(GSS_KEX_DEFAULT_KEX);
- if (options->password_authentication == -1)
- options->password_authentication = 1;
- if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
-@@ -360,7 +364,7 @@ typedef enum {
- sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, sClientAliveInterval,
- sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile,
- sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssEnablek5users, sGssStrictAcceptor,
-- sGssKeyEx, sGssStoreRekey, sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel,
-+ sGssKeyEx, sGssStoreRekey, sGssKexAlgorithms, sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel,
- sMatch, sPermitOpen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory,
- sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding,
- sHostCertificate,
-@@ -434,6 +438,7 @@ static struct {
- { "gssapikeyexchange", sGssKeyEx, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- { "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sGssStoreRekey, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- { "gssapienablek5users", sGssEnablek5users, SSHCFG_ALL },
-+ { "gssapikexalgorithms", sGssKexAlgorithms, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- #else
- { "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
- { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-@@ -442,6 +447,7 @@ static struct {
- { "gssapikeyexchange", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- { "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- { "gssapienablek5users", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
-+ { "gssapikexalgorithms", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- #endif
- { "gssusesessionccache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- { "gssapiusesessioncredcache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-@@ -1137,6 +1143,18 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
- intptr = &options->gss_store_rekey;
- goto parse_flag;
-
-+ case sGssKexAlgorithms:
-+ arg = strdelim(&cp);
-+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
-+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.",
-+ filename, linenum);
-+ if (!gss_kex_names_valid(arg))
-+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad GSSAPI KexAlgorithms '%s'.",
-+ filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
-+ if (*activep && options->gss_kex_algorithms == NULL)
-+ options->gss_kex_algorithms = xstrdup(arg);
-+ break;
-+
- case sPasswordAuthentication:
- intptr = &options->password_authentication;
- goto parse_flag;
-@@ -2068,6 +2086,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
- dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssKeyEx, o->gss_keyex);
- dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStrictAcceptor, o->gss_strict_acceptor);
- dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStoreRekey, o->gss_store_rekey);
-+ dump_cfg_string(sGssKexAlgorithms, o->gss_kex_algorithms);
- #endif
- dump_cfg_fmtint(sPasswordAuthentication, o->password_authentication);
- dump_cfg_fmtint(sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
-diff -up openssh-6.6p1/servconf.h.gsskexalg openssh-6.6p1/servconf.h
---- openssh-6.6p1/servconf.h.gsskexalg 2015-08-14 16:07:48.160314777 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.6p1/servconf.h 2015-08-14 16:09:34.447112854 +0200
-@@ -116,6 +116,7 @@ typedef struct {
- int gss_cleanup_creds; /* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */
- int gss_strict_acceptor; /* If true, restrict the GSSAPI acceptor name */
- int gss_store_rekey;
-+ char *gss_kex_algorithms; /* GSSAPI kex methods to be offered by client. */
- int password_authentication; /* If true, permit password
- * authentication. */
- int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* If true, permit */
-diff -up openssh-6.6p1/sshconnect2.c.gsskexalg openssh-6.6p1/sshconnect2.c
---- openssh-6.6p1/sshconnect2.c.gsskexalg 2015-08-14 16:07:33.304343001 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.6p1/sshconnect2.c 2015-08-14 16:07:33.339342935 +0200
-@@ -179,7 +179,8 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *ho
- else
- gss_host = host;
-
-- gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host, options.gss_client_identity);
-+ gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host,
-+ options.gss_client_identity, options.gss_kex_algorithms);
- if (gss) {
- debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss);
- xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
-diff -up openssh-6.6p1/ssh-gss.h.gsskexalg openssh-6.6p1/ssh-gss.h
---- openssh-6.6p1/ssh-gss.h.gsskexalg 2015-08-14 16:07:33.278343050 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.6p1/ssh-gss.h 2015-08-14 16:07:33.340342932 +0200
-@@ -76,6 +76,11 @@ extern char **k5users_allowed_cmds;
- #define KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID "gss-group14-sha1-"
- #define KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID "gss-gex-sha1-"
-
-+#define GSS_KEX_DEFAULT_KEX \
-+ KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID "," \
-+ KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID "," \
-+ KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID
-+
- typedef struct {
- char *filename;
- char *envvar;
-@@ -147,9 +152,9 @@ int ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(Gssct
- /* In the server */
- typedef int ssh_gssapi_check_fn(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *,
- const char *);
--char *ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *, const char *);
-+char *ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *, const char *, const char *);
- char *ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *, const char *,
-- const char *);
-+ const char *, const char *);
- gss_OID ssh_gssapi_id_kex(Gssctxt *, char *, int);
- int ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt **,gss_OID, const char *,
- const char *);
-diff --git a/ssh.1 b/ssh.1
-index 4a7d1cd..c795c40 100644
---- a/ssh.1
-+++ b/ssh.1
-@@ -449,6 +449,7 @@ For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see
- .It GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
- .It GSSAPIRenewalForcesRekey
- .It GSSAPITrustDns
-+.It GSSAPIKexAlgorithms
- .It HashKnownHosts
- .It Host
- .It HostbasedAuthentication
-diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
-index c95fda6..a2af9c4 100644
---- a/ssh_config.5
-+++ b/ssh_config.5
-@@ -719,6 +719,18 @@ command line will be passed untouched to the GSSAPI library.
- The default is
- .Dq no .
- This option only applies to protocol version 2 connections using GSSAPI.
-+.It Cm GSSAPIKexAlgorithms
-+The list of key exchange algorithms that are offered for GSSAPI
-+key exchange. Possible values are
-+.Bd -literal -offset 3n
-+gss-gex-sha1-,
-+gss-group1-sha1-,
-+gss-group14-sha1-
-+.Ed
-+.Pp
-+The default is
-+.Dq gss-gex-sha1-,gss-group1-sha1-,gss-group14-sha1- .
-+This option only applies to protocol version 2 connections using GSSAPI.
- .It Cm HashKnownHosts
- Indicates that
- .Xr ssh 1
-diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
-index 5e8c6c6..4c670aa 100644
---- a/sshd_config.5
-+++ b/sshd_config.5
-@@ -545,6 +545,18 @@ Controls whether the user's GSSAPI credentials should be updated following a
- successful connection rekeying. This option can be used to accepted renewed
- or updated credentials from a compatible client. The default is
- .Dq no .
-+.It Cm GSSAPIKexAlgorithms
-+The list of key exchange algorithms that are accepted by GSSAPI
-+key exchange. Possible values are
-+.Bd -literal -offset 3n
-+gss-gex-sha1-,
-+gss-group1-sha1-,
-+gss-group14-sha1-
-+.Ed
-+.Pp
-+The default is
-+.Dq gss-gex-sha1-,gss-group1-sha1-,gss-group14-sha1- .
-+This option only applies to protocol version 2 connections using GSSAPI.
- .It Cm HostbasedAuthentication
- Specifies whether rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication together
- with successful public key client host authentication is allowed
-diff --git a/kex.h b/kex.h
-index db3dde4..17ae43b 100644
---- a/kex.h
-+++ b/kex.h
-@@ -158,6 +158,7 @@ struct Kex {
-
- int kex_names_valid(const char *);
- char *kex_alg_list(char);
-+int gss_kex_names_valid(const char *);
-
- Kex *kex_setup(char *[PROPOSAL_MAX]);
- void kex_finish(Kex *);
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-gsskex.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-gsskex.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index d1ee1ab..0000000
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-gsskex.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,2825 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in
-index 581b121..2ad26ff 100644
---- a/Makefile.in
-+++ b/Makefile.in
-@@ -77,6 +77,7 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=authfd.o authfile.o bufaux.o bufbn.o buffer.o \
- atomicio.o key.o dispatch.o kex.o mac.o uidswap.o uuencode.o misc.o \
- monitor_fdpass.o rijndael.o ssh-dss.o ssh-ecdsa.o ssh-rsa.o dh.o \
- kexdh.o kexgex.o kexdhc.o kexgexc.o bufec.o kexecdh.o kexecdhc.o \
-+ kexgssc.o \
- msg.o progressmeter.o dns.o entropy.o gss-genr.o umac.o umac128.o \
- ssh-pkcs11.o krl.o smult_curve25519_ref.o \
- kexc25519.o kexc25519c.o poly1305.o chacha.o cipher-chachapoly.o \
-@@ -96,7 +97,7 @@ SSHDOBJS=sshd.o auth-rhosts.o auth-passwd.o auth-rsa.o auth-rh-rsa.o \
- auth2-none.o auth2-passwd.o auth2-pubkey.o \
- monitor_mm.o monitor.o monitor_wrap.o kexdhs.o kexgexs.o kexecdhs.o \
- kexc25519s.o auth-krb5.o \
-- auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o \
-+ auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o kexgsss.o \
- loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o md5crypt.o \
- sftp-server.o sftp-common.o \
- roaming_common.o roaming_serv.o \
-diff --git a/auth2-gss.c b/auth2-gss.c
-index 4756dd7..ad65059 100644
---- a/auth2-gss.c
-+++ b/auth2-gss.c
-@@ -52,6 +52,40 @@ static void input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt);
- static void input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt);
- static void input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, void *);
-
-+/*
-+ * The 'gssapi_keyex' userauth mechanism.
-+ */
-+static int
-+userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt)
-+{
-+ int authenticated = 0;
-+ Buffer b;
-+ gss_buffer_desc mic, gssbuf;
-+ u_int len;
-+
-+ mic.value = packet_get_string(&len);
-+ mic.length = len;
-+
-+ packet_check_eom();
-+
-+ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->user, authctxt->service,
-+ "gssapi-keyex");
-+
-+ gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b);
-+ gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b);
-+
-+ /* gss_kex_context is NULL with privsep, so we can't check it here */
-+ if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gss_kex_context,
-+ &gssbuf, &mic))))
-+ authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
-+ authctxt->pw));
-+
-+ buffer_free(&b);
-+ free(mic.value);
-+
-+ return (authenticated);
-+}
-+
- /*
- * We only support those mechanisms that we know about (ie ones that we know
- * how to check local user kuserok and the like)
-@@ -235,7 +269,8 @@ input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
-
- packet_check_eom();
-
-- authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user));
-+ authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
-+ authctxt->pw));
-
- authctxt->postponed = 0;
- dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
-@@ -277,7 +312,8 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
- gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b);
-
- if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gssctxt, &gssbuf, &mic))))
-- authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user));
-+ authenticated =
-+ PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw));
- else
- logit("GSSAPI MIC check failed");
-
-@@ -294,6 +330,12 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
- userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, "gssapi-with-mic", NULL);
- }
-
-+Authmethod method_gsskeyex = {
-+ "gssapi-keyex",
-+ userauth_gsskeyex,
-+ &options.gss_authentication
-+};
-+
- Authmethod method_gssapi = {
- "gssapi-with-mic",
- userauth_gssapi,
-diff --git a/auth2.c b/auth2.c
-index 5f4f26f..0f52b68 100644
---- a/auth2.c
-+++ b/auth2.c
-@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@ extern Authmethod method_passwd;
- extern Authmethod method_kbdint;
- extern Authmethod method_hostbased;
- #ifdef GSSAPI
-+extern Authmethod method_gsskeyex;
- extern Authmethod method_gssapi;
- #endif
-
-@@ -76,6 +77,7 @@ Authmethod *authmethods[] = {
- &method_none,
- &method_pubkey,
- #ifdef GSSAPI
-+ &method_gsskeyex,
- &method_gssapi,
- #endif
- &method_passwd,
-diff --git a/clientloop.c b/clientloop.c
-index 59ad3a2..9c60108 100644
---- a/clientloop.c
-+++ b/clientloop.c
-@@ -111,6 +111,10 @@
- #include "msg.h"
- #include "roaming.h"
-
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+#include "ssh-gss.h"
-+#endif
-+
- /* import options */
- extern Options options;
-
-@@ -1608,6 +1612,15 @@ client_loop(int have_pty, int escape_char_arg, int ssh2_chan_id)
- /* Do channel operations unless rekeying in progress. */
- if (!rekeying) {
- channel_after_select(readset, writeset);
-+
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+ if (options.gss_renewal_rekey &&
-+ ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)) {
-+ debug("credentials updated - forcing rekey");
-+ need_rekeying = 1;
-+ }
-+#endif
-+
- if (need_rekeying || packet_need_rekeying()) {
- debug("need rekeying");
- xxx_kex->done = 0;
-diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
-index 74e77db..9bde04e 100644
---- a/configure.ac
-+++ b/configure.ac
-@@ -584,6 +584,30 @@ main() { if (NSVersionOfRunTimeLibrary("System") >= (60 << 16))
- [Use tunnel device compatibility to OpenBSD])
- AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF], [1],
- [Prepend the address family to IP tunnel traffic])
-+ AC_MSG_CHECKING(if we have the Security Authorization Session API)
-+ AC_TRY_COMPILE([#include <Security/AuthSession.h>],
-+ [SessionCreate(0, 0);],
-+ [ac_cv_use_security_session_api="yes"
-+ AC_DEFINE(USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API, 1,
-+ [platform has the Security Authorization Session API])
-+ LIBS="$LIBS -framework Security"
-+ AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)],
-+ [ac_cv_use_security_session_api="no"
-+ AC_MSG_RESULT(no)])
-+ AC_MSG_CHECKING(if we have an in-memory credentials cache)
-+ AC_TRY_COMPILE(
-+ [#include <Kerberos/Kerberos.h>],
-+ [cc_context_t c;
-+ (void) cc_initialize (&c, 0, NULL, NULL);],
-+ [AC_DEFINE(USE_CCAPI, 1,
-+ [platform uses an in-memory credentials cache])
-+ LIBS="$LIBS -framework Security"
-+ AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)
-+ if test "x$ac_cv_use_security_session_api" = "xno"; then
-+ AC_MSG_ERROR(*** Need a security framework to use the credentials cache API ***)
-+ fi],
-+ [AC_MSG_RESULT(no)]
-+ )
- m4_pattern_allow([AU_IPv])
- AC_CHECK_DECL([AU_IPv4], [],
- AC_DEFINE([AU_IPv4], [0], [System only supports IPv4 audit records])
-diff --git a/gss-genr.c b/gss-genr.c
-index b39281b..a3a2289 100644
---- a/gss-genr.c
-+++ b/gss-genr.c
-@@ -39,12 +39,167 @@
- #include "buffer.h"
- #include "log.h"
- #include "ssh2.h"
-+#include "cipher.h"
-+#include "key.h"
-+#include "kex.h"
-+#include <openssl/evp.h>
-
- #include "ssh-gss.h"
-
- extern u_char *session_id2;
- extern u_int session_id2_len;
-
-+typedef struct {
-+ char *encoded;
-+ gss_OID oid;
-+} ssh_gss_kex_mapping;
-+
-+/*
-+ * XXX - It would be nice to find a more elegant way of handling the
-+ * XXX passing of the key exchange context to the userauth routines
-+ */
-+
-+Gssctxt *gss_kex_context = NULL;
-+
-+static ssh_gss_kex_mapping *gss_enc2oid = NULL;
-+
-+int
-+ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok() {
-+ return (gss_enc2oid != NULL);
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Return a list of the gss-group1-sha1 mechanisms supported by this program
-+ *
-+ * We test mechanisms to ensure that we can use them, to avoid starting
-+ * a key exchange with a bad mechanism
-+ */
-+
-+char *
-+ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *host, const char *client) {
-+ gss_OID_set gss_supported;
-+ OM_uint32 min_status;
-+
-+ if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &gss_supported)))
-+ return NULL;
-+
-+ return(ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_supported, ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism,
-+ host, client));
-+}
-+
-+char *
-+ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set gss_supported, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *check,
-+ const char *host, const char *client) {
-+ Buffer buf;
-+ size_t i;
-+ int oidpos, enclen;
-+ char *mechs, *encoded;
-+ u_char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-+ char deroid[2];
-+ const EVP_MD *evp_md = EVP_md5();
-+ EVP_MD_CTX md;
-+
-+ if (gss_enc2oid != NULL) {
-+ for (i = 0; gss_enc2oid[i].encoded != NULL; i++)
-+ free(gss_enc2oid[i].encoded);
-+ free(gss_enc2oid);
-+ }
-+
-+ gss_enc2oid = xmalloc(sizeof(ssh_gss_kex_mapping) *
-+ (gss_supported->count + 1));
-+
-+ buffer_init(&buf);
-+
-+ oidpos = 0;
-+ for (i = 0; i < gss_supported->count; i++) {
-+ if (gss_supported->elements[i].length < 128 &&
-+ (*check)(NULL, &(gss_supported->elements[i]), host, client)) {
-+
-+ deroid[0] = SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE;
-+ deroid[1] = gss_supported->elements[i].length;
-+
-+ EVP_DigestInit(&md, evp_md);
-+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, deroid, 2);
-+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md,
-+ gss_supported->elements[i].elements,
-+ gss_supported->elements[i].length);
-+ EVP_DigestFinal(&md, digest, NULL);
-+
-+ encoded = xmalloc(EVP_MD_size(evp_md) * 2);
-+ enclen = __b64_ntop(digest, EVP_MD_size(evp_md),
-+ encoded, EVP_MD_size(evp_md) * 2);
-+
-+ if (oidpos != 0)
-+ buffer_put_char(&buf, ',');
-+
-+ buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID,
-+ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID) - 1);
-+ buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen);
-+ buffer_put_char(&buf, ',');
-+ buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID,
-+ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID) - 1);
-+ buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen);
-+ buffer_put_char(&buf, ',');
-+ buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID,
-+ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID) - 1);
-+ buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen);
-+
-+ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].oid = &(gss_supported->elements[i]);
-+ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].encoded = encoded;
-+ oidpos++;
-+ }
-+ }
-+ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].oid = NULL;
-+ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].encoded = NULL;
-+
-+ buffer_put_char(&buf, '\0');
-+
-+ mechs = xmalloc(buffer_len(&buf));
-+ buffer_get(&buf, mechs, buffer_len(&buf));
-+ buffer_free(&buf);
-+
-+ if (strlen(mechs) == 0) {
-+ free(mechs);
-+ mechs = NULL;
-+ }
-+
-+ return (mechs);
-+}
-+
-+gss_OID
-+ssh_gssapi_id_kex(Gssctxt *ctx, char *name, int kex_type) {
-+ int i = 0;
-+
-+ switch (kex_type) {
-+ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
-+ if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID))
-+ return GSS_C_NO_OID;
-+ name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID) - 1;
-+ break;
-+ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
-+ if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID))
-+ return GSS_C_NO_OID;
-+ name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID) - 1;
-+ break;
-+ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
-+ if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID))
-+ return GSS_C_NO_OID;
-+ name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID) - 1;
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ return GSS_C_NO_OID;
-+ }
-+
-+ while (gss_enc2oid[i].encoded != NULL &&
-+ strcmp(name, gss_enc2oid[i].encoded) != 0)
-+ i++;
-+
-+ if (gss_enc2oid[i].oid != NULL && ctx != NULL)
-+ ssh_gssapi_set_oid(ctx, gss_enc2oid[i].oid);
-+
-+ return gss_enc2oid[i].oid;
-+}
-+
- /* Check that the OID in a data stream matches that in the context */
- int
- ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *ctx, void *data, size_t len)
-@@ -197,7 +352,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(Gssctxt *ctx, int deleg_creds, gss_buffer_desc *recv_tok,
- }
-
- ctx->major = gss_init_sec_context(&ctx->minor,
-- GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, &ctx->context, ctx->name, ctx->oid,
-+ ctx->client_creds, &ctx->context, ctx->name, ctx->oid,
- GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG | GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG | deleg_flag,
- 0, NULL, recv_tok, NULL, send_tok, flags, NULL);
-
-@@ -227,8 +382,42 @@ ssh_gssapi_import_name(Gssctxt *ctx, const char *host)
- }
-
- OM_uint32
-+ssh_gssapi_client_identity(Gssctxt *ctx, const char *name)
-+{
-+ gss_buffer_desc gssbuf;
-+ gss_name_t gssname;
-+ OM_uint32 status;
-+ gss_OID_set oidset;
-+
-+ gssbuf.value = (void *) name;
-+ gssbuf.length = strlen(gssbuf.value);
-+
-+ gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
-+ gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset);
-+
-+ ctx->major = gss_import_name(&ctx->minor, &gssbuf,
-+ GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME, &gssname);
-+
-+ if (!ctx->major)
-+ ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor,
-+ gssname, 0, oidset, GSS_C_INITIATE,
-+ &ctx->client_creds, NULL, NULL);
-+
-+ gss_release_name(&status, &gssname);
-+ gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
-+
-+ if (ctx->major)
-+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
-+
-+ return(ctx->major);
-+}
-+
-+OM_uint32
- ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t buffer, gss_buffer_t hash)
- {
-+ if (ctx == NULL)
-+ return -1;
-+
- if ((ctx->major = gss_get_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
- GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, buffer, hash)))
- ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
-@@ -236,6 +425,19 @@ ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t buffer, gss_buffer_t hash)
- return (ctx->major);
- }
-
-+/* Priviledged when used by server */
-+OM_uint32
-+ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic)
-+{
-+ if (ctx == NULL)
-+ return -1;
-+
-+ ctx->major = gss_verify_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
-+ gssbuf, gssmic, NULL);
-+
-+ return (ctx->major);
-+}
-+
- void
- ssh_gssapi_buildmic(Buffer *b, const char *user, const char *service,
- const char *context)
-@@ -249,11 +451,16 @@ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(Buffer *b, const char *user, const char *service,
- }
-
- int
--ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host)
-+ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host,
-+ const char *client)
- {
- gss_buffer_desc token = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
- OM_uint32 major, minor;
- gss_OID_desc spnego_oid = {6, (void *)"\x2B\x06\x01\x05\x05\x02"};
-+ Gssctxt *intctx = NULL;
-+
-+ if (ctx == NULL)
-+ ctx = &intctx;
-
- /* RFC 4462 says we MUST NOT do SPNEGO */
- if (oid->length == spnego_oid.length &&
-@@ -263,6 +470,10 @@ ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host)
- ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(ctx);
- ssh_gssapi_set_oid(*ctx, oid);
- major = ssh_gssapi_import_name(*ctx, host);
-+
-+ if (!GSS_ERROR(major) && client)
-+ major = ssh_gssapi_client_identity(*ctx, client);
-+
- if (!GSS_ERROR(major)) {
- major = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(*ctx, 0, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER, &token,
- NULL);
-@@ -272,10 +483,67 @@ ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host)
- GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
- }
-
-- if (GSS_ERROR(major))
-+ if (GSS_ERROR(major) || intctx != NULL)
- ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(ctx);
-
- return (!GSS_ERROR(major));
- }
-
-+int
-+ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(Gssctxt *ctxt) {
-+ static gss_name_t saved_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
-+ static OM_uint32 saved_lifetime = 0;
-+ static gss_OID saved_mech = GSS_C_NO_OID;
-+ static gss_name_t name;
-+ static OM_uint32 last_call = 0;
-+ OM_uint32 lifetime, now, major, minor;
-+ int equal;
-+ gss_cred_usage_t usage = GSS_C_INITIATE;
-+
-+ now = time(NULL);
-+
-+ if (ctxt) {
-+ debug("Rekey has happened - updating saved versions");
-+
-+ if (saved_name != GSS_C_NO_NAME)
-+ gss_release_name(&minor, &saved_name);
-+
-+ major = gss_inquire_cred(&minor, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL,
-+ &saved_name, &saved_lifetime, NULL, NULL);
-+
-+ if (!GSS_ERROR(major)) {
-+ saved_mech = ctxt->oid;
-+ saved_lifetime+= now;
-+ } else {
-+ /* Handle the error */
-+ }
-+ return 0;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (now - last_call < 10)
-+ return 0;
-+
-+ last_call = now;
-+
-+ if (saved_mech == GSS_C_NO_OID)
-+ return 0;
-+
-+ major = gss_inquire_cred(&minor, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL,
-+ &name, &lifetime, NULL, NULL);
-+ if (major == GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED)
-+ return 0;
-+ else if (GSS_ERROR(major))
-+ return 0;
-+
-+ major = gss_compare_name(&minor, saved_name, name, &equal);
-+ gss_release_name(&minor, &name);
-+ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
-+ return 0;
-+
-+ if (equal && (saved_lifetime < lifetime + now - 10))
-+ return 1;
-+
-+ return 0;
-+}
-+
- #endif /* GSSAPI */
-diff --git a/gss-serv-krb5.c b/gss-serv-krb5.c
-index 759fa10..42de994 100644
---- a/gss-serv-krb5.c
-+++ b/gss-serv-krb5.c
-@@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client)
- krb5_error_code problem;
- krb5_principal princ;
- OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
-- int len;
-+ const char *new_ccname, *new_cctype;
- const char *errmsg;
-
- if (client->creds == NULL) {
-@@ -180,11 +180,26 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client)
- return;
- }
-
-- client->store.filename = xstrdup(krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache));
-+ new_cctype = krb5_cc_get_type(krb_context, ccache);
-+ new_ccname = krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache);
-+
- client->store.envvar = "KRB5CCNAME";
-- len = strlen(client->store.filename) + 6;
-- client->store.envval = xmalloc(len);
-- snprintf(client->store.envval, len, "FILE:%s", client->store.filename);
-+#ifdef USE_CCAPI
-+ xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "API:%s", new_ccname);
-+ client->store.filename = NULL;
-+#else
-+ if (new_ccname[0] == ':')
-+ new_ccname++;
-+ xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "%s:%s", new_cctype, new_ccname);
-+ if (strcmp(new_cctype, "DIR") == 0) {
-+ char *p;
-+ p = strrchr(client->store.envval, '/');
-+ if (p)
-+ *p = '\0';
-+ }
-+ if ((strcmp(new_cctype, "FILE") == 0) || (strcmp(new_cctype, "DIR") == 0))
-+ client->store.filename = xstrdup(new_ccname);
-+#endif
-
- #ifdef USE_PAM
- if (options.use_pam)
-@@ -193,9 +208,76 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client)
-
- krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
-
-+ client->store.data = krb_context;
-+
- return;
- }
-
-+int
-+ssh_gssapi_krb5_updatecreds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store,
-+ ssh_gssapi_client *client)
-+{
-+ krb5_ccache ccache = NULL;
-+ krb5_principal principal = NULL;
-+ char *name = NULL;
-+ krb5_error_code problem;
-+ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
-+
-+ if ((problem = krb5_cc_resolve(krb_context, store->envval, &ccache))) {
-+ logit("krb5_cc_resolve(): %.100s",
-+ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
-+ return 0;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* Find out who the principal in this cache is */
-+ if ((problem = krb5_cc_get_principal(krb_context, ccache,
-+ &principal))) {
-+ logit("krb5_cc_get_principal(): %.100s",
-+ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
-+ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
-+ return 0;
-+ }
-+
-+ if ((problem = krb5_unparse_name(krb_context, principal, &name))) {
-+ logit("krb5_unparse_name(): %.100s",
-+ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
-+ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
-+ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
-+ return 0;
-+ }
-+
-+
-+ if (strcmp(name,client->exportedname.value)!=0) {
-+ debug("Name in local credentials cache differs. Not storing");
-+ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
-+ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
-+ krb5_free_unparsed_name(krb_context, name);
-+ return 0;
-+ }
-+ krb5_free_unparsed_name(krb_context, name);
-+
-+ /* Name matches, so lets get on with it! */
-+
-+ if ((problem = krb5_cc_initialize(krb_context, ccache, principal))) {
-+ logit("krb5_cc_initialize(): %.100s",
-+ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
-+ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
-+ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
-+ return 0;
-+ }
-+
-+ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
-+
-+ if ((maj_status = gss_krb5_copy_ccache(&min_status, client->creds,
-+ ccache))) {
-+ logit("gss_krb5_copy_ccache() failed. Sorry!");
-+ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
-+ return 0;
-+ }
-+
-+ return 1;
-+}
-+
- ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech = {
- "toWM5Slw5Ew8Mqkay+al2g==",
- "Kerberos",
-@@ -203,7 +285,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech = {
- NULL,
- &ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok,
- NULL,
-- &ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds
-+ &ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds,
-+ &ssh_gssapi_krb5_updatecreds
- };
-
- #endif /* KRB5 */
-diff --git a/gss-serv.c b/gss-serv.c
-index e61b37b..14f540e 100644
---- a/gss-serv.c
-+++ b/gss-serv.c
-@@ -45,15 +45,20 @@
- #include "channels.h"
- #include "session.h"
- #include "misc.h"
-+#include "servconf.h"
-+#include "uidswap.h"
-
- #include "ssh-gss.h"
-+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
-+
-+extern ServerOptions options;
-
- static ssh_gssapi_client gssapi_client =
- { GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER,
-- GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}};
-+ GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, GSS_C_NO_NAME, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL}, 0, 0};
-
- ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_null_mech =
-- { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL};
-+ { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL};
-
- #ifdef KRB5
- extern ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech;
-@@ -100,25 +105,32 @@ ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred(Gssctxt *ctx)
- char lname[MAXHOSTNAMELEN];
- gss_OID_set oidset;
-
-- gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
-- gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset);
-+ if (options.gss_strict_acceptor) {
-+ gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
-+ gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset);
-
-- if (gethostname(lname, MAXHOSTNAMELEN)) {
-- gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
-- return (-1);
-- }
-+ if (gethostname(lname, MAXHOSTNAMELEN)) {
-+ gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
-+ return (-1);
-+ }
-+
-+ if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctx, lname))) {
-+ gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
-+ return (ctx->major);
-+ }
-+
-+ if ((ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor,
-+ ctx->name, 0, oidset, GSS_C_ACCEPT, &ctx->creds,
-+ NULL, NULL)))
-+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
-
-- if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctx, lname))) {
- gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
- return (ctx->major);
-+ } else {
-+ ctx->name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
-+ ctx->creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
- }
--
-- if ((ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor,
-- ctx->name, 0, oidset, GSS_C_ACCEPT, &ctx->creds, NULL, NULL)))
-- ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
--
-- gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
-- return (ctx->major);
-+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
- }
-
- /* Privileged */
-@@ -133,6 +145,29 @@ ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid)
- }
-
- /* Unprivileged */
-+char *
-+ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms() {
-+ gss_OID_set supported;
-+
-+ ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(&supported);
-+ return (ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(supported, &ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech,
-+ NULL, NULL));
-+}
-+
-+/* Unprivileged */
-+int
-+ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt **dum, gss_OID oid, const char *data,
-+ const char *dummy) {
-+ Gssctxt *ctx = NULL;
-+ int res;
-+
-+ res = !GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctx, oid)));
-+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctx);
-+
-+ return (res);
-+}
-+
-+/* Unprivileged */
- void
- ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *oidset)
- {
-@@ -142,7 +177,9 @@ ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *oidset)
- gss_OID_set supported;
-
- gss_create_empty_oid_set(&min_status, oidset);
-- gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &supported);
-+
-+ if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &supported)))
-+ return;
-
- while (supported_mechs[i]->name != NULL) {
- if (GSS_ERROR(gss_test_oid_set_member(&min_status,
-@@ -268,8 +305,48 @@ OM_uint32
- ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
- {
- int i = 0;
-+ int equal = 0;
-+ gss_name_t new_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
-+ gss_buffer_desc ename = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
-+
-+ if (options.gss_store_rekey && client->used && ctx->client_creds) {
-+ if (client->mech->oid.length != ctx->oid->length ||
-+ (memcmp(client->mech->oid.elements,
-+ ctx->oid->elements, ctx->oid->length) !=0)) {
-+ debug("Rekeyed credentials have different mechanism");
-+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
-+ }
-+
-+ if ((ctx->major = gss_inquire_cred_by_mech(&ctx->minor,
-+ ctx->client_creds, ctx->oid, &new_name,
-+ NULL, NULL, NULL))) {
-+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
-+ return (ctx->major);
-+ }
-+
-+ ctx->major = gss_compare_name(&ctx->minor, client->name,
-+ new_name, &equal);
-
-- gss_buffer_desc ename;
-+ if (GSS_ERROR(ctx->major)) {
-+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
-+ return (ctx->major);
-+ }
-+
-+ if (!equal) {
-+ debug("Rekeyed credentials have different name");
-+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
-+ }
-+
-+ debug("Marking rekeyed credentials for export");
-+
-+ gss_release_name(&ctx->minor, &client->name);
-+ gss_release_cred(&ctx->minor, &client->creds);
-+ client->name = new_name;
-+ client->creds = ctx->client_creds;
-+ ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
-+ client->updated = 1;
-+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
-+ }
-
- client->mech = NULL;
-
-@@ -284,6 +361,13 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
- if (client->mech == NULL)
- return GSS_S_FAILURE;
-
-+ if (ctx->client_creds &&
-+ (ctx->major = gss_inquire_cred_by_mech(&ctx->minor,
-+ ctx->client_creds, ctx->oid, &client->name, NULL, NULL, NULL))) {
-+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
-+ return (ctx->major);
-+ }
-+
- if ((ctx->major = gss_display_name(&ctx->minor, ctx->client,
- &client->displayname, NULL))) {
- ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
-@@ -301,6 +385,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
- return (ctx->major);
- }
-
-+ gss_release_buffer(&ctx->minor, &ename);
-+
- /* We can't copy this structure, so we just move the pointer to it */
- client->creds = ctx->client_creds;
- ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
-@@ -311,11 +397,20 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
- void
- ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void)
- {
-- if (gssapi_client.store.filename != NULL) {
-- /* Unlink probably isn't sufficient */
-- debug("removing gssapi cred file\"%s\"",
-- gssapi_client.store.filename);
-- unlink(gssapi_client.store.filename);
-+ krb5_ccache ccache = NULL;
-+ krb5_error_code problem;
-+
-+ if (gssapi_client.store.data != NULL) {
-+ if ((problem = krb5_cc_resolve(gssapi_client.store.data, gssapi_client.store.envval, &ccache))) {
-+ debug("%s: krb5_cc_resolve(): %.100s", __func__,
-+ krb5_get_err_text(gssapi_client.store.data, problem));
-+ } else if ((problem = krb5_cc_destroy(gssapi_client.store.data, ccache))) {
-+ debug("%s: krb5_cc_resolve(): %.100s", __func__,
-+ krb5_get_err_text(gssapi_client.store.data, problem));
-+ } else {
-+ krb5_free_context(gssapi_client.store.data);
-+ gssapi_client.store.data = NULL;
-+ }
- }
- }
-
-@@ -348,7 +443,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***envp, u_int *envsizep)
-
- /* Privileged */
- int
--ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
-+ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw)
- {
- OM_uint32 lmin;
-
-@@ -358,9 +453,11 @@ ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
- return 0;
- }
- if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->userok)
-- if ((*gssapi_client.mech->userok)(&gssapi_client, user))
-+ if ((*gssapi_client.mech->userok)(&gssapi_client, user)) {
-+ gssapi_client.used = 1;
-+ gssapi_client.store.owner = pw;
- return 1;
-- else {
-+ } else {
- /* Destroy delegated credentials if userok fails */
- gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.displayname);
- gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.exportedname);
-@@ -374,14 +471,90 @@ ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
- return (0);
- }
-
--/* Privileged */
--OM_uint32
--ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic)
-+/* These bits are only used for rekeying. The unpriviledged child is running
-+ * as the user, the monitor is root.
-+ *
-+ * In the child, we want to :
-+ * *) Ask the monitor to store our credentials into the store we specify
-+ * *) If it succeeds, maybe do a PAM update
-+ */
-+
-+/* Stuff for PAM */
-+
-+#ifdef USE_PAM
-+static int ssh_gssapi_simple_conv(int n, const struct pam_message **msg,
-+ struct pam_response **resp, void *data)
- {
-- ctx->major = gss_verify_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
-- gssbuf, gssmic, NULL);
-+ return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
-+}
-+#endif
-
-- return (ctx->major);
-+void
-+ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds() {
-+ int ok;
-+ int ret;
-+#ifdef USE_PAM
-+ pam_handle_t *pamh = NULL;
-+ struct pam_conv pamconv = {ssh_gssapi_simple_conv, NULL};
-+ char *envstr;
-+#endif
-+
-+ if (gssapi_client.store.filename == NULL &&
-+ gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL &&
-+ gssapi_client.store.envvar == NULL)
-+ return;
-+
-+ ok = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&gssapi_client.store));
-+
-+ if (!ok)
-+ return;
-+
-+ debug("Rekeyed credentials stored successfully");
-+
-+ /* Actually managing to play with the ssh pam stack from here will
-+ * be next to impossible. In any case, we may want different options
-+ * for rekeying. So, use our own :)
-+ */
-+#ifdef USE_PAM
-+ if (!use_privsep) {
-+ debug("Not even going to try and do PAM with privsep disabled");
-+ return;
-+ }
-+
-+ ret = pam_start("sshd-rekey", gssapi_client.store.owner->pw_name,
-+ &pamconv, &pamh);
-+ if (ret)
-+ return;
-+
-+ xasprintf(&envstr, "%s=%s", gssapi_client.store.envvar,
-+ gssapi_client.store.envval);
-+
-+ ret = pam_putenv(pamh, envstr);
-+ if (!ret)
-+ pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_REINITIALIZE_CRED);
-+ pam_end(pamh, PAM_SUCCESS);
-+#endif
-+}
-+
-+int
-+ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store) {
-+ int ok = 0;
-+
-+ /* Check we've got credentials to store */
-+ if (!gssapi_client.updated)
-+ return 0;
-+
-+ gssapi_client.updated = 0;
-+
-+ temporarily_use_uid(gssapi_client.store.owner);
-+ if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->updatecreds)
-+ ok = (*gssapi_client.mech->updatecreds)(store, &gssapi_client);
-+ else
-+ debug("No update function for this mechanism");
-+
-+ restore_uid();
-+
-+ return ok;
- }
-
- #endif
-diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c
-index 74e2b86..bce2ab8 100644
---- a/kex.c
-+++ b/kex.c
-@@ -51,6 +51,10 @@
- #include "roaming.h"
- #include "digest.h"
-
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+#include "ssh-gss.h"
-+#endif
-+
- #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L
- # if defined(HAVE_EVP_SHA256)
- # define evp_ssh_sha256 EVP_sha256
-@@ -90,6 +94,11 @@ static const struct kexalg kexalgs[] = {
- #ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256
- { KEX_CURVE25519_SHA256, KEX_C25519_SHA256, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 },
- #endif
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+ { KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
-+ { KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
-+ { KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
-+#endif
- { NULL, -1, -1, -1},
- };
-
-@@ -119,6 +128,12 @@ kex_alg_by_name(const char *name)
- for (k = kexalgs; k->name != NULL; k++) {
- if (strcmp(k->name, name) == 0)
- return k;
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+ if (strncmp(name, "gss-", 4) == 0) {
-+ if (strncmp(k->name, name, strlen(k->name)) == 0)
-+ return k;
-+ }
-+#endif
- }
- return NULL;
- }
-diff --git a/kex.h b/kex.h
-index c85680e..313bb51 100644
---- a/kex.h
-+++ b/kex.h
-@@ -76,6 +76,11 @@ enum kex_exchange {
- KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256,
- KEX_ECDH_SHA2,
- KEX_C25519_SHA256,
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+ KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1,
-+ KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1,
-+ KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1,
-+#endif
- KEX_MAX
- };
-
-@@ -135,6 +140,12 @@ struct Kex {
- int flags;
- int hash_alg;
- int ec_nid;
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+ int gss_deleg_creds;
-+ int gss_trust_dns;
-+ char *gss_host;
-+ char *gss_client;
-+#endif
- char *client_version_string;
- char *server_version_string;
- int (*verify_host_key)(Key *);
-@@ -166,6 +177,10 @@ void kexecdh_client(Kex *);
- void kexecdh_server(Kex *);
- void kexc25519_client(Kex *);
- void kexc25519_server(Kex *);
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+void kexgss_client(Kex *);
-+void kexgss_server(Kex *);
-+#endif
-
- void
- kex_dh_hash(char *, char *, char *, int, char *, int, u_char *, int,
-diff --git a/kexgssc.c b/kexgssc.c
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..e90b567
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/kexgssc.c
-@@ -0,0 +1,334 @@
-+/*
-+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
-+ *
-+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-+ * are met:
-+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
-+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
-+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
-+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
-+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
-+ *
-+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
-+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
-+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
-+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
-+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
-+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
-+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
-+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
-+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
-+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
-+ */
-+
-+#include "includes.h"
-+
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+
-+#include "includes.h"
-+
-+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
-+#include <openssl/bn.h>
-+
-+#include <string.h>
-+
-+#include "xmalloc.h"
-+#include "buffer.h"
-+#include "ssh2.h"
-+#include "key.h"
-+#include "cipher.h"
-+#include "kex.h"
-+#include "log.h"
-+#include "packet.h"
-+#include "dh.h"
-+
-+#include "ssh-gss.h"
-+
-+void
-+kexgss_client(Kex *kex) {
-+ gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
-+ gss_buffer_desc recv_tok, gssbuf, msg_tok, *token_ptr;
-+ Gssctxt *ctxt;
-+ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status, ret_flags;
-+ u_int klen, kout, slen = 0, hashlen, strlen;
-+ DH *dh;
-+ BIGNUM *dh_server_pub = NULL;
-+ BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL;
-+ BIGNUM *p = NULL;
-+ BIGNUM *g = NULL;
-+ u_char *kbuf, *hash;
-+ u_char *serverhostkey = NULL;
-+ u_char *empty = "";
-+ char *msg;
-+ char *lang;
-+ int type = 0;
-+ int first = 1;
-+ int nbits = 0, min = DH_GRP_MIN, max = DH_GRP_MAX;
-+
-+ /* Initialise our GSSAPI world */
-+ ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(&ctxt);
-+ if (ssh_gssapi_id_kex(ctxt, kex->name, kex->kex_type)
-+ == GSS_C_NO_OID)
-+ fatal("Couldn't identify host exchange");
-+
-+ if (ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctxt, kex->gss_host))
-+ fatal("Couldn't import hostname");
-+
-+ if (kex->gss_client &&
-+ ssh_gssapi_client_identity(ctxt, kex->gss_client))
-+ fatal("Couldn't acquire client credentials");
-+
-+ switch (kex->kex_type) {
-+ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
-+ dh = dh_new_group1();
-+ break;
-+ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
-+ dh = dh_new_group14();
-+ break;
-+ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
-+ debug("Doing group exchange\n");
-+ nbits = dh_estimate(kex->we_need * 8);
-+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ);
-+ packet_put_int(min);
-+ packet_put_int(nbits);
-+ packet_put_int(max);
-+
-+ packet_send();
-+
-+ packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP);
-+
-+ if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL)
-+ fatal("BN_new() failed");
-+ packet_get_bignum2(p);
-+ if ((g = BN_new()) == NULL)
-+ fatal("BN_new() failed");
-+ packet_get_bignum2(g);
-+ packet_check_eom();
-+
-+ if (BN_num_bits(p) < min || BN_num_bits(p) > max)
-+ fatal("GSSGRP_GEX group out of range: %d !< %d !< %d",
-+ min, BN_num_bits(p), max);
-+
-+ dh = dh_new_group(g, p);
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type);
-+ }
-+
-+ /* Step 1 - e is dh->pub_key */
-+ dh_gen_key(dh, kex->we_need * 8);
-+
-+ /* This is f, we initialise it now to make life easier */
-+ dh_server_pub = BN_new();
-+ if (dh_server_pub == NULL)
-+ fatal("dh_server_pub == NULL");
-+
-+ token_ptr = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER;
-+
-+ do {
-+ debug("Calling gss_init_sec_context");
-+
-+ maj_status = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(ctxt,
-+ kex->gss_deleg_creds, token_ptr, &send_tok,
-+ &ret_flags);
-+
-+ if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) {
-+ if (send_tok.length != 0) {
-+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
-+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value,
-+ send_tok.length);
-+ }
-+ fatal("gss_init_context failed");
-+ }
-+
-+ /* If we've got an old receive buffer get rid of it */
-+ if (token_ptr != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER)
-+ free(recv_tok.value);
-+
-+ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
-+ /* If mutual state flag is not true, kex fails */
-+ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG))
-+ fatal("Mutual authentication failed");
-+
-+ /* If integ avail flag is not true kex fails */
-+ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))
-+ fatal("Integrity check failed");
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * If we have data to send, then the last message that we
-+ * received cannot have been a 'complete'.
-+ */
-+ if (send_tok.length != 0) {
-+ if (first) {
-+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT);
-+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value,
-+ send_tok.length);
-+ packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key);
-+ first = 0;
-+ } else {
-+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
-+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value,
-+ send_tok.length);
-+ }
-+ packet_send();
-+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
-+
-+ /* If we've sent them data, they should reply */
-+ do {
-+ type = packet_read();
-+ if (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY) {
-+ debug("Received KEXGSS_HOSTKEY");
-+ if (serverhostkey)
-+ fatal("Server host key received more than once");
-+ serverhostkey =
-+ packet_get_string(&slen);
-+ }
-+ } while (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY);
-+
-+ switch (type) {
-+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE:
-+ debug("Received GSSAPI_CONTINUE");
-+ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE)
-+ fatal("GSSAPI Continue received from server when complete");
-+ recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&strlen);
-+ recv_tok.length = strlen;
-+ break;
-+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE:
-+ debug("Received GSSAPI_COMPLETE");
-+ packet_get_bignum2(dh_server_pub);
-+ msg_tok.value = packet_get_string(&strlen);
-+ msg_tok.length = strlen;
-+
-+ /* Is there a token included? */
-+ if (packet_get_char()) {
-+ recv_tok.value=
-+ packet_get_string(&strlen);
-+ recv_tok.length = strlen;
-+ /* If we're already complete - protocol error */
-+ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE)
-+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: received token when complete");
-+ } else {
-+ /* No token included */
-+ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
-+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: did not receive final token");
-+ }
-+ break;
-+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR:
-+ debug("Received Error");
-+ maj_status = packet_get_int();
-+ min_status = packet_get_int();
-+ msg = packet_get_string(NULL);
-+ lang = packet_get_string(NULL);
-+ fatal("GSSAPI Error: \n%.400s",msg);
-+ default:
-+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d",
-+ type);
-+ }
-+ token_ptr = &recv_tok;
-+ } else {
-+ /* No data, and not complete */
-+ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
-+ fatal("Not complete, and no token output");
-+ }
-+ } while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * We _must_ have received a COMPLETE message in reply from the
-+ * server, which will have set dh_server_pub and msg_tok
-+ */
-+
-+ if (type != SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE)
-+ fatal("Didn't receive a SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE when I expected it");
-+
-+ /* Check f in range [1, p-1] */
-+ if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh_server_pub))
-+ packet_disconnect("bad server public DH value");
-+
-+ /* compute K=f^x mod p */
-+ klen = DH_size(dh);
-+ kbuf = xmalloc(klen);
-+ kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_server_pub, dh);
-+ if ((int)kout < 0)
-+ fatal("DH_compute_key: failed");
-+
-+ shared_secret = BN_new();
-+ if (shared_secret == NULL)
-+ fatal("kexgss_client: BN_new failed");
-+
-+ if (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL)
-+ fatal("kexdh_client: BN_bin2bn failed");
-+
-+ memset(kbuf, 0, klen);
-+ free(kbuf);
-+
-+ switch (kex->kex_type) {
-+ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
-+ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
-+ kex_dh_hash( kex->client_version_string,
-+ kex->server_version_string,
-+ buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my),
-+ buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer),
-+ (serverhostkey ? serverhostkey : empty), slen,
-+ dh->pub_key, /* e */
-+ dh_server_pub, /* f */
-+ shared_secret, /* K */
-+ &hash, &hashlen
-+ );
-+ break;
-+ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
-+ kexgex_hash(
-+ kex->hash_alg,
-+ kex->client_version_string,
-+ kex->server_version_string,
-+ buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my),
-+ buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer),
-+ (serverhostkey ? serverhostkey : empty), slen,
-+ min, nbits, max,
-+ dh->p, dh->g,
-+ dh->pub_key,
-+ dh_server_pub,
-+ shared_secret,
-+ &hash, &hashlen
-+ );
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type);
-+ }
-+
-+ gssbuf.value = hash;
-+ gssbuf.length = hashlen;
-+
-+ /* Verify that the hash matches the MIC we just got. */
-+ if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(ctxt, &gssbuf, &msg_tok)))
-+ packet_disconnect("Hash's MIC didn't verify");
-+
-+ free(msg_tok.value);
-+
-+ DH_free(dh);
-+ if (serverhostkey)
-+ free(serverhostkey);
-+ BN_clear_free(dh_server_pub);
-+
-+ /* save session id */
-+ if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
-+ kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
-+ kex->session_id = xmalloc(kex->session_id_len);
-+ memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len);
-+ }
-+
-+ if (kex->gss_deleg_creds)
-+ ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(ctxt);
-+
-+ if (gss_kex_context == NULL)
-+ gss_kex_context = ctxt;
-+ else
-+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
-+
-+ kex_derive_keys_bn(kex, hash, hashlen, shared_secret);
-+ BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
-+ kex_finish(kex);
-+}
-+
-+#endif /* GSSAPI */
-diff --git a/kexgsss.c b/kexgsss.c
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..6d7518c
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/kexgsss.c
-@@ -0,0 +1,288 @@
-+/*
-+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
-+ *
-+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-+ * are met:
-+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
-+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
-+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
-+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
-+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
-+ *
-+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
-+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
-+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
-+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
-+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
-+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
-+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
-+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
-+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
-+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
-+ */
-+
-+#include "includes.h"
-+
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+
-+#include <string.h>
-+
-+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
-+#include <openssl/bn.h>
-+
-+#include "xmalloc.h"
-+#include "buffer.h"
-+#include "ssh2.h"
-+#include "key.h"
-+#include "cipher.h"
-+#include "kex.h"
-+#include "log.h"
-+#include "packet.h"
-+#include "dh.h"
-+#include "ssh-gss.h"
-+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
-+#include "servconf.h"
-+
-+extern ServerOptions options;
-+
-+void
-+kexgss_server(Kex *kex)
-+{
-+ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Some GSSAPI implementations use the input value of ret_flags (an
-+ * output variable) as a means of triggering mechanism specific
-+ * features. Initializing it to zero avoids inadvertently
-+ * activating this non-standard behaviour.
-+ */
-+
-+ OM_uint32 ret_flags = 0;
-+ gss_buffer_desc gssbuf, recv_tok, msg_tok;
-+ gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
-+ Gssctxt *ctxt = NULL;
-+ u_int slen, klen, kout, hashlen;
-+ u_char *kbuf, *hash;
-+ DH *dh;
-+ int min = -1, max = -1, nbits = -1;
-+ BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL;
-+ BIGNUM *dh_client_pub = NULL;
-+ int type = 0;
-+ gss_OID oid;
-+ char *mechs;
-+
-+ /* Initialise GSSAPI */
-+
-+ /* If we're rekeying, privsep means that some of the private structures
-+ * in the GSSAPI code are no longer available. This kludges them back
-+ * into life
-+ */
-+ if (!ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok())
-+ if ((mechs = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms()))
-+ free(mechs);
-+
-+ debug2("%s: Identifying %s", __func__, kex->name);
-+ oid = ssh_gssapi_id_kex(NULL, kex->name, kex->kex_type);
-+ if (oid == GSS_C_NO_OID)
-+ fatal("Unknown gssapi mechanism");
-+
-+ debug2("%s: Acquiring credentials", __func__);
-+
-+ if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctxt, oid))))
-+ fatal("Unable to acquire credentials for the server");
-+
-+ switch (kex->kex_type) {
-+ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
-+ dh = dh_new_group1();
-+ break;
-+ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
-+ dh = dh_new_group14();
-+ break;
-+ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
-+ debug("Doing group exchange");
-+ packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ);
-+ min = packet_get_int();
-+ nbits = packet_get_int();
-+ max = packet_get_int();
-+ min = MAX(DH_GRP_MIN, min);
-+ max = MIN(DH_GRP_MAX, max);
-+ packet_check_eom();
-+ if (max < min || nbits < min || max < nbits)
-+ fatal("GSS_GEX, bad parameters: %d !< %d !< %d",
-+ min, nbits, max);
-+ dh = PRIVSEP(choose_dh(min, nbits, max));
-+ if (dh == NULL)
-+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: no matching group found");
-+
-+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP);
-+ packet_put_bignum2(dh->p);
-+ packet_put_bignum2(dh->g);
-+ packet_send();
-+
-+ packet_write_wait();
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type);
-+ }
-+
-+ dh_gen_key(dh, kex->we_need * 8);
-+
-+ do {
-+ debug("Wait SSH2_MSG_GSSAPI_INIT");
-+ type = packet_read();
-+ switch(type) {
-+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT:
-+ if (dh_client_pub != NULL)
-+ fatal("Received KEXGSS_INIT after initialising");
-+ recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&slen);
-+ recv_tok.length = slen;
-+
-+ if ((dh_client_pub = BN_new()) == NULL)
-+ fatal("dh_client_pub == NULL");
-+
-+ packet_get_bignum2(dh_client_pub);
-+
-+ /* Send SSH_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY here, if we want */
-+ break;
-+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE:
-+ recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&slen);
-+ recv_tok.length = slen;
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ packet_disconnect(
-+ "Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d",
-+ type);
-+ }
-+
-+ maj_status = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(ctxt, &recv_tok,
-+ &send_tok, &ret_flags));
-+
-+ free(recv_tok.value);
-+
-+ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE && send_tok.length == 0)
-+ fatal("Zero length token output when incomplete");
-+
-+ if (dh_client_pub == NULL)
-+ fatal("No client public key");
-+
-+ if (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
-+ debug("Sending GSSAPI_CONTINUE");
-+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
-+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
-+ packet_send();
-+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
-+ }
-+ } while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
-+
-+ if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) {
-+ if (send_tok.length > 0) {
-+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
-+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
-+ packet_send();
-+ }
-+ fatal("accept_ctx died");
-+ }
-+
-+ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG))
-+ fatal("Mutual Authentication flag wasn't set");
-+
-+ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))
-+ fatal("Integrity flag wasn't set");
-+
-+ if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh_client_pub))
-+ packet_disconnect("bad client public DH value");
-+
-+ klen = DH_size(dh);
-+ kbuf = xmalloc(klen);
-+ kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_client_pub, dh);
-+ if ((int)kout < 0)
-+ fatal("DH_compute_key: failed");
-+
-+ shared_secret = BN_new();
-+ if (shared_secret == NULL)
-+ fatal("kexgss_server: BN_new failed");
-+
-+ if (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL)
-+ fatal("kexgss_server: BN_bin2bn failed");
-+
-+ memset(kbuf, 0, klen);
-+ free(kbuf);
-+
-+ switch (kex->kex_type) {
-+ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
-+ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
-+ kex_dh_hash(
-+ kex->client_version_string, kex->server_version_string,
-+ buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer),
-+ buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my),
-+ NULL, 0, /* Change this if we start sending host keys */
-+ dh_client_pub, dh->pub_key, shared_secret,
-+ &hash, &hashlen
-+ );
-+ break;
-+ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
-+ kexgex_hash(
-+ kex->hash_alg,
-+ kex->client_version_string, kex->server_version_string,
-+ buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer),
-+ buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my),
-+ NULL, 0,
-+ min, nbits, max,
-+ dh->p, dh->g,
-+ dh_client_pub,
-+ dh->pub_key,
-+ shared_secret,
-+ &hash, &hashlen
-+ );
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type);
-+ }
-+
-+ BN_clear_free(dh_client_pub);
-+
-+ if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
-+ kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
-+ kex->session_id = xmalloc(kex->session_id_len);
-+ memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len);
-+ }
-+
-+ gssbuf.value = hash;
-+ gssbuf.length = hashlen;
-+
-+ if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_sign(ctxt,&gssbuf,&msg_tok))))
-+ fatal("Couldn't get MIC");
-+
-+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE);
-+ packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key);
-+ packet_put_string(msg_tok.value,msg_tok.length);
-+
-+ if (send_tok.length != 0) {
-+ packet_put_char(1); /* true */
-+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
-+ } else {
-+ packet_put_char(0); /* false */
-+ }
-+ packet_send();
-+
-+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
-+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &msg_tok);
-+
-+ if (gss_kex_context == NULL)
-+ gss_kex_context = ctxt;
-+ else
-+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
-+
-+ DH_free(dh);
-+
-+ kex_derive_keys_bn(kex, hash, hashlen, shared_secret);
-+ BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
-+ kex_finish(kex);
-+
-+ /* If this was a rekey, then save out any delegated credentials we
-+ * just exchanged. */
-+ if (options.gss_store_rekey)
-+ ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds();
-+}
-+#endif /* GSSAPI */
-diff --git a/key.c b/key.c
-index eb98ea8..900b9e3 100644
---- a/key.c
-+++ b/key.c
-@@ -1013,6 +1013,7 @@ static const struct keytype keytypes[] = {
- KEY_DSA_CERT_V00, 0, 1 },
- { "ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com", "ED25519-CERT",
- KEY_ED25519_CERT, 0, 1 },
-+ { "null", "null", KEY_NULL, 0, 0 },
- { NULL, NULL, -1, -1, 0 }
- };
-
-diff --git a/key.h b/key.h
-index 0e3eea5..d51ed81 100644
---- a/key.h
-+++ b/key.h
-@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ enum types {
- KEY_ED25519_CERT,
- KEY_RSA_CERT_V00,
- KEY_DSA_CERT_V00,
-+ KEY_NULL,
- KEY_UNSPEC
- };
- enum fp_type {
-diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
-index 229fada..aa70945 100644
---- a/monitor.c
-+++ b/monitor.c
-@@ -178,6 +178,8 @@ int mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int, Buffer *);
- int mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int, Buffer *);
- int mm_answer_gss_userok(int, Buffer *);
- int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int, Buffer *);
-+int mm_answer_gss_sign(int, Buffer *);
-+int mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(int, Buffer *);
- #endif
-
- #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-@@ -253,11 +255,18 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = {
- {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
- {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_gss_userok},
- {MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_checkmic},
-+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_gss_sign},
- #endif
- {0, 0, NULL}
- };
-
- struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = {
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 0, mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx},
-+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
-+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, 0, mm_answer_gss_sign},
-+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, 0, mm_answer_gss_updatecreds},
-+#endif
- {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 0, mm_answer_moduli},
- {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 0, mm_answer_sign},
- {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 0, mm_answer_pty},
-@@ -366,6 +375,10 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctxt, struct monitor *pmonitor)
- /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+ /* and for the GSSAPI key exchange */
-+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 1);
-+#endif
- } else {
- mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto15;
-
-@@ -471,6 +484,10 @@ monitor_child_postauth(struct monitor *pmonitor)
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+ /* and for the GSSAPI key exchange */
-+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 1);
-+#endif
- } else {
- mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth15;
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
-@@ -1866,6 +1883,13 @@ mm_get_kex(Buffer *m)
- kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
- kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_server;
- kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_server;
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+ if (options.gss_keyex) {
-+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
-+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
-+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
-+ }
-+#endif
- kex->server = 1;
- kex->hostkey_type = buffer_get_int(m);
- kex->kex_type = buffer_get_int(m);
-@@ -2073,6 +2097,9 @@ mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
- OM_uint32 major;
- u_int len;
-
-+ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
-+ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
-+
- goid.elements = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
- goid.length = len;
-
-@@ -2100,6 +2127,9 @@ mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
- OM_uint32 flags = 0; /* GSI needs this */
- u_int len;
-
-+ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
-+ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
-+
- in.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
- in.length = len;
- major = ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gsscontext, &in, &out, &flags);
-@@ -2117,6 +2147,7 @@ mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0);
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1);
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, 1);
-+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, 1);
- }
- return (0);
- }
-@@ -2128,6 +2159,9 @@ mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int sock, Buffer *m)
- OM_uint32 ret;
- u_int len;
-
-+ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
-+ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
-+
- gssbuf.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
- gssbuf.length = len;
- mic.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
-@@ -2154,7 +2188,11 @@ mm_answer_gss_userok(int sock, Buffer *m)
- {
- int authenticated;
-
-- authenticated = authctxt->valid && ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user);
-+ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
-+ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
-+
-+ authenticated = authctxt->valid &&
-+ ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw);
-
- buffer_clear(m);
- buffer_put_int(m, authenticated);
-@@ -2167,5 +2205,73 @@ mm_answer_gss_userok(int sock, Buffer *m)
- /* Monitor loop will terminate if authenticated */
- return (authenticated);
- }
-+
-+int
-+mm_answer_gss_sign(int socket, Buffer *m)
-+{
-+ gss_buffer_desc data;
-+ gss_buffer_desc hash = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
-+ OM_uint32 major, minor;
-+ u_int len;
-+
-+ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
-+ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
-+
-+ data.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
-+ data.length = len;
-+ if (data.length != 20)
-+ fatal("%s: data length incorrect: %d", __func__,
-+ (int) data.length);
-+
-+ /* Save the session ID on the first time around */
-+ if (session_id2_len == 0) {
-+ session_id2_len = data.length;
-+ session_id2 = xmalloc(session_id2_len);
-+ memcpy(session_id2, data.value, session_id2_len);
-+ }
-+ major = ssh_gssapi_sign(gsscontext, &data, &hash);
-+
-+ free(data.value);
-+
-+ buffer_clear(m);
-+ buffer_put_int(m, major);
-+ buffer_put_string(m, hash.value, hash.length);
-+
-+ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, m);
-+
-+ gss_release_buffer(&minor, &hash);
-+
-+ /* Turn on getpwnam permissions */
-+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1);
-+
-+ /* And credential updating, for when rekeying */
-+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, 1);
-+
-+ return (0);
-+}
-+
-+int
-+mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(int socket, Buffer *m) {
-+ ssh_gssapi_ccache store;
-+ int ok;
-+
-+ store.filename = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
-+ store.envvar = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
-+ store.envval = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
-+
-+ ok = ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&store);
-+
-+ free(store.filename);
-+ free(store.envvar);
-+ free(store.envval);
-+
-+ buffer_clear(m);
-+ buffer_put_int(m, ok);
-+
-+ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS, m);
-+
-+ return(0);
-+}
-+
- #endif /* GSSAPI */
-
-diff --git a/monitor.h b/monitor.h
-index 20e2b4a..ff79fbb 100644
---- a/monitor.h
-+++ b/monitor.h
-@@ -60,6 +60,8 @@ enum monitor_reqtype {
- #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
- MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE = 80,
- #endif
-+ MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN = 82, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN = 83,
-+ MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS = 84, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS = 85,
-
- MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START = 100,
- MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT = 102, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT = 103,
-diff --git a/monitor_wrap.c b/monitor_wrap.c
-index d1b6d99..d1e1caa 100644
---- a/monitor_wrap.c
-+++ b/monitor_wrap.c
-@@ -1290,7 +1290,7 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic)
- }
-
- int
--mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
-+mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw)
- {
- Buffer m;
- int authenticated = 0;
-@@ -1307,5 +1307,50 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
- debug3("%s: user %sauthenticated",__func__, authenticated ? "" : "not ");
- return (authenticated);
- }
-+
-+OM_uint32
-+mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_desc *data, gss_buffer_desc *hash)
-+{
-+ Buffer m;
-+ OM_uint32 major;
-+ u_int len;
-+
-+ buffer_init(&m);
-+ buffer_put_string(&m, data->value, data->length);
-+
-+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, &m);
-+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, &m);
-+
-+ major = buffer_get_int(&m);
-+ hash->value = buffer_get_string(&m, &len);
-+ hash->length = len;
-+
-+ buffer_free(&m);
-+
-+ return(major);
-+}
-+
-+int
-+mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store)
-+{
-+ Buffer m;
-+ int ok;
-+
-+ buffer_init(&m);
-+
-+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->filename ? store->filename : "");
-+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->envvar ? store->envvar : "");
-+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->envval ? store->envval : "");
-+
-+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, &m);
-+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS, &m);
-+
-+ ok = buffer_get_int(&m);
-+
-+ buffer_free(&m);
-+
-+ return (ok);
-+}
-+
- #endif /* GSSAPI */
-
-diff --git a/monitor_wrap.h b/monitor_wrap.h
-index 9d5e5ba..93929e0 100644
---- a/monitor_wrap.h
-+++ b/monitor_wrap.h
-@@ -61,8 +61,10 @@ BIGNUM *mm_auth_rsa_generate_challenge(Key *);
- OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID);
- OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *,
- gss_buffer_desc *, gss_buffer_desc *, OM_uint32 *);
--int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user);
-+int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *);
- OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
-+OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
-+int mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *);
- #endif
-
- #ifdef USE_PAM
-diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
-index dc884c9..7613ff2 100644
---- a/readconf.c
-+++ b/readconf.c
-@@ -141,6 +141,8 @@ typedef enum {
- oClearAllForwardings, oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost,
- oEnableSSHKeysign, oRekeyLimit, oVerifyHostKeyDNS, oConnectTimeout,
- oAddressFamily, oGssAuthentication, oGssDelegateCreds,
-+ oGssTrustDns, oGssKeyEx, oGssClientIdentity, oGssRenewalRekey,
-+ oGssServerIdentity,
- oServerAliveInterval, oServerAliveCountMax, oIdentitiesOnly,
- oSendEnv, oControlPath, oControlMaster, oControlPersist,
- oHashKnownHosts,
-@@ -183,10 +185,19 @@ static struct {
- { "afstokenpassing", oUnsupported },
- #if defined(GSSAPI)
- { "gssapiauthentication", oGssAuthentication },
-+ { "gssapikeyexchange", oGssKeyEx },
- { "gssapidelegatecredentials", oGssDelegateCreds },
-+ { "gssapitrustdns", oGssTrustDns },
-+ { "gssapiclientidentity", oGssClientIdentity },
-+ { "gssapiserveridentity", oGssServerIdentity },
-+ { "gssapirenewalforcesrekey", oGssRenewalRekey },
- #else
- { "gssapiauthentication", oUnsupported },
-+ { "gssapikeyexchange", oUnsupported },
- { "gssapidelegatecredentials", oUnsupported },
-+ { "gssapitrustdns", oUnsupported },
-+ { "gssapiclientidentity", oUnsupported },
-+ { "gssapirenewalforcesrekey", oUnsupported },
- #endif
- { "fallbacktorsh", oDeprecated },
- { "usersh", oDeprecated },
-@@ -841,10 +852,30 @@ parse_time:
- intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
- goto parse_flag;
-
-+ case oGssKeyEx:
-+ intptr = &options->gss_keyex;
-+ goto parse_flag;
-+
- case oGssDelegateCreds:
- intptr = &options->gss_deleg_creds;
- goto parse_flag;
-
-+ case oGssTrustDns:
-+ intptr = &options->gss_trust_dns;
-+ goto parse_flag;
-+
-+ case oGssClientIdentity:
-+ charptr = &options->gss_client_identity;
-+ goto parse_string;
-+
-+ case oGssServerIdentity:
-+ charptr = &options->gss_server_identity;
-+ goto parse_string;
-+
-+ case oGssRenewalRekey:
-+ intptr = &options->gss_renewal_rekey;
-+ goto parse_flag;
-+
- case oBatchMode:
- intptr = &options->batch_mode;
- goto parse_flag;
-@@ -1497,7 +1528,12 @@ initialize_options(Options * options)
- options->pubkey_authentication = -1;
- options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
- options->gss_authentication = -1;
-+ options->gss_keyex = -1;
- options->gss_deleg_creds = -1;
-+ options->gss_trust_dns = -1;
-+ options->gss_renewal_rekey = -1;
-+ options->gss_client_identity = NULL;
-+ options->gss_server_identity = NULL;
- options->password_authentication = -1;
- options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
- options->kbd_interactive_devices = NULL;
-@@ -1616,8 +1652,14 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
- options->challenge_response_authentication = 1;
- if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
- options->gss_authentication = 0;
-+ if (options->gss_keyex == -1)
-+ options->gss_keyex = 0;
- if (options->gss_deleg_creds == -1)
- options->gss_deleg_creds = 0;
-+ if (options->gss_trust_dns == -1)
-+ options->gss_trust_dns = 0;
-+ if (options->gss_renewal_rekey == -1)
-+ options->gss_renewal_rekey = 0;
- if (options->password_authentication == -1)
- options->password_authentication = 1;
- if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
-diff --git a/readconf.h b/readconf.h
-index 75e3f8f..5cc97f0 100644
---- a/readconf.h
-+++ b/readconf.h
-@@ -54,7 +54,12 @@ typedef struct {
- int challenge_response_authentication;
- /* Try S/Key or TIS, authentication. */
- int gss_authentication; /* Try GSS authentication */
-+ int gss_keyex; /* Try GSS key exchange */
- int gss_deleg_creds; /* Delegate GSS credentials */
-+ int gss_trust_dns; /* Trust DNS for GSS canonicalization */
-+ int gss_renewal_rekey; /* Credential renewal forces rekey */
-+ char *gss_client_identity; /* Principal to initiate GSSAPI with */
-+ char *gss_server_identity; /* GSSAPI target principal */
- int password_authentication; /* Try password
- * authentication. */
- int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* Try keyboard-interactive auth. */
-diff --git a/regress/cert-hostkey.sh b/regress/cert-hostkey.sh
-index 1d9e0ed..1277409 100644
---- a/regress/cert-hostkey.sh
-+++ b/regress/cert-hostkey.sh
-@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t rsa -f $OBJ/host_ca_key ||\
- cat $OBJ/host_ca_key.pub
- ) > $OBJ/known_hosts-cert
-
--PLAIN_TYPES=`$SSH -Q key-plain | sed 's/^ssh-dss/ssh-dsa/g;s/^ssh-//'`
-+PLAIN_TYPES=`$SSH -Q key-plain | grep -v null | sed 's/^ssh-dss/ssh-dsa/g;s/^ssh-//'`
-
- type_has_legacy() {
- case $1 in
-diff --git a/regress/cert-userkey.sh b/regress/cert-userkey.sh
-index b093a91..4c8da00 100644
---- a/regress/cert-userkey.sh
-+++ b/regress/cert-userkey.sh
-@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ tid="certified user keys"
- rm -f $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER $OBJ/user_ca_key* $OBJ/cert_user_key*
- cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
-
--PLAIN_TYPES=`$SSH -Q key-plain | sed 's/^ssh-dss/ssh-dsa/;s/^ssh-//'`
-+PLAIN_TYPES=`$SSH -Q key-plain | grep -v null | sed 's/^ssh-dss/ssh-dsa/;s/^ssh-//'`
-
- type_has_legacy() {
- case $1 in
-diff --git a/regress/kextype.sh b/regress/kextype.sh
-index 8c2ac09..a2a87ca 100644
---- a/regress/kextype.sh
-+++ b/regress/kextype.sh
-@@ -9,6 +9,9 @@ cp $OBJ/ssh_proxy $OBJ/ssh_proxy_bak
-
- tries="1 2 3 4"
- for k in `${SSH} -Q kex`; do
-+ if [ $k = "gss-gex-sha1-" -o $k = "gss-group1-sha1-" -o $k = "gss-group14-sha1-" ]; then
-+ continue
-+ fi
- verbose "kex $k"
- for i in $tries; do
- ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -o KexAlgorithms=$k x true
-diff --git a/regress/rekey.sh b/regress/rekey.sh
-index cf9401e..31fb0f7 100644
---- a/regress/rekey.sh
-+++ b/regress/rekey.sh
-@@ -30,6 +30,9 @@ increase_datafile_size 300
-
- opts=""
- for i in `${SSH} -Q kex`; do
-+ if [ $i = "gss-gex-sha1-" -o $i = "gss-group1-sha1-" -o $i = "gss-group14-sha1-" ]; then
-+ continue
-+ fi
- opts="$opts KexAlgorithms=$i"
- done
- for i in `${SSH} -Q cipher`; do
-@@ -48,6 +51,9 @@ done
- if ${SSH} -Q cipher-auth | grep '^.*$' >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then
- for c in `${SSH} -Q cipher-auth`; do
- for kex in `${SSH} -Q kex`; do
-+ if [ $kex = "gss-gex-sha1-" -o $kex = "gss-group1-sha1-" -o $kex = "gss-group14-sha1-" ]; then
-+ continue
-+ fi
- verbose "client rekey $c $kex"
- ssh_data_rekeying -oRekeyLimit=256k -oCiphers=$c -oKexAlgorithms=$kex
- done
-diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
-index f763317..68fb9ef 100644
---- a/servconf.c
-+++ b/servconf.c
-@@ -108,7 +108,10 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
- options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = -1;
- options->kerberos_get_afs_token = -1;
- options->gss_authentication=-1;
-+ options->gss_keyex = -1;
- options->gss_cleanup_creds = -1;
-+ options->gss_strict_acceptor = -1;
-+ options->gss_store_rekey = -1;
- options->password_authentication = -1;
- options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
- options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
-@@ -245,8 +248,14 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
- options->kerberos_get_afs_token = 0;
- if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
- options->gss_authentication = 0;
-+ if (options->gss_keyex == -1)
-+ options->gss_keyex = 0;
- if (options->gss_cleanup_creds == -1)
- options->gss_cleanup_creds = 1;
-+ if (options->gss_strict_acceptor == -1)
-+ options->gss_strict_acceptor = 1;
-+ if (options->gss_store_rekey == -1)
-+ options->gss_store_rekey = 0;
- if (options->password_authentication == -1)
- options->password_authentication = 1;
- if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
-@@ -344,7 +353,8 @@ typedef enum {
- sBanner, sShowPatchLevel, sUseDNS, sHostbasedAuthentication,
- sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, sClientAliveInterval,
- sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile,
-- sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel,
-+ sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssStrictAcceptor,
-+ sGssKeyEx, sGssStoreRekey, sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel,
- sMatch, sPermitOpen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory,
- sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding,
- sHostCertificate,
-@@ -411,10 +421,20 @@ static struct {
- #ifdef GSSAPI
- { "gssapiauthentication", sGssAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
- { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-+ { "gssapicleanupcreds", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-+ { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sGssStrictAcceptor, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-+ { "gssapikeyexchange", sGssKeyEx, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-+ { "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sGssStoreRekey, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- #else
- { "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
- { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-+ { "gssapicleanupcreds", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-+ { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-+ { "gssapikeyexchange", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-+ { "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- #endif
-+ { "gssusesessionccache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-+ { "gssapiusesessioncredcache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- { "passwordauthentication", sPasswordAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
- { "kbdinteractiveauthentication", sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
- { "challengeresponseauthentication", sChallengeResponseAuthentication, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-@@ -1091,10 +1111,22 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
- intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
- goto parse_flag;
-
-+ case sGssKeyEx:
-+ intptr = &options->gss_keyex;
-+ goto parse_flag;
-+
- case sGssCleanupCreds:
- intptr = &options->gss_cleanup_creds;
- goto parse_flag;
-
-+ case sGssStrictAcceptor:
-+ intptr = &options->gss_strict_acceptor;
-+ goto parse_flag;
-+
-+ case sGssStoreRekey:
-+ intptr = &options->gss_store_rekey;
-+ goto parse_flag;
-+
- case sPasswordAuthentication:
- intptr = &options->password_authentication;
- goto parse_flag;
-@@ -2005,6 +2037,9 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
- #ifdef GSSAPI
- dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication);
- dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssCleanupCreds, o->gss_cleanup_creds);
-+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssKeyEx, o->gss_keyex);
-+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStrictAcceptor, o->gss_strict_acceptor);
-+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStoreRekey, o->gss_store_rekey);
- #endif
- dump_cfg_fmtint(sPasswordAuthentication, o->password_authentication);
- dump_cfg_fmtint(sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
-diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
-index 4572066..37cfa9b 100644
---- a/servconf.h
-+++ b/servconf.h
-@@ -112,7 +112,10 @@ typedef struct {
- int kerberos_get_afs_token; /* If true, try to get AFS token if
- * authenticated with Kerberos. */
- int gss_authentication; /* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */
-+ int gss_keyex; /* If true, permit GSSAPI key exchange */
- int gss_cleanup_creds; /* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */
-+ int gss_strict_acceptor; /* If true, restrict the GSSAPI acceptor name */
-+ int gss_store_rekey;
- int password_authentication; /* If true, permit password
- * authentication. */
- int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* If true, permit */
-diff --git a/ssh-gss.h b/ssh-gss.h
-index a99d7f0..0374c88 100644
---- a/ssh-gss.h
-+++ b/ssh-gss.h
-@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
- /* $OpenBSD: ssh-gss.h,v 1.11 2014/02/26 20:28:44 djm Exp $ */
- /*
-- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
-+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-@@ -61,10 +61,22 @@
-
- #define SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE 0x06
-
-+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT 30
-+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE 31
-+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE 32
-+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY 33
-+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR 34
-+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ 40
-+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP 41
-+#define KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID "gss-group1-sha1-"
-+#define KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID "gss-group14-sha1-"
-+#define KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID "gss-gex-sha1-"
-+
- typedef struct {
- char *filename;
- char *envvar;
- char *envval;
-+ struct passwd *owner;
- void *data;
- } ssh_gssapi_ccache;
-
-@@ -72,8 +84,11 @@ typedef struct {
- gss_buffer_desc displayname;
- gss_buffer_desc exportedname;
- gss_cred_id_t creds;
-+ gss_name_t name;
- struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct *mech;
- ssh_gssapi_ccache store;
-+ int used;
-+ int updated;
- } ssh_gssapi_client;
-
- typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct {
-@@ -84,6 +99,7 @@ typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct {
- int (*userok) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char *);
- int (*localname) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char **);
- void (*storecreds) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
-+ int (*updatecreds) (ssh_gssapi_ccache *, ssh_gssapi_client *);
- } ssh_gssapi_mech;
-
- typedef struct {
-@@ -94,10 +110,11 @@ typedef struct {
- gss_OID oid; /* client */
- gss_cred_id_t creds; /* server */
- gss_name_t client; /* server */
-- gss_cred_id_t client_creds; /* server */
-+ gss_cred_id_t client_creds; /* both */
- } Gssctxt;
-
- extern ssh_gssapi_mech *supported_mechs[];
-+extern Gssctxt *gss_kex_context;
-
- int ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t);
- void ssh_gssapi_set_oid_data(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t);
-@@ -119,16 +136,30 @@ void ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(Gssctxt **);
- void ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(Gssctxt **);
- OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
- void ssh_gssapi_buildmic(Buffer *, const char *, const char *, const char *);
--int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *);
-+int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *, const char *);
-+OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_client_identity(Gssctxt *, const char *);
-+int ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(Gssctxt *);
-
- /* In the server */
-+typedef int ssh_gssapi_check_fn(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *,
-+ const char *);
-+char *ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *, const char *);
-+char *ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *, const char *,
-+ const char *);
-+gss_OID ssh_gssapi_id_kex(Gssctxt *, char *, int);
-+int ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt **,gss_OID, const char *,
-+ const char *);
- OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID);
--int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name);
-+int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name, struct passwd *);
- OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
- void ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***, u_int *);
- void ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void);
- void ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void);
-
-+char *ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(void);
-+int ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok();
-+
-+int ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store);
- #endif /* GSSAPI */
-
- #endif /* _SSH_GSS_H */
-diff --git a/ssh_config b/ssh_config
-index 6d1abaf..b0d343b 100644
---- a/ssh_config
-+++ b/ssh_config
-@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@
- # HostbasedAuthentication no
- # GSSAPIAuthentication no
- # GSSAPIDelegateCredentials no
-+# GSSAPIKeyExchange no
-+# GSSAPITrustDNS no
- # BatchMode no
- # CheckHostIP yes
- # AddressFamily any
-diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
-index b580392..e7accd6 100644
---- a/ssh_config.5
-+++ b/ssh_config.5
-@@ -682,11 +682,43 @@ Specifies whether user authentication based on GSSAPI is allowed.
- The default is
- .Dq no .
- Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
-+.It Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange
-+Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI may be used. When using
-+GSSAPI key exchange the server need not have a host key.
-+The default is
-+.Dq no .
-+Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
-+.It Cm GSSAPIClientIdentity
-+If set, specifies the GSSAPI client identity that ssh should use when
-+connecting to the server. The default is unset, which means that the default
-+identity will be used.
-+.It Cm GSSAPIServerIdentity
-+If set, specifies the GSSAPI server identity that ssh should expect when
-+connecting to the server. The default is unset, which means that the
-+expected GSSAPI server identity will be determined from the target
-+hostname.
- .It Cm GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
- Forward (delegate) credentials to the server.
- The default is
- .Dq no .
--Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
-+Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 connections using GSSAPI.
-+.It Cm GSSAPIRenewalForcesRekey
-+If set to
-+.Dq yes
-+then renewal of the client's GSSAPI credentials will force the rekeying of the
-+ssh connection. With a compatible server, this can delegate the renewed
-+credentials to a session on the server.
-+The default is
-+.Dq no .
-+.It Cm GSSAPITrustDns
-+Set to
-+.Dq yes to indicate that the DNS is trusted to securely canonicalize
-+the name of the host being connected to. If
-+.Dq no, the hostname entered on the
-+command line will be passed untouched to the GSSAPI library.
-+The default is
-+.Dq no .
-+This option only applies to protocol version 2 connections using GSSAPI.
- .It Cm HashKnownHosts
- Indicates that
- .Xr ssh 1
-diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
-index adbbfc7..cadf234 100644
---- a/sshconnect2.c
-+++ b/sshconnect2.c
-@@ -158,9 +158,34 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port)
- {
- Kex *kex;
-
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+ char *orig = NULL, *gss = NULL;
-+ char *gss_host = NULL;
-+#endif
-+
- xxx_host = host;
- xxx_hostaddr = hostaddr;
-
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+ if (options.gss_keyex) {
-+ /* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this
-+ * client to the key exchange algorithm proposal */
-+ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
-+
-+ if (options.gss_trust_dns)
-+ gss_host = (char *)get_canonical_hostname(1);
-+ else
-+ gss_host = host;
-+
-+ gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host, options.gss_client_identity);
-+ if (gss) {
-+ debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss);
-+ xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
-+ "%s,%s", gss, orig);
-+ }
-+ }
-+#endif
-+
- if (options.ciphers == (char *)-1) {
- logit("No valid ciphers for protocol version 2 given, using defaults.");
- options.ciphers = NULL;
-@@ -196,6 +221,17 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port)
- if (options.kex_algorithms != NULL)
- myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = options.kex_algorithms;
-
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+ /* If we've got GSSAPI algorithms, then we also support the
-+ * 'null' hostkey, as a last resort */
-+ if (options.gss_keyex && gss) {
-+ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS];
-+ xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
-+ "%s,null", orig);
-+ free(gss);
-+ }
-+#endif
-+
- if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval)
- packet_set_rekey_limits((u_int32_t)options.rekey_limit,
- (time_t)options.rekey_interval);
-@@ -208,10 +244,30 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port)
- kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_client;
- kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_client;
- kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_client;
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+ if (options.gss_keyex) {
-+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_client;
-+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_client;
-+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_client;
-+ }
-+#endif
- kex->client_version_string=client_version_string;
- kex->server_version_string=server_version_string;
- kex->verify_host_key=&verify_host_key_callback;
-
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+ if (options.gss_keyex) {
-+ kex->gss_deleg_creds = options.gss_deleg_creds;
-+ kex->gss_trust_dns = options.gss_trust_dns;
-+ kex->gss_client = options.gss_client_identity;
-+ if (options.gss_server_identity) {
-+ kex->gss_host = options.gss_server_identity;
-+ } else {
-+ kex->gss_host = gss_host;
-+ }
-+ }
-+#endif
-+
- xxx_kex = kex;
-
- dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &kex->done, kex);
-@@ -301,6 +357,7 @@ void input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t, void *);
- void input_gssapi_hash(int type, u_int32_t, void *);
- void input_gssapi_error(int, u_int32_t, void *);
- void input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, void *);
-+int userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt);
- #endif
-
- void userauth(Authctxt *, char *);
-@@ -316,6 +373,11 @@ static char *authmethods_get(void);
-
- Authmethod authmethods[] = {
- #ifdef GSSAPI
-+ {"gssapi-keyex",
-+ userauth_gsskeyex,
-+ NULL,
-+ &options.gss_authentication,
-+ NULL},
- {"gssapi-with-mic",
- userauth_gssapi,
- NULL,
-@@ -613,19 +675,31 @@ userauth_gssapi(Authctxt *authctxt)
- static u_int mech = 0;
- OM_uint32 min;
- int ok = 0;
-+ const char *gss_host;
-+
-+ if (options.gss_server_identity)
-+ gss_host = options.gss_server_identity;
-+ else if (options.gss_trust_dns)
-+ gss_host = get_canonical_hostname(1);
-+ else
-+ gss_host = authctxt->host;
-
- /* Try one GSSAPI method at a time, rather than sending them all at
- * once. */
-
- if (gss_supported == NULL)
-- gss_indicate_mechs(&min, &gss_supported);
-+ if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min, &gss_supported))) {
-+ gss_supported = NULL;
-+ return 0;
-+ }
-
- /* Check to see if the mechanism is usable before we offer it */
- while (mech < gss_supported->count && !ok) {
- /* My DER encoding requires length<128 */
- if (gss_supported->elements[mech].length < 128 &&
- ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(&gssctxt,
-- &gss_supported->elements[mech], authctxt->host)) {
-+ &gss_supported->elements[mech], gss_host,
-+ options.gss_client_identity)) {
- ok = 1; /* Mechanism works */
- } else {
- mech++;
-@@ -722,8 +796,8 @@ input_gssapi_response(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
- {
- Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
- Gssctxt *gssctxt;
-- int oidlen;
-- char *oidv;
-+ u_int oidlen;
-+ u_char *oidv;
-
- if (authctxt == NULL)
- fatal("input_gssapi_response: no authentication context");
-@@ -832,6 +906,48 @@ input_gssapi_error(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
- free(msg);
- free(lang);
- }
-+
-+int
-+userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt)
-+{
-+ Buffer b;
-+ gss_buffer_desc gssbuf;
-+ gss_buffer_desc mic = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
-+ OM_uint32 ms;
-+
-+ static int attempt = 0;
-+ if (attempt++ >= 1)
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ if (gss_kex_context == NULL) {
-+ debug("No valid Key exchange context");
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->server_user, authctxt->service,
-+ "gssapi-keyex");
-+
-+ gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b);
-+ gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b);
-+
-+ if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_sign(gss_kex_context, &gssbuf, &mic))) {
-+ buffer_free(&b);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
-+ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user);
-+ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service);
-+ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name);
-+ packet_put_string(mic.value, mic.length);
-+ packet_send();
-+
-+ buffer_free(&b);
-+ gss_release_buffer(&ms, &mic);
-+
-+ return (1);
-+}
-+
- #endif /* GSSAPI */
-
- int
-diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
-index 24ab272..e4e406e 100644
---- a/sshd.c
-+++ b/sshd.c
-@@ -122,6 +122,10 @@
- #include "ssh-sandbox.h"
- #include "version.h"
-
-+#ifdef USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API
-+#include <Security/AuthSession.h>
-+#endif
-+
- #ifdef LIBWRAP
- #include <tcpd.h>
- #include <syslog.h>
-@@ -1744,10 +1748,13 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- logit("Disabling protocol version 1. Could not load host key");
- options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_1;
- }
-+#ifndef GSSAPI
-+ /* The GSSAPI key exchange can run without a host key */
- if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) && !sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key) {
- logit("Disabling protocol version 2. Could not load host key");
- options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_2;
- }
-+#endif
- if (!(options.protocol & (SSH_PROTO_1|SSH_PROTO_2))) {
- logit("sshd: no hostkeys available -- exiting.");
- exit(1);
-@@ -2488,6 +2495,48 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void)
- myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = compat_pkalg_proposal(
- list_hostkey_types());
-
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+ {
-+ char *orig;
-+ char *gss = NULL;
-+ char *newstr = NULL;
-+ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
-+
-+ /*
-+ * If we don't have a host key, then there's no point advertising
-+ * the other key exchange algorithms
-+ */
-+
-+ if (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]) == 0)
-+ orig = NULL;
-+
-+ if (options.gss_keyex)
-+ gss = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms();
-+ else
-+ gss = NULL;
-+
-+ if (gss && orig)
-+ xasprintf(&newstr, "%s,%s", gss, orig);
-+ else if (gss)
-+ newstr = gss;
-+ else if (orig)
-+ newstr = orig;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * If we've got GSSAPI mechanisms, then we've got the 'null' host
-+ * key alg, but we can't tell people about it unless its the only
-+ * host key algorithm we support
-+ */
-+ if (gss && (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS])) == 0)
-+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = "null";
-+
-+ if (newstr)
-+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = newstr;
-+ else
-+ fatal("No supported key exchange algorithms");
-+ }
-+#endif
-+
- /* start key exchange */
- kex = kex_setup(myproposal);
- kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
-@@ -2496,6 +2545,13 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void)
- kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
- kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_server;
- kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_server;
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+ if (options.gss_keyex) {
-+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
-+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
-+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
-+ }
-+#endif
- kex->server = 1;
- kex->client_version_string=client_version_string;
- kex->server_version_string=server_version_string;
-diff --git a/sshd_config b/sshd_config
-index c1b7c03..adfd7b1 100644
---- a/sshd_config
-+++ b/sshd_config
-@@ -91,6 +91,8 @@ ChallengeResponseAuthentication no
- # GSSAPI options
- GSSAPIAuthentication yes
- GSSAPICleanupCredentials no
-+#GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck yes
-+#GSSAPIKeyExchange no
-
- # Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing,
- # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will
-diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
-index 95b5f8c..1fb002d 100644
---- a/sshd_config.5
-+++ b/sshd_config.5
-@@ -493,12 +493,40 @@ Specifies whether user authentication based on GSSAPI is allowed.
- The default is
- .Dq no .
- Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
-+.It Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange
-+Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI is allowed. GSSAPI key exchange
-+doesn't rely on ssh keys to verify host identity.
-+The default is
-+.Dq no .
-+Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
- .It Cm GSSAPICleanupCredentials
- Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's credentials cache
- on logout.
- The default is
- .Dq yes .
- Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
-+.It Cm GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck
-+Determines whether to be strict about the identity of the GSSAPI acceptor
-+a client authenticates against. If
-+.Dq yes
-+then the client must authenticate against the
-+.Pa host
-+service on the current hostname. If
-+.Dq no
-+then the client may authenticate against any service key stored in the
-+machine's default store. This facility is provided to assist with operation
-+on multi homed machines.
-+The default is
-+.Dq yes .
-+Note that this option applies only to protocol version 2 GSSAPI connections,
-+and setting it to
-+.Dq no
-+may only work with recent Kerberos GSSAPI libraries.
-+.It Cm GSSAPIStoreCredentialsOnRekey
-+Controls whether the user's GSSAPI credentials should be updated following a
-+successful connection rekeying. This option can be used to accepted renewed
-+or updated credentials from a compatible client. The default is
-+.Dq no .
- .It Cm HostbasedAuthentication
- Specifies whether rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication together
- with successful public key client host authentication is allowed
-diff --git a/ssh-gss.h b/ssh-gss.h
-index 132fd0d..39f6645 100644
---- a/ssh-gss.h
-+++ b/ssh-gss.h
-@@ -169,6 +169,7 @@ char *ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(void);
- int ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok();
-
- int ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store);
-+void ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds();
- #endif /* GSSAPI */
-
- #endif /* _SSH_GSS_H */
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-keycat.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-keycat.patch
index 49b9798..37aa9c5 100644
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-keycat.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-keycat.patch
@@ -1,8 +1,61 @@
-diff --git a/HOWTO.ssh-keycat b/HOWTO.ssh-keycat
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..630ec62
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/HOWTO.ssh-keycat
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/auth2-pubkey.c.keycat openssh-7.4p1/auth2-pubkey.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/auth2-pubkey.c.keycat 2017-02-08 14:32:33.015581448 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/auth2-pubkey.c 2017-02-08 14:40:26.125216292 +0100
+@@ -1043,6 +1043,14 @@ user_key_command_allowed2(struct passwd
+ xasprintf(&command, "%s %s", av[0], av[1]);
+ }
+
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++ if (sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables() < 0) {
++ error ("failed to copy environment: %s",
++ strerror(errno));
++ _exit(127);
++ }
++#endif
++
+ if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedKeysCommand", pw, command,
+ ac, av, &f)) == 0)
+ goto out;
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/configure.ac.keycat openssh-7.4p1/configure.ac
+--- openssh-7.4p1/configure.ac.keycat 2017-02-08 14:32:33.011581451 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/configure.ac 2017-02-08 14:32:33.016581448 +0100
+@@ -3129,6 +3129,7 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([pam],
+ PAM_MSG="yes"
+
+ SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lpam"
++ KEYCATLIBS="$KEYCATLIBS -lpam"
+ AC_DEFINE([USE_PAM], [1],
+ [Define if you want to enable PAM support])
+
+@@ -3139,6 +3140,7 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([pam],
+ ;;
+ *)
+ SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -ldl"
++ KEYCATLIBS="$KEYCATLIBS -ldl"
+ ;;
+ esac
+ fi
+@@ -4255,6 +4257,7 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([selinux],
+ )
+ AC_SUBST([SSHLIBS])
+ AC_SUBST([SSHDLIBS])
++AC_SUBST([KEYCATLIBS])
+
+ # Check whether user wants Kerberos 5 support
+ KRB5_MSG="no"
+@@ -5206,6 +5209,9 @@ fi
+ if test ! -z "${SSHLIBS}"; then
+ echo " +for ssh: ${SSHLIBS}"
+ fi
++if test ! -z "${KEYCATLIBS}"; then
++echo " +for ssh-keycat: ${KEYCATLIBS}"
++fi
+
+ echo ""
+
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/HOWTO.ssh-keycat.keycat openssh-7.4p1/HOWTO.ssh-keycat
+--- openssh-7.4p1/HOWTO.ssh-keycat.keycat 2017-02-08 14:32:33.014581449 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/HOWTO.ssh-keycat 2017-02-08 14:32:33.014581449 +0100
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+The ssh-keycat retrieves the content of the ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
+of an user in any environment. This includes environments with
@@ -16,10 +69,9 @@ index 0000000..630ec62
+ PubkeyAuthentication yes
+
+
-diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in
-index 411eadb..4ab6717 100644
---- a/Makefile.in
-+++ b/Makefile.in
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/Makefile.in.keycat openssh-7.4p1/Makefile.in
+--- openssh-7.4p1/Makefile.in.keycat 2017-02-08 14:32:33.012581451 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/Makefile.in 2017-02-08 14:38:28.839306815 +0100
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ SFTP_SERVER=$(libexecdir)/sftp-server
SSH_KEYSIGN=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keysign
SSH_LDAP_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-ldap-helper
@@ -28,7 +80,7 @@ index 411eadb..4ab6717 100644
SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-pkcs11-helper
PRIVSEP_PATH=@PRIVSEP_PATH@
SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=@SSH_PRIVSEP_USER@
-@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ K5LIBS=@K5LIBS@
+@@ -51,6 +52,7 @@ K5LIBS=@K5LIBS@
GSSLIBS=@GSSLIBS@
SSHLIBS=@SSHLIBS@
SSHDLIBS=@SSHDLIBS@
@@ -36,26 +88,26 @@ index 411eadb..4ab6717 100644
LIBEDIT=@LIBEDIT@
AR=@AR@
AWK=@AWK@
-@@ -64,7 +65,7 @@ EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@
+@@ -65,7 +67,7 @@ EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@
MANFMT=@MANFMT@
INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER=@INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER@
-TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT)
+TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT)
- LIBSSH_OBJS=authfd.o authfile.o bufaux.o bufbn.o buffer.o \
- canohost.o channels.o cipher.o cipher-aes.o \
-@@ -176,6 +177,9 @@ ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-pkcs11-helper.o ssh-pkcs11
+ LIBOPENSSH_OBJS=\
+ ssh_api.o \
+@@ -190,6 +192,9 @@ ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT)
ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ldapconf.o ldapbody.o ldapmisc.o ldap-helper.o
- $(LD) -o $@ ldapconf.o ldapbody.o ldapmisc.o ldap-helper.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(LIBS)
+ $(LD) -o $@ ldapconf.o ldapbody.o ldapmisc.o ldap-helper.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(LIBS)
+ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHDOBJS) libssh.a ssh-keycat.o
+ $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keycat.o bufaux.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(KEYCATLIBS) $(SSHLIBS)
+
- ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keyscan.o roaming_dummy.o
- $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o roaming_dummy.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
+ ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keyscan.o
+ $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
-@@ -283,6 +287,7 @@ install-files:
+@@ -332,6 +337,7 @@ install-files:
$(INSTALL) -m 0700 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-ldap-helper $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_LDAP_HELPER) ; \
$(INSTALL) -m 0700 ssh-ldap-wrapper $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_LDAP_WRAPPER) ; \
fi
@@ -63,29 +115,23 @@ index 411eadb..4ab6717 100644
$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT)
$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT)
$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1
-diff --git a/auth2-pubkey.c b/auth2-pubkey.c
-index c0ae0d4..cb0f931 100644
---- a/auth2-pubkey.c
-+++ b/auth2-pubkey.c
-@@ -600,6 +600,14 @@ user_key_command_allowed2(struct passwd *user_pw, Key *key)
- _exit(1);
- }
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.keycat openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.keycat 2017-02-08 14:32:33.009581453 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h 2017-02-08 14:32:33.015581448 +0100
+@@ -23,8 +23,10 @@ void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const
+ void ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *);
+ void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *);
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+ if (sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables() < 0) {
-+ error ("failed to copy environment: %s",
-+ strerror(errno));
-+ _exit(127);
-+ }
-+#endif
-+
- execl(options.authorized_keys_command,
- options.authorized_keys_command, user_pw->pw_name, NULL);
++int sshd_selinux_enabled(void);
+ void sshd_selinux_copy_context(void);
+ void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
++int sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(void);
+ #endif
-diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
-index d04f4ed..0077dd7 100644
---- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
-+++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
+ #ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.keycat openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.keycat 2017-02-08 14:32:33.008581454 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c 2017-02-08 14:32:33.015581448 +0100
@@ -53,6 +53,20 @@ extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
extern int inetd_flag;
extern int rexeced_flag;
@@ -161,7 +207,7 @@ index d04f4ed..0077dd7 100644
/* Set the execution context to the default for the specified user */
void
sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
-@@ -343,7 +375,7 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
+@@ -343,7 +375,7 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pw
int r = 0;
security_context_t default_ctx = NULL;
@@ -179,26 +225,10 @@ index d04f4ed..0077dd7 100644
return;
if (getexeccon((security_context_t *)&ctx) != 0) {
-diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
-index b18893c..cb51f99 100644
---- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
-+++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
-@@ -25,8 +25,10 @@ void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const char *);
- void ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *);
- void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *);
-
-+int sshd_selinux_enabled(void);
- void sshd_selinux_copy_context(void);
- void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
-+int sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(void);
- #endif
-
- #ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST
-diff --git a/platform.c b/platform.c
-index 0d39ab2..0dae387 100644
---- a/platform.c
-+++ b/platform.c
-@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ platform_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/platform.c.keycat openssh-7.4p1/platform.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/platform.c.keycat 2017-02-08 14:32:33.007581455 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/platform.c 2017-02-08 14:32:33.015581448 +0100
+@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ platform_setusercontext(struct passwd *p
{
#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
/* Cache selinux status for later use */
@@ -207,11 +237,9 @@ index 0d39ab2..0dae387 100644
#endif
#ifdef USE_SOLARIS_PROJECTS
-diff --git a/ssh-keycat.c b/ssh-keycat.c
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..f8ed7af
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/ssh-keycat.c
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/ssh-keycat.c.keycat openssh-7.4p1/ssh-keycat.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/ssh-keycat.c.keycat 2017-02-08 14:32:33.015581448 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/ssh-keycat.c 2017-02-08 14:32:33.015581448 +0100
@@ -0,0 +1,238 @@
+/*
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
@@ -451,41 +479,3 @@ index 0000000..f8ed7af
+ }
+ return ev;
+}
-diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
-index 3bbccfd..6481f1f 100644
---- a/configure.ac
-+++ b/configure.ac
-@@ -2952,6 +2952,7 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([pam],
- PAM_MSG="yes"
-
- SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lpam"
-+ KEYCATLIBS="$KEYCATLIBS -lpam"
- AC_DEFINE([USE_PAM], [1],
- [Define if you want to enable PAM support])
-
-@@ -2962,6 +2963,7 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([pam],
- ;;
- *)
- SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -ldl"
-+ KEYCATLIBS="$KEYCATLIBS -ldl"
- ;;
- esac
- fi
-@@ -4042,6 +4044,7 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([selinux],
- )
- AC_SUBST([SSHLIBS])
- AC_SUBST([SSHDLIBS])
-+AC_SUBST([KEYCATLIBS])
-
- # Check whether user wants Kerberos 5 support
- KRB5_MSG="no"
-@@ -5031,6 +5034,9 @@ fi
- if test ! -z "${SSHLIBS}"; then
- echo " +for ssh: ${SSHLIBS}"
- fi
-+if test ! -z "${KEYCATLIBS}"; then
-+echo " +for ssh-keycat: ${KEYCATLIBS}"
-+fi
-
- echo ""
-
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-keyperm.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-keyperm.patch
index fccb328..1ac2c55 100644
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-keyperm.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-keyperm.patch
@@ -6,8 +6,8 @@ diff -up openssh-6.6p1/authfile.c.keyperm openssh-6.6p1/authfile.c
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <grp.h>
- #include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
+ #include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
@@ -979,6 +980,13 @@ key_perm_ok(int fd, const char *filename
#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index f7c5a1c..0000000
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,294 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/auth-krb5.c b/auth-krb5.c
-index 6c62bdf..11c8562 100644
---- a/auth-krb5.c
-+++ b/auth-krb5.c
-@@ -54,6 +54,21 @@
-
- extern ServerOptions options;
-
-+int
-+ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb5_context krb5_ctx, krb5_principal krb5_user, const char *client,
-+ int k5login_exists)
-+{
-+ if (options.use_kuserok || !k5login_exists)
-+ return krb5_kuserok(krb5_ctx, krb5_user, client);
-+ else {
-+ char kuser[65];
-+
-+ if (krb5_aname_to_localname(krb5_ctx, krb5_user, sizeof(kuser), kuser))
-+ return 0;
-+ return strcmp(kuser, client) == 0;
-+ }
-+}
-+
- static int
- krb5_init(void *context)
- {
-@@ -157,8 +172,9 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
- if (problem)
- goto out;
-
-- if (!krb5_kuserok(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user,
-- authctxt->pw->pw_name)) {
-+ /* Use !options.use_kuserok here to make ssh_krb5_kuserok() not
-+ * depend on the existance of .k5login */
-+ if (!ssh_krb5_kuserok(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user, authctxt->pw->pw_name, !options.use_kuserok)) {
- problem = -1;
- goto out;
- }
-diff --git a/gss-serv-krb5.c b/gss-serv-krb5.c
-index 60de320..0a4930e 100644
---- a/gss-serv-krb5.c
-+++ b/gss-serv-krb5.c
-@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ static int ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal, const char *, const char *,
- int);
-
- static krb5_context krb_context = NULL;
-+extern int ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb5_context, krb5_principal, const char *, int);
-
- /* Initialise the krb5 library, for the stuff that GSSAPI won't do */
-
-@@ -92,6 +93,103 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_init(void)
- * Returns true if the user is OK to log in, otherwise returns 0
- */
-
-+/* The purpose of the function is to find out if a Kerberos principal is
-+ * allowed to log in as the given local user. This is a general problem with
-+ * Kerberized services because by design the Kerberos principals are
-+ * completely independent from the local user names. This is one of the
-+ * reasons why Kerberos is working well on different operating systems like
-+ * Windows and UNIX/Linux. Nevertheless a relationship between a Kerberos
-+ * principal and a local user name must be established because otherwise every
-+ * access would be granted for every principal with a valid ticket.
-+ *
-+ * Since it is a general issue libkrb5 provides some functions for
-+ * applications to find out about the relationship between the Kerberos
-+ * principal and a local user name. They are krb5_kuserok() and
-+ * krb5_aname_to_localname().
-+ *
-+ * krb5_kuserok() can be used to "Determine if a principal is authorized to
-+ * log in as a local user" (from the MIT Kerberos documentation of this
-+ * function). Which is exactly what we are looking for and should be the
-+ * preferred choice. It accepts the Kerberos principal and a local user name
-+ * and let libkrb5 or its plugins determine if they relate to each other or
-+ * not.
-+ *
-+ * krb5_aname_to_localname() can use used to "Convert a principal name to a
-+ * local name" (from the MIT Kerberos documentation of this function). It
-+ * accepts a Kerberos principle and returns a local name and it is up to the
-+ * application to do any additional checks. There are two issues using
-+ * krb5_aname_to_localname(). First, since POSIX user names are case
-+ * sensitive, the calling application in general has no other choice than
-+ * doing a case-sensitive string comparison between the name returned by
-+ * krb5_aname_to_localname() and the name used at the login prompt. When the
-+ * users are provided by a case in-sensitive server, e.g. Active Directory,
-+ * this might lead to login failures because the user typing the name at the
-+ * login prompt might not be aware of the right case. Another issue might be
-+ * caused if there are multiple alias names available for a single user. E.g.
-+ * the canonical name of a user is user@group.department.example.com but there
-+ * exists a shorter login name, e.g. user@example.com, to safe typing at the
-+ * login prompt. Here krb5_aname_to_localname() can only return the canonical
-+ * name, but if the short alias is used at the login prompt authentication
-+ * will fail as well. All this can be avoided by using krb5_kuserok() and
-+ * configuring krb5.conf or using a suitable plugin to meet the needs of the
-+ * given environment.
-+ *
-+ * The Fedora and RHEL version of openssh contain two patches which modify the
-+ * access control behavior:
-+ * - openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch
-+ * - openssh-6.6p1-force_krb.patch
-+ *
-+ * openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch adds a new option KerberosUseKuserok for
-+ * sshd_config which controls if krb5_kuserok() is used to check if the
-+ * principle is authorized or if krb5_aname_to_localname() should be used.
-+ * The reason to add this patch was that krb5_kuserok() by default checks if
-+ * a .k5login file exits in the users home-directory. With this the user can
-+ * give access to his account for any given principal which might be
-+ * in violation with company policies and it would be useful if this can be
-+ * rejected. Nevertheless the patch ignores the fact that krb5_kuserok() does
-+ * no only check .k5login but other sources as well and checking .k5login can
-+ * be disabled for all applications in krb5.conf as well. With this new
-+ * option KerberosUseKuserok set to 'no' (and this is the default for RHEL7
-+ * and Fedora 21) openssh can only use krb5_aname_to_localname() with the
-+ * restrictions mentioned above.
-+ *
-+ * openssh-6.6p1-force_krb.patch adds a ksu like behaviour to ssh, i.e. when
-+ * using GSSAPI authentication only commands configured in the .k5user can be
-+ * executed. Here the wrong assumption that krb5_kuserok() only checks
-+ * .k5login is made as well. In contrast ksu checks .k5login directly and
-+ * does not use krb5_kuserok() which might be more useful for the given
-+ * purpose. Additionally this patch is not synced with
-+ * openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch.
-+ *
-+ * The current patch tries to restore the usage of krb5_kuserok() so that e.g.
-+ * localauth plugins can be used. It does so by adding a forth parameter to
-+ * ssh_krb5_kuserok() which indicates whether .k5login exists or not. If it
-+ * does not exists krb5_kuserok() is called even if KerberosUseKuserok is set
-+ * to 'no' because the intent of the option is to not check .k5login and if it
-+ * does not exists krb5_kuserok() returns a result without checking .k5login.
-+ * If .k5login does exists and KerberosUseKuserok is 'no' we fall back to
-+ * krb5_aname_to_localname(). This is in my point of view an acceptable
-+ * limitation and does not break the current behaviour.
-+ *
-+ * Additionally with this patch ssh_krb5_kuserok() is called in
-+ * ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok() instead of only krb5_aname_to_localname() is
-+ * neither .k5login nor .k5users exists to allow plugin evaluation via
-+ * krb5_kuserok() as well.
-+ *
-+ * I tried to keep the patch as minimal as possible, nevertheless I see some
-+ * areas for improvement which, if they make sense, have to be evaluated
-+ * carefully because they might change existing behaviour and cause breaks
-+ * during upgrade:
-+ * - I wonder if disabling .k5login usage make sense in sshd or if it should
-+ * be better disabled globally in krb5.conf
-+ * - if really needed openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch should be fixed to really
-+ * only disable checking .k5login and maybe .k5users
-+ * - the ksu behaviour should be configurable and maybe check the .k5login and
-+ * .k5users files directly like ksu itself does
-+ * - to make krb5_aname_to_localname() more useful an option for sshd to use
-+ * the canonical name (the one returned by getpwnam()) instead of the name
-+ * given at the login prompt might be useful */
-+
- static int
- ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name)
- {
-@@ -116,7 +214,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name)
- /* NOTE: .k5login and .k5users must opened as root, not the user,
- * because if they are on a krb5-protected filesystem, user credentials
- * to access these files aren't available yet. */
-- if (krb5_kuserok(krb_context, princ, name) && k5login_exists) {
-+ if (ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb_context, princ, name, k5login_exists)
-+ && k5login_exists) {
- retval = 1;
- logit("Authorized to %s, krb5 principal %s (krb5_kuserok)",
- name, (char *)client->displayname.value);
-@@ -171,9 +270,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal principal, const char *name,
- snprintf(file, sizeof(file), "%s/.k5users", pw->pw_dir);
- /* If both .k5login and .k5users DNE, self-login is ok. */
- if (!k5login_exists && (access(file, F_OK) == -1)) {
-- return (krb5_aname_to_localname(krb_context, principal,
-- sizeof(kuser), kuser) == 0) &&
-- (strcmp(kuser, luser) == 0);
-+ return ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb_context, principal, luser,
-+ k5login_exists);
- }
- if ((fp = fopen(file, "r")) == NULL) {
- int saved_errno = errno;
-diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
-index 68fb9ef..904c869 100644
---- a/servconf.c
-+++ b/servconf.c
-@@ -157,6 +157,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
- options->ip_qos_interactive = -1;
- options->ip_qos_bulk = -1;
- options->version_addendum = NULL;
-+ options->use_kuserok = -1;
- }
-
- void
-@@ -312,6 +313,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
- options->version_addendum = xstrdup("");
- if (options->show_patchlevel == -1)
- options->show_patchlevel = 0;
-+ if (options->use_kuserok == -1)
-+ options->use_kuserok = 1;
-
- /* Turn privilege separation on by default */
- if (use_privsep == -1)
-@@ -338,7 +341,7 @@ typedef enum {
- sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel,
- sRhostsRSAAuthentication, sRSAAuthentication,
- sKerberosAuthentication, sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, sKerberosTicketCleanup,
-- sKerberosGetAFSToken,
-+ sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUseKuserok,
- sKerberosTgtPassing, sChallengeResponseAuthentication,
- sPasswordAuthentication, sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
- sListenAddress, sAddressFamily,
-@@ -410,11 +413,13 @@ static struct {
- #else
- { "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- #endif
-+ { "kerberosusekuserok", sKerberosUseKuserok, SSHCFG_ALL },
- #else
- { "kerberosauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
- { "kerberosorlocalpasswd", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- { "kerberosticketcleanup", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- { "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-+ { "kerberosusekuserok", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
- #endif
- { "kerberostgtpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- { "afstokenpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-@@ -1526,6 +1531,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
- *activep = value;
- break;
-
-+ case sKerberosUseKuserok:
-+ intptr = &options->use_kuserok;
-+ goto parse_flag;
-+
- case sPermitOpen:
- arg = strdelim(&cp);
- if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
-@@ -1811,6 +1820,7 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *dst, ServerOptions *src, int preauth)
- M_CP_INTOPT(max_authtries);
- M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_interactive);
- M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_bulk);
-+ M_CP_INTOPT(use_kuserok);
- M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_limit);
- M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_interval);
-
-@@ -2062,6 +2072,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
- dump_cfg_fmtint(sUseDNS, o->use_dns);
- dump_cfg_fmtint(sAllowTcpForwarding, o->allow_tcp_forwarding);
- dump_cfg_fmtint(sUsePrivilegeSeparation, use_privsep);
-+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosUseKuserok, o->use_kuserok);
-
- /* string arguments */
- dump_cfg_string(sPidFile, o->pid_file);
-diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
-index 37cfa9b..5117dfa 100644
---- a/servconf.h
-+++ b/servconf.h
-@@ -173,6 +173,7 @@ typedef struct {
-
- int num_permitted_opens;
-
-+ int use_kuserok;
- char *chroot_directory;
- char *revoked_keys_file;
- char *trusted_user_ca_keys;
-diff --git a/sshd_config b/sshd_config
-index adfd7b1..e772ed5 100644
---- a/sshd_config
-+++ b/sshd_config
-@@ -87,6 +87,7 @@ ChallengeResponseAuthentication no
- #KerberosOrLocalPasswd yes
- #KerberosTicketCleanup yes
- #KerberosGetAFSToken no
-+#KerberosUseKuserok yes
-
- # GSSAPI options
- GSSAPIAuthentication yes
-diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
-index 1fb002d..e0e5fff 100644
---- a/sshd_config.5
-+++ b/sshd_config.5
-@@ -697,6 +697,10 @@ Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's ticket cache
- file on logout.
- The default is
- .Dq yes .
-+.It Cm KerberosUseKuserok
-+Specifies whether to look at .k5login file for user's aliases.
-+The default is
-+.Dq yes .
- .It Cm KexAlgorithms
- Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms.
- Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
-@@ -862,6 +866,7 @@ Available keywords are
- .Cm HostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly ,
- .Cm KbdInteractiveAuthentication ,
- .Cm KerberosAuthentication ,
-+.Cm KerberosUseKuserok ,
- .Cm MaxAuthTries ,
- .Cm MaxSessions ,
- .Cm PasswordAuthentication ,
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-ldap.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-ldap.patch
index fb8dd2b..ef5b14b 100644
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-ldap.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-ldap.patch
@@ -1,8 +1,6 @@
-diff --git a/HOWTO.ldap-keys b/HOWTO.ldap-keys
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..dd5f5cc
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/HOWTO.ldap-keys
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/HOWTO.ldap-keys.ldap openssh-7.4p1/HOWTO.ldap-keys
+--- openssh-7.4p1/HOWTO.ldap-keys.ldap 2017-02-08 14:26:19.935750452 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/HOWTO.ldap-keys 2017-02-08 14:26:19.935750452 +0100
@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
+
+HOW TO START
@@ -129,10 +127,9 @@ index 0000000..dd5f5cc
+5) Author
+ Jan F. Chadima <jchadima@redhat.com>
+
-diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in
-index 28a8ec4..411eadb 100644
---- a/Makefile.in
-+++ b/Makefile.in
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/Makefile.in.ldap openssh-7.4p1/Makefile.in
+--- openssh-7.4p1/Makefile.in.ldap 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/Makefile.in 2017-02-08 14:31:36.851624797 +0100
@@ -25,6 +25,8 @@ SSH_PROGRAM=@bindir@/ssh
ASKPASS_PROGRAM=$(libexecdir)/ssh-askpass
SFTP_SERVER=$(libexecdir)/sftp-server
@@ -142,7 +139,7 @@ index 28a8ec4..411eadb 100644
SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-pkcs11-helper
PRIVSEP_PATH=@PRIVSEP_PATH@
SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=@SSH_PRIVSEP_USER@
-@@ -60,8 +62,9 @@ XAUTH_PATH=@XAUTH_PATH@
+@@ -61,8 +63,9 @@ XAUTH_PATH=@XAUTH_PATH@
LDFLAGS=-L. -Lopenbsd-compat/ @LDFLAGS@
EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@
MANFMT=@MANFMT@
@@ -151,11 +148,11 @@ index 28a8ec4..411eadb 100644
-TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT)
+TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT)
- LIBSSH_OBJS=authfd.o authfile.o bufaux.o bufbn.o buffer.o \
- canohost.o channels.o cipher.o cipher-aes.o \
-@@ -98,8 +101,8 @@ SSHDOBJS=sshd.o auth-rhosts.o auth-passwd.o auth-rsa.o auth-rh-rsa.o \
- sandbox-null.o sandbox-rlimit.o sandbox-systrace.o sandbox-darwin.o \
- sandbox-seccomp-filter.o sandbox-capsicum.o
+ LIBOPENSSH_OBJS=\
+ ssh_api.o \
+@@ -112,8 +115,8 @@ SSHDOBJS=sshd.o auth-rhosts.o auth-passw
+ sandbox-seccomp-filter.o sandbox-capsicum.o sandbox-pledge.o \
+ sandbox-solaris.o
-MANPAGES = moduli.5.out scp.1.out ssh-add.1.out ssh-agent.1.out ssh-keygen.1.out ssh-keyscan.1.out ssh.1.out sshd.8.out sftp-server.8.out sftp.1.out ssh-keysign.8.out ssh-pkcs11-helper.8.out sshd_config.5.out ssh_config.5.out
-MANPAGES_IN = moduli.5 scp.1 ssh-add.1 ssh-agent.1 ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keyscan.1 ssh.1 sshd.8 sftp-server.8 sftp.1 ssh-keysign.8 ssh-pkcs11-helper.8 sshd_config.5 ssh_config.5
@@ -164,17 +161,17 @@ index 28a8ec4..411eadb 100644
MANTYPE = @MANTYPE@
CONFIGFILES=sshd_config.out ssh_config.out moduli.out
-@@ -170,6 +173,9 @@ ssh-keysign$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keysign.o roaming_dummy.o readco
+@@ -184,6 +187,9 @@ ssh-keysign$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libss
ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-pkcs11-helper.o ssh-pkcs11.o
$(LD) -o $@ ssh-pkcs11-helper.o ssh-pkcs11.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ldapconf.o ldapbody.o ldapmisc.o ldap-helper.o
-+ $(LD) -o $@ ldapconf.o ldapbody.o ldapmisc.o ldap-helper.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(LIBS)
++ $(LD) -o $@ ldapconf.o ldapbody.o ldapmisc.o ldap-helper.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(LIBS)
+
- ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keyscan.o roaming_dummy.o
- $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o roaming_dummy.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
+ ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keyscan.o
+ $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
-@@ -273,6 +279,10 @@ install-files:
+@@ -322,6 +328,10 @@ install-files:
$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sshd$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(sbindir)/sshd$(EXEEXT)
$(INSTALL) -m 4711 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keysign$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_KEYSIGN)$(EXEEXT)
$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_PKCS11_HELPER)$(EXEEXT)
@@ -185,7 +182,7 @@ index 28a8ec4..411eadb 100644
$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT)
$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT)
$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1
-@@ -289,6 +299,10 @@ install-files:
+@@ -338,6 +348,10 @@ install-files:
$(INSTALL) -m 644 sftp-server.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/sftp-server.8
$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-keysign.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-keysign.8
$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-pkcs11-helper.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8
@@ -193,10 +190,10 @@ index 28a8ec4..411eadb 100644
+ $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-ldap-helper.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-ldap-helper.8 ; \
+ $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-ldap.conf.5.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5/ssh-ldap.conf.5 ; \
+ fi
- -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/slogin
- ln -s ./ssh$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/slogin
- -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/slogin.1
-@@ -318,6 +332,13 @@ install-sysconf:
+
+ install-sysconf:
+ if [ ! -d $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir) ]; then \
+@@ -363,6 +377,13 @@ install-sysconf:
else \
echo "$(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/moduli already exists, install will not overwrite"; \
fi
@@ -210,7 +207,7 @@ index 28a8ec4..411eadb 100644
host-key: ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT)
@if [ -z "$(DESTDIR)" ] ; then \
-@@ -381,6 +402,8 @@ uninstall:
+@@ -403,6 +424,8 @@ uninstall:
-rm -r $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT)
-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_KEYSIGN)$(EXEEXT)
-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_PKCS11_HELPER)$(EXEEXT)
@@ -219,19 +216,18 @@ index 28a8ec4..411eadb 100644
-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1
-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/scp.1
-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-add.1
-@@ -392,6 +415,7 @@ uninstall:
+@@ -414,6 +437,7 @@ uninstall:
-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/sftp-server.8
-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-keysign.8
-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8
+ -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-ldap-helper.8
- -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/slogin.1
- regress/modpipe$(EXEEXT): $(srcdir)/regress/modpipe.c
-diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
-index 7c6ce08..722a19e 100644
---- a/configure.ac
-+++ b/configure.ac
-@@ -1625,6 +1625,106 @@ if test "x$use_pie" != "xno"; then
+ regress-prep:
+ [ -d `pwd`/regress ] || mkdir -p `pwd`/regress
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/configure.ac.ldap openssh-7.4p1/configure.ac
+--- openssh-7.4p1/configure.ac.ldap 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/configure.ac 2017-02-08 14:26:19.936750452 +0100
+@@ -1656,6 +1656,106 @@ if test "x$use_pie" != "xno"; then
fi
fi
@@ -338,11 +334,9 @@ index 7c6ce08..722a19e 100644
dnl Checks for library functions. Please keep in alphabetical order
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([ \
Blowfish_initstate \
-diff --git a/ldap-helper.c b/ldap-helper.c
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..e95a94a
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/ldap-helper.c
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/ldap-helper.c.ldap openssh-7.4p1/ldap-helper.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/ldap-helper.c.ldap 2017-02-08 14:26:19.936750452 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/ldap-helper.c 2017-02-08 14:26:19.936750452 +0100
@@ -0,0 +1,155 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-pka-ldap.c,v 1.1 2009/12/03 03:34:42 jfch Exp $ */
+/*
@@ -499,11 +493,9 @@ index 0000000..e95a94a
+void *buffer_get_string(Buffer *b, u_int *l) { return NULL; }
+void buffer_put_string(Buffer *b, const void *f, u_int l) {}
+
-diff --git a/ldap-helper.h b/ldap-helper.h
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..14cb29a
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/ldap-helper.h
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/ldap-helper.h.ldap openssh-7.4p1/ldap-helper.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/ldap-helper.h.ldap 2017-02-08 14:26:19.936750452 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/ldap-helper.h 2017-02-08 14:26:19.936750452 +0100
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: ldap-helper.h,v 1.1 2009/12/03 03:34:42 jfch Exp $ */
+/*
@@ -537,12 +529,10 @@ index 0000000..14cb29a
+extern int config_warning_config_file;
+
+#endif /* LDAP_HELPER_H */
-diff --git a/ldap.conf b/ldap.conf
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..42e38d3
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/ldap.conf
-@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/ldap.conf.ldap openssh-7.4p1/ldap.conf
+--- openssh-7.4p1/ldap.conf.ldap 2017-02-08 14:26:19.936750452 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/ldap.conf 2017-02-08 14:26:19.936750452 +0100
+@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+# $Id: openssh-5.5p1-ldap.patch,v 1.3 2010/07/07 13:48:36 jfch2222 Exp $
+#
+# This is the example configuration file for the OpenSSH
@@ -631,11 +621,15 @@ index 0000000..42e38d3
+#tls_cert
+#tls_key
+
-diff --git a/ldapbody.c b/ldapbody.c
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..3029108
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/ldapbody.c
++# OpenLDAP search_format
++# format used to search for users in LDAP directory using substitution
++# for %u for user name and %f for SSH_Filter option (optional, empty by default)
++#search_format (&(objectclass=%c)(objectclass=ldapPublicKey)(uid=%u)%f)
++
++#AccountClass posixAccount
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/ldapbody.c.ldap openssh-7.4p1/ldapbody.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/ldapbody.c.ldap 2017-02-08 14:26:19.937750451 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/ldapbody.c 2017-02-08 14:26:19.937750451 +0100
@@ -0,0 +1,493 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: ldapbody.c,v 1.1 2009/12/03 03:34:42 jfch Exp $ */
+/*
@@ -1130,11 +1124,9 @@ index 0000000..3029108
+ return;
+}
+
-diff --git a/ldapbody.h b/ldapbody.h
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..665dca2
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/ldapbody.h
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/ldapbody.h.ldap openssh-7.4p1/ldapbody.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/ldapbody.h.ldap 2017-02-08 14:26:19.937750451 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/ldapbody.h 2017-02-08 14:26:19.937750451 +0100
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: ldapbody.h,v 1.1 2009/12/03 03:34:42 jfch Exp $ */
+/*
@@ -1173,12 +1165,10 @@ index 0000000..665dca2
+
+#endif /* LDAPBODY_H */
+
-diff --git a/ldapconf.c b/ldapconf.c
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..525060a
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/ldapconf.c
-@@ -0,0 +1,729 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/ldapconf.c.ldap openssh-7.4p1/ldapconf.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/ldapconf.c.ldap 2017-02-08 14:26:19.937750451 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/ldapconf.c 2017-02-08 14:26:19.937750451 +0100
+@@ -0,0 +1,728 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: ldapconf.c,v 1.1 2009/12/03 03:34:42 jfch Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2009 Jan F. Chadima. All rights reserved.
@@ -1641,7 +1631,7 @@ index 0000000..525060a
+{
+ FILE *f;
+ char line[1024];
-+ int active, linenum;
++ int linenum;
+ int bad_options = 0;
+ struct stat sb;
+
@@ -1660,7 +1650,6 @@ index 0000000..525060a
+ * Mark that we are now processing the options. This flag is turned
+ * on/off by Host specifications.
+ */
-+ active = 1;
+ linenum = 0;
+ while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), f)) {
+ /* Update line number counter. */
@@ -1755,7 +1744,7 @@ index 0000000..525060a
+ len = snprintf (options.uri, MAXURILEN, "ldap%s://%s:%d",
+ (options.ssl == 0) ? "" : "s", options.host, options.port);
+ options.uri[MAXURILEN - 1] = 0;
-+ options.uri = xrealloc (options.uri, len + 1, 1);
++ options.uri = xreallocarray(options.uri, len + 1, 1);
+ }
+ if (options.binddn == NULL)
+ options.binddn = "";
@@ -1905,14 +1894,12 @@ index 0000000..525060a
+ dump_cfg_int(lDebug, options.debug);
+ dump_cfg_string(lSSH_Filter, options.ssh_filter);
+ dump_cfg_string(lSearch_Format, options.search_format);
-+ dump_cfg_string(lAccountClass, options.logdir);
++ dump_cfg_string(lAccountClass, options.account_class);
+}
+
-diff --git a/ldapconf.h b/ldapconf.h
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..2cb550c
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/ldapconf.h
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/ldapconf.h.ldap openssh-7.4p1/ldapconf.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/ldapconf.h.ldap 2017-02-08 14:26:19.937750451 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/ldapconf.h 2017-02-08 14:26:19.937750451 +0100
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: ldapconf.c,v 1.1 2009/12/03 03:34:42 jfch Exp $ */
+/*
@@ -1987,11 +1974,9 @@ index 0000000..2cb550c
+void dump_config(void);
+
+#endif /* LDAPCONF_H */
-diff --git a/ldapincludes.h b/ldapincludes.h
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..8539bdc
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/ldapincludes.h
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/ldapincludes.h.ldap openssh-7.4p1/ldapincludes.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/ldapincludes.h.ldap 2017-02-08 14:26:19.937750451 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/ldapincludes.h 2017-02-08 14:26:19.937750451 +0100
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: ldapconf.c,v 1.1 2009/12/03 03:34:42 jfch Exp $ */
+/*
@@ -2034,11 +2019,9 @@ index 0000000..8539bdc
+#endif
+
+#endif /* LDAPINCLUDES_H */
-diff --git a/ldapmisc.c b/ldapmisc.c
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..de23c0c
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/ldapmisc.c
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/ldapmisc.c.ldap openssh-7.4p1/ldapmisc.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/ldapmisc.c.ldap 2017-02-08 14:26:19.937750451 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/ldapmisc.c 2017-02-08 14:26:19.937750451 +0100
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+
+#include "ldapincludes.h"
@@ -2119,11 +2102,9 @@ index 0000000..de23c0c
+}
+#endif
+
-diff --git a/ldapmisc.h b/ldapmisc.h
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..4c271df
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/ldapmisc.h
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/ldapmisc.h.ldap openssh-7.4p1/ldapmisc.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/ldapmisc.h.ldap 2017-02-08 14:26:19.937750451 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/ldapmisc.h 2017-02-08 14:26:19.937750451 +0100
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: ldapbody.h,v 1.1 2009/12/03 03:34:42 jfch Exp $ */
+/*
@@ -2160,11 +2141,9 @@ index 0000000..4c271df
+
+#endif /* LDAPMISC_H */
+
-diff --git a/openssh-lpk-openldap.schema b/openssh-lpk-openldap.schema
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..c84f90f
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/openssh-lpk-openldap.schema
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/openssh-lpk-openldap.schema.ldap openssh-7.4p1/openssh-lpk-openldap.schema
+--- openssh-7.4p1/openssh-lpk-openldap.schema.ldap 2017-02-08 14:26:19.937750451 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/openssh-lpk-openldap.schema 2017-02-08 14:26:19.937750451 +0100
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+#
+# LDAP Public Key Patch schema for use with openssh-ldappubkey
@@ -2187,11 +2166,9 @@ index 0000000..c84f90f
+ DESC 'MANDATORY: OpenSSH LPK objectclass'
+ MUST ( sshPublicKey $ uid )
+ )
-diff --git a/openssh-lpk-sun.schema b/openssh-lpk-sun.schema
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..3136673
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/openssh-lpk-sun.schema
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/openssh-lpk-sun.schema.ldap openssh-7.4p1/openssh-lpk-sun.schema
+--- openssh-7.4p1/openssh-lpk-sun.schema.ldap 2017-02-08 14:26:19.938750451 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/openssh-lpk-sun.schema 2017-02-08 14:26:19.938750451 +0100
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+#
+# LDAP Public Key Patch schema for use with openssh-ldappubkey
@@ -2216,11 +2193,9 @@ index 0000000..3136673
+ DESC 'MANDATORY: OpenSSH LPK objectclass'
+ MUST ( sshPublicKey $ uid )
+ )
-diff --git a/ssh-ldap-helper.8 b/ssh-ldap-helper.8
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..5d2d7be
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/ssh-ldap-helper.8
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/ssh-ldap-helper.8.ldap openssh-7.4p1/ssh-ldap-helper.8
+--- openssh-7.4p1/ssh-ldap-helper.8.ldap 2017-02-08 14:26:19.938750451 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/ssh-ldap-helper.8 2017-02-08 14:26:19.938750451 +0100
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-ldap-helper.8,v 1.1 2010/02/10 23:20:38 markus Exp $
+.\"
@@ -2301,21 +2276,17 @@ index 0000000..5d2d7be
+OpenSSH 5.5 + PKA-LDAP .
+.Sh AUTHORS
+.An Jan F. Chadima Aq jchadima@redhat.com
-diff --git a/ssh-ldap-wrapper b/ssh-ldap-wrapper
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..cb500aa
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/ssh-ldap-wrapper
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/ssh-ldap-wrapper.ldap openssh-7.4p1/ssh-ldap-wrapper
+--- openssh-7.4p1/ssh-ldap-wrapper.ldap 2017-02-08 14:26:19.938750451 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/ssh-ldap-wrapper 2017-02-08 14:26:19.938750451 +0100
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+
+exec /usr/libexec/openssh/ssh-ldap-helper -s "$1"
+
-diff --git a/ssh-ldap.conf.5 b/ssh-ldap.conf.5
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..f7081b8
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/ssh-ldap.conf.5
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/ssh-ldap.conf.5.ldap openssh-7.4p1/ssh-ldap.conf.5
+--- openssh-7.4p1/ssh-ldap.conf.5.ldap 2017-02-08 14:26:19.938750451 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/ssh-ldap.conf.5 2017-02-08 14:26:19.938750451 +0100
@@ -0,0 +1,379 @@
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-ldap.conf.5,v 1.1 2010/02/10 23:20:38 markus Exp $
+.\"
@@ -2702,11 +2673,9 @@ index 0000000..f7081b8
+OpenSSH 5.5 + PKA-LDAP .
+.Sh AUTHORS
+.An Jan F. Chadima Aq jchadima@redhat.com
-diff --git a/openssh-lpk-openldap.ldif b/openssh-lpk-openldap.ldif
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..9adf4b8
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/openssh-lpk-openldap.ldif
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/openssh-lpk-openldap.ldif.ldap openssh-7.4p1/openssh-lpk-openldap.ldif
+--- openssh-7.4p1/openssh-lpk-openldap.ldif.ldap 2017-02-08 14:26:19.938750451 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/openssh-lpk-openldap.ldif 2017-02-08 14:26:19.938750451 +0100
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+#
+# LDAP Public Key Patch schema for use with openssh-ldappubkey
@@ -2727,11 +2696,9 @@ index 0000000..9adf4b8
+olcObjectClasses: {0}( 1.3.6.1.4.1.24552.500.1.1.2.0
+ NAME 'ldapPublicKey' DESC 'MANDATORY: OpenSSH LPK objectclass'
+ SUP top AUXILIARY MUST ( sshPublicKey $ uid ) )
-diff --git a/openssh-lpk-sun.ldif b/openssh-lpk-sun.ldif
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..9adf4b8
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/openssh-lpk-sun.ldif
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/openssh-lpk-sun.ldif.ldap openssh-7.4p1/openssh-lpk-sun.ldif
+--- openssh-7.4p1/openssh-lpk-sun.ldif.ldap 2017-02-08 14:26:19.938750451 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/openssh-lpk-sun.ldif 2017-02-08 14:26:19.938750451 +0100
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+#
+# LDAP Public Key Patch schema for use with openssh-ldappubkey
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-memory-problems.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-memory-problems.patch
index f359193..0f5a0ab 100644
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-memory-problems.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-memory-problems.patch
@@ -1,8 +1,7 @@
-diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
-index ad5869b..0255ed3 100644
---- a/servconf.c
-+++ b/servconf.c
-@@ -1910,6 +1910,8 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *dst, ServerOptions *src, int preauth)
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.memory-problems openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.memory-problems 2017-02-09 10:41:42.483123417 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c 2017-02-09 10:42:16.392102462 +0100
+@@ -2006,6 +2006,8 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *d
dst->n = src->n; \
} while (0)
@@ -10,8 +9,8 @@ index ad5869b..0255ed3 100644
+
M_CP_INTOPT(password_authentication);
M_CP_INTOPT(gss_authentication);
- M_CP_INTOPT(rsa_authentication);
-@@ -1947,8 +1949,10 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *dst, ServerOptions *src, int preauth)
+ M_CP_INTOPT(pubkey_authentication);
+@@ -2058,8 +2060,10 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *d
} while(0)
#define M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(n, num_n) do {\
if (src->num_n != 0) { \
@@ -23,21 +22,4 @@ index ad5869b..0255ed3 100644
} \
} while(0)
-diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
-index 7e43153..f2a08f6 100644
---- a/sshd.c
-+++ b/sshd.c
-@@ -2160,10 +2160,12 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- }
- #endif /* LIBWRAP */
-
-+ char *addr = get_local_ipaddr(sock_in);
- /* Log the connection. */
- verbose("Connection from %s port %d on %s port %d",
- remote_ip, remote_port,
-- get_local_ipaddr(sock_in), get_local_port());
-+ addr, get_local_port());
-+ free(addr);
-
- /*
- * We don't want to listen forever unless the other side
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.memory-problems openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-permitopen-any-host.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-permitopen-any-host.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index ec519b2..0000000
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-permitopen-any-host.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,74 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-6.6p1/channels.c.permitopen openssh-6.6p1/channels.c
---- openssh-6.6p1/channels.c.permitopen 2016-06-29 15:37:08.780327108 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.6p1/channels.c 2016-06-29 16:04:38.480857525 +0200
-@@ -128,6 +128,9 @@ static int num_adm_permitted_opens = 0;
- /* special-case port number meaning allow any port */
- #define FWD_PERMIT_ANY_PORT 0
-
-+/* special-case wildcard meaning allow any host */
-+#define FWD_PERMIT_ANY_HOST "*"
-+
- /*
- * If this is true, all opens are permitted. This is the case on the server
- * on which we have to trust the client anyway, and the user could do
-@@ -3271,6 +3274,21 @@ port_match(u_short allowedport, u_short
- return 0;
- }
-
-+static int
-+open_match(ForwardPermission *allowed_open, const char *requestedhost,
-+ u_short requestedport)
-+{
-+ if (allowed_open->host_to_connect == NULL)
-+ return 0;
-+ if (allowed_open->port_to_connect != FWD_PERMIT_ANY_PORT &&
-+ allowed_open->port_to_connect != requestedport)
-+ return 0;
-+ if (strcmp(allowed_open->host_to_connect, FWD_PERMIT_ANY_HOST) != 0 &&
-+ strcmp(allowed_open->host_to_connect, requestedhost) != 0)
-+ return 0;
-+ return 1;
-+}
-+
- /* Try to start non-blocking connect to next host in cctx list */
- static int
- connect_next(struct channel_connect *cctx)
-@@ -3391,20 +3409,18 @@ channel_connect_to(const char *host, u_s
- permit = all_opens_permitted;
- if (!permit) {
- for (i = 0; i < num_permitted_opens; i++)
-- if (permitted_opens[i].host_to_connect != NULL &&
-- port_match(permitted_opens[i].port_to_connect, port) &&
-- strcmp(permitted_opens[i].host_to_connect, host) == 0)
-+ if (open_match(&permitted_opens[i], host, port)) {
- permit = 1;
-+ }
- }
-
- if (num_adm_permitted_opens > 0) {
- permit_adm = 0;
- for (i = 0; i < num_adm_permitted_opens; i++)
-- if (permitted_adm_opens[i].host_to_connect != NULL &&
-- port_match(permitted_adm_opens[i].port_to_connect, port) &&
-- strcmp(permitted_adm_opens[i].host_to_connect, host)
-- == 0)
-+ if (open_match(&permitted_adm_opens[i], host, port)) {
- permit_adm = 1;
-+ break;
-+ }
- }
-
- if (!permit || !permit_adm) {
-diff -up openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config.5.permitopen openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config.5
---- openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config.5.permitopen 2016-06-29 15:37:08.778327110 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config.5 2016-06-29 15:37:08.782327106 +0200
-@@ -1005,6 +1005,9 @@ can be used to remove all restrictions a
- An argument of
- .Dq none
- can be used to prohibit all forwarding requests.
-+Wildcard
-+.Dq *
-+can be used for host or port to allow all hosts or all ports respectively.
- By default all port forwarding requests are permitted.
- .It Cm PermitRootLogin
- Specifies whether root can log in using
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-privsep-selinux.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-privsep-selinux.patch
index 6507647..8b7d0c2 100644
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-privsep-selinux.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-privsep-selinux.patch
@@ -89,9 +89,9 @@ index 07f9926..a97f8b7 100644
+ ssh_selinux_change_context("sshd_net_t");
+#endif
+
- /* Change our root directory */
- if (chroot(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR) == -1)
- fatal("chroot(\"%s\"): %s", _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR,
+ /* Demote the child */
+ if (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0) {
+ /* Change our root directory */
@@ -768,6 +772,13 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
do_setusercontext(authctxt->pw);
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-redhat.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-redhat.patch
index 12f4a9f..cd48484 100644
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-redhat.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-redhat.patch
@@ -1,8 +1,7 @@
-diff --git a/ssh_config b/ssh_config
-index 49a4f6c..3f83c40 100644
---- a/ssh_config
-+++ b/ssh_config
-@@ -50,3 +50,15 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/ssh_config.redhat openssh-7.4p1/ssh_config
+--- openssh-7.4p1/ssh_config.redhat 2017-02-08 15:22:30.811307915 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/ssh_config 2017-02-08 15:22:30.812307915 +0100
+@@ -52,3 +52,15 @@
# Uncomment this if you want to use .local domain
# Host *.local
# CheckHostIP no
@@ -18,11 +17,38 @@ index 49a4f6c..3f83c40 100644
+ SendEnv LC_PAPER LC_NAME LC_ADDRESS LC_TELEPHONE LC_MEASUREMENT
+ SendEnv LC_IDENTIFICATION LC_ALL LANGUAGE
+ SendEnv XMODIFIERS
-diff --git a/sshd_config b/sshd_config
-index c735429..e68ddee 100644
---- a/sshd_config
-+++ b/sshd_config
-@@ -10,6 +10,10 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.0.redhat openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.0
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.0.redhat 2016-12-19 06:21:22.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.0 2017-02-08 15:22:30.813307914 +0100
+@@ -837,9 +837,9 @@ DESCRIPTION
+
+ SyslogFacility
+ Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from
+- sshd(8). The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0,
+- LOCAL1, LOCAL2, LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7. The
+- default is AUTH.
++ sshd(8). The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, AUTHPRIV,
++ LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2, LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7.
++ The default is AUTH.
+
+ TCPKeepAlive
+ Specifies whether the system should send TCP keepalive messages
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.redhat openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.redhat 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5 2017-02-08 15:22:30.813307914 +0100
+@@ -1393,7 +1393,7 @@ By default no subsystems are defined.
+ .It Cm SyslogFacility
+ Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from
+ .Xr sshd 8 .
+-The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2,
++The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, AUTHPRIV, LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2,
+ LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7.
+ The default is AUTH.
+ .It Cm TCPKeepAlive
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.redhat openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.redhat 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config 2017-02-08 15:33:24.705736576 +0100
+@@ -10,21 +10,26 @@
# possible, but leave them commented. Uncommented options override the
# default value.
@@ -33,10 +59,8 @@ index c735429..e68ddee 100644
#Port 22
#AddressFamily any
#ListenAddress 0.0.0.0
-@@ -21,10 +25,10 @@
- # HostKey for protocol version 1
- #HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key
- # HostKeys for protocol version 2
+ #ListenAddress ::
+
-#HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
+HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
#HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key
@@ -45,17 +69,16 @@ index c735429..e68ddee 100644
+HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key
+HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key
- # Lifetime and size of ephemeral version 1 server key
- #KeyRegenerationInterval 1h
-@@ -36,6 +40,7 @@
+ # Ciphers and keying
+ #RekeyLimit default none
+
# Logging
- # obsoletes QuietMode and FascistLogging
#SyslogFacility AUTH
+SyslogFacility AUTHPRIV
#LogLevel INFO
# Authentication:
-@@ -71,9 +76,11 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys
+@@ -57,9 +62,11 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys
# To disable tunneled clear text passwords, change to no here!
#PasswordAuthentication yes
#PermitEmptyPasswords no
@@ -67,7 +90,7 @@ index c735429..e68ddee 100644
# Kerberos options
#KerberosAuthentication no
-@@ -82,8 +89,8 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys
+@@ -68,8 +75,8 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys
#KerberosGetAFSToken no
# GSSAPI options
@@ -78,7 +101,7 @@ index c735429..e68ddee 100644
# Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing,
# and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will
-@@ -94,12 +101,12 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys
+@@ -80,12 +87,12 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys
# If you just want the PAM account and session checks to run without
# PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication
# and ChallengeResponseAuthentication to 'no'.
@@ -93,7 +116,7 @@ index c735429..e68ddee 100644
#X11DisplayOffset 10
#X11UseLocalhost yes
#PermitTTY yes
-@@ -122,6 +129,12 @@ UsePrivilegeSeparation sandbox # Default for new installations.
+@@ -108,6 +115,12 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys
# no default banner path
#Banner none
@@ -106,33 +129,3 @@ index c735429..e68ddee 100644
# override default of no subsystems
Subsystem sftp /usr/libexec/sftp-server
-diff --git a/sshd_config.0 b/sshd_config.0
-index 413c260..87e7ee7 100644
---- a/sshd_config.0
-+++ b/sshd_config.0
-@@ -675,9 +675,9 @@ DESCRIPTION
-
- SyslogFacility
- Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from
-- sshd(8). The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0,
-- LOCAL1, LOCAL2, LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7. The
-- default is AUTH.
-+ sshd(8). The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, AUTHPRIV,
-+ LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2, LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7.
-+ The default is AUTH.
-
- TCPKeepAlive
- Specifies whether the system should send TCP keepalive messages
-diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
-index ce71efe..12465c2 100644
---- a/sshd_config.5
-+++ b/sshd_config.5
-@@ -1131,7 +1131,7 @@ Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
- .It Cm SyslogFacility
- Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from
- .Xr sshd 8 .
--The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2,
-+The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, AUTHPRIV, LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2,
- LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7.
- The default is AUTH.
- .It Cm TCPKeepAlive
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-role-mls.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-role-mls.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 4740c99..0000000
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-role-mls.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,896 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/auth-pam.c b/auth-pam.c
-index d789bad..cd1a775 100644
---- a/auth-pam.c
-+++ b/auth-pam.c
-@@ -1068,7 +1068,7 @@ is_pam_session_open(void)
- * during the ssh authentication process.
- */
- int
--do_pam_putenv(char *name, char *value)
-+do_pam_putenv(char *name, const char *value)
- {
- int ret = 1;
- #ifdef HAVE_PAM_PUTENV
-diff --git a/auth-pam.h b/auth-pam.h
-index a1a2b52..b109a5a 100644
---- a/auth-pam.h
-+++ b/auth-pam.h
-@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ void do_pam_session(void);
- void do_pam_set_tty(const char *);
- void do_pam_setcred(int );
- void do_pam_chauthtok(void);
--int do_pam_putenv(char *, char *);
-+int do_pam_putenv(char *, const char *);
- char ** fetch_pam_environment(void);
- char ** fetch_pam_child_environment(void);
- void free_pam_environment(char **);
-diff --git a/auth.h b/auth.h
-index 124e597..4605588 100644
---- a/auth.h
-+++ b/auth.h
-@@ -59,6 +59,9 @@ struct Authctxt {
- char *service;
- struct passwd *pw; /* set if 'valid' */
- char *style;
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+ char *role;
-+#endif
- void *kbdintctxt;
- char *info; /* Extra info for next auth_log */
- #ifdef BSD_AUTH
-diff --git a/auth1.c b/auth1.c
-index 0f870b3..df040bb 100644
---- a/auth1.c
-+++ b/auth1.c
-@@ -381,6 +381,9 @@ do_authentication(Authctxt *authctxt)
- {
- u_int ulen;
- char *user, *style = NULL;
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+ char *role=NULL;
-+#endif
-
- /* Get the name of the user that we wish to log in as. */
- packet_read_expect(SSH_CMSG_USER);
-@@ -389,11 +392,24 @@ do_authentication(Authctxt *authctxt)
- user = packet_get_cstring(&ulen);
- packet_check_eom();
-
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+ if ((role = strchr(user, '/')) != NULL)
-+ *role++ = '\0';
-+#endif
-+
- if ((style = strchr(user, ':')) != NULL)
- *style++ = '\0';
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+ else
-+ if (role && (style = strchr(role, ':')) != NULL)
-+ *style++ = '\0';
-+#endif
-
- authctxt->user = user;
- authctxt->style = style;
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+ authctxt->role = role;
-+#endif
-
- /* Verify that the user is a valid user. */
- if ((authctxt->pw = PRIVSEP(getpwnamallow(user))) != NULL)
-diff --git a/auth2-gss.c b/auth2-gss.c
-index c28a705..4756dd7 100644
---- a/auth2-gss.c
-+++ b/auth2-gss.c
-@@ -251,6 +251,7 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
- Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
- Gssctxt *gssctxt;
- int authenticated = 0;
-+ char *micuser;
- Buffer b;
- gss_buffer_desc mic, gssbuf;
- u_int len;
-@@ -263,7 +264,13 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
- mic.value = packet_get_string(&len);
- mic.length = len;
-
-- ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->user, authctxt->service,
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+ if (authctxt->role && (strlen(authctxt->role) > 0))
-+ xasprintf(&micuser, "%s/%s", authctxt->user, authctxt->role);
-+ else
-+#endif
-+ micuser = authctxt->user;
-+ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, micuser, authctxt->service,
- "gssapi-with-mic");
-
- gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b);
-@@ -275,6 +282,8 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
- logit("GSSAPI MIC check failed");
-
- buffer_free(&b);
-+ if (micuser != authctxt->user)
-+ free(micuser);
- free(mic.value);
-
- authctxt->postponed = 0;
-diff --git a/auth2-hostbased.c b/auth2-hostbased.c
-index eca0069..95d678e 100644
---- a/auth2-hostbased.c
-+++ b/auth2-hostbased.c
-@@ -112,7 +112,15 @@ userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *authctxt)
- buffer_put_string(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len);
- /* reconstruct packet */
- buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
-- buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->user);
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+ if (authctxt->role) {
-+ buffer_put_int(&b, strlen(authctxt->user)+strlen(authctxt->role)+1);
-+ buffer_append(&b, authctxt->user, strlen(authctxt->user));
-+ buffer_put_char(&b, '/');
-+ buffer_append(&b, authctxt->role, strlen(authctxt->role));
-+ } else
-+#endif
-+ buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->user);
- buffer_put_cstring(&b, service);
- buffer_put_cstring(&b, "hostbased");
- buffer_put_string(&b, pkalg, alen);
-diff --git a/auth2-pubkey.c b/auth2-pubkey.c
-index 749b11a..c0ae0d4 100644
---- a/auth2-pubkey.c
-+++ b/auth2-pubkey.c
-@@ -133,9 +133,11 @@ userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt)
- }
- /* reconstruct packet */
- buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
-- xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
-+ xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
- authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
-- authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
-+ authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "",
-+ authctxt->role ? "/" : "",
-+ authctxt->role ? authctxt->role : "");
- buffer_put_cstring(&b, userstyle);
- free(userstyle);
- buffer_put_cstring(&b,
-diff --git a/auth2.c b/auth2.c
-index a5490c0..5f4f26f 100644
---- a/auth2.c
-+++ b/auth2.c
-@@ -215,6 +215,9 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
- Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
- Authmethod *m = NULL;
- char *user, *service, *method, *style = NULL;
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+ char *role = NULL;
-+#endif
- int authenticated = 0;
-
- if (authctxt == NULL)
-@@ -226,6 +229,11 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
- debug("userauth-request for user %s service %s method %s", user, service, method);
- debug("attempt %d failures %d", authctxt->attempt, authctxt->failures);
-
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+ if ((role = strchr(user, '/')) != NULL)
-+ *role++ = 0;
-+#endif
-+
- if ((style = strchr(user, ':')) != NULL)
- *style++ = 0;
-
-@@ -251,8 +259,15 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
- use_privsep ? " [net]" : "");
- authctxt->service = xstrdup(service);
- authctxt->style = style ? xstrdup(style) : NULL;
-- if (use_privsep)
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+ authctxt->role = role ? xstrdup(role) : NULL;
-+#endif
-+ if (use_privsep) {
- mm_inform_authserv(service, style);
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+ mm_inform_authrole(role);
-+#endif
-+ }
- userauth_banner();
- if (auth2_setup_methods_lists(authctxt) != 0)
- packet_disconnect("no authentication methods enabled");
-diff --git a/misc.c b/misc.c
-index e4c8c32..f31cd91 100644
---- a/misc.c
-+++ b/misc.c
-@@ -430,6 +430,7 @@ char *
- colon(char *cp)
- {
- int flag = 0;
-+ int start = 1;
-
- if (*cp == ':') /* Leading colon is part of file name. */
- return NULL;
-@@ -445,6 +446,13 @@ colon(char *cp)
- return (cp);
- if (*cp == '/')
- return NULL;
-+ if (start) {
-+ /* Slash on beginning or after dots only denotes file name. */
-+ if (*cp == '/')
-+ return (0);
-+ if (*cp != '.')
-+ start = 0;
-+ }
- }
- return NULL;
- }
-diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
-index 531c4f9..229fada 100644
---- a/monitor.c
-+++ b/monitor.c
-@@ -145,6 +145,9 @@ int mm_answer_sign(int, Buffer *);
- int mm_answer_pwnamallow(int, Buffer *);
- int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(int, Buffer *);
- int mm_answer_authserv(int, Buffer *);
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+int mm_answer_authrole(int, Buffer *);
-+#endif
- int mm_answer_authpassword(int, Buffer *);
- int mm_answer_bsdauthquery(int, Buffer *);
- int mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(int, Buffer *);
-@@ -219,6 +222,9 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = {
- {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sign},
- {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
- {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authserv},
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authrole},
-+#endif
- {MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_auth2_read_banner},
- {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
- #ifdef USE_PAM
-@@ -805,6 +811,9 @@ mm_answer_pwnamallow(int sock, Buffer *m)
- else {
- /* Allow service/style information on the auth context */
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, 1);
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, 1);
-+#endif
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, 1);
- }
- #ifdef USE_PAM
-@@ -846,6 +855,25 @@ mm_answer_authserv(int sock, Buffer *m)
- return (0);
- }
-
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+int
-+mm_answer_authrole(int sock, Buffer *m)
-+{
-+ monitor_permit_authentications(1);
-+
-+ authctxt->role = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
-+ debug3("%s: role=%s",
-+ __func__, authctxt->role);
-+
-+ if (strlen(authctxt->role) == 0) {
-+ free(authctxt->role);
-+ authctxt->role = NULL;
-+ }
-+
-+ return (0);
-+}
-+#endif
-+
- int
- mm_answer_authpassword(int sock, Buffer *m)
- {
-@@ -1220,7 +1248,7 @@ static int
- monitor_valid_userblob(u_char *data, u_int datalen)
- {
- Buffer b;
-- char *p, *userstyle;
-+ char *p, *r, *userstyle;
- u_int len;
- int fail = 0;
-
-@@ -1246,6 +1274,8 @@ monitor_valid_userblob(u_char *data, u_int datalen)
- if (buffer_get_char(&b) != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)
- fail++;
- p = buffer_get_cstring(&b, NULL);
-+ if ((r = strchr(p, '/')) != NULL)
-+ *r = '\0';
- xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
- authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
- authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
-@@ -1281,7 +1311,7 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(u_char *data, u_int datalen, char *cuser,
- char *chost)
- {
- Buffer b;
-- char *p, *userstyle;
-+ char *p, *r, *userstyle;
- u_int len;
- int fail = 0;
-
-@@ -1298,6 +1328,8 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(u_char *data, u_int datalen, char *cuser,
- if (buffer_get_char(&b) != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)
- fail++;
- p = buffer_get_cstring(&b, NULL);
-+ if ((r = strchr(p, '/')) != NULL)
-+ *r = '\0';
- xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
- authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
- authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
-diff --git a/monitor.h b/monitor.h
-index 5bc41b5..20e2b4a 100644
---- a/monitor.h
-+++ b/monitor.h
-@@ -57,6 +57,10 @@ enum monitor_reqtype {
- MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC = 48, MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC = 49,
- MONITOR_REQ_TERM = 50,
-
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+ MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE = 80,
-+#endif
-+
- MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START = 100,
- MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT = 102, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT = 103,
- MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX = 104, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX = 105,
-diff --git a/monitor_wrap.c b/monitor_wrap.c
-index 1a47e41..d1b6d99 100644
---- a/monitor_wrap.c
-+++ b/monitor_wrap.c
-@@ -336,6 +336,25 @@ mm_inform_authserv(char *service, char *style)
- buffer_free(&m);
- }
-
-+/* Inform the privileged process about role */
-+
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+void
-+mm_inform_authrole(char *role)
-+{
-+ Buffer m;
-+
-+ debug3("%s entering", __func__);
-+
-+ buffer_init(&m);
-+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, role ? role : "");
-+
-+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, &m);
-+
-+ buffer_free(&m);
-+}
-+#endif
-+
- /* Do the password authentication */
- int
- mm_auth_password(Authctxt *authctxt, char *password)
-diff --git a/monitor_wrap.h b/monitor_wrap.h
-index 18c2501..9d5e5ba 100644
---- a/monitor_wrap.h
-+++ b/monitor_wrap.h
-@@ -42,6 +42,9 @@ int mm_is_monitor(void);
- DH *mm_choose_dh(int, int, int);
- int mm_key_sign(Key *, u_char **, u_int *, u_char *, u_int);
- void mm_inform_authserv(char *, char *);
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+void mm_inform_authrole(char *);
-+#endif
- struct passwd *mm_getpwnamallow(const char *);
- char *mm_auth2_read_banner(void);
- int mm_auth_password(struct Authctxt *, char *);
-diff --git a/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in b/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
-index 6ecfb93..b912dbe 100644
---- a/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
-+++ b/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
-@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ OPENBSD=base64.o basename.o bcrypt_pbkdf.o bindresvport.o blowfish.o daemon.o di
-
- COMPAT=arc4random.o bsd-asprintf.o bsd-closefrom.o bsd-cray.o bsd-cygwin_util.o bsd-getpeereid.o getrrsetbyname-ldns.o bsd-misc.o bsd-nextstep.o bsd-openpty.o bsd-poll.o bsd-setres_id.o bsd-snprintf.o bsd-statvfs.o bsd-waitpid.o fake-rfc2553.o openssl-compat.o xmmap.o xcrypt.o
-
--PORTS=port-aix.o port-irix.o port-linux.o port-solaris.o port-tun.o port-uw.o
-+PORTS=port-aix.o port-irix.o port-linux.o port-linux-sshd.o port-solaris.o port-tun.o port-uw.o
-
- .c.o:
- $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $<
-diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..c18524e
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
-@@ -0,0 +1,414 @@
-+/*
-+ * Copyright (c) 2005 Daniel Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
-+ * Copyright (c) 2014 Petr Lautrbach <plautrba@redhat.com>
-+ *
-+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
-+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
-+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
-+ *
-+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
-+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
-+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
-+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
-+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
-+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
-+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
-+ */
-+
-+/*
-+ * Linux-specific portability code - just SELinux support for sshd at present
-+ */
-+
-+#include "includes.h"
-+
-+#if defined(WITH_SELINUX) || defined(LINUX_OOM_ADJUST)
-+#include <errno.h>
-+#include <stdarg.h>
-+#include <string.h>
-+#include <stdio.h>
-+
-+#include "log.h"
-+#include "xmalloc.h"
-+#include "servconf.h"
-+#include "port-linux.h"
-+#include "key.h"
-+#include "hostfile.h"
-+#include "auth.h"
-+
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+#include <selinux/selinux.h>
-+#include <selinux/flask.h>
-+#include <selinux/context.h>
-+#include <selinux/get_context_list.h>
-+#include <selinux/get_default_type.h>
-+#include <selinux/av_permissions.h>
-+
-+#ifdef HAVE_LINUX_AUDIT
-+#include <libaudit.h>
-+#include <unistd.h>
-+#endif
-+
-+extern ServerOptions options;
-+extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
-+extern int inetd_flag;
-+extern int rexeced_flag;
-+
-+/* Send audit message */
-+static int
-+sshd_selinux_send_audit_message(int success, security_context_t default_context,
-+ security_context_t selected_context)
-+{
-+ int rc=0;
-+#ifdef HAVE_LINUX_AUDIT
-+ char *msg = NULL;
-+ int audit_fd = audit_open();
-+ security_context_t default_raw=NULL;
-+ security_context_t selected_raw=NULL;
-+ rc = -1;
-+ if (audit_fd < 0) {
-+ if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT ||
-+ errno == EAFNOSUPPORT)
-+ return 0; /* No audit support in kernel */
-+ error("Error connecting to audit system.");
-+ return rc;
-+ }
-+ if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(default_context, &default_raw) < 0) {
-+ error("Error translating default context.");
-+ default_raw = NULL;
-+ }
-+ if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(selected_context, &selected_raw) < 0) {
-+ error("Error translating selected context.");
-+ selected_raw = NULL;
-+ }
-+ if (asprintf(&msg, "sshd: default-context=%s selected-context=%s",
-+ default_raw ? default_raw : (default_context ? default_context: "?"),
-+ selected_context ? selected_raw : (selected_context ? selected_context :"?")) < 0) {
-+ error("Error allocating memory.");
-+ goto out;
-+ }
-+ if (audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_ROLE_CHANGE,
-+ msg, NULL, NULL, NULL, success) <= 0) {
-+ error("Error sending audit message.");
-+ goto out;
-+ }
-+ rc = 0;
-+ out:
-+ free(msg);
-+ freecon(default_raw);
-+ freecon(selected_raw);
-+ close(audit_fd);
-+#endif
-+ return rc;
-+}
-+
-+static int
-+mls_range_allowed(security_context_t src, security_context_t dst)
-+{
-+ struct av_decision avd;
-+ int retval;
-+ unsigned int bit = CONTEXT__CONTAINS;
-+
-+ debug("%s: src:%s dst:%s", __func__, src, dst);
-+ retval = security_compute_av(src, dst, SECCLASS_CONTEXT, bit, &avd);
-+ if (retval || ((bit & avd.allowed) != bit))
-+ return 0;
-+
-+ return 1;
-+}
-+
-+static int
-+get_user_context(const char *sename, const char *role, const char *lvl,
-+ security_context_t *sc) {
-+#ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL
-+ if (lvl == NULL || lvl[0] == '\0' || get_default_context_with_level(sename, lvl, NULL, sc) != 0) {
-+ /* User may have requested a level completely outside of his
-+ allowed range. We get a context just for auditing as the
-+ range check below will certainly fail for default context. */
-+#endif
-+ if (get_default_context(sename, NULL, sc) != 0) {
-+ *sc = NULL;
-+ return -1;
-+ }
-+#ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL
-+ }
-+#endif
-+ if (role != NULL && role[0]) {
-+ context_t con;
-+ char *type=NULL;
-+ if (get_default_type(role, &type) != 0) {
-+ error("get_default_type: failed to get default type for '%s'",
-+ role);
-+ goto out;
-+ }
-+ con = context_new(*sc);
-+ if (!con) {
-+ goto out;
-+ }
-+ context_role_set(con, role);
-+ context_type_set(con, type);
-+ freecon(*sc);
-+ *sc = strdup(context_str(con));
-+ context_free(con);
-+ if (!*sc)
-+ return -1;
-+ }
-+#ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL
-+ if (lvl != NULL && lvl[0]) {
-+ /* verify that the requested range is obtained */
-+ context_t con;
-+ security_context_t obtained_raw;
-+ security_context_t requested_raw;
-+ con = context_new(*sc);
-+ if (!con) {
-+ goto out;
-+ }
-+ context_range_set(con, lvl);
-+ if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(*sc, &obtained_raw) < 0) {
-+ context_free(con);
-+ goto out;
-+ }
-+ if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(context_str(con), &requested_raw) < 0) {
-+ freecon(obtained_raw);
-+ context_free(con);
-+ goto out;
-+ }
-+
-+ debug("get_user_context: obtained context '%s' requested context '%s'",
-+ obtained_raw, requested_raw);
-+ if (strcmp(obtained_raw, requested_raw)) {
-+ /* set the context to the real requested one but fail */
-+ freecon(requested_raw);
-+ freecon(obtained_raw);
-+ freecon(*sc);
-+ *sc = strdup(context_str(con));
-+ context_free(con);
-+ return -1;
-+ }
-+ freecon(requested_raw);
-+ freecon(obtained_raw);
-+ context_free(con);
-+ }
-+#endif
-+ return 0;
-+ out:
-+ freecon(*sc);
-+ *sc = NULL;
-+ return -1;
-+}
-+
-+static void
-+ssh_selinux_get_role_level(char **role, const char **level)
-+{
-+ *role = NULL;
-+ *level = NULL;
-+ if (the_authctxt) {
-+ if (the_authctxt->role != NULL) {
-+ char *slash;
-+ *role = xstrdup(the_authctxt->role);
-+ if ((slash = strchr(*role, '/')) != NULL) {
-+ *slash = '\0';
-+ *level = slash + 1;
-+ }
-+ }
-+ }
-+}
-+
-+/* Return the default security context for the given username */
-+static int
-+sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname,
-+ security_context_t *default_sc, security_context_t *user_sc)
-+{
-+ char *sename, *lvl;
-+ char *role;
-+ const char *reqlvl;
-+ int r = 0;
-+ context_t con = NULL;
-+
-+ ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl);
-+
-+#ifdef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME
-+ if ((r=getseuserbyname(pwname, &sename, &lvl)) != 0) {
-+ sename = NULL;
-+ lvl = NULL;
-+ }
-+#else
-+ sename = pwname;
-+ lvl = "";
-+#endif
-+
-+ if (r == 0) {
-+#ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL
-+ r = get_default_context_with_level(sename, lvl, NULL, default_sc);
-+#else
-+ r = get_default_context(sename, NULL, default_sc);
-+#endif
-+ }
-+
-+ if (r == 0) {
-+ /* If launched from xinetd, we must use current level */
-+ if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) {
-+ security_context_t sshdsc=NULL;
-+
-+ if (getcon_raw(&sshdsc) < 0)
-+ fatal("failed to allocate security context");
-+
-+ if ((con=context_new(sshdsc)) == NULL)
-+ fatal("failed to allocate selinux context");
-+ reqlvl = context_range_get(con);
-+ freecon(sshdsc);
-+ if (reqlvl !=NULL && lvl != NULL && strcmp(reqlvl, lvl) == 0)
-+ /* we actually don't change level */
-+ reqlvl = "";
-+
-+ debug("%s: current connection level '%s'", __func__, reqlvl);
-+
-+ }
-+
-+ if ((reqlvl != NULL && reqlvl[0]) || (role != NULL && role[0])) {
-+ r = get_user_context(sename, role, reqlvl, user_sc);
-+
-+ if (r == 0 && reqlvl != NULL && reqlvl[0]) {
-+ security_context_t default_level_sc = *default_sc;
-+ if (role != NULL && role[0]) {
-+ if (get_user_context(sename, role, lvl, &default_level_sc) < 0)
-+ default_level_sc = *default_sc;
-+ }
-+ /* verify that the requested range is contained in the user range */
-+ if (mls_range_allowed(default_level_sc, *user_sc)) {
-+ logit("permit MLS level %s (user range %s)", reqlvl, lvl);
-+ } else {
-+ r = -1;
-+ error("deny MLS level %s (user range %s)", reqlvl, lvl);
-+ }
-+ if (default_level_sc != *default_sc)
-+ freecon(default_level_sc);
-+ }
-+ } else {
-+ *user_sc = *default_sc;
-+ }
-+ }
-+ if (r != 0) {
-+ error("%s: Failed to get default SELinux security "
-+ "context for %s", __func__, pwname);
-+ }
-+
-+#ifdef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME
-+ free(sename);
-+ free(lvl);
-+#endif
-+
-+ if (role != NULL)
-+ free(role);
-+ if (con)
-+ context_free(con);
-+
-+ return (r);
-+}
-+
-+/* Setup environment variables for pam_selinux */
-+static int
-+sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void)
-+{
-+ const char *reqlvl;
-+ char *role;
-+ char *use_current;
-+ int rv;
-+
-+ debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__);
-+
-+ ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl);
-+
-+ rv = do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", role ? role : "");
-+
-+ if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) {
-+ use_current = "1";
-+ } else {
-+ use_current = "";
-+ rv = rv || do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_LEVEL_REQUESTED", reqlvl ? reqlvl: "");
-+ }
-+
-+ rv = rv || do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_USE_CURRENT_RANGE", use_current);
-+
-+ if (role != NULL)
-+ free(role);
-+
-+ return rv;
-+}
-+
-+/* Set the execution context to the default for the specified user */
-+void
-+sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
-+{
-+ security_context_t user_ctx = NULL;
-+ int r = 0;
-+ security_context_t default_ctx = NULL;
-+
-+ if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
-+ return;
-+
-+ if (options.use_pam) {
-+ /* do not compute context, just setup environment for pam_selinux */
-+ if (sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables()) {
-+ switch (security_getenforce()) {
-+ case -1:
-+ fatal("%s: security_getenforce() failed", __func__);
-+ case 0:
-+ error("%s: SELinux PAM variable setup failure. Continuing in permissive mode.",
-+ __func__);
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ fatal("%s: SELinux PAM variable setup failure. Aborting connection.",
-+ __func__);
-+ }
-+ }
-+ return;
-+ }
-+
-+ debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__);
-+
-+ r = sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname, &default_ctx, &user_ctx);
-+ if (r >= 0) {
-+ r = setexeccon(user_ctx);
-+ if (r < 0) {
-+ error("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution context %s for %s",
-+ __func__, user_ctx, pwname);
-+ }
-+#ifdef HAVE_SETKEYCREATECON
-+ else if (setkeycreatecon(user_ctx) < 0) {
-+ error("%s: Failed to set SELinux keyring creation context %s for %s",
-+ __func__, user_ctx, pwname);
-+ }
-+#endif
-+ }
-+ if (user_ctx == NULL) {
-+ user_ctx = default_ctx;
-+ }
-+ if (r < 0 || user_ctx != default_ctx) {
-+ /* audit just the case when user changed a role or there was
-+ a failure */
-+ sshd_selinux_send_audit_message(r >= 0, default_ctx, user_ctx);
-+ }
-+ if (r < 0) {
-+ switch (security_getenforce()) {
-+ case -1:
-+ fatal("%s: security_getenforce() failed", __func__);
-+ case 0:
-+ error("%s: SELinux failure. Continuing in permissive mode.",
-+ __func__);
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ fatal("%s: SELinux failure. Aborting connection.",
-+ __func__);
-+ }
-+ }
-+ if (user_ctx != NULL && user_ctx != default_ctx)
-+ freecon(user_ctx);
-+ if (default_ctx != NULL)
-+ freecon(default_ctx);
-+
-+ debug3("%s: done", __func__);
-+}
-+
-+#endif
-+#endif
-+
-diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
-index 4637a7a..22ea8ef 100644
---- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
-+++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
-@@ -103,37 +103,6 @@ ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname)
- return sc;
- }
-
--/* Set the execution context to the default for the specified user */
--void
--ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
--{
-- security_context_t user_ctx = NULL;
--
-- if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
-- return;
--
-- debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__);
--
-- user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname);
-- if (setexeccon(user_ctx) != 0) {
-- switch (security_getenforce()) {
-- case -1:
-- fatal("%s: security_getenforce() failed", __func__);
-- case 0:
-- error("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution "
-- "context for %s", __func__, pwname);
-- break;
-- default:
-- fatal("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution context "
-- "for %s (in enforcing mode)", __func__, pwname);
-- }
-- }
-- if (user_ctx != NULL)
-- freecon(user_ctx);
--
-- debug3("%s: done", __func__);
--}
--
- /* Set the TTY context for the specified user */
- void
- ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *pwname, const char *tty)
-diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
-index e3d1004..8ef6cc4 100644
---- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
-+++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
-@@ -22,9 +22,10 @@
- #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
- int ssh_selinux_enabled(void);
- void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const char *);
--void ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
- void ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *);
- void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *);
-+
-+void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
- #endif
-
- #ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST
-diff --git a/platform.c b/platform.c
-index 30fc609..0d39ab2 100644
---- a/platform.c
-+++ b/platform.c
-@@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ platform_setusercontext_post_groups(struct passwd *pw)
- }
- #endif /* HAVE_SETPCRED */
- #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-- ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name);
-+ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name);
- #endif
- }
-
-diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
-index 7523de9..07f9926 100644
---- a/sshd.c
-+++ b/sshd.c
-@@ -2138,6 +2138,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- restore_uid();
- }
- #endif
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(authctxt->pw->pw_name);
-+#endif
- #ifdef USE_PAM
- if (options.use_pam) {
- do_pam_setcred(1);
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-security-7.0.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-security-7.0.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 1e6963d..0000000
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-security-7.0.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,44 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
-index b410965..f1b873d 100644
---- a/monitor.c
-+++ b/monitor.c
-@@ -1084,9 +1084,7 @@ extern KbdintDevice sshpam_device;
- int
- mm_answer_pam_init_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
- {
--
- debug3("%s", __func__);
-- authctxt->user = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
- sshpam_ctxt = (sshpam_device.init_ctx)(authctxt);
- sshpam_authok = NULL;
- buffer_clear(m);
-@@ -1166,14 +1166,16 @@ mm_answer_pam_respond(int sock, Buffer *m)
- int
- mm_answer_pam_free_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
- {
-+ int r = sshpam_authok != NULL && sshpam_authok == sshpam_ctxt;
-
- debug3("%s", __func__);
- (sshpam_device.free_ctx)(sshpam_ctxt);
-+ sshpam_ctxt = sshpam_authok = NULL;
- buffer_clear(m);
- mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX, m);
- auth_method = "keyboard-interactive";
- auth_submethod = "pam";
-- return (sshpam_authok == sshpam_ctxt);
-+ return r;
- }
- #endif
-
-diff --git a/monitor_wrap.c b/monitor_wrap.c
-index e6217b3..eac421b 100644
---- a/monitor_wrap.c
-+++ b/monitor_wrap.c
-@@ -614,7 +614,6 @@ mm_sshpam_init_ctx(Authctxt *authctxt)
-
- debug3("%s", __func__);
- buffer_init(&m);
-- buffer_put_cstring(&m, authctxt->user);
- mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, &m);
- debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX", __func__);
- mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX, &m);
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-set_remote_ipaddr.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-set_remote_ipaddr.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 166e569..0000000
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-set_remote_ipaddr.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,87 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/canohost.c b/canohost.c
-index 97ce58c..1f9320a 100644
---- a/canohost.c
-+++ b/canohost.c
-@@ -338,6 +338,21 @@ clear_cached_addr(void)
- cached_port = -1;
- }
-
-+void set_remote_ipaddr(void) {
-+ if (canonical_host_ip != NULL)
-+ free(canonical_host_ip);
-+
-+ if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) {
-+ canonical_host_ip =
-+ get_peer_ipaddr(packet_get_connection_in());
-+ if (canonical_host_ip == NULL)
-+ cleanup_exit(255);
-+ } else {
-+ /* If not on socket, return UNKNOWN. */
-+ canonical_host_ip = xstrdup("UNKNOWN");
-+ }
-+}
-+
- /*
- * Returns the IP-address of the remote host as a string. The returned
- * string must not be freed.
-@@ -347,17 +362,9 @@ const char *
- get_remote_ipaddr(void)
- {
- /* Check whether we have cached the ipaddr. */
-- if (canonical_host_ip == NULL) {
-- if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) {
-- canonical_host_ip =
-- get_peer_ipaddr(packet_get_connection_in());
-- if (canonical_host_ip == NULL)
-- cleanup_exit(255);
-- } else {
-- /* If not on socket, return UNKNOWN. */
-- canonical_host_ip = xstrdup("UNKNOWN");
-- }
-- }
-+ if (canonical_host_ip == NULL)
-+ set_remote_ipaddr();
-+
- return canonical_host_ip;
- }
-
-diff --git a/canohost.h b/canohost.h
-index 4c8636f..4079953 100644
---- a/canohost.h
-+++ b/canohost.h
-@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
- */
-
- const char *get_canonical_hostname(int);
-+void set_remote_ipaddr(void);
- const char *get_remote_ipaddr(void);
- const char *get_remote_name_or_ip(u_int, int);
-
-diff --git a/sshconnect.c b/sshconnect.c
-index e636f33..451a58b 100644
---- a/sshconnect.c
-+++ b/sshconnect.c
-@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@
- #include "monitor_fdpass.h"
- #include "ssh2.h"
- #include "version.h"
-+#include "canohost.h"
-
- char *client_version_string = NULL;
- char *server_version_string = NULL;
-@@ -170,6 +171,7 @@ ssh_proxy_fdpass_connect(const char *host, u_short port,
-
- /* Set the connection file descriptors. */
- packet_set_connection(sock, sock);
-+ set_remote_ipaddr();
-
- return 0;
- }
-@@ -492,6 +494,7 @@ ssh_connect_direct(const char *host, struct addrinfo *aitop,
-
- /* Set the connection. */
- packet_set_connection(sock, sock);
-+ set_remote_ipaddr();
-
- return 0;
- }
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-sftp-force-permission.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-sftp-force-permission.patch
index a35b7b7..21607e7 100644
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-sftp-force-permission.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-sftp-force-permission.patch
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
-diff -up openssh-6.6p1/sftp-server.8.sftp-force-mode openssh-6.6p1/sftp-server.8
---- openssh-6.6p1/sftp-server.8.sftp-force-mode 2013-10-15 03:07:05.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.6p1/sftp-server.8 2015-04-20 14:04:47.427562510 +0200
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server.8.sftp-force-mode openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server.8
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server.8.sftp-force-mode 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server.8 2017-02-09 10:35:41.926475399 +0100
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@
.Op Fl P Ar blacklisted_requests
.Op Fl p Ar whitelisted_requests
@@ -19,11 +19,11 @@ diff -up openssh-6.6p1/sftp-server.8.sftp-force-mode openssh-6.6p1/sftp-server.8
+777, 755, 750, 666, 644, 640, etc. Option -u is ineffective if -m is set.
.El
.Pp
- For logging to work,
-diff -up openssh-6.6p1/sftp-server.c.sftp-force-mode openssh-6.6p1/sftp-server.c
---- openssh-6.6p1/sftp-server.c.sftp-force-mode 2015-04-20 14:04:47.420562526 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.6p1/sftp-server.c 2015-04-20 14:07:13.799231025 +0200
-@@ -71,6 +71,10 @@ static Buffer oqueue;
+ On some systems,
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server.c.sftp-force-mode openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server.c.sftp-force-mode 2017-02-09 10:22:36.498019921 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server.c 2017-02-09 10:35:07.190520959 +0100
+@@ -65,6 +65,10 @@ struct sshbuf *oqueue;
/* Version of client */
static u_int version;
@@ -34,18 +34,18 @@ diff -up openssh-6.6p1/sftp-server.c.sftp-force-mode openssh-6.6p1/sftp-server.c
/* SSH2_FXP_INIT received */
static int init_done;
-@@ -668,6 +672,7 @@ process_open(u_int32_t id)
- Attrib *a;
+@@ -679,6 +683,7 @@ process_open(u_int32_t id)
+ Attrib a;
char *name;
- int handle, fd, flags, mode, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
-+ mode_t old_umask;
+ int r, handle, fd, flags, mode, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
++ mode_t old_umask = 0;
- name = get_string(NULL);
- pflags = get_int(); /* portable flags */
-@@ -675,6 +680,10 @@ process_open(u_int32_t id)
- a = get_attrib();
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &name, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(iqueue, &pflags)) != 0 || /* portable flags */
+@@ -688,6 +693,10 @@ process_open(u_int32_t id)
+ debug3("request %u: open flags %d", id, pflags);
flags = flags_from_portable(pflags);
- mode = (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) ? a->perm : 0666;
+ mode = (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) ? a.perm : 0666;
+ if (permforce == 1) { /* Force perm if -m is set */
+ mode = permforcemode;
+ old_umask = umask(0); /* so umask does not interfere */
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ diff -up openssh-6.6p1/sftp-server.c.sftp-force-mode openssh-6.6p1/sftp-server.c
logit("open \"%s\" flags %s mode 0%o",
name, string_from_portable(pflags), mode);
if (readonly &&
-@@ -696,6 +705,8 @@ process_open(u_int32_t id)
+@@ -709,6 +718,8 @@ process_open(u_int32_t id)
}
}
}
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ diff -up openssh-6.6p1/sftp-server.c.sftp-force-mode openssh-6.6p1/sftp-server.c
if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
send_status(id, status);
free(name);
-@@ -1430,7 +1441,7 @@ sftp_server_usage(void)
+@@ -1490,7 +1501,7 @@ sftp_server_usage(void)
fprintf(stderr,
"usage: %s [-ehR] [-d start_directory] [-f log_facility] "
"[-l log_level]\n\t[-P blacklisted_requests] "
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ diff -up openssh-6.6p1/sftp-server.c.sftp-force-mode openssh-6.6p1/sftp-server.c
" %s -Q protocol_feature\n",
__progname, __progname);
exit(1);
-@@ -1455,7 +1463,7 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv,
+@@ -1516,7 +1527,7 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv,
pw = pwcopy(user_pw);
while (!skipargs && (ch = getopt(argc, argv,
@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ diff -up openssh-6.6p1/sftp-server.c.sftp-force-mode openssh-6.6p1/sftp-server.c
switch (ch) {
case 'Q':
if (strcasecmp(optarg, "requests") != 0) {
-@@ -1515,6 +1523,15 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv,
+@@ -1576,6 +1587,15 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv,
fatal("Invalid umask \"%s\"", optarg);
(void)umask((mode_t)mask);
break;
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-ssh-agent-and-xsecurity-bypass.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-ssh-agent-and-xsecurity-bypass.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 3435cf2..0000000
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-ssh-agent-and-xsecurity-bypass.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,214 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-6.6p1/channels.c.security openssh-6.6p1/channels.c
---- openssh-6.6p1/channels.c.security 2015-07-01 19:27:08.521162690 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.6p1/channels.c 2015-07-01 19:27:08.597162521 +0200
-@@ -151,6 +151,9 @@ static char *x11_saved_proto = NULL;
- static char *x11_saved_data = NULL;
- static u_int x11_saved_data_len = 0;
-
-+/* Deadline after which all X11 connections are refused */
-+static u_int x11_refuse_time;
-+
- /*
- * Fake X11 authentication data. This is what the server will be sending us;
- * we should replace any occurrences of this by the real data.
-@@ -894,6 +897,13 @@ x11_open_helper(Buffer *b)
- u_char *ucp;
- u_int proto_len, data_len;
-
-+ /* Is this being called after the refusal deadline? */
-+ if (x11_refuse_time != 0 && (u_int)monotime() >= x11_refuse_time) {
-+ verbose("Rejected X11 connection after ForwardX11Timeout "
-+ "expired");
-+ return -1;
-+ }
-+
- /* Check if the fixed size part of the packet is in buffer. */
- if (buffer_len(b) < 12)
- return 0;
-@@ -1457,6 +1467,12 @@ channel_set_reuseaddr(int fd)
- error("setsockopt SO_REUSEADDR fd %d: %s", fd, strerror(errno));
- }
-
-+void
-+channel_set_x11_refuse_time(u_int refuse_time)
-+{
-+ x11_refuse_time = refuse_time;
-+}
-+
- /*
- * This socket is listening for connections to a forwarded TCP/IP port.
- */
-diff -up openssh-6.6p1/channels.h.security openssh-6.6p1/channels.h
---- openssh-6.6p1/channels.h.security 2015-07-01 19:27:08.597162521 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.6p1/channels.h 2015-07-01 19:43:32.900950560 +0200
-@@ -279,6 +279,7 @@ int permitopen_port(const char *);
-
- /* x11 forwarding */
-
-+void channel_set_x11_refuse_time(u_int);
- int x11_connect_display(void);
- int x11_create_display_inet(int, int, int, u_int *, int **);
- void x11_input_open(int, u_int32_t, void *);
-diff -up openssh-6.6p1/clientloop.c.security openssh-6.6p1/clientloop.c
---- openssh-6.6p1/clientloop.c.security 2015-07-01 19:27:08.540162648 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.6p1/clientloop.c 2015-07-01 19:44:51.139761508 +0200
-@@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ static int connection_in; /* Connection
- static int connection_out; /* Connection to server (output). */
- static int need_rekeying; /* Set to non-zero if rekeying is requested. */
- static int session_closed; /* In SSH2: login session closed. */
--static int x11_refuse_time; /* If >0, refuse x11 opens after this time. */
-+static u_int x11_refuse_time; /* If >0, refuse x11 opens after this time. */
-
- static void client_init_dispatch(void);
- int session_ident = -1;
-@@ -302,7 +302,8 @@ client_x11_display_valid(const char *dis
- return 1;
- }
-
--#define SSH_X11_PROTO "MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1"
-+#define SSH_X11_PROTO "MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1"
-+#define X11_TIMEOUT_SLACK 60
- void
- client_x11_get_proto(const char *display, const char *xauth_path,
- u_int trusted, u_int timeout, char **_proto, char **_data)
-@@ -315,7 +316,7 @@ client_x11_get_proto(const char *display
- int got_data = 0, generated = 0, do_unlink = 0, i;
- char *xauthdir, *xauthfile;
- struct stat st;
-- u_int now;
-+ u_int now, x11_timeout_real;
-
- xauthdir = xauthfile = NULL;
- *_proto = proto;
-@@ -348,6 +349,15 @@ client_x11_get_proto(const char *display
- xauthdir = xmalloc(MAXPATHLEN);
- xauthfile = xmalloc(MAXPATHLEN);
- mktemp_proto(xauthdir, MAXPATHLEN);
-+ /*
-+ * The authentication cookie should briefly outlive
-+ * ssh's willingness to forward X11 connections to
-+ * avoid nasty fail-open behaviour in the X server.
-+ */
-+ if (timeout >= UINT_MAX - X11_TIMEOUT_SLACK)
-+ x11_timeout_real = UINT_MAX;
-+ else
-+ x11_timeout_real = timeout + X11_TIMEOUT_SLACK;
- if (mkdtemp(xauthdir) != NULL) {
- do_unlink = 1;
- snprintf(xauthfile, MAXPATHLEN, "%s/xauthfile",
-@@ -355,17 +365,20 @@ client_x11_get_proto(const char *display
- snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd),
- "%s -f %s generate %s " SSH_X11_PROTO
- " untrusted timeout %u 2>" _PATH_DEVNULL,
-- xauth_path, xauthfile, display, timeout);
-+ xauth_path, xauthfile, display,
-+ x11_timeout_real);
- debug2("x11_get_proto: %s", cmd);
-- if (system(cmd) == 0)
-- generated = 1;
- if (x11_refuse_time == 0) {
- now = monotime() + 1;
- if (UINT_MAX - timeout < now)
- x11_refuse_time = UINT_MAX;
- else
- x11_refuse_time = now + timeout;
-+ channel_set_x11_refuse_time(
-+ x11_refuse_time);
- }
-+ if (system(cmd) == 0)
-+ generated = 1;
- }
- }
-
-@@ -1884,7 +1897,7 @@ client_request_x11(const char *request_t
- "malicious server.");
- return NULL;
- }
-- if (x11_refuse_time != 0 && monotime() >= x11_refuse_time) {
-+ if (x11_refuse_time != 0 && (u_int)monotime() >= x11_refuse_time) {
- verbose("Rejected X11 connection after ForwardX11Timeout "
- "expired");
- return NULL;
-diff -up openssh-6.6p1/ssh-agent.c.security openssh-6.6p1/ssh-agent.c
---- openssh-6.6p1/ssh-agent.c.security 2015-07-01 19:27:08.597162521 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.6p1/ssh-agent.c 2015-07-01 19:42:35.691088800 +0200
-@@ -64,6 +64,9 @@
- #include <time.h>
- #include <string.h>
- #include <unistd.h>
-+#ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H
-+#include <util.h>
-+#endif
-
- #include "xmalloc.h"
- #include "ssh.h"
-@@ -129,8 +130,12 @@ char socket_name[MAXPATHLEN];
- char socket_dir[MAXPATHLEN];
-
- /* locking */
-+#define LOCK_SIZE 32
-+#define LOCK_SALT_SIZE 16
-+#define LOCK_ROUNDS 1
- int locked = 0;
--char *lock_passwd = NULL;
-+char lock_passwd[LOCK_SIZE];
-+char lock_salt[LOCK_SALT_SIZE];
-
- extern char *__progname;
-
-@@ -548,22 +553,45 @@ send:
- static void
- process_lock_agent(SocketEntry *e, int lock)
- {
-- int success = 0;
-- char *passwd;
-+ int success = 0, delay;
-+ char *passwd, passwdhash[LOCK_SIZE];
-+ static u_int fail_count = 0;
-+ size_t pwlen;
-
- passwd = buffer_get_string(&e->request, NULL);
-- if (locked && !lock && strcmp(passwd, lock_passwd) == 0) {
-- locked = 0;
-- explicit_bzero(lock_passwd, strlen(lock_passwd));
-- free(lock_passwd);
-- lock_passwd = NULL;
-- success = 1;
-+ pwlen = strlen(passwd);
-+ if (pwlen == 0) {
-+ debug("empty password not supported");
-+ } else if (locked && !lock) {
-+ if (bcrypt_pbkdf(passwd, pwlen, lock_salt, sizeof(lock_salt),
-+ passwdhash, sizeof(passwdhash), LOCK_ROUNDS) < 0)
-+ fatal("bcrypt_pbkdf");
-+ if (timingsafe_bcmp(passwdhash, lock_passwd, LOCK_SIZE) == 0) {
-+ debug("agent unlocked");
-+ locked = 0;
-+ fail_count = 0;
-+ explicit_bzero(lock_passwd, sizeof(lock_passwd));
-+ success = 1;
-+ } else {
-+ /* delay in 0.1s increments up to 10s */
-+ if (fail_count < 100)
-+ fail_count++;
-+ delay = 100000 * fail_count;
-+ debug("unlock failed, delaying %0.1lf seconds",
-+ (double)delay/1000000);
-+ usleep(delay);
-+ }
-+ explicit_bzero(passwdhash, sizeof(passwdhash));
- } else if (!locked && lock) {
-+ debug("agent locked");
- locked = 1;
-- lock_passwd = xstrdup(passwd);
-+ arc4random_buf(lock_salt, sizeof(lock_salt));
-+ if (bcrypt_pbkdf(passwd, pwlen, lock_salt, sizeof(lock_salt),
-+ lock_passwd, sizeof(lock_passwd), LOCK_ROUNDS) < 0)
-+ fatal("bcrypt_pbkdf");
- success = 1;
- }
-- explicit_bzero(passwd, strlen(passwd));
-+ explicit_bzero(passwd, pwlen);
- free(passwd);
-
- buffer_put_int(&e->output, 1);
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-ssh-copy-id-quiet.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-ssh-copy-id-quiet.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 4cce020..0000000
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-ssh-copy-id-quiet.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-6.6p1/contrib/ssh-copy-id.quiet openssh-6.6p1/contrib/ssh-copy-id
---- openssh-6.6p1/contrib/ssh-copy-id.quiet 2016-06-27 13:42:47.844393842 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.6p1/contrib/ssh-copy-id 2016-06-27 13:42:57.861398744 +0200
-@@ -215,6 +215,7 @@ populate_new_ids() {
- # The point being that if file based, ssh needs the private key, which it cannot
- # find if only given the contents of the .pub file in an unrelated tmpfile
- ssh -i "${PRIV_ID_FILE:-$L_TMP_ID_FILE}" \
-+ -o LogLevel=INFO \
- -o PreferredAuthentications=publickey \
- -o IdentitiesOnly=yes "$@" exit 2>$L_TMP_ID_FILE.stderr </dev/null
- if [ "$?" = "$L_SUCCESS" ] ; then
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-systemd.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-systemd.patch
index 4351e5a..8f3114f 100644
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-systemd.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-systemd.patch
@@ -40,9 +40,9 @@ index 2ffc369..162ce92 100644
PRIVSEP_PATH=/var/empty
@@ -5097,6 +5121,7 @@ echo " libedit support: $LIBEDIT_MSG"
- echo " libedit support: $LIBEDIT_MSG"
echo " Solaris process contract support: $SPC_MSG"
echo " Solaris project support: $SP_MSG"
+ echo " Solaris privilege support: $SPP_MSG"
+echo " systemd support: $SYSTEMD_MSG"
echo " IP address in \$DISPLAY hack: $DISPLAY_HACK_MSG"
echo " Translate v4 in v6 hack: $IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG"
@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ index 816611c..b8b9d13 100644
+
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh.h"
- #include "ssh1.h"
+ #include "ssh2.h"
@@ -1833,6 +1837,11 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
}
}
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-test-mode-all-values.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-test-mode-all-values.patch
index 05f83a0..2903938 100644
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-test-mode-all-values.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-test-mode-all-values.patch
@@ -1,65 +1,19 @@
-diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
-index ad5869b..1171c33 100644
---- a/servconf.c
-+++ b/servconf.c
-@@ -1990,6 +1990,8 @@ dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(ServerOpCodes code, u_int count, char **vals)
- {
- u_int i;
-
-+ if (count <= 0)
-+ return;
- printf("%s", lookup_opcode_name(code));
- for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
- printf(" %s", vals[i]);
-@@ -2028,7 +2030,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
-
- /* integer arguments */
- #ifdef USE_PAM
-- dump_cfg_int(sUsePAM, o->use_pam);
-+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sUsePAM, o->use_pam);
- #endif
- dump_cfg_int(sServerKeyBits, o->server_key_bits);
- dump_cfg_int(sLoginGraceTime, o->login_grace_time);
-@@ -2084,6 +2086,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
- dump_cfg_fmtint(sShowPatchLevel, o->show_patchlevel);
- dump_cfg_fmtint(sUseDNS, o->use_dns);
- dump_cfg_fmtint(sAllowTcpForwarding, o->allow_tcp_forwarding);
-+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sAllowAgentForwarding, o->allow_agent_forwarding);
- dump_cfg_fmtint(sUsePrivilegeSeparation, use_privsep);
- dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosUseKuserok, o->use_kuserok);
- dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssEnablek5users, o->enable_k5users);
-@@ -2094,14 +2097,15 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
- dump_cfg_string(sCiphers, o->ciphers ? o->ciphers :
- cipher_alg_list(',', 0));
- dump_cfg_string(sMacs, o->macs ? o->macs : mac_alg_list(','));
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.sshd-t openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.sshd-t 2017-02-09 10:19:56.859306131 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c 2017-02-09 10:22:07.895104402 +0100
+@@ -2337,7 +2337,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
+ dump_cfg_string(sXAuthLocation, o->xauth_location);
+ dump_cfg_string(sCiphers, o->ciphers ? o->ciphers : KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT);
+ dump_cfg_string(sMacs, o->macs ? o->macs : KEX_SERVER_MAC);
- dump_cfg_string(sBanner, o->banner);
+ dump_cfg_string(sBanner, o->banner == NULL ? "none" : o->banner);
dump_cfg_string(sForceCommand, o->adm_forced_command);
dump_cfg_string(sChrootDirectory, o->chroot_directory);
dump_cfg_string(sTrustedUserCAKeys, o->trusted_user_ca_keys);
- dump_cfg_string(sRevokedKeys, o->revoked_keys_file);
- dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile,
- o->authorized_principals_file);
-- dump_cfg_string(sVersionAddendum, o->version_addendum);
-+ dump_cfg_string(sVersionAddendum, *o->version_addendum == '\0' ?
-+ "none" : o->version_addendum);
- dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedKeysCommand, o->authorized_keys_command);
- dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser, o->authorized_keys_command_user);
- dump_cfg_string(sHostKeyAgent, o->host_key_agent);
-@@ -2117,7 +2121,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
- o->authorized_keys_files);
- dump_cfg_strarray(sHostKeyFile, o->num_host_key_files,
- o->host_key_files);
-- dump_cfg_strarray(sHostKeyFile, o->num_host_cert_files,
-+ dump_cfg_strarray(sHostCertificate, o->num_host_cert_files,
- o->host_cert_files);
- dump_cfg_strarray(sAllowUsers, o->num_allow_users, o->allow_users);
- dump_cfg_strarray(sDenyUsers, o->num_deny_users, o->deny_users);
-diff --git a/ssh.1 b/ssh.1
-index f65e42f..4a7d1cd 100644
---- a/ssh.1
-+++ b/ssh.1
-@@ -444,7 +444,11 @@ For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/ssh.1.sshd-t openssh-7.4p1/ssh.1
+--- openssh-7.4p1/ssh.1.sshd-t 2017-02-09 10:19:56.823306172 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/ssh.1 2017-02-09 10:19:56.859306131 +0100
+@@ -512,7 +512,11 @@ For full details of the options listed b
.It GatewayPorts
.It GlobalKnownHostsFile
.It GSSAPIAuthentication
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-x11-max-displays.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-x11-max-displays.patch
index f5b339f..2c93ef1 100644
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-x11-max-displays.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-x11-max-displays.patch
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
-diff -up openssh-6.6p1/channels.c.x11max openssh-6.6p1/channels.c
---- openssh-6.6p1/channels.c.x11max 2016-06-27 16:28:49.803631684 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.6p1/channels.c 2016-06-27 16:28:49.814631678 +0200
-@@ -138,8 +138,8 @@ static int all_opens_permitted = 0;
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/channels.c.x11max openssh-7.4p1/channels.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/channels.c.x11max 2017-02-09 12:49:04.690996627 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/channels.c 2017-02-09 12:49:04.744996547 +0100
+@@ -152,8 +152,8 @@ static int all_opens_permitted = 0;
/* -- X11 forwarding */
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ diff -up openssh-6.6p1/channels.c.x11max openssh-6.6p1/channels.c
/* Saved X11 local (client) display. */
static char *x11_saved_display = NULL;
-@@ -3445,7 +3445,8 @@ channel_send_window_changes(void)
+@@ -4228,7 +4228,8 @@ channel_send_window_changes(void)
*/
int
x11_create_display_inet(int x11_display_offset, int x11_use_localhost,
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ diff -up openssh-6.6p1/channels.c.x11max openssh-6.6p1/channels.c
{
Channel *nc = NULL;
int display_number, sock;
-@@ -3457,10 +3458,15 @@ x11_create_display_inet(int x11_display_
+@@ -4240,10 +4241,15 @@ x11_create_display_inet(int x11_display_
if (chanids == NULL)
return -1;
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ diff -up openssh-6.6p1/channels.c.x11max openssh-6.6p1/channels.c
memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
hints.ai_family = IPv4or6;
hints.ai_flags = x11_use_localhost ? 0: AI_PASSIVE;
-@@ -3512,7 +3518,7 @@ x11_create_display_inet(int x11_display_
+@@ -4295,7 +4301,7 @@ x11_create_display_inet(int x11_display_
if (num_socks > 0)
break;
}
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ diff -up openssh-6.6p1/channels.c.x11max openssh-6.6p1/channels.c
error("Failed to allocate internet-domain X11 display socket.");
return -1;
}
-@@ -3658,7 +3664,7 @@ x11_connect_display(void)
+@@ -4441,7 +4447,7 @@ x11_connect_display(void)
memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
hints.ai_family = IPv4or6;
hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ diff -up openssh-6.6p1/channels.c.x11max openssh-6.6p1/channels.c
if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(buf, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0) {
error("%.100s: unknown host. (%s)", buf,
ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr));
-@@ -3674,7 +3680,7 @@ x11_connect_display(void)
+@@ -4457,7 +4463,7 @@ x11_connect_display(void)
/* Connect it to the display. */
if (connect(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) {
debug2("connect %.100s port %u: %.100s", buf,
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ diff -up openssh-6.6p1/channels.c.x11max openssh-6.6p1/channels.c
close(sock);
continue;
}
-@@ -3683,8 +3689,8 @@ x11_connect_display(void)
+@@ -4466,8 +4472,8 @@ x11_connect_display(void)
}
freeaddrinfo(aitop);
if (!ai) {
@@ -78,30 +78,30 @@ diff -up openssh-6.6p1/channels.c.x11max openssh-6.6p1/channels.c
return -1;
}
set_nodelay(sock);
-diff -up openssh-6.6p1/channels.h.x11max openssh-6.6p1/channels.h
---- openssh-6.6p1/channels.h.x11max 2016-06-27 16:28:49.814631678 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.6p1/channels.h 2016-06-27 16:31:18.925557840 +0200
-@@ -281,7 +281,7 @@ int permitopen_port(const char *);
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/channels.h.x11max openssh-7.4p1/channels.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/channels.h.x11max 2017-02-09 12:49:04.744996547 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/channels.h 2017-02-09 12:49:50.230929693 +0100
+@@ -293,7 +293,7 @@ int permitopen_port(const char *);
void channel_set_x11_refuse_time(u_int);
int x11_connect_display(void);
-int x11_create_display_inet(int, int, int, u_int *, int **);
+int x11_create_display_inet(int, int, int, int, u_int *, int **);
- void x11_input_open(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+ int x11_input_open(int, u_int32_t, void *);
void x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(int, const char *, const char *,
const char *, int);
-diff -up openssh-6.6p1/servconf.c.x11max openssh-6.6p1/servconf.c
---- openssh-6.6p1/servconf.c.x11max 2016-06-27 16:28:49.808631681 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.6p1/servconf.c 2016-06-27 16:30:46.941573678 +0200
-@@ -92,6 +92,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.x11max openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.x11max 2017-02-09 12:49:04.741996552 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c 2017-02-09 12:51:03.167822492 +0100
+@@ -94,6 +94,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
options->print_lastlog = -1;
options->x11_forwarding = -1;
options->x11_display_offset = -1;
+ options->x11_max_displays = -1;
options->x11_use_localhost = -1;
options->permit_tty = -1;
- options->xauth_location = NULL;
-@@ -219,6 +220,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
+ options->permit_user_rc = -1;
+@@ -242,6 +243,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
options->x11_forwarding = 0;
if (options->x11_display_offset == -1)
options->x11_display_offset = 10;
@@ -110,16 +110,16 @@ diff -up openssh-6.6p1/servconf.c.x11max openssh-6.6p1/servconf.c
if (options->x11_use_localhost == -1)
options->x11_use_localhost = 1;
if (options->xauth_location == NULL)
-@@ -364,7 +367,7 @@ typedef enum {
+@@ -416,7 +419,7 @@ typedef enum {
sPasswordAuthentication, sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
sListenAddress, sAddressFamily,
sPrintMotd, sPrintLastLog, sIgnoreRhosts,
- sX11Forwarding, sX11DisplayOffset, sX11UseLocalhost,
+ sX11Forwarding, sX11DisplayOffset, sX11MaxDisplays, sX11UseLocalhost,
sPermitTTY, sStrictModes, sEmptyPasswd, sTCPKeepAlive,
- sPermitUserEnvironment, sUseLogin, sAllowTcpForwarding, sCompression,
+ sPermitUserEnvironment, sAllowTcpForwarding, sCompression,
sRekeyLimit, sAllowUsers, sDenyUsers, sAllowGroups, sDenyGroups,
-@@ -476,6 +479,7 @@ static struct {
+@@ -537,6 +540,7 @@ static struct {
{ "ignoreuserknownhosts", sIgnoreUserKnownHosts, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "x11forwarding", sX11Forwarding, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "x11displayoffset", sX11DisplayOffset, SSHCFG_ALL },
@@ -127,9 +127,9 @@ diff -up openssh-6.6p1/servconf.c.x11max openssh-6.6p1/servconf.c
{ "x11uselocalhost", sX11UseLocalhost, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "xauthlocation", sXAuthLocation, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "strictmodes", sStrictModes, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-@@ -1202,6 +1206,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
- intptr = &options->x11_display_offset;
- goto parse_int;
+@@ -1313,6 +1317,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
+ *intptr = value;
+ break;
+ case sX11MaxDisplays:
+ intptr = &options->x11_max_displays;
@@ -138,25 +138,25 @@ diff -up openssh-6.6p1/servconf.c.x11max openssh-6.6p1/servconf.c
case sX11UseLocalhost:
intptr = &options->x11_use_localhost;
goto parse_flag;
-@@ -1889,6 +1897,7 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *d
- M_CP_INTOPT(gateway_ports);
+@@ -2060,6 +2068,7 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *d
+ M_CP_INTOPT(fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink);
M_CP_INTOPT(x11_display_offset);
M_CP_INTOPT(x11_forwarding);
+ M_CP_INTOPT(x11_max_displays);
M_CP_INTOPT(x11_use_localhost);
M_CP_INTOPT(permit_tty);
- M_CP_INTOPT(max_sessions);
-@@ -2106,6 +2115,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
+ M_CP_INTOPT(permit_user_rc);
+@@ -2312,6 +2321,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
+ #endif
dump_cfg_int(sLoginGraceTime, o->login_grace_time);
- dump_cfg_int(sKeyRegenerationTime, o->key_regeneration_time);
dump_cfg_int(sX11DisplayOffset, o->x11_display_offset);
+ dump_cfg_int(sX11MaxDisplays, o->x11_max_displays);
dump_cfg_int(sMaxAuthTries, o->max_authtries);
dump_cfg_int(sMaxSessions, o->max_sessions);
dump_cfg_int(sClientAliveInterval, o->client_alive_interval);
-diff -up openssh-6.6p1/servconf.h.x11max openssh-6.6p1/servconf.h
---- openssh-6.6p1/servconf.h.x11max 2016-06-27 16:28:49.809631681 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.6p1/servconf.h 2016-06-27 16:28:49.815631678 +0200
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.x11max openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.x11max 2017-02-09 12:49:04.741996552 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h 2017-02-09 12:49:04.744996547 +0100
@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@
#define DEFAULT_AUTH_FAIL_MAX 6 /* Default for MaxAuthTries */
@@ -173,10 +173,10 @@ diff -up openssh-6.6p1/servconf.h.x11max openssh-6.6p1/servconf.h
int x11_use_localhost; /* If true, use localhost for fake X11 server. */
char *xauth_location; /* Location of xauth program */
int permit_tty; /* If false, deny pty allocation */
-diff -up openssh-6.6p1/session.c.x11max openssh-6.6p1/session.c
---- openssh-6.6p1/session.c.x11max 2016-06-27 16:28:49.809631681 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.6p1/session.c 2016-06-27 16:28:49.815631678 +0200
-@@ -2741,8 +2741,9 @@ session_setup_x11fwd(Session *s)
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.x11max openssh-7.4p1/session.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/session.c.x11max 2017-02-09 12:49:04.742996550 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/session.c 2017-02-09 12:49:04.745996546 +0100
+@@ -2502,8 +2502,9 @@ session_setup_x11fwd(Session *s)
return 0;
}
if (x11_create_display_inet(options.x11_display_offset,
@@ -188,18 +188,18 @@ diff -up openssh-6.6p1/session.c.x11max openssh-6.6p1/session.c
debug("x11_create_display_inet failed.");
return 0;
}
-diff -up openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config.5.x11max openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config.5
---- openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config.5.x11max 2016-06-27 16:28:49.809631681 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.6p1/sshd_config.5 2016-06-27 16:32:01.253536879 +0200
-@@ -930,6 +930,7 @@ Available keywords are
- .Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication ,
- .Cm RSAAuthentication ,
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.x11max openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.x11max 2017-02-09 12:49:04.742996550 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5 2017-02-09 12:51:24.656790909 +0100
+@@ -1137,6 +1137,7 @@ Available keywords are
+ .Cm StreamLocalBindUnlink ,
+ .Cm TrustedUserCAKeys ,
.Cm X11DisplayOffset ,
+.Cm X11MaxDisplays ,
.Cm X11Forwarding
and
.Cm X11UseLocalHost .
-@@ -1339,6 +1340,12 @@ Specifies the first display number avail
+@@ -1563,6 +1564,12 @@ Specifies the first display number avail
X11 forwarding.
This prevents sshd from interfering with real X11 servers.
The default is 10.
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-ControlPath_too_long.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-ControlPath_too_long.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6d9125c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-ControlPath_too_long.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/mux.c.controlPath openssh-7.4p1/mux.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/mux.c.controlPath 2017-05-04 14:49:44.629247946 +0200
++++ openssh-7.4p1/mux.c 2017-05-04 14:52:54.955109022 +0200
+@@ -1290,6 +1290,12 @@ muxserver_listen(void)
+ oerrno = errno;
+ umask(old_umask);
+ if (muxserver_sock < 0) {
++ if (oerrno == ENAMETOOLONG) {
++ /* the error is already logged from unix_listener() */
++ error("ControlPath %s too long, "
++ "disabling multiplexing", options.control_path);
++ goto disable_mux_master;
++ }
+ if (oerrno == EINVAL || oerrno == EADDRINUSE) {
+ error("ControlSocket %s already exists, "
+ "disabling multiplexing", options.control_path);
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-audit.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-audit.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4ce694a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-audit.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,2168 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/audit-bsm.c.audit openssh-7.4p1/audit-bsm.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/audit-bsm.c.audit 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/audit-bsm.c 2016-12-23 18:54:54.433080419 +0100
+@@ -373,10 +373,23 @@ audit_connection_from(const char *host,
+ #endif
+ }
+
+-void
++int
+ audit_run_command(const char *command)
+ {
+ /* not implemented */
++ return 0;
++}
++
++void
++audit_end_command(int handle, const char *command)
++{
++ /* not implemented */
++}
++
++void
++audit_count_session_open(void)
++{
++ /* not necessary */
+ }
+
+ void
+@@ -391,6 +404,12 @@ audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li
+ /* not implemented */
+ }
+
++int
++audit_keyusage(int host_user, const char *type, unsigned bits, char *fp, int rv)
++{
++ /* not implemented */
++}
++
+ void
+ audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event)
+ {
+@@ -452,4 +471,40 @@ audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event)
+ debug("%s: unhandled event %d", __func__, event);
+ }
+ }
++
++void
++audit_unsupported_body(int what)
++{
++ /* not implemented */
++}
++
++void
++audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress, char *pfs, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
++{
++ /* not implemented */
++}
++
++void
++audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
++{
++ /* not implemented */
++}
++
++void
++audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *fp)
++{
++ /* not implemented */
++}
++
++void
++audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *fp, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
++{
++ /* not implemented */
++}
++
++void
++audit_generate_ephemeral_server_key(const char *fp)
++{
++ /* not implemented */
++}
+ #endif /* BSM */
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/audit.c.audit openssh-7.4p1/audit.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/audit.c.audit 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/audit.c 2016-12-23 18:54:54.433080419 +0100
+@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
+
+ #include <stdarg.h>
+ #include <string.h>
++#include <unistd.h>
+
+ #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+
+@@ -34,6 +35,11 @@
+ #include "key.h"
+ #include "hostfile.h"
+ #include "auth.h"
++#include "ssh-gss.h"
++#include "monitor_wrap.h"
++#include "xmalloc.h"
++#include "misc.h"
++#include "servconf.h"
+
+ /*
+ * Care must be taken when using this since it WILL NOT be initialized when
+@@ -41,6 +47,7 @@
+ * audit_event(CONNECTION_ABANDON) is called. Test for NULL before using.
+ */
+ extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
++extern ServerOptions options;
+
+ /* Maybe add the audit class to struct Authmethod? */
+ ssh_audit_event_t
+@@ -69,13 +76,10 @@ audit_classify_auth(const char *method)
+ const char *
+ audit_username(void)
+ {
+- static const char unknownuser[] = "(unknown user)";
+- static const char invaliduser[] = "(invalid user)";
++ static const char unknownuser[] = "(unknown)";
+
+- if (the_authctxt == NULL || the_authctxt->user == NULL)
++ if (the_authctxt == NULL || the_authctxt->user == NULL || !the_authctxt->valid)
+ return (unknownuser);
+- if (!the_authctxt->valid)
+- return (invaliduser);
+ return (the_authctxt->user);
+ }
+
+@@ -109,6 +113,40 @@ audit_event_lookup(ssh_audit_event_t ev)
+ return(event_lookup[i].name);
+ }
+
++void
++audit_key(int host_user, int *rv, const Key *key)
++{
++ char *fp;
++ const char *crypto_name;
++
++ fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_HEX);
++ if (key->type == KEY_RSA1)
++ crypto_name = "ssh-rsa1";
++ else
++ crypto_name = key_ssh_name(key);
++ if (audit_keyusage(host_user, crypto_name, key_size(key), fp, *rv) == 0)
++ *rv = 0;
++ free(fp);
++}
++
++void
++audit_unsupported(int what)
++{
++ PRIVSEP(audit_unsupported_body(what));
++}
++
++void
++audit_kex(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *comp, char *pfs)
++{
++ PRIVSEP(audit_kex_body(ctos, enc, mac, comp, pfs, getpid(), getuid()));
++}
++
++void
++audit_session_key_free(int ctos)
++{
++ PRIVSEP(audit_session_key_free_body(ctos, getpid(), getuid()));
++}
++
+ # ifndef CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ /*
+ * Null implementations of audit functions.
+@@ -138,6 +176,17 @@ audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event)
+ }
+
+ /*
++ * Called when a child process has called, or will soon call,
++ * audit_session_open.
++ */
++void
++audit_count_session_open(void)
++{
++ debug("audit count session open euid %d user %s", geteuid(),
++ audit_username());
++}
++
++/*
+ * Called when a user session is started. Argument is the tty allocated to
+ * the session, or NULL if no tty was allocated.
+ *
+@@ -172,13 +221,91 @@ audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li
+ /*
+ * This will be called when a user runs a non-interactive command. Note that
+ * it may be called multiple times for a single connection since SSH2 allows
+- * multiple sessions within a single connection.
++ * multiple sessions within a single connection. Returns a "handle" for
++ * audit_end_command.
+ */
+-void
++int
+ audit_run_command(const char *command)
+ {
+ debug("audit run command euid %d user %s command '%.200s'", geteuid(),
+ audit_username(), command);
++ return 0;
++}
++
++/*
++ * This will be called when the non-interactive command finishes. Note that
++ * it may be called multiple times for a single connection since SSH2 allows
++ * multiple sessions within a single connection. "handle" should come from
++ * the corresponding audit_run_command.
++ */
++void
++audit_end_command(int handle, const char *command)
++{
++ debug("audit end nopty exec euid %d user %s command '%.200s'", geteuid(),
++ audit_username(), command);
++}
++
++/*
++ * This will be called when user is successfully autherized by the RSA1/RSA/DSA key.
++ *
++ * Type is the key type, len is the key length(byte) and fp is the fingerprint of the key.
++ */
++int
++audit_keyusage(int host_user, const char *type, unsigned bits, char *fp, int rv)
++{
++ debug("audit %s key usage euid %d user %s key type %s key length %d fingerprint %s, result %d",
++ host_user ? "pubkey" : "hostbased", geteuid(), audit_username(), type, bits,
++ fp, rv);
++}
++
++/*
++ * This will be called when the protocol negotiation fails.
++ */
++void
++audit_unsupported_body(int what)
++{
++ debug("audit unsupported protocol euid %d type %d", geteuid(), what);
++}
++
++/*
++ * This will be called on succesfull protocol negotiation.
++ */
++void
++audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress, char *pfs, pid_t pid,
++ uid_t uid)
++{
++ debug("audit protocol negotiation euid %d direction %d cipher %s mac %s compresion %s pfs %s from pid %ld uid %u",
++ (unsigned)geteuid(), ctos, enc, mac, compress, pfs, (long)pid,
++ (unsigned)uid);
++}
++
++/*
++ * This will be called on succesfull session key discard
++ */
++void
++audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
++{
++ debug("audit session key discard euid %u direction %d from pid %ld uid %u",
++ (unsigned)geteuid(), ctos, (long)pid, (unsigned)uid);
++}
++
++/*
++ * This will be called on destroy private part of the server key
++ */
++void
++audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *fp, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
++{
++ debug("audit destroy sensitive data euid %d fingerprint %s from pid %ld uid %u",
++ geteuid(), fp, (long)pid, (unsigned)uid);
++}
++
++/*
++ * This will be called on generation of the ephemeral server key
++ */
++void
++audit_generate_ephemeral_server_key(const char *)
++{
++ debug("audit create ephemeral server key euid %d fingerprint %s", geteuid(), fp);
+ }
+ # endif /* !defined CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
+ #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/audit.h.audit openssh-7.4p1/audit.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/audit.h.audit 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/audit.h 2016-12-23 18:54:54.433080419 +0100
+@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
+ # define _SSH_AUDIT_H
+
+ #include "loginrec.h"
++#include "key.h"
+
+ enum ssh_audit_event_type {
+ SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES,
+@@ -43,13 +44,33 @@ enum ssh_audit_event_type {
+ SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON, /* closed without completing auth */
+ SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN
+ };
++
++enum ssh_audit_kex {
++ SSH_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER,
++ SSH_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED_MAC,
++ SSH_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION
++};
+ typedef enum ssh_audit_event_type ssh_audit_event_t;
+
++int listening_for_clients(void);
++
+ void audit_connection_from(const char *, int);
+ void audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t);
++void audit_count_session_open(void);
+ void audit_session_open(struct logininfo *);
+ void audit_session_close(struct logininfo *);
+-void audit_run_command(const char *);
++int audit_run_command(const char *);
++void audit_end_command(int, const char *);
+ ssh_audit_event_t audit_classify_auth(const char *);
++int audit_keyusage(int, const char *, unsigned, char *, int);
++void audit_key(int, int *, const Key *);
++void audit_unsupported(int);
++void audit_kex(int, char *, char *, char *, char *);
++void audit_unsupported_body(int);
++void audit_kex_body(int, char *, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t);
++void audit_session_key_free(int ctos);
++void audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t, uid_t);
++void audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *, pid_t, uid_t);
++void audit_generate_ephemeral_server_key(const char *);
+
+ #endif /* _SSH_AUDIT_H */
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/audit-linux.c.audit openssh-7.4p1/audit-linux.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/audit-linux.c.audit 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/audit-linux.c 2016-12-23 18:54:54.434080419 +0100
+@@ -33,25 +33,38 @@
+
+ #include "log.h"
+ #include "audit.h"
++#include "key.h"
++#include "hostfile.h"
++#include "auth.h"
++#include "misc.h" /* servconf.h needs misc.h for struct ForwardOptions */
++#include "servconf.h"
+ #include "canohost.h"
+ #include "packet.h"
+-
++#include "cipher.h"
++#include "channels.h"
++#include "session.h"
++
++#define AUDIT_LOG_SIZE 256
++
++extern ServerOptions options;
++extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
++extern u_int utmp_len;
+ const char *audit_username(void);
+
+-int
+-linux_audit_record_event(int uid, const char *username, const char *hostname,
+- const char *ip, const char *ttyn, int success)
++static void
++linux_audit_user_logxxx(int uid, const char *username, const char *hostname,
++ const char *ip, const char *ttyn, int success, int event)
+ {
+ int audit_fd, rc, saved_errno;
+
+ if ((audit_fd = audit_open()) < 0) {
+ if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT ||
+ errno == EAFNOSUPPORT)
+- return 1; /* No audit support in kernel */
++ return; /* No audit support in kernel */
+ else
+- return 0; /* Must prevent login */
++ goto fatal_report; /* Must prevent login */
+ }
+- rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN,
++ rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, event,
+ NULL, "login", username ? username : "(unknown)",
+ username == NULL ? uid : -1, hostname, ip, ttyn, success);
+ saved_errno = errno;
+@@ -65,9 +78,97 @@ linux_audit_record_event(int uid, const
+ rc = 0;
+ errno = saved_errno;
+
+- return rc >= 0;
++ if (rc < 0) {
++fatal_report:
++ fatal("linux_audit_write_entry failed: %s", strerror(errno));
++ }
++}
++
++static void
++linux_audit_user_auth(int uid, const char *username,
++ const char *hostname, const char *ip, const char *ttyn, int success, int event)
++{
++ int audit_fd, rc, saved_errno;
++ static const char *event_name[] = {
++ "maxtries exceeded",
++ "root denied",
++ "success",
++ "none",
++ "password",
++ "challenge-response",
++ "pubkey",
++ "hostbased",
++ "gssapi",
++ "invalid user",
++ "nologin",
++ "connection closed",
++ "connection abandoned",
++ "unknown"
++ };
++
++ audit_fd = audit_open();
++ if (audit_fd < 0) {
++ if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT ||
++ errno == EAFNOSUPPORT)
++ return; /* No audit support in kernel */
++ else
++ goto fatal_report; /* Must prevent login */
++ }
++
++ if ((event < 0) || (event > SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN))
++ event = SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN;
++
++ rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_AUTH,
++ NULL, event_name[event], username ? username : "(unknown)",
++ username == NULL ? uid : -1, hostname, ip, ttyn, success);
++ saved_errno = errno;
++ close(audit_fd);
++ /*
++ * Do not report error if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non
++ * root user.
++ */
++ if ((rc == -EPERM) && (geteuid() != 0))
++ rc = 0;
++ errno = saved_errno;
++ if (rc < 0) {
++fatal_report:
++ fatal("linux_audit_write_entry failed: %s", strerror(errno));
++ }
++}
++
++int
++audit_keyusage(int host_user, const char *type, unsigned bits, char *fp, int rv)
++{
++ char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE];
++ int audit_fd, rc, saved_errno;
++
++ audit_fd = audit_open();
++ if (audit_fd < 0) {
++ if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT ||
++ errno == EAFNOSUPPORT)
++ return 1; /* No audit support in kernel */
++ else
++ return 0; /* Must prevent login */
++ }
++ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s_auth rport=%d", host_user ? "pubkey" : "hostbased", ssh_remote_port(active_state));
++ rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_AUTH, NULL,
++ buf, audit_username(), -1, NULL, ssh_remote_ipaddr(active_state), NULL, rv);
++ if ((rc < 0) && ((rc != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
++ goto out;
++ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "key algo=%s size=%d fp=%s rport=%d",
++ type, bits, fp, ssh_remote_port(active_state));
++ rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_AUTH, NULL,
++ buf, audit_username(), -1, NULL, ssh_remote_ipaddr(active_state), NULL, rv);
++out:
++ saved_errno = errno;
++ audit_close(audit_fd);
++ errno = saved_errno;
++ /* do not report error if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */
++ return (rc >= 0) || ((rc == -EPERM) && (getuid() != 0));
+ }
+
++static int user_login_count = 0;
++
+ /* Below is the sshd audit API code */
+
+ void
+@@ -76,24 +177,51 @@ audit_connection_from(const char *host,
+ /* not implemented */
+ }
+
+-void
++int
+ audit_run_command(const char *command)
+ {
+- /* not implemented */
++ if (!user_login_count++)
++ linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, session_get_remote_name_or_ip(active_state, utmp_len, options.use_dns),
++ NULL, "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN);
++ linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, session_get_remote_name_or_ip(active_state, utmp_len, options.use_dns),
++ NULL, "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_START);
++ return 0;
++}
++
++void
++audit_end_command(int handle, const char *command)
++{
++ linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, session_get_remote_name_or_ip(active_state, utmp_len, options.use_dns),
++ NULL, "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_END);
++ if (user_login_count && !--user_login_count)
++ linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, session_get_remote_name_or_ip(active_state, utmp_len, options.use_dns),
++ NULL, "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGOUT);
++}
++
++void
++audit_count_session_open(void)
++{
++ user_login_count++;
+ }
+
+ void
+ audit_session_open(struct logininfo *li)
+ {
+- if (linux_audit_record_event(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname, NULL,
+- li->line, 1) == 0)
+- fatal("linux_audit_write_entry failed: %s", strerror(errno));
++ if (!user_login_count++)
++ linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname,
++ NULL, li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN);
++ linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname,
++ NULL, li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_START);
+ }
+
+ void
+ audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li)
+ {
+- /* not implemented */
++ linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname,
++ NULL, li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_END);
++ if (user_login_count && !--user_login_count)
++ linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname,
++ NULL, li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGOUT);
+ }
+
+ void
+@@ -103,24 +231,180 @@ audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event)
+
+ switch(event) {
+ case SSH_AUTH_SUCCESS:
+- case SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE:
++ linux_audit_user_auth(-1, audit_username(), NULL,
++ ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), "ssh", 1, event);
++ break;
++
+ case SSH_NOLOGIN:
+- case SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES:
+ case SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED:
++ linux_audit_user_auth(-1, audit_username(), NULL,
++ ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), "ssh", 0, event);
++ linux_audit_user_logxxx(-1, audit_username(), NULL,
++ ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), "ssh", 0, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN);
+ break;
++ case SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES:
+ case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_NONE:
+ case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD:
+ case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT:
+ case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY:
+ case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED:
+ case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI:
++ linux_audit_user_auth(-1, audit_username(), NULL,
++ ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), "ssh", 0, event);
++ break;
++
++ case SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE:
++ if (user_login_count) {
++ while (user_login_count--)
++ linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL,
++ session_get_remote_name_or_ip(ssh, utmp_len, options.use_dns),
++ NULL, "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_END);
++ linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL,
++ session_get_remote_name_or_ip(ssh, utmp_len, options.use_dns),
++ NULL, "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGOUT);
++ }
++ break;
++
++ case SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON:
+ case SSH_INVALID_USER:
+- linux_audit_record_event(-1, audit_username(), NULL,
+- ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), "sshd", 0);
++ linux_audit_user_logxxx(-1, audit_username(), NULL,
++ ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), "ssh", 0, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN);
+ break;
+ default:
+ debug("%s: unhandled event %d", __func__, event);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
++
++void
++audit_unsupported_body(int what)
++{
++#ifdef AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION
++ char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE];
++ const static char *name[] = { "cipher", "mac", "comp" };
++ char *s;
++ int audit_fd;
++
++ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=unsupported-%s direction=? cipher=? ksize=? rport=%d laddr=%s lport=%d ",
++ name[what], ssh_remote_port(active_state), (s = get_local_ipaddr(packet_get_connection_in())),
++ ssh_local_port(active_state));
++ free(s);
++ audit_fd = audit_open();
++ if (audit_fd < 0)
++ /* no problem, the next instruction will be fatal() */
++ return;
++ audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION,
++ buf, NULL, ssh_remote_ipaddr(active_state), NULL, 0);
++ audit_close(audit_fd);
++#endif
++}
++
++const static char *direction[] = { "from-server", "from-client", "both" };
++
++void
++audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress, char *pfs, pid_t pid,
++ uid_t uid)
++{
++#ifdef AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION
++ char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE];
++ int audit_fd, audit_ok;
++ const struct sshcipher *cipher = cipher_by_name(enc);
++ char *s;
++
++ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=start direction=%s cipher=%s ksize=%d mac=%s pfs=%s spid=%jd suid=%jd rport=%d laddr=%s lport=%d ",
++ direction[ctos], enc, cipher ? 8 * cipher->key_len : 0, mac, pfs,
++ (intmax_t)pid, (intmax_t)uid,
++ ssh_remote_port(active_state), (s = get_local_ipaddr(packet_get_connection_in())), ssh_local_port(active_state));
++ free(s);
++ audit_fd = audit_open();
++ if (audit_fd < 0) {
++ if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT ||
++ errno == EAFNOSUPPORT)
++ return; /* No audit support in kernel */
++ else
++ fatal("cannot open audit"); /* Must prevent login */
++ }
++ audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION,
++ buf, NULL, ssh_remote_ipaddr(active_state), NULL, 1);
++ audit_close(audit_fd);
++ /* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */
++ if ((audit_ok < 0) && ((audit_ok != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
++ fatal("cannot write into audit"); /* Must prevent login */
++#endif
++}
++
++void
++audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
++{
++ char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE];
++ int audit_fd, audit_ok;
++ char *s;
++
++ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=destroy kind=session fp=? direction=%s spid=%jd suid=%jd rport=%d laddr=%s lport=%d ",
++ direction[ctos], (intmax_t)pid, (intmax_t)uid,
++ ssh_remote_port(active_state),
++ (s = get_local_ipaddr(packet_get_connection_in())),
++ ssh_local_port(active_state));
++ free(s);
++ audit_fd = audit_open();
++ if (audit_fd < 0) {
++ if (errno != EINVAL && errno != EPROTONOSUPPORT &&
++ errno != EAFNOSUPPORT)
++ error("cannot open audit");
++ return;
++ }
++ audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_KEY_USER,
++ buf, NULL, ssh_remote_ipaddr(active_state), NULL, 1);
++ audit_close(audit_fd);
++ /* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */
++ if ((audit_ok < 0) && ((audit_ok != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
++ error("cannot write into audit");
++}
++
++void
++audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *fp, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
++{
++ char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE];
++ int audit_fd, audit_ok;
++
++ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=destroy kind=server fp=%s direction=? spid=%jd suid=%jd ",
++ fp, (intmax_t)pid, (intmax_t)uid);
++ audit_fd = audit_open();
++ if (audit_fd < 0) {
++ if (errno != EINVAL && errno != EPROTONOSUPPORT &&
++ errno != EAFNOSUPPORT)
++ error("cannot open audit");
++ return;
++ }
++ audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_KEY_USER,
++ buf, NULL,
++ listening_for_clients() ? NULL : ssh_remote_ipaddr(active_state),
++ NULL, 1);
++ audit_close(audit_fd);
++ /* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */
++ if ((audit_ok < 0) && ((audit_ok != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
++ error("cannot write into audit");
++}
++
++void
++audit_generate_ephemeral_server_key(const char *fp)
++{
++ char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE];
++ int audit_fd, audit_ok;
++
++ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=create kind=server fp=%s direction=? ", fp);
++ audit_fd = audit_open();
++ if (audit_fd < 0) {
++ if (errno != EINVAL && errno != EPROTONOSUPPORT &&
++ errno != EAFNOSUPPORT)
++ error("cannot open audit");
++ return;
++ }
++ audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_KEY_USER,
++ buf, NULL, 0, NULL, 1);
++ audit_close(audit_fd);
++ /* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */
++ if ((audit_ok < 0) && ((audit_ok != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
++ error("cannot write into audit");
++}
+ #endif /* USE_LINUX_AUDIT */
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/auditstub.c.audit openssh-7.4p1/auditstub.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/auditstub.c.audit 2016-12-23 18:54:54.434080419 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/auditstub.c 2016-12-23 18:54:54.434080419 +0100
+@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
++/* $Id: auditstub.c,v 1.1 jfch Exp $ */
++
++/*
++ * Copyright 2010 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved.
++ * Use is subject to license terms.
++ *
++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
++ * are met:
++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
++ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
++ *
++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
++ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
++ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
++ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
++ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
++ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
++ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
++ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
++ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
++ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
++ *
++ * Red Hat author: Jan F. Chadima <jchadima@redhat.com>
++ */
++
++#include <sys/types.h>
++
++void
++audit_unsupported(int n)
++{
++}
++
++void
++audit_kex(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *comp, char *pfs)
++{
++}
++
++void
++audit_session_key_free(int ctos)
++{
++}
++
++void
++audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
++{
++}
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/auth2.c.audit openssh-7.4p1/auth2.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/auth2.c.audit 2016-12-23 18:54:54.422080416 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/auth2.c 2016-12-23 18:54:54.434080419 +0100
+@@ -249,9 +249,6 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32
+ } else {
+ logit("input_userauth_request: invalid user %s", user);
+ authctxt->pw = fakepw();
+-#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+- PRIVSEP(audit_event(SSH_INVALID_USER));
+-#endif
+ }
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+ if (options.use_pam)
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/auth2-hostbased.c.audit openssh-7.4p1/auth2-hostbased.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/auth2-hostbased.c.audit 2016-12-23 18:54:54.422080416 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/auth2-hostbased.c 2016-12-23 18:54:54.434080419 +0100
+@@ -148,7 +148,7 @@ userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ /* test for allowed key and correct signature */
+ authenticated = 0;
+ if (PRIVSEP(hostbased_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, cuser, chost, key)) &&
+- PRIVSEP(key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b),
++ PRIVSEP(hostbased_key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b),
+ buffer_len(&b))) == 1) {
+ authenticated = 1;
+ authctxt->last_details = pubkey;
+@@ -169,6 +169,18 @@ done:
+ return authenticated;
+ }
+
++int
++hostbased_key_verify(const Key *key, const u_char *sig, u_int slen, const u_char *data, u_int datalen)
++{
++ int rv;
++
++ rv = key_verify(key, sig, slen, data, datalen);
++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
++ audit_key(0, &rv, key);
++#endif
++ return rv;
++}
++
+ /* return 1 if given hostkey is allowed */
+ int
+ hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, const char *cuser, char *chost,
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/auth2-pubkey.c.audit openssh-7.4p1/auth2-pubkey.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/auth2-pubkey.c.audit 2016-12-23 18:54:54.423080416 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/auth2-pubkey.c 2016-12-23 18:54:54.435080419 +0100
+@@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ /* test for correct signature */
+ authenticated = 0;
+ if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key, 1)) &&
+- PRIVSEP(key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b),
++ PRIVSEP(user_key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b),
+ buffer_len(&b))) == 1) {
+ authenticated = 1;
+ authctxt->last_details = pubkey;
+@@ -252,6 +252,18 @@ pubkey_auth_info(Authctxt *authctxt, con
+ free(extra);
+ }
+
++int
++user_key_verify(const Key *key, const u_char *sig, u_int slen, const u_char *data, u_int datalen)
++{
++ int rv;
++
++ rv = key_verify(key, sig, slen, data, datalen);
++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
++ audit_key(1, &rv, key);
++#endif
++ return rv;
++}
++
+ /*
+ * Splits 's' into an argument vector. Handles quoted string and basic
+ * escape characters (\\, \", \'). Caller must free the argument vector
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/auth.c.audit openssh-7.4p1/auth.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/auth.c.audit 2016-12-23 18:54:54.373080404 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/auth.c 2016-12-23 18:54:54.435080419 +0100
+@@ -666,9 +666,6 @@ getpwnamallow(const char *user)
+ record_failed_login(user,
+ auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns), "ssh");
+ #endif
+-#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+- audit_event(SSH_INVALID_USER);
+-#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
+ return (NULL);
+ }
+ if (!allowed_user(pw))
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/auth.h.audit openssh-7.4p1/auth.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/auth.h.audit 2016-12-23 18:54:54.423080416 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/auth.h 2016-12-23 18:54:54.435080419 +0100
+@@ -185,6 +185,7 @@ struct passwd * getpwnamallow(const char
+
+ char *expand_authorized_keys(const char *, struct passwd *pw);
+ char *authorized_principals_file(struct passwd *);
++int user_key_verify(const Key *, const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int);
+
+ FILE *auth_openkeyfile(const char *, struct passwd *, int);
+ FILE *auth_openprincipals(const char *, struct passwd *, int);
+@@ -204,6 +205,7 @@ Key *get_hostkey_private_by_type(int, in
+ int get_hostkey_index(Key *, int, struct ssh *);
+ int sshd_hostkey_sign(Key *, Key *, u_char **, size_t *,
+ const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int);
++int hostbased_key_verify(const Key *, const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int);
+
+ /* debug messages during authentication */
+ void auth_debug_add(const char *fmt,...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/cipher.c.audit openssh-7.4p1/cipher.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/cipher.c.audit 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/cipher.c 2016-12-23 18:54:54.435080419 +0100
+@@ -66,26 +66,6 @@ struct sshcipher_ctx {
+ const struct sshcipher *cipher;
+ };
+
+-struct sshcipher {
+- char *name;
+- int number; /* for ssh1 only */
+- u_int block_size;
+- u_int key_len;
+- u_int iv_len; /* defaults to block_size */
+- u_int auth_len;
+- u_int discard_len;
+- u_int flags;
+-#define CFLAG_CBC (1<<0)
+-#define CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY (1<<1)
+-#define CFLAG_AESCTR (1<<2)
+-#define CFLAG_NONE (1<<3)
+-#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+- const EVP_CIPHER *(*evptype)(void);
+-#else
+- void *ignored;
+-#endif
+-};
+-
+ static const struct sshcipher ciphers[] = {
+ #ifdef WITH_SSH1
+ { "des", SSH_CIPHER_DES, 8, 8, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_des_cbc },
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/cipher.h.audit openssh-7.4p1/cipher.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/cipher.h.audit 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/cipher.h 2016-12-23 18:54:54.436080419 +0100
+@@ -62,7 +62,25 @@
+ #define CIPHER_ENCRYPT 1
+ #define CIPHER_DECRYPT 0
+
+-struct sshcipher;
++struct sshcipher { /* from cipher.c */
++ char *name;
++ int number; /* for ssh1 only */
++ u_int block_size;
++ u_int key_len;
++ u_int iv_len; /* defaults to block_size */
++ u_int auth_len;
++ u_int discard_len;
++ u_int flags;
++#define CFLAG_CBC (1<<0)
++#define CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY (1<<1)
++#define CFLAG_AESCTR (1<<2)
++#define CFLAG_NONE (1<<3)
++#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
++ const EVP_CIPHER *(*evptype)(void);
++#else
++ void *ignored;
++#endif
++};
+ struct sshcipher_ctx;
+
+ u_int cipher_mask_ssh1(int);
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/kex.c.audit openssh-7.4p1/kex.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/kex.c.audit 2016-12-23 18:54:54.410080413 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/kex.c 2016-12-23 18:54:54.436080419 +0100
+@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@
+ #include "ssherr.h"
+ #include "sshbuf.h"
+ #include "digest.h"
++#include "audit.h"
+
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
+ #include "ssh-gss.h"
+@@ -683,8 +684,12 @@ choose_enc(struct sshenc *enc, char *cli
+ {
+ char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL);
+
+- if (name == NULL)
++ if (name == NULL) {
++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
++ audit_unsupported(SSH_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER);
++#endif
+ return SSH_ERR_NO_CIPHER_ALG_MATCH;
++ }
+ if ((enc->cipher = cipher_by_name(name)) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ enc->name = name;
+@@ -702,8 +707,12 @@ choose_mac(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshma
+ {
+ char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL);
+
+- if (name == NULL)
++ if (name == NULL) {
++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
++ audit_unsupported(SSH_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED_MAC);
++#endif
+ return SSH_ERR_NO_MAC_ALG_MATCH;
++ }
+ if (mac_setup(mac, name) < 0)
+ return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ /* truncate the key */
+@@ -720,8 +729,12 @@ choose_comp(struct sshcomp *comp, char *
+ {
+ char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL);
+
+- if (name == NULL)
++ if (name == NULL) {
++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
++ audit_unsupported(SSH_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION);
++#endif
+ return SSH_ERR_NO_COMPRESS_ALG_MATCH;
++ }
+ if (strcmp(name, "zlib@openssh.com") == 0) {
+ comp->type = COMP_DELAYED;
+ } else if (strcmp(name, "zlib") == 0) {
+@@ -890,6 +903,10 @@ kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh)
+ dh_need = MAXIMUM(dh_need, newkeys->enc.block_size);
+ dh_need = MAXIMUM(dh_need, newkeys->enc.iv_len);
+ dh_need = MAXIMUM(dh_need, newkeys->mac.key_len);
++ debug("kex: %s need=%d dh_need=%d", kex->name, need, dh_need);
++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
++ audit_kex(mode, newkeys->enc.name, newkeys->mac.name, newkeys->comp.name, kex->name);
++#endif
+ }
+ /* XXX need runden? */
+ kex->we_need = need;
+@@ -1064,3 +1081,33 @@ dump_digest(char *msg, u_char *digest, i
+ sshbuf_dump_data(digest, len, stderr);
+ }
+ #endif
++
++static void
++enc_destroy(struct sshenc *enc)
++{
++ if (enc == NULL)
++ return;
++
++ if (enc->key) {
++ memset(enc->key, 0, enc->key_len);
++ free(enc->key);
++ }
++
++ if (enc->iv) {
++ memset(enc->iv, 0, enc->iv_len);
++ free(enc->iv);
++ }
++
++ memset(enc, 0, sizeof(*enc));
++}
++
++void
++newkeys_destroy(struct newkeys *newkeys)
++{
++ if (newkeys == NULL)
++ return;
++
++ enc_destroy(&newkeys->enc);
++ mac_destroy(&newkeys->mac);
++ memset(&newkeys->comp, 0, sizeof(newkeys->comp));
++}
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/kex.h.audit openssh-7.4p1/kex.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/kex.h.audit 2016-12-23 18:54:54.410080413 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/kex.h 2016-12-23 18:54:54.436080419 +0100
+@@ -213,6 +213,8 @@ int kexgss_client(struct ssh *);
+ int kexgss_server(struct ssh *);
+ #endif
+
++void newkeys_destroy(struct newkeys *newkeys);
++
+ int kex_dh_hash(int, const char *, const char *,
+ const u_char *, size_t, const u_char *, size_t, const u_char *, size_t,
+ const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, u_char *, size_t *);
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/key.h.audit openssh-7.4p1/key.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/key.h.audit 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/key.h 2016-12-23 18:54:54.436080419 +0100
+@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ typedef struct sshkey Key;
+ #define key_ecdsa_bits_to_nid sshkey_ecdsa_bits_to_nid
+ #define key_ecdsa_key_to_nid sshkey_ecdsa_key_to_nid
+ #define key_is_cert sshkey_is_cert
++#define key_is_private sshkey_is_private
+ #define key_type_plain sshkey_type_plain
+ #define key_curve_name_to_nid sshkey_curve_name_to_nid
+ #define key_curve_nid_to_bits sshkey_curve_nid_to_bits
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/mac.c.audit openssh-7.4p1/mac.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/mac.c.audit 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/mac.c 2016-12-23 18:54:54.436080419 +0100
+@@ -249,6 +249,20 @@ mac_clear(struct sshmac *mac)
+ mac->umac_ctx = NULL;
+ }
+
++void
++mac_destroy(struct sshmac *mac)
++{
++ if (mac == NULL)
++ return;
++
++ if (mac->key) {
++ memset(mac->key, 0, mac->key_len);
++ free(mac->key);
++ }
++
++ memset(mac, 0, sizeof(*mac));
++}
++
+ /* XXX copied from ciphers_valid */
+ #define MAC_SEP ","
+ int
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/mac.h.audit openssh-7.4p1/mac.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/mac.h.audit 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/mac.h 2016-12-23 18:54:54.436080419 +0100
+@@ -49,5 +49,6 @@ int mac_compute(struct sshmac *, u_int3
+ int mac_check(struct sshmac *, u_int32_t, const u_char *, size_t,
+ const u_char *, size_t);
+ void mac_clear(struct sshmac *);
++void mac_destroy(struct sshmac *);
+
+ #endif /* SSHMAC_H */
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/Makefile.in.audit openssh-7.4p1/Makefile.in
+--- openssh-7.4p1/Makefile.in.audit 2016-12-23 18:54:54.375080404 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/Makefile.in 2016-12-23 18:54:54.436080419 +0100
+@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=${LIBOPENSSH_OBJS} \
+ kex.o kexdh.o kexgex.o kexecdh.o kexc25519.o \
+ kexdhc.o kexgexc.o kexecdhc.o kexc25519c.o \
+ kexdhs.o kexgexs.o kexecdhs.o kexc25519s.o \
+- platform-pledge.o platform-tracing.o
++ platform-pledge.o platform-tracing.o auditstub.o
+
+ SSHOBJS= ssh.o readconf.o clientloop.o sshtty.o \
+ sshconnect.o sshconnect1.o sshconnect2.o mux.o
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.audit openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.audit 2016-12-23 18:54:54.423080416 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c 2016-12-23 18:54:54.437080420 +0100
+@@ -102,6 +102,7 @@
+ #include "compat.h"
+ #include "ssh2.h"
+ #include "authfd.h"
++#include "audit.h"
+ #include "match.h"
+ #include "ssherr.h"
+
+@@ -117,6 +118,8 @@ extern Buffer auth_debug;
+ extern int auth_debug_init;
+ extern Buffer loginmsg;
+
++extern void destroy_sensitive_data(int);
++
+ /* State exported from the child */
+ static struct sshbuf *child_state;
+
+@@ -167,6 +170,11 @@ int mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(int, Buffe
+ #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ int mm_answer_audit_event(int, Buffer *);
+ int mm_answer_audit_command(int, Buffer *);
++int mm_answer_audit_end_command(int, Buffer *);
++int mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body(int, Buffer *);
++int mm_answer_audit_kex_body(int, Buffer *);
++int mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body(int, Buffer *);
++int mm_answer_audit_server_key_free(int, Buffer *);
+ #endif
+
+ static int monitor_read_log(struct monitor *);
+@@ -222,6 +230,10 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[]
+ #endif
+ #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
++ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body},
++ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body},
++ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body},
++ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_server_key_free},
+ #endif
+ #ifdef BSD_AUTH
+ {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery},
+@@ -260,6 +272,11 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20
+ #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_command},
++ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_end_command},
++ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body},
++ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body},
++ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body},
++ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_server_key_free},
+ #endif
+ {0, 0, NULL}
+ };
+@@ -1396,9 +1413,11 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, Buffer *m)
+ Key *key;
+ u_char *signature, *data, *blob;
+ u_int signaturelen, datalen, bloblen;
++ int type = 0;
+ int verified = 0;
+ int valid_data = 0;
+
++ type = buffer_get_int(m);
+ blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen);
+ signature = buffer_get_string(m, &signaturelen);
+ data = buffer_get_string(m, &datalen);
+@@ -1406,6 +1425,8 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, Buffer *m)
+ if (hostbased_cuser == NULL || hostbased_chost == NULL ||
+ !monitor_allowed_key(blob, bloblen))
+ fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__);
++ if (type != key_blobtype)
++ fatal("%s: bad key type", __func__);
+
+ key = key_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
+ if (key == NULL)
+@@ -1426,7 +1447,17 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, Buffer *m)
+ if (!valid_data)
+ fatal("%s: bad signature data blob", __func__);
+
+- verified = key_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen);
++ switch (key_blobtype) {
++ case MM_USERKEY:
++ verified = user_key_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen);
++ break;
++ case MM_HOSTKEY:
++ verified = hostbased_key_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen);
++ break;
++ default:
++ verified = 0;
++ break;
++ }
+ debug3("%s: key %p signature %s",
+ __func__, key, (verified == 1) ? "verified" : "unverified");
+
+@@ -1489,6 +1520,12 @@ mm_session_close(Session *s)
+ debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d", __func__, s->tty, s->ptyfd);
+ session_pty_cleanup2(s);
+ }
++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
++ if (s->command != NULL) {
++ debug3("%s: command %d", __func__, s->command_handle);
++ session_end_command2(s);
++ }
++#endif
+ session_unused(s->self);
+ }
+
+@@ -1591,6 +1628,8 @@ mm_answer_term(int sock, Buffer *req)
+ sshpam_cleanup();
+ #endif
+
++ destroy_sensitive_data(0);
++
+ while (waitpid(pmonitor->m_pid, &status, 0) == -1)
+ if (errno != EINTR)
+ exit(1);
+@@ -1633,11 +1672,45 @@ mm_answer_audit_command(int socket, Buff
+ {
+ u_int len;
+ char *cmd;
++ Session *s;
+
+ debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+ cmd = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
++
+ /* sanity check command, if so how? */
+- audit_run_command(cmd);
++ s = session_new();
++ if (s == NULL)
++ fatal("%s: error allocating a session", __func__);
++ s->command = cmd;
++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
++ s->command_handle = audit_run_command(cmd);
++#endif
++
++ buffer_clear(m);
++ buffer_put_int(m, s->self);
++
++ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_COMMAND, m);
++
++ return (0);
++}
++
++int
++mm_answer_audit_end_command(int socket, Buffer *m)
++{
++ int handle;
++ u_int len;
++ char *cmd;
++ Session *s;
++
++ debug3("%s entering", __func__);
++ handle = buffer_get_int(m);
++ cmd = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
++
++ s = session_by_id(handle);
++ if (s == NULL || s->ttyfd != -1 || s->command == NULL ||
++ strcmp(s->command, cmd) != 0)
++ fatal("%s: invalid handle", __func__);
++ mm_session_close(s);
+ free(cmd);
+ return (0);
+ }
+@@ -1690,6 +1763,7 @@ monitor_apply_keystate(struct monitor *p
+ void
+ mm_get_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor)
+ {
++ Buffer m;
+ debug3("%s: Waiting for new keys", __func__);
+
+ if ((child_state = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+@@ -1697,6 +1771,21 @@ mm_get_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor
+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_sendfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYEXPORT,
+ child_state);
+ debug3("%s: GOT new keys", __func__);
++
++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
++ if (compat20) {
++ buffer_init(&m);
++ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_sendfd,
++ MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, &m);
++ mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body(pmonitor->m_sendfd, &m);
++ buffer_free(&m);
++ }
++#endif
++
++ /* Drain any buffered messages from the child */
++ while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd >= 0 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)
++ ;
++
+ }
+
+
+@@ -1953,3 +2042,86 @@ mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(int socket, Bu
+
+ #endif /* GSSAPI */
+
++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
++int
++mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body(int sock, Buffer *m)
++{
++ int what;
++
++ what = buffer_get_int(m);
++
++ audit_unsupported_body(what);
++
++ buffer_clear(m);
++
++ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, m);
++ return 0;
++}
++
++int
++mm_answer_audit_kex_body(int sock, Buffer *m)
++{
++ int ctos, len;
++ char *cipher, *mac, *compress, *pfs;
++ pid_t pid;
++ uid_t uid;
++
++ ctos = buffer_get_int(m);
++ cipher = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
++ mac = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
++ compress = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
++ pfs = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
++ pid = buffer_get_int64(m);
++ uid = buffer_get_int64(m);
++
++ audit_kex_body(ctos, cipher, mac, compress, pfs, pid, uid);
++
++ free(cipher);
++ free(mac);
++ free(compress);
++ free(pfs);
++ buffer_clear(m);
++
++ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_KEX, m);
++ return 0;
++}
++
++int
++mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body(int sock, Buffer *m)
++{
++ int ctos;
++ pid_t pid;
++ uid_t uid;
++
++ ctos = buffer_get_int(m);
++ pid = buffer_get_int64(m);
++ uid = buffer_get_int64(m);
++
++ audit_session_key_free_body(ctos, pid, uid);
++
++ buffer_clear(m);
++
++ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, m);
++ return 0;
++}
++
++int
++mm_answer_audit_server_key_free(int sock, Buffer *m)
++{
++ int len;
++ char *fp;
++ pid_t pid;
++ uid_t uid;
++
++ fp = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
++ pid = buffer_get_int64(m);
++ uid = buffer_get_int64(m);
++
++ audit_destroy_sensitive_data(fp, pid, uid);
++
++ free(fp);
++ buffer_clear(m);
++
++ return 0;
++}
++#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor.h.audit openssh-7.4p1/monitor.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/monitor.h.audit 2016-12-23 18:54:54.393080409 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor.h 2016-12-23 18:54:54.437080420 +0100
+@@ -69,7 +69,13 @@ enum monitor_reqtype {
+ MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY = 106, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_QUERY = 107,
+ MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND = 108, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_RESPOND = 109,
+ MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX = 110, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX = 111,
+- MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT = 112, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND = 113,
++ MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT = 112,
++ MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND = 114, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_COMMAND = 115,
++ MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND = 116,
++ MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED = 118, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED = 119,
++ MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX = 120, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_KEX = 121,
++ MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE = 122, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE = 123,
++ MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE = 124
+
+ };
+
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit 2016-12-23 18:54:54.376080405 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c 2016-12-23 18:54:54.437080420 +0100
+@@ -453,7 +453,7 @@ mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype type, con
+ */
+
+ int
+-mm_key_verify(Key *key, u_char *sig, u_int siglen, u_char *data, u_int datalen)
++mm_key_verify(enum mm_keytype type, Key *key, u_char *sig, u_int siglen, u_char *data, u_int datalen)
+ {
+ Buffer m;
+ u_char *blob;
+@@ -467,6 +467,7 @@ mm_key_verify(Key *key, u_char *sig, u_i
+ return (0);
+
+ buffer_init(&m);
++ buffer_put_int(&m, type);
+ buffer_put_string(&m, blob, len);
+ buffer_put_string(&m, sig, siglen);
+ buffer_put_string(&m, data, datalen);
+@@ -484,6 +485,18 @@ mm_key_verify(Key *key, u_char *sig, u_i
+ return (verified);
+ }
+
++int
++mm_hostbased_key_verify(Key *key, u_char *sig, u_int siglen, u_char *data, u_int datalen)
++{
++ return mm_key_verify(MM_HOSTKEY, key, sig, siglen, data, datalen);
++}
++
++int
++mm_user_key_verify(Key *key, u_char *sig, u_int siglen, u_char *data, u_int datalen)
++{
++ return mm_key_verify(MM_USERKEY, key, sig, siglen, data, datalen);
++}
++
+ void
+ mm_send_keystate(struct monitor *monitor)
+ {
+@@ -861,10 +874,11 @@ mm_audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event)
+ buffer_free(&m);
+ }
+
+-void
++int
+ mm_audit_run_command(const char *command)
+ {
+ Buffer m;
++ int handle;
+
+ debug3("%s entering command %s", __func__, command);
+
+@@ -872,6 +886,26 @@ mm_audit_run_command(const char *command
+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, command);
+
+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, &m);
++ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_COMMAND, &m);
++
++ handle = buffer_get_int(&m);
++ buffer_free(&m);
++
++ return (handle);
++}
++
++void
++mm_audit_end_command(int handle, const char *command)
++{
++ Buffer m;
++
++ debug3("%s entering command %s", __func__, command);
++
++ buffer_init(&m);
++ buffer_put_int(&m, handle);
++ buffer_put_cstring(&m, command);
++
++ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND, &m);
+ buffer_free(&m);
+ }
+ #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
+@@ -1007,3 +1041,70 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_cc
+
+ #endif /* GSSAPI */
+
++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
++void
++mm_audit_unsupported_body(int what)
++{
++ Buffer m;
++
++ buffer_init(&m);
++ buffer_put_int(&m, what);
++
++ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, &m);
++ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED,
++ &m);
++
++ buffer_free(&m);
++}
++
++void
++mm_audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *cipher, char *mac, char *compress, char *fps, pid_t pid,
++ uid_t uid)
++{
++ Buffer m;
++
++ buffer_init(&m);
++ buffer_put_int(&m, ctos);
++ buffer_put_cstring(&m, cipher);
++ buffer_put_cstring(&m, (mac ? mac : "<implicit>"));
++ buffer_put_cstring(&m, compress);
++ buffer_put_cstring(&m, fps);
++ buffer_put_int64(&m, pid);
++ buffer_put_int64(&m, uid);
++
++ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, &m);
++ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_KEX,
++ &m);
++
++ buffer_free(&m);
++}
++
++void
++mm_audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
++{
++ Buffer m;
++
++ buffer_init(&m);
++ buffer_put_int(&m, ctos);
++ buffer_put_int64(&m, pid);
++ buffer_put_int64(&m, uid);
++ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, &m);
++ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE,
++ &m);
++ buffer_free(&m);
++}
++
++void
++mm_audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *fp, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
++{
++ Buffer m;
++
++ buffer_init(&m);
++ buffer_put_cstring(&m, fp);
++ buffer_put_int64(&m, pid);
++ buffer_put_int64(&m, uid);
++
++ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, &m);
++ buffer_free(&m);
++}
++#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit 2016-12-23 18:54:54.376080405 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.h 2016-12-23 18:54:54.437080420 +0100
+@@ -52,7 +52,8 @@ int mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype, cons
+ int mm_user_key_allowed(struct passwd *, Key *, int);
+ int mm_hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *, const char *,
+ const char *, Key *);
+-int mm_key_verify(Key *, u_char *, u_int, u_char *, u_int);
++int mm_hostbased_key_verify(Key *, u_char *, u_int, u_char *, u_int);
++int mm_user_key_verify(Key *, u_char *, u_int, u_char *, u_int);
+
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
+ OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID);
+@@ -76,7 +77,12 @@ void mm_sshpam_free_ctx(void *);
+ #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ #include "audit.h"
+ void mm_audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t);
+-void mm_audit_run_command(const char *);
++int mm_audit_run_command(const char *);
++void mm_audit_end_command(int, const char *);
++void mm_audit_unsupported_body(int);
++void mm_audit_kex_body(int, char *, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t);
++void mm_audit_session_key_free_body(int, pid_t, uid_t);
++void mm_audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *, pid_t, uid_t);
+ #endif
+
+ struct Session;
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/packet.c.audit openssh-7.4p1/packet.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/packet.c.audit 2016-12-23 18:54:54.318080390 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/packet.c 2016-12-23 18:54:54.438080420 +0100
+@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@
+ #include "key.h" /* typedefs XXX */
+
+ #include "xmalloc.h"
++#include "audit.h"
+ #include "crc32.h"
+ #include "deattack.h"
+ #include "compat.h"
+@@ -494,6 +495,13 @@ ssh_packet_get_connection_out(struct ssh
+ return ssh->state->connection_out;
+ }
+
++static int
++packet_state_has_keys (const struct session_state *state)
++{
++ return state != NULL &&
++ (state->newkeys[MODE_IN] != NULL || state->newkeys[MODE_OUT] != NULL);
++}
++
+ /*
+ * Returns the IP-address of the remote host as a string. The returned
+ * string must not be freed.
+@@ -562,13 +570,6 @@ ssh_packet_close(struct ssh *ssh)
+ if (!state->initialized)
+ return;
+ state->initialized = 0;
+- if (state->connection_in == state->connection_out) {
+- shutdown(state->connection_out, SHUT_RDWR);
+- close(state->connection_out);
+- } else {
+- close(state->connection_in);
+- close(state->connection_out);
+- }
+ sshbuf_free(state->input);
+ sshbuf_free(state->output);
+ sshbuf_free(state->outgoing_packet);
+@@ -600,11 +601,21 @@ ssh_packet_close(struct ssh *ssh)
+ inflateEnd(stream);
+ }
+ }
+- cipher_free(state->send_context);
+- cipher_free(state->receive_context);
++ if (packet_state_has_keys(state)) {
++ cipher_free(state->send_context);
++ cipher_free(state->receive_context);
++ audit_session_key_free(MODE_MAX);
++ }
+ state->send_context = state->receive_context = NULL;
+ free(ssh->remote_ipaddr);
+ ssh->remote_ipaddr = NULL;
++ if (state->connection_in == state->connection_out) {
++ shutdown(state->connection_out, SHUT_RDWR);
++ close(state->connection_out);
++ } else {
++ close(state->connection_in);
++ close(state->connection_out);
++ }
+ free(ssh->state);
+ ssh->state = NULL;
+ }
+@@ -950,6 +961,7 @@ ssh_set_newkeys(struct ssh *ssh, int mod
+ " (%llu bytes total)", __func__,
+ (unsigned long long)ps->blocks, dir,
+ (unsigned long long)ps->bytes);
++ audit_session_key_free(mode);
+ cipher_free(*ccp);
+ *ccp = NULL;
+ enc = &state->newkeys[mode]->enc;
+@@ -2440,6 +2452,72 @@ ssh_packet_get_output(struct ssh *ssh)
+ return (void *)ssh->state->output;
+ }
+
++static void
++newkeys_destroy_and_free(struct newkeys *newkeys)
++{
++ if (newkeys == NULL)
++ return;
++
++ free(newkeys->enc.name);
++
++ if (newkeys->mac.enabled) {
++ mac_clear(&newkeys->mac);
++ free(newkeys->mac.name);
++ }
++
++ free(newkeys->comp.name);
++
++ newkeys_destroy(newkeys);
++ free(newkeys);
++}
++
++static void
++packet_destroy_state(struct session_state *state)
++{
++ if (state == NULL)
++ return;
++
++ cipher_free(state->receive_context);
++ cipher_free(state->send_context);
++
++ buffer_free(state->input);
++ state->input = NULL;
++ buffer_free(state->output);
++ state->output = NULL;
++ buffer_free(state->outgoing_packet);
++ state->outgoing_packet = NULL;
++ buffer_free(state->incoming_packet);
++ state->incoming_packet = NULL;
++ if( state->compression_buffer ) {
++ buffer_free(state->compression_buffer);
++ state->compression_buffer = NULL;
++ }
++ newkeys_destroy_and_free(state->newkeys[MODE_IN]);
++ state->newkeys[MODE_IN] = NULL;
++ newkeys_destroy_and_free(state->newkeys[MODE_OUT]);
++ state->newkeys[MODE_OUT] = NULL;
++ mac_destroy(state->packet_discard_mac);
++// TAILQ_HEAD(, packet) outgoing;
++// memset(state, 0, sizeof(state));
++}
++
++void
++packet_destroy_all(int audit_it, int privsep)
++{
++ if (audit_it)
++ audit_it = (active_state != NULL && packet_state_has_keys(active_state->state));
++ if (active_state != NULL)
++ packet_destroy_state(active_state->state);
++ if (audit_it) {
++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
++ if (privsep)
++ audit_session_key_free(MODE_MAX);
++ else
++ audit_session_key_free_body(MODE_MAX, getpid(), getuid());
++#endif
++ }
++}
++
+ /* Reset after_authentication and reset compression in post-auth privsep */
+ static int
+ ssh_packet_set_postauth(struct ssh *ssh)
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/packet.h.audit openssh-7.4p1/packet.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/packet.h.audit 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/packet.h 2016-12-23 18:54:54.438080420 +0100
+@@ -208,4 +208,5 @@ extern struct ssh *active_state;
+ # undef EC_POINT
+ #endif
+
++void packet_destroy_all(int, int);
+ #endif /* PACKET_H */
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.audit openssh-7.4p1/session.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/session.c.audit 2016-12-23 18:54:54.430080418 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/session.c 2016-12-23 18:57:45.068115466 +0100
+@@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ extern int log_stderr;
+ extern int debug_flag;
+ extern u_int utmp_len;
+ extern int startup_pipe;
+-extern void destroy_sensitive_data(void);
++extern void destroy_sensitive_data(int);
+ extern Buffer loginmsg;
+
+ /* original command from peer. */
+@@ -576,6 +576,14 @@ do_exec_pty(Session *s, const char *comm
+ /* Parent. Close the slave side of the pseudo tty. */
+ close(ttyfd);
+
++#if !defined(HAVE_OSF_SIA) && defined(SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS)
++ /* do_login in the child did not affect state in this process,
++ compensate. From an architectural standpoint, this is extremely
++ ugly. */
++ if (command != NULL)
++ audit_count_session_open();
++#endif
++
+ /* Enter interactive session. */
+ s->ptymaster = ptymaster;
+ packet_set_interactive(1,
+@@ -696,15 +704,19 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
+ s->self);
+
+ #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
++ if (s->command != NULL || s->command_handle != -1)
++ fatal("do_exec: command already set");
+ if (command != NULL)
+- PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(command));
++ s->command = xstrdup(command);
+ else if (s->ttyfd == -1) {
+ char *shell = s->pw->pw_shell;
+
+ if (shell[0] == '\0') /* empty shell means /bin/sh */
+ shell =_PATH_BSHELL;
+- PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(shell));
++ s->command = xstrdup(shell);
+ }
++ if (s->command != NULL && s->ptyfd == -1)
++ s->command_handle = PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(s->command));
+ #endif
+ if (s->ttyfd != -1)
+ ret = do_exec_pty(s, command);
+@@ -1543,7 +1555,10 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command
+ int r = 0;
+
+ /* remove hostkey from the child's memory */
+- destroy_sensitive_data();
++ destroy_sensitive_data(1);
++ /* Don't audit this - both us and the parent would be talking to the
++ monitor over a single socket, with no synchronization. */
++ packet_destroy_all(0, 1);
+
+ /* Force a password change */
+ if (s->authctxt->force_pwchange) {
+@@ -1757,6 +1772,9 @@ session_unused(int id)
+ sessions[id].ttyfd = -1;
+ sessions[id].ptymaster = -1;
+ sessions[id].x11_chanids = NULL;
++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
++ sessions[id].command_handle = -1;
++#endif
+ sessions[id].next_unused = sessions_first_unused;
+ sessions_first_unused = id;
+ }
+@@ -1839,6 +1857,19 @@ session_open(Authctxt *authctxt, int cha
+ }
+
+ Session *
++session_by_id(int id)
++{
++ if (id >= 0 && id < sessions_nalloc) {
++ Session *s = &sessions[id];
++ if (s->used)
++ return s;
++ }
++ debug("%s: unknown id %d", __func__, id);
++ session_dump();
++ return NULL;
++}
++
++Session *
+ session_by_tty(char *tty)
+ {
+ int i;
+@@ -2351,6 +2382,32 @@ session_exit_message(Session *s, int sta
+ chan_write_failed(c);
+ }
+
++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
++void
++session_end_command2(Session *s)
++{
++ if (s->command != NULL) {
++ if (s->command_handle != -1)
++ audit_end_command(s->command_handle, s->command);
++ free(s->command);
++ s->command = NULL;
++ s->command_handle = -1;
++ }
++}
++
++static void
++session_end_command(Session *s)
++{
++ if (s->command != NULL) {
++ if (s->command_handle != -1)
++ PRIVSEP(audit_end_command(s->command_handle, s->command));
++ free(s->command);
++ s->command = NULL;
++ s->command_handle = -1;
++ }
++}
++#endif
++
+ void
+ session_close(Session *s)
+ {
+@@ -2365,6 +2422,10 @@ session_close(Session *s)
+
+ if (s->ttyfd != -1)
+ session_pty_cleanup(s);
++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
++ if (s->command)
++ session_end_command(s);
++#endif
+ free(s->term);
+ free(s->display);
+ free(s->x11_chanids);
+@@ -2575,6 +2636,15 @@ do_authenticated2(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ server_loop2(authctxt);
+ }
+
++static void
++do_cleanup_one_session(Session *s)
++{
++ session_pty_cleanup2(s);
++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
++ session_end_command2(s);
++#endif
++}
++
+ void
+ do_cleanup(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ {
+@@ -2626,7 +2696,7 @@ do_cleanup(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ * or if running in monitor.
+ */
+ if (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor())
+- session_destroy_all(session_pty_cleanup2);
++ session_destroy_all(do_cleanup_one_session);
+ }
+
+ /* Return a name for the remote host that fits inside utmp_size */
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.h.audit openssh-7.4p1/session.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/session.h.audit 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/session.h 2016-12-23 18:54:54.438080420 +0100
+@@ -60,6 +60,12 @@ struct Session {
+ char *name;
+ char *val;
+ } *env;
++
++ /* exec */
++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
++ int command_handle;
++ char *command;
++#endif
+ };
+
+ void do_authenticated(Authctxt *);
+@@ -72,8 +78,10 @@ void session_close_by_pid(pid_t, int);
+ void session_close_by_channel(int, void *);
+ void session_destroy_all(void (*)(Session *));
+ void session_pty_cleanup2(Session *);
++void session_end_command2(Session *);
+
+ Session *session_new(void);
++Session *session_by_id(int);
+ Session *session_by_tty(char *);
+ void session_close(Session *);
+ void do_setusercontext(struct passwd *);
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.audit openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.audit 2016-12-23 18:54:54.403080411 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c 2016-12-23 18:56:18.992101105 +0100
+@@ -119,6 +119,7 @@
+ #include "ssh-gss.h"
+ #endif
+ #include "monitor_wrap.h"
++#include "audit.h"
+ #include "ssh-sandbox.h"
+ #include "version.h"
+ #include "ssherr.h"
+@@ -244,7 +245,7 @@ Buffer loginmsg;
+ struct passwd *privsep_pw = NULL;
+
+ /* Prototypes for various functions defined later in this file. */
+-void destroy_sensitive_data(void);
++void destroy_sensitive_data(int);
+ void demote_sensitive_data(void);
+ static void do_ssh2_kex(void);
+
+@@ -261,6 +262,15 @@ close_listen_socks(void)
+ num_listen_socks = -1;
+ }
+
++/*
++ * Is this process listening for clients (i.e. not specific to any specific
++ * client connection?)
++ */
++int listening_for_clients(void)
++{
++ return num_listen_socks >= 0;
++}
++
+ static void
+ close_startup_pipes(void)
+ {
+@@ -473,18 +483,45 @@ sshd_exchange_identification(struct ssh
+ }
+ }
+
+-/* Destroy the host and server keys. They will no longer be needed. */
++/*
++ * Destroy the host and server keys. They will no longer be needed. Careful,
++ * this can be called from cleanup_exit() - i.e. from just about anywhere.
++ */
+ void
+-destroy_sensitive_data(void)
++destroy_sensitive_data(int privsep)
+ {
+ int i;
++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
++ pid_t pid;
++ uid_t uid;
+
++ pid = getpid();
++ uid = getuid();
++#endif
+ for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
+ if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) {
++ char *fp;
++
++ if (key_is_private(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]))
++ fp = sshkey_fingerprint(sensitive_data.host_keys[i], options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_HEX);
++ else
++ fp = NULL;
+ key_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]);
+ sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL;
++ if (fp != NULL) {
++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
++ if (privsep)
++ PRIVSEP(audit_destroy_sensitive_data(fp,
++ pid, uid));
++ else
++ audit_destroy_sensitive_data(fp,
++ pid, uid);
++#endif
++ free(fp);
++ }
+ }
+- if (sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]) {
++ if (sensitive_data.host_certificates
++ && sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]) {
+ key_free(sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]);
+ sensitive_data.host_certificates[i] = NULL;
+ }
+@@ -497,12 +534,30 @@ demote_sensitive_data(void)
+ {
+ Key *tmp;
+ int i;
++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
++ pid_t pid;
++ uid_t uid;
+
++ pid = getpid();
++ uid = getuid();
++#endif
+ for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
+ if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) {
++ char *fp;
++
++ if (key_is_private(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]))
++ fp = sshkey_fingerprint(sensitive_data.host_keys[i], options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_HEX);
++ else
++ fp = NULL;
+ tmp = key_demote(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]);
+ key_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]);
+ sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = tmp;
++ if (fp != NULL) {
++#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
++ audit_destroy_sensitive_data(fp, pid, uid);
++#endif
++ free(fp);
++ }
+ }
+ /* Certs do not need demotion */
+ }
+@@ -585,7 +640,7 @@ privsep_preauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
+
+ if (use_privsep == PRIVSEP_ON)
+ box = ssh_sandbox_init(pmonitor);
+- pid = fork();
++ pmonitor->m_pid = pid = fork();
+ if (pid == -1) {
+ fatal("fork of unprivileged child failed");
+ } else if (pid != 0) {
+@@ -665,6 +720,12 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ else if (pmonitor->m_pid != 0) {
+ verbose("User child is on pid %ld", (long)pmonitor->m_pid);
+ buffer_clear(&loginmsg);
++ if (*pmonitor->m_pkex != NULL ){
++ newkeys_destroy((*pmonitor->m_pkex)->newkeys[MODE_OUT]);
++ newkeys_destroy((*pmonitor->m_pkex)->newkeys[MODE_IN]);
++ audit_session_key_free_body(2, getpid(), getuid());
++ packet_destroy_all(0, 0);
++ }
+ monitor_child_postauth(pmonitor);
+
+ /* NEVERREACHED */
+@@ -1154,6 +1215,7 @@ server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *so
+ if (received_sigterm) {
+ logit("Received signal %d; terminating.",
+ (int) received_sigterm);
++ destroy_sensitive_data(0);
+ close_listen_socks();
+ if (options.pid_file != NULL)
+ unlink(options.pid_file);
+@@ -2092,6 +2150,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ */
+ if (use_privsep) {
+ mm_send_keystate(pmonitor);
++ packet_destroy_all(1, 1);
+ exit(0);
+ }
+
+@@ -2148,6 +2207,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ do_authenticated(authctxt);
+
+ /* The connection has been terminated. */
++ packet_destroy_all(1, 1);
++ destroy_sensitive_data(1);
++
+ packet_get_bytes(&ibytes, &obytes);
+ verbose("Transferred: sent %llu, received %llu bytes",
+ (unsigned long long)obytes, (unsigned long long)ibytes);
+@@ -2321,6 +2383,16 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void)
+ void
+ cleanup_exit(int i)
+ {
++ static int in_cleanup = 0;
++ int is_privsep_child;
++
++ /* cleanup_exit can be called at the very least from the privsep
++ wrappers used for auditing. Make sure we don't recurse
++ indefinitely. */
++ if (in_cleanup)
++ _exit(i);
++ in_cleanup = 1;
++
+ if (the_authctxt) {
+ do_cleanup(the_authctxt);
+ if (use_privsep && privsep_is_preauth &&
+@@ -2332,9 +2404,14 @@ cleanup_exit(int i)
+ pmonitor->m_pid, strerror(errno));
+ }
+ }
++ is_privsep_child = use_privsep && pmonitor != NULL && pmonitor->m_pid == 0;
++ if (sensitive_data.host_keys != NULL)
++ destroy_sensitive_data(is_privsep_child);
++ packet_destroy_all(1, is_privsep_child);
+ #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ /* done after do_cleanup so it can cancel the PAM auth 'thread' */
+- if (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor())
++ if ((the_authctxt == NULL || !the_authctxt->authenticated) &&
++ (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()))
+ audit_event(SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON);
+ #endif
+ _exit(i);
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshkey.c.audit openssh-7.4p1/sshkey.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshkey.c.audit 2016-12-23 18:54:54.425080417 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshkey.c 2016-12-23 18:54:54.439080420 +0100
+@@ -303,6 +303,33 @@ sshkey_type_is_valid_ca(int type)
+ }
+
+ int
++sshkey_is_private(const struct sshkey *k)
++{
++ switch (k->type) {
++#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
++ case KEY_RSA_CERT:
++ case KEY_RSA1:
++ case KEY_RSA:
++ return k->rsa->d != NULL;
++ case KEY_DSA_CERT:
++ case KEY_DSA:
++ return k->dsa->priv_key != NULL;
++#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
++ case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
++ case KEY_ECDSA:
++ return EC_KEY_get0_private_key(k->ecdsa) != NULL;
++#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
++#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
++ case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
++ case KEY_ED25519:
++ return (k->ed25519_pk != NULL);
++ default:
++ /* fatal("key_is_private: bad key type %d", k->type); */
++ return 0;
++ }
++}
++
++int
+ sshkey_is_cert(const struct sshkey *k)
+ {
+ if (k == NULL)
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshkey.h.audit openssh-7.4p1/sshkey.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshkey.h.audit 2016-12-23 18:54:54.425080417 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshkey.h 2016-12-23 18:54:54.439080420 +0100
+@@ -134,6 +134,7 @@ u_int sshkey_size(const struct sshkey
+ int sshkey_generate(int type, u_int bits, struct sshkey **keyp);
+ int sshkey_from_private(const struct sshkey *, struct sshkey **);
+ int sshkey_type_from_name(const char *);
++int sshkey_is_private(const struct sshkey *);
+ int sshkey_is_cert(const struct sshkey *);
+ int sshkey_type_is_cert(int);
+ int sshkey_type_plain(int);
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-canonize-pkcs11-provider.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-canonize-pkcs11-provider.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f626a1d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-canonize-pkcs11-provider.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+diff --git a/ssh-agent.c b/ssh-agent.c
+index 1320cda..2441329 100644
+--- a/ssh-agent.c
++++ b/ssh-agent.c
+@@ -821,7 +821,7 @@ send:
+ static void
+ process_remove_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e)
+ {
+- char *provider = NULL, *pin = NULL;
++ char *provider = NULL, *pin = NULL, canonical_provider[PATH_MAX];
+ int r, version, success = 0;
+ Identity *id, *nxt;
+ Idtab *tab;
+@@ -831,6 +831,13 @@ process_remove_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ free(pin);
+
++ if (realpath(provider, canonical_provider) == NULL) {
++ verbose("failed PKCS#11 add of \"%.100s\": realpath: %s",
++ provider, strerror(errno));
++ goto send;
++ }
++
++ debug("%s: remove %.100s", __func__, canonical_provider);
+ for (version = 1; version < 3; version++) {
+ tab = idtab_lookup(version);
+ for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&tab->idlist); id; id = nxt) {
+@@ -838,18 +845,19 @@ process_remove_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e)
+ /* Skip file--based keys */
+ if (id->provider == NULL)
+ continue;
+- if (!strcmp(provider, id->provider)) {
++ if (!strcmp(canonical_provider, id->provider)) {
+ TAILQ_REMOVE(&tab->idlist, id, next);
+ free_identity(id);
+ tab->nentries--;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+- if (pkcs11_del_provider(provider) == 0)
++ if (pkcs11_del_provider(canonical_provider) == 0)
+ success = 1;
+ else
+ error("process_remove_smartcard_key:"
+ " pkcs11_del_provider failed");
++send:
+ free(provider);
+ send_status(e, success);
+ }
+
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-cbc-weakness.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-cbc-weakness.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f05b564
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-cbc-weakness.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+commit 0fb1a617a07b8df5de188dd5a0c8bf293d4bfc0e
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Mar 11 13:07:35 2017 +0000
+
+ upstream commit
+
+ Don't count the initial block twice when computing how
+ many bytes to discard for the work around for the attacks against CBC-mode.
+ ok djm@; report from Jean Paul, Kenny, Martin and Torben @ RHUL
+
+ Upstream-ID: f445f509a4e0a7ba3b9c0dae7311cb42458dc1e2
+
+diff --git a/packet.c b/packet.c
+index 01e2d45..2f3a2ec 100644
+--- a/packet.c
++++ b/packet.c
+@@ -1850,11 +1850,11 @@ ssh_packet_read_poll2(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
+ if (r != SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID)
+ goto out;
+ logit("Corrupted MAC on input.");
+- if (need > PACKET_MAX_SIZE)
++ if (need + block_size > PACKET_MAX_SIZE)
+ return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return ssh_packet_start_discard(ssh, enc, mac,
+ sshbuf_len(state->incoming_packet),
+- PACKET_MAX_SIZE - need);
++ PACKET_MAX_SIZE - need - block_size);
+ }
+ /* Remove MAC from input buffer */
+ DBG(debug("MAC #%d ok", state->p_read.seqnr));
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-coverity.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-coverity.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a80d4d5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-coverity.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,574 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/auth-pam.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/auth-pam.c
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/channels.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/channels.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/channels.c.coverity 2017-02-09 14:58:32.786064600 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/channels.c 2017-02-09 15:01:28.869890219 +0100
+@@ -266,11 +266,11 @@ channel_register_fds(Channel *c, int rfd
+ channel_max_fd = MAXIMUM(channel_max_fd, wfd);
+ channel_max_fd = MAXIMUM(channel_max_fd, efd);
+
+- if (rfd != -1)
++ if (rfd >= 0)
+ fcntl(rfd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
+- if (wfd != -1 && wfd != rfd)
++ if (wfd >= 0 && wfd != rfd)
+ fcntl(wfd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
+- if (efd != -1 && efd != rfd && efd != wfd)
++ if (efd >= 0 && efd != rfd && efd != wfd)
+ fcntl(efd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
+
+ c->rfd = rfd;
+@@ -288,11 +288,11 @@ channel_register_fds(Channel *c, int rfd
+
+ /* enable nonblocking mode */
+ if (nonblock) {
+- if (rfd != -1)
++ if (rfd >= 0)
+ set_nonblock(rfd);
+- if (wfd != -1)
++ if (wfd >= 0)
+ set_nonblock(wfd);
+- if (efd != -1)
++ if (efd >= 0)
+ set_nonblock(efd);
+ }
+ }
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/clientloop.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/clientloop.c
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/key.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/key.c
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.coverity 2017-02-09 14:58:32.793064593 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c 2017-02-09 14:58:32.805064581 +0100
+@@ -411,7 +411,7 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctx
+ mm_get_keystate(pmonitor);
+
+ /* Drain any buffered messages from the child */
+- while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd != -1 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)
++ while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd >= 0 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)
+ ;
+
+ close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c.coverity 2017-02-09 14:58:32.797064589 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c 2017-02-09 14:58:32.805064581 +0100
+@@ -525,10 +525,10 @@ mm_pty_allocate(int *ptyfd, int *ttyfd,
+ if ((tmp1 = dup(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1 ||
+ (tmp2 = dup(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1) {
+ error("%s: cannot allocate fds for pty", __func__);
+- if (tmp1 > 0)
++ if (tmp1 >= 0)
+ close(tmp1);
+- if (tmp2 > 0)
+- close(tmp2);
++ /*DEAD CODE if (tmp2 >= 0)
++ close(tmp2);*/
+ return 0;
+ }
+ close(tmp1);
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c.coverity 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c 2017-02-09 14:58:32.805064581 +0100
+@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ bindresvport_sa(int sd, struct sockaddr
+ struct sockaddr_in6 *in6;
+ u_int16_t *portp;
+ u_int16_t port;
+- socklen_t salen;
++ socklen_t salen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage);
+ int i;
+
+ if (sa == NULL) {
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/packet.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/packet.c
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/progressmeter.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/progressmeter.c
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/scp.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/scp.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/scp.c.coverity 2017-02-09 14:58:32.761064625 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/scp.c 2017-02-09 14:58:38.590058852 +0100
+@@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ killchild(int signo)
+ {
+ if (do_cmd_pid > 1) {
+ kill(do_cmd_pid, signo ? signo : SIGTERM);
+- waitpid(do_cmd_pid, NULL, 0);
++ (void) waitpid(do_cmd_pid, NULL, 0);
+ }
+
+ if (signo)
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.coverity 2017-02-09 14:58:32.801064585 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c 2017-02-09 14:58:38.591058851 +0100
+@@ -1544,7 +1544,7 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
+ fatal("%s line %d: Missing subsystem name.",
+ filename, linenum);
+ if (!*activep) {
+- arg = strdelim(&cp);
++ /*arg =*/ (void) strdelim(&cp);
+ break;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < options->num_subsystems; i++)
+@@ -1635,8 +1635,9 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
+ if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) {
+ *charptr = tilde_expand_filename(arg, getuid());
+ /* increase optional counter */
+- if (intptr != NULL)
+- *intptr = *intptr + 1;
++ /* DEAD CODE intptr is still NULL ;)
++ if (intptr != NULL)
++ *intptr = *intptr + 1; */
+ }
+ break;
+
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/serverloop.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/serverloop.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/serverloop.c.coverity 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/serverloop.c 2017-02-09 14:58:38.592058850 +0100
+@@ -125,13 +125,13 @@ notify_setup(void)
+ static void
+ notify_parent(void)
+ {
+- if (notify_pipe[1] != -1)
++ if (notify_pipe[1] >= 0)
+ (void)write(notify_pipe[1], "", 1);
+ }
+ static void
+ notify_prepare(fd_set *readset)
+ {
+- if (notify_pipe[0] != -1)
++ if (notify_pipe[0] >= 0)
+ FD_SET(notify_pipe[0], readset);
+ }
+ static void
+@@ -139,8 +139,8 @@ notify_done(fd_set *readset)
+ {
+ char c;
+
+- if (notify_pipe[0] != -1 && FD_ISSET(notify_pipe[0], readset))
+- while (read(notify_pipe[0], &c, 1) != -1)
++ if (notify_pipe[0] >= 0 && FD_ISSET(notify_pipe[0], readset))
++ while (read(notify_pipe[0], &c, 1) >= 0)
+ debug2("notify_done: reading");
+ }
+
+@@ -518,7 +518,7 @@ server_request_tun(void)
+ }
+
+ tun = packet_get_int();
+- if (forced_tun_device != -1) {
++ if (forced_tun_device >= 0) {
+ if (tun != SSH_TUNID_ANY && forced_tun_device != tun)
+ goto done;
+ tun = forced_tun_device;
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sftp.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/sftp.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sftp.c.coverity 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sftp.c 2017-02-09 14:58:38.598058844 +0100
+@@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ killchild(int signo)
+ {
+ if (sshpid > 1) {
+ kill(sshpid, SIGTERM);
+- waitpid(sshpid, NULL, 0);
++ (void) waitpid(sshpid, NULL, 0);
+ }
+
+ _exit(1);
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sftp-client.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/sftp-client.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sftp-client.c.coverity 2017-02-09 14:58:38.596058846 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sftp-client.c 2017-02-09 15:20:18.893624636 +0100
+@@ -973,7 +973,7 @@ do_symlink(struct sftp_conn *conn, const
+ }
+
+ int
+-do_fsync(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_char *handle, u_int handle_len)
++do_fsync(struct sftp_conn *conn, const u_char *handle, u_int handle_len)
+ {
+ struct sshbuf *msg;
+ u_int status, id;
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sftp-client.h.coverity 2017-02-10 09:28:10.951155129 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sftp-client.h 2017-02-10 09:27:28.685069870 +0100
+@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ int do_hardlink(struct sftp_conn *, cons
+ int do_symlink(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *);
+
+ /* Call fsync() on open file 'handle' */
+-int do_fsync(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_char *, u_int);
++int do_fsync(struct sftp_conn *conn, const u_char *, u_int);
+
+ /*
+ * Download 'remote_path' to 'local_path'. Preserve permissions and times
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c.coverity 2017-02-09 14:58:38.599058843 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c 2017-02-09 15:29:21.938917065 +0100
+@@ -1220,8 +1220,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ sanitise_stdfd();
+
+ /* drop */
+- setegid(getgid());
+- setgid(getgid());
++ (void) setegid(getgid());
++ (void) setgid(getgid());
+
+ platform_disable_tracing(0); /* strict=no */
+
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.coverity 2017-02-09 14:58:38.600058842 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c 2017-02-09 15:30:33.403800831 +0100
+@@ -679,8 +679,10 @@ privsep_preauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
+
+ privsep_preauth_child();
+ setproctitle("%s", "[net]");
+- if (box != NULL)
++ if (box != NULL) {
+ ssh_sandbox_child(box);
++ free(box);
++ }
+
+ return 0;
+ }
+@@ -1382,6 +1384,9 @@ server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *so
+ if (num_listen_socks < 0)
+ break;
+ }
++
++ if (fdset != NULL)
++ free(fdset);
+ }
+
+ /*
+diff --git a/auth-pam.c b/auth-pam.c
+index e554ec4..bd16d80 100644
+--- a/auth-pam.c
++++ b/auth-pam.c
+@@ -834,6 +834,8 @@ fake_password(const char *wire_password)
+ fatal("%s: password length too long: %zu", __func__, l);
+
+ ret = malloc(l + 1);
++ if (ret == NULL)
++ return NULL;
+ for (i = 0; i < l; i++)
+ ret[i] = junk[i % (sizeof(junk) - 1)];
+ ret[i] = '\0';
+diff --git a/clientloop.c b/clientloop.c
+index c6a4138..9b00e12 100644
+--- a/clientloop.c
++++ b/clientloop.c
+@@ -2290,7 +2290,7 @@ update_known_hosts(struct hostkeys_update_ctx *ctx)
+ free(response);
+ response = read_passphrase("Accept updated hostkeys? "
+ "(yes/no): ", RP_ECHO);
+- if (strcasecmp(response, "yes") == 0)
++ if (response != NULL && strcasecmp(response, "yes") == 0)
+ break;
+ else if (quit_pending || response == NULL ||
+ strcasecmp(response, "no") == 0) {
+diff --git a/digest-openssl.c b/digest-openssl.c
+index 13b63c2..dfa9b8d 100644
+--- a/digest-openssl.c
++++ b/digest-openssl.c
+@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ ssh_digest_final(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx, u_char *d, size_t dlen)
+ const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(ctx->alg);
+ u_int l = dlen;
+
+- if (dlen > UINT_MAX)
++ if (digest == NULL || dlen > UINT_MAX)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ if (dlen < digest->digest_len) /* No truncation allowed */
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c
+index a30dabe..a8ac91f 100644
+--- a/kex.c
++++ b/kex.c
+@@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ kex_names_valid(const char *names)
+ char *
+ kex_names_cat(const char *a, const char *b)
+ {
+- char *ret = NULL, *tmp = NULL, *cp, *p;
++ char *ret = NULL, *tmp = NULL, *cp, *p, *m;
+ size_t len;
+
+ if (a == NULL || *a == '\0')
+@@ -195,8 +195,10 @@ kex_names_cat(const char *a, const char *b)
+ }
+ strlcpy(ret, a, len);
+ for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0'; (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
+- if (match_list(ret, p, NULL) != NULL)
++ if ((m = match_list(ret, p, NULL)) != NULL) {
++ free(m);
+ continue; /* Algorithm already present */
++ }
+ if (strlcat(ret, ",", len) >= len ||
+ strlcat(ret, p, len) >= len) {
+ free(tmp);
+@@ -651,8 +653,10 @@ choose_enc(struct sshenc *enc, char *client, char *server)
+ #endif
+ return SSH_ERR_NO_CIPHER_ALG_MATCH;
+ }
+- if ((enc->cipher = cipher_by_name(name)) == NULL)
++ if ((enc->cipher = cipher_by_name(name)) == NULL) {
++ free(name);
+ return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
++ }
+ enc->name = name;
+ enc->enabled = 0;
+ enc->iv = NULL;
+@@ -670,8 +674,10 @@ choose_mac(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshmac *mac, char *client, char *server)
+ #endif
+ return SSH_ERR_NO_MAC_ALG_MATCH;
+ }
+- if (mac_setup(mac, name) < 0)
++ if (mac_setup(mac, name) < 0) {
++ free(name);
+ return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
++ }
+ /* truncate the key */
+ if (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_HMAC)
+ mac->key_len = 16;
+@@ -695,6 +701,7 @@ choose_comp(struct sshcomp *comp, char *client, char *server)
+ } else if (strcmp(name, "none") == 0) {
+ comp->type = COMP_NONE;
+ } else {
++ free(name);
+ return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ }
+ comp->name = name;
+diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
+index 3e7a5d8..acc1391 100644
+--- a/readconf.c
++++ b/readconf.c
+@@ -1500,6 +1500,7 @@ parse_keytypes:
+ if (r == GLOB_NOMATCH) {
+ debug("%.200s line %d: include %s matched no "
+ "files",filename, linenum, arg2);
++ free(arg2);
+ continue;
+ } else if (r != 0 || gl.gl_pathc < 0)
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: glob failed for %s.",
+diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
+index 6ab1cb4..5f2464a 100644
+--- a/servconf.c
++++ b/servconf.c
+@@ -2284,8 +2284,6 @@ dump_cfg_fmtint(ServerOpCodes code, int val)
+ static void
+ dump_cfg_string(ServerOpCodes code, const char *val)
+ {
+- if (val == NULL)
+- return;
+ printf("%s %s\n", lookup_opcode_name(code),
+ val == NULL ? "none" : val);
+ }
+diff --git a/sshconnect.c b/sshconnect.c
+index 07f80cd..5d4b41b 100644
+--- a/sshconnect.c
++++ b/sshconnect.c
+@@ -1533,6 +1533,7 @@ maybe_add_key_to_agent(char *authfile, Key *private, char *comment,
+ if (options.add_keys_to_agent == 2 &&
+ !ask_permission("Add key %s (%s) to agent?", authfile, comment)) {
+ debug3("user denied adding this key");
++ close(auth_sock);
+ return;
+ }
+
+@@ -1541,4 +1542,5 @@ maybe_add_key_to_agent(char *authfile, Key *private, char *comment,
+ debug("identity added to agent: %s", authfile);
+ else
+ debug("could not add identity to agent: %s (%d)", authfile, r);
++ close(auth_sock);
+ }
+diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
+index f31c24c..aecf765 100644
+--- a/sshconnect2.c
++++ b/sshconnect2.c
+@@ -1061,6 +1061,7 @@ sign_and_send_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt, Identity *id)
+
+ if (key_to_blob(id->key, &blob, &bloblen) == 0) {
+ /* we cannot handle this key */
++ free(blob);
+ debug3("sign_and_send_pubkey: cannot handle key");
+ return 0;
+ }
+@@ -1170,6 +1171,7 @@ send_pubkey_test(Authctxt *authctxt, Identity *id)
+
+ if (key_to_blob(id->key, &blob, &bloblen) == 0) {
+ /* we cannot handle this key */
++ free(blob);
+ debug3("send_pubkey_test: cannot handle key");
+ return 0;
+ }
+diff --git a/sshkey.c b/sshkey.c
+index 85fd1bd..58c1051 100644
+--- a/sshkey.c
++++ b/sshkey.c
+@@ -1375,8 +1375,6 @@ sshkey_read(struct sshkey *ret, char **cpp)
+ retval = 0;
+ /*XXXX*/
+ sshkey_free(k);
+- if (retval != 0)
+- break;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+diff --git a/krl.c b/krl.c
+index e271a19..69bec99 100644
+--- a/krl.c
++++ b/krl.c
+@@ -1089,7 +1089,7 @@ ssh_krl_from_blob(struct sshbuf *buf, struct ssh_krl **krlp,
+ break;
+ case KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE:
+ /* Handled above, but still need to stay in synch */
+- sshbuf_reset(sect);
++ sshbuf_free(sect);
+ sect = NULL;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(copy)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+@@ -1288,7 +1288,8 @@ ssh_krl_file_contains_key(const char *path, const struct sshkey *key)
+ debug2("%s: checking KRL %s", __func__, path);
+ r = ssh_krl_check_key(krl, key);
+ out:
+- close(fd);
++ if (fd != -1)
++ close(fd);
+ sshbuf_free(krlbuf);
+ ssh_krl_free(krl);
+ if (r != 0)
+diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
+index acc1391..c4dff15 100644
+--- a/readconf.c
++++ b/readconf.c
+@@ -1185,7 +1185,7 @@ parse_int:
+ value = cipher_number(arg);
+ if (value == -1)
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad cipher '%s'.",
+- filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
++ filename, linenum, arg);
+ if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
+ *intptr = value;
+ break;
+@@ -1196,7 +1196,7 @@ parse_int:
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
+ if (!ciphers_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg))
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad SSH2 cipher spec '%s'.",
+- filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
++ filename, linenum, arg);
+ if (*activep && options->ciphers == NULL)
+ options->ciphers = xstrdup(arg);
+ break;
+@@ -1207,7 +1207,7 @@ parse_int:
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
+ if (!mac_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg))
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad SSH2 Mac spec '%s'.",
+- filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
++ filename, linenum, arg);
+ if (*activep && options->macs == NULL)
+ options->macs = xstrdup(arg);
+ break;
+@@ -1220,7 +1220,7 @@ parse_int:
+ filename, linenum);
+ if (!kex_names_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg))
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad SSH2 KexAlgorithms '%s'.",
+- filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
++ filename, linenum, arg);
+ if (*activep && options->kex_algorithms == NULL)
+ options->kex_algorithms = xstrdup(arg);
+ break;
+@@ -1235,7 +1235,7 @@ parse_keytypes:
+ filename, linenum);
+ if (!sshkey_names_valid2(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg, 1))
+ fatal("%s line %d: Bad key types '%s'.",
+- filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
++ filename, linenum, arg);
+ if (*activep && *charptr == NULL)
+ *charptr = xstrdup(arg);
+ break;
+@@ -1248,7 +1248,7 @@ parse_keytypes:
+ value = proto_spec(arg);
+ if (value == SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN)
+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad protocol spec '%s'.",
+- filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
++ filename, linenum, arg);
+ if (*activep && *intptr == SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN)
+ *intptr = value;
+ break;
+diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
+index 5f2464a..4564494 100644
+--- a/servconf.c
++++ b/servconf.c
+@@ -1217,7 +1217,7 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
+ filename, linenum);
+ if (!sshkey_names_valid2(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg, 1))
+ fatal("%s line %d: Bad key types '%s'.",
+- filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
++ filename, linenum, arg);
+ if (*activep && *charptr == NULL)
+ *charptr = xstrdup(arg);
+ break;
+@@ -1476,7 +1476,7 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
+ fatal("%s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
+ if (!ciphers_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg))
+ fatal("%s line %d: Bad SSH2 cipher spec '%s'.",
+- filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
++ filename, linenum, arg);
+ if (options->ciphers == NULL)
+ options->ciphers = xstrdup(arg);
+ break;
+@@ -1487,7 +1487,7 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
+ fatal("%s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
+ if (!mac_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg))
+ fatal("%s line %d: Bad SSH2 mac spec '%s'.",
+- filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
++ filename, linenum, arg);
+ if (options->macs == NULL)
+ options->macs = xstrdup(arg);
+ break;
+@@ -1500,7 +1500,7 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
+ filename, linenum);
+ if (!kex_names_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg))
+ fatal("%s line %d: Bad SSH2 KexAlgorithms '%s'.",
+- filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
++ filename, linenum, arg);
+ if (options->kex_algorithms == NULL)
+ options->kex_algorithms = xstrdup(arg);
+ break;
+diff --git a/ssh-pkcs11.c b/ssh-pkcs11.c
+index aaf712d..62a76b3 100644
+--- a/ssh-pkcs11.c
++++ b/ssh-pkcs11.c
+@@ -536,8 +536,8 @@ pkcs11_fetch_keys_filter(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
+ X509_free(x509);
+ }
+ if (rsa && rsa->n && rsa->e &&
+- pkcs11_rsa_wrap(p, slotidx, &attribs[0], rsa) == 0) {
+- key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
++ pkcs11_rsa_wrap(p, slotidx, &attribs[0], rsa) == 0 &&
++ (key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) != NULL) {
+ key->rsa = rsa;
+ key->type = KEY_RSA;
+ key->flags |= SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT;
+diff --git a/sshconnect1.c b/sshconnect1.c
+index a045361..0e1a506 100644
+--- a/sshconnect1.c
++++ b/sshconnect1.c
+@@ -520,7 +520,8 @@ ssh_kex(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr)
+ cookie[i] = packet_get_char();
+
+ /* Get the public key. */
+- server_key = key_new(KEY_RSA1);
++ if ((server_key = key_new(KEY_RSA1)) == NULL)
++ fatal("%s: key_new(KEY_RSA1) failed", __func__);
+ bits = packet_get_int();
+ packet_get_bignum(server_key->rsa->e);
+ packet_get_bignum(server_key->rsa->n);
+@@ -532,7 +533,8 @@ ssh_kex(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr)
+ logit("Warning: This may be due to an old implementation of ssh.");
+ }
+ /* Get the host key. */
+- host_key = key_new(KEY_RSA1);
++ if ((host_key = key_new(KEY_RSA1)) == NULL)
++ fatal("%s: key_new(KEY_RSA1) failed", __func__);
+ bits = packet_get_int();
+ packet_get_bignum(host_key->rsa->e);
+ packet_get_bignum(host_key->rsa->n);
+diff --git a/sshkey.c b/sshkey.c
+index 58c1051..6afacb5 100644
+--- a/sshkey.c
++++ b/sshkey.c
+@@ -1239,6 +1239,9 @@ sshkey_read(struct sshkey *ret, char **cpp)
+ u_long bits;
+ #endif /* WITH_SSH1 */
+
++ if (ret == NULL)
++ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++
+ cp = *cpp;
+
+ switch (ret->type) {
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-ctr-cavstest.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-ctr-cavstest.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..eb43c79
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-ctr-cavstest.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,250 @@
+diff -up openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in.ctr-cavs openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in
+--- openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in.ctr-cavs 2015-03-18 11:22:05.493289018 +0100
++++ openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in 2015-03-18 11:22:44.504196316 +0100
+@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ SSH_KEYSIGN=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keysign
+ SSH_LDAP_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-ldap-helper
+ SSH_LDAP_WRAPPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-ldap-wrapper
+ SSH_KEYCAT=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat
++CTR_CAVSTEST=$(libexecdir)/ctr-cavstest
+ SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-pkcs11-helper
+ PRIVSEP_PATH=@PRIVSEP_PATH@
+ SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=@SSH_PRIVSEP_USER@
+@@ -66,7 +67,7 @@ EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@
+ MANFMT=@MANFMT@
+ INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER=@INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER@
+
+-TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT)
++TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT)
+
+ LIBOPENSSH_OBJS=\
+ ssh_api.o \
+@@ -194,6 +195,9 @@ ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) l
+ ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHDOBJS) libssh.a ssh-keycat.o
+ $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keycat.o bufaux.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(KEYCATLIBS) $(SSHLIBS)
+
++ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ctr-cavstest.o
++ $(LD) -o $@ ctr-cavstest.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lfipscheck $(LIBS)
++
+ ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keyscan.o
+ $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
+
+@@ -326,6 +330,7 @@ install-files:
+ $(INSTALL) -m 0700 ssh-ldap-wrapper $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_LDAP_WRAPPER) ; \
+ fi
+ $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT)
++ $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT)
+ $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT)
+ $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT)
+ $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1
+diff -up openssh-6.8p1/ctr-cavstest.c.ctr-cavs openssh-6.8p1/ctr-cavstest.c
+--- openssh-6.8p1/ctr-cavstest.c.ctr-cavs 2015-03-18 11:22:05.521288952 +0100
++++ openssh-6.8p1/ctr-cavstest.c 2015-03-18 11:22:05.521288952 +0100
+@@ -0,0 +1,208 @@
++/*
++ *
++ * invocation (all of the following are equal):
++ * ./ctr-cavstest --algo aes128-ctr --key 987212980144b6a632e864031f52dacc --mode encrypt --data a6deca405eef2e8e4609abf3c3ccf4a6
++ * ./ctr-cavstest --algo aes128-ctr --key 987212980144b6a632e864031f52dacc --mode encrypt --data a6deca405eef2e8e4609abf3c3ccf4a6 --iv 00000000000000000000000000000000
++ * echo -n a6deca405eef2e8e4609abf3c3ccf4a6 | ./ctr-cavstest --algo aes128-ctr --key 987212980144b6a632e864031f52dacc --mode encrypt
++ */
++
++#include "includes.h"
++
++#include <sys/types.h>
++#include <sys/param.h>
++#include <stdarg.h>
++#include <stdio.h>
++#include <stdlib.h>
++#include <string.h>
++#include <ctype.h>
++
++#include "xmalloc.h"
++#include "log.h"
++#include "cipher.h"
++
++/* compatibility with old or broken OpenSSL versions */
++#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
++
++void usage(void) {
++ fprintf(stderr, "Usage: ctr-cavstest --algo <ssh-crypto-algorithm>\n"
++ " --key <hexadecimal-key> --mode <encrypt|decrypt>\n"
++ " [--iv <hexadecimal-iv>] --data <hexadecimal-data>\n\n"
++ "Hexadecimal output is printed to stdout.\n"
++ "Hexadecimal input data can be alternatively read from stdin.\n");
++ exit(1);
++}
++
++void *fromhex(char *hex, size_t *len)
++{
++ unsigned char *bin;
++ char *p;
++ size_t n = 0;
++ int shift = 4;
++ unsigned char out = 0;
++ unsigned char *optr;
++
++ bin = xmalloc(strlen(hex)/2);
++ optr = bin;
++
++ for (p = hex; *p != '\0'; ++p) {
++ unsigned char c;
++
++ c = *p;
++ if (isspace(c))
++ continue;
++
++ if (c >= '0' && c <= '9') {
++ c = c - '0';
++ } else if (c >= 'A' && c <= 'F') {
++ c = c - 'A' + 10;
++ } else if (c >= 'a' && c <= 'f') {
++ c = c - 'a' + 10;
++ } else {
++ /* truncate on nonhex cipher */
++ break;
++ }
++
++ out |= c << shift;
++ shift = (shift + 4) % 8;
++
++ if (shift) {
++ *(optr++) = out;
++ out = 0;
++ ++n;
++ }
++ }
++
++ *len = n;
++ return bin;
++}
++
++#define READ_CHUNK 4096
++#define MAX_READ_SIZE 1024*1024*100
++char *read_stdin(void)
++{
++ char *buf;
++ size_t n, total = 0;
++
++ buf = xmalloc(READ_CHUNK);
++
++ do {
++ n = fread(buf + total, 1, READ_CHUNK, stdin);
++ if (n < READ_CHUNK) /* terminate on short read */
++ break;
++
++ total += n;
++ buf = xreallocarray(buf, total + READ_CHUNK, 1);
++ } while(total < MAX_READ_SIZE);
++ return buf;
++}
++
++int main (int argc, char *argv[])
++{
++
++ const struct sshcipher *c;
++ struct sshcipher_ctx *cc;
++ char *algo = "aes128-ctr";
++ char *hexkey = NULL;
++ char *hexiv = "00000000000000000000000000000000";
++ char *hexdata = NULL;
++ char *p;
++ int i;
++ int encrypt = 1;
++ void *key;
++ size_t keylen;
++ void *iv;
++ size_t ivlen;
++ void *data;
++ size_t datalen;
++ void *outdata;
++
++ for (i = 1; i < argc; ++i) {
++ if (strcmp(argv[i], "--algo") == 0) {
++ algo = argv[++i];
++ } else if (strcmp(argv[i], "--key") == 0) {
++ hexkey = argv[++i];
++ } else if (strcmp(argv[i], "--mode") == 0) {
++ ++i;
++ if (argv[i] == NULL) {
++ usage();
++ }
++ if (strncmp(argv[i], "enc", 3) == 0) {
++ encrypt = 1;
++ } else if (strncmp(argv[i], "dec", 3) == 0) {
++ encrypt = 0;
++ } else {
++ usage();
++ }
++ } else if (strcmp(argv[i], "--iv") == 0) {
++ hexiv = argv[++i];
++ } else if (strcmp(argv[i], "--data") == 0) {
++ hexdata = argv[++i];
++ }
++ }
++
++ if (hexkey == NULL || algo == NULL) {
++ usage();
++ }
++
++ SSLeay_add_all_algorithms();
++
++ c = cipher_by_name(algo);
++ if (c == NULL) {
++ fprintf(stderr, "Error: unknown algorithm\n");
++ return 2;
++ }
++
++ if (hexdata == NULL) {
++ hexdata = read_stdin();
++ } else {
++ hexdata = xstrdup(hexdata);
++ }
++
++ key = fromhex(hexkey, &keylen);
++
++ if (keylen != 16 && keylen != 24 && keylen == 32) {
++ fprintf(stderr, "Error: unsupported key length\n");
++ return 2;
++ }
++
++ iv = fromhex(hexiv, &ivlen);
++
++ if (ivlen != 16) {
++ fprintf(stderr, "Error: unsupported iv length\n");
++ return 2;
++ }
++
++ data = fromhex(hexdata, &datalen);
++
++ if (data == NULL || datalen == 0) {
++ fprintf(stderr, "Error: no data to encrypt/decrypt\n");
++ return 2;
++ }
++
++ cipher_init(&cc, c, key, keylen, iv, ivlen, encrypt);
++
++ free(key);
++ free(iv);
++
++ outdata = malloc(datalen);
++ if(outdata == NULL) {
++ fprintf(stderr, "Error: memory allocation failure\n");
++ return 2;
++ }
++
++ cipher_crypt(cc, 0, outdata, data, datalen, 0, 0);
++
++ free(data);
++
++ cipher_free(cc);
++
++ for (p = outdata; datalen > 0; ++p, --datalen) {
++ printf("%02X", (unsigned char)*p);
++ }
++
++ free(outdata);
++
++ printf("\n");
++ return 0;
++}
++
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-debian-restore-tcp-wrappers.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-debian-restore-tcp-wrappers.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5fcc451
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-debian-restore-tcp-wrappers.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,140 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/configure.ac.tcp_wrappers openssh-7.4p1/configure.ac
+--- openssh-7.4p1/configure.ac.tcp_wrappers 2016-12-23 15:36:38.745411192 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/configure.ac 2016-12-23 15:36:38.777411197 +0100
+@@ -1491,6 +1491,62 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([skey],
+ ]
+ )
+
++# Check whether user wants TCP wrappers support
++TCPW_MSG="no"
++AC_ARG_WITH([tcp-wrappers],
++ [ --with-tcp-wrappers[[=PATH]] Enable tcpwrappers support (optionally in PATH)],
++ [
++ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
++ saved_LIBS="$LIBS"
++ saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
++ saved_CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS"
++ if test -n "${withval}" && \
++ test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
++ if test -d "${withval}/lib"; then
++ if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then
++ LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib -R${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
++ else
++ LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
++ fi
++ else
++ if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then
++ LDFLAGS="-L${withval} -R${withval} ${LDFLAGS}"
++ else
++ LDFLAGS="-L${withval} ${LDFLAGS}"
++ fi
++ fi
++ if test -d "${withval}/include"; then
++ CPPFLAGS="-I${withval}/include ${CPPFLAGS}"
++ else
++ CPPFLAGS="-I${withval} ${CPPFLAGS}"
++ fi
++ fi
++ LIBS="-lwrap $LIBS"
++ AC_MSG_CHECKING([for libwrap])
++ AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
++#include <sys/types.h>
++#include <sys/socket.h>
++#include <netinet/in.h>
++#include <tcpd.h>
++int deny_severity = 0, allow_severity = 0;
++ ]], [[
++ hosts_access(0);
++ ]])], [
++ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
++ AC_DEFINE([LIBWRAP], [1],
++ [Define if you want
++ TCP Wrappers support])
++ SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lwrap"
++ TCPW_MSG="yes"
++ ], [
++ AC_MSG_ERROR([*** libwrap missing])
++
++ ])
++ LIBS="$saved_LIBS"
++ fi
++ ]
++)
++
+ # Check whether user wants to use ldns
+ LDNS_MSG="no"
+ AC_ARG_WITH(ldns,
+@@ -5214,6 +5270,7 @@ echo " KerberosV support
+ echo " SELinux support: $SELINUX_MSG"
+ echo " Smartcard support: $SCARD_MSG"
+ echo " S/KEY support: $SKEY_MSG"
++echo " TCP Wrappers support: $TCPW_MSG"
+ echo " MD5 password support: $MD5_MSG"
+ echo " libedit support: $LIBEDIT_MSG"
+ echo " Solaris process contract support: $SPC_MSG"
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd.8.tcp_wrappers openssh-7.4p1/sshd.8
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd.8.tcp_wrappers 2016-12-23 15:36:38.759411194 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd.8 2016-12-23 15:36:38.778411197 +0100
+@@ -836,6 +836,12 @@ the user's home directory becomes access
+ This file should be writable only by the user, and need not be
+ readable by anyone else.
+ .Pp
++.It Pa /etc/hosts.allow
++.It Pa /etc/hosts.deny
++Access controls that should be enforced by tcp-wrappers are defined here.
++Further details are described in
++.Xr hosts_access 5 .
++.Pp
+ .It Pa /etc/hosts.equiv
+ This file is for host-based authentication (see
+ .Xr ssh 1 ) .
+@@ -960,6 +966,7 @@ IPv6 address can be used everywhere wher
+ .Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
+ .Xr ssh-keyscan 1 ,
+ .Xr chroot 2 ,
++.Xr hosts_access 5 ,
+ .Xr login.conf 5 ,
+ .Xr moduli 5 ,
+ .Xr sshd_config 5 ,
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.tcp_wrappers openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.tcp_wrappers 2016-12-23 15:36:38.772411196 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c 2016-12-23 15:37:15.032417028 +0100
+@@ -123,6 +123,13 @@
+ #include "version.h"
+ #include "ssherr.h"
+
++#ifdef LIBWRAP
++#include <tcpd.h>
++#include <syslog.h>
++int allow_severity;
++int deny_severity;
++#endif /* LIBWRAP */
++
+ /* Re-exec fds */
+ #define REEXEC_DEVCRYPTO_RESERVED_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 1)
+ #define REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 2)
+@@ -2012,6 +2019,24 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ audit_connection_from(remote_ip, remote_port);
+ #endif
++#ifdef LIBWRAP
++ allow_severity = options.log_facility|LOG_INFO;
++ deny_severity = options.log_facility|LOG_WARNING;
++ /* Check whether logins are denied from this host. */
++ if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) {
++ struct request_info req;
++
++ request_init(&req, RQ_DAEMON, __progname, RQ_FILE, sock_in, 0);
++ fromhost(&req);
++
++ if (!hosts_access(&req)) {
++ debug("Connection refused by tcp wrapper");
++ refuse(&req);
++ /* NOTREACHED */
++ fatal("libwrap refuse returns");
++ }
++ }
++#endif /* LIBWRAP */
+
+ /* Log the connection. */
+ laddr = get_local_ipaddr(sock_in);
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-expose-pam.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-expose-pam.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e4e6d82
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-expose-pam.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,517 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/auth2.c.expose-pam openssh-7.4p1/auth2.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/auth2.c.expose-pam 2016-12-23 15:40:26.768447868 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/auth2.c 2016-12-23 15:40:26.818447876 +0100
+@@ -310,6 +310,7 @@ userauth_finish(Authctxt *authctxt, int
+ const char *submethod)
+ {
+ char *methods;
++ char *prev_auth_details;
+ int partial = 0;
+
+ if (!authctxt->valid && authenticated)
+@@ -340,6 +341,18 @@ userauth_finish(Authctxt *authctxt, int
+ if (authctxt->postponed)
+ return;
+
++ if (authenticated || partial) {
++ prev_auth_details = authctxt->auth_details;
++ xasprintf(&authctxt->auth_details, "%s%s%s%s%s",
++ prev_auth_details ? prev_auth_details : "",
++ prev_auth_details ? ", " : "", method,
++ authctxt->last_details ? ": " : "",
++ authctxt->last_details ? authctxt->last_details : "");
++ free(prev_auth_details);
++ }
++ free(authctxt->last_details);
++ authctxt->last_details = NULL;
++
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+ if (options.use_pam && authenticated) {
+ if (!PRIVSEP(do_pam_account())) {
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/auth2-gss.c.expose-pam openssh-7.4p1/auth2-gss.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/auth2-gss.c.expose-pam 2016-12-23 15:40:26.769447868 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/auth2-gss.c 2016-12-23 15:40:26.818447876 +0100
+@@ -276,6 +276,9 @@ input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type,
+ authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
+ authctxt->pw));
+
++ if (authenticated)
++ authctxt->last_details = ssh_gssapi_get_displayname();
++
+ authctxt->postponed = 0;
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK, NULL);
+@@ -322,6 +325,9 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple
+ else
+ logit("GSSAPI MIC check failed");
+
++ if (authenticated)
++ authctxt->last_details = ssh_gssapi_get_displayname();
++
+ buffer_free(&b);
+ if (micuser != authctxt->user)
+ free(micuser);
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/auth2-hostbased.c.expose-pam openssh-7.4p1/auth2-hostbased.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/auth2-hostbased.c.expose-pam 2016-12-23 15:40:26.731447862 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/auth2-hostbased.c 2016-12-23 15:40:26.818447876 +0100
+@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ {
+ Buffer b;
+ Key *key = NULL;
+- char *pkalg, *cuser, *chost, *service;
++ char *pkalg, *cuser, *chost, *service, *pubkey;
+ u_char *pkblob, *sig;
+ u_int alen, blen, slen;
+ int pktype;
+@@ -140,15 +140,21 @@ userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ buffer_dump(&b);
+ #endif
+
+- pubkey_auth_info(authctxt, key,
+- "client user \"%.100s\", client host \"%.100s\"", cuser, chost);
++ pubkey = sshkey_format_oneline(key, options.fingerprint_hash);
++ auth_info(authctxt,
++ "%s, client user \"%.100s\", client host \"%.100s\"",
++ pubkey, cuser, chost);
+
+ /* test for allowed key and correct signature */
+ authenticated = 0;
+ if (PRIVSEP(hostbased_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, cuser, chost, key)) &&
+ PRIVSEP(key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b),
+- buffer_len(&b))) == 1)
++ buffer_len(&b))) == 1) {
+ authenticated = 1;
++ authctxt->last_details = pubkey;
++ } else {
++ free(pubkey);
++ }
+
+ buffer_free(&b);
+ done:
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/auth2-pubkey.c.expose-pam openssh-7.4p1/auth2-pubkey.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/auth2-pubkey.c.expose-pam 2016-12-23 15:40:26.746447864 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/auth2-pubkey.c 2016-12-23 15:40:26.819447876 +0100
+@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ {
+ Buffer b;
+ Key *key = NULL;
+- char *pkalg, *userstyle, *fp = NULL;
++ char *pkalg, *userstyle, *pubkey, *fp = NULL;
+ u_char *pkblob, *sig;
+ u_int alen, blen, slen;
+ int have_sig, pktype;
+@@ -177,7 +177,8 @@ userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ #ifdef DEBUG_PK
+ buffer_dump(&b);
+ #endif
+- pubkey_auth_info(authctxt, key, NULL);
++ pubkey = sshkey_format_oneline(key, options.fingerprint_hash);
++ auth_info(authctxt, "%s", pubkey);
+
+ /* test for correct signature */
+ authenticated = 0;
+@@ -185,9 +186,12 @@ userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ PRIVSEP(key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b),
+ buffer_len(&b))) == 1) {
+ authenticated = 1;
++ authctxt->last_details = pubkey;
+ /* Record the successful key to prevent reuse */
+ auth2_record_userkey(authctxt, key);
+ key = NULL; /* Don't free below */
++ } else {
++ free(pubkey);
+ }
+ buffer_free(&b);
+ free(sig);
+@@ -228,7 +232,7 @@ done:
+ void
+ pubkey_auth_info(Authctxt *authctxt, const Key *key, const char *fmt, ...)
+ {
+- char *fp, *extra;
++ char *extra, *pubkey;
+ va_list ap;
+ int i;
+
+@@ -238,27 +242,13 @@ pubkey_auth_info(Authctxt *authctxt, con
+ i = vasprintf(&extra, fmt, ap);
+ va_end(ap);
+ if (i < 0 || extra == NULL)
+- fatal("%s: vasprintf failed", __func__);
++ fatal("%s: vasprintf failed", __func__);
+ }
+
+- if (key_is_cert(key)) {
+- fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,
+- options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
+- auth_info(authctxt, "%s ID %s (serial %llu) CA %s %s%s%s",
+- key_type(key), key->cert->key_id,
+- (unsigned long long)key->cert->serial,
+- key_type(key->cert->signature_key),
+- fp == NULL ? "(null)" : fp,
+- extra == NULL ? "" : ", ", extra == NULL ? "" : extra);
+- free(fp);
+- } else {
+- fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash,
+- SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
+- auth_info(authctxt, "%s %s%s%s", key_type(key),
+- fp == NULL ? "(null)" : fp,
+- extra == NULL ? "" : ", ", extra == NULL ? "" : extra);
+- free(fp);
+- }
++ pubkey = sshkey_format_oneline(key, options.fingerprint_hash);
++ auth_info(authctxt, "%s%s%s", pubkey, extra == NULL ? "" : ", ",
++ extra == NULL ? "" : extra);
++ free(pubkey);
+ free(extra);
+ }
+
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/auth.h.expose-pam openssh-7.4p1/auth.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/auth.h.expose-pam 2016-12-23 15:40:26.782447870 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/auth.h 2016-12-23 15:40:26.819447876 +0100
+@@ -84,6 +84,9 @@ struct Authctxt {
+
+ struct sshkey **prev_userkeys;
+ u_int nprev_userkeys;
++
++ char *last_details;
++ char *auth_details;
+ };
+ /*
+ * Every authentication method has to handle authentication requests for
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/auth-pam.c.expose-pam openssh-7.4p1/auth-pam.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/auth-pam.c.expose-pam 2016-12-23 15:40:26.731447862 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/auth-pam.c 2016-12-23 15:40:26.819447876 +0100
+@@ -688,6 +688,11 @@ sshpam_init_ctx(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ return (NULL);
+ }
+
++ /* Notify PAM about any already successful auth methods */
++ if (options.expose_auth_methods >= EXPOSE_AUTHMETH_PAMONLY &&
++ authctxt->auth_details)
++ do_pam_putenv("SSH_USER_AUTH", authctxt->auth_details);
++
+ ctxt = xcalloc(1, sizeof *ctxt);
+
+ /* Start the authentication thread */
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv.c.expose-pam openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv.c.expose-pam 2016-12-23 15:40:26.808447874 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv.c 2016-12-23 15:40:26.819447876 +0100
+@@ -441,6 +441,16 @@ ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***envp, u_int
+ }
+
+ /* Privileged */
++char*
++ssh_gssapi_get_displayname(void)
++{
++ if (gssapi_client.displayname.length != 0 &&
++ gssapi_client.displayname.value != NULL)
++ return strdup((char *)gssapi_client.displayname.value);
++ return NULL;
++}
++
++/* Privileged */
+ int
+ ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw)
+ {
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.expose-pam openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.expose-pam 2016-12-23 15:40:26.794447872 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c 2016-12-23 15:41:16.473455863 +0100
+@@ -300,6 +300,7 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctx
+ {
+ struct mon_table *ent;
+ int authenticated = 0, partial = 0;
++ char *prev_auth_details;
+
+ debug3("preauth child monitor started");
+
+@@ -330,6 +331,18 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctx
+ auth_submethod = NULL;
+ authenticated = (monitor_read(pmonitor, mon_dispatch, &ent) == 1);
+
++ if (authenticated) {
++ prev_auth_details = authctxt->auth_details;
++ xasprintf(&authctxt->auth_details, "%s%s%s%s%s",
++ prev_auth_details ? prev_auth_details : "",
++ prev_auth_details ? ", " : "", auth_method,
++ authctxt->last_details ? ": " : "",
++ authctxt->last_details ? authctxt->last_details : "");
++ free(prev_auth_details);
++ }
++ free(authctxt->last_details);
++ authctxt->last_details = NULL;
++
+ /* Special handling for multiple required authentications */
+ if (options.num_auth_methods != 0) {
+ if (authenticated &&
+@@ -1417,6 +1430,10 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, Buffer *m)
+ debug3("%s: key %p signature %s",
+ __func__, key, (verified == 1) ? "verified" : "unverified");
+
++ if (verified == 1)
++ authctxt->last_details = sshkey_format_oneline(key,
++ options.fingerprint_hash);
++
+ /* If auth was successful then record key to ensure it isn't reused */
+ if (verified == 1 && key_blobtype == MM_USERKEY)
+ auth2_record_userkey(authctxt, key);
+@@ -1860,6 +1877,9 @@ mm_answer_gss_userok(int sock, Buffer *m
+
+ auth_method = "gssapi-with-mic";
+
++ if (authenticated)
++ authctxt->last_details = ssh_gssapi_get_displayname();
++
+ /* Monitor loop will terminate if authenticated */
+ return (authenticated);
+ }
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.expose-pam openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.expose-pam 2016-12-23 15:40:26.810447875 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c 2016-12-23 15:44:04.691482920 +0100
+@@ -171,6 +171,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
+ options->version_addendum = NULL;
+ options->use_kuserok = -1;
+ options->enable_k5users = -1;
++ options->expose_auth_methods = -1;
+ options->fingerprint_hash = -1;
+ options->disable_forwarding = -1;
+ }
+@@ -354,6 +355,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
+ options->use_kuserok = 1;
+ if (options->enable_k5users == -1)
+ options->enable_k5users = 0;
++ if (options->expose_auth_methods == -1)
++ options->expose_auth_methods = EXPOSE_AUTHMETH_NEVER;
+ if (options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask == (mode_t)-1)
+ options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask = 0177;
+ if (options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink == -1)
+@@ -439,6 +442,7 @@ typedef enum {
+ sAuthenticationMethods, sHostKeyAgent, sPermitUserRC,
+ sStreamLocalBindMask, sStreamLocalBindUnlink,
+ sAllowStreamLocalForwarding, sFingerprintHash, sDisableForwarding,
++ sExposeAuthenticationMethods,
+ sDeprecated, sIgnore, sUnsupported
+ } ServerOpCodes;
+
+@@ -595,6 +599,7 @@ static struct {
+ { "allowstreamlocalforwarding", sAllowStreamLocalForwarding, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "fingerprinthash", sFingerprintHash, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "disableforwarding", sDisableForwarding, SSHCFG_ALL },
++ { "exposeauthenticationmethods", sExposeAuthenticationMethods, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { NULL, sBadOption, 0 }
+ };
+
+@@ -984,6 +989,12 @@ static const struct multistate multistat
+ { "local", FORWARD_LOCAL },
+ { NULL, -1 }
+ };
++static const struct multistate multistate_exposeauthmeth[] = {
++ { "never", EXPOSE_AUTHMETH_NEVER },
++ { "pam-only", EXPOSE_AUTHMETH_PAMONLY },
++ { "pam-and-env", EXPOSE_AUTHMETH_PAMENV },
++ { NULL, -1}
++};
+
+ int
+ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
+@@ -1902,6 +1913,11 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
+ options->fingerprint_hash = value;
+ break;
+
++ case sExposeAuthenticationMethods:
++ intptr = &options->expose_auth_methods;
++ multistate_ptr = multistate_exposeauthmeth;
++ goto parse_multistate;
++
+ case sDeprecated:
+ case sIgnore:
+ case sUnsupported:
+@@ -2060,6 +2076,7 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *d
+ M_CP_INTOPT(enable_k5users);
+ M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_limit);
+ M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_interval);
++ M_CP_INTOPT(expose_auth_methods);
+
+ /*
+ * The bind_mask is a mode_t that may be unsigned, so we can't use
+@@ -2176,6 +2193,8 @@ fmt_intarg(ServerOpCodes code, int val)
+ return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_tcpfwd);
+ case sFingerprintHash:
+ return ssh_digest_alg_name(val);
++ case sExposeAuthenticationMethods:
++ return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_exposeauthmeth);
+ default:
+ switch (val) {
+ case 0:
+@@ -2356,6 +2375,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sUsePrivilegeSeparation, use_privsep);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosUseKuserok, o->use_kuserok);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssEnablek5users, o->enable_k5users);
++ dump_cfg_fmtint(sExposeAuthenticationMethods, o->expose_auth_methods);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sFingerprintHash, o->fingerprint_hash);
+
+ /* string arguments */
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.expose-pam openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.expose-pam 2016-12-23 15:40:26.810447875 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h 2016-12-23 15:40:26.821447876 +0100
+@@ -48,6 +48,11 @@
+ #define FORWARD_LOCAL (1<<1)
+ #define FORWARD_ALLOW (FORWARD_REMOTE|FORWARD_LOCAL)
+
++/* Expose AuthenticationMethods */
++#define EXPOSE_AUTHMETH_NEVER 0
++#define EXPOSE_AUTHMETH_PAMONLY 1
++#define EXPOSE_AUTHMETH_PAMENV 2
++
+ #define DEFAULT_AUTH_FAIL_MAX 6 /* Default for MaxAuthTries */
+ #define DEFAULT_SESSIONS_MAX 10 /* Default for MaxSessions */
+
+@@ -195,6 +200,8 @@ typedef struct {
+ char *auth_methods[MAX_AUTH_METHODS];
+
+ int fingerprint_hash;
++
++ int expose_auth_methods; /* EXPOSE_AUTHMETH_* above */
+ } ServerOptions;
+
+ /* Information about the incoming connection as used by Match */
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.expose-pam openssh-7.4p1/session.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/session.c.expose-pam 2016-12-23 15:40:26.794447872 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/session.c 2016-12-23 15:40:26.821447876 +0100
+@@ -997,6 +997,12 @@ copy_environment(char **source, char ***
+ }
+ *var_val++ = '\0';
+
++ if (options.expose_auth_methods < EXPOSE_AUTHMETH_PAMENV &&
++ strcmp(var_name, "SSH_USER_AUTH") == 0) {
++ free(var_name);
++ continue;
++ }
++
+ debug3("Copy environment: %s=%s", var_name, var_val);
+ child_set_env(env, envsize, var_name, var_val);
+
+@@ -1173,6 +1179,11 @@ do_setup_env(Session *s, const char *she
+ }
+ #endif /* USE_PAM */
+
++ if (options.expose_auth_methods >= EXPOSE_AUTHMETH_PAMENV &&
++ s->authctxt->auth_details)
++ child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_USER_AUTH",
++ s->authctxt->auth_details);
++
+ if (auth_sock_name != NULL)
+ child_set_env(&env, &envsize, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME,
+ auth_sock_name);
+@@ -2561,6 +2572,9 @@ do_cleanup(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ if (authctxt == NULL)
+ return;
+
++ free(authctxt->auth_details);
++ authctxt->auth_details = NULL;
++
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+ if (options.use_pam) {
+ sshpam_cleanup();
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/ssh.1.expose-pam openssh-7.4p1/ssh.1
+--- openssh-7.4p1/ssh.1.expose-pam 2016-12-23 15:40:26.810447875 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/ssh.1 2016-12-23 15:40:26.822447877 +0100
+@@ -1421,6 +1421,10 @@ server IP address, and server port numbe
+ This variable contains the original command line if a forced command
+ is executed.
+ It can be used to extract the original arguments.
++.It Ev SSH_USER_AUTH
++This variable contains, for SSH2 only, a comma-separated list of authentication
++methods that were successfuly used to authenticate. When possible, these
++methods are extended with detailed information on the credential used.
+ .It Ev SSH_TTY
+ This is set to the name of the tty (path to the device) associated
+ with the current shell or command.
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.expose-pam openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.expose-pam 2016-12-23 15:40:26.822447877 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5 2016-12-23 15:45:22.411495421 +0100
+@@ -570,6 +570,21 @@ Disables all forwarding features, includ
+ TCP and StreamLocal.
+ This option overrides all other forwarding-related options and may
+ simplify restricted configurations.
++.It Cm ExposeAuthenticationMethods
++When using SSH2, this option controls the exposure of the list of
++successful authentication methods to PAM during the authentication
++and to the shell environment via the
++.Cm SSH_USER_AUTH
++variable. See the description of this variable for more details.
++Valid options are:
++.Cm never
++(Do not expose successful authentication methods),
++.Cm pam-only
++(Only expose them to PAM during authentication, not afterwards),
++.Cm pam-and-env
++(Expose them to PAM and keep them in the shell environment).
++The default is
++.Cm never .
+ .It Cm FingerprintHash
+ Specifies the hash algorithm used when logging key fingerprints.
+ Valid options are:
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/ssh-gss.h.expose-pam openssh-7.4p1/ssh-gss.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/ssh-gss.h.expose-pam 2016-12-23 15:40:26.811447875 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/ssh-gss.h 2016-12-23 15:40:26.823447877 +0100
+@@ -159,6 +159,7 @@ int ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt
+ const char *);
+ OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID);
+ int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name, struct passwd *);
++char* ssh_gssapi_get_displayname(void);
+ OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
+ void ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***, u_int *);
+ void ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void);
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshkey.c.expose-pam openssh-7.4p1/sshkey.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshkey.c.expose-pam 2016-12-23 15:40:26.777447869 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshkey.c 2016-12-23 15:40:26.823447877 +0100
+@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@
+ #define SSHKEY_INTERNAL
+ #include "sshkey.h"
+ #include "match.h"
++#include "xmalloc.h"
+
+ /* openssh private key file format */
+ #define MARK_BEGIN "-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----\n"
+@@ -1191,6 +1192,30 @@ sshkey_fingerprint(const struct sshkey *
+ return retval;
+ }
+
++char *
++sshkey_format_oneline(const struct sshkey *key, int dgst_alg)
++{
++ char *fp, *result;
++
++ if (sshkey_is_cert(key)) {
++ fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key, dgst_alg,
++ SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
++ xasprintf(&result, "%s ID %s (serial %llu) CA %s %s",
++ sshkey_type(key), key->cert->key_id,
++ (unsigned long long)key->cert->serial,
++ sshkey_type(key->cert->signature_key),
++ fp == NULL ? "(null)" : fp);
++ free(fp);
++ } else {
++ fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, dgst_alg, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
++ xasprintf(&result, "%s %s", sshkey_type(key),
++ fp == NULL ? "(null)" : fp);
++ free(fp);
++ }
++
++ return result;
++}
++
+ #ifdef WITH_SSH1
+ /*
+ * Reads a multiple-precision integer in decimal from the buffer, and advances
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshkey.h.expose-pam openssh-7.4p1/sshkey.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshkey.h.expose-pam 2016-12-23 15:40:26.777447869 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshkey.h 2016-12-23 15:40:26.823447877 +0100
+@@ -124,6 +124,7 @@ char *sshkey_fingerprint(const struct s
+ int, enum sshkey_fp_rep);
+ int sshkey_fingerprint_raw(const struct sshkey *k,
+ int, u_char **retp, size_t *lenp);
++char *sshkey_format_oneline(const struct sshkey *k, int dgst_alg);
+ const char *sshkey_type(const struct sshkey *);
+ const char *sshkey_cert_type(const struct sshkey *);
+ int sshkey_write(const struct sshkey *, FILE *);
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-fips.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-fips.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..38bd6f8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-fips.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,710 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/cipher.c.fips openssh-7.4p1/cipher.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/cipher.c.fips 2017-02-09 14:53:47.174347449 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/cipher.c 2017-02-09 14:53:47.182347441 +0100
+@@ -39,6 +39,8 @@
+
+ #include <sys/types.h>
+
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
++
+ #include <string.h>
+ #include <stdarg.h>
+ #include <stdio.h>
+@@ -116,6 +118,20 @@ static const struct sshcipher ciphers[]
+ { NULL, SSH_CIPHER_INVALID, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, NULL }
+ };
+
++static const struct sshcipher fips_ciphers[] = {
++ { "none", SSH_CIPHER_NONE, 8, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, EVP_enc_null },
++ { "3des-cbc", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 24, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_des_ede3_cbc },
++ { "aes128-cbc", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 16, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_aes_128_cbc },
++ { "aes192-cbc", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 24, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_aes_192_cbc },
++ { "aes256-cbc", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_aes_256_cbc },
++ { "rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se",
++ SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_aes_256_cbc },
++ { "aes128-ctr", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 16, 0, 0, 0, 0, EVP_aes_128_ctr },
++ { "aes192-ctr", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 24, 0, 0, 0, 0, EVP_aes_192_ctr },
++ { "aes256-ctr", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 0, 0, 0, 0, EVP_aes_256_ctr },
++ { NULL, SSH_CIPHER_INVALID, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, NULL }
++};
++
+ /*--*/
+
+ /* Returns a comma-separated list of supported ciphers. */
+@@ -126,7 +142,7 @@ cipher_alg_list(char sep, int auth_only)
+ size_t nlen, rlen = 0;
+ const struct sshcipher *c;
+
+- for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++) {
++ for (c = FIPS_mode() ? fips_ciphers : ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++) {
+ if (c->number != SSH_CIPHER_SSH2)
+ continue;
+ if (auth_only && c->auth_len == 0)
+@@ -222,7 +238,7 @@ const struct sshcipher *
+ cipher_by_name(const char *name)
+ {
+ const struct sshcipher *c;
+- for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++)
++ for (c = FIPS_mode() ? fips_ciphers : ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++)
+ if (strcmp(c->name, name) == 0)
+ return c;
+ return NULL;
+@@ -232,7 +248,7 @@ const struct sshcipher *
+ cipher_by_number(int id)
+ {
+ const struct sshcipher *c;
+- for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++)
++ for (c = FIPS_mode() ? fips_ciphers : ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++)
+ if (c->number == id)
+ return c;
+ return NULL;
+@@ -273,7 +289,7 @@ cipher_number(const char *name)
+ const struct sshcipher *c;
+ if (name == NULL)
+ return -1;
+- for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++)
++ for (c = FIPS_mode() ? fips_ciphers : ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++)
+ if (strcasecmp(c->name, name) == 0)
+ return c->number;
+ return -1;
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/cipher-ctr.c.fips openssh-7.4p1/cipher-ctr.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/cipher-ctr.c.fips 2017-02-09 14:53:47.125347498 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/cipher-ctr.c 2017-02-09 14:53:47.182347441 +0100
+@@ -179,7 +179,8 @@ evp_aes_128_ctr(void)
+ aes_ctr.do_cipher = ssh_aes_ctr;
+ #ifndef SSH_OLD_EVP
+ aes_ctr.flags = EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE | EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH |
+- EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV;
++ EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV |
++ EVP_CIPH_FLAG_FIPS;
+ #endif
+ return (&aes_ctr);
+ }
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/dh.h.fips openssh-7.4p1/dh.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/dh.h.fips 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/dh.h 2017-02-09 14:53:47.182347441 +0100
+@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ u_int dh_estimate(int);
+ * Miniumum increased in light of DH precomputation attacks.
+ */
+ #define DH_GRP_MIN 1024
++#define DH_GRP_MIN_FIPS 2048
+ #define DH_GRP_MAX 8192
+
+ /*
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/entropy.c.fips openssh-7.4p1/entropy.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/entropy.c.fips 2017-02-09 14:53:47.116347507 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/entropy.c 2017-02-09 14:53:47.182347441 +0100
+@@ -217,6 +217,9 @@ seed_rng(void)
+ fatal("OpenSSL version mismatch. Built against %lx, you "
+ "have %lx", (u_long)OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER, SSLeay());
+
++ /* clean the PRNG status when exiting the program */
++ atexit(RAND_cleanup);
++
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY
+ if (RAND_status() == 1) {
+ debug3("RNG is ready, skipping seeding");
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/kex.c.fips openssh-7.4p1/kex.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/kex.c.fips 2017-02-09 14:53:47.174347449 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/kex.c 2017-02-09 14:53:47.183347440 +0100
+@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ #include <openssl/crypto.h>
+ #include <openssl/dh.h>
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
+ #endif
+
+ #include "ssh2.h"
+@@ -124,6 +125,28 @@ static const struct kexalg kexalgs[] = {
+ { NULL, -1, -1, -1},
+ };
+
++static const struct kexalg kexalgs_fips[] = {
++ { KEX_DH14_SHA1, KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
++ { KEX_DH14_SHA256, KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 },
++ { KEX_DH16_SHA512, KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA512 },
++ { KEX_DH18_SHA512, KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA512 },
++ { KEX_DHGEX_SHA1, KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
++#ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256
++ { KEX_DHGEX_SHA256, KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 },
++#endif
++#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
++ { KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP256, KEX_ECDH_SHA2,
++ NID_X9_62_prime256v1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 },
++ { KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP384, KEX_ECDH_SHA2, NID_secp384r1,
++ SSH_DIGEST_SHA384 },
++# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521
++ { KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP521, KEX_ECDH_SHA2, NID_secp521r1,
++ SSH_DIGEST_SHA512 },
++# endif
++#endif
++ { NULL, -1, -1, -1},
++};
++
+ char *
+ kex_alg_list(char sep)
+ {
+@@ -151,7 +169,7 @@ kex_alg_by_name(const char *name)
+ {
+ const struct kexalg *k;
+
+- for (k = kexalgs; k->name != NULL; k++) {
++ for (k = (FIPS_mode() ? kexalgs_fips : kexalgs); k->name != NULL; k++) {
+ if (strcmp(k->name, name) == 0)
+ return k;
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
+@@ -177,7 +195,10 @@ kex_names_valid(const char *names)
+ for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0';
+ (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
+ if (kex_alg_by_name(p) == NULL) {
+- error("Unsupported KEX algorithm \"%.100s\"", p);
++ if (FIPS_mode())
++ error("\"%.100s\" is not allowed in FIPS mode", p);
++ else
++ error("Unsupported KEX algorithm \"%.100s\"", p);
+ free(s);
+ return 0;
+ }
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/kexgexc.c.fips openssh-7.4p1/kexgexc.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/kexgexc.c.fips 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/kexgexc.c 2017-02-09 14:53:47.183347440 +0100
+@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
+
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
+ #include <sys/types.h>
+
+ #include <openssl/dh.h>
+@@ -63,7 +64,7 @@ kexgex_client(struct ssh *ssh)
+
+ nbits = dh_estimate(kex->dh_need * 8);
+
+- kex->min = DH_GRP_MIN;
++ kex->min = FIPS_mode() ? DH_GRP_MIN_FIPS : DH_GRP_MIN;
+ kex->max = DH_GRP_MAX;
+ kex->nbits = nbits;
+ if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_DHGEX_LARGE)
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/kexgexs.c.fips openssh-7.4p1/kexgexs.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/kexgexs.c.fips 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/kexgexs.c 2017-02-09 14:53:47.183347440 +0100
+@@ -83,9 +83,9 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_request(int type, u_int
+ kex->nbits = nbits;
+ kex->min = min;
+ kex->max = max;
+- min = MAXIMUM(DH_GRP_MIN, min);
++ min = MAXIMUM(FIPS_mode() ? DH_GRP_MIN_FIPS : DH_GRP_MIN, min);
+ max = MINIMUM(DH_GRP_MAX, max);
+- nbits = MAXIMUM(DH_GRP_MIN, nbits);
++ nbits = MAXIMUM(FIPS_mode() ? DH_GRP_MIN_FIPS : DH_GRP_MIN, nbits);
+ nbits = MINIMUM(DH_GRP_MAX, nbits);
+
+ if (kex->max < kex->min || kex->nbits < kex->min ||
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/mac.c.fips openssh-7.4p1/mac.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/mac.c.fips 2017-02-09 14:53:47.175347448 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/mac.c 2017-02-09 14:53:47.183347440 +0100
+@@ -27,6 +27,8 @@
+
+ #include <sys/types.h>
+
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
++
+ #include <string.h>
+ #include <stdio.h>
+
+@@ -54,7 +56,7 @@ struct macalg {
+ int etm; /* Encrypt-then-MAC */
+ };
+
+-static const struct macalg macs[] = {
++static const struct macalg all_macs[] = {
+ /* Encrypt-and-MAC (encrypt-and-authenticate) variants */
+ { "hmac-sha1", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, 0, 0, 0, 0 },
+ { "hmac-sha1-96", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, 96, 0, 0, 0 },
+@@ -89,6 +91,24 @@ static const struct macalg macs[] = {
+ { NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }
+ };
+
++static const struct macalg fips_macs[] = {
++ /* Encrypt-and-MAC (encrypt-and-authenticate) variants */
++ { "hmac-sha1", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, 0, 0, 0, 0 },
++#ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256
++ { "hmac-sha2-256", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, 0, 0, 0, 0 },
++ { "hmac-sha2-512", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA512, 0, 0, 0, 0 },
++#endif
++
++ /* Encrypt-then-MAC variants */
++ { "hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, 0, 0, 0, 1 },
++#ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256
++ { "hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, 0, 0, 0, 1 },
++ { "hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA512, 0, 0, 0, 1 },
++#endif
++
++ { NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }
++};
++
+ /* Returns a list of supported MACs separated by the specified char. */
+ char *
+ mac_alg_list(char sep)
+@@ -97,7 +117,7 @@ mac_alg_list(char sep)
+ size_t nlen, rlen = 0;
+ const struct macalg *m;
+
+- for (m = macs; m->name != NULL; m++) {
++ for (m = FIPS_mode() ? fips_macs : all_macs; m->name != NULL; m++) {
+ if (ret != NULL)
+ ret[rlen++] = sep;
+ nlen = strlen(m->name);
+@@ -136,7 +156,7 @@ mac_setup(struct sshmac *mac, char *name
+ {
+ const struct macalg *m;
+
+- for (m = macs; m->name != NULL; m++) {
++ for (m = FIPS_mode() ? fips_macs : all_macs; m->name != NULL; m++) {
+ if (strcmp(name, m->name) != 0)
+ continue;
+ if (mac != NULL)
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/Makefile.in.fips openssh-7.4p1/Makefile.in
+--- openssh-7.4p1/Makefile.in.fips 2017-02-09 14:53:47.175347448 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/Makefile.in 2017-02-09 14:53:47.184347440 +0100
+@@ -168,25 +168,25 @@ libssh.a: $(LIBSSH_OBJS)
+ $(RANLIB) $@
+
+ ssh$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SSHOBJS)
+- $(LD) -o $@ $(SSHOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(SSHLIBS) $(LIBS) $(GSSLIBS)
++ $(LD) -o $@ $(SSHOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(SSHLIBS) $(LIBS) $(GSSLIBS)
+
+ sshd$(EXEEXT): libssh.a $(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHDOBJS)
+- $(LD) -o $@ $(SSHDOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(SSHDLIBS) $(LIBS) $(GSSLIBS) $(K5LIBS)
++ $(LD) -o $@ $(SSHDOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(SSHDLIBS) $(LIBS) $(GSSLIBS) $(K5LIBS)
+
+ scp$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a scp.o progressmeter.o
+ $(LD) -o $@ scp.o progressmeter.o bufaux.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+
+ ssh-add$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-add.o
+- $(LD) -o $@ ssh-add.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
++ $(LD) -o $@ ssh-add.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(LIBS)
+
+ ssh-agent$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-agent.o ssh-pkcs11-client.o
+- $(LD) -o $@ ssh-agent.o ssh-pkcs11-client.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
++ $(LD) -o $@ ssh-agent.o ssh-pkcs11-client.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(LIBS)
+
+ ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keygen.o
+- $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keygen.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
++ $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keygen.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(LIBS)
+
+ ssh-keysign$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keysign.o readconf.o
+- $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keysign.o readconf.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
++ $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keysign.o readconf.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(LIBS)
+
+ ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-pkcs11-helper.o ssh-pkcs11.o
+ $(LD) -o $@ ssh-pkcs11-helper.o ssh-pkcs11.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+@@ -205,7 +205,7 @@ ssh-cavs$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a
+ $(LD) -o $@ ssh-cavs.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+
+ ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keyscan.o
+- $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
++ $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lfipscheck $(LIBS)
+
+ sftp-server$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a sftp.o sftp-common.o sftp-server.o sftp-server-main.o
+ $(LD) -o $@ sftp-server.o sftp-common.o sftp-server-main.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/myproposal.h.fips openssh-7.4p1/myproposal.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/myproposal.h.fips 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/myproposal.h 2017-02-09 14:53:47.184347440 +0100
+@@ -144,6 +144,37 @@
+
+ #define KEX_CLIENT_MAC KEX_SERVER_MAC
+
++#define KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT \
++ "aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr," \
++ "aes128-cbc,3des-cbc," \
++ "aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc,rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se"
++#ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256
++# define KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS \
++ KEX_ECDH_METHODS \
++ KEX_SHA2_METHODS \
++ "diffie-hellman-group14-sha256"
++# define KEX_FIPS_MAC \
++ "hmac-sha1," \
++ "hmac-sha2-256," \
++ "hmac-sha2-512," \
++ "hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com," \
++ "hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com," \
++ "hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com"
++#else
++# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521
++# define KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS \
++ "ecdh-sha2-nistp256," \
++ "ecdh-sha2-nistp384," \
++ "ecdh-sha2-nistp521"
++# else
++# define KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS \
++ "ecdh-sha2-nistp256," \
++ "ecdh-sha2-nistp384"
++# endif
++#define KEX_FIPS_MAC \
++ "hmac-sha1"
++#endif
++
+ #else /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+
+ #define KEX_SERVER_KEX \
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_user_key_allowed2.c.fips openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_user_key_allowed2.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_user_key_allowed2.c.fips 2017-02-09 14:53:47.184347440 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_user_key_allowed2.c 2017-02-09 14:55:25.123250447 +0100
+@@ -102,7 +102,8 @@ pamsshagentauth_check_authkeys_file(FILE
+ found_key = 1;
+ logit("matching key found: file/command %s, line %lu", file,
+ linenum);
+- fp = key_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
++ fp = sshkey_fingerprint(found, FIPS_mode() ? SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 : SSH_DIGEST_MD5,
++ SSH_FP_HEX);
+ logit("Found matching %s key: %s",
+ key_type(found), fp);
+ free(fp);
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/readconf.c.fips openssh-7.4p1/readconf.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/readconf.c.fips 2017-02-09 14:53:47.185347438 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/readconf.c 2017-02-09 14:56:24.840191308 +0100
+@@ -2104,9 +2104,12 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
+ }
+ if (options->update_hostkeys == -1)
+ options->update_hostkeys = 0;
+- if (kex_assemble_names(KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT, &options->ciphers) != 0 ||
+- kex_assemble_names(KEX_CLIENT_MAC, &options->macs) != 0 ||
+- kex_assemble_names(KEX_CLIENT_KEX, &options->kex_algorithms) != 0 ||
++ if (kex_assemble_names((FIPS_mode() ? KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT
++ : KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT), &options->ciphers) != 0 ||
++ kex_assemble_names((FIPS_mode() ? KEX_FIPS_MAC
++ : KEX_CLIENT_MAC), &options->macs) != 0 ||
++ kex_assemble_names((FIPS_mode() ? KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS
++ : KEX_CLIENT_KEX), &options->kex_algorithms) != 0 ||
+ kex_assemble_names(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG,
+ &options->hostbased_key_types) != 0 ||
+ kex_assemble_names(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG,
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c.fips openssh-7.4p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c.fips 2017-02-09 14:53:47.177347446 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c 2017-02-09 14:53:47.185347438 +0100
+@@ -118,6 +118,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_
+ #ifdef __NR_open
+ SC_DENY(open, EACCES),
+ #endif
++#ifdef __NR_socket
++ SC_DENY(socket, EACCES),
++#endif
+ #ifdef __NR_openat
+ SC_DENY(openat, EACCES),
+ #endif
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.fips openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.fips 2017-02-09 14:53:47.169347454 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c 2017-02-09 14:57:24.957131771 +0100
+@@ -184,9 +184,12 @@ option_clear_or_none(const char *o)
+ static void
+ assemble_algorithms(ServerOptions *o)
+ {
+- if (kex_assemble_names(KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT, &o->ciphers) != 0 ||
+- kex_assemble_names(KEX_SERVER_MAC, &o->macs) != 0 ||
+- kex_assemble_names(KEX_SERVER_KEX, &o->kex_algorithms) != 0 ||
++ if (kex_assemble_names((FIPS_mode() ? KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT
++ : KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT), &o->ciphers) != 0 ||
++ kex_assemble_names((FIPS_mode() ? KEX_FIPS_MAC
++ : KEX_SERVER_MAC), &o->macs) != 0 ||
++ kex_assemble_names((FIPS_mode() ? KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS
++ : KEX_SERVER_KEX), &o->kex_algorithms) != 0 ||
+ kex_assemble_names(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG,
+ &o->hostkeyalgorithms) != 0 ||
+ kex_assemble_names(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG,
+@@ -2386,8 +2389,10 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
+ /* string arguments */
+ dump_cfg_string(sPidFile, o->pid_file);
+ dump_cfg_string(sXAuthLocation, o->xauth_location);
+- dump_cfg_string(sCiphers, o->ciphers ? o->ciphers : KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT);
+- dump_cfg_string(sMacs, o->macs ? o->macs : KEX_SERVER_MAC);
++ dump_cfg_string(sCiphers, o->ciphers ? o->ciphers : FIPS_mode()
++ ? KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT : KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT);
++ dump_cfg_string(sMacs, o->macs ? o->macs : FIPS_mode()
++ ? KEX_FIPS_MAC : KEX_SERVER_MAC);
+ dump_cfg_string(sBanner, o->banner == NULL ? "none" : o->banner);
+ dump_cfg_string(sForceCommand, o->adm_forced_command);
+ dump_cfg_string(sChrootDirectory, o->chroot_directory);
+@@ -2402,8 +2407,8 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
+ dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommand, o->authorized_principals_command);
+ dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser, o->authorized_principals_command_user);
+ dump_cfg_string(sHostKeyAgent, o->host_key_agent);
+- dump_cfg_string(sKexAlgorithms,
+- o->kex_algorithms ? o->kex_algorithms : KEX_SERVER_KEX);
++ dump_cfg_string(sKexAlgorithms, o->kex_algorithms ? o->kex_algorithms :
++ FIPS_mode() ? KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS : KEX_SERVER_KEX);
+ dump_cfg_string(sHostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes, o->hostbased_key_types ?
+ o->hostbased_key_types : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG);
+ dump_cfg_string(sHostKeyAlgorithms, o->hostkeyalgorithms ?
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/ssh.c.fips openssh-7.4p1/ssh.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/ssh.c.fips 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/ssh.c 2017-02-09 14:53:47.185347438 +0100
+@@ -76,6 +76,8 @@
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+ #include <openssl/err.h>
+ #endif
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
++#include <fipscheck.h>
+ #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+ #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+
+@@ -530,6 +532,14 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ sanitise_stdfd();
+
+ __progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]);
++ SSLeay_add_all_algorithms();
++ if (access("/etc/system-fips", F_OK) == 0)
++ if (! FIPSCHECK_verify(NULL, NULL)){
++ if (FIPS_mode())
++ fatal("FIPS integrity verification test failed.");
++ else
++ logit("FIPS integrity verification test failed.");
++ }
+
+ #ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE
+ /* Prepare for later setproctitle emulation */
+@@ -609,6 +619,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ "ACD:E:F:GI:J:KL:MNO:PQ:R:S:TVw:W:XYy")) != -1) {
+ switch (opt) {
+ case '1':
++ if (FIPS_mode()) {
++ fatal("Protocol 1 not allowed in the FIPS mode.");
++ }
+ options.protocol = SSH_PROTO_1;
+ break;
+ case '2':
+@@ -964,7 +977,6 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ host_arg = xstrdup(host);
+
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+- OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
+ ERR_load_crypto_strings();
+ #endif
+
+@@ -1175,6 +1187,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+
+ seed_rng();
+
++ if (FIPS_mode()) {
++ logit("FIPS mode initialized");
++ }
++
+ if (options.user == NULL)
+ options.user = xstrdup(pw->pw_name);
+
+@@ -1263,6 +1279,12 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+
+ timeout_ms = options.connection_timeout * 1000;
+
++ if (FIPS_mode()) {
++ options.protocol &= SSH_PROTO_2;
++ if (options.protocol == 0)
++ fatal("Protocol 2 disabled by configuration but required in the FIPS mode.");
++ }
++
+ /* Open a connection to the remote host. */
+ if (ssh_connect(host, addrs, &hostaddr, options.port,
+ options.address_family, options.connection_attempts,
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshconnect2.c.fips openssh-7.4p1/sshconnect2.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshconnect2.c.fips 2017-02-09 14:53:47.162347461 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshconnect2.c 2017-02-09 14:53:47.186347437 +0100
+@@ -44,6 +44,8 @@
+ #include <vis.h>
+ #endif
+
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
++
+ #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+
+ #include "xmalloc.h"
+@@ -172,21 +174,26 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *ho
+
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
+ if (options.gss_keyex) {
+- /* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this
+- * client to the key exchange algorithm proposal */
+- orig = options.kex_algorithms;
+-
+- if (options.gss_trust_dns)
+- gss_host = (char *)get_canonical_hostname(active_state, 1);
+- else
+- gss_host = host;
+-
+- gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host,
+- options.gss_client_identity, options.gss_kex_algorithms);
+- if (gss) {
+- debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss);
+- xasprintf(&options.kex_algorithms,
+- "%s,%s", gss, orig);
++ if (FIPS_mode()) {
++ logit("Disabling GSSAPIKeyExchange. Not usable in FIPS mode");
++ options.gss_keyex = 0;
++ } else {
++ /* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this
++ * client to the key exchange algorithm proposal */
++ orig = options.kex_algorithms;
++
++ if (options.gss_trust_dns)
++ gss_host = (char *)get_canonical_hostname(active_state, 1);
++ else
++ gss_host = host;
++
++ gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host,
++ options.gss_client_identity, options.gss_kex_algorithms);
++ if (gss) {
++ debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss);
++ xasprintf(&options.kex_algorithms,
++ "%s,%s", gss, orig);
++ }
+ }
+ }
+ #endif
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.fips openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.fips 2017-02-09 14:53:47.178347445 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c 2017-02-09 14:53:47.186347437 +0100
+@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@
+ #include <grp.h>
+ #include <pwd.h>
+ #include <signal.h>
++#include <syslog.h>
+ #include <stdarg.h>
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ #include <stdlib.h>
+@@ -77,6 +78,8 @@
+ #include <openssl/dh.h>
+ #include <openssl/bn.h>
+ #include <openssl/rand.h>
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
++#include <fipscheck.h>
+ #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+ #endif
+
+@@ -1471,6 +1474,18 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ #endif
+ __progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]);
+
++ SSLeay_add_all_algorithms();
++ if (access("/etc/system-fips", F_OK) == 0)
++ if (! FIPSCHECK_verify(NULL, NULL)) {
++ openlog(__progname, LOG_PID, LOG_AUTHPRIV);
++ if (FIPS_mode()) {
++ syslog(LOG_CRIT, "FIPS integrity verification test failed.");
++ cleanup_exit(255);
++ }
++ else
++ syslog(LOG_INFO, "FIPS integrity verification test failed.");
++ closelog();
++ }
+ /* Save argv. Duplicate so setproctitle emulation doesn't clobber it */
+ saved_argc = ac;
+ rexec_argc = ac;
+@@ -1619,7 +1634,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ else
+ closefrom(REEXEC_DEVCRYPTO_RESERVED_FD);
+
+-#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
++#if 0 /* FIPS */
+ OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
+ #endif
+
+@@ -1928,6 +1943,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ /* Reinitialize the log (because of the fork above). */
+ log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr);
+
++ if (FIPS_mode()) {
++ logit("FIPS mode initialized");
++ }
++
+ /* Chdir to the root directory so that the current disk can be
+ unmounted if desired. */
+ if (chdir("/") == -1)
+@@ -2282,10 +2301,14 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void)
+ if (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]) == 0)
+ orig = NULL;
+
+- if (options.gss_keyex)
+- gss = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms();
+- else
+- gss = NULL;
++ if (options.gss_keyex) {
++ if (FIPS_mode()) {
++ logit("Disabling GSSAPIKeyExchange. Not usable in FIPS mode");
++ options.gss_keyex = 0;
++ } else {
++ gss = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms();
++ }
++ }
+
+ if (gss && orig)
+ xasprintf(&newstr, "%s,%s", gss, orig);
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshkey.c.fips openssh-7.4p1/sshkey.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshkey.c.fips 2017-02-09 14:53:47.179347444 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshkey.c 2017-02-09 14:58:02.117094971 +0100
+@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+ #include <openssl/err.h>
+ #include <openssl/pem.h>
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
+ #endif
+
+ #include "crypto_api.h"
+@@ -57,6 +58,7 @@
+ #include "sshkey.h"
+ #include "match.h"
+ #include "xmalloc.h"
++#include "log.h"
+
+ /* openssh private key file format */
+ #define MARK_BEGIN "-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----\n"
+@@ -1555,6 +1557,8 @@ rsa_generate_private_key(u_int bits, RSA
+ }
+ if (!BN_set_word(f4, RSA_F4) ||
+ !RSA_generate_key_ex(private, bits, f4, NULL)) {
++ if (FIPS_mode())
++ logit("%s: the key length might be unsupported by FIPS mode approved key generation method", __func__);
+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+@@ -3921,8 +3925,11 @@ sshkey_parse_private_fileblob_type(struc
+ switch (type) {
+ #ifdef WITH_SSH1
+ case KEY_RSA1:
+- return sshkey_parse_private_rsa1(blob, passphrase,
+- keyp, commentp);
++ if (! FIPS_mode())
++ return sshkey_parse_private_rsa1(blob, passphrase,
++ keyp, commentp);
++ error("%s: cannot parse rsa1 key in FIPS mode", __func__);
++ return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
+ #endif /* WITH_SSH1 */
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ case KEY_DSA:
+@@ -3961,8 +3968,9 @@ sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(struct ssh
+ #ifdef WITH_SSH1
+ /* it's a SSH v1 key if the public key part is readable */
+ if (sshkey_parse_public_rsa1_fileblob(buffer, NULL, NULL) == 0) {
+- return sshkey_parse_private_fileblob_type(buffer, KEY_RSA1,
+- passphrase, keyp, commentp);
++ if (!FIPS_mode())
++ return sshkey_parse_private_fileblob_type(buffer, KEY_RSA1,
++ passphrase, keyp, commentp);
+ }
+ #endif /* WITH_SSH1 */
+ return sshkey_parse_private_fileblob_type(buffer, KEY_UNSPEC,
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/ssh-keygen.c.fips openssh-7.4p1/ssh-keygen.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/ssh-keygen.c.fips 2017-05-22 13:50:06.731776762 +0200
++++ openssh-7.4p1/ssh-keygen.c 2017-05-22 13:50:11.843773909 +0200
+@@ -215,6 +215,12 @@ type_bits_valid(int type, const char *na
+ OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS : OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS;
+ if (*bitsp > maxbits)
+ fatal("key bits exceeds maximum %d", maxbits);
++ if (FIPS_mode()) {
++ if (type == KEY_DSA)
++ fatal("DSA keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
++ if (type == KEY_ED25519)
++ fatal("ED25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
++ }
+ if (type == KEY_DSA && *bitsp != 1024)
+ fatal("DSA keys must be 1024 bits");
+ else if (type != KEY_ECDSA && type != KEY_ED25519 && *bitsp < 1024)
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-gssKexAlgorithms.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-gssKexAlgorithms.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..657610d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-gssKexAlgorithms.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,410 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/gss-genr.c.gsskexalg openssh-7.4p1/gss-genr.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/gss-genr.c.gsskexalg 2017-02-09 10:46:50.417893132 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/gss-genr.c 2017-02-09 10:46:50.448893107 +0100
+@@ -77,7 +77,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok() {
+ */
+
+ char *
+-ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *host, const char *client) {
++ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *host, const char *client,
++ const char *kex) {
+ gss_OID_set gss_supported;
+ OM_uint32 min_status;
+
+@@ -85,12 +86,12 @@ ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char
+ return NULL;
+
+ return(ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_supported, ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism,
+- host, client));
++ host, client, kex));
+ }
+
+ char *
+ ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set gss_supported, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *check,
+- const char *host, const char *client) {
++ const char *host, const char *client, const char *kex) {
+ Buffer buf;
+ size_t i;
+ int oidpos, enclen;
+@@ -99,6 +100,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set gss_sup
+ char deroid[2];
+ const EVP_MD *evp_md = EVP_md5();
+ EVP_MD_CTX md;
++ char *s, *cp, *p;
+
+ if (gss_enc2oid != NULL) {
+ for (i = 0; gss_enc2oid[i].encoded != NULL; i++)
+@@ -112,6 +114,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set gss_sup
+ buffer_init(&buf);
+
+ oidpos = 0;
++ s = cp = strdup(kex);
+ for (i = 0; i < gss_supported->count; i++) {
+ if (gss_supported->elements[i].length < 128 &&
+ (*check)(NULL, &(gss_supported->elements[i]), host, client)) {
+@@ -130,26 +133,22 @@ ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set gss_sup
+ enclen = __b64_ntop(digest, EVP_MD_size(evp_md),
+ encoded, EVP_MD_size(evp_md) * 2);
+
+- if (oidpos != 0)
+- buffer_put_char(&buf, ',');
+-
+- buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID,
+- sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID) - 1);
+- buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen);
+- buffer_put_char(&buf, ',');
+- buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID,
+- sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID) - 1);
+- buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen);
+- buffer_put_char(&buf, ',');
+- buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID,
+- sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID) - 1);
+- buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen);
++ cp = strncpy(s, kex, strlen(kex));
++ for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0';
++ (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
++ if (buffer_len(&buf) != 0)
++ buffer_put_char(&buf, ',');
++ buffer_append(&buf, p,
++ strlen(p));
++ buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen);
++ }
+
+ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].oid = &(gss_supported->elements[i]);
+ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].encoded = encoded;
+ oidpos++;
+ }
+ }
++ free(s);
+ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].oid = NULL;
+ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].encoded = NULL;
+
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv.c.gsskexalg openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv.c.gsskexalg 2017-02-09 10:46:50.449893106 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv.c 2017-02-09 10:55:12.189422901 +0100
+@@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms() {
+ if (supported_oids == NULL)
+ ssh_gssapi_prepare_supported_oids();
+ return (ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(supported_oids,
+- &ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech, NULL, NULL));
++ &ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech, NULL, NULL, options.gss_kex_algorithms));
+ }
+
+ /* Unprivileged */
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/kex.c.gsskexalg openssh-7.4p1/kex.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/kex.c.gsskexalg 2017-02-09 10:46:50.449893106 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/kex.c 2017-02-09 10:55:44.008393539 +0100
+@@ -248,6 +248,29 @@ kex_assemble_names(const char *def, char
+ return 0;
+ }
+
++/* Validate GSS KEX method name list */
++int
++gss_kex_names_valid(const char *names)
++{
++ char *s, *cp, *p;
++
++ if (names == NULL || *names == '\0')
++ return 0;
++ s = cp = strdup(names);
++ for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0';
++ (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
++ if (strncmp(p, "gss-", 4) != 0
++ || kex_alg_by_name(p) == NULL) {
++ error("Unsupported KEX algorithm \"%.100s\"", p);
++ free(s);
++ return 0;
++ }
++ }
++ debug3("gss kex names ok: [%s]", names);
++ free(s);
++ return 1;
++}
++
+ /* put algorithm proposal into buffer */
+ int
+ kex_prop2buf(struct sshbuf *b, char *proposal[PROPOSAL_MAX])
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/kex.h.gsskexalg openssh-7.4p1/kex.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/kex.h.gsskexalg 2017-02-09 10:46:50.452893104 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/kex.h 2017-02-09 11:02:35.313012903 +0100
+@@ -179,6 +179,7 @@ struct kex {
+ char *kex_alg_list(char);
+ char *kex_names_cat(const char *, const char *);
+ int kex_assemble_names(const char *, char **);
++int gss_kex_names_valid(const char *);
+
+ int kex_new(struct ssh *, char *[PROPOSAL_MAX], struct kex **);
+ int kex_setup(struct ssh *, char *[PROPOSAL_MAX]);
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/readconf.c.gsskexalg openssh-7.4p1/readconf.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/readconf.c.gsskexalg 2017-02-09 10:46:50.420893129 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/readconf.c 2017-02-09 10:56:06.759372540 +0100
+@@ -64,6 +64,7 @@
+ #include "uidswap.h"
+ #include "myproposal.h"
+ #include "digest.h"
++#include "ssh-gss.h"
+
+ /* Format of the configuration file:
+
+@@ -161,7 +162,7 @@ typedef enum {
+ oEnableSSHKeysign, oRekeyLimit, oVerifyHostKeyDNS, oConnectTimeout,
+ oAddressFamily, oGssAuthentication, oGssDelegateCreds,
+ oGssTrustDns, oGssKeyEx, oGssClientIdentity, oGssRenewalRekey,
+- oGssServerIdentity,
++ oGssServerIdentity, oGssKexAlgorithms,
+ oServerAliveInterval, oServerAliveCountMax, oIdentitiesOnly,
+ oSendEnv, oControlPath, oControlMaster, oControlPersist,
+ oHashKnownHosts,
+@@ -213,6 +214,7 @@ static struct {
+ { "gssapiclientidentity", oGssClientIdentity },
+ { "gssapiserveridentity", oGssServerIdentity },
+ { "gssapirenewalforcesrekey", oGssRenewalRekey },
++ { "gssapikexalgorithms", oGssKexAlgorithms },
+ #else
+ { "gssapiauthentication", oUnsupported },
+ { "gssapikeyexchange", oUnsupported },
+@@ -220,6 +222,7 @@ static struct {
+ { "gssapitrustdns", oUnsupported },
+ { "gssapiclientidentity", oUnsupported },
+ { "gssapirenewalforcesrekey", oUnsupported },
++ { "gssapikexalgorithms", oUnsupported },
+ #endif
+ { "fallbacktorsh", oDeprecated },
+ { "usersh", oDeprecated },
+@@ -996,6 +999,18 @@ parse_time:
+ intptr = &options->gss_renewal_rekey;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
++ case oGssKexAlgorithms:
++ arg = strdelim(&s);
++ if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
++ fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.",
++ filename, linenum);
++ if (!gss_kex_names_valid(arg))
++ fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad GSSAPI KexAlgorithms '%s'.",
++ filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
++ if (*activep && options->gss_kex_algorithms == NULL)
++ options->gss_kex_algorithms = strdup(arg);
++ break;
++
+ case oBatchMode:
+ intptr = &options->batch_mode;
+ goto parse_flag;
+@@ -1813,6 +1828,7 @@ initialize_options(Options * options)
+ options->gss_renewal_rekey = -1;
+ options->gss_client_identity = NULL;
+ options->gss_server_identity = NULL;
++ options->gss_kex_algorithms = NULL;
+ options->password_authentication = -1;
+ options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
+ options->kbd_interactive_devices = NULL;
+@@ -1964,6 +1980,10 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
+ options->gss_trust_dns = 0;
+ if (options->gss_renewal_rekey == -1)
+ options->gss_renewal_rekey = 0;
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++ if (options->gss_kex_algorithms == NULL)
++ options->gss_kex_algorithms = strdup(GSS_KEX_DEFAULT_KEX);
++#endif
+ if (options->password_authentication == -1)
+ options->password_authentication = 1;
+ if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/readconf.h.gsskexalg openssh-7.4p1/readconf.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/readconf.h.gsskexalg 2017-02-09 10:46:50.420893129 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/readconf.h 2017-02-09 10:46:50.450893106 +0100
+@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ typedef struct {
+ int gss_renewal_rekey; /* Credential renewal forces rekey */
+ char *gss_client_identity; /* Principal to initiate GSSAPI with */
+ char *gss_server_identity; /* GSSAPI target principal */
++ char *gss_kex_algorithms; /* GSSAPI kex methods to be offered by client. */
+ int password_authentication; /* Try password
+ * authentication. */
+ int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* Try keyboard-interactive auth. */
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.gsskexalg openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.gsskexalg 2017-02-09 10:46:50.446893109 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c 2017-02-09 10:57:15.784309297 +0100
+@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@
+ #include "auth.h"
+ #include "myproposal.h"
+ #include "digest.h"
++#include "ssh-gss.h"
+
+ static void add_listen_addr(ServerOptions *, char *, int);
+ static void add_one_listen_addr(ServerOptions *, char *, int);
+@@ -117,6 +117,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
+ options->gss_cleanup_creds = -1;
+ options->gss_strict_acceptor = -1;
+ options->gss_store_rekey = -1;
++ options->gss_kex_algorithms = NULL;
+ options->password_authentication = -1;
+ options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
+ options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
+@@ -280,6 +281,10 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
+ options->gss_strict_acceptor = 0;
+ if (options->gss_store_rekey == -1)
+ options->gss_store_rekey = 0;
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++ if (options->gss_kex_algorithms == NULL)
++ options->gss_kex_algorithms = strdup(GSS_KEX_DEFAULT_KEX);
++#endif
+ if (options->password_authentication == -1)
+ options->password_authentication = 1;
+ if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
+@@ -422,7 +425,7 @@ typedef enum {
+ sHostKeyAlgorithms,
+ sClientAliveInterval, sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile,
+ sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssEnablek5users, sGssStrictAcceptor,
+- sGssKeyEx, sGssStoreRekey, sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel,
++ sGssKeyEx, sGssStoreRekey, sGssKexAlgorithms, sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel,
+ sMatch, sPermitOpen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory,
+ sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding,
+ sHostCertificate,
+@@ -501,6 +504,7 @@ static struct {
+ { "gssapikeyexchange", sGssKeyEx, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sGssStoreRekey, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "gssapienablek5users", sGssEnablek5users, SSHCFG_ALL },
++ { "gssapikexalgorithms", sGssKexAlgorithms, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ #else
+ { "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+@@ -508,6 +512,7 @@ static struct {
+ { "gssapikeyexchange", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "gssapienablek5users", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
++ { "gssapikexalgorithms", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ #endif
+ { "gssusesessionccache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "gssapiusesessioncredcache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+@@ -1249,6 +1254,18 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
+ intptr = &options->gss_store_rekey;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
++ case sGssKexAlgorithms:
++ arg = strdelim(&cp);
++ if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
++ fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.",
++ filename, linenum);
++ if (!gss_kex_names_valid(arg))
++ fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad GSSAPI KexAlgorithms '%s'.",
++ filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
++ if (*activep && options->gss_kex_algorithms == NULL)
++ options->gss_kex_algorithms = strdup(arg);
++ break;
++
+ case sPasswordAuthentication:
+ intptr = &options->password_authentication;
+ goto parse_flag;
+@@ -2304,6 +2321,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssKeyEx, o->gss_keyex);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStrictAcceptor, o->gss_strict_acceptor);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStoreRekey, o->gss_store_rekey);
++ dump_cfg_string(sGssKexAlgorithms, o->gss_kex_algorithms);
+ #endif
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sPasswordAuthentication, o->password_authentication);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.gsskexalg openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.gsskexalg 2017-02-09 10:46:50.450893106 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h 2017-02-09 10:57:33.717292870 +0100
+@@ -116,6 +116,7 @@ typedef struct {
+ int gss_cleanup_creds; /* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */
+ int gss_strict_acceptor; /* If true, restrict the GSSAPI acceptor name */
+ int gss_store_rekey;
++ char *gss_kex_algorithms; /* GSSAPI kex methods to be offered by client. */
+ int password_authentication; /* If true, permit password
+ * authentication. */
+ int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* If true, permit */
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/ssh.1.gsskexalg openssh-7.4p1/ssh.1
+--- openssh-7.4p1/ssh.1.gsskexalg 2017-02-09 10:46:50.443893111 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/ssh.1 2017-02-09 10:46:50.451893105 +0100
+@@ -517,6 +517,7 @@ For full details of the options listed b
+ .It GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
+ .It GSSAPIRenewalForcesRekey
+ .It GSSAPITrustDns
++.It GSSAPIKexAlgorithms
+ .It HashKnownHosts
+ .It Host
+ .It HostbasedAuthentication
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/ssh_config.5.gsskexalg openssh-7.4p1/ssh_config.5
+--- openssh-7.4p1/ssh_config.5.gsskexalg 2017-02-09 10:46:50.452893104 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/ssh_config.5 2017-02-09 11:00:39.053122745 +0100
+@@ -782,6 +782,18 @@ the name of the host being connected to.
+ command line will be passed untouched to the GSSAPI library.
+ The default is
+ .Dq no .
++.It Cm GSSAPIKexAlgorithms
++The list of key exchange algorithms that are offered for GSSAPI
++key exchange. Possible values are
++.Bd -literal -offset 3n
++gss-gex-sha1-,
++gss-group1-sha1-,
++gss-group14-sha1-
++.Ed
++.Pp
++The default is
++.Dq gss-gex-sha1-,gss-group1-sha1-,gss-group14-sha1- .
++This option only applies to protocol version 2 connections using GSSAPI.
+ .It Cm HashKnownHosts
+ Indicates that
+ .Xr ssh 1
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshconnect2.c.gsskexalg openssh-7.4p1/sshconnect2.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshconnect2.c.gsskexalg 2017-02-09 10:46:50.451893105 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshconnect2.c 2017-02-09 10:58:08.533260973 +0100
+@@ -181,7 +181,8 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *ho
+ else
+ gss_host = host;
+
+- gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host, options.gss_client_identity);
++ gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host,
++ options.gss_client_identity, options.gss_kex_algorithms);
+ if (gss) {
+ debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss);
+ xasprintf(&options.kex_algorithms,
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.gsskexalg openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.gsskexalg 2017-02-09 10:46:50.452893104 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5 2017-02-09 11:01:55.141050861 +0100
+@@ -666,6 +666,18 @@ Controls whether the user's GSSAPI crede
+ successful connection rekeying. This option can be used to accepted renewed
+ or updated credentials from a compatible client. The default is
+ .Dq no .
++.It Cm GSSAPIKexAlgorithms
++The list of key exchange algorithms that are accepted by GSSAPI
++key exchange. Possible values are
++.Bd -literal -offset 3n
++gss-gex-sha1-,
++gss-group1-sha1-,
++gss-group14-sha1-
++.Ed
++.Pp
++The default is
++.Dq gss-gex-sha1-,gss-group1-sha1-,gss-group14-sha1- .
++This option only applies to protocol version 2 connections using GSSAPI.
+ .It Cm HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes
+ Specifies the key types that will be accepted for hostbased authentication
+ as a comma-separated pattern list.
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/ssh-gss.h.gsskexalg openssh-7.4p1/ssh-gss.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/ssh-gss.h.gsskexalg 2017-02-09 10:46:50.425893125 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/ssh-gss.h 2017-02-09 10:46:50.451893105 +0100
+@@ -76,6 +76,11 @@ extern char **k5users_allowed_cmds;
+ #define KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID "gss-group14-sha1-"
+ #define KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID "gss-gex-sha1-"
+
++#define GSS_KEX_DEFAULT_KEX \
++ KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID "," \
++ KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID "," \
++ KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID
++
+ typedef struct {
+ char *filename;
+ char *envvar;
+@@ -147,9 +152,9 @@ int ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(Gssct
+ /* In the server */
+ typedef int ssh_gssapi_check_fn(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *,
+ const char *);
+-char *ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *, const char *);
++char *ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *, const char *, const char *);
+ char *ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *, const char *,
+- const char *);
++ const char *, const char *);
+ gss_OID ssh_gssapi_id_kex(Gssctxt *, char *, int);
+ int ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt **,gss_OID, const char *,
+ const char *);
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-gsskex.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-gsskex.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0ab2e04
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-gsskex.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,3000 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/auth2.c.gsskex openssh-7.4p1/auth2.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/auth2.c.gsskex 2016-12-23 13:38:53.685300997 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/auth2.c 2016-12-23 13:38:53.725301005 +0100
+@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@ extern Authmethod method_passwd;
+ extern Authmethod method_kbdint;
+ extern Authmethod method_hostbased;
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
++extern Authmethod method_gsskeyex;
+ extern Authmethod method_gssapi;
+ #endif
+
+@@ -77,6 +78,7 @@ Authmethod *authmethods[] = {
+ &method_none,
+ &method_pubkey,
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
++ &method_gsskeyex,
+ &method_gssapi,
+ #endif
+ &method_passwd,
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/auth2-gss.c.gsskex openssh-7.4p1/auth2-gss.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/auth2-gss.c.gsskex 2016-12-23 13:38:53.685300997 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/auth2-gss.c 2016-12-23 13:38:53.725301005 +0100
+@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
+ #include <sys/types.h>
+
+ #include <stdarg.h>
++#include <string.h>
+
+ #include "xmalloc.h"
+ #include "key.h"
+@@ -53,6 +54,40 @@ static int input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_
+ static int input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt);
+ static int input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+
++/*
++ * The 'gssapi_keyex' userauth mechanism.
++ */
++static int
++userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt)
++{
++ int authenticated = 0;
++ Buffer b;
++ gss_buffer_desc mic, gssbuf;
++ u_int len;
++
++ mic.value = packet_get_string(&len);
++ mic.length = len;
++
++ packet_check_eom();
++
++ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->user, authctxt->service,
++ "gssapi-keyex");
++
++ gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b);
++ gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b);
++
++ /* gss_kex_context is NULL with privsep, so we can't check it here */
++ if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gss_kex_context,
++ &gssbuf, &mic))))
++ authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
++ authctxt->pw));
++
++ buffer_free(&b);
++ free(mic.value);
++
++ return (authenticated);
++}
++
+ /*
+ * We only support those mechanisms that we know about (ie ones that we know
+ * how to check local user kuserok and the like)
+@@ -238,7 +273,8 @@ input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type,
+
+ packet_check_eom();
+
+- authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user));
++ authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
++ authctxt->pw));
+
+ authctxt->postponed = 0;
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
+@@ -281,7 +317,8 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple
+ gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b);
+
+ if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gssctxt, &gssbuf, &mic))))
+- authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user));
++ authenticated =
++ PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw));
+ else
+ logit("GSSAPI MIC check failed");
+
+@@ -299,6 +336,12 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple
+ return 0;
+ }
+
++Authmethod method_gsskeyex = {
++ "gssapi-keyex",
++ userauth_gsskeyex,
++ &options.gss_authentication
++};
++
+ Authmethod method_gssapi = {
+ "gssapi-with-mic",
+ userauth_gssapi,
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/clientloop.c.gsskex openssh-7.4p1/clientloop.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/clientloop.c.gsskex 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/clientloop.c 2016-12-23 13:38:53.725301005 +0100
+@@ -113,6 +113,10 @@
+ #include "ssherr.h"
+ #include "hostfile.h"
+
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++#include "ssh-gss.h"
++#endif
++
+ /* import options */
+ extern Options options;
+
+@@ -1664,9 +1668,18 @@ client_loop(int have_pty, int escape_cha
+ break;
+
+ /* Do channel operations unless rekeying in progress. */
+- if (!ssh_packet_is_rekeying(active_state))
++ if (!ssh_packet_is_rekeying(active_state)) {
+ channel_after_select(readset, writeset);
+
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++ if (options.gss_renewal_rekey &&
++ ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(NULL)) {
++ debug("credentials updated - forcing rekey");
++ need_rekeying = 1;
++ }
++#endif
++ }
++
+ /* Buffer input from the connection. */
+ client_process_net_input(readset);
+
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/configure.ac.gsskex openssh-7.4p1/configure.ac
+--- openssh-7.4p1/configure.ac.gsskex 2016-12-23 13:38:53.716301003 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/configure.ac 2016-12-23 13:38:53.726301005 +0100
+@@ -623,6 +623,30 @@ main() { if (NSVersionOfRunTimeLibrary("
+ [Use tunnel device compatibility to OpenBSD])
+ AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF], [1],
+ [Prepend the address family to IP tunnel traffic])
++ AC_MSG_CHECKING(if we have the Security Authorization Session API)
++ AC_TRY_COMPILE([#include <Security/AuthSession.h>],
++ [SessionCreate(0, 0);],
++ [ac_cv_use_security_session_api="yes"
++ AC_DEFINE(USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API, 1,
++ [platform has the Security Authorization Session API])
++ LIBS="$LIBS -framework Security"
++ AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)],
++ [ac_cv_use_security_session_api="no"
++ AC_MSG_RESULT(no)])
++ AC_MSG_CHECKING(if we have an in-memory credentials cache)
++ AC_TRY_COMPILE(
++ [#include <Kerberos/Kerberos.h>],
++ [cc_context_t c;
++ (void) cc_initialize (&c, 0, NULL, NULL);],
++ [AC_DEFINE(USE_CCAPI, 1,
++ [platform uses an in-memory credentials cache])
++ LIBS="$LIBS -framework Security"
++ AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)
++ if test "x$ac_cv_use_security_session_api" = "xno"; then
++ AC_MSG_ERROR(*** Need a security framework to use the credentials cache API ***)
++ fi],
++ [AC_MSG_RESULT(no)]
++ )
+ m4_pattern_allow([AU_IPv])
+ AC_CHECK_DECL([AU_IPv4], [],
+ AC_DEFINE([AU_IPv4], [0], [System only supports IPv4 audit records])
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/gss-genr.c.gsskex openssh-7.4p1/gss-genr.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/gss-genr.c.gsskex 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/gss-genr.c 2016-12-23 13:38:53.726301005 +0100
+@@ -40,12 +40,167 @@
+ #include "buffer.h"
+ #include "log.h"
+ #include "ssh2.h"
++#include "cipher.h"
++#include "key.h"
++#include "kex.h"
++#include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+ #include "ssh-gss.h"
+
+ extern u_char *session_id2;
+ extern u_int session_id2_len;
+
++typedef struct {
++ char *encoded;
++ gss_OID oid;
++} ssh_gss_kex_mapping;
++
++/*
++ * XXX - It would be nice to find a more elegant way of handling the
++ * XXX passing of the key exchange context to the userauth routines
++ */
++
++Gssctxt *gss_kex_context = NULL;
++
++static ssh_gss_kex_mapping *gss_enc2oid = NULL;
++
++int
++ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok() {
++ return (gss_enc2oid != NULL);
++}
++
++/*
++ * Return a list of the gss-group1-sha1 mechanisms supported by this program
++ *
++ * We test mechanisms to ensure that we can use them, to avoid starting
++ * a key exchange with a bad mechanism
++ */
++
++char *
++ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *host, const char *client) {
++ gss_OID_set gss_supported;
++ OM_uint32 min_status;
++
++ if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &gss_supported)))
++ return NULL;
++
++ return(ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_supported, ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism,
++ host, client));
++}
++
++char *
++ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set gss_supported, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *check,
++ const char *host, const char *client) {
++ Buffer buf;
++ size_t i;
++ int oidpos, enclen;
++ char *mechs, *encoded;
++ u_char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
++ char deroid[2];
++ const EVP_MD *evp_md = EVP_md5();
++ EVP_MD_CTX md;
++
++ if (gss_enc2oid != NULL) {
++ for (i = 0; gss_enc2oid[i].encoded != NULL; i++)
++ free(gss_enc2oid[i].encoded);
++ free(gss_enc2oid);
++ }
++
++ gss_enc2oid = xmalloc(sizeof(ssh_gss_kex_mapping) *
++ (gss_supported->count + 1));
++
++ buffer_init(&buf);
++
++ oidpos = 0;
++ for (i = 0; i < gss_supported->count; i++) {
++ if (gss_supported->elements[i].length < 128 &&
++ (*check)(NULL, &(gss_supported->elements[i]), host, client)) {
++
++ deroid[0] = SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE;
++ deroid[1] = gss_supported->elements[i].length;
++
++ EVP_DigestInit(&md, evp_md);
++ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, deroid, 2);
++ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md,
++ gss_supported->elements[i].elements,
++ gss_supported->elements[i].length);
++ EVP_DigestFinal(&md, digest, NULL);
++
++ encoded = xmalloc(EVP_MD_size(evp_md) * 2);
++ enclen = __b64_ntop(digest, EVP_MD_size(evp_md),
++ encoded, EVP_MD_size(evp_md) * 2);
++
++ if (oidpos != 0)
++ buffer_put_char(&buf, ',');
++
++ buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID,
++ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID) - 1);
++ buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen);
++ buffer_put_char(&buf, ',');
++ buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID,
++ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID) - 1);
++ buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen);
++ buffer_put_char(&buf, ',');
++ buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID,
++ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID) - 1);
++ buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen);
++
++ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].oid = &(gss_supported->elements[i]);
++ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].encoded = encoded;
++ oidpos++;
++ }
++ }
++ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].oid = NULL;
++ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].encoded = NULL;
++
++ buffer_put_char(&buf, '\0');
++
++ mechs = xmalloc(buffer_len(&buf));
++ buffer_get(&buf, mechs, buffer_len(&buf));
++ buffer_free(&buf);
++
++ if (strlen(mechs) == 0) {
++ free(mechs);
++ mechs = NULL;
++ }
++
++ return (mechs);
++}
++
++gss_OID
++ssh_gssapi_id_kex(Gssctxt *ctx, char *name, int kex_type) {
++ int i = 0;
++
++ switch (kex_type) {
++ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
++ if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID))
++ return GSS_C_NO_OID;
++ name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID) - 1;
++ break;
++ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
++ if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID))
++ return GSS_C_NO_OID;
++ name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID) - 1;
++ break;
++ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
++ if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID))
++ return GSS_C_NO_OID;
++ name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID) - 1;
++ break;
++ default:
++ return GSS_C_NO_OID;
++ }
++
++ while (gss_enc2oid[i].encoded != NULL &&
++ strcmp(name, gss_enc2oid[i].encoded) != 0)
++ i++;
++
++ if (gss_enc2oid[i].oid != NULL && ctx != NULL)
++ ssh_gssapi_set_oid(ctx, gss_enc2oid[i].oid);
++
++ return gss_enc2oid[i].oid;
++}
++
+ /* Check that the OID in a data stream matches that in the context */
+ int
+ ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *ctx, void *data, size_t len)
+@@ -198,7 +353,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(Gssctxt *ctx, int de
+ }
+
+ ctx->major = gss_init_sec_context(&ctx->minor,
+- GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, &ctx->context, ctx->name, ctx->oid,
++ ctx->client_creds, &ctx->context, ctx->name, ctx->oid,
+ GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG | GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG | deleg_flag,
+ 0, NULL, recv_tok, NULL, send_tok, flags, NULL);
+
+@@ -228,8 +383,42 @@ ssh_gssapi_import_name(Gssctxt *ctx, con
+ }
+
+ OM_uint32
++ssh_gssapi_client_identity(Gssctxt *ctx, const char *name)
++{
++ gss_buffer_desc gssbuf;
++ gss_name_t gssname;
++ OM_uint32 status;
++ gss_OID_set oidset;
++
++ gssbuf.value = (void *) name;
++ gssbuf.length = strlen(gssbuf.value);
++
++ gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
++ gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset);
++
++ ctx->major = gss_import_name(&ctx->minor, &gssbuf,
++ GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME, &gssname);
++
++ if (!ctx->major)
++ ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor,
++ gssname, 0, oidset, GSS_C_INITIATE,
++ &ctx->client_creds, NULL, NULL);
++
++ gss_release_name(&status, &gssname);
++ gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
++
++ if (ctx->major)
++ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
++
++ return(ctx->major);
++}
++
++OM_uint32
+ ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t buffer, gss_buffer_t hash)
+ {
++ if (ctx == NULL)
++ return -1;
++
+ if ((ctx->major = gss_get_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
+ GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, buffer, hash)))
+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
+@@ -237,6 +426,19 @@ ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer
+ return (ctx->major);
+ }
+
++/* Priviledged when used by server */
++OM_uint32
++ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic)
++{
++ if (ctx == NULL)
++ return -1;
++
++ ctx->major = gss_verify_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
++ gssbuf, gssmic, NULL);
++
++ return (ctx->major);
++}
++
+ void
+ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(Buffer *b, const char *user, const char *service,
+ const char *context)
+@@ -250,11 +452,16 @@ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(Buffer *b, const cha
+ }
+
+ int
+-ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host)
++ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host,
++ const char *client)
+ {
+ gss_buffer_desc token = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+ OM_uint32 major, minor;
+ gss_OID_desc spnego_oid = {6, (void *)"\x2B\x06\x01\x05\x05\x02"};
++ Gssctxt *intctx = NULL;
++
++ if (ctx == NULL)
++ ctx = &intctx;
+
+ /* RFC 4462 says we MUST NOT do SPNEGO */
+ if (oid->length == spnego_oid.length &&
+@@ -264,6 +471,10 @@ ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx
+ ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(ctx);
+ ssh_gssapi_set_oid(*ctx, oid);
+ major = ssh_gssapi_import_name(*ctx, host);
++
++ if (!GSS_ERROR(major) && client)
++ major = ssh_gssapi_client_identity(*ctx, client);
++
+ if (!GSS_ERROR(major)) {
+ major = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(*ctx, 0, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER, &token,
+ NULL);
+@@ -273,10 +484,66 @@ ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx
+ GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
+ }
+
+- if (GSS_ERROR(major))
++ if (GSS_ERROR(major) || intctx != NULL)
+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(ctx);
+
+ return (!GSS_ERROR(major));
+ }
+
++int
++ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(Gssctxt *ctxt) {
++ static gss_name_t saved_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
++ static OM_uint32 saved_lifetime = 0;
++ static gss_OID saved_mech = GSS_C_NO_OID;
++ static gss_name_t name;
++ static OM_uint32 last_call = 0;
++ OM_uint32 lifetime, now, major, minor;
++ int equal;
++
++ now = time(NULL);
++
++ if (ctxt) {
++ debug("Rekey has happened - updating saved versions");
++
++ if (saved_name != GSS_C_NO_NAME)
++ gss_release_name(&minor, &saved_name);
++
++ major = gss_inquire_cred(&minor, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL,
++ &saved_name, &saved_lifetime, NULL, NULL);
++
++ if (!GSS_ERROR(major)) {
++ saved_mech = ctxt->oid;
++ saved_lifetime+= now;
++ } else {
++ /* Handle the error */
++ }
++ return 0;
++ }
++
++ if (now - last_call < 10)
++ return 0;
++
++ last_call = now;
++
++ if (saved_mech == GSS_C_NO_OID)
++ return 0;
++
++ major = gss_inquire_cred(&minor, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL,
++ &name, &lifetime, NULL, NULL);
++ if (major == GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED)
++ return 0;
++ else if (GSS_ERROR(major))
++ return 0;
++
++ major = gss_compare_name(&minor, saved_name, name, &equal);
++ gss_release_name(&minor, &name);
++ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
++ return 0;
++
++ if (equal && (saved_lifetime < lifetime + now - 10))
++ return 1;
++
++ return 0;
++}
++
+ #endif /* GSSAPI */
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv.c.gsskex openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv.c.gsskex 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv.c 2016-12-23 13:38:53.727301005 +0100
+@@ -45,17 +45,19 @@
+ #include "session.h"
+ #include "misc.h"
+ #include "servconf.h"
++#include "uidswap.h"
+
+ #include "ssh-gss.h"
++#include "monitor_wrap.h"
+
+ extern ServerOptions options;
+
+ static ssh_gssapi_client gssapi_client =
+- { GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER,
+- GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}};
++ { GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL,
++ GSS_C_NO_NAME, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, 0, 0};
+
+ ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_null_mech =
+- { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL};
++ { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL};
+
+ #ifdef KRB5
+ extern ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech;
+@@ -142,6 +144,28 @@ ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx, gss
+ }
+
+ /* Unprivileged */
++char *
++ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms() {
++ if (supported_oids == NULL)
++ ssh_gssapi_prepare_supported_oids();
++ return (ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(supported_oids,
++ &ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech, NULL, NULL));
++}
++
++/* Unprivileged */
++int
++ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt **dum, gss_OID oid, const char *data,
++ const char *dummy) {
++ Gssctxt *ctx = NULL;
++ int res;
++
++ res = !GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctx, oid)));
++ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctx);
++
++ return (res);
++}
++
++/* Unprivileged */
+ void
+ ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *oidset)
+ {
+@@ -151,7 +176,9 @@ ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *o
+ gss_OID_set supported;
+
+ gss_create_empty_oid_set(&min_status, oidset);
+- gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &supported);
++
++ if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &supported)))
++ return;
+
+ while (supported_mechs[i]->name != NULL) {
+ if (GSS_ERROR(gss_test_oid_set_member(&min_status,
+@@ -277,8 +304,48 @@ OM_uint32
+ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
+ {
+ int i = 0;
++ int equal = 0;
++ gss_name_t new_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
++ gss_buffer_desc ename = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
++
++ if (options.gss_store_rekey && client->used && ctx->client_creds) {
++ if (client->mech->oid.length != ctx->oid->length ||
++ (memcmp(client->mech->oid.elements,
++ ctx->oid->elements, ctx->oid->length) !=0)) {
++ debug("Rekeyed credentials have different mechanism");
++ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
++ }
++
++ if ((ctx->major = gss_inquire_cred_by_mech(&ctx->minor,
++ ctx->client_creds, ctx->oid, &new_name,
++ NULL, NULL, NULL))) {
++ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
++ return (ctx->major);
++ }
+
+- gss_buffer_desc ename;
++ ctx->major = gss_compare_name(&ctx->minor, client->name,
++ new_name, &equal);
++
++ if (GSS_ERROR(ctx->major)) {
++ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
++ return (ctx->major);
++ }
++
++ if (!equal) {
++ debug("Rekeyed credentials have different name");
++ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
++ }
++
++ debug("Marking rekeyed credentials for export");
++
++ gss_release_name(&ctx->minor, &client->name);
++ gss_release_cred(&ctx->minor, &client->creds);
++ client->name = new_name;
++ client->creds = ctx->client_creds;
++ ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
++ client->updated = 1;
++ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
++ }
+
+ client->mech = NULL;
+
+@@ -293,6 +360,13 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_g
+ if (client->mech == NULL)
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+
++ if (ctx->client_creds &&
++ (ctx->major = gss_inquire_cred_by_mech(&ctx->minor,
++ ctx->client_creds, ctx->oid, &client->name, NULL, NULL, NULL))) {
++ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
++ return (ctx->major);
++ }
++
+ if ((ctx->major = gss_display_name(&ctx->minor, ctx->client,
+ &client->displayname, NULL))) {
+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
+@@ -310,6 +384,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_g
+ return (ctx->major);
+ }
+
++ gss_release_buffer(&ctx->minor, &ename);
++
+ /* We can't copy this structure, so we just move the pointer to it */
+ client->creds = ctx->client_creds;
+ ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
+@@ -320,11 +396,20 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_g
+ void
+ ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void)
+ {
+- if (gssapi_client.store.filename != NULL) {
+- /* Unlink probably isn't sufficient */
+- debug("removing gssapi cred file\"%s\"",
+- gssapi_client.store.filename);
+- unlink(gssapi_client.store.filename);
++ krb5_ccache ccache = NULL;
++ krb5_error_code problem;
++
++ if (gssapi_client.store.data != NULL) {
++ if ((problem = krb5_cc_resolve(gssapi_client.store.data, gssapi_client.store.envval, &ccache))) {
++ debug("%s: krb5_cc_resolve(): %.100s", __func__,
++ krb5_get_err_text(gssapi_client.store.data, problem));
++ } else if ((problem = krb5_cc_destroy(gssapi_client.store.data, ccache))) {
++ debug("%s: krb5_cc_resolve(): %.100s", __func__,
++ krb5_get_err_text(gssapi_client.store.data, problem));
++ } else {
++ krb5_free_context(gssapi_client.store.data);
++ gssapi_client.store.data = NULL;
++ }
+ }
+ }
+
+@@ -357,7 +442,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***envp, u_int
+
+ /* Privileged */
+ int
+-ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
++ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw)
+ {
+ OM_uint32 lmin;
+
+@@ -367,9 +452,11 @@ ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->userok)
+- if ((*gssapi_client.mech->userok)(&gssapi_client, user))
++ if ((*gssapi_client.mech->userok)(&gssapi_client, user)) {
++ gssapi_client.used = 1;
++ gssapi_client.store.owner = pw;
+ return 1;
+- else {
++ } else {
+ /* Destroy delegated credentials if userok fails */
+ gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.displayname);
+ gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.exportedname);
+@@ -383,14 +470,90 @@ ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+-/* Privileged */
+-OM_uint32
+-ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic)
++/* These bits are only used for rekeying. The unpriviledged child is running
++ * as the user, the monitor is root.
++ *
++ * In the child, we want to :
++ * *) Ask the monitor to store our credentials into the store we specify
++ * *) If it succeeds, maybe do a PAM update
++ */
++
++/* Stuff for PAM */
++
++#ifdef USE_PAM
++static int ssh_gssapi_simple_conv(int n, const struct pam_message **msg,
++ struct pam_response **resp, void *data)
+ {
+- ctx->major = gss_verify_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
+- gssbuf, gssmic, NULL);
++ return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
++}
++#endif
+
+- return (ctx->major);
++void
++ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds() {
++ int ok;
++ int ret;
++#ifdef USE_PAM
++ pam_handle_t *pamh = NULL;
++ struct pam_conv pamconv = {ssh_gssapi_simple_conv, NULL};
++ char *envstr;
++#endif
++
++ if (gssapi_client.store.filename == NULL &&
++ gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL &&
++ gssapi_client.store.envvar == NULL)
++ return;
++
++ ok = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&gssapi_client.store));
++
++ if (!ok)
++ return;
++
++ debug("Rekeyed credentials stored successfully");
++
++ /* Actually managing to play with the ssh pam stack from here will
++ * be next to impossible. In any case, we may want different options
++ * for rekeying. So, use our own :)
++ */
++#ifdef USE_PAM
++ if (!use_privsep) {
++ debug("Not even going to try and do PAM with privsep disabled");
++ return;
++ }
++
++ ret = pam_start("sshd-rekey", gssapi_client.store.owner->pw_name,
++ &pamconv, &pamh);
++ if (ret)
++ return;
++
++ xasprintf(&envstr, "%s=%s", gssapi_client.store.envvar,
++ gssapi_client.store.envval);
++
++ ret = pam_putenv(pamh, envstr);
++ if (!ret)
++ pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_REINITIALIZE_CRED);
++ pam_end(pamh, PAM_SUCCESS);
++#endif
++}
++
++int
++ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store) {
++ int ok = 0;
++
++ /* Check we've got credentials to store */
++ if (!gssapi_client.updated)
++ return 0;
++
++ gssapi_client.updated = 0;
++
++ temporarily_use_uid(gssapi_client.store.owner);
++ if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->updatecreds)
++ ok = (*gssapi_client.mech->updatecreds)(store, &gssapi_client);
++ else
++ debug("No update function for this mechanism");
++
++ restore_uid();
++
++ return ok;
+ }
+
+ #endif
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.gsskex openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.gsskex 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c 2016-12-23 13:38:53.727301005 +0100
+@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl
+ krb5_error_code problem;
+ krb5_principal princ;
+ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
+- int len;
++ const char *new_ccname, *new_cctype;
+ const char *errmsg;
+
+ if (client->creds == NULL) {
+@@ -181,11 +181,26 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl
+ return;
+ }
+
+- client->store.filename = xstrdup(krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache));
++ new_cctype = krb5_cc_get_type(krb_context, ccache);
++ new_ccname = krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache);
++
+ client->store.envvar = "KRB5CCNAME";
+- len = strlen(client->store.filename) + 6;
+- client->store.envval = xmalloc(len);
+- snprintf(client->store.envval, len, "FILE:%s", client->store.filename);
++#ifdef USE_CCAPI
++ xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "API:%s", new_ccname);
++ client->store.filename = NULL;
++#else
++ if (new_ccname[0] == ':')
++ new_ccname++;
++ xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "%s:%s", new_cctype, new_ccname);
++ if (strcmp(new_cctype, "DIR") == 0) {
++ char *p;
++ p = strrchr(client->store.envval, '/');
++ if (p)
++ *p = '\0';
++ }
++ if ((strcmp(new_cctype, "FILE") == 0) || (strcmp(new_cctype, "DIR") == 0))
++ client->store.filename = xstrdup(new_ccname);
++#endif
+
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+ if (options.use_pam)
+@@ -194,9 +209,76 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl
+
+ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
+
++ client->store.data = krb_context;
++
+ return;
+ }
+
++int
++ssh_gssapi_krb5_updatecreds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store,
++ ssh_gssapi_client *client)
++{
++ krb5_ccache ccache = NULL;
++ krb5_principal principal = NULL;
++ char *name = NULL;
++ krb5_error_code problem;
++ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
++
++ if ((problem = krb5_cc_resolve(krb_context, store->envval, &ccache))) {
++ logit("krb5_cc_resolve(): %.100s",
++ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
++ return 0;
++ }
++
++ /* Find out who the principal in this cache is */
++ if ((problem = krb5_cc_get_principal(krb_context, ccache,
++ &principal))) {
++ logit("krb5_cc_get_principal(): %.100s",
++ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
++ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
++ return 0;
++ }
++
++ if ((problem = krb5_unparse_name(krb_context, principal, &name))) {
++ logit("krb5_unparse_name(): %.100s",
++ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
++ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
++ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
++ return 0;
++ }
++
++
++ if (strcmp(name,client->exportedname.value)!=0) {
++ debug("Name in local credentials cache differs. Not storing");
++ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
++ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
++ krb5_free_unparsed_name(krb_context, name);
++ return 0;
++ }
++ krb5_free_unparsed_name(krb_context, name);
++
++ /* Name matches, so lets get on with it! */
++
++ if ((problem = krb5_cc_initialize(krb_context, ccache, principal))) {
++ logit("krb5_cc_initialize(): %.100s",
++ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
++ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
++ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
++ return 0;
++ }
++
++ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
++
++ if ((maj_status = gss_krb5_copy_ccache(&min_status, client->creds,
++ ccache))) {
++ logit("gss_krb5_copy_ccache() failed. Sorry!");
++ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
++ return 0;
++ }
++
++ return 1;
++}
++
+ ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech = {
+ "toWM5Slw5Ew8Mqkay+al2g==",
+ "Kerberos",
+@@ -204,7 +286,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech = {
+ NULL,
+ &ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok,
+ NULL,
+- &ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds
++ &ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds,
++ &ssh_gssapi_krb5_updatecreds
+ };
+
+ #endif /* KRB5 */
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/kex.c.gsskex openssh-7.4p1/kex.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/kex.c.gsskex 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/kex.c 2016-12-23 13:39:56.064313151 +0100
+@@ -54,6 +54,10 @@
+ #include "sshbuf.h"
+ #include "digest.h"
+
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++#include "ssh-gss.h"
++#endif
++
+ #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L
+ # if defined(HAVE_EVP_SHA256)
+ # define evp_ssh_sha256 EVP_sha256
+@@ -111,6 +115,11 @@ static const struct kexalg kexalgs[] = {
+ { KEX_CURVE25519_SHA256, KEX_C25519_SHA256, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 },
+ { KEX_CURVE25519_SHA256_OLD, KEX_C25519_SHA256, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 },
+ #endif /* HAVE_EVP_SHA256 || !WITH_OPENSSL */
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++ { KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
++ { KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
++ { KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
++#endif
+ { NULL, -1, -1, -1},
+ };
+
+@@ -144,6 +153,12 @@ kex_alg_by_name(const char *name)
+ for (k = kexalgs; k->name != NULL; k++) {
+ if (strcmp(k->name, name) == 0)
+ return k;
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++ if (strncmp(name, "gss-", 4) == 0) {
++ if (strncmp(k->name, name, strlen(k->name)) == 0)
++ return k;
++ }
++#endif
+ }
+ return NULL;
+ }
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/kexgssc.c.gsskex openssh-7.4p1/kexgssc.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/kexgssc.c.gsskex 2016-12-23 13:38:53.727301005 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/kexgssc.c 2016-12-23 13:38:53.727301005 +0100
+@@ -0,0 +1,338 @@
++/*
++ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
++ *
++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
++ * are met:
++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
++ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
++ *
++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
++ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
++ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
++ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
++ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
++ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
++ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
++ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
++ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
++ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
++ */
++
++#include "includes.h"
++
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++
++#include "includes.h"
++
++#include <openssl/crypto.h>
++#include <openssl/bn.h>
++
++#include <string.h>
++
++#include "xmalloc.h"
++#include "buffer.h"
++#include "ssh2.h"
++#include "key.h"
++#include "cipher.h"
++#include "kex.h"
++#include "log.h"
++#include "packet.h"
++#include "dh.h"
++#include "digest.h"
++
++#include "ssh-gss.h"
++
++int
++kexgss_client(struct ssh *ssh) {
++ gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
++ gss_buffer_desc recv_tok, gssbuf, msg_tok, *token_ptr;
++ Gssctxt *ctxt;
++ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status, ret_flags;
++ u_int klen, kout, slen = 0, strlen;
++ DH *dh;
++ BIGNUM *dh_server_pub = NULL;
++ BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL;
++ BIGNUM *p = NULL;
++ BIGNUM *g = NULL;
++ u_char *kbuf;
++ u_char *serverhostkey = NULL;
++ u_char *empty = "";
++ char *msg;
++ char *lang;
++ int type = 0;
++ int first = 1;
++ int nbits = 0, min = DH_GRP_MIN, max = DH_GRP_MAX;
++ u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
++ size_t hashlen;
++
++ /* Initialise our GSSAPI world */
++ ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(&ctxt);
++ if (ssh_gssapi_id_kex(ctxt, ssh->kex->name, ssh->kex->kex_type)
++ == GSS_C_NO_OID)
++ fatal("Couldn't identify host exchange");
++
++ if (ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctxt, ssh->kex->gss_host))
++ fatal("Couldn't import hostname");
++
++ if (ssh->kex->gss_client &&
++ ssh_gssapi_client_identity(ctxt, ssh->kex->gss_client))
++ fatal("Couldn't acquire client credentials");
++
++ switch (ssh->kex->kex_type) {
++ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
++ dh = dh_new_group1();
++ break;
++ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
++ dh = dh_new_group14();
++ break;
++ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
++ debug("Doing group exchange\n");
++ nbits = dh_estimate(ssh->kex->we_need * 8);
++ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ);
++ packet_put_int(min);
++ packet_put_int(nbits);
++ packet_put_int(max);
++
++ packet_send();
++
++ packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP);
++
++ if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL)
++ fatal("BN_new() failed");
++ packet_get_bignum2(p);
++ if ((g = BN_new()) == NULL)
++ fatal("BN_new() failed");
++ packet_get_bignum2(g);
++ packet_check_eom();
++
++ if (BN_num_bits(p) < min || BN_num_bits(p) > max)
++ fatal("GSSGRP_GEX group out of range: %d !< %d !< %d",
++ min, BN_num_bits(p), max);
++
++ dh = dh_new_group(g, p);
++ break;
++ default:
++ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, ssh->kex->kex_type);
++ }
++
++ /* Step 1 - e is dh->pub_key */
++ dh_gen_key(dh, ssh->kex->we_need * 8);
++
++ /* This is f, we initialise it now to make life easier */
++ dh_server_pub = BN_new();
++ if (dh_server_pub == NULL)
++ fatal("dh_server_pub == NULL");
++
++ token_ptr = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER;
++
++ do {
++ debug("Calling gss_init_sec_context");
++
++ maj_status = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(ctxt,
++ ssh->kex->gss_deleg_creds, token_ptr, &send_tok,
++ &ret_flags);
++
++ if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) {
++ if (send_tok.length != 0) {
++ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
++ packet_put_string(send_tok.value,
++ send_tok.length);
++ }
++ fatal("gss_init_context failed");
++ }
++
++ /* If we've got an old receive buffer get rid of it */
++ if (token_ptr != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER)
++ free(recv_tok.value);
++
++ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
++ /* If mutual state flag is not true, kex fails */
++ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG))
++ fatal("Mutual authentication failed");
++
++ /* If integ avail flag is not true kex fails */
++ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))
++ fatal("Integrity check failed");
++ }
++
++ /*
++ * If we have data to send, then the last message that we
++ * received cannot have been a 'complete'.
++ */
++ if (send_tok.length != 0) {
++ if (first) {
++ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT);
++ packet_put_string(send_tok.value,
++ send_tok.length);
++ packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key);
++ first = 0;
++ } else {
++ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
++ packet_put_string(send_tok.value,
++ send_tok.length);
++ }
++ packet_send();
++ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
++
++ /* If we've sent them data, they should reply */
++ do {
++ type = packet_read();
++ if (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY) {
++ debug("Received KEXGSS_HOSTKEY");
++ if (serverhostkey)
++ fatal("Server host key received more than once");
++ serverhostkey =
++ packet_get_string(&slen);
++ }
++ } while (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY);
++
++ switch (type) {
++ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE:
++ debug("Received GSSAPI_CONTINUE");
++ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE)
++ fatal("GSSAPI Continue received from server when complete");
++ recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&strlen);
++ recv_tok.length = strlen;
++ break;
++ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE:
++ debug("Received GSSAPI_COMPLETE");
++ packet_get_bignum2(dh_server_pub);
++ msg_tok.value = packet_get_string(&strlen);
++ msg_tok.length = strlen;
++
++ /* Is there a token included? */
++ if (packet_get_char()) {
++ recv_tok.value=
++ packet_get_string(&strlen);
++ recv_tok.length = strlen;
++ /* If we're already complete - protocol error */
++ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE)
++ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: received token when complete");
++ } else {
++ /* No token included */
++ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
++ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: did not receive final token");
++ }
++ break;
++ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR:
++ debug("Received Error");
++ maj_status = packet_get_int();
++ min_status = packet_get_int();
++ msg = packet_get_string(NULL);
++ lang = packet_get_string(NULL);
++ fatal("GSSAPI Error: \n%.400s",msg);
++ default:
++ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d",
++ type);
++ }
++ token_ptr = &recv_tok;
++ } else {
++ /* No data, and not complete */
++ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
++ fatal("Not complete, and no token output");
++ }
++ } while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
++
++ /*
++ * We _must_ have received a COMPLETE message in reply from the
++ * server, which will have set dh_server_pub and msg_tok
++ */
++
++ if (type != SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE)
++ fatal("Didn't receive a SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE when I expected it");
++
++ /* Check f in range [1, p-1] */
++ if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh_server_pub))
++ packet_disconnect("bad server public DH value");
++
++ /* compute K=f^x mod p */
++ klen = DH_size(dh);
++ kbuf = xmalloc(klen);
++ kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_server_pub, dh);
++ if ((int)kout < 0)
++ fatal("DH_compute_key: failed");
++
++ shared_secret = BN_new();
++ if (shared_secret == NULL)
++ fatal("kexgss_client: BN_new failed");
++
++ if (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL)
++ fatal("kexdh_client: BN_bin2bn failed");
++
++ memset(kbuf, 0, klen);
++ free(kbuf);
++
++ hashlen = sizeof(hash);
++ switch (ssh->kex->kex_type) {
++ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
++ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
++ kex_dh_hash(ssh->kex->hash_alg, ssh->kex->client_version_string,
++ ssh->kex->server_version_string,
++ buffer_ptr(ssh->kex->my), buffer_len(ssh->kex->my),
++ buffer_ptr(ssh->kex->peer), buffer_len(ssh->kex->peer),
++ (serverhostkey ? serverhostkey : empty), slen,
++ dh->pub_key, /* e */
++ dh_server_pub, /* f */
++ shared_secret, /* K */
++ hash, &hashlen
++ );
++ break;
++ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
++ kexgex_hash(
++ ssh->kex->hash_alg,
++ ssh->kex->client_version_string,
++ ssh->kex->server_version_string,
++ buffer_ptr(ssh->kex->my), buffer_len(ssh->kex->my),
++ buffer_ptr(ssh->kex->peer), buffer_len(ssh->kex->peer),
++ (serverhostkey ? serverhostkey : empty), slen,
++ min, nbits, max,
++ dh->p, dh->g,
++ dh->pub_key,
++ dh_server_pub,
++ shared_secret,
++ hash, &hashlen
++ );
++ break;
++ default:
++ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, ssh->kex->kex_type);
++ }
++
++ gssbuf.value = hash;
++ gssbuf.length = hashlen;
++
++ /* Verify that the hash matches the MIC we just got. */
++ if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(ctxt, &gssbuf, &msg_tok)))
++ packet_disconnect("Hash's MIC didn't verify");
++
++ free(msg_tok.value);
++
++ DH_free(dh);
++ if (serverhostkey)
++ free(serverhostkey);
++ BN_clear_free(dh_server_pub);
++
++ /* save session id */
++ if (ssh->kex->session_id == NULL) {
++ ssh->kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
++ ssh->kex->session_id = xmalloc(ssh->kex->session_id_len);
++ memcpy(ssh->kex->session_id, hash, ssh->kex->session_id_len);
++ }
++
++ if (ssh->kex->gss_deleg_creds)
++ ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(ctxt);
++
++ if (gss_kex_context == NULL)
++ gss_kex_context = ctxt;
++ else
++ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
++
++ kex_derive_keys_bn(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret);
++ BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
++ return kex_send_newkeys(ssh);
++}
++
++#endif /* GSSAPI */
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/kexgsss.c.gsskex openssh-7.4p1/kexgsss.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/kexgsss.c.gsskex 2016-12-23 13:38:53.728301005 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/kexgsss.c 2016-12-23 13:38:53.728301005 +0100
+@@ -0,0 +1,297 @@
++/*
++ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
++ *
++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
++ * are met:
++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
++ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
++ *
++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
++ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
++ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
++ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
++ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
++ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
++ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
++ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
++ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
++ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
++ */
++
++#include "includes.h"
++
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++
++#include <string.h>
++
++#include <openssl/crypto.h>
++#include <openssl/bn.h>
++
++#include "xmalloc.h"
++#include "buffer.h"
++#include "ssh2.h"
++#include "key.h"
++#include "cipher.h"
++#include "kex.h"
++#include "log.h"
++#include "packet.h"
++#include "dh.h"
++#include "ssh-gss.h"
++#include "monitor_wrap.h"
++#include "misc.h" /* servconf.h needs misc.h for struct ForwardOptions */
++#include "servconf.h"
++#include "ssh-gss.h"
++#include "digest.h"
++
++extern ServerOptions options;
++
++int
++kexgss_server(struct ssh *ssh)
++{
++ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
++
++ /*
++ * Some GSSAPI implementations use the input value of ret_flags (an
++ * output variable) as a means of triggering mechanism specific
++ * features. Initializing it to zero avoids inadvertently
++ * activating this non-standard behaviour.
++ */
++
++ OM_uint32 ret_flags = 0;
++ gss_buffer_desc gssbuf, recv_tok, msg_tok;
++ gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
++ Gssctxt *ctxt = NULL;
++ u_int slen, klen, kout;
++ u_char *kbuf;
++ DH *dh;
++ int min = -1, max = -1, nbits = -1;
++ int cmin = -1, cmax = -1; /* client proposal */
++ BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL;
++ BIGNUM *dh_client_pub = NULL;
++ int type = 0;
++ gss_OID oid;
++ char *mechs;
++ u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
++ size_t hashlen;
++
++ /* Initialise GSSAPI */
++
++ /* If we're rekeying, privsep means that some of the private structures
++ * in the GSSAPI code are no longer available. This kludges them back
++ * into life
++ */
++ if (!ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok())
++ if ((mechs = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms()))
++ free(mechs);
++
++ debug2("%s: Identifying %s", __func__, ssh->kex->name);
++ oid = ssh_gssapi_id_kex(NULL, ssh->kex->name, ssh->kex->kex_type);
++ if (oid == GSS_C_NO_OID)
++ fatal("Unknown gssapi mechanism");
++
++ debug2("%s: Acquiring credentials", __func__);
++
++ if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctxt, oid))))
++ fatal("Unable to acquire credentials for the server");
++
++ switch (ssh->kex->kex_type) {
++ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
++ dh = dh_new_group1();
++ break;
++ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
++ dh = dh_new_group14();
++ break;
++ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
++ debug("Doing group exchange");
++ packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ);
++ /* store client proposal to provide valid signature */
++ cmin = packet_get_int();
++ nbits = packet_get_int();
++ cmax = packet_get_int();
++ min = MAX(DH_GRP_MIN, cmin);
++ max = MIN(DH_GRP_MAX, cmax);
++ packet_check_eom();
++ if (max < min || nbits < min || max < nbits)
++ fatal("GSS_GEX, bad parameters: %d !< %d !< %d",
++ min, nbits, max);
++ dh = PRIVSEP(choose_dh(min, nbits, max));
++ if (dh == NULL)
++ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: no matching group found");
++
++ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP);
++ packet_put_bignum2(dh->p);
++ packet_put_bignum2(dh->g);
++ packet_send();
++
++ packet_write_wait();
++ break;
++ default:
++ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, ssh->kex->kex_type);
++ }
++
++ dh_gen_key(dh, ssh->kex->we_need * 8);
++
++ do {
++ debug("Wait SSH2_MSG_GSSAPI_INIT");
++ type = packet_read();
++ switch(type) {
++ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT:
++ if (dh_client_pub != NULL)
++ fatal("Received KEXGSS_INIT after initialising");
++ recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&slen);
++ recv_tok.length = slen;
++
++ if ((dh_client_pub = BN_new()) == NULL)
++ fatal("dh_client_pub == NULL");
++
++ packet_get_bignum2(dh_client_pub);
++
++ /* Send SSH_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY here, if we want */
++ break;
++ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE:
++ recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&slen);
++ recv_tok.length = slen;
++ break;
++ default:
++ packet_disconnect(
++ "Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d",
++ type);
++ }
++
++ maj_status = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(ctxt, &recv_tok,
++ &send_tok, &ret_flags));
++
++ free(recv_tok.value);
++
++ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE && send_tok.length == 0)
++ fatal("Zero length token output when incomplete");
++
++ if (dh_client_pub == NULL)
++ fatal("No client public key");
++
++ if (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
++ debug("Sending GSSAPI_CONTINUE");
++ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
++ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
++ packet_send();
++ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
++ }
++ } while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
++
++ if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) {
++ if (send_tok.length > 0) {
++ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
++ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
++ packet_send();
++ }
++ fatal("accept_ctx died");
++ }
++
++ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG))
++ fatal("Mutual Authentication flag wasn't set");
++
++ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))
++ fatal("Integrity flag wasn't set");
++
++ if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh_client_pub))
++ packet_disconnect("bad client public DH value");
++
++ klen = DH_size(dh);
++ kbuf = xmalloc(klen);
++ kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_client_pub, dh);
++ if ((int)kout < 0)
++ fatal("DH_compute_key: failed");
++
++ shared_secret = BN_new();
++ if (shared_secret == NULL)
++ fatal("kexgss_server: BN_new failed");
++
++ if (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL)
++ fatal("kexgss_server: BN_bin2bn failed");
++
++ memset(kbuf, 0, klen);
++ free(kbuf);
++
++ hashlen = sizeof(hash);
++ switch (ssh->kex->kex_type) {
++ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
++ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
++ kex_dh_hash(ssh->kex->hash_alg,
++ ssh->kex->client_version_string, ssh->kex->server_version_string,
++ buffer_ptr(ssh->kex->peer), buffer_len(ssh->kex->peer),
++ buffer_ptr(ssh->kex->my), buffer_len(ssh->kex->my),
++ NULL, 0, /* Change this if we start sending host keys */
++ dh_client_pub, dh->pub_key, shared_secret,
++ hash, &hashlen
++ );
++ break;
++ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
++ kexgex_hash(
++ ssh->kex->hash_alg,
++ ssh->kex->client_version_string, ssh->kex->server_version_string,
++ buffer_ptr(ssh->kex->peer), buffer_len(ssh->kex->peer),
++ buffer_ptr(ssh->kex->my), buffer_len(ssh->kex->my),
++ NULL, 0,
++ cmin, nbits, cmax,
++ dh->p, dh->g,
++ dh_client_pub,
++ dh->pub_key,
++ shared_secret,
++ hash, &hashlen
++ );
++ break;
++ default:
++ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, ssh->kex->kex_type);
++ }
++
++ BN_clear_free(dh_client_pub);
++
++ if (ssh->kex->session_id == NULL) {
++ ssh->kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
++ ssh->kex->session_id = xmalloc(ssh->kex->session_id_len);
++ memcpy(ssh->kex->session_id, hash, ssh->kex->session_id_len);
++ }
++
++ gssbuf.value = hash;
++ gssbuf.length = hashlen;
++
++ if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_sign(ctxt,&gssbuf,&msg_tok))))
++ fatal("Couldn't get MIC");
++
++ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE);
++ packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key);
++ packet_put_string(msg_tok.value,msg_tok.length);
++
++ if (send_tok.length != 0) {
++ packet_put_char(1); /* true */
++ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
++ } else {
++ packet_put_char(0); /* false */
++ }
++ packet_send();
++
++ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
++ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &msg_tok);
++
++ if (gss_kex_context == NULL)
++ gss_kex_context = ctxt;
++ else
++ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
++
++ DH_free(dh);
++
++ kex_derive_keys_bn(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret);
++ BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
++ kex_send_newkeys(ssh);
++
++ /* If this was a rekey, then save out any delegated credentials we
++ * just exchanged. */
++ if (options.gss_store_rekey)
++ ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds();
++ return 0;
++}
++#endif /* GSSAPI */
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/kex.h.gsskex openssh-7.4p1/kex.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/kex.h.gsskex 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/kex.h 2016-12-23 13:38:53.728301005 +0100
+@@ -99,6 +99,11 @@ enum kex_exchange {
+ KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256,
+ KEX_ECDH_SHA2,
+ KEX_C25519_SHA256,
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++ KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1,
++ KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1,
++ KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1,
++#endif
+ KEX_MAX
+ };
+
+@@ -147,6 +152,12 @@ struct kex {
+ u_int flags;
+ int hash_alg;
+ int ec_nid;
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++ int gss_deleg_creds;
++ int gss_trust_dns;
++ char *gss_host;
++ char *gss_client;
++#endif
+ char *client_version_string;
+ char *server_version_string;
+ char *failed_choice;
+@@ -196,6 +207,10 @@ int kexecdh_client(struct ssh *);
+ int kexecdh_server(struct ssh *);
+ int kexc25519_client(struct ssh *);
+ int kexc25519_server(struct ssh *);
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++int kexgss_client(struct ssh *);
++int kexgss_server(struct ssh *);
++#endif
+
+ int kex_dh_hash(int, const char *, const char *,
+ const u_char *, size_t, const u_char *, size_t, const u_char *, size_t,
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/Makefile.in.gsskex openssh-7.4p1/Makefile.in
+--- openssh-7.4p1/Makefile.in.gsskex 2016-12-23 13:38:53.723301004 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/Makefile.in 2016-12-23 13:40:32.226320197 +0100
+@@ -91,6 +91,7 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=${LIBOPENSSH_OBJS} \
+ readpass.o rsa.o ttymodes.o xmalloc.o addrmatch.o \
+ atomicio.o key.o dispatch.o mac.o uidswap.o uuencode.o misc.o utf8.o \
+ monitor_fdpass.o rijndael.o ssh-dss.o ssh-ecdsa.o ssh-rsa.o dh.o \
++ kexgssc.o \
+ msg.o progressmeter.o dns.o entropy.o gss-genr.o umac.o umac128.o \
+ ssh-pkcs11.o smult_curve25519_ref.o \
+ poly1305.o chacha.o cipher-chachapoly.o \
+@@ -112,7 +113,7 @@ SSHDOBJS=sshd.o auth-rhosts.o auth-passw
+ auth-skey.o auth-bsdauth.o auth2-hostbased.o auth2-kbdint.o \
+ auth2-none.o auth2-passwd.o auth2-pubkey.o \
+ monitor.o monitor_wrap.o auth-krb5.o \
+- auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o \
++ auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o kexgsss.o \
+ loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o md5crypt.o \
+ sftp-server.o sftp-common.o \
+ sandbox-null.o sandbox-rlimit.o sandbox-systrace.o sandbox-darwin.o \
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.gsskex openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.gsskex 2016-12-23 13:38:53.687300997 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c 2016-12-23 13:45:49.347381091 +0100
+@@ -160,6 +160,8 @@ int mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int, Buffer
+ int mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int, Buffer *);
+ int mm_answer_gss_userok(int, Buffer *);
+ int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int, Buffer *);
++int mm_answer_gss_sign(int, Buffer *);
++int mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(int, Buffer *);
+ #endif
+
+ #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+@@ -236,11 +238,18 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[]
+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_gss_userok},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_gss_checkmic},
++ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_gss_sign},
+ #endif
+ {0, 0, NULL}
+ };
+
+ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = {
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 0, mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx},
++ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
++ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, 0, mm_answer_gss_sign},
++ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, 0, mm_answer_gss_updatecreds},
++#endif
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 0, mm_answer_moduli},
+ #endif
+@@ -307,6 +316,10 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctx
+ /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++ /* and for the GSSAPI key exchange */
++ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 1);
++#endif
+
+ /* The first few requests do not require asynchronous access */
+ while (!authenticated) {
+@@ -406,6 +419,10 @@ monitor_child_postauth(struct monitor *p
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++ /* and for the GSSAPI key exchange */
++ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 1);
++#endif
+
+ if (!no_pty_flag) {
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 1);
+@@ -1633,6 +1650,13 @@ monitor_apply_keystate(struct monitor *p
+ # endif
+ #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_server;
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++ if (options.gss_keyex) {
++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
++ }
++#endif
+ kex->load_host_public_key=&get_hostkey_public_by_type;
+ kex->load_host_private_key=&get_hostkey_private_by_type;
+ kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index;
+@@ -1712,7 +1736,7 @@ mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int sock, Buffer
+ OM_uint32 major;
+ u_int len;
+
+- if (!options.gss_authentication)
++ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
+ fatal("%s: GSSAPI authentication not enabled", __func__);
+
+ goid.elements = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
+@@ -1742,7 +1766,7 @@ mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int sock, Buffe
+ OM_uint32 flags = 0; /* GSI needs this */
+ u_int len;
+
+- if (!options.gss_authentication)
++ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
+ fatal("%s: GSSAPI authentication not enabled", __func__);
+
+ in.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
+@@ -1762,6 +1786,7 @@ mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int sock, Buffe
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0);
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1);
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, 1);
++ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, 1);
+ }
+ return (0);
+ }
+@@ -1773,7 +1798,7 @@ mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int sock, Buffer
+ OM_uint32 ret;
+ u_int len;
+
+- if (!options.gss_authentication)
++ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
+ fatal("%s: GSSAPI authentication not enabled", __func__);
+
+ gssbuf.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
+@@ -1802,10 +1827,11 @@ mm_answer_gss_userok(int sock, Buffer *m
+ {
+ int authenticated;
+
+- if (!options.gss_authentication)
++ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
+ fatal("%s: GSSAPI authentication not enabled", __func__);
+
+- authenticated = authctxt->valid && ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user);
++ authenticated = authctxt->valid &&
++ ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw);
+
+ buffer_clear(m);
+ buffer_put_int(m, authenticated);
+@@ -1818,5 +1844,73 @@ mm_answer_gss_userok(int sock, Buffer *m
+ /* Monitor loop will terminate if authenticated */
+ return (authenticated);
+ }
++
++int
++mm_answer_gss_sign(int socket, Buffer *m)
++{
++ gss_buffer_desc data;
++ gss_buffer_desc hash = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
++ OM_uint32 major, minor;
++ u_int len;
++
++ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
++ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
++
++ data.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
++ data.length = len;
++ if (data.length != 20)
++ fatal("%s: data length incorrect: %d", __func__,
++ (int) data.length);
++
++ /* Save the session ID on the first time around */
++ if (session_id2_len == 0) {
++ session_id2_len = data.length;
++ session_id2 = xmalloc(session_id2_len);
++ memcpy(session_id2, data.value, session_id2_len);
++ }
++ major = ssh_gssapi_sign(gsscontext, &data, &hash);
++
++ free(data.value);
++
++ buffer_clear(m);
++ buffer_put_int(m, major);
++ buffer_put_string(m, hash.value, hash.length);
++
++ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, m);
++
++ gss_release_buffer(&minor, &hash);
++
++ /* Turn on getpwnam permissions */
++ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1);
++
++ /* And credential updating, for when rekeying */
++ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, 1);
++
++ return (0);
++}
++
++int
++mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(int socket, Buffer *m) {
++ ssh_gssapi_ccache store;
++ int ok;
++
++ store.filename = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
++ store.envvar = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
++ store.envval = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
++
++ ok = ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&store);
++
++ free(store.filename);
++ free(store.envvar);
++ free(store.envval);
++
++ buffer_clear(m);
++ buffer_put_int(m, ok);
++
++ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS, m);
++
++ return(0);
++}
++
+ #endif /* GSSAPI */
+
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor.h.gsskex openssh-7.4p1/monitor.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/monitor.h.gsskex 2016-12-23 13:38:53.687300997 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor.h 2016-12-23 13:38:53.729301005 +0100
+@@ -60,6 +60,8 @@ enum monitor_reqtype {
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE = 80,
+ #endif
++ MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN = 82, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN = 83,
++ MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS = 84, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS = 85,
+
+ MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START = 100,
+ MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT = 102, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT = 103,
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c.gsskex openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c.gsskex 2016-12-23 13:38:53.687300997 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c 2016-12-23 13:38:53.729301005 +0100
+@@ -943,7 +943,7 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss
+ }
+
+ int
+-mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
++mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw)
+ {
+ Buffer m;
+ int authenticated = 0;
+@@ -960,5 +960,50 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
+ debug3("%s: user %sauthenticated",__func__, authenticated ? "" : "not ");
+ return (authenticated);
+ }
++
++OM_uint32
++mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_desc *data, gss_buffer_desc *hash)
++{
++ Buffer m;
++ OM_uint32 major;
++ u_int len;
++
++ buffer_init(&m);
++ buffer_put_string(&m, data->value, data->length);
++
++ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, &m);
++ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, &m);
++
++ major = buffer_get_int(&m);
++ hash->value = buffer_get_string(&m, &len);
++ hash->length = len;
++
++ buffer_free(&m);
++
++ return(major);
++}
++
++int
++mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store)
++{
++ Buffer m;
++ int ok;
++
++ buffer_init(&m);
++
++ buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->filename ? store->filename : "");
++ buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->envvar ? store->envvar : "");
++ buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->envval ? store->envval : "");
++
++ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, &m);
++ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS, &m);
++
++ ok = buffer_get_int(&m);
++
++ buffer_free(&m);
++
++ return (ok);
++}
++
+ #endif /* GSSAPI */
+
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.h.gsskex openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.h.gsskex 2016-12-23 13:38:53.687300997 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.h 2016-12-23 13:38:53.729301005 +0100
+@@ -58,8 +58,10 @@ int mm_key_verify(Key *, u_char *, u_int
+ OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID);
+ OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *,
+ gss_buffer_desc *, gss_buffer_desc *, OM_uint32 *);
+-int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user);
++int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *);
+ OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
++OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
++int mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *);
+ #endif
+
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/readconf.c.gsskex openssh-7.4p1/readconf.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/readconf.c.gsskex 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/readconf.c 2016-12-23 13:38:53.730301005 +0100
+@@ -160,6 +160,8 @@ typedef enum {
+ oClearAllForwardings, oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost,
+ oEnableSSHKeysign, oRekeyLimit, oVerifyHostKeyDNS, oConnectTimeout,
+ oAddressFamily, oGssAuthentication, oGssDelegateCreds,
++ oGssTrustDns, oGssKeyEx, oGssClientIdentity, oGssRenewalRekey,
++ oGssServerIdentity,
+ oServerAliveInterval, oServerAliveCountMax, oIdentitiesOnly,
+ oSendEnv, oControlPath, oControlMaster, oControlPersist,
+ oHashKnownHosts,
+@@ -205,10 +207,19 @@ static struct {
+ { "afstokenpassing", oUnsupported },
+ #if defined(GSSAPI)
+ { "gssapiauthentication", oGssAuthentication },
++ { "gssapikeyexchange", oGssKeyEx },
+ { "gssapidelegatecredentials", oGssDelegateCreds },
++ { "gssapitrustdns", oGssTrustDns },
++ { "gssapiclientidentity", oGssClientIdentity },
++ { "gssapiserveridentity", oGssServerIdentity },
++ { "gssapirenewalforcesrekey", oGssRenewalRekey },
+ #else
+ { "gssapiauthentication", oUnsupported },
++ { "gssapikeyexchange", oUnsupported },
+ { "gssapidelegatecredentials", oUnsupported },
++ { "gssapitrustdns", oUnsupported },
++ { "gssapiclientidentity", oUnsupported },
++ { "gssapirenewalforcesrekey", oUnsupported },
+ #endif
+ { "fallbacktorsh", oDeprecated },
+ { "usersh", oDeprecated },
+@@ -961,10 +972,30 @@ parse_time:
+ intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
++ case oGssKeyEx:
++ intptr = &options->gss_keyex;
++ goto parse_flag;
++
+ case oGssDelegateCreds:
+ intptr = &options->gss_deleg_creds;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
++ case oGssTrustDns:
++ intptr = &options->gss_trust_dns;
++ goto parse_flag;
++
++ case oGssClientIdentity:
++ charptr = &options->gss_client_identity;
++ goto parse_string;
++
++ case oGssServerIdentity:
++ charptr = &options->gss_server_identity;
++ goto parse_string;
++
++ case oGssRenewalRekey:
++ intptr = &options->gss_renewal_rekey;
++ goto parse_flag;
++
+ case oBatchMode:
+ intptr = &options->batch_mode;
+ goto parse_flag;
+@@ -1776,7 +1807,12 @@ initialize_options(Options * options)
+ options->pubkey_authentication = -1;
+ options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
+ options->gss_authentication = -1;
++ options->gss_keyex = -1;
+ options->gss_deleg_creds = -1;
++ options->gss_trust_dns = -1;
++ options->gss_renewal_rekey = -1;
++ options->gss_client_identity = NULL;
++ options->gss_server_identity = NULL;
+ options->password_authentication = -1;
+ options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
+ options->kbd_interactive_devices = NULL;
+@@ -1920,8 +1956,14 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
+ options->challenge_response_authentication = 1;
+ if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
+ options->gss_authentication = 0;
++ if (options->gss_keyex == -1)
++ options->gss_keyex = 0;
+ if (options->gss_deleg_creds == -1)
+ options->gss_deleg_creds = 0;
++ if (options->gss_trust_dns == -1)
++ options->gss_trust_dns = 0;
++ if (options->gss_renewal_rekey == -1)
++ options->gss_renewal_rekey = 0;
+ if (options->password_authentication == -1)
+ options->password_authentication = 1;
+ if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/readconf.h.gsskex openssh-7.4p1/readconf.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/readconf.h.gsskex 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/readconf.h 2016-12-23 13:38:53.730301005 +0100
+@@ -45,7 +45,12 @@ typedef struct {
+ int challenge_response_authentication;
+ /* Try S/Key or TIS, authentication. */
+ int gss_authentication; /* Try GSS authentication */
++ int gss_keyex; /* Try GSS key exchange */
+ int gss_deleg_creds; /* Delegate GSS credentials */
++ int gss_trust_dns; /* Trust DNS for GSS canonicalization */
++ int gss_renewal_rekey; /* Credential renewal forces rekey */
++ char *gss_client_identity; /* Principal to initiate GSSAPI with */
++ char *gss_server_identity; /* GSSAPI target principal */
+ int password_authentication; /* Try password
+ * authentication. */
+ int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* Try keyboard-interactive auth. */
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/regress/cert-hostkey.sh.gsskex openssh-7.4p1/regress/cert-hostkey.sh
+--- openssh-7.4p1/regress/cert-hostkey.sh.gsskex 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/regress/cert-hostkey.sh 2016-12-23 13:38:53.731301006 +0100
+@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ touch $OBJ/host_revoked_plain
+ touch $OBJ/host_revoked_cert
+ cat $OBJ/host_ca_key.pub $OBJ/host_ca_key2.pub > $OBJ/host_revoked_ca
+
+-PLAIN_TYPES=`$SSH -Q key-plain | sed 's/^ssh-dss/ssh-dsa/g;s/^ssh-//'`
++PLAIN_TYPES=`$SSH -Q key-plain | grep -v null | sed 's/^ssh-dss/ssh-dsa/g;s/^ssh-//'`
+
+ if echo "$PLAIN_TYPES" | grep '^rsa$' >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then
+ PLAIN_TYPES="$PLAIN_TYPES rsa-sha2-256 rsa-sha2-512"
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/regress/cert-userkey.sh.gsskex openssh-7.4p1/regress/cert-userkey.sh
+--- openssh-7.4p1/regress/cert-userkey.sh.gsskex 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/regress/cert-userkey.sh 2016-12-23 13:38:53.731301006 +0100
+@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ rm -f $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER $OBJ/us
+ cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
+ cp $OBJ/ssh_proxy $OBJ/ssh_proxy_bak
+
+-PLAIN_TYPES=`$SSH -Q key-plain | sed 's/^ssh-dss/ssh-dsa/;s/^ssh-//'`
++PLAIN_TYPES=`$SSH -Q key-plain | grep -v null | sed 's/^ssh-dss/ssh-dsa/;s/^ssh-//'`
+
+ if echo "$PLAIN_TYPES" | grep '^rsa$' >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then
+ PLAIN_TYPES="$PLAIN_TYPES rsa-sha2-256 rsa-sha2-512"
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/regress/kextype.sh.gsskex openssh-7.4p1/regress/kextype.sh
+--- openssh-7.4p1/regress/kextype.sh.gsskex 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/regress/kextype.sh 2016-12-23 13:38:53.731301006 +0100
+@@ -14,6 +14,9 @@ echo "KexAlgorithms=$KEXOPT" >> $OBJ/ssh
+
+ tries="1 2 3 4"
+ for k in `${SSH} -Q kex`; do
++ if [ $k = "gss-gex-sha1-" -o $k = "gss-group1-sha1-" -o $k = "gss-group14-sha1-" ]; then
++ continue
++ fi
+ verbose "kex $k"
+ for i in $tries; do
+ ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -o KexAlgorithms=$k x true
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/regress/rekey.sh.gsskex openssh-7.4p1/regress/rekey.sh
+--- openssh-7.4p1/regress/rekey.sh.gsskex 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/regress/rekey.sh 2016-12-23 13:38:53.731301006 +0100
+@@ -38,6 +38,9 @@ increase_datafile_size 300
+
+ opts=""
+ for i in `${SSH} -Q kex`; do
++ if [ $i = "gss-gex-sha1-" -o $i = "gss-group1-sha1-" -o $i = "gss-group14-sha1-" ]; then
++ continue
++ fi
+ opts="$opts KexAlgorithms=$i"
+ done
+ for i in `${SSH} -Q cipher`; do
+@@ -56,6 +59,9 @@ done
+ if ${SSH} -Q cipher-auth | grep '^.*$' >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then
+ for c in `${SSH} -Q cipher-auth`; do
+ for kex in `${SSH} -Q kex`; do
++ if [ $kex = "gss-gex-sha1-" -o $kex = "gss-group1-sha1-" -o $kex = "gss-group14-sha1-" ]; then
++ continue
++ fi
+ verbose "client rekey $c $kex"
+ ssh_data_rekeying "KexAlgorithms=$kex" -oRekeyLimit=256k -oCiphers=$c
+ done
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.gsskex openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.gsskex 2016-12-23 13:38:53.717301003 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c 2016-12-23 13:38:53.732301006 +0100
+@@ -113,8 +113,10 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
+ options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = -1;
+ options->kerberos_get_afs_token = -1;
+ options->gss_authentication=-1;
++ options->gss_keyex = -1;
+ options->gss_cleanup_creds = -1;
+ options->gss_strict_acceptor = -1;
++ options->gss_store_rekey = -1;
+ options->password_authentication = -1;
+ options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
+ options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
+@@ -268,10 +270,14 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
+ options->kerberos_get_afs_token = 0;
+ if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
+ options->gss_authentication = 0;
++ if (options->gss_keyex == -1)
++ options->gss_keyex = 0;
+ if (options->gss_cleanup_creds == -1)
+ options->gss_cleanup_creds = 1;
+ if (options->gss_strict_acceptor == -1)
+ options->gss_strict_acceptor = 0;
++ if (options->gss_store_rekey == -1)
++ options->gss_store_rekey = 0;
+ if (options->password_authentication == -1)
+ options->password_authentication = 1;
+ if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
+@@ -410,7 +416,7 @@ typedef enum {
+ sHostKeyAlgorithms,
+ sClientAliveInterval, sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile,
+ sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssStrictAcceptor,
+- sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel,
++ sGssKeyEx, sGssStoreRekey, sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel,
+ sMatch, sPermitOpen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory,
+ sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding,
+ sHostCertificate,
+@@ -484,11 +490,17 @@ static struct {
+ { "gssapiauthentication", sGssAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sGssStrictAcceptor, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++ { "gssapikeyexchange", sGssKeyEx, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++ { "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sGssStoreRekey, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ #else
+ { "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++ { "gssapikeyexchange", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++ { "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ #endif
++ { "gssusesessionccache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++ { "gssapiusesessioncredcache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "passwordauthentication", sPasswordAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "kbdinteractiveauthentication", sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "challengeresponseauthentication", sChallengeResponseAuthentication, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+@@ -1211,6 +1223,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
+ intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
++ case sGssKeyEx:
++ intptr = &options->gss_keyex;
++ goto parse_flag;
++
+ case sGssCleanupCreds:
+ intptr = &options->gss_cleanup_creds;
+ goto parse_flag;
+@@ -1219,6 +1235,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
+ intptr = &options->gss_strict_acceptor;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
++ case sGssStoreRekey:
++ intptr = &options->gss_store_rekey;
++ goto parse_flag;
++
+ case sPasswordAuthentication:
+ intptr = &options->password_authentication;
+ goto parse_flag;
+@@ -2257,6 +2277,9 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssCleanupCreds, o->gss_cleanup_creds);
++ dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssKeyEx, o->gss_keyex);
++ dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStrictAcceptor, o->gss_strict_acceptor);
++ dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStoreRekey, o->gss_store_rekey);
+ #endif
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sPasswordAuthentication, o->password_authentication);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.gsskex openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.gsskex 2016-12-23 13:38:53.717301003 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h 2016-12-23 13:38:53.732301006 +0100
+@@ -112,8 +112,10 @@ typedef struct {
+ int kerberos_get_afs_token; /* If true, try to get AFS token if
+ * authenticated with Kerberos. */
+ int gss_authentication; /* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */
++ int gss_keyex; /* If true, permit GSSAPI key exchange */
+ int gss_cleanup_creds; /* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */
+ int gss_strict_acceptor; /* If true, restrict the GSSAPI acceptor name */
++ int gss_store_rekey;
+ int password_authentication; /* If true, permit password
+ * authentication. */
+ int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* If true, permit */
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/ssh_config.5.gsskex openssh-7.4p1/ssh_config.5
+--- openssh-7.4p1/ssh_config.5.gsskex 2016-12-23 13:38:53.732301006 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/ssh_config.5 2016-12-23 13:48:00.502331870 +0100
+@@ -748,10 +748,40 @@ The default is
+ Specifies whether user authentication based on GSSAPI is allowed.
+ The default is
+ .Cm no .
++.It Cm GSSAPIClientIdentity
++If set, specifies the GSSAPI client identity that ssh should use when
++connecting to the server. The default is unset, which means that the default
++identity will be used.
+ .It Cm GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
+ Forward (delegate) credentials to the server.
+ The default is
+ .Cm no .
++.It Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange
++Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI may be used. When using
++GSSAPI key exchange the server need not have a host key.
++The default is
++.Dq no .
++.It Cm GSSAPIRenewalForcesRekey
++If set to
++.Dq yes
++then renewal of the client's GSSAPI credentials will force the rekeying of the
++ssh connection. With a compatible server, this can delegate the renewed
++credentials to a session on the server.
++The default is
++.Dq no .
++.It Cm GSSAPIServerIdentity
++If set, specifies the GSSAPI server identity that ssh should expect when
++connecting to the server. The default is unset, which means that the
++expected GSSAPI server identity will be determined from the target
++hostname.
++.It Cm GSSAPITrustDns
++Set to
++.Dq yes to indicate that the DNS is trusted to securely canonicalize
++the name of the host being connected to. If
++.Dq no, the hostname entered on the
++command line will be passed untouched to the GSSAPI library.
++The default is
++.Dq no .
+ .It Cm HashKnownHosts
+ Indicates that
+ .Xr ssh 1
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/ssh_config.gsskex openssh-7.4p1/ssh_config
+--- openssh-7.4p1/ssh_config.gsskex 2016-12-23 13:38:53.708301001 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/ssh_config 2016-12-23 13:38:53.733301006 +0100
+@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@
+ # HostbasedAuthentication no
+ # GSSAPIAuthentication no
+ # GSSAPIDelegateCredentials no
++# GSSAPIKeyExchange no
++# GSSAPITrustDNS no
+ # BatchMode no
+ # CheckHostIP yes
+ # AddressFamily any
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshconnect2.c.gsskex openssh-7.4p1/sshconnect2.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshconnect2.c.gsskex 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshconnect2.c 2016-12-23 13:38:53.733301006 +0100
+@@ -162,9 +162,34 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *ho
+ struct kex *kex;
+ int r;
+
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++ char *orig = NULL, *gss = NULL;
++ char *gss_host = NULL;
++#endif
++
+ xxx_host = host;
+ xxx_hostaddr = hostaddr;
+
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++ if (options.gss_keyex) {
++ /* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this
++ * client to the key exchange algorithm proposal */
++ orig = options.kex_algorithms;
++
++ if (options.gss_trust_dns)
++ gss_host = (char *)get_canonical_hostname(active_state, 1);
++ else
++ gss_host = host;
++
++ gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host, options.gss_client_identity);
++ if (gss) {
++ debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss);
++ xasprintf(&options.kex_algorithms,
++ "%s,%s", gss, orig);
++ }
++ }
++#endif
++
+ if ((s = kex_names_cat(options.kex_algorithms, "ext-info-c")) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: kex_names_cat", __func__);
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal(s);
+@@ -192,6 +217,17 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *ho
+ order_hostkeyalgs(host, hostaddr, port));
+ }
+
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++ /* If we've got GSSAPI algorithms, then we also support the
++ * 'null' hostkey, as a last resort */
++ if (options.gss_keyex && gss) {
++ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS];
++ xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
++ "%s,null", orig);
++ free(gss);
++ }
++#endif
++
+ if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval)
+ packet_set_rekey_limits((u_int32_t)options.rekey_limit,
+ (time_t)options.rekey_interval);
+@@ -212,11 +248,31 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *ho
+ kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_client;
+ # endif
+ #endif
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++ if (options.gss_keyex) {
++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_client;
++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_client;
++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_client;
++ }
++#endif
+ kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_client;
+ kex->client_version_string=client_version_string;
+ kex->server_version_string=server_version_string;
+ kex->verify_host_key=&verify_host_key_callback;
+
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++ if (options.gss_keyex) {
++ kex->gss_deleg_creds = options.gss_deleg_creds;
++ kex->gss_trust_dns = options.gss_trust_dns;
++ kex->gss_client = options.gss_client_identity;
++ if (options.gss_server_identity) {
++ kex->gss_host = options.gss_server_identity;
++ } else {
++ kex->gss_host = gss_host;
++ }
++ }
++#endif
++
+ dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &kex->done, active_state);
+
+ /* remove ext-info from the KEX proposals for rekeying */
+@@ -311,6 +367,7 @@ int input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32
+ int input_gssapi_hash(int type, u_int32_t, void *);
+ int input_gssapi_error(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+ int input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, void *);
++int userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt);
+ #endif
+
+ void userauth(Authctxt *, char *);
+@@ -327,6 +384,11 @@ static char *authmethods_get(void);
+
+ Authmethod authmethods[] = {
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
++ {"gssapi-keyex",
++ userauth_gsskeyex,
++ NULL,
++ &options.gss_authentication,
++ NULL},
+ {"gssapi-with-mic",
+ userauth_gssapi,
+ NULL,
+@@ -652,19 +714,31 @@ userauth_gssapi(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ static u_int mech = 0;
+ OM_uint32 min;
+ int ok = 0;
++ const char *gss_host;
++
++ if (options.gss_server_identity)
++ gss_host = options.gss_server_identity;
++ else if (options.gss_trust_dns)
++ gss_host = get_canonical_hostname(active_state, 1);
++ else
++ gss_host = authctxt->host;
+
+ /* Try one GSSAPI method at a time, rather than sending them all at
+ * once. */
+
+ if (gss_supported == NULL)
+- gss_indicate_mechs(&min, &gss_supported);
++ if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min, &gss_supported))) {
++ gss_supported = NULL;
++ return 0;
++ }
+
+ /* Check to see if the mechanism is usable before we offer it */
+ while (mech < gss_supported->count && !ok) {
+ /* My DER encoding requires length<128 */
+ if (gss_supported->elements[mech].length < 128 &&
+ ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(&gssctxt,
+- &gss_supported->elements[mech], authctxt->host)) {
++ &gss_supported->elements[mech], gss_host,
++ options.gss_client_identity)) {
+ ok = 1; /* Mechanism works */
+ } else {
+ mech++;
+@@ -761,8 +835,8 @@ input_gssapi_response(int type, u_int32_
+ {
+ Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
+ Gssctxt *gssctxt;
+- int oidlen;
+- char *oidv;
++ u_int oidlen;
++ u_char *oidv;
+
+ if (authctxt == NULL)
+ fatal("input_gssapi_response: no authentication context");
+@@ -875,6 +949,48 @@ input_gssapi_error(int type, u_int32_t p
+ free(lang);
+ return 0;
+ }
++
++int
++userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt)
++{
++ Buffer b;
++ gss_buffer_desc gssbuf;
++ gss_buffer_desc mic = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
++ OM_uint32 ms;
++
++ static int attempt = 0;
++ if (attempt++ >= 1)
++ return (0);
++
++ if (gss_kex_context == NULL) {
++ debug("No valid Key exchange context");
++ return (0);
++ }
++
++ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->server_user, authctxt->service,
++ "gssapi-keyex");
++
++ gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b);
++ gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b);
++
++ if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_sign(gss_kex_context, &gssbuf, &mic))) {
++ buffer_free(&b);
++ return (0);
++ }
++
++ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
++ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user);
++ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service);
++ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name);
++ packet_put_string(mic.value, mic.length);
++ packet_send();
++
++ buffer_free(&b);
++ gss_release_buffer(&ms, &mic);
++
++ return (1);
++}
++
+ #endif /* GSSAPI */
+
+ int
+diff -up openssh-7.2p1/sshd.c.gsskex openssh-7.2p1/sshd.c
+--- openssh-7.2p1/sshd.c.gsskex 2016-02-19 10:01:04.860969328 +0100
++++ openssh-7.2p1/sshd.c 2016-02-19 10:01:04.872969321 +0100
+@@ -547,7 +547,7 @@ privsep_preauth_child(void)
+
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
+ /* Cache supported mechanism OIDs for later use */
+- if (options.gss_authentication)
++ if (options.gss_authentication || options.gss_keyex)
+ ssh_gssapi_prepare_supported_oids();
+ #endif
+
+@@ -974,8 +974,9 @@ notify_hostkeys(struct ssh *ssh)
+ }
+ debug3("%s: sent %d hostkeys", __func__, nkeys);
+ if (nkeys == 0)
+- fatal("%s: no hostkeys", __func__);
+- packet_send();
++ debug3("%s: no hostkeys", __func__);
++ else
++ packet_send();
+ sshbuf_free(buf);
+ }
+
+@@ -1739,7 +1740,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ key ? "private" : "agent", i, sshkey_ssh_name(pubkey), fp);
+ free(fp);
+ }
+- if (!sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key) {
++ /* The GSSAPI key exchange can run without a host key */
++ if (!sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key && !options.gss_keyex) {
+ logit("sshd: no hostkeys available -- exiting.");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+@@ -2196,6 +2198,48 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void)
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = compat_pkalg_proposal(
+ list_hostkey_types());
+
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++ {
++ char *orig;
++ char *gss = NULL;
++ char *newstr = NULL;
++ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
++
++ /*
++ * If we don't have a host key, then there's no point advertising
++ * the other key exchange algorithms
++ */
++
++ if (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]) == 0)
++ orig = NULL;
++
++ if (options.gss_keyex)
++ gss = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms();
++ else
++ gss = NULL;
++
++ if (gss && orig)
++ xasprintf(&newstr, "%s,%s", gss, orig);
++ else if (gss)
++ newstr = gss;
++ else if (orig)
++ newstr = orig;
++
++ /*
++ * If we've got GSSAPI mechanisms, then we've got the 'null' host
++ * key alg, but we can't tell people about it unless its the only
++ * host key algorithm we support
++ */
++ if (gss && (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS])) == 0)
++ myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = "null";
++
++ if (newstr)
++ myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = newstr;
++ else
++ fatal("No supported key exchange algorithms");
++ }
++#endif
++
+ /* start key exchange */
+ if ((r = kex_setup(active_state, myproposal)) != 0)
+ fatal("kex_setup: %s", ssh_err(r));
+@@ -2213,6 +2257,13 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void)
+ # endif
+ #endif
+ kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_server;
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++ if (options.gss_keyex) {
++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
++ }
++#endif
+ kex->server = 1;
+ kex->client_version_string=client_version_string;
+ kex->server_version_string=server_version_string;
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.gsskex openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.gsskex 2016-12-23 13:38:53.734301006 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5 2016-12-23 13:48:57.825310358 +0100
+@@ -628,6 +628,11 @@ Specifies whether to automatically destr
+ on logout.
+ The default is
+ .Cm yes .
++.It Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange
++Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI is allowed. GSSAPI key exchange
++doesn't rely on ssh keys to verify host identity.
++The default is
++.Dq no .
+ .It Cm GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck
+ Determines whether to be strict about the identity of the GSSAPI acceptor
+ a client authenticates against.
+@@ -642,6 +647,11 @@ machine's default store.
+ This facility is provided to assist with operation on multi homed machines.
+ The default is
+ .Cm yes .
++.It Cm GSSAPIStoreCredentialsOnRekey
++Controls whether the user's GSSAPI credentials should be updated following a
++successful connection rekeying. This option can be used to accepted renewed
++or updated credentials from a compatible client. The default is
++.Dq no .
+ .It Cm HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes
+ Specifies the key types that will be accepted for hostbased authentication
+ as a comma-separated pattern list.
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.gsskex openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.gsskex 2016-12-23 13:38:53.719301003 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config 2016-12-23 13:38:53.734301006 +0100
+@@ -77,6 +77,8 @@ ChallengeResponseAuthentication no
+ # GSSAPI options
+ GSSAPIAuthentication yes
+ GSSAPICleanupCredentials no
++#GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck yes
++#GSSAPIKeyExchange no
+
+ # Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing,
+ # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/ssh-gss.h.gsskex openssh-7.4p1/ssh-gss.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/ssh-gss.h.gsskex 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/ssh-gss.h 2016-12-23 13:38:53.734301006 +0100
+@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
+ /* $OpenBSD: ssh-gss.h,v 1.11 2014/02/26 20:28:44 djm Exp $ */
+ /*
+- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
++ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+@@ -61,10 +61,22 @@
+
+ #define SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE 0x06
+
++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT 30
++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE 31
++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE 32
++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY 33
++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR 34
++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ 40
++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP 41
++#define KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID "gss-group1-sha1-"
++#define KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID "gss-group14-sha1-"
++#define KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID "gss-gex-sha1-"
++
+ typedef struct {
+ char *filename;
+ char *envvar;
+ char *envval;
++ struct passwd *owner;
+ void *data;
+ } ssh_gssapi_ccache;
+
+@@ -72,8 +84,11 @@ typedef struct {
+ gss_buffer_desc displayname;
+ gss_buffer_desc exportedname;
+ gss_cred_id_t creds;
++ gss_name_t name;
+ struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct *mech;
+ ssh_gssapi_ccache store;
++ int used;
++ int updated;
+ } ssh_gssapi_client;
+
+ typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct {
+@@ -84,6 +99,7 @@ typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct {
+ int (*userok) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char *);
+ int (*localname) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char **);
+ void (*storecreds) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
++ int (*updatecreds) (ssh_gssapi_ccache *, ssh_gssapi_client *);
+ } ssh_gssapi_mech;
+
+ typedef struct {
+@@ -94,10 +110,11 @@ typedef struct {
+ gss_OID oid; /* client */
+ gss_cred_id_t creds; /* server */
+ gss_name_t client; /* server */
+- gss_cred_id_t client_creds; /* server */
++ gss_cred_id_t client_creds; /* both */
+ } Gssctxt;
+
+ extern ssh_gssapi_mech *supported_mechs[];
++extern Gssctxt *gss_kex_context;
+
+ int ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t);
+ void ssh_gssapi_set_oid_data(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t);
+@@ -119,16 +136,32 @@ void ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(Gssctxt **);
+ void ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(Gssctxt **);
+ OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
+ void ssh_gssapi_buildmic(Buffer *, const char *, const char *, const char *);
+-int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *);
++int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *, const char *);
++OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_client_identity(Gssctxt *, const char *);
++int ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(Gssctxt *);
+
+ /* In the server */
++typedef int ssh_gssapi_check_fn(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *,
++ const char *);
++char *ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *, const char *);
++char *ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *, const char *,
++ const char *);
++gss_OID ssh_gssapi_id_kex(Gssctxt *, char *, int);
++int ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt **,gss_OID, const char *,
++ const char *);
+ OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID);
+-int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name);
++int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name, struct passwd *);
+ OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
+ void ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***, u_int *);
+ void ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void);
+ void ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void);
+
++char *ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(void);
++int ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok();
++
++int ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store);
++
++void ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds(void);
+ #endif /* GSSAPI */
+
+ #endif /* _SSH_GSS_H */
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshkey.c.gsskex openssh-7.4p1/sshkey.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshkey.c.gsskex 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshkey.c 2016-12-23 13:38:53.735301006 +0100
+@@ -114,6 +114,7 @@ static const struct keytype keytypes[] =
+ # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */
+ # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+ #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
++ { "null", "null", KEY_NULL, 0, 0, 1 },
+ { NULL, NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0 }
+ };
+
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshkey.h.gsskex openssh-7.4p1/sshkey.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshkey.h.gsskex 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshkey.h 2016-12-23 13:38:53.735301006 +0100
+@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ enum sshkey_types {
+ KEY_DSA_CERT,
+ KEY_ECDSA_CERT,
+ KEY_ED25519_CERT,
++ KEY_NULL,
+ KEY_UNSPEC
+ };
+
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/auth.c.gsskex openssh-7.4p1/auth.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/auth.c.gsskex 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/auth.c 2016-12-23 13:38:53.735301006 +0100
+@@ -372,6 +372,7 @@ auth_root_allowed(const char *method)
+ case PERMIT_NO_PASSWD:
+ if (strcmp(method, "publickey") == 0 ||
+ strcmp(method, "hostbased") == 0 ||
++ strcmp(method, "gssapi-keyex") == 0 ||
+ strcmp(method, "gssapi-with-mic") == 0)
+ return 1;
+ break;
+@@ -795,99 +796,6 @@ fakepw(void)
+ }
+
+ /*
+- * Returns the remote DNS hostname as a string. The returned string must not
+- * be freed. NB. this will usually trigger a DNS query the first time it is
+- * called.
+- * This function does additional checks on the hostname to mitigate some
+- * attacks on legacy rhosts-style authentication.
+- * XXX is RhostsRSAAuthentication vulnerable to these?
+- * XXX Can we remove these checks? (or if not, remove RhostsRSAAuthentication?)
+- */
+-
+-static char *
+-remote_hostname(struct ssh *ssh)
+-{
+- struct sockaddr_storage from;
+- socklen_t fromlen;
+- struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop;
+- char name[NI_MAXHOST], ntop2[NI_MAXHOST];
+- const char *ntop = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
+-
+- /* Get IP address of client. */
+- fromlen = sizeof(from);
+- memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
+- if (getpeername(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh),
+- (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) {
+- debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+- return strdup(ntop);
+- }
+-
+- ipv64_normalise_mapped(&from, &fromlen);
+- if (from.ss_family == AF_INET6)
+- fromlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
+-
+- debug3("Trying to reverse map address %.100s.", ntop);
+- /* Map the IP address to a host name. */
+- if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, name, sizeof(name),
+- NULL, 0, NI_NAMEREQD) != 0) {
+- /* Host name not found. Use ip address. */
+- return strdup(ntop);
+- }
+-
+- /*
+- * if reverse lookup result looks like a numeric hostname,
+- * someone is trying to trick us by PTR record like following:
+- * 1.1.1.10.in-addr.arpa. IN PTR 2.3.4.5
+- */
+- memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+- hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM; /*dummy*/
+- hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST;
+- if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &ai) == 0) {
+- logit("Nasty PTR record \"%s\" is set up for %s, ignoring",
+- name, ntop);
+- freeaddrinfo(ai);
+- return strdup(ntop);
+- }
+-
+- /* Names are stored in lowercase. */
+- lowercase(name);
+-
+- /*
+- * Map it back to an IP address and check that the given
+- * address actually is an address of this host. This is
+- * necessary because anyone with access to a name server can
+- * define arbitrary names for an IP address. Mapping from
+- * name to IP address can be trusted better (but can still be
+- * fooled if the intruder has access to the name server of
+- * the domain).
+- */
+- memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+- hints.ai_family = from.ss_family;
+- hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+- if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &aitop) != 0) {
+- logit("reverse mapping checking getaddrinfo for %.700s "
+- "[%s] failed.", name, ntop);
+- return strdup(ntop);
+- }
+- /* Look for the address from the list of addresses. */
+- for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
+- if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop2,
+- sizeof(ntop2), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) == 0 &&
+- (strcmp(ntop, ntop2) == 0))
+- break;
+- }
+- freeaddrinfo(aitop);
+- /* If we reached the end of the list, the address was not there. */
+- if (ai == NULL) {
+- /* Address not found for the host name. */
+- logit("Address %.100s maps to %.600s, but this does not "
+- "map back to the address.", ntop, name);
+- return strdup(ntop);
+- }
+- return strdup(name);
+-}
+-
+-/*
+ * Return the canonical name of the host in the other side of the current
+ * connection. The host name is cached, so it is efficient to call this
+ * several times.
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.gsskex openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.gsskex 2016-12-23 13:38:53.688300997 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c 2016-12-23 13:38:53.735301006 +0100
+@@ -30,6 +30,8 @@
+ #include "log.h"
+ #include "xmalloc.h"
+ #include "port-linux.h"
++#include "canohost.h"
++#include "misc.h"
+
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ #include <selinux/selinux.h>
+@@ -279,4 +281,121 @@ oom_adjust_restore(void)
+ return;
+ }
+ #endif /* LINUX_OOM_ADJUST */
++
++/**************** XXX moved from auth.c ****************/
++
++/*
++ * Returns the remote DNS hostname as a string. The returned string must not
++ * be freed. NB. this will usually trigger a DNS query the first time it is
++ * called.
++ * This function does additional checks on the hostname to mitigate some
++ * attacks on legacy rhosts-style authentication.
++ * XXX is RhostsRSAAuthentication vulnerable to these?
++ * XXX Can we remove these checks? (or if not, remove RhostsRSAAuthentication?)
++ */
++
++char *
++remote_hostname(struct ssh *ssh)
++{
++ struct sockaddr_storage from;
++ socklen_t fromlen;
++ struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop;
++ char name[NI_MAXHOST], ntop2[NI_MAXHOST];
++ const char *ntop = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
++
++ /* Get IP address of client. */
++ fromlen = sizeof(from);
++ memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
++ if (getpeername(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh),
++ (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) {
++ debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
++ return strdup(ntop);
++ }
++
++ ipv64_normalise_mapped(&from, &fromlen);
++ if (from.ss_family == AF_INET6)
++ fromlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
++
++ debug3("Trying to reverse map address %.100s.", ntop);
++ /* Map the IP address to a host name. */
++ if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, name, sizeof(name),
++ NULL, 0, NI_NAMEREQD) != 0) {
++ /* Host name not found. Use ip address. */
++ return strdup(ntop);
++ }
++
++ /*
++ * if reverse lookup result looks like a numeric hostname,
++ * someone is trying to trick us by PTR record like following:
++ * 1.1.1.10.in-addr.arpa. IN PTR 2.3.4.5
++ */
++ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
++ hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM; /*dummy*/
++ hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST;
++ if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &ai) == 0) {
++ logit("Nasty PTR record \"%s\" is set up for %s, ignoring",
++ name, ntop);
++ freeaddrinfo(ai);
++ return strdup(ntop);
++ }
++
++ /* Names are stored in lowercase. */
++ lowercase(name);
++
++ /*
++ * Map it back to an IP address and check that the given
++ * address actually is an address of this host. This is
++ * necessary because anyone with access to a name server can
++ * define arbitrary names for an IP address. Mapping from
++ * name to IP address can be trusted better (but can still be
++ * fooled if the intruder has access to the name server of
++ * the domain).
++ */
++ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
++ hints.ai_family = from.ss_family;
++ hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
++ if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &aitop) != 0) {
++ logit("reverse mapping checking getaddrinfo for %.700s "
++ "[%s] failed - POSSIBLE BREAK-IN ATTEMPT!", name, ntop);
++ return strdup(ntop);
++ }
++ /* Look for the address from the list of addresses. */
++ for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
++ if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop2,
++ sizeof(ntop2), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) == 0 &&
++ (strcmp(ntop, ntop2) == 0))
++ break;
++ }
++ freeaddrinfo(aitop);
++ /* If we reached the end of the list, the address was not there. */
++ if (ai == NULL) {
++ /* Address not found for the host name. */
++ logit("Address %.100s maps to %.600s, but this does not "
++ "map back to the address - POSSIBLE BREAK-IN ATTEMPT!",
++ ntop, name);
++ return strdup(ntop);
++ }
++ return strdup(name);
++}
++
++/*
++ * Return the canonical name of the host in the other side of the current
++ * connection. The host name is cached, so it is efficient to call this
++ * several times.
++ */
++
++const char *
++get_canonical_hostname(struct ssh *ssh, int use_dns)
++{
++ static char *dnsname;
++
++ if (!use_dns)
++ return ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
++ else if (dnsname != NULL)
++ return dnsname;
++ else {
++ dnsname = remote_hostname(ssh);
++ return dnsname;
++ }
++}
+ #endif /* WITH_SELINUX || LINUX_OOM_ADJUST */
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.gsskex openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.gsskex 2016-12-23 13:38:53.712301002 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h 2016-12-23 13:38:53.735301006 +0100
+@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
+
+ #ifndef _PORT_LINUX_H
+ #define _PORT_LINUX_H
++#include "packet.h"
+
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ int ssh_selinux_enabled(void);
+@@ -36,4 +37,8 @@ void oom_adjust_setup(void);
+
+ void linux_seed(void);
+
++const char *get_canonical_hostname(struct ssh *, int);
++char *remote_hostname(struct ssh *);
++
++
+ #endif /* ! _PORT_LINUX_H */
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-kdf-cavs.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-kdf-cavs.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..65feb96
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-kdf-cavs.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,611 @@
+diff -up openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in.kdf-cavs openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in
+--- openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in.kdf-cavs 2015-03-18 11:23:46.346049359 +0100
++++ openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in 2015-03-18 11:24:20.395968445 +0100
+@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ SSH_LDAP_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-ldap-h
+ SSH_LDAP_WRAPPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-ldap-wrapper
+ SSH_KEYCAT=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat
+ CTR_CAVSTEST=$(libexecdir)/ctr-cavstest
++SSH_CAVS=$(libexecdir)/ssh-cavs
+ SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-pkcs11-helper
+ PRIVSEP_PATH=@PRIVSEP_PATH@
+ SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=@SSH_PRIVSEP_USER@
+@@ -67,7 +68,7 @@ EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@
+ MANFMT=@MANFMT@
+ INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER=@INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER@
+
+-TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT)
++TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT) ssh-cavs$(EXEEXT)
+
+ LIBOPENSSH_OBJS=\
+ ssh_api.o \
+@@ -198,6 +199,9 @@ ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHD
+ ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ctr-cavstest.o
+ $(LD) -o $@ ctr-cavstest.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lfipscheck $(LIBS)
+
++ssh-cavs$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-cavs.o
++ $(LD) -o $@ ssh-cavs.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
++
+ ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keyscan.o
+ $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
+
+@@ -331,6 +335,8 @@ install-files:
+ fi
+ $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT)
+ $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT)
++ $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-cavs$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ssh-cavs$(EXEEXT)
++ $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-cavs_driver.pl $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ssh-cavs_driver.pl
+ $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT)
+ $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT)
+ $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1
+diff -up openssh-6.8p1/ssh-cavs.c.kdf-cavs openssh-6.8p1/ssh-cavs.c
+--- openssh-6.8p1/ssh-cavs.c.kdf-cavs 2015-03-18 11:23:46.348049354 +0100
++++ openssh-6.8p1/ssh-cavs.c 2015-03-18 11:23:46.348049354 +0100
+@@ -0,0 +1,380 @@
++/*
++ * Copyright (C) 2015, Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
++ *
++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
++ * are met:
++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
++ * notice, and the entire permission notice in its entirety,
++ * including the disclaimer of warranties.
++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
++ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
++ * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
++ * products derived from this software without specific prior
++ * written permission.
++ *
++ * ALTERNATIVELY, this product may be distributed under the terms of
++ * the GNU General Public License, in which case the provisions of the GPL2
++ * are required INSTEAD OF the above restrictions. (This clause is
++ * necessary due to a potential bad interaction between the GPL and
++ * the restrictions contained in a BSD-style copyright.)
++ *
++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
++ * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
++ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, ALL OF
++ * WHICH ARE HEREBY DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE
++ * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
++ * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT
++ * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR
++ * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF
++ * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
++ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE
++ * USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF NOT ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH
++ * DAMAGE.
++ */
++
++#include "includes.h"
++
++#include <stdio.h>
++#include <stdlib.h>
++#include <errno.h>
++#include <sys/types.h>
++#include <string.h>
++
++#include <openssl/bn.h>
++
++#include "xmalloc.h"
++#include "buffer.h"
++#include "key.h"
++#include "cipher.h"
++#include "kex.h"
++#include "packet.h"
++
++static int bin_char(unsigned char hex)
++{
++ if (48 <= hex && 57 >= hex)
++ return (hex - 48);
++ if (65 <= hex && 70 >= hex)
++ return (hex - 55);
++ if (97 <= hex && 102 >= hex)
++ return (hex - 87);
++ return 0;
++}
++
++/*
++ * Convert hex representation into binary string
++ * @hex input buffer with hex representation
++ * @hexlen length of hex
++ * @bin output buffer with binary data
++ * @binlen length of already allocated bin buffer (should be at least
++ * half of hexlen -- if not, only a fraction of hexlen is converted)
++ */
++static void hex2bin(const char *hex, size_t hexlen,
++ unsigned char *bin, size_t binlen)
++{
++ size_t i = 0;
++ size_t chars = (binlen > (hexlen / 2)) ? (hexlen / 2) : binlen;
++
++ for (i = 0; i < chars; i++) {
++ bin[i] = bin_char(hex[(i*2)]) << 4;
++ bin[i] |= bin_char(hex[((i*2)+1)]);
++ }
++}
++
++/*
++ * Allocate sufficient space for binary representation of hex
++ * and convert hex into bin
++ *
++ * Caller must free bin
++ * @hex input buffer with hex representation
++ * @hexlen length of hex
++ * @bin return value holding the pointer to the newly allocated buffer
++ * @binlen return value holding the allocated size of bin
++ *
++ * return: 0 on success, !0 otherwise
++ */
++static int hex2bin_alloc(const char *hex, size_t hexlen,
++ unsigned char **bin, size_t *binlen)
++{
++ unsigned char *out = NULL;
++ size_t outlen = 0;
++
++ if (!hexlen)
++ return -EINVAL;
++
++ outlen = (hexlen + 1) / 2;
++
++ out = calloc(1, outlen);
++ if (!out)
++ return -errno;
++
++ hex2bin(hex, hexlen, out, outlen);
++ *bin = out;
++ *binlen = outlen;
++ return 0;
++}
++
++static char hex_char_map_l[] = { '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7',
++ '8', '9', 'a', 'b', 'c', 'd', 'e', 'f' };
++static char hex_char_map_u[] = { '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7',
++ '8', '9', 'A', 'B', 'C', 'D', 'E', 'F' };
++static char hex_char(unsigned int bin, int u)
++{
++ if (bin < sizeof(hex_char_map_l))
++ return (u) ? hex_char_map_u[bin] : hex_char_map_l[bin];
++ return 'X';
++}
++
++/*
++ * Convert binary string into hex representation
++ * @bin input buffer with binary data
++ * @binlen length of bin
++ * @hex output buffer to store hex data
++ * @hexlen length of already allocated hex buffer (should be at least
++ * twice binlen -- if not, only a fraction of binlen is converted)
++ * @u case of hex characters (0=>lower case, 1=>upper case)
++ */
++static void bin2hex(const unsigned char *bin, size_t binlen,
++ char *hex, size_t hexlen, int u)
++{
++ size_t i = 0;
++ size_t chars = (binlen > (hexlen / 2)) ? (hexlen / 2) : binlen;
++
++ for (i = 0; i < chars; i++) {
++ hex[(i*2)] = hex_char((bin[i] >> 4), u);
++ hex[((i*2)+1)] = hex_char((bin[i] & 0x0f), u);
++ }
++}
++
++struct kdf_cavs {
++ unsigned char *K;
++ size_t Klen;
++ unsigned char *H;
++ size_t Hlen;
++ unsigned char *session_id;
++ size_t session_id_len;
++
++ unsigned int iv_len;
++ unsigned int ek_len;
++ unsigned int ik_len;
++};
++
++static int sshkdf_cavs(struct kdf_cavs *test)
++{
++ int ret = 0;
++ struct kex kex;
++ BIGNUM *Kbn = NULL;
++ int mode = 0;
++ struct newkeys *ctoskeys;
++ struct newkeys *stockeys;
++ struct ssh *ssh = NULL;
++
++#define HEXOUTLEN 500
++ char hex[HEXOUTLEN];
++
++ memset(&kex, 0, sizeof(struct kex));
++
++ Kbn = BN_new();
++ BN_bin2bn(test->K, test->Klen, Kbn);
++ if (!Kbn) {
++ printf("cannot convert K into BIGNUM\n");
++ ret = 1;
++ goto out;
++ }
++
++ kex.session_id = test->session_id;
++ kex.session_id_len = test->session_id_len;
++
++ /* setup kex */
++
++ /* select the right hash based on struct ssh_digest digests */
++ switch (test->ik_len) {
++ case 20:
++ kex.hash_alg = 2;
++ break;
++ case 32:
++ kex.hash_alg = 3;
++ break;
++ case 48:
++ kex.hash_alg = 4;
++ break;
++ case 64:
++ kex.hash_alg = 5;
++ break;
++ default:
++ printf("Wrong hash type %u\n", test->ik_len);
++ ret = 1;
++ goto out;
++ }
++
++ /* implement choose_enc */
++ for (mode = 0; mode < 2; mode++) {
++ kex.newkeys[mode] = calloc(1, sizeof(struct newkeys));
++ if (!kex.newkeys[mode]) {
++ printf("allocation of newkeys failed\n");
++ ret = 1;
++ goto out;
++ }
++ kex.newkeys[mode]->enc.iv_len = test->iv_len;
++ kex.newkeys[mode]->enc.key_len = test->ek_len;
++ kex.newkeys[mode]->enc.block_size = (test->iv_len == 64) ? 8 : 16;
++ kex.newkeys[mode]->mac.key_len = test->ik_len;
++ }
++
++ /* implement kex_choose_conf */
++ kex.we_need = kex.newkeys[0]->enc.key_len;
++ if (kex.we_need < kex.newkeys[0]->enc.block_size)
++ kex.we_need = kex.newkeys[0]->enc.block_size;
++ if (kex.we_need < kex.newkeys[0]->enc.iv_len)
++ kex.we_need = kex.newkeys[0]->enc.iv_len;
++ if (kex.we_need < kex.newkeys[0]->mac.key_len)
++ kex.we_need = kex.newkeys[0]->mac.key_len;
++
++ /* MODE_OUT (1) -> server to client
++ * MODE_IN (0) -> client to server */
++ kex.server = 1;
++
++ /* do it */
++ if ((ssh = ssh_packet_set_connection(NULL, -1, -1)) == NULL){
++ printf("Allocation error\n");
++ goto out;
++ }
++ ssh->kex = &kex;
++ kex_derive_keys_bn(ssh, test->H, test->Hlen, Kbn);
++
++ ctoskeys = kex.newkeys[0];
++ stockeys = kex.newkeys[1];
++
++ /* get data */
++ memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN);
++ bin2hex(ctoskeys->enc.iv, (size_t)ctoskeys->enc.iv_len,
++ hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0);
++ printf("Initial IV (client to server) = %s\n", hex);
++ memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN);
++ bin2hex(stockeys->enc.iv, (size_t)stockeys->enc.iv_len,
++ hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0);
++ printf("Initial IV (server to client) = %s\n", hex);
++
++ memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN);
++ bin2hex(ctoskeys->enc.key, (size_t)ctoskeys->enc.key_len,
++ hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0);
++ printf("Encryption key (client to server) = %s\n", hex);
++ memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN);
++ bin2hex(stockeys->enc.key, (size_t)stockeys->enc.key_len,
++ hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0);
++ printf("Encryption key (server to client) = %s\n", hex);
++
++ memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN);
++ bin2hex(ctoskeys->mac.key, (size_t)ctoskeys->mac.key_len,
++ hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0);
++ printf("Integrity key (client to server) = %s\n", hex);
++ memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN);
++ bin2hex(stockeys->mac.key, (size_t)stockeys->mac.key_len,
++ hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0);
++ printf("Integrity key (server to client) = %s\n", hex);
++
++out:
++ if (Kbn)
++ BN_free(Kbn);
++ if (kex.newkeys[0])
++ free(kex.newkeys[0]);
++ if (kex.newkeys[1])
++ free(kex.newkeys[1]);
++ if (ssh)
++ ssh_packet_close(ssh);
++ return ret;
++}
++
++static void usage(void)
++{
++ fprintf(stderr, "\nOpenSSH KDF CAVS Test\n\n");
++ fprintf(stderr, "Usage:\n");
++ fprintf(stderr, "\t-K\tShared secret string\n");
++ fprintf(stderr, "\t-H\tHash string\n");
++ fprintf(stderr, "\t-s\tSession ID string\n");
++ fprintf(stderr, "\t-i\tIV length to be generated\n");
++ fprintf(stderr, "\t-e\tEncryption key length to be generated\n");
++ fprintf(stderr, "\t-m\tMAC key length to be generated\n");
++}
++
++/*
++ * Test command example:
++ * ./ssh-cavs -K 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 -H d3ab91a850febb417a25d892ec48ed5952c7a5de -s d3ab91a850febb417a25d892ec48ed5952c7a5de -i 8 -e 24 -m 20
++ *
++ * Initial IV (client to server) = 4bb320d1679dfd3a
++ * Initial IV (server to client) = 43dea6fdf263a308
++ * Encryption key (client to server) = 13048cc600b9d3cf9095aa6cf8e2ff9cf1c54ca0520c89ed
++ * Encryption key (server to client) = 1e483c5134e901aa11fc4e0a524e7ec7b75556148a222bb0
++ * Integrity key (client to server) = ecef63a092b0dcc585bdc757e01b2740af57d640
++ * Integrity key (server to client) = 7424b05f3c44a72b4ebd281fb71f9cbe7b64d479
++ */
++int main(int argc, char *argv[])
++{
++ struct kdf_cavs test;
++ int ret = 1;
++ int opt = 0;
++
++ memset(&test, 0, sizeof(struct kdf_cavs));
++ while((opt = getopt(argc, argv, "K:H:s:i:e:m:")) != -1)
++ {
++ size_t len = 0;
++ switch(opt)
++ {
++ /*
++ * CAVS K is MPINT
++ * we want a hex (i.e. the caller must ensure the
++ * following transformations already happened):
++ * 1. cut off first four bytes
++ * 2. if most significant bit of value is
++ * 1, prepend 0 byte
++ */
++ case 'K':
++ len = strlen(optarg);
++ ret = hex2bin_alloc(optarg, len,
++ &test.K, &test.Klen);
++ if (ret)
++ goto out;
++ break;
++ case 'H':
++ len = strlen(optarg);
++ ret = hex2bin_alloc(optarg, len,
++ &test.H, &test.Hlen);
++ if (ret)
++ goto out;
++ break;
++ case 's':
++ len = strlen(optarg);
++ ret = hex2bin_alloc(optarg, len,
++ &test.session_id,
++ &test.session_id_len);
++ if (ret)
++ goto out;
++ break;
++ case 'i':
++ test.iv_len = strtoul(optarg, NULL, 10);
++ break;
++ case 'e':
++ test.ek_len = strtoul(optarg, NULL, 10);
++ break;
++ case 'm':
++ test.ik_len = strtoul(optarg, NULL, 10);
++ break;
++ default:
++ usage();
++ goto out;
++ }
++ }
++
++ ret = sshkdf_cavs(&test);
++
++out:
++ if (test.session_id)
++ free(test.session_id);
++ if (test.K)
++ free(test.K);
++ if (test.H)
++ free(test.H);
++ return ret;
++
++}
+diff -up openssh-6.8p1/ssh-cavs_driver.pl.kdf-cavs openssh-6.8p1/ssh-cavs_driver.pl
+--- openssh-6.8p1/ssh-cavs_driver.pl.kdf-cavs 2015-03-18 11:23:46.348049354 +0100
++++ openssh-6.8p1/ssh-cavs_driver.pl 2015-03-18 11:23:46.348049354 +0100
+@@ -0,0 +1,184 @@
++#!/usr/bin/env perl
++#
++# CAVS test driver for OpenSSH
++#
++# Copyright (C) 2015, Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
++#
++# Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
++# of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
++# in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
++# to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
++# copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
++# furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
++#
++# The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in
++# all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
++#
++# NO WARRANTY
++#
++# BECAUSE THE PROGRAM IS LICENSED FREE OF CHARGE, THERE IS NO WARRANTY
++# FOR THE PROGRAM, TO THE EXTENT PERMITTED BY APPLICABLE LAW. EXCEPT WHEN
++# OTHERWISE STATED IN WRITING THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND/OR OTHER PARTIES
++# PROVIDE THE PROGRAM "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESSED
++# OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
++# MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. THE ENTIRE RISK AS
++# TO THE QUALITY AND PERFORMANCE OF THE PROGRAM IS WITH YOU. SHOULD THE
++# PROGRAM PROVE DEFECTIVE, YOU ASSUME THE COST OF ALL NECESSARY SERVICING,
++# REPAIR OR CORRECTION.
++#
++# IN NO EVENT UNLESS REQUIRED BY APPLICABLE LAW OR AGREED TO IN WRITING
++# WILL ANY COPYRIGHT HOLDER, OR ANY OTHER PARTY WHO MAY MODIFY AND/OR
++# REDISTRIBUTE THE PROGRAM AS PERMITTED ABOVE, BE LIABLE TO YOU FOR DAMAGES,
++# INCLUDING ANY GENERAL, SPECIAL, INCIDENTAL OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES ARISING
++# OUT OF THE USE OR INABILITY TO USE THE PROGRAM (INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED
++# TO LOSS OF DATA OR DATA BEING RENDERED INACCURATE OR LOSSES SUSTAINED BY
++# YOU OR THIRD PARTIES OR A FAILURE OF THE PROGRAM TO OPERATE WITH ANY OTHER
++# PROGRAMS), EVEN IF SUCH HOLDER OR OTHER PARTY HAS BEEN ADVISED OF THE
++# POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES.
++#
++use strict;
++use warnings;
++use IPC::Open2;
++
++# Executing a program by feeding STDIN and retrieving
++# STDOUT
++# $1: data string to be piped to the app on STDIN
++# rest: program and args
++# returns: STDOUT of program as string
++sub pipe_through_program($@) {
++ my $in = shift;
++ my @args = @_;
++
++ my ($CO, $CI);
++ my $pid = open2($CO, $CI, @args);
++
++ my $out = "";
++ my $len = length($in);
++ my $first = 1;
++ while (1) {
++ my $rin = "";
++ my $win = "";
++ # Output of prog is FD that we read
++ vec($rin,fileno($CO),1) = 1;
++ # Input of prog is FD that we write
++ # check for $first is needed because we can have NULL input
++ # that is to be written to the app
++ if ( $len > 0 || $first) {
++ (vec($win,fileno($CI),1) = 1);
++ $first=0;
++ }
++ # Let us wait for 100ms
++ my $nfound = select(my $rout=$rin, my $wout=$win, undef, 0.1);
++ if ( $wout ) {
++ my $written = syswrite($CI, $in, $len);
++ die "broken pipe" if !defined $written;
++ $len -= $written;
++ substr($in, 0, $written) = "";
++ if ($len <= 0) {
++ close $CI or die "broken pipe: $!";
++ }
++ }
++ if ( $rout ) {
++ my $tmp_out = "";
++ my $bytes_read = sysread($CO, $tmp_out, 4096);
++ $out .= $tmp_out;
++ last if ($bytes_read == 0);
++ }
++ }
++ close $CO or die "broken pipe: $!";
++ waitpid $pid, 0;
++
++ return $out;
++}
++
++# Parser of CAVS test vector file
++# $1: Test vector file
++# $2: Output file for test results
++# return: nothing
++sub parse($$) {
++ my $infile = shift;
++ my $outfile = shift;
++
++ my $out = "";
++
++ my $K = "";
++ my $H = "";
++ my $session_id = "";
++ my $ivlen = 0;
++ my $eklen = "";
++ my $iklen = "";
++
++ open(IN, "<$infile");
++ while(<IN>) {
++
++ my $line = $_;
++ chomp($line);
++ $line =~ s/\r//;
++
++ if ($line =~ /\[SHA-1\]/) {
++ $iklen = 20;
++ } elsif ($line =~ /\[SHA-256\]/) {
++ $iklen = 32;
++ } elsif ($line =~ /\[SHA-384\]/) {
++ $iklen = 48;
++ } elsif ($line =~ /\[SHA-512\]/) {
++ $iklen = 64;
++ } elsif ($line =~ /^\[IV length\s*=\s*(.*)\]/) {
++ $ivlen = $1;
++ $ivlen = $ivlen / 8;
++ } elsif ($line =~ /^\[encryption key length\s*=\s*(.*)\]/) {
++ $eklen = $1;
++ $eklen = $eklen / 8;
++ } elsif ($line =~ /^K\s*=\s*(.*)/) {
++ $K = $1;
++ $K = substr($K, 8);
++ $K = "00" . $K;
++ } elsif ($line =~ /^H\s*=\s*(.*)/) {
++ $H = $1;
++ } elsif ($line =~ /^session_id\s*=\s*(.*)/) {
++ $session_id = $1;
++ }
++ $out .= $line . "\n";
++
++ if ($K ne "" && $H ne "" && $session_id ne "" &&
++ $ivlen ne "" && $eklen ne "" && $iklen > 0) {
++ $out .= pipe_through_program("", "./ssh-cavs -H $H -K $K -s $session_id -i $ivlen -e $eklen -m $iklen");
++
++ $K = "";
++ $H = "";
++ $session_id = "";
++ }
++ }
++ close IN;
++ $out =~ s/\n/\r\n/g; # make it a dos file
++ open(OUT, ">$outfile") or die "Cannot create output file $outfile: $?";
++ print OUT $out;
++ close OUT;
++}
++
++############################################################
++#
++# let us pretend to be C :-)
++sub main() {
++
++ my $infile=$ARGV[0];
++ die "Error: Test vector file $infile not found" if (! -f $infile);
++
++ my $outfile = $infile;
++ # let us add .rsp regardless whether we could strip .req
++ $outfile =~ s/\.req$//;
++ $outfile .= ".rsp";
++ if (-f $outfile) {
++ die "Output file $outfile could not be removed: $?"
++ unless unlink($outfile);
++ }
++ print STDERR "Performing tests from source file $infile with results stored in destination file $outfile\n";
++
++ # Do the job
++ parse($infile, $outfile);
++}
++
++###########################################
++# Call it
++main();
++1;
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-kuserok.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-kuserok.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ff0d6d4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-kuserok.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,288 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/auth-krb5.c.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/auth-krb5.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/auth-krb5.c.kuserok 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/auth-krb5.c 2017-02-09 09:20:00.958084311 +0100
+@@ -54,6 +54,21 @@
+
+ extern ServerOptions options;
+
++int
++ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb5_context krb5_ctx, krb5_principal krb5_user, const char *client,
++ int k5login_exists)
++{
++ if (options.use_kuserok || !k5login_exists)
++ return krb5_kuserok(krb5_ctx, krb5_user, client);
++ else {
++ char kuser[65];
++
++ if (krb5_aname_to_localname(krb5_ctx, krb5_user, sizeof(kuser), kuser))
++ return 0;
++ return strcmp(kuser, client) == 0;
++ }
++}
++
+ static int
+ krb5_init(void *context)
+ {
+@@ -157,8 +172,9 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, c
+ if (problem)
+ goto out;
+
+- if (!krb5_kuserok(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user,
+- authctxt->pw->pw_name)) {
++ /* Use !options.use_kuserok here to make ssh_krb5_kuserok() not
++ * depend on the existance of .k5login */
++ if (!ssh_krb5_kuserok(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user, authctxt->pw->pw_name, !options.use_kuserok)) {
+ problem = -1;
+ goto out;
+ }
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.kuserok 2017-02-09 09:20:00.955084317 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c 2017-02-09 09:20:00.958084311 +0100
+@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ static int ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_pr
+ int);
+
+ static krb5_context krb_context = NULL;
++extern int ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb5_context, krb5_principal, const char *, int);
+
+ /* Initialise the krb5 library, for the stuff that GSSAPI won't do */
+
+@@ -92,6 +93,103 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_init(void)
+ * Returns true if the user is OK to log in, otherwise returns 0
+ */
+
++/* The purpose of the function is to find out if a Kerberos principal is
++ * allowed to log in as the given local user. This is a general problem with
++ * Kerberized services because by design the Kerberos principals are
++ * completely independent from the local user names. This is one of the
++ * reasons why Kerberos is working well on different operating systems like
++ * Windows and UNIX/Linux. Nevertheless a relationship between a Kerberos
++ * principal and a local user name must be established because otherwise every
++ * access would be granted for every principal with a valid ticket.
++ *
++ * Since it is a general issue libkrb5 provides some functions for
++ * applications to find out about the relationship between the Kerberos
++ * principal and a local user name. They are krb5_kuserok() and
++ * krb5_aname_to_localname().
++ *
++ * krb5_kuserok() can be used to "Determine if a principal is authorized to
++ * log in as a local user" (from the MIT Kerberos documentation of this
++ * function). Which is exactly what we are looking for and should be the
++ * preferred choice. It accepts the Kerberos principal and a local user name
++ * and let libkrb5 or its plugins determine if they relate to each other or
++ * not.
++ *
++ * krb5_aname_to_localname() can use used to "Convert a principal name to a
++ * local name" (from the MIT Kerberos documentation of this function). It
++ * accepts a Kerberos principle and returns a local name and it is up to the
++ * application to do any additional checks. There are two issues using
++ * krb5_aname_to_localname(). First, since POSIX user names are case
++ * sensitive, the calling application in general has no other choice than
++ * doing a case-sensitive string comparison between the name returned by
++ * krb5_aname_to_localname() and the name used at the login prompt. When the
++ * users are provided by a case in-sensitive server, e.g. Active Directory,
++ * this might lead to login failures because the user typing the name at the
++ * login prompt might not be aware of the right case. Another issue might be
++ * caused if there are multiple alias names available for a single user. E.g.
++ * the canonical name of a user is user@group.department.example.com but there
++ * exists a shorter login name, e.g. user@example.com, to safe typing at the
++ * login prompt. Here krb5_aname_to_localname() can only return the canonical
++ * name, but if the short alias is used at the login prompt authentication
++ * will fail as well. All this can be avoided by using krb5_kuserok() and
++ * configuring krb5.conf or using a suitable plugin to meet the needs of the
++ * given environment.
++ *
++ * The Fedora and RHEL version of openssh contain two patches which modify the
++ * access control behavior:
++ * - openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch
++ * - openssh-6.6p1-force_krb.patch
++ *
++ * openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch adds a new option KerberosUseKuserok for
++ * sshd_config which controls if krb5_kuserok() is used to check if the
++ * principle is authorized or if krb5_aname_to_localname() should be used.
++ * The reason to add this patch was that krb5_kuserok() by default checks if
++ * a .k5login file exits in the users home-directory. With this the user can
++ * give access to his account for any given principal which might be
++ * in violation with company policies and it would be useful if this can be
++ * rejected. Nevertheless the patch ignores the fact that krb5_kuserok() does
++ * no only check .k5login but other sources as well and checking .k5login can
++ * be disabled for all applications in krb5.conf as well. With this new
++ * option KerberosUseKuserok set to 'no' (and this is the default for RHEL7
++ * and Fedora 21) openssh can only use krb5_aname_to_localname() with the
++ * restrictions mentioned above.
++ *
++ * openssh-6.6p1-force_krb.patch adds a ksu like behaviour to ssh, i.e. when
++ * using GSSAPI authentication only commands configured in the .k5user can be
++ * executed. Here the wrong assumption that krb5_kuserok() only checks
++ * .k5login is made as well. In contrast ksu checks .k5login directly and
++ * does not use krb5_kuserok() which might be more useful for the given
++ * purpose. Additionally this patch is not synced with
++ * openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch.
++ *
++ * The current patch tries to restore the usage of krb5_kuserok() so that e.g.
++ * localauth plugins can be used. It does so by adding a forth parameter to
++ * ssh_krb5_kuserok() which indicates whether .k5login exists or not. If it
++ * does not exists krb5_kuserok() is called even if KerberosUseKuserok is set
++ * to 'no' because the intent of the option is to not check .k5login and if it
++ * does not exists krb5_kuserok() returns a result without checking .k5login.
++ * If .k5login does exists and KerberosUseKuserok is 'no' we fall back to
++ * krb5_aname_to_localname(). This is in my point of view an acceptable
++ * limitation and does not break the current behaviour.
++ *
++ * Additionally with this patch ssh_krb5_kuserok() is called in
++ * ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok() instead of only krb5_aname_to_localname() is
++ * neither .k5login nor .k5users exists to allow plugin evaluation via
++ * krb5_kuserok() as well.
++ *
++ * I tried to keep the patch as minimal as possible, nevertheless I see some
++ * areas for improvement which, if they make sense, have to be evaluated
++ * carefully because they might change existing behaviour and cause breaks
++ * during upgrade:
++ * - I wonder if disabling .k5login usage make sense in sshd or if it should
++ * be better disabled globally in krb5.conf
++ * - if really needed openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch should be fixed to really
++ * only disable checking .k5login and maybe .k5users
++ * - the ksu behaviour should be configurable and maybe check the .k5login and
++ * .k5users files directly like ksu itself does
++ * - to make krb5_aname_to_localname() more useful an option for sshd to use
++ * the canonical name (the one returned by getpwnam()) instead of the name
++ * given at the login prompt might be useful */
++
+ static int
+ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name)
+ {
+@@ -116,7 +214,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client
+ /* NOTE: .k5login and .k5users must opened as root, not the user,
+ * because if they are on a krb5-protected filesystem, user credentials
+ * to access these files aren't available yet. */
+- if (krb5_kuserok(krb_context, princ, name) && k5login_exists) {
++ if (ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb_context, princ, name, k5login_exists)
++ && k5login_exists) {
+ retval = 1;
+ logit("Authorized to %s, krb5 principal %s (krb5_kuserok)",
+ name, (char *)client->displayname.value);
+@@ -171,9 +270,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal pri
+ snprintf(file, sizeof(file), "%s/.k5users", pw->pw_dir);
+ /* If both .k5login and .k5users DNE, self-login is ok. */
+ if (!k5login_exists && (access(file, F_OK) == -1)) {
+- return (krb5_aname_to_localname(krb_context, principal,
+- sizeof(kuser), kuser) == 0) &&
+- (strcmp(kuser, luser) == 0);
++ return ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb_context, principal, luser,
++ k5login_exists);
+ }
+ if ((fp = fopen(file, "r")) == NULL) {
+ int saved_errno = errno;
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.kuserok 2017-02-09 09:20:00.951084326 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c 2017-02-09 09:21:29.802896034 +0100
+@@ -165,6 +165,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
+ options->ip_qos_interactive = -1;
+ options->ip_qos_bulk = -1;
+ options->version_addendum = NULL;
++ options->use_kuserok = -1;
+ options->fingerprint_hash = -1;
+ options->disable_forwarding = -1;
+ }
+@@ -334,6 +335,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
+ options->version_addendum = xstrdup("");
+ if (options->show_patchlevel == -1)
+ options->show_patchlevel = 0;
++ if (options->use_kuserok == -1)
++ options->use_kuserok = 1;
+ if (options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask == (mode_t)-1)
+ options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask = 0177;
+ if (options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink == -1)
+@@ -399,7 +402,7 @@ typedef enum {
+ sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel,
+ sRhostsRSAAuthentication, sRSAAuthentication,
+ sKerberosAuthentication, sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, sKerberosTicketCleanup,
+- sKerberosGetAFSToken,
++ sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUseKuserok,
+ sKerberosTgtPassing, sChallengeResponseAuthentication,
+ sPasswordAuthentication, sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
+ sListenAddress, sAddressFamily,
+@@ -478,11 +481,13 @@ static struct {
+ #else
+ { "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ #endif
++ { "kerberosusekuserok", sKerberosUseKuserok, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ #else
+ { "kerberosauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "kerberosorlocalpasswd", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "kerberosticketcleanup", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++ { "kerberosusekuserok", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ #endif
+ { "kerberostgtpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "afstokenpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+@@ -1644,6 +1649,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
+ *activep = value;
+ break;
+
++ case sKerberosUseKuserok:
++ intptr = &options->use_kuserok;
++ goto parse_flag;
++
+ case sPermitOpen:
+ arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+@@ -2016,6 +2025,7 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *d
+ M_CP_INTOPT(client_alive_interval);
+ M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_interactive);
+ M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_bulk);
++ M_CP_INTOPT(use_kuserok);
+ M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_limit);
+ M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_interval);
+
+@@ -2308,6 +2318,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sAllowStreamLocalForwarding, o->allow_streamlocal_forwarding);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sStreamLocalBindUnlink, o->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sUsePrivilegeSeparation, use_privsep);
++ dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosUseKuserok, o->use_kuserok);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sFingerprintHash, o->fingerprint_hash);
+
+ /* string arguments */
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h.kuserok 2017-02-09 09:20:00.951084326 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.h 2017-02-09 09:20:00.959084309 +0100
+@@ -174,6 +174,7 @@ typedef struct {
+
+ int num_permitted_opens;
+
++ int use_kuserok;
+ char *chroot_directory;
+ char *revoked_keys_file;
+ char *trusted_user_ca_keys;
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.kuserok 2017-02-09 09:20:00.959084309 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5 2017-02-09 09:22:33.517761012 +0100
+@@ -846,6 +846,10 @@ Specifies whether to automatically destr
+ file on logout.
+ The default is
+ .Cm yes .
++.It Cm KerberosUseKuserok
++Specifies whether to look at .k5login file for user's aliases.
++The default is
++.Cm yes .
+ .It Cm KexAlgorithms
+ Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms.
+ Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
+@@ -1074,6 +1078,7 @@ Available keywords are
+ .Cm IPQoS ,
+ .Cm KbdInteractiveAuthentication ,
+ .Cm KerberosAuthentication ,
++.Cm KerberosUseKuserok ,
+ .Cm MaxAuthTries ,
+ .Cm MaxSessions ,
+ .Cm PasswordAuthentication ,
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.kuserok 2017-02-09 09:20:00.953084322 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config 2017-02-09 09:20:00.959084309 +0100
+@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ ChallengeResponseAuthentication no
+ #KerberosOrLocalPasswd yes
+ #KerberosTicketCleanup yes
+ #KerberosGetAFSToken no
++#KerberosUseKuserok yes
+
+ # GSSAPI options
+ GSSAPIAuthentication yes
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-legacy-algorithms.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-legacy-algorithms.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1d8178c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-legacy-algorithms.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,263 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/dh.h.legacy openssh-7.4p1/dh.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/dh.h.legacy 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/dh.h 2017-03-02 17:00:37.640695985 +0100
+@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ u_int dh_estimate(int);
+ * Max value from RFC4419.
+ * Miniumum increased in light of DH precomputation attacks.
+ */
+-#define DH_GRP_MIN 2048
++#define DH_GRP_MIN 1024
+ #define DH_GRP_MAX 8192
+
+ /*
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/moduli.legacy openssh-7.4p1/moduli
+--- openssh-7.4p1/moduli.legacy 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/moduli 2017-03-02 17:00:37.642695983 +0100
+@@ -1,5 +1,83 @@
+ # $OpenBSD: moduli,v 1.18 2016/08/11 01:42:11 dtucker Exp $
+ # Time Type Tests Tries Size Generator Modulus
++20150520233853 2 6 100 1023 5 DB662973FB21C0B7BF21AB46AFD3E2002AE70C92DE6B9AEAFECF7B0A96D7ACB024B7C29DB18E70CB945FA54C7773519BC7161648AFE4939058AC40ECDBBD3636F5BF45863117E955007C9D0F9333BB4EF62F7C9F6298AB79A309C734F3CF201C61EBC3926ADD4E80968A65D9F60535164ACE7A7BFEDC1022002BB2BBA2AC62AF
++20150520233854 2 6 100 1023 5 DB662973FB21C0B7BF21AB46AFD3E2002AE70C92DE6B9AEAFECF7B0A96D7ACB024B7C29DB18E70CB945FA54C7773519BC7161648AFE4939058AC40ECDBBD3636F5BF45863117E955007C9D0F9333BB4EF62F7C9F6298AB79A309C734F3CF201C61EBC3926ADD4E80968A65D9F60535164ACE7A7BFEDC1022002BB2BBA2BCC50F
++20150520233854 2 6 100 1023 2 DB662973FB21C0B7BF21AB46AFD3E2002AE70C92DE6B9AEAFECF7B0A96D7ACB024B7C29DB18E70CB945FA54C7773519BC7161648AFE4939058AC40ECDBBD3636F5BF45863117E955007C9D0F9333BB4EF62F7C9F6298AB79A309C734F3CF201C61EBC3926ADD4E80968A65D9F60535164ACE7A7BFEDC1022002BB2BBA2C241F3
++20150520233855 2 6 100 1023 5 DB662973FB21C0B7BF21AB46AFD3E2002AE70C92DE6B9AEAFECF7B0A96D7ACB024B7C29DB18E70CB945FA54C7773519BC7161648AFE4939058AC40ECDBBD3636F5BF45863117E955007C9D0F9333BB4EF62F7C9F6298AB79A309C734F3CF201C61EBC3926ADD4E80968A65D9F60535164ACE7A7BFEDC1022002BB2BBA2DDF347
++20150520233856 2 6 100 1023 2 DB662973FB21C0B7BF21AB46AFD3E2002AE70C92DE6B9AEAFECF7B0A96D7ACB024B7C29DB18E70CB945FA54C7773519BC7161648AFE4939058AC40ECDBBD3636F5BF45863117E955007C9D0F9333BB4EF62F7C9F6298AB79A309C734F3CF201C61EBC3926ADD4E80968A65D9F60535164ACE7A7BFEDC1022002BB2BBA2E3FDBB
++20150520233857 2 6 100 1023 2 DB662973FB21C0B7BF21AB46AFD3E2002AE70C92DE6B9AEAFECF7B0A96D7ACB024B7C29DB18E70CB945FA54C7773519BC7161648AFE4939058AC40ECDBBD3636F5BF45863117E955007C9D0F9333BB4EF62F7C9F6298AB79A309C734F3CF201C61EBC3926ADD4E80968A65D9F60535164ACE7A7BFEDC1022002BB2BBA3006603
++20150520233858 2 6 100 1023 5 DB662973FB21C0B7BF21AB46AFD3E2002AE70C92DE6B9AEAFECF7B0A96D7ACB024B7C29DB18E70CB945FA54C7773519BC7161648AFE4939058AC40ECDBBD3636F5BF45863117E955007C9D0F9333BB4EF62F7C9F6298AB79A309C734F3CF201C61EBC3926ADD4E80968A65D9F60535164ACE7A7BFEDC1022002BB2BBA31D9C37
++20150520233859 2 6 100 1023 2 DB662973FB21C0B7BF21AB46AFD3E2002AE70C92DE6B9AEAFECF7B0A96D7ACB024B7C29DB18E70CB945FA54C7773519BC7161648AFE4939058AC40ECDBBD3636F5BF45863117E955007C9D0F9333BB4EF62F7C9F6298AB79A309C734F3CF201C61EBC3926ADD4E80968A65D9F60535164ACE7A7BFEDC1022002BB2BBA333355B
++20150520233900 2 6 100 1023 2 DB662973FB21C0B7BF21AB46AFD3E2002AE70C92DE6B9AEAFECF7B0A96D7ACB024B7C29DB18E70CB945FA54C7773519BC7161648AFE4939058AC40ECDBBD3636F5BF45863117E955007C9D0F9333BB4EF62F7C9F6298AB79A309C734F3CF201C61EBC3926ADD4E80968A65D9F60535164ACE7A7BFEDC1022002BB2BBA3428B23
++20150520233902 2 6 100 1023 2 DB662973FB21C0B7BF21AB46AFD3E2002AE70C92DE6B9AEAFECF7B0A96D7ACB024B7C29DB18E70CB945FA54C7773519BC7161648AFE4939058AC40ECDBBD3636F5BF45863117E955007C9D0F9333BB4EF62F7C9F6298AB79A309C734F3CF201C61EBC3926ADD4E80968A65D9F60535164ACE7A7BFEDC1022002BB2BBA37C9A43
++20150520233903 2 6 100 1023 5 DB662973FB21C0B7BF21AB46AFD3E2002AE70C92DE6B9AEAFECF7B0A96D7ACB024B7C29DB18E70CB945FA54C7773519BC7161648AFE4939058AC40ECDBBD3636F5BF45863117E955007C9D0F9333BB4EF62F7C9F6298AB79A309C734F3CF201C61EBC3926ADD4E80968A65D9F60535164ACE7A7BFEDC1022002BB2BBA384B367
++20150520233903 2 6 100 1023 2 DB662973FB21C0B7BF21AB46AFD3E2002AE70C92DE6B9AEAFECF7B0A96D7ACB024B7C29DB18E70CB945FA54C7773519BC7161648AFE4939058AC40ECDBBD3636F5BF45863117E955007C9D0F9333BB4EF62F7C9F6298AB79A309C734F3CF201C61EBC3926ADD4E80968A65D9F60535164ACE7A7BFEDC1022002BB2BBA3903453
++20150520233904 2 6 100 1023 5 DB662973FB21C0B7BF21AB46AFD3E2002AE70C92DE6B9AEAFECF7B0A96D7ACB024B7C29DB18E70CB945FA54C7773519BC7161648AFE4939058AC40ECDBBD3636F5BF45863117E955007C9D0F9333BB4EF62F7C9F6298AB79A309C734F3CF201C61EBC3926ADD4E80968A65D9F60535164ACE7A7BFEDC1022002BB2BBA3946C77
++20150520233904 2 6 100 1023 2 DB662973FB21C0B7BF21AB46AFD3E2002AE70C92DE6B9AEAFECF7B0A96D7ACB024B7C29DB18E70CB945FA54C7773519BC7161648AFE4939058AC40ECDBBD3636F5BF45863117E955007C9D0F9333BB4EF62F7C9F6298AB79A309C734F3CF201C61EBC3926ADD4E80968A65D9F60535164ACE7A7BFEDC1022002BB2BBA39F6A9B
++20150520233904 2 6 100 1023 2 DB662973FB21C0B7BF21AB46AFD3E2002AE70C92DE6B9AEAFECF7B0A96D7ACB024B7C29DB18E70CB945FA54C7773519BC7161648AFE4939058AC40ECDBBD3636F5BF45863117E955007C9D0F9333BB4EF62F7C9F6298AB79A309C734F3CF201C61EBC3926ADD4E80968A65D9F60535164ACE7A7BFEDC1022002BB2BBA3A0E88B
++20150520233905 2 6 100 1023 2 DB662973FB21C0B7BF21AB46AFD3E2002AE70C92DE6B9AEAFECF7B0A96D7ACB024B7C29DB18E70CB945FA54C7773519BC7161648AFE4939058AC40ECDBBD3636F5BF45863117E955007C9D0F9333BB4EF62F7C9F6298AB79A309C734F3CF201C61EBC3926ADD4E80968A65D9F60535164ACE7A7BFEDC1022002BB2BBA3A37763
++20150520233906 2 6 100 1023 5 DB662973FB21C0B7BF21AB46AFD3E2002AE70C92DE6B9AEAFECF7B0A96D7ACB024B7C29DB18E70CB945FA54C7773519BC7161648AFE4939058AC40ECDBBD3636F5BF45863117E955007C9D0F9333BB4EF62F7C9F6298AB79A309C734F3CF201C61EBC3926ADD4E80968A65D9F60535164ACE7A7BFEDC1022002BB2BBA3BBDD57
++20150520233906 2 6 100 1023 5 DB662973FB21C0B7BF21AB46AFD3E2002AE70C92DE6B9AEAFECF7B0A96D7ACB024B7C29DB18E70CB945FA54C7773519BC7161648AFE4939058AC40ECDBBD3636F5BF45863117E955007C9D0F9333BB4EF62F7C9F6298AB79A309C734F3CF201C61EBC3926ADD4E80968A65D9F60535164ACE7A7BFEDC1022002BB2BBA3BDCDD7
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+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/myproposal.h.legacy openssh-7.4p1/myproposal.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/myproposal.h.legacy 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/myproposal.h 2017-03-02 17:05:12.353352522 +0100
+@@ -96,34 +96,40 @@
+ KEX_SHA2_METHODS
+
+ #define KEX_SERVER_KEX KEX_COMMON_KEX \
++ "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1," \
+ KEX_SHA2_GROUP14 \
+- "diffie-hellman-group14-sha1" \
++ "diffie-hellman-group14-sha1," \
++ "diffie-hellman-group1-sha1"
+
+ #define KEX_CLIENT_KEX KEX_COMMON_KEX \
+ "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1," \
+ KEX_SHA2_GROUP14 \
+- "diffie-hellman-group14-sha1"
++ "diffie-hellman-group14-sha1," \
++ "diffie-hellman-group1-sha1"
+
+ #define KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG \
+ HOSTKEY_ECDSA_CERT_METHODS \
+ "ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
+ "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
++ "ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
+ HOSTKEY_ECDSA_METHODS \
+ "ssh-ed25519," \
+ "rsa-sha2-512," \
+ "rsa-sha2-256," \
+- "ssh-rsa"
++ "ssh-rsa," \
++ "ssh-dss"
+
+ /* the actual algorithms */
+
+-#define KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT \
++#define KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT \
+ "chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com," \
+ "aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr" \
+- AESGCM_CIPHER_MODES
+-
+-#define KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT "," \
++ AESGCM_CIPHER_MODES "," \
+ "aes128-cbc,aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc"
+
++#define KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT "," \
++ "blowfish-cbc,cast128-cbc,3des-cbc"
++
+ #define KEX_SERVER_MAC \
+ "umac-64-etm@openssh.com," \
+ "umac-128-etm@openssh.com," \
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/ssh_config.5.legacy openssh-7.4p1/ssh_config.5
+--- openssh-7.4p1/ssh_config.5.legacy 2017-03-02 17:00:37.620696010 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/ssh_config.5 2017-03-02 17:00:37.642695983 +0100
+@@ -833,8 +833,9 @@ ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com
+ ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
++ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+-ssh-ed25519,ssh-rsa
++ssh-ed25519,ssh-rsa,ssh-dss
+ .Ed
+ .Pp
+ The
+@@ -856,8 +857,9 @@ ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com
+ ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
++ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+-ssh-ed25519,ssh-rsa
++ssh-ed25519,ssh-rsa,ssh-dss
+ .Ed
+ .Pp
+ If hostkeys are known for the destination host then this default is modified
+@@ -1075,7 +1077,8 @@ curve25519-sha256,curve25519-sha256@libs
+ ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,
+ diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,
+ diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1,
+-diffie-hellman-group14-sha1
++diffie-hellman-group14-sha1,
++diffie-hellman-group1-sha1
+ .Ed
+ .Pp
+ The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using
+@@ -1313,8 +1316,9 @@ ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com
+ ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
++ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+-ssh-ed25519,ssh-rsa
++ssh-ed25519,ssh-rsa,ssh-dsa
+ .Ed
+ .Pp
+ The list of available key types may also be obtained using
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.legacy openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.legacy 2017-03-02 17:00:37.636695990 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5 2017-03-02 17:04:17.528421067 +0100
+@@ -481,7 +481,9 @@ The default is:
+ .Bd -literal -offset indent
+ chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com,
+ aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr,
+-aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com
++aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com,
++aes128-cbc,aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc,
++blowfish-cbc,cast128-cbc,3des-cbc
+ .Ed
+ .Pp
+ The list of available ciphers may also be obtained using
+@@ -707,8 +709,9 @@ ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com
+ ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
++ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+-ssh-ed25519,ssh-rsa
++ssh-ed25519,ssh-rsa,ssh-dss
+ .Ed
+ .Pp
+ The list of available key types may also be obtained using
+@@ -785,8 +788,9 @@ ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com
+ ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
++ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+-ssh-ed25519,ssh-rsa
++ssh-ed25519,ssh-rsa,ssh-dss
+ .Ed
+ .Pp
+ The list of available key types may also be obtained using
+@@ -926,7 +930,8 @@ The default is:
+ curve25519-sha256,curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,
+ ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,
+ diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,
+-diffie-hellman-group14-sha1
++diffie-hellman-group14-sha1,
++diffie-hellman-group1-sha1
+ .Ed
+ .Pp
+ The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using
+@@ -1040,7 +1045,8 @@ umac-64-etm@openssh.com,umac-128-etm@ope
+ hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com,
+ hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com,
+ umac-64@openssh.com,umac-128@openssh.com,
+-hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha1
++hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha1,
++hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com
+ .Ed
+ .Pp
+ The list of available MAC algorithms may also be obtained using
+@@ -1344,8 +1350,9 @@ ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com
+ ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
++ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+-ssh-ed25519,ssh-rsa
++ssh-ed25519,ssh-rsa,ssh-dss
+ .Ed
+ .Pp
+ The list of available key types may also be obtained using
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-legacy-ssh-copy-id.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-legacy-ssh-copy-id.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c6770ff
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-legacy-ssh-copy-id.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/contrib/ssh-copy-id.1.legacy-ssh-copy-id openssh-7.4p1/contrib/ssh-copy-id.1
+--- openssh-7.4p1/contrib/ssh-copy-id.1.legacy-ssh-copy-id 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/contrib/ssh-copy-id.1 2017-02-09 09:23:25.366651136 +0100
+@@ -185,6 +185,19 @@ should prove enlightening (N.B. the mode
+ .Fl W
+ option, rather than
+ .Xr nc 1 ) .
++.Sh ENVIRONMENT
++.Bl -tag -width Ds
++.Pp
++.It Pa SSH_COPY_ID_LEGACY
++If the
++.Cm SSH_COPY_ID_LEGACY
++environment variable is set, the
++.Nm
++is run in a legacy mode. In this mode, the
++.Nm
++doesn't check an existence of a private key and doesn't do remote checks
++of the remote server versions or if public keys are already installed.
++.El
+ .Sh "SEE ALSO"
+ .Xr ssh 1 ,
+ .Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/contrib/ssh-copy-id.legacy-ssh-copy-id openssh-7.4p1/contrib/ssh-copy-id
+--- openssh-7.4p1/contrib/ssh-copy-id.legacy-ssh-copy-id 2017-02-09 09:23:25.366651136 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/contrib/ssh-copy-id 2017-02-09 09:33:07.896518169 +0100
+@@ -99,6 +99,9 @@ if [ -n "$SSH_AUTH_SOCK" ] && ssh-add -L
+ GET_ID="ssh-add -L"
+ fi
+
++# legacy environment variable implies forced copy
++[ "x$SSH_COPY_ID_LEGACY" != "x" ] && FORCED=1
++
+ while test "$#" -gt 0
+ do
+ [ "${SEEN_OPT_I}" ] && expr "$1" : "[-]i" >/dev/null && {
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-log-in-chroot.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-log-in-chroot.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..eedd198
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-log-in-chroot.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,285 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/log.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/log.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/log.c.log-in-chroot 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/log.c 2017-02-09 09:51:07.571909000 +0100
+@@ -250,6 +250,11 @@ debug3(const char *fmt,...)
+ void
+ log_init(char *av0, LogLevel level, SyslogFacility facility, int on_stderr)
+ {
++ log_init_handler(av0, level, facility, on_stderr, 1);
++}
++
++void
++log_init_handler(char *av0, LogLevel level, SyslogFacility facility, int on_stderr, int reset_handler) {
+ #if defined(HAVE_OPENLOG_R) && defined(SYSLOG_DATA_INIT)
+ struct syslog_data sdata = SYSLOG_DATA_INIT;
+ #endif
+@@ -273,8 +278,10 @@ log_init(char *av0, LogLevel level, Sysl
+ exit(1);
+ }
+
+- log_handler = NULL;
+- log_handler_ctx = NULL;
++ if (reset_handler) {
++ log_handler = NULL;
++ log_handler_ctx = NULL;
++ }
+
+ log_on_stderr = on_stderr;
+ if (on_stderr)
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/log.h.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/log.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/log.h.log-in-chroot 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/log.h 2017-02-09 09:51:07.571909000 +0100
+@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ typedef enum {
+ typedef void (log_handler_fn)(LogLevel, const char *, void *);
+
+ void log_init(char *, LogLevel, SyslogFacility, int);
++void log_init_handler(char *, LogLevel, SyslogFacility, int, int);
+ void log_change_level(LogLevel);
+ int log_is_on_stderr(void);
+ void log_redirect_stderr_to(const char *);
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.log-in-chroot 2017-02-09 09:51:07.554909017 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c 2017-02-09 10:05:21.067174230 +0100
+@@ -307,6 +307,8 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctx
+ close(pmonitor->m_log_sendfd);
+ pmonitor->m_log_sendfd = pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1;
+
++ pmonitor->m_state = "preauth";
++
+ authctxt = _authctxt;
+ memset(authctxt, 0, sizeof(*authctxt));
+
+@@ -405,6 +407,8 @@ monitor_child_postauth(struct monitor *p
+ close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
+ pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1;
+
++ pmonitor->m_state = "postauth";
++
+ monitor_set_child_handler(pmonitor->m_pid);
+ signal(SIGHUP, &monitor_child_handler);
+ signal(SIGTERM, &monitor_child_handler);
+@@ -472,7 +476,7 @@ monitor_read_log(struct monitor *pmonito
+ if (log_level_name(level) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: invalid log level %u (corrupted message?)",
+ __func__, level);
+- do_log2(level, "%s [preauth]", msg);
++ do_log2(level, "%s [%s]", msg, pmonitor->m_state);
+
+ buffer_free(&logmsg);
+ free(msg);
+@@ -1719,13 +1723,28 @@ monitor_init(void)
+ mon = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*mon));
+ monitor_openfds(mon, 1);
+
++ mon->m_state = "";
++
+ return mon;
+ }
+
+ void
+-monitor_reinit(struct monitor *mon)
++monitor_reinit(struct monitor *mon, const char *chroot_dir)
+ {
+- monitor_openfds(mon, 0);
++ struct stat dev_log_stat;
++ char *dev_log_path;
++ int do_logfds = 0;
++
++ if (chroot_dir != NULL) {
++ xasprintf(&dev_log_path, "%s/dev/log", chroot_dir);
++
++ if (stat(dev_log_path, &dev_log_stat) != 0) {
++ debug("%s: /dev/log doesn't exist in %s chroot - will try to log via monitor using [postauth] suffix", __func__, chroot_dir);
++ do_logfds = 1;
++ }
++ free(dev_log_path);
++ }
++ monitor_openfds(mon, do_logfds);
+ }
+
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor.h.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/monitor.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/monitor.h.log-in-chroot 2017-02-09 09:51:07.571909000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor.h 2017-02-09 10:05:49.792146561 +0100
+@@ -83,10 +83,11 @@ struct monitor {
+ int m_log_sendfd;
+ struct kex **m_pkex;
+ pid_t m_pid;
++ char *m_state;
+ };
+
+ struct monitor *monitor_init(void);
+-void monitor_reinit(struct monitor *);
++void monitor_reinit(struct monitor *, const char *);
+
+ struct Authctxt;
+ void monitor_child_preauth(struct Authctxt *, struct monitor *);
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/session.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/session.c.log-in-chroot 2017-02-09 09:51:07.570909002 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/session.c 2017-02-09 10:08:16.241005497 +0100
+@@ -160,6 +160,7 @@ login_cap_t *lc;
+
+ static int is_child = 0;
+ static int in_chroot = 0;
++static int have_dev_log = 1;
+
+ /* Name and directory of socket for authentication agent forwarding. */
+ static char *auth_sock_name = NULL;
+@@ -365,8 +366,8 @@ do_exec_no_pty(Session *s, const char *c
+ is_child = 1;
+
+ /* Child. Reinitialize the log since the pid has changed. */
+- log_init(__progname, options.log_level,
+- options.log_facility, log_stderr);
++ log_init_handler(__progname, options.log_level,
++ options.log_facility, log_stderr, have_dev_log);
+
+ /*
+ * Create a new session and process group since the 4.4BSD
+@@ -523,8 +524,8 @@ do_exec_pty(Session *s, const char *comm
+ close(ptymaster);
+
+ /* Child. Reinitialize the log because the pid has changed. */
+- log_init(__progname, options.log_level,
+- options.log_facility, log_stderr);
++ log_init_handler(__progname, options.log_level,
++ options.log_facility, log_stderr, have_dev_log);
+ /* Close the master side of the pseudo tty. */
+ close(ptyfd);
+
+@@ -619,6 +620,7 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
+ int ret;
+ const char *forced = NULL, *tty = NULL;
+ char session_type[1024];
++ struct stat dev_log_stat;
+
+ if (options.adm_forced_command) {
+ original_command = command;
+@@ -676,6 +678,10 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
+ tty += 5;
+ }
+
++ if (lstat("/dev/log", &dev_log_stat) != 0) {
++ have_dev_log = 0;
++ }
++
+ verbose("Starting session: %s%s%s for %s from %.200s port %d id %d",
+ session_type,
+ tty == NULL ? "" : " on ",
+@@ -1490,14 +1496,6 @@ child_close_fds(void)
+ * descriptors left by system functions. They will be closed later.
+ */
+ endpwent();
+-
+- /*
+- * Close any extra open file descriptors so that we don't have them
+- * hanging around in clients. Note that we want to do this after
+- * initgroups, because at least on Solaris 2.3 it leaves file
+- * descriptors open.
+- */
+- closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
+ }
+
+ /*
+@@ -1633,8 +1631,6 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command
+ exit(1);
+ }
+
+- closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
+-
+ do_rc_files(s, shell);
+
+ /* restore SIGPIPE for child */
+@@ -1658,9 +1654,17 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command
+ argv[i] = NULL;
+ optind = optreset = 1;
+ __progname = argv[0];
+- exit(sftp_server_main(i, argv, s->pw));
++ exit(sftp_server_main(i, argv, s->pw, have_dev_log));
+ }
+
++ /*
++ * Close any extra open file descriptors so that we don't have them
++ * hanging around in clients. Note that we want to do this after
++ * initgroups, because at least on Solaris 2.3 it leaves file
++ * descriptors open.
++ */
++ closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
++
+ fflush(NULL);
+
+ /* Get the last component of the shell name. */
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sftp.h.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/sftp.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sftp.h.log-in-chroot 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sftp.h 2017-02-09 09:51:07.572908999 +0100
+@@ -97,5 +97,5 @@
+
+ struct passwd;
+
+-int sftp_server_main(int, char **, struct passwd *);
++int sftp_server_main(int, char **, struct passwd *, int);
+ void sftp_server_cleanup_exit(int) __attribute__((noreturn));
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server.c.log-in-chroot 2017-02-09 09:51:07.572908999 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server.c 2017-02-09 10:09:39.662925141 +0100
+@@ -1497,7 +1497,7 @@ sftp_server_usage(void)
+ }
+
+ int
+-sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw)
++sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw, int reset_handler)
+ {
+ fd_set *rset, *wset;
+ int i, r, in, out, max, ch, skipargs = 0, log_stderr = 0;
+@@ -1511,7 +1511,7 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv,
+
+ ssh_malloc_init(); /* must be called before any mallocs */
+ __progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
+- log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr);
++ log_init_handler(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr, reset_handler);
+
+ pw = pwcopy(user_pw);
+
+@@ -1582,7 +1582,7 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv,
+ }
+ }
+
+- log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr);
++ log_init_handler(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr, reset_handler);
+
+ /*
+ * On platforms where we can, avoid making /proc/self/{mem,maps}
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server-main.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server-main.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server-main.c.log-in-chroot 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server-main.c 2017-02-09 09:51:07.572908999 +0100
+@@ -49,5 +49,5 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+- return (sftp_server_main(argc, argv, user_pw));
++ return (sftp_server_main(argc, argv, user_pw, 0));
+ }
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.log-in-chroot 2017-02-09 09:51:07.557909015 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c 2017-02-09 09:51:07.573908998 +0100
+@@ -642,7 +642,7 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ }
+
+ /* New socket pair */
+- monitor_reinit(pmonitor);
++ monitor_reinit(pmonitor, options.chroot_directory);
+
+ pmonitor->m_pid = fork();
+ if (pmonitor->m_pid == -1)
+@@ -660,6 +660,11 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
+
+ close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
+ pmonitor->m_sendfd = -1;
++ close(pmonitor->m_log_recvfd);
++ pmonitor->m_log_recvfd = -1;
++
++ if (pmonitor->m_log_sendfd != -1)
++ set_log_handler(mm_log_handler, pmonitor);
+
+ /* Demote the private keys to public keys. */
+ demote_sensitive_data();
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-newline-banner.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-newline-banner.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..32ff492
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-newline-banner.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.newline-banner openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.newline-banner 2017-02-17 14:00:47.237168594 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c 2017-02-17 14:02:10.933096707 +0100
+@@ -369,15 +369,15 @@ sshd_exchange_identification(struct ssh
+ {
+ u_int i;
+ int remote_major, remote_minor;
+- char *s, *newline = "\n";
++ char *s;
+ char buf[256]; /* Must not be larger than remote_version. */
+ char remote_version[256]; /* Must be at least as big as buf. */
+
+- xasprintf(&server_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s%s%s%s",
++ xasprintf(&server_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s%s%s\r\n",
+ PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2,
+ (options.show_patchlevel == 1) ? SSH_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL : SSH_VERSION,
+ *options.version_addendum == '\0' ? "" : " ",
+- options.version_addendum, newline);
++ options.version_addendum);
+
+ /* Send our protocol version identification. */
+ if (atomicio(vwrite, sock_out, server_version_string,
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-permit-root-login.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-permit-root-login.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3689fdd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-permit-root-login.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.permit-root openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.permit-root 2017-02-10 10:27:18.109487568 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c 2017-02-10 10:28:12.385776132 +0100
+@@ -231,7 +231,7 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
+ if (options->login_grace_time == -1)
+ options->login_grace_time = 120;
+ if (options->permit_root_login == PERMIT_NOT_SET)
+- options->permit_root_login = PERMIT_NO_PASSWD;
++ options->permit_root_login = PERMIT_YES;
+ if (options->ignore_rhosts == -1)
+ options->ignore_rhosts = 1;
+ if (options->ignore_user_known_hosts == -1)
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.permit-root openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.permit-root 2017-02-10 10:28:24.174605582 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5 2017-02-10 10:28:42.254344023 +0100
+@@ -1227,7 +1227,7 @@ The argument must be
+ or
+ .Cm no .
+ The default is
+-.Cm prohibit-password .
++.Cm yes .
+ .Pp
+ If this option is set to
+ .Cm prohibit-password
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.permit-root openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.permit-root 2017-02-10 10:26:52.256797645 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config 2017-02-10 10:26:52.276797405 +0100
+@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ SyslogFacility AUTHPRIV
+ # Authentication:
+
+ #LoginGraceTime 2m
+-#PermitRootLogin prohibit-password
++#PermitRootLogin yes
+ #StrictModes yes
+ #MaxAuthTries 6
+ #MaxSessions 10
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-pkcs11-whitelist.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-pkcs11-whitelist.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..36b4232
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-pkcs11-whitelist.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.1.pkcs11-whitelist openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.1
+--- openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.1.pkcs11-whitelist 2017-01-03 10:41:01.916331710 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.1 2017-01-03 10:40:06.549366029 +0100
+@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ that may be added using the
+ option to
+ .Xr ssh-add 1 .
+ The default is to allow loading PKCS#11 libraries from
+-.Dq /usr/lib/*,/usr/local/lib/* .
++.Dq /usr/lib*/*,/usr/local/lib*/* .
+ PKCS#11 libraries that do not match the whitelist will be refused.
+ See PATTERNS in
+ .Xr ssh_config 5
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c.pkcs11-whitelist openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c.pkcs11-whitelist 2017-01-03 10:41:09.324327118 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c 2017-01-03 10:40:21.212356939 +0100
+@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@
+ #endif
+
+ #ifndef DEFAULT_PKCS11_WHITELIST
+-# define DEFAULT_PKCS11_WHITELIST "/usr/lib/*,/usr/local/lib/*"
++# define DEFAULT_PKCS11_WHITELIST "/usr/lib*/*,/usr/local/lib*/*"
+ #endif
+
+ typedef enum {
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-role-mls.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-role-mls.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..75c1710
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-role-mls.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,840 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/auth2.c.role-mls openssh-7.4p1/auth2.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/auth2.c.role-mls 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/auth2.c 2017-02-08 14:08:30.271308186 +0100
+@@ -215,6 +215,9 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32
+ Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
+ Authmethod *m = NULL;
+ char *user, *service, *method, *style = NULL;
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++ char *role = NULL;
++#endif
+ int authenticated = 0;
+
+ if (authctxt == NULL)
+@@ -226,6 +229,11 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32
+ debug("userauth-request for user %s service %s method %s", user, service, method);
+ debug("attempt %d failures %d", authctxt->attempt, authctxt->failures);
+
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++ if ((role = strchr(user, '/')) != NULL)
++ *role++ = 0;
++#endif
++
+ if ((style = strchr(user, ':')) != NULL)
+ *style++ = 0;
+
+@@ -251,8 +259,15 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32
+ use_privsep ? " [net]" : "");
+ authctxt->service = xstrdup(service);
+ authctxt->style = style ? xstrdup(style) : NULL;
+- if (use_privsep)
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++ authctxt->role = role ? xstrdup(role) : NULL;
++#endif
++ if (use_privsep) {
+ mm_inform_authserv(service, style);
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++ mm_inform_authrole(role);
++#endif
++ }
+ userauth_banner();
+ if (auth2_setup_methods_lists(authctxt) != 0)
+ packet_disconnect("no authentication methods enabled");
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/auth2-gss.c.role-mls openssh-7.4p1/auth2-gss.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/auth2-gss.c.role-mls 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/auth2-gss.c 2017-02-08 14:08:30.270308187 +0100
+@@ -255,6 +255,7 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple
+ Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
+ Gssctxt *gssctxt;
+ int authenticated = 0;
++ char *micuser;
+ Buffer b;
+ gss_buffer_desc mic, gssbuf;
+ u_int len;
+@@ -267,7 +268,13 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple
+ mic.value = packet_get_string(&len);
+ mic.length = len;
+
+- ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->user, authctxt->service,
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++ if (authctxt->role && (strlen(authctxt->role) > 0))
++ xasprintf(&micuser, "%s/%s", authctxt->user, authctxt->role);
++ else
++#endif
++ micuser = authctxt->user;
++ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, micuser, authctxt->service,
+ "gssapi-with-mic");
+
+ gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b);
+@@ -279,6 +286,8 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple
+ logit("GSSAPI MIC check failed");
+
+ buffer_free(&b);
++ if (micuser != authctxt->user)
++ free(micuser);
+ free(mic.value);
+
+ authctxt->postponed = 0;
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/auth2-hostbased.c.role-mls openssh-7.4p1/auth2-hostbased.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/auth2-hostbased.c.role-mls 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/auth2-hostbased.c 2017-02-08 14:08:30.270308187 +0100
+@@ -121,7 +121,15 @@ userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ buffer_put_string(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len);
+ /* reconstruct packet */
+ buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
+- buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->user);
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++ if (authctxt->role) {
++ buffer_put_int(&b, strlen(authctxt->user)+strlen(authctxt->role)+1);
++ buffer_append(&b, authctxt->user, strlen(authctxt->user));
++ buffer_put_char(&b, '/');
++ buffer_append(&b, authctxt->role, strlen(authctxt->role));
++ } else
++#endif
++ buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->user);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&b, service);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&b, "hostbased");
+ buffer_put_string(&b, pkalg, alen);
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/auth2-pubkey.c.role-mls openssh-7.4p1/auth2-pubkey.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/auth2-pubkey.c.role-mls 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/auth2-pubkey.c 2017-02-08 14:08:30.270308187 +0100
+@@ -151,9 +151,11 @@ userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ }
+ /* reconstruct packet */
+ buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
+- xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
++ xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
+ authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
+- authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
++ authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "",
++ authctxt->role ? "/" : "",
++ authctxt->role ? authctxt->role : "");
+ buffer_put_cstring(&b, userstyle);
+ free(userstyle);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&b,
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/auth.h.role-mls openssh-7.4p1/auth.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/auth.h.role-mls 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/auth.h 2017-02-08 14:08:30.270308187 +0100
+@@ -62,6 +62,9 @@ struct Authctxt {
+ char *service;
+ struct passwd *pw; /* set if 'valid' */
+ char *style;
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++ char *role;
++#endif
+ void *kbdintctxt;
+ char *info; /* Extra info for next auth_log */
+ #ifdef BSD_AUTH
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/auth-pam.c.role-mls openssh-7.4p1/auth-pam.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/auth-pam.c.role-mls 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/auth-pam.c 2017-02-08 14:08:30.270308187 +0100
+@@ -1087,7 +1087,7 @@ is_pam_session_open(void)
+ * during the ssh authentication process.
+ */
+ int
+-do_pam_putenv(char *name, char *value)
++do_pam_putenv(char *name, const char *value)
+ {
+ int ret = 1;
+ #ifdef HAVE_PAM_PUTENV
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/auth-pam.h.role-mls openssh-7.4p1/auth-pam.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/auth-pam.h.role-mls 2017-02-08 14:08:30.270308187 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/auth-pam.h 2017-02-08 14:09:09.711273302 +0100
+@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ u_int do_pam_account(void);
+ void do_pam_session(void);
+ void do_pam_setcred(int );
+ void do_pam_chauthtok(void);
+-int do_pam_putenv(char *, char *);
++int do_pam_putenv(char *, const char *);
+ char ** fetch_pam_environment(void);
+ char ** fetch_pam_child_environment(void);
+ void free_pam_environment(char **);
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/misc.c.role-mls openssh-7.4p1/misc.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/misc.c.role-mls 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/misc.c 2017-02-08 14:08:30.271308186 +0100
+@@ -432,6 +432,7 @@ char *
+ colon(char *cp)
+ {
+ int flag = 0;
++ int start = 1;
+
+ if (*cp == ':') /* Leading colon is part of file name. */
+ return NULL;
+@@ -447,6 +448,13 @@ colon(char *cp)
+ return (cp);
+ if (*cp == '/')
+ return NULL;
++ if (start) {
++ /* Slash on beginning or after dots only denotes file name. */
++ if (*cp == '/')
++ return (0);
++ if (*cp != '.')
++ start = 0;
++ }
+ }
+ return NULL;
+ }
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.role-mls openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.role-mls 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c 2017-02-08 14:18:13.289928913 +0100
+@@ -127,6 +127,9 @@ int mm_answer_sign(int, Buffer *);
+ int mm_answer_pwnamallow(int, Buffer *);
+ int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(int, Buffer *);
+ int mm_answer_authserv(int, Buffer *);
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++int mm_answer_authrole(int, Buffer *);
++#endif
+ int mm_answer_authpassword(int, Buffer *);
+ int mm_answer_bsdauthquery(int, Buffer *);
+ int mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(int, Buffer *);
+@@ -202,6 +205,9 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[]
+ {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sign},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authserv},
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++ {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authrole},
++#endif
+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_auth2_read_banner},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+@@ -769,6 +775,9 @@ mm_answer_pwnamallow(int sock, Buffer *m
+
+ /* Allow service/style information on the auth context */
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, 1);
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, 1);
++#endif
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, 1);
+
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+@@ -810,6 +819,25 @@ mm_answer_authserv(int sock, Buffer *m)
+ return (0);
+ }
+
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++int
++mm_answer_authrole(int sock, Buffer *m)
++{
++ monitor_permit_authentications(1);
++
++ authctxt->role = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
++ debug3("%s: role=%s",
++ __func__, authctxt->role);
++
++ if (strlen(authctxt->role) == 0) {
++ free(authctxt->role);
++ authctxt->role = NULL;
++ }
++
++ return (0);
++}
++#endif
++
+ int
+ mm_answer_authpassword(int sock, Buffer *m)
+ {
+@@ -1208,7 +1236,7 @@ monitor_valid_userblob(u_char *data, u_i
+ {
+ Buffer b;
+ u_char *p;
+- char *userstyle, *cp;
++ char *userstyle, *r, *cp;
+ u_int len;
+ int fail = 0;
+
+@@ -1234,6 +1262,8 @@ monitor_valid_userblob(u_char *data, u_i
+ if (buffer_get_char(&b) != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)
+ fail++;
+ cp = buffer_get_cstring(&b, NULL);
++ if ((r = strchr(cp, '/')) != NULL)
++ *r = '\0';
+ xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
+ authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
+ authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
+@@ -1269,7 +1299,7 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(u_char *data
+ char *chost)
+ {
+ Buffer b;
+- char *p, *userstyle;
++ char *p, *r, *userstyle;
+ u_int len;
+ int fail = 0;
+
+@@ -1286,6 +1316,8 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(u_char *data
+ if (buffer_get_char(&b) != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)
+ fail++;
+ p = buffer_get_cstring(&b, NULL);
++ if ((r = strchr(p, '/')) != NULL)
++ *r = '\0';
+ xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
+ authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
+ authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor.h.role-mls openssh-7.4p1/monitor.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/monitor.h.role-mls 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor.h 2017-02-08 14:08:30.271308186 +0100
+@@ -57,6 +57,10 @@ enum monitor_reqtype {
+ MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC = 48, MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC = 49,
+ MONITOR_REQ_TERM = 50,
+
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++ MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE = 80,
++#endif
++
+ MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START = 100,
+ MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT = 102, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT = 103,
+ MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX = 104, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX = 105,
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c.role-mls openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c.role-mls 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c 2017-02-08 14:08:30.271308186 +0100
+@@ -345,6 +345,25 @@ mm_inform_authserv(char *service, char *
+ buffer_free(&m);
+ }
+
++/* Inform the privileged process about role */
++
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++void
++mm_inform_authrole(char *role)
++{
++ Buffer m;
++
++ debug3("%s entering", __func__);
++
++ buffer_init(&m);
++ buffer_put_cstring(&m, role ? role : "");
++
++ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, &m);
++
++ buffer_free(&m);
++}
++#endif
++
+ /* Do the password authentication */
+ int
+ mm_auth_password(Authctxt *authctxt, char *password)
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.h.role-mls openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.h.role-mls 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.h 2016-12-23 12:19:58.588459376 +0100
+@@ -42,6 +42,9 @@ int mm_is_monitor(void);
+ DH *mm_choose_dh(int, int, int);
+ int mm_key_sign(Key *, u_char **, u_int *, const u_char *, u_int, const char *);
+ void mm_inform_authserv(char *, char *);
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++void mm_inform_authrole(char *);
++#endif
+ struct passwd *mm_getpwnamallow(const char *);
+ char *mm_auth2_read_banner(void);
+ int mm_auth_password(struct Authctxt *, char *);
+diff --git a/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in b/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
+index 6ecfb93..b912dbe 100644
+--- a/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
++++ b/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
+@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ OPENBSD=base64.o basename.o bcrypt_pbkdf.o bindresvport.o blowfish.o daemon.o di
+
+ COMPAT=arc4random.o bsd-asprintf.o bsd-closefrom.o bsd-cray.o bsd-cygwin_util.o bsd-getpeereid.o getrrsetbyname-ldns.o bsd-err.o bsd-misc.o bsd-nextstep.o bsd-openpty.o bsd-poll.o bsd-setres_id.o bsd-snprintf.o bsd-statvfs.o bsd-waitpid.o fake-rfc2553.o openssl-compat.o xcrypt.o kludge-fd_set.o
+
+-PORTS=port-aix.o port-irix.o port-linux.o port-solaris.o port-tun.o port-uw.o
++PORTS=port-aix.o port-irix.o port-linux.o port-linux-sshd.o port-solaris.o port-tun.o port-uw.o
+
+ .c.o:
+ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $<
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.role-mls openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.role-mls 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c 2017-02-08 14:08:30.272308185 +0100
+@@ -101,37 +101,6 @@ ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname)
+ return sc;
+ }
+
+-/* Set the execution context to the default for the specified user */
+-void
+-ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
+-{
+- security_context_t user_ctx = NULL;
+-
+- if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
+- return;
+-
+- debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__);
+-
+- user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname);
+- if (setexeccon(user_ctx) != 0) {
+- switch (security_getenforce()) {
+- case -1:
+- fatal("%s: security_getenforce() failed", __func__);
+- case 0:
+- error("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution "
+- "context for %s", __func__, pwname);
+- break;
+- default:
+- fatal("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution context "
+- "for %s (in enforcing mode)", __func__, pwname);
+- }
+- }
+- if (user_ctx != NULL)
+- freecon(user_ctx);
+-
+- debug3("%s: done", __func__);
+-}
+-
+ /* Set the TTY context for the specified user */
+ void
+ ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *pwname, const char *tty)
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.role-mls openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.role-mls 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h 2017-02-08 14:08:30.272308185 +0100
+@@ -20,9 +20,10 @@
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ int ssh_selinux_enabled(void);
+ void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const char *);
+-void ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
+ void ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *);
+ void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *);
++
++void sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
+ #endif
+
+ #ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls 2017-02-08 14:08:30.272308185 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c 2017-02-08 14:08:30.272308185 +0100
+@@ -0,0 +1,415 @@
++/*
++ * Copyright (c) 2005 Daniel Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
++ * Copyright (c) 2014 Petr Lautrbach <plautrba@redhat.com>
++ *
++ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
++ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
++ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
++ *
++ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
++ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
++ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
++ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
++ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
++ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
++ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
++ */
++
++/*
++ * Linux-specific portability code - just SELinux support for sshd at present
++ */
++
++#include "includes.h"
++
++#if defined(WITH_SELINUX) || defined(LINUX_OOM_ADJUST)
++#include <errno.h>
++#include <stdarg.h>
++#include <string.h>
++#include <stdio.h>
++
++#include "log.h"
++#include "xmalloc.h"
++#include "misc.h" /* servconf.h needs misc.h for struct ForwardOptions */
++#include "servconf.h"
++#include "port-linux.h"
++#include "key.h"
++#include "hostfile.h"
++#include "auth.h"
++
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++#include <selinux/selinux.h>
++#include <selinux/flask.h>
++#include <selinux/context.h>
++#include <selinux/get_context_list.h>
++#include <selinux/get_default_type.h>
++#include <selinux/av_permissions.h>
++
++#ifdef HAVE_LINUX_AUDIT
++#include <libaudit.h>
++#include <unistd.h>
++#endif
++
++extern ServerOptions options;
++extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
++extern int inetd_flag;
++extern int rexeced_flag;
++
++/* Send audit message */
++static int
++sshd_selinux_send_audit_message(int success, security_context_t default_context,
++ security_context_t selected_context)
++{
++ int rc=0;
++#ifdef HAVE_LINUX_AUDIT
++ char *msg = NULL;
++ int audit_fd = audit_open();
++ security_context_t default_raw=NULL;
++ security_context_t selected_raw=NULL;
++ rc = -1;
++ if (audit_fd < 0) {
++ if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT ||
++ errno == EAFNOSUPPORT)
++ return 0; /* No audit support in kernel */
++ error("Error connecting to audit system.");
++ return rc;
++ }
++ if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(default_context, &default_raw) < 0) {
++ error("Error translating default context.");
++ default_raw = NULL;
++ }
++ if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(selected_context, &selected_raw) < 0) {
++ error("Error translating selected context.");
++ selected_raw = NULL;
++ }
++ if (asprintf(&msg, "sshd: default-context=%s selected-context=%s",
++ default_raw ? default_raw : (default_context ? default_context: "?"),
++ selected_context ? selected_raw : (selected_context ? selected_context :"?")) < 0) {
++ error("Error allocating memory.");
++ goto out;
++ }
++ if (audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_ROLE_CHANGE,
++ msg, NULL, NULL, NULL, success) <= 0) {
++ error("Error sending audit message.");
++ goto out;
++ }
++ rc = 0;
++ out:
++ free(msg);
++ freecon(default_raw);
++ freecon(selected_raw);
++ close(audit_fd);
++#endif
++ return rc;
++}
++
++static int
++mls_range_allowed(security_context_t src, security_context_t dst)
++{
++ struct av_decision avd;
++ int retval;
++ unsigned int bit = CONTEXT__CONTAINS;
++
++ debug("%s: src:%s dst:%s", __func__, src, dst);
++ retval = security_compute_av(src, dst, SECCLASS_CONTEXT, bit, &avd);
++ if (retval || ((bit & avd.allowed) != bit))
++ return 0;
++
++ return 1;
++}
++
++static int
++get_user_context(const char *sename, const char *role, const char *lvl,
++ security_context_t *sc) {
++#ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL
++ if (lvl == NULL || lvl[0] == '\0' || get_default_context_with_level(sename, lvl, NULL, sc) != 0) {
++ /* User may have requested a level completely outside of his
++ allowed range. We get a context just for auditing as the
++ range check below will certainly fail for default context. */
++#endif
++ if (get_default_context(sename, NULL, sc) != 0) {
++ *sc = NULL;
++ return -1;
++ }
++#ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL
++ }
++#endif
++ if (role != NULL && role[0]) {
++ context_t con;
++ char *type=NULL;
++ if (get_default_type(role, &type) != 0) {
++ error("get_default_type: failed to get default type for '%s'",
++ role);
++ goto out;
++ }
++ con = context_new(*sc);
++ if (!con) {
++ goto out;
++ }
++ context_role_set(con, role);
++ context_type_set(con, type);
++ freecon(*sc);
++ *sc = strdup(context_str(con));
++ context_free(con);
++ if (!*sc)
++ return -1;
++ }
++#ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL
++ if (lvl != NULL && lvl[0]) {
++ /* verify that the requested range is obtained */
++ context_t con;
++ security_context_t obtained_raw;
++ security_context_t requested_raw;
++ con = context_new(*sc);
++ if (!con) {
++ goto out;
++ }
++ context_range_set(con, lvl);
++ if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(*sc, &obtained_raw) < 0) {
++ context_free(con);
++ goto out;
++ }
++ if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(context_str(con), &requested_raw) < 0) {
++ freecon(obtained_raw);
++ context_free(con);
++ goto out;
++ }
++
++ debug("get_user_context: obtained context '%s' requested context '%s'",
++ obtained_raw, requested_raw);
++ if (strcmp(obtained_raw, requested_raw)) {
++ /* set the context to the real requested one but fail */
++ freecon(requested_raw);
++ freecon(obtained_raw);
++ freecon(*sc);
++ *sc = strdup(context_str(con));
++ context_free(con);
++ return -1;
++ }
++ freecon(requested_raw);
++ freecon(obtained_raw);
++ context_free(con);
++ }
++#endif
++ return 0;
++ out:
++ freecon(*sc);
++ *sc = NULL;
++ return -1;
++}
++
++static void
++ssh_selinux_get_role_level(char **role, const char **level)
++{
++ *role = NULL;
++ *level = NULL;
++ if (the_authctxt) {
++ if (the_authctxt->role != NULL) {
++ char *slash;
++ *role = xstrdup(the_authctxt->role);
++ if ((slash = strchr(*role, '/')) != NULL) {
++ *slash = '\0';
++ *level = slash + 1;
++ }
++ }
++ }
++}
++
++/* Return the default security context for the given username */
++static int
++sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname,
++ security_context_t *default_sc, security_context_t *user_sc)
++{
++ char *sename, *lvl;
++ char *role;
++ const char *reqlvl;
++ int r = 0;
++ context_t con = NULL;
++
++ ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl);
++
++#ifdef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME
++ if ((r=getseuserbyname(pwname, &sename, &lvl)) != 0) {
++ sename = NULL;
++ lvl = NULL;
++ }
++#else
++ sename = pwname;
++ lvl = "";
++#endif
++
++ if (r == 0) {
++#ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL
++ r = get_default_context_with_level(sename, lvl, NULL, default_sc);
++#else
++ r = get_default_context(sename, NULL, default_sc);
++#endif
++ }
++
++ if (r == 0) {
++ /* If launched from xinetd, we must use current level */
++ if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) {
++ security_context_t sshdsc=NULL;
++
++ if (getcon_raw(&sshdsc) < 0)
++ fatal("failed to allocate security context");
++
++ if ((con=context_new(sshdsc)) == NULL)
++ fatal("failed to allocate selinux context");
++ reqlvl = context_range_get(con);
++ freecon(sshdsc);
++ if (reqlvl !=NULL && lvl != NULL && strcmp(reqlvl, lvl) == 0)
++ /* we actually don't change level */
++ reqlvl = "";
++
++ debug("%s: current connection level '%s'", __func__, reqlvl);
++
++ }
++
++ if ((reqlvl != NULL && reqlvl[0]) || (role != NULL && role[0])) {
++ r = get_user_context(sename, role, reqlvl, user_sc);
++
++ if (r == 0 && reqlvl != NULL && reqlvl[0]) {
++ security_context_t default_level_sc = *default_sc;
++ if (role != NULL && role[0]) {
++ if (get_user_context(sename, role, lvl, &default_level_sc) < 0)
++ default_level_sc = *default_sc;
++ }
++ /* verify that the requested range is contained in the user range */
++ if (mls_range_allowed(default_level_sc, *user_sc)) {
++ logit("permit MLS level %s (user range %s)", reqlvl, lvl);
++ } else {
++ r = -1;
++ error("deny MLS level %s (user range %s)", reqlvl, lvl);
++ }
++ if (default_level_sc != *default_sc)
++ freecon(default_level_sc);
++ }
++ } else {
++ *user_sc = *default_sc;
++ }
++ }
++ if (r != 0) {
++ error("%s: Failed to get default SELinux security "
++ "context for %s", __func__, pwname);
++ }
++
++#ifdef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME
++ free(sename);
++ free(lvl);
++#endif
++
++ if (role != NULL)
++ free(role);
++ if (con)
++ context_free(con);
++
++ return (r);
++}
++
++/* Setup environment variables for pam_selinux */
++static int
++sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void)
++{
++ const char *reqlvl;
++ char *role;
++ char *use_current;
++ int rv;
++
++ debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__);
++
++ ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl);
++
++ rv = do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", role ? role : "");
++
++ if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) {
++ use_current = "1";
++ } else {
++ use_current = "";
++ rv = rv || do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_LEVEL_REQUESTED", reqlvl ? reqlvl: "");
++ }
++
++ rv = rv || do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_USE_CURRENT_RANGE", use_current);
++
++ if (role != NULL)
++ free(role);
++
++ return rv;
++}
++
++/* Set the execution context to the default for the specified user */
++void
++sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
++{
++ security_context_t user_ctx = NULL;
++ int r = 0;
++ security_context_t default_ctx = NULL;
++
++ if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
++ return;
++
++ if (options.use_pam) {
++ /* do not compute context, just setup environment for pam_selinux */
++ if (sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables()) {
++ switch (security_getenforce()) {
++ case -1:
++ fatal("%s: security_getenforce() failed", __func__);
++ case 0:
++ error("%s: SELinux PAM variable setup failure. Continuing in permissive mode.",
++ __func__);
++ break;
++ default:
++ fatal("%s: SELinux PAM variable setup failure. Aborting connection.",
++ __func__);
++ }
++ }
++ return;
++ }
++
++ debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__);
++
++ r = sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname, &default_ctx, &user_ctx);
++ if (r >= 0) {
++ r = setexeccon(user_ctx);
++ if (r < 0) {
++ error("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution context %s for %s",
++ __func__, user_ctx, pwname);
++ }
++#ifdef HAVE_SETKEYCREATECON
++ else if (setkeycreatecon(user_ctx) < 0) {
++ error("%s: Failed to set SELinux keyring creation context %s for %s",
++ __func__, user_ctx, pwname);
++ }
++#endif
++ }
++ if (user_ctx == NULL) {
++ user_ctx = default_ctx;
++ }
++ if (r < 0 || user_ctx != default_ctx) {
++ /* audit just the case when user changed a role or there was
++ a failure */
++ sshd_selinux_send_audit_message(r >= 0, default_ctx, user_ctx);
++ }
++ if (r < 0) {
++ switch (security_getenforce()) {
++ case -1:
++ fatal("%s: security_getenforce() failed", __func__);
++ case 0:
++ error("%s: SELinux failure. Continuing in permissive mode.",
++ __func__);
++ break;
++ default:
++ fatal("%s: SELinux failure. Aborting connection.",
++ __func__);
++ }
++ }
++ if (user_ctx != NULL && user_ctx != default_ctx)
++ freecon(user_ctx);
++ if (default_ctx != NULL)
++ freecon(default_ctx);
++
++ debug3("%s: done", __func__);
++}
++
++#endif
++#endif
++
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/platform.c.role-mls openssh-7.4p1/platform.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/platform.c.role-mls 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/platform.c 2017-02-08 14:08:30.272308185 +0100
+@@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ platform_setusercontext_post_groups(stru
+ }
+ #endif /* HAVE_SETPCRED */
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+- ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name);
++ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name);
+ #endif
+ }
+
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.role-mls openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.role-mls 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c 2017-02-08 14:08:30.273308184 +0100
+@@ -2053,6 +2053,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ restore_uid();
+ }
+ #endif
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(authctxt->pw->pw_name);
++#endif
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+ if (options.use_pam) {
+ do_pam_setcred(1);
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-rsa1-segfault.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-rsa1-segfault.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1128800
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-rsa1-segfault.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
+--- a/sshd.c
++++ b/sshd.c
+@@ -1551,6 +1551,15 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ continue;
+ key = key_load_private(options.host_key_files[i], "", NULL);
+ pubkey = key_load_public(options.host_key_files[i], NULL);
++
++ if ((pubkey != NULL && pubkey->type == KEY_RSA1) ||
++ (key != NULL && key->type == KEY_RSA1)) {
++ verbose("Ignoring RSA1 key %s",
++ options.host_key_files[i]);
++ key_free(key);
++ key_free(pubkey);
++ continue;
++ }
+ if (pubkey == NULL && key != NULL)
+ pubkey = key_demote(key);
+ sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = key;
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-sandbox-ibmca.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-sandbox-ibmca.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5479c65
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-sandbox-ibmca.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
+From 5f1596e11d55539678c41f68aed358628d33d86f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Tue, 14 Mar 2017 13:15:18 +1100
+Subject: [PATCH] support ioctls for ICA crypto card on Linux/s390
+
+Based on patch from Eduardo Barretto; ok dtucker@
+---
+ sandbox-seccomp-filter.c | 6 ++++++
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+index af5525a..6ceee33 100644
+--- a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
++++ b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+@@ -223,6 +223,12 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
+ SC_ALLOW_ARG(socketcall, 0, SYS_SHUTDOWN),
+ SC_DENY(socketcall, EACCES),
+ #endif
++#if defined(__NR_ioctl) && defined(__s390__)
++ /* Allow ioctls for ICA crypto card on s390 */
++ SC_ALLOW_ARG(ioctl, 1, Z90STAT_STATUS_MASK),
++ SC_ALLOW_ARG(ioctl, 1, ICARSAMODEXPO),
++ SC_ALLOW_ARG(ioctl, 1, ICARSACRT),
++#endif /* defined(__NR_ioctl) && defined(__s390__) */
+
+ /* Default deny */
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL),
+
+From 9e96b41682aed793fadbea5ccd472f862179fb02 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Tue, 14 Mar 2017 12:24:47 +1100
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix weakness in seccomp-bpf sandbox arg inspection
+
+Syscall arguments are passed via an array of 64-bit values in struct
+seccomp_data, but we were only inspecting the bottom 32 bits and not
+even those correctly for BE systems.
+
+Fortunately, the only case argument inspection was used was in the
+socketcall filtering so using this for sandbox escape seems
+impossible.
+
+ok dtucker
+---
+ sandbox-seccomp-filter.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++----
+ 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+index 2e1ed2c..af5525a 100644
+--- a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
++++ b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+@@ -73,6 +73,16 @@
+ # define SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL SECCOMP_RET_TRAP
+ #endif /* SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG */
+
++#if __BYTE_ORDER == __LITTLE_ENDIAN
++# define ARG_LO_OFFSET 0
++# define ARG_HI_OFFSET sizeof(uint32_t)
++#elif __BYTE_ORDER == __BIG_ENDIAN
++# define ARG_LO_OFFSET sizeof(uint32_t)
++# define ARG_HI_OFFSET 0
++#else
++#error "Unknown endianness"
++#endif
++
+ /* Simple helpers to avoid manual errors (but larger BPF programs). */
+ #define SC_DENY(_nr, _errno) \
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, __NR_ ## _nr, 0, 1), \
+@@ -81,11 +91,17 @@
+ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, __NR_ ## _nr, 0, 1), \
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW)
+ #define SC_ALLOW_ARG(_nr, _arg_nr, _arg_val) \
+- BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, __NR_ ## _nr, 0, 4), \
+- /* load first syscall argument */ \
++ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, __NR_ ## _nr, 0, 6), \
++ /* load and test first syscall argument, low word */ \
++ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \
++ offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[(_arg_nr)]) + ARG_LO_OFFSET), \
++ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, \
++ ((_arg_val) & 0xFFFFFFFF), 0, 3), \
++ /* load and test first syscall argument, high word */ \
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \
+- offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[(_arg_nr)])), \
+- BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, (_arg_val), 0, 1), \
++ offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[(_arg_nr)]) + ARG_HI_OFFSET), \
++ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, \
++ (((uint32_t)((uint64_t)(_arg_val) >> 32)) & 0xFFFFFFFF), 0, 1), \
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW), \
+ /* reload syscall number; all rules expect it in accumulator */ \
+ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \
+
+From 58b8cfa2a062b72139d7229ae8de567f55776f24 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Wed, 22 Mar 2017 12:43:02 +1100
+Subject: [PATCH] Missing header on Linux/s390
+
+Patch from Jakub Jelen
+---
+ sandbox-seccomp-filter.c | 3 +++
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+index a8d472a..2831e9d 100644
+--- a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
++++ b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+@@ -50,6 +50,9 @@
+ #include <elf.h>
+
+ #include <asm/unistd.h>
++#ifdef __s390__
++#include <asm/zcrypt.h>
++#endif
+
+ #include <errno.h>
+ #include <signal.h>
+
+getuid and geteuid are needed when using an openssl engine that calls a
+crypto card, e.g. ICA (libica).
+Those syscalls are also needed by the distros for audit code.
+
+Signed-off-by: Eduardo Barretto <ebarretto at linux.vnet.ibm.com>
+---
+ sandbox-seccomp-filter.c | 12 ++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+index 6e7de31..e86aa2c 100644
+--- a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
++++ b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+@@ -175,6 +175,18 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
+ #ifdef __NR_getpid
+ SC_ALLOW(getpid),
+ #endif
++#ifdef __NR_getuid
++ SC_ALLOW(getuid),
++#endif
++#ifdef __NR_getuid32
++ SC_ALLOW(getuid32),
++#endif
++#ifdef __NR_geteuid
++ SC_ALLOW(geteuid),
++#endif
++#ifdef __NR_geteuid32
++ SC_ALLOW(geteuid32),
++#endif
+ #ifdef __NR_getrandom
+ SC_ALLOW(getrandom),
+ #endif
+--
+1.9.1
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-sandbox-ppc64le.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-sandbox-ppc64le.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..09eae99
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-sandbox-ppc64le.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c.sandbox openssh-7.4p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c.sandbox 2017-04-21 13:30:49.692650798 +0200
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c 2017-04-21 13:30:52.259647579 +0200
+@@ -215,6 +215,7 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_
+ #endif
+ #ifdef __NR_socketcall
+ SC_ALLOW_ARG(socketcall, 0, SYS_SHUTDOWN),
++ SC_DENY(socketcall, EACCES),
+ #endif
+
+ /* Default deny */
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-sha2-signatures.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-sha2-signatures.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..951e641
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-sha2-signatures.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/kex.c.sha2 openssh-7.4p1/kex.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/kex.c.sha2 2017-02-17 18:15:53.589835864 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/kex.c 2017-02-17 18:17:20.404781663 +0100
+@@ -379,21 +379,14 @@ static int
+ kex_send_ext_info(struct ssh *ssh)
+ {
+ int r;
+- char *algs;
+
+- if ((algs = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, ',')) == NULL)
+- return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, 1)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "server-sig-algs")) != 0 ||
+- (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, algs)) != 0 ||
++ (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "rsa-sha2-256,rsa-sha2-512")) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+- goto out;
+- /* success */
+- r = 0;
+- out:
+- free(algs);
+- return r;
++ return r;
++ return 0;
+ }
+
+ int
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-show-more-fingerprints.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-show-more-fingerprints.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..570f11c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-show-more-fingerprints.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,315 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/clientloop.c.fingerprint openssh-7.4p1/clientloop.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/clientloop.c.fingerprint 2016-12-23 15:38:50.520432387 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/clientloop.c 2016-12-23 15:38:50.564432394 +0100
+@@ -2279,7 +2279,7 @@ update_known_hosts(struct hostkeys_updat
+ if (ctx->keys_seen[i] != 2)
+ continue;
+ if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(ctx->keys[i],
+- options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
++ options.fingerprint_hash[0], SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__);
+ do_log2(loglevel, "Learned new hostkey: %s %s",
+ sshkey_type(ctx->keys[i]), fp);
+@@ -2287,7 +2287,7 @@ update_known_hosts(struct hostkeys_updat
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < ctx->nold; i++) {
+ if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(ctx->old_keys[i],
+- options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
++ options.fingerprint_hash[0], SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__);
+ do_log2(loglevel, "Deprecating obsolete hostkey: %s %s",
+ sshkey_type(ctx->old_keys[i]), fp);
+@@ -2330,7 +2330,7 @@ update_known_hosts(struct hostkeys_updat
+ (r = hostfile_replace_entries(options.user_hostfiles[0],
+ ctx->host_str, ctx->ip_str, ctx->keys, ctx->nkeys,
+ options.hash_known_hosts, 0,
+- options.fingerprint_hash)) != 0)
++ options.fingerprint_hash[0])) != 0)
+ error("%s: hostfile_replace_entries failed: %s",
+ __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ }
+@@ -2443,7 +2443,7 @@ client_input_hostkeys(void)
+ error("%s: parse key: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ goto out;
+ }
+- fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash,
++ fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash[0],
+ SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
+ debug3("%s: received %s key %s", __func__,
+ sshkey_type(key), fp);
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/readconf.c.fingerprint openssh-7.4p1/readconf.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/readconf.c.fingerprint 2016-12-23 15:38:50.559432393 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/readconf.c 2016-12-23 15:38:50.565432394 +0100
+@@ -1668,16 +1668,18 @@ parse_keytypes:
+ goto parse_string;
+
+ case oFingerprintHash:
+- intptr = &options->fingerprint_hash;
+- arg = strdelim(&s);
+- if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+- fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.",
+- filename, linenum);
+- if ((value = ssh_digest_alg_by_name(arg)) == -1)
+- fatal("%.200s line %d: Invalid hash algorithm \"%s\".",
+- filename, linenum, arg);
+- if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
+- *intptr = value;
++ if (*activep && options->num_fingerprint_hash == 0)
++ while ((arg = strdelim(&s)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') {
++ value = ssh_digest_alg_by_name(arg);
++ if (value == -1)
++ fatal("%s line %d: unknown fingerprints algorithm specs: %s.",
++ filename, linenum, arg);
++ if (options->num_fingerprint_hash >= SSH_DIGEST_MAX)
++ fatal("%s line %d: too many fingerprints algorithm specs.",
++ filename, linenum);
++ options->fingerprint_hash[
++ options->num_fingerprint_hash++] = value;
++ }
+ break;
+
+ case oUpdateHostkeys:
+@@ -1905,7 +1907,7 @@ initialize_options(Options * options)
+ options->canonicalize_fallback_local = -1;
+ options->canonicalize_hostname = -1;
+ options->revoked_host_keys = NULL;
+- options->fingerprint_hash = -1;
++ options->num_fingerprint_hash = 0;
+ options->update_hostkeys = -1;
+ options->hostbased_key_types = NULL;
+ options->pubkey_key_types = NULL;
+@@ -2102,8 +2104,10 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
+ options->canonicalize_fallback_local = 1;
+ if (options->canonicalize_hostname == -1)
+ options->canonicalize_hostname = SSH_CANONICALISE_NO;
+- if (options->fingerprint_hash == -1)
+- options->fingerprint_hash = SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT;
++ if (options->num_fingerprint_hash == 0) {
++ options->fingerprint_hash[options->num_fingerprint_hash++] = SSH_DIGEST_SHA256;
++ options->fingerprint_hash[options->num_fingerprint_hash++] = (FIPS_mode() ? SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 : SSH_DIGEST_MD5);
++ }
+ if (options->update_hostkeys == -1)
+ options->update_hostkeys = 0;
+ if (kex_assemble_names(KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT, &options->ciphers) != 0 ||
+@@ -2489,6 +2493,17 @@ dump_cfg_strarray(OpCodes code, u_int co
+ }
+
+ static void
++dump_cfg_fmtarray(OpCodes code, u_int count, int *vals)
++{
++ u_int i;
++
++ printf("%s", lookup_opcode_name(code));
++ for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
++ printf(" %s", fmt_intarg(code, vals[i]));
++ printf("\n");
++}
++
++static void
+ dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(OpCodes code, u_int count, char **vals)
+ {
+ u_int i;
+@@ -2564,7 +2579,6 @@ dump_client_config(Options *o, const cha
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(oEnableSSHKeysign, o->enable_ssh_keysign);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(oClearAllForwardings, o->clear_forwardings);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(oExitOnForwardFailure, o->exit_on_forward_failure);
+- dump_cfg_fmtint(oFingerprintHash, o->fingerprint_hash);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(oForwardAgent, o->forward_agent);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(oForwardX11, o->forward_x11);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(oForwardX11Trusted, o->forward_x11_trusted);
+@@ -2634,6 +2648,7 @@ dump_client_config(Options *o, const cha
+ dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(oGlobalKnownHostsFile, o->num_system_hostfiles, o->system_hostfiles);
+ dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(oUserKnownHostsFile, o->num_user_hostfiles, o->user_hostfiles);
+ dump_cfg_strarray(oSendEnv, o->num_send_env, o->send_env);
++ dump_cfg_fmtarray(oFingerprintHash, o->num_fingerprint_hash, o->fingerprint_hash);
+
+ /* Special cases */
+
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/readconf.h.fingerprint openssh-7.4p1/readconf.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/readconf.h.fingerprint 2016-12-23 15:38:50.559432393 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/readconf.h 2016-12-23 15:38:50.565432394 +0100
+@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
+ #define MAX_SEND_ENV 256
+ #define SSH_MAX_HOSTS_FILES 32
+ #define MAX_CANON_DOMAINS 32
++#define MAX_SSH_DIGESTS 8
+ #define PATH_MAX_SUN (sizeof((struct sockaddr_un *)0)->sun_path)
+
+ struct allowed_cname {
+@@ -162,7 +163,8 @@ typedef struct {
+
+ char *revoked_host_keys;
+
+- int fingerprint_hash;
++ int num_fingerprint_hash;
++ int fingerprint_hash[MAX_SSH_DIGESTS];
+
+ int update_hostkeys; /* one of SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_* */
+
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/ssh_config.5.fingerprint openssh-7.4p1/ssh_config.5
+--- openssh-7.4p1/ssh_config.5.fingerprint 2016-12-23 15:38:50.565432394 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/ssh_config.5 2016-12-23 15:40:03.754444166 +0100
+@@ -652,12 +652,13 @@ or
+ .Cm no
+ (the default).
+ .It Cm FingerprintHash
+-Specifies the hash algorithm used when displaying key fingerprints.
++Specifies the hash algorithms used when displaying key fingerprints.
+ Valid options are:
+ .Cm md5
+ and
+-.Cm sha256
+-(the default).
++.Cm sha256 .
++The default is
++.Cm "sha256 md5".
+ .It Cm ForwardAgent
+ Specifies whether the connection to the authentication agent (if any)
+ will be forwarded to the remote machine.
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshconnect2.c.fingerprint openssh-7.4p1/sshconnect2.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshconnect2.c.fingerprint 2016-12-23 15:38:50.561432394 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshconnect2.c 2016-12-23 15:38:50.566432394 +0100
+@@ -677,7 +677,7 @@ input_userauth_pk_ok(int type, u_int32_t
+ key->type, pktype);
+ goto done;
+ }
+- if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash,
++ if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash[0],
+ SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
+ goto done;
+ debug2("input_userauth_pk_ok: fp %s", fp);
+@@ -1172,7 +1172,7 @@ sign_and_send_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt,
+ int matched, ret = -1, have_sig = 1;
+ char *fp;
+
+- if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(id->key, options.fingerprint_hash,
++ if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(id->key, options.fingerprint_hash[0],
+ SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ debug3("%s: %s %s", __func__, key_type(id->key), fp);
+@@ -1864,7 +1864,7 @@ userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+- if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(private, options.fingerprint_hash,
++ if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(private, options.fingerprint_hash[0],
+ SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) {
+ error("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__);
+ goto out;
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshconnect.c.fingerprint openssh-7.4p1/sshconnect.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshconnect.c.fingerprint 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshconnect.c 2016-12-23 15:38:50.566432394 +0100
+@@ -922,9 +922,9 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct so
+ "of known hosts.", type, ip);
+ } else if (options.visual_host_key) {
+ fp = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key,
+- options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
++ options.fingerprint_hash[0], SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
+ ra = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key,
+- options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
++ options.fingerprint_hash[0], SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
+ if (fp == NULL || ra == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint fail", __func__);
+ logit("Host key fingerprint is %s\n%s", fp, ra);
+@@ -966,12 +966,6 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct so
+ else
+ snprintf(msg1, sizeof(msg1), ".");
+ /* The default */
+- fp = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key,
+- options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
+- ra = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key,
+- options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
+- if (fp == NULL || ra == NULL)
+- fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint fail", __func__);
+ msg2[0] = '\0';
+ if (options.verify_host_key_dns) {
+ if (matching_host_key_dns)
+@@ -985,16 +979,28 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct so
+ }
+ snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg),
+ "The authenticity of host '%.200s (%s)' can't be "
+- "established%s\n"
+- "%s key fingerprint is %s.%s%s\n%s"
++ "established%s\n", host, ip, msg1);
++ for (i = 0; i < (u_int) options.num_fingerprint_hash; i++) {
++ fp = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key,
++ options.fingerprint_hash[i], SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
++ ra = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key,
++ options.fingerprint_hash[i], SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
++ if (fp == NULL || ra == NULL)
++ fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint fail", __func__);
++ len = strlen(msg);
++ snprintf(msg+len, sizeof(msg)-len,
++ "%s key fingerprint is %s.%s%s\n%s",
++ type, fp,
++ options.visual_host_key ? "\n" : "",
++ options.visual_host_key ? ra : "",
++ msg2);
++ free(ra);
++ free(fp);
++ }
++ len = strlen(msg);
++ snprintf(msg+len, sizeof(msg)-len,
+ "Are you sure you want to continue connecting "
+- "(yes/no)? ",
+- host, ip, msg1, type, fp,
+- options.visual_host_key ? "\n" : "",
+- options.visual_host_key ? ra : "",
+- msg2);
+- free(ra);
+- free(fp);
++ "(yes/no)? ");
+ if (!confirm(msg))
+ goto fail;
+ hostkey_trusted = 1; /* user explicitly confirmed */
+@@ -1244,7 +1250,7 @@ verify_host_key(char *host, struct socka
+ struct sshkey *plain = NULL;
+
+ if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key,
+- options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) {
++ options.fingerprint_hash[0], SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) {
+ error("%s: fingerprint host key: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ r = -1;
+ goto out;
+@@ -1252,7 +1258,7 @@ verify_host_key(char *host, struct socka
+
+ if (sshkey_is_cert(host_key)) {
+ if ((cafp = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key->cert->signature_key,
+- options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) {
++ options.fingerprint_hash[0], SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) {
+ error("%s: fingerprint CA key: %s",
+ __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ r = -1;
+@@ -1432,9 +1438,9 @@ show_other_keys(struct hostkeys *hostkey
+ if (!lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type(hostkeys, type[i], &found))
+ continue;
+ fp = sshkey_fingerprint(found->key,
+- options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
++ options.fingerprint_hash[0], SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
+ ra = sshkey_fingerprint(found->key,
+- options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
++ options.fingerprint_hash[0], SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
+ if (fp == NULL || ra == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint fail", __func__);
+ logit("WARNING: %s key found for host %s\n"
+@@ -1457,7 +1463,7 @@ warn_changed_key(Key *host_key)
+ {
+ char *fp;
+
+- fp = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key, options.fingerprint_hash,
++ fp = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key, options.fingerprint_hash[0],
+ SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
+ if (fp == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint fail", __func__);
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/ssh-keysign.c.fingerprint openssh-7.4p1/ssh-keysign.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/ssh-keysign.c.fingerprint 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/ssh-keysign.c 2016-12-23 15:38:50.566432394 +0100
+@@ -285,7 +285,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
+ }
+ }
+ if (!found) {
+- if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash,
++ if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash[0],
+ SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __progname);
+ fatal("no matching hostkey found for key %s %s",
diff --git a/SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent-rmheaders b/SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent-rmheaders
index 5f036cc..06d899d 100644
--- a/SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent-rmheaders
+++ b/SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent-rmheaders
@@ -1,20 +1,37 @@
-atomicio.h
+authfd.c
authfd.h
+atomicio.c
+atomicio.h
+bufaux.c
+bufbn.c
buffer.h
+buffer.c
+cleanup.c
cipher.h
compat.h
defines.h
+entropy.c
entropy.h
+fatal.c
includes.h
kex.h
+key.c
key.h
+log.c
log.h
match.h
+misc.c
misc.h
pathnames.h
platform.h
rsa.h
+ssh-dss.c
+ssh-rsa.c
ssh.h
ssh2.h
+uidswap.c
+uidswap.h
+uuencode.c
uuencode.h
+xmalloc.c
xmalloc.h
diff --git a/SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3-agent_structure.patch b/SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3-agent_structure.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..91e1c3d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3-agent_structure.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,690 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/get_command_line.c.psaa-agent openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/get_command_line.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/get_command_line.c.psaa-agent 2017-02-14 10:19:16.466070259 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/get_command_line.c 2017-02-14 10:26:10.062866980 +0100
+@@ -65,8 +65,8 @@ proc_pid_cmdline(char *** inargv)
+ case EOF:
+ case '\0':
+ if (len > 0) {
+- argv = pamsshagentauth_xrealloc(argv, count + 1, sizeof(*argv));
+- argv[count] = pamsshagentauth_xcalloc(len + 1, sizeof(*argv[count]));
++ argv = xrealloc(argv, count + 1, sizeof(*argv));
++ argv[count] = xcalloc(len + 1, sizeof(*argv[count]));
+ strncpy(argv[count++], argbuf, len);
+ memset(argbuf, '\0', MAX_LEN_PER_CMDLINE_ARG + 1);
+ len = 0;
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/identity.h.psaa-agent openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/identity.h
+--- openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/identity.h.psaa-agent 2016-11-13 04:24:32.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/identity.h 2017-02-14 10:19:12.225071868 +0100
+@@ -38,6 +38,12 @@
+ typedef struct identity Identity;
+ typedef struct idlist Idlist;
+
++typedef struct {
++ int fd;
++ Buffer identities;
++ int howmany;
++} AuthenticationConnection;
++
+ struct identity {
+ TAILQ_ENTRY(identity) next;
+ AuthenticationConnection *ac; /* set if agent supports key */
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-agent openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-agent 2017-02-14 10:19:12.224071868 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c 2017-02-14 10:19:12.226071867 +0100
+@@ -52,12 +52,15 @@
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+ #include "ssh2.h"
+ #include "misc.h"
++#include "ssherr.h"
+
+ #include "userauth_pubkey_from_id.h"
+ #include "identity.h"
+ #include "get_command_line.h"
+ extern char **environ;
+
++#define PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_REQUESTv1 101
++
+ static char *
+ log_action(char ** action, size_t count)
+ {
+@@ -67,7 +70,7 @@ log_action(char ** action, size_t count)
+ if (count == 0)
+ return NULL;
+
+- buf = pamsshagentauth_xcalloc((count * MAX_LEN_PER_CMDLINE_ARG) + (count * 3), sizeof(*buf));
++ buf = xcalloc((count * MAX_LEN_PER_CMDLINE_ARG) + (count * 3), sizeof(*buf));
+ for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+ strcat(buf, (i > 0) ? " '" : "'");
+ strncat(buf, action[i], MAX_LEN_PER_CMDLINE_ARG);
+@@ -80,12 +83,12 @@ void
+ agent_action(Buffer *buf, char ** action, size_t count)
+ {
+ size_t i;
+- pamsshagentauth_buffer_init(buf);
++ buffer_init(buf);
+
+- pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_int(buf, count);
++ buffer_put_int(buf, count);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+- pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(buf, action[i]);
++ buffer_put_cstring(buf, action[i]);
+ }
+ }
+
+@@ -109,17 +112,17 @@ pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(Buffer *
+ char * retc;
+ int32_t reti;
+
+- rnd = pamsshagentauth_arc4random();
++ rnd = arc4random();
+ cookie_len = ((uint8_t) rnd);
+ while (cookie_len < 16) {
+ cookie_len += 16; /* Add 16 bytes to the size to ensure that while the length is random, the length is always reasonable; ticket #18 */
+ }
+
+- cookie = pamsshagentauth_xcalloc(1,cookie_len);
++ cookie = xcalloc(1,cookie_len);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < cookie_len; i++) {
+ if (i % 4 == 0) {
+- rnd = pamsshagentauth_arc4random();
++ rnd = arc4random();
+ }
+ cookie[i] = (char) rnd;
+ rnd >>= 8;
+@@ -134,7 +137,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(Buffer *
+ }
+ else {
+ action_logbuf = "unknown on this platform";
+- pamsshagentauth_buffer_init(&action_agentbuf); /* stays empty, means unavailable */
++ buffer_init(&action_agentbuf); /* stays empty, means unavailable */
+ }
+
+ /*
+@@ -151,35 +154,35 @@ pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(Buffer *
+ retc = getcwd(pwd, sizeof(pwd) - 1);
+ time(&ts);
+
+- pamsshagentauth_buffer_init(session_id2);
++ buffer_init(session_id2);
+
+- pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_int(session_id2, PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_REQUESTv1);
+- /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("cookie: %s", pamsshagentauth_tohex(cookie, cookie_len)); */
+- pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_string(session_id2, cookie, cookie_len);
+- /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("user: %s", user); */
+- pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, user);
+- /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("ruser: %s", ruser); */
+- pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, ruser);
+- /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("servicename: %s", servicename); */
+- pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, servicename);
+- /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("pwd: %s", pwd); */
++ buffer_put_int(session_id2, PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_REQUESTv1);
++ /* debug3("cookie: %s", tohex(cookie, cookie_len)); */
++ buffer_put_string(session_id2, cookie, cookie_len);
++ /* debug3("user: %s", user); */
++ buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, user);
++ /* debug3("ruser: %s", ruser); */
++ buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, ruser);
++ /* debug3("servicename: %s", servicename); */
++ buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, servicename);
++ /* debug3("pwd: %s", pwd); */
+ if(retc)
+- pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, pwd);
++ buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, pwd);
+ else
+- pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, "");
+- /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("action: %s", action_logbuf); */
+- pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_string(session_id2, action_agentbuf.buf + action_agentbuf.offset, action_agentbuf.end - action_agentbuf.offset);
++ buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, "");
++ /* debug3("action: %s", action_logbuf); */
++ buffer_put_string(session_id2, sshbuf_ptr(&action_agentbuf), sshbuf_len(&action_agentbuf));
+ if (free_logbuf) {
+ free(action_logbuf);
+- pamsshagentauth_buffer_free(&action_agentbuf);
++ buffer_free(&action_agentbuf);
+ }
+- /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("hostname: %s", hostname); */
++ /* debug3("hostname: %s", hostname); */
+ if(reti >= 0)
+- pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, hostname);
++ buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, hostname);
+ else
+- pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, "");
+- /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("ts: %ld", ts); */
+- pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_int64(session_id2, (uint64_t) ts);
++ buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, "");
++ /* debug3("ts: %ld", ts); */
++ buffer_put_int64(session_id2, (uint64_t) ts);
+
+ free(cookie);
+ return;
+@@ -288,39 +291,47 @@ pamsshagentauth_find_authorized_keys(con
+ {
+ Buffer session_id2 = { 0 };
+ Identity *id;
+- Key *key;
+ AuthenticationConnection *ac;
+- char *comment;
+ uint8_t retval = 0;
+ uid_t uid = getpwnam(ruser)->pw_uid;
++ struct ssh_identitylist *idlist;
++ int r;
++ unsigned int i;
+
+ OpenSSL_add_all_digests();
+ pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(&session_id2, user, ruser, servicename);
+
+ if ((ac = ssh_get_authentication_connection_for_uid(uid))) {
+- pamsshagentauth_verbose("Contacted ssh-agent of user %s (%u)", ruser, uid);
+- for (key = ssh_get_first_identity(ac, &comment, 2); key != NULL; key = ssh_get_next_identity(ac, &comment, 2))
++ verbose("Contacted ssh-agent of user %s (%u)", ruser, uid);
++ if ((r = ssh_fetch_identitylist(ac->fd, 2,
++ &idlist)) != 0) {
++ if (r != SSH_ERR_AGENT_NO_IDENTITIES)
++ fprintf(stderr, "error fetching identities for "
++ "protocol %d: %s\n", 2, ssh_err(r));
++ } else {
++ for (i = 0; i < idlist->nkeys; i++)
+ {
+- if(key != NULL) {
+- id = pamsshagentauth_xcalloc(1, sizeof(*id));
+- id->key = key;
+- id->filename = comment;
++ if(idlist->keys[i] != NULL) {
++ id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*id));
++ id->key = idlist->keys[i];
++ id->filename = idlist->comments[i];
+ id->ac = ac;
+ if(userauth_pubkey_from_id(ruser, id, &session_id2)) {
+ retval = 1;
+ }
+- free(id->filename);
+- pamsshagentauth_key_free(id->key);
+ free(id);
+ if(retval == 1)
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+- pamsshagentauth_buffer_free(&session_id2);
+- ssh_close_authentication_connection(ac);
++ buffer_free(&session_id2);
++ ssh_free_identitylist(idlist);
++ ssh_close_authentication_socket(ac->fd);
++ free(ac);
++ }
+ }
+ else {
+- pamsshagentauth_verbose("No ssh-agent could be contacted");
++ verbose("No ssh-agent could be contacted");
+ }
+ /* pamsshagentauth_xfree(session_id2); */
+ EVP_cleanup();
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c.psaa-agent openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c.psaa-agent 2017-02-14 10:19:12.223071868 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c 2017-02-14 10:19:12.226071867 +0100
+@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,
+ * a patch 8-)
+ */
+ #if ! HAVE___PROGNAME || HAVE_BUNDLE
+- __progname = pamsshagentauth_xstrdup(servicename);
++ __progname = xstrdup(servicename);
+ #endif
+
+ for(i = argc, argv_ptr = (char **) argv; i > 0; ++argv_ptr, i--) {
+@@ -130,11 +130,11 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,
+ #endif
+ }
+
+- pamsshagentauth_log_init(__progname, log_lvl, facility, getenv("PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_DEBUG") ? 1 : 0);
++ log_init(__progname, log_lvl, facility, getenv("PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_DEBUG") ? 1 : 0);
+ pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_USER, (void *) &user);
+ pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_RUSER, (void *) &ruser_ptr);
+
+- pamsshagentauth_verbose("Beginning pam_ssh_agent_auth for user %s", user);
++ verbose("Beginning pam_ssh_agent_auth for user %s", user);
+
+ if(ruser_ptr) {
+ strncpy(ruser, ruser_ptr, sizeof(ruser) - 1);
+@@ -149,12 +149,12 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,
+ #ifdef ENABLE_SUDO_HACK
+ if( (strlen(sudo_service_name) > 0) && strncasecmp(servicename, sudo_service_name, sizeof(sudo_service_name) - 1) == 0 && getenv("SUDO_USER") ) {
+ strncpy(ruser, getenv("SUDO_USER"), sizeof(ruser) - 1 );
+- pamsshagentauth_verbose( "Using environment variable SUDO_USER (%s)", ruser );
++ verbose( "Using environment variable SUDO_USER (%s)", ruser );
+ } else
+ #endif
+ {
+ if( ! getpwuid(getuid()) ) {
+- pamsshagentauth_verbose("Unable to getpwuid(getuid())");
++ verbose("Unable to getpwuid(getuid())");
+ goto cleanexit;
+ }
+ strncpy(ruser, getpwuid(getuid())->pw_name, sizeof(ruser) - 1);
+@@ -163,11 +163,11 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,
+
+ /* Might as well explicitely confirm the user exists here */
+ if(! getpwnam(ruser) ) {
+- pamsshagentauth_verbose("getpwnam(%s) failed, bailing out", ruser);
++ verbose("getpwnam(%s) failed, bailing out", ruser);
+ goto cleanexit;
+ }
+ if( ! getpwnam(user) ) {
+- pamsshagentauth_verbose("getpwnam(%s) failed, bailing out", user);
++ verbose("getpwnam(%s) failed, bailing out", user);
+ goto cleanexit;
+ }
+
+@@ -177,8 +177,8 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,
+ */
+ parse_authorized_key_file(user, authorized_keys_file_input);
+ } else {
+- pamsshagentauth_verbose("Using default file=/etc/security/authorized_keys");
+- authorized_keys_file = pamsshagentauth_xstrdup("/etc/security/authorized_keys");
++ verbose("Using default file=/etc/security/authorized_keys");
++ authorized_keys_file = xstrdup("/etc/security/authorized_keys");
+ }
+
+ /*
+@@ -187,19 +187,19 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,
+ */
+
+ if(user && strlen(ruser) > 0) {
+- pamsshagentauth_verbose("Attempting authentication: `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);
++ verbose("Attempting authentication: `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);
+
+ /*
+ * this pw_uid is used to validate the SSH_AUTH_SOCK, and so must be the uid of the ruser invoking the program, not the target-user
+ */
+ if(pamsshagentauth_find_authorized_keys(user, ruser, servicename)) { /* getpwnam(ruser)->pw_uid)) { */
+- pamsshagentauth_logit("Authenticated: `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);
++ logit("Authenticated: `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);
+ retval = PAM_SUCCESS;
+ } else {
+- pamsshagentauth_logit("Failed Authentication: `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);
++ logit("Failed Authentication: `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);
+ }
+ } else {
+- pamsshagentauth_logit("No %s specified, cannot continue with this form of authentication", (user) ? "ruser" : "user" );
++ logit("No %s specified, cannot continue with this form of authentication", (user) ? "ruser" : "user" );
+ }
+
+ cleanexit:
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_user_authorized_keys.c.psaa-agent openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_user_authorized_keys.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_user_authorized_keys.c.psaa-agent 2016-11-13 04:24:32.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_user_authorized_keys.c 2017-02-14 10:19:12.226071867 +0100
+@@ -117,12 +117,12 @@ parse_authorized_key_file(const char *us
+ } else {
+ slash_ptr = strchr(auth_keys_file_buf, '/');
+ if(!slash_ptr)
+- pamsshagentauth_fatal
++ fatal
+ ("cannot expand tilde in path without a `/'");
+
+ owner_uname_len = slash_ptr - auth_keys_file_buf - 1;
+ if(owner_uname_len > (sizeof(owner_uname) - 1))
+- pamsshagentauth_fatal("Username too long");
++ fatal("Username too long");
+
+ strncat(owner_uname, auth_keys_file_buf + 1, owner_uname_len);
+ if(!authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid)
+@@ -130,11 +130,11 @@ parse_authorized_key_file(const char *us
+ getpwnam(owner_uname)->pw_uid;
+ }
+ authorized_keys_file =
+- pamsshagentauth_tilde_expand_filename(auth_keys_file_buf,
++ tilde_expand_filename(auth_keys_file_buf,
+ authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid);
+ strncpy(auth_keys_file_buf, authorized_keys_file,
+ sizeof(auth_keys_file_buf) - 1);
+- pamsshagentauth_xfree(authorized_keys_file) /* when we
++ free(authorized_keys_file) /* when we
+ percent_expand
+ later, we'd step
+ on this, so free
+@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ parse_authorized_key_file(const char *us
+ strncat(hostname, fqdn, strcspn(fqdn, "."));
+ #endif
+ authorized_keys_file =
+- pamsshagentauth_percent_expand(auth_keys_file_buf, "h",
++ percent_expand(auth_keys_file_buf, "h",
+ getpwnam(user)->pw_dir, "H", hostname,
+ "f", fqdn, "u", user, NULL);
+ }
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_user_key_allowed2.c.psaa-agent openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_user_key_allowed2.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_user_key_allowed2.c.psaa-agent 2017-02-14 10:19:12.224071868 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_user_key_allowed2.c 2017-02-14 10:19:12.226071867 +0100
+@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
+ #include <sys/stat.h>
+ #include <sys/wait.h>
+ #include <fcntl.h>
++#include <unistd.h>
+
+ #include <pwd.h>
+ #include <stdio.h>
+@@ -53,6 +54,7 @@
+ #include "misc.h"
+ #include "secure_filename.h"
+ #include "uidswap.h"
++#include "digest.h"
+
+ #include "identity.h"
+
+@@ -68,7 +70,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_check_authkeys_file(FILE
+ char *fp;
+
+ found_key = 0;
+- found = pamsshagentauth_key_new(key->type);
++ found = key_new(key->type);
+
+ while(read_keyfile_line(f, file, line, sizeof(line), &linenum) != -1) {
+ char *cp = NULL; /* *key_options = NULL; */
+@@ -78,11 +80,11 @@ pamsshagentauth_check_authkeys_file(FILE
+ if(!*cp || *cp == '\n' || *cp == '#')
+ continue;
+
+- if(pamsshagentauth_key_read(found, &cp) != 1) {
++ if(key_read(found, &cp) != 1) {
+ /* no key? check if there are options for this key */
+ int quoted = 0;
+
+- pamsshagentauth_verbose("user_key_allowed: check options: '%s'", cp);
++ verbose("user_key_allowed: check options: '%s'", cp);
+ /* key_options = cp; */
+ for(; *cp && (quoted || (*cp != ' ' && *cp != '\t')); cp++) {
+ if(*cp == '\\' && cp[1] == '"')
+@@ -92,26 +94,26 @@ pamsshagentauth_check_authkeys_file(FILE
+ }
+ /* Skip remaining whitespace. */
+ for(; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++);
+- if(pamsshagentauth_key_read(found, &cp) != 1) {
+- pamsshagentauth_verbose("user_key_allowed: advance: '%s'", cp);
++ if(key_read(found, &cp) != 1) {
++ verbose("user_key_allowed: advance: '%s'", cp);
+ /* still no key? advance to next line */
+ continue;
+ }
+ }
+- if(pamsshagentauth_key_equal(found, key)) {
++ if(key_equal(found, key)) {
+ found_key = 1;
+- pamsshagentauth_logit("matching key found: file/command %s, line %lu", file,
++ logit("matching key found: file/command %s, line %lu", file,
+ linenum);
+- fp = pamsshagentauth_key_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+- pamsshagentauth_logit("Found matching %s key: %s",
+- pamsshagentauth_key_type(found), fp);
++ fp = key_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
++ logit("Found matching %s key: %s",
++ key_type(found), fp);
+ free(fp);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+- pamsshagentauth_key_free(found);
++ key_free(found);
+ if(!found_key)
+- pamsshagentauth_verbose("key not found");
++ verbose("key not found");
+ return found_key;
+ }
+
+@@ -128,11 +130,11 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(struct
+ char buf[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES];
+
+ /* Temporarily use the user's uid. */
+- pamsshagentauth_verbose("trying public key file %s", file);
++ verbose("trying public key file %s", file);
+
+ /* Fail not so quietly if file does not exist */
+ if(stat(file, &st) < 0) {
+- pamsshagentauth_verbose("File not found: %s", file);
++ verbose("File not found: %s", file);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+@@ -144,7 +146,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(struct
+
+ if(pamsshagentauth_secure_filename(f, file, pw, buf, sizeof(buf)) != 0) {
+ fclose(f);
+- pamsshagentauth_logit("Authentication refused: %s", buf);
++ logit("Authentication refused: %s", buf);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+@@ -187,44 +189,44 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed
+ else {
+ pw = getpwnam(authorized_keys_command_user);
+ if(pw == NULL) {
+- pamsshagentauth_logerror("authorized_keys_command_user \"%s\" not found: %s",
++ error("authorized_keys_command_user \"%s\" not found: %s",
+ authorized_keys_command_user, strerror(errno));
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+- pamsshagentauth_temporarily_use_uid(pw);
++ temporarily_use_uid(pw);
+
+ if(stat(authorized_keys_command, &st) < 0) {
+- pamsshagentauth_logerror
++ error
+ ("Could not stat AuthorizedKeysCommand \"%s\": %s",
+ authorized_keys_command, strerror(errno));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if(pamsshagentauth_auth_secure_path
+ (authorized_keys_command, &st, NULL, 0, errmsg, sizeof(errmsg)) != 0) {
+- pamsshagentauth_logerror("Unsafe AuthorizedKeysCommand: %s", errmsg);
++ error("Unsafe AuthorizedKeysCommand: %s", errmsg);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* open the pipe and read the keys */
+ if(pipe(p) != 0) {
+- pamsshagentauth_logerror("%s: pipe: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
++ error("%s: pipe: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+- pamsshagentauth_debug("Running AuthorizedKeysCommand: \"%s\" as \"%s\" with argument: \"%s\"",
++ debug("Running AuthorizedKeysCommand: \"%s\" as \"%s\" with argument: \"%s\"",
+ authorized_keys_command, pw->pw_name, username);
+
+ /*
+ * Don't want to call this in the child, where it can fatal() and
+ * run cleanup_exit() code.
+ */
+- pamsshagentauth_restore_uid();
++ restore_uid();
+
+ switch ((pid = fork())) {
+ case -1: /* error */
+- pamsshagentauth_logerror("%s: fork: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
++ error("%s: fork: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ close(p[0]);
+ close(p[1]);
+ return 0;
+@@ -234,13 +236,13 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed
+
+ /* do this before the setresuid so thta they can be logged */
+ if((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) == -1) {
+- pamsshagentauth_logerror("%s: open %s: %s", __func__, _PATH_DEVNULL,
++ error("%s: open %s: %s", __func__, _PATH_DEVNULL,
+ strerror(errno));
+ _exit(1);
+ }
+ if(dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1 || dup2(p[1], STDOUT_FILENO) == -1
+ || dup2(devnull, STDERR_FILENO) == -1) {
+- pamsshagentauth_logerror("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
++ error("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ _exit(1);
+ }
+ #if defined(HAVE_SETRESGID) && !defined(BROKEN_SETRESGID)
+@@ -248,7 +250,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed
+ #else
+ if (setgid(pw->pw_gid) != 0 || setegid(pw->pw_gid) != 0) {
+ #endif
+- pamsshagentauth_logerror("setresgid %u: %s", (u_int) pw->pw_gid,
++ error("setresgid %u: %s", (u_int) pw->pw_gid,
+ strerror(errno));
+ _exit(1);
+ }
+@@ -258,7 +260,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed
+ #else
+ if (setuid(pw->pw_uid) != 0 || seteuid(pw->pw_uid) != 0) {
+ #endif
+- pamsshagentauth_logerror("setresuid %u: %s", (u_int) pw->pw_uid,
++ error("setresuid %u: %s", (u_int) pw->pw_uid,
+ strerror(errno));
+ _exit(1);
+ }
+@@ -270,18 +272,18 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed
+
+ /* pretty sure this will barf because we are now suid, but since we
+ should't reach this anyway, I'll leave it here */
+- pamsshagentauth_logerror("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s exec failed: %s",
++ error("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s exec failed: %s",
+ authorized_keys_command, strerror(errno));
+ _exit(127);
+ default: /* parent */
+ break;
+ }
+
+- pamsshagentauth_temporarily_use_uid(pw);
++ temporarily_use_uid(pw);
+
+ close(p[1]);
+ if((f = fdopen(p[0], "r")) == NULL) {
+- pamsshagentauth_logerror("%s: fdopen: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
++ error("%s: fdopen: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ close(p[0]);
+ /* Don't leave zombie child */
+ while(waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) == -1 && errno == EINTR);
+@@ -292,22 +294,22 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed
+
+ while(waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) {
+ if(errno != EINTR) {
+- pamsshagentauth_logerror("%s: waitpid: %s", __func__,
++ error("%s: waitpid: %s", __func__,
+ strerror(errno));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+ if(WIFSIGNALED(status)) {
+- pamsshagentauth_logerror("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s exited on signal %d",
++ error("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s exited on signal %d",
+ authorized_keys_command, WTERMSIG(status));
+ goto out;
+ } else if(WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) {
+- pamsshagentauth_logerror("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s returned status %d",
++ error("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s returned status %d",
+ authorized_keys_command, WEXITSTATUS(status));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ found_key = ok;
+ out:
+- pamsshagentauth_restore_uid();
++ restore_uid();
+ return found_key;
+ }
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/secure_filename.c.psaa-agent openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/secure_filename.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/secure_filename.c.psaa-agent 2016-11-13 04:24:32.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/secure_filename.c 2017-02-14 10:19:12.226071867 +0100
+@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_auth_secure_path(const c
+ int comparehome = 0;
+ struct stat st;
+
+- pamsshagentauth_verbose("auth_secure_filename: checking for uid: %u", uid);
++ verbose("auth_secure_filename: checking for uid: %u", uid);
+
+ if (realpath(name, buf) == NULL) {
+ snprintf(err, errlen, "realpath %s failed: %s", name,
+@@ -115,9 +115,9 @@ pamsshagentauth_auth_secure_path(const c
+ snprintf(err, errlen, "dirname() failed");
+ return -1;
+ }
+- pamsshagentauth_strlcpy(buf, cp, sizeof(buf));
++ strlcpy(buf, cp, sizeof(buf));
+
+- pamsshagentauth_verbose("secure_filename: checking '%s'", buf);
++ verbose("secure_filename: checking '%s'", buf);
+ if (stat(buf, &st) < 0 ||
+ (st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != uid) ||
+ (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) {
+@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_auth_secure_path(const c
+
+ /* If are passed the homedir then we can stop */
+ if (comparehome && strcmp(homedir, buf) == 0) {
+- pamsshagentauth_verbose("secure_filename: terminating check at '%s'",
++ verbose("secure_filename: terminating check at '%s'",
+ buf);
+ break;
+ }
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c.psaa-agent openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c.psaa-agent 2017-02-14 10:19:12.224071868 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c 2017-02-14 10:19:12.226071867 +0100
+@@ -48,6 +48,8 @@
+ #include "identity.h"
+ #include "pam_user_authorized_keys.h"
+
++#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_TRUST_REQUEST 54
++
+ /* extern u_char *session_id2;
+ extern uint8_t session_id_len;
+ */
+@@ -58,7 +60,8 @@ userauth_pubkey_from_id(const char *ruse
+ Buffer b = { 0 };
+ char *pkalg = NULL;
+ u_char *pkblob = NULL, *sig = NULL;
+- u_int blen = 0, slen = 0;
++ u_int blen = 0;
++ size_t slen = 0;
+ int authenticated = 0;
+
+ pkalg = (char *) key_ssh_name(id->key);
+@@ -67,31 +70,31 @@ userauth_pubkey_from_id(const char *ruse
+ if(! pam_user_key_allowed(ruser, id->key))
+ goto user_auth_clean_exit;
+
+- if(pamsshagentauth_key_to_blob(id->key, &pkblob, &blen) == 0)
++ if(key_to_blob(id->key, &pkblob, &blen) == 0)
+ goto user_auth_clean_exit;
+
+ /* construct packet to sign and test */
+- pamsshagentauth_buffer_init(&b);
++ buffer_init(&b);
+
+- pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_string(&b, session_id2->buf + session_id2->offset, session_id2->end - session_id2->offset);
+- pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_TRUST_REQUEST);
+- pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(&b, ruser);
+- pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(&b, "pam_ssh_agent_auth");
+- pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(&b, "publickey");
+- pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_char(&b, 1);
+- pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(&b, pkalg);
+- pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_string(&b, pkblob, blen);
++ buffer_put_string(&b, sshbuf_ptr(session_id2), sshbuf_len(session_id2));
++ buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_TRUST_REQUEST);
++ buffer_put_cstring(&b, ruser);
++ buffer_put_cstring(&b, "pam_ssh_agent_auth");
++ buffer_put_cstring(&b, "publickey");
++ buffer_put_char(&b, 1);
++ buffer_put_cstring(&b, pkalg);
++ buffer_put_string(&b, pkblob, blen);
+
+- if(ssh_agent_sign(id->ac, id->key, &sig, &slen, pamsshagentauth_buffer_ptr(&b), pamsshagentauth_buffer_len(&b)) != 0)
++ if(ssh_agent_sign(id->ac->fd, id->key, &sig, &slen, buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b), NULL, 0) != 0)
+ goto user_auth_clean_exit;
+
+ /* test for correct signature */
+- if(pamsshagentauth_key_verify(id->key, sig, slen, pamsshagentauth_buffer_ptr(&b), pamsshagentauth_buffer_len(&b)) == 1)
++ if(key_verify(id->key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b)) == 1)
+ authenticated = 1;
+
+ user_auth_clean_exit:
+ /* if(&b != NULL) */
+- pamsshagentauth_buffer_free(&b);
++ buffer_free(&b);
+ if(sig != NULL)
+ free(sig);
+ if(pkblob != NULL)
diff --git a/SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3-build.patch b/SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3-build.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..18b4078
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3-build.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,177 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-build openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-build 2016-11-13 04:24:32.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c 2017-02-13 16:06:17.468680048 +0100
+@@ -39,6 +39,15 @@
+ #include "buffer.h"
+ #include "key.h"
+ #include "authfd.h"
++#include "ssh.h"
++#include <sys/types.h>
++#include <sys/stat.h>
++#include <sys/socket.h>
++#include <sys/un.h>
++#include <unistd.h>
++#include <stdlib.h>
++#include <errno.h>
++#include <fcntl.h>
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+ #include "ssh2.h"
+@@ -176,6 +185,96 @@ pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(Buffer *
+ return;
+ }
+
++/*
++ * Added by Jamie Beverly, ensure socket fd points to a socket owned by the user
++ * A cursory check is done, but to avoid race conditions, it is necessary
++ * to drop effective UID when connecting to the socket.
++ *
++ * If the cause of error is EACCES, because we verified we would not have that
++ * problem initially, we can safely assume that somebody is attempting to find a
++ * race condition; so a more "direct" log message is generated.
++ */
++
++int
++ssh_get_authentication_socket_for_uid(uid_t uid)
++{
++ const char *authsocket;
++ int sock;
++ struct sockaddr_un sunaddr;
++ struct stat sock_st;
++
++ authsocket = getenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME);
++ if (!authsocket)
++ return -1;
++
++ /* Advisory only; seteuid ensures no race condition; but will only log if we see EACCES */
++ if( stat(authsocket,&sock_st) == 0) {
++ if(uid != 0 && sock_st.st_uid != uid) {
++ fatal("uid %lu attempted to open an agent socket owned by uid %lu", (unsigned long) uid, (unsigned long) sock_st.st_uid);
++ return -1;
++ }
++ }
++
++ /*
++ * Ensures that the EACCES tested for below can _only_ happen if somebody
++ * is attempting to race the stat above to bypass authentication.
++ */
++ if( (sock_st.st_mode & S_IWUSR) != S_IWUSR || (sock_st.st_mode & S_IRUSR) != S_IRUSR) {
++ error("ssh-agent socket has incorrect permissions for owner");
++ return -1;
++ }
++
++ sunaddr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
++ strlcpy(sunaddr.sun_path, authsocket, sizeof(sunaddr.sun_path));
++
++ sock = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
++ if (sock < 0)
++ return -1;
++
++ /* close on exec */
++ if (fcntl(sock, F_SETFD, 1) == -1) {
++ close(sock);
++ return -1;
++ }
++
++ errno = 0;
++ seteuid(uid); /* To ensure a race condition is not used to circumvent the stat
++ above, we will temporarily drop UID to the caller */
++ if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&sunaddr, sizeof sunaddr) < 0) {
++ close(sock);
++ if(errno == EACCES)
++ fatal("MAJOR SECURITY WARNING: uid %lu made a deliberate and malicious attempt to open an agent socket owned by another user", (unsigned long) uid);
++ return -1;
++ }
++
++ seteuid(0); /* we now continue the regularly scheduled programming */
++
++ return sock;
++}
++
++AuthenticationConnection *
++ssh_get_authentication_connection_for_uid(uid_t uid)
++{
++ AuthenticationConnection *auth;
++ int sock;
++
++ sock = ssh_get_authentication_socket_for_uid(uid);
++
++ /*
++ * Fail if we couldn't obtain a connection. This happens if we
++ * exited due to a timeout.
++ */
++ if (sock < 0)
++ return NULL;
++
++ auth = xmalloc(sizeof(*auth));
++ auth->fd = sock;
++ buffer_init(&auth->identities);
++ auth->howmany = 0;
++
++ return auth;
++}
++
+ int
+ pamsshagentauth_find_authorized_keys(const char * user, const char * ruser, const char * servicename)
+ {
+@@ -190,7 +289,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_find_authorized_keys(con
+ OpenSSL_add_all_digests();
+ pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(&session_id2, user, ruser, servicename);
+
+- if ((ac = ssh_get_authentication_connection(uid))) {
++ if ((ac = ssh_get_authentication_connection_for_uid(uid))) {
+ pamsshagentauth_verbose("Contacted ssh-agent of user %s (%u)", ruser, uid);
+ for (key = ssh_get_first_identity(ac, &comment, 2); key != NULL; key = ssh_get_next_identity(ac, &comment, 2))
+ {
+@@ -219,3 +318,4 @@ pamsshagentauth_find_authorized_keys(con
+ EVP_cleanup();
+ return retval;
+ }
++
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/Makefile.in.psaa-build openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/Makefile.in
+--- openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/Makefile.in.psaa-build 2016-11-13 04:24:32.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/Makefile.in 2017-02-13 16:04:58.685753236 +0100
+@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ PATHS=
+ CC=@CC@
+ LD=@LD@
+ CFLAGS=@CFLAGS@
+-CPPFLAGS=-I. -I$(srcdir) @CPPFLAGS@ $(PATHS) @DEFS@
++CPPFLAGS=-I.. -I$(srcdir) -I/usr/include/nss3 -I/usr/include/nspr4 @CPPFLAGS@ $(PATHS) @DEFS@
+ LIBS=@LIBS@
+ AR=@AR@
+ AWK=@AWK@
+@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ INSTALL=@INSTALL@
+ PERL=@PERL@
+ SED=@SED@
+ ENT=@ENT@
+-LDFLAGS=-L. -Lopenbsd-compat/ @LDFLAGS@
++LDFLAGS=-L.. -L../openbsd-compat/ @LDFLAGS@
+ LDFLAGS_SHARED = @LDFLAGS_SHARED@
+ EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@
+
+@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ SSHOBJS=xmalloc.o atomicio.o authfd.o bu
+
+ ED25519OBJS=ed25519-donna/ed25519.o
+
+-PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS=pam_user_key_allowed2.o iterate_ssh_agent_keys.o userauth_pubkey_from_id.o pam_user_authorized_keys.o get_command_line.o
++PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS=pam_user_key_allowed2.o iterate_ssh_agent_keys.o userauth_pubkey_from_id.o pam_user_authorized_keys.o get_command_line.o secure_filename.o
+
+
+ MANPAGES_IN = pam_ssh_agent_auth.pod
+@@ -94,13 +94,13 @@ $(PAM_MODULES): Makefile.in config.h
+ .c.o:
+ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $< -o $@
+
+-LIBCOMPAT=openbsd-compat/libopenbsd-compat.a
++LIBCOMPAT=../openbsd-compat/libopenbsd-compat.a
+ $(LIBCOMPAT): always
+ (cd openbsd-compat && $(MAKE))
+ always:
+
+-pam_ssh_agent_auth.so: $(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHOBJS) $(ED25519OBJS) $(PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS) pam_ssh_agent_auth.o
+- $(LD) $(LDFLAGS_SHARED) -o $@ $(SSHOBJS) $(ED25519OBJS) $(PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lopenbsd-compat pam_ssh_agent_auth.o $(LIBS) -lpam
++pam_ssh_agent_auth.so: $(PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS) pam_ssh_agent_auth.o
++ $(LD) $(LDFLAGS_SHARED) -o $@ $(PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat pam_ssh_agent_auth.o $(LIBS) -lpam -lnss3
+
+ $(MANPAGES): $(MANPAGES_IN)
+ pod2man --section=8 --release=v0.10.3 --name=pam_ssh_agent_auth --official --center "PAM" pam_ssh_agent_auth.pod > pam_ssh_agent_auth.8
diff --git a/SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3-dereference.patch b/SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3-dereference.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..351aea8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3-dereference.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+diff --git a/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2/pam_user_authorized_keys.c b/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2/pam_user_authorized_keys.c
+--- a/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2/pam_user_authorized_keys.c
++++ b/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2/pam_user_authorized_keys.c
+@@ -158,11 +158,12 @@ parse_authorized_key_file(const char *user,
+ int
+ pam_user_key_allowed(const char *ruser, Key * key)
+ {
++ struct passwd *pw;
+ return
+- pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(getpwuid(authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid),
+- key, authorized_keys_file)
+- || pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(getpwuid(0), key,
+- authorized_keys_file)
++ ( (pw = getpwuid(authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid)) &&
++ pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(pw, key, authorized_keys_file))
++ || ((pw = getpwuid(0)) &&
++ pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(pw, key, authorized_keys_file))
+ || pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed2(authorized_keys_command,
+ authorized_keys_command_user,
+ getpwnam(ruser), key);
diff --git a/SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3-man-date.patch b/SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3-man-date.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8305c12
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3-man-date.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/Makefile.in.pss-pod openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/Makefile.in
+--- openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/Makefile.in.pod 2017-05-12 16:10:50.484898322 +0200
++++ openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/Makefile.in 2017-05-12 16:10:20.149908941 +0200
+@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ pam_ssh_agent_auth.so: $(PAM_SSH_AGENT_A
+ $(LD) $(LDFLAGS_SHARED) -o $@ $(PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat pam_ssh_agent_auth.o $(LIBS) -lpam -lnss3
+
+ $(MANPAGES): $(MANPAGES_IN)
+- pod2man --section=8 --release=v0.10.3 --name=pam_ssh_agent_auth --official --center "PAM" pam_ssh_agent_auth.pod > pam_ssh_agent_auth.8
++ pod2man --date="2016-11-12" --section=8 --release=v0.10.3 --name=pam_ssh_agent_auth --official --center "PAM" pam_ssh_agent_auth.pod > pam_ssh_agent_auth.8
+
+ clean: regressclean
+ rm -f *.o *.a $(PAM_MODULES) logintest config.cache config.log
diff --git a/SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3-no-xfree.patch b/SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3-no-xfree.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e766610
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3-no-xfree.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/get_command_line.c.psaa-xfree openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/get_command_line.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/get_command_line.c.psaa-xfree 2017-02-13 16:06:46.260653300 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/get_command_line.c 2017-02-13 16:07:22.228619884 +0100
+@@ -105,9 +105,9 @@ pamsshagentauth_free_command_line(char *
+ {
+ size_t i;
+ for (i = 0; i < n_args; i++)
+- pamsshagentauth_xfree(argv[i]);
++ free(argv[i]);
+
+- pamsshagentauth_xfree(argv);
++ free(argv);
+ return;
+ }
+
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-xfree openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-xfree 2017-02-13 16:06:46.261653299 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c 2017-02-13 16:08:01.263583622 +0100
+@@ -170,7 +170,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(Buffer *
+ /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("action: %s", action_logbuf); */
+ pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_string(session_id2, action_agentbuf.buf + action_agentbuf.offset, action_agentbuf.end - action_agentbuf.offset);
+ if (free_logbuf) {
+- pamsshagentauth_xfree(action_logbuf);
++ free(action_logbuf);
+ pamsshagentauth_buffer_free(&action_agentbuf);
+ }
+ /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("hostname: %s", hostname); */
+@@ -306,9 +306,9 @@ pamsshagentauth_find_authorized_keys(con
+ if(userauth_pubkey_from_id(ruser, id, &session_id2)) {
+ retval = 1;
+ }
+- pamsshagentauth_xfree(id->filename);
++ free(id->filename);
+ pamsshagentauth_key_free(id->key);
+- pamsshagentauth_xfree(id);
++ free(id);
+ if(retval == 1)
+ break;
+ }
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_user_key_allowed2.c.psaa-xfree openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_user_key_allowed2.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_user_key_allowed2.c.psaa-xfree 2017-02-13 16:06:46.261653299 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_user_key_allowed2.c 2017-02-13 16:08:25.507561099 +0100
+@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_check_authkeys_file(FILE
+ fp = pamsshagentauth_key_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+ pamsshagentauth_logit("Found matching %s key: %s",
+ pamsshagentauth_key_type(found), fp);
+- pamsshagentauth_xfree(fp);
++ free(fp);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c.psaa-xfree openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c.psaa-xfree 2017-02-13 16:06:46.261653299 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c 2017-02-13 16:08:44.164543767 +0100
+@@ -93,9 +93,9 @@ userauth_pubkey_from_id(const char *ruse
+ /* if(&b != NULL) */
+ pamsshagentauth_buffer_free(&b);
+ if(sig != NULL)
+- pamsshagentauth_xfree(sig);
++ free(sig);
+ if(pkblob != NULL)
+- pamsshagentauth_xfree(pkblob);
++ free(pkblob);
+ CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data();
+ return authenticated;
+ }
diff --git a/SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3-seteuid.patch b/SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3-seteuid.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bf485c0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3-seteuid.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-seteuid openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-seteuid 2017-02-13 17:51:29.790005199 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c 2017-02-13 17:52:53.640919947 +0100
+@@ -238,17 +238,25 @@ ssh_get_authentication_socket_for_uid(ui
+ }
+
+ errno = 0;
+- seteuid(uid); /* To ensure a race condition is not used to circumvent the stat
+- above, we will temporarily drop UID to the caller */
+- if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&sunaddr, sizeof sunaddr) < 0) {
++ /* To ensure a race condition is not used to circumvent the stat
++ above, we will temporarily drop UID to the caller */
++ if (seteuid(uid) == -1) {
+ close(sock);
+- if(errno == EACCES)
+- fatal("MAJOR SECURITY WARNING: uid %lu made a deliberate and malicious attempt to open an agent socket owned by another user", (unsigned long) uid);
++ error("seteuid(%lu) failed with error: %s", (unsigned long) uid, strerror(errno));
+ return -1;
+ }
++ if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&sunaddr, sizeof sunaddr) < 0) {
++ close(sock);
++ sock = -1;
++ if(errno == EACCES)
++ fatal("MAJOR SECURITY WARNING: uid %lu made a deliberate and malicious attempt to open an agent socket owned by another user", (unsigned long) uid);
++ }
+
+- seteuid(0); /* we now continue the regularly scheduled programming */
+-
++ /* we now continue the regularly scheduled programming */
++ if (0 != seteuid(0)) {
++ fatal("setuid(0) failed with error: %s", strerror(errno));
++ return -1;
++ }
+ return sock;
+ }
+
diff --git a/SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2-seteuid.patch b/SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2-seteuid.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index b7f12a4..0000000
--- a/SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2-seteuid.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
-diff -up pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.seteuid pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c
---- pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.seteuid 2010-09-08 08:54:29.000000000 +0200
-+++ pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c 2010-11-22 08:38:05.000000000 +0100
-@@ -131,13 +131,18 @@ ssh_get_authentication_socket_for_uid(ui
- }
-
- errno = 0;
-- seteuid(uid); /* To ensure a race condition is not used to circumvent the stat
-- above, we will temporarily drop UID to the caller */
-+ /* To ensure a race condition is not used to circumvent the stat
-+ above, we will temporarily drop UID to the caller */
-+ if (seteuid(uid) == -1) {
-+ close(sock);
-+ error("seteuid(%lu) failed", (unsigned long) uid);
-+ return -1;
-+ }
- if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&sunaddr, sizeof sunaddr) < 0) {
- close(sock);
-- if(errno == EACCES)
-- fatal("MAJOR SECURITY WARNING: uid %lu made a deliberate and malicious attempt to open an agent socket owned by another user", (unsigned long) uid);
-- return -1;
-+ sock = -1;
-+ if(errno == EACCES)
-+ fatal("MAJOR SECURITY WARNING: uid %lu made a deliberate and malicious attempt to open an agent socket owned by another user", (unsigned long) uid);
- }
-
- seteuid(0); /* we now continue the regularly scheduled programming */
diff --git a/SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2-visibility.patch b/SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2-visibility.patch
index f229144..b3127b6 100644
--- a/SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2-visibility.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2-visibility.patch
@@ -18,4 +18,4 @@ diff -up pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c.visibility pam_ssh_agent_
+PAM_EXTERN int __attribute__ ((visibility ("default")))
pam_sm_setcred(pam_handle_t * pamh, int flags, int argc, const char **argv)
{
- return PAM_SUCCESS;
+ UNUSED(pamh);
diff --git a/SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3-build.patch b/SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3-build.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 40ab19d..0000000
--- a/SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3-build.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,179 +0,0 @@
-diff -up pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-build pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c
---- pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-build 2010-01-13 03:17:01.000000000 +0100
-+++ pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c 2012-06-21 20:14:56.432527764 +0200
-@@ -37,7 +37,16 @@
- #include "buffer.h"
- #include "key.h"
- #include "authfd.h"
-+#include "ssh.h"
- #include <stdio.h>
-+#include <sys/types.h>
-+#include <sys/stat.h>
-+#include <sys/socket.h>
-+#include <sys/un.h>
-+#include <unistd.h>
-+#include <stdlib.h>
-+#include <errno.h>
-+#include <fcntl.h>
- #include <openssl/evp.h>
-
- #include "userauth_pubkey_from_id.h"
-@@ -69,6 +78,96 @@ session_id2_gen()
- return cookie;
- }
-
-+/*
-+ * Added by Jamie Beverly, ensure socket fd points to a socket owned by the user
-+ * A cursory check is done, but to avoid race conditions, it is necessary
-+ * to drop effective UID when connecting to the socket.
-+ *
-+ * If the cause of error is EACCES, because we verified we would not have that
-+ * problem initially, we can safely assume that somebody is attempting to find a
-+ * race condition; so a more "direct" log message is generated.
-+ */
-+
-+int
-+ssh_get_authentication_socket_for_uid(uid_t uid)
-+{
-+ const char *authsocket;
-+ int sock;
-+ struct sockaddr_un sunaddr;
-+ struct stat sock_st;
-+
-+ authsocket = getenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME);
-+ if (!authsocket)
-+ return -1;
-+
-+ /* Advisory only; seteuid ensures no race condition; but will only log if we see EACCES */
-+ if( stat(authsocket,&sock_st) == 0) {
-+ if(uid != 0 && sock_st.st_uid != uid) {
-+ fatal("uid %lu attempted to open an agent socket owned by uid %lu", (unsigned long) uid, (unsigned long) sock_st.st_uid);
-+ return -1;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Ensures that the EACCES tested for below can _only_ happen if somebody
-+ * is attempting to race the stat above to bypass authentication.
-+ */
-+ if( (sock_st.st_mode & S_IWUSR) != S_IWUSR || (sock_st.st_mode & S_IRUSR) != S_IRUSR) {
-+ error("ssh-agent socket has incorrect permissions for owner");
-+ return -1;
-+ }
-+
-+ sunaddr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
-+ strlcpy(sunaddr.sun_path, authsocket, sizeof(sunaddr.sun_path));
-+
-+ sock = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
-+ if (sock < 0)
-+ return -1;
-+
-+ /* close on exec */
-+ if (fcntl(sock, F_SETFD, 1) == -1) {
-+ close(sock);
-+ return -1;
-+ }
-+
-+ errno = 0;
-+ seteuid(uid); /* To ensure a race condition is not used to circumvent the stat
-+ above, we will temporarily drop UID to the caller */
-+ if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&sunaddr, sizeof sunaddr) < 0) {
-+ close(sock);
-+ if(errno == EACCES)
-+ fatal("MAJOR SECURITY WARNING: uid %lu made a deliberate and malicious attempt to open an agent socket owned by another user", (unsigned long) uid);
-+ return -1;
-+ }
-+
-+ seteuid(0); /* we now continue the regularly scheduled programming */
-+
-+ return sock;
-+}
-+
-+AuthenticationConnection *
-+ssh_get_authentication_connection_for_uid(uid_t uid)
-+{
-+ AuthenticationConnection *auth;
-+ int sock;
-+
-+ sock = ssh_get_authentication_socket_for_uid(uid);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Fail if we couldn't obtain a connection. This happens if we
-+ * exited due to a timeout.
-+ */
-+ if (sock < 0)
-+ return NULL;
-+
-+ auth = xmalloc(sizeof(*auth));
-+ auth->fd = sock;
-+ buffer_init(&auth->identities);
-+ auth->howmany = 0;
-+
-+ return auth;
-+}
-+
- int
- find_authorized_keys(uid_t uid)
- {
-@@ -81,7 +180,7 @@ find_authorized_keys(uid_t uid)
- OpenSSL_add_all_digests();
- session_id2 = session_id2_gen();
-
-- if ((ac = ssh_get_authentication_connection(uid))) {
-+ if ((ac = ssh_get_authentication_connection_for_uid(uid))) {
- verbose("Contacted ssh-agent of user %s (%u)", getpwuid(uid)->pw_name, uid);
- for (key = ssh_get_first_identity(ac, &comment, 2); key != NULL; key = ssh_get_next_identity(ac, &comment, 2))
- {
-@@ -109,3 +208,4 @@ find_authorized_keys(uid_t uid)
- EVP_cleanup();
- return retval;
- }
-+
-diff -up pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/Makefile.in.psaa-build pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/Makefile.in
---- pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/Makefile.in.psaa-build 2009-10-27 21:19:41.000000000 +0100
-+++ pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/Makefile.in 2012-06-21 20:14:56.432527764 +0200
-@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ PATHS=
- CC=@CC@
- LD=@LD@
- CFLAGS=@CFLAGS@
--CPPFLAGS=-I. -I$(srcdir) @CPPFLAGS@ $(PATHS) @DEFS@
-+CPPFLAGS=-I.. -I$(srcdir) -I/usr/include/nss3 -I/usr/include/nspr4 @CPPFLAGS@ $(PATHS) @DEFS@
- LIBS=@LIBS@
- AR=@AR@
- AWK=@AWK@
-@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ INSTALL=@INSTALL@
- PERL=@PERL@
- SED=@SED@
- ENT=@ENT@
--LDFLAGS=-L. -Lopenbsd-compat/ @LDFLAGS@
-+LDFLAGS=-L.. -L../openbsd-compat/ @LDFLAGS@
- LDFLAGS_SHARED = @LDFLAGS_SHARED@
- EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@
-
-@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ PAM_MODULES=pam_ssh_agent_auth.so
-
- SSHOBJS=xmalloc.o atomicio.o authfd.o bufaux.o bufbn.o buffer.o cleanup.o entropy.o fatal.o key.o log.o misc.o secure_filename.o ssh-dss.o ssh-rsa.o uuencode.o compat.o
-
--PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS=pam_user_key_allowed2.o iterate_ssh_agent_keys.o userauth_pubkey_from_id.o pam_user_authorized_keys.o
-+PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS=pam_user_key_allowed2.o iterate_ssh_agent_keys.o userauth_pubkey_from_id.o pam_user_authorized_keys.o secure_filename.o
-
-
- MANPAGES_IN = pam_ssh_agent_auth.pod
-@@ -67,13 +67,13 @@ $(PAM_MODULES): Makefile.in config.h
- .c.o:
- $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $<
-
--LIBCOMPAT=openbsd-compat/libopenbsd-compat.a
-+LIBCOMPAT=../openbsd-compat/libopenbsd-compat.a
- $(LIBCOMPAT): always
- (cd openbsd-compat && $(MAKE))
- always:
-
--pam_ssh_agent_auth.so: $(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHOBJS) $(PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS) pam_ssh_agent_auth.o
-- $(LD) $(LDFLAGS_SHARED) -o $@ $(SSHOBJS) $(PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) -lpam pam_ssh_agent_auth.o
-+pam_ssh_agent_auth.so: $(PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS) pam_ssh_agent_auth.o
-+ $(LD) $(LDFLAGS_SHARED) -o $@ $(PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) -lpam -lnss3 pam_ssh_agent_auth.o
-
- $(MANPAGES): $(MANPAGES_IN)
- pod2man --section=8 --release=v0.8 --name=pam_ssh_agent_auth --official --center "PAM" pam_ssh_agent_auth.pod > pam_ssh_agent_auth.8
-diff -up pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/pam_user_authorized_keys.c.psaa-build pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/pam_user_authorized_keys.c
diff --git a/SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3-command.patch b/SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3-command.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 88e8d7d..0000000
--- a/SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3-command.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,1451 +0,0 @@
-From b0695cc9f5478daa14d3f451ecdd39ba6e6abe0f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
-Date: Tue, 19 Jan 2016 15:29:22 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] authorized_keys_command
-
----
- pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/CONTRIBUTORS | 2 +
- pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/Makefile.in | 28 +-
- pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/README | 38 +++
- pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/configure.ac | 27 +-
- pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/get_command_line.c | 113 +++++++
- pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/get_command_line.h | 40 +++
- pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/identity.h | 24 ++
- pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c | 137 ++++++++-
- pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.h | 2 +-
- pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c | 16 +-
- pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/pam_ssh_agent_auth.pod | 50 ++-
- pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/pam_static_macros.h | 29 ++
- .../pam_user_authorized_keys.c | 23 +-
- .../pam_user_authorized_keys.h | 2 +-
- pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/pam_user_key_allowed2.c | 334 ++++++++++++++++-----
- pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/pam_user_key_allowed2.h | 3 +-
- pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/secure_filename.c | 51 +++-
- pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/secure_filename.h | 4 +-
- pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c | 20 +-
- pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/userauth_pubkey_from_id.h | 2 +-
- 20 files changed, 805 insertions(+), 140 deletions(-)
- create mode 100644 pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/README
- create mode 100644 pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/get_command_line.c
- create mode 100644 pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/get_command_line.h
-
-diff --git a/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/CONTRIBUTORS b/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/CONTRIBUTORS
-index d5a21cb..22b424a 100644
---- a/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/CONTRIBUTORS
-+++ b/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/CONTRIBUTORS
-@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
- * Foremost, OpenSSH from which this project is derived.
- * Jamie Beverly
- * Rafael D'Halleweyn - 2011-06-05 18:56:24 EDT
-+* Jan-Pieter Cornet ( johnpc ) - 2012-03-23 03:25:52 PDT
-+* chrysn@fsfe.org
-diff --git a/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/Makefile.in b/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/Makefile.in
-index 47bb103..4977838 100644
---- a/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/Makefile.in
-+++ b/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/Makefile.in
-@@ -1,4 +1,28 @@
- # $Id: Makefile.in,v 1.289 2008/03/13 01:41:31 djm Exp $
-+#
-+# Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
-+# Modifications Copyright (c) 2008-2014 Jamie Beverly. All Rights reserved
-+#
-+# Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-+# modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-+# are met:
-+# 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
-+# notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
-+# 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
-+# notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
-+# documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
-+#
-+# THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
-+# IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
-+# OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
-+# IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
-+# INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
-+# NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
-+# DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
-+# THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
-+# (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
-+# THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
-+#
-
- # uncomment if you run a non bourne compatable shell. Ie. csh
- #SHELL = @SH@
-@@ -46,9 +70,9 @@ INSTALL_SSH_RAND_HELPER=@INSTALL_SSH_RAND_HELPER@
-
- PAM_MODULES=pam_ssh_agent_auth.so
-
--SSHOBJS=xmalloc.o atomicio.o authfd.o bufaux.o bufbn.o buffer.o cleanup.o entropy.o fatal.o key.o log.o misc.o secure_filename.o ssh-dss.o ssh-rsa.o uuencode.o compat.o
-+SSHOBJS=xmalloc.o atomicio.o authfd.o bufaux.o bufbn.o buffer.o cleanup.o entropy.o fatal.o key.o log.o misc.o secure_filename.o ssh-dss.o ssh-rsa.o uuencode.o compat.o uidswap.o
-
--PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS=pam_user_key_allowed2.o iterate_ssh_agent_keys.o userauth_pubkey_from_id.o pam_user_authorized_keys.o secure_filename.o
-+PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS=pam_user_key_allowed2.o iterate_ssh_agent_keys.o userauth_pubkey_from_id.o pam_user_authorized_keys.o secure_filename.o get_command_line.o
-
-
- MANPAGES_IN = pam_ssh_agent_auth.pod
-diff --git a/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/README b/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/README
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..c1a49ef
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/README
-@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
-+pam_ssh_agent_auth is a PAM module which permits PAM authentication via your
-+keyring in a forwarded ssh-agent.
-+
-+Release 0.10.1 is stable, and has been tested on FreeBSD, Solaris 10, Solaris 11,
-+RHEL5, RHEL6, Debian Wheezy, Ubuntu 12.04 (LTS), Ubuntu 13.10,
-+and MacOS X 10.7.
-+
-+This module can be used to provide authentication for anything run locally that
-+supports PAM. It was written specifically with the intention of permitting
-+authentication for sudo without password entry, and also has been proven useful
-+for use with su as an alternative to wheel.
-+
-+It serves as middle ground between the two most common, and suboptimal
-+alternatives for large-scale system administration: allowing rootlogin via ssh,
-+or using NOPASSWD in sudoers. This module allows for ssh public-key
-+authentication, and it does this by leveraging an authentication mechanism you
-+are probably already using, ssh-agent.
-+
-+There are caveats of course, ssh-agent forwarding has it’s own security risks
-+which must be carefully considered for your environment. In cases where there
-+are not untrustworthy intermediate servers, and you wish to retain traceability,
-+accountability, and required authentication for privileged command invocation,
-+the benefits should outweigh the risks. Release 0.10.1 can be downloaded from
-+SourceForge: https://sourceforge.net/project/showfiles.php?group_id=249556
-+
-+If you encounter any issues with usability or security, please use the project's
-+SourceForge tracker:
-+https://sourceforge.net/tracker2/?group_id=249556&atid=1126337
-+
-+Note that if you wish to use this for sudo, you will need a version of sudo that
-+preserves the env_keep environment during authentication; and ideally a version
-+incorporating my minor patch which ensures RUSER is set during PAM authentication.
-+
-+sudo 1.6.8p12 does not work correctly with this PAM module, because it clears the
-+environment (even env_keep variables) prior to attempting PAM authentication.
-+
-+sudo 1.7.2p1 or later is preferred, as it correctly sets PAM_RUSER for
-+authentication.
-diff --git a/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/configure.ac b/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/configure.ac
-index 1f372ce..4eb1f32 100644
---- a/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/configure.ac
-+++ b/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/configure.ac
-@@ -18,8 +18,10 @@ AC_INIT(OpenSSH, Portable, openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org)
- AC_REVISION($Revision: 1.397 $)
- AC_CONFIG_SRCDIR([pam_ssh_agent_auth.c])
-
--AC_CONFIG_HEADER(config.h)
-+AC_CONFIG_SRCDIR([config.h.in])
-+AC_CONFIG_HEADERS([config.h])
- AC_PROG_CC
-+AC_C_INLINE
- AC_CANONICAL_HOST
- AC_C_BIGENDIAN
-
-@@ -117,7 +119,6 @@ if test -z "$LD" ; then
- fi
- AC_SUBST(LD)
-
--AC_C_INLINE
-
- AC_CHECK_DECL(LLONG_MAX, have_llong_max=1, , [#include <limits.h>])
-
-@@ -151,7 +152,7 @@ if test "$GCC" = "yes" || test "$GCC" = "egcs"; then
- ;;
- 2.*) no_attrib_nonnull=1 ;;
- 3.*) CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Wsign-compare" ;;
-- 4.*) CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Wsign-compare -Wno-pointer-sign" ;;
-+ 4.*) CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Wsign-compare -Wall -Wextra" ;;
- *) ;;
- esac
-
-@@ -1656,11 +1657,11 @@ fi
-
- if test "x$check_for_conflicting_getspnam" = "x1"; then
- AC_MSG_CHECKING(for conflicting getspnam in shadow.h)
-- AC_COMPILE_IFELSE(
-+ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE(
- [
- #include <shadow.h>
- int main(void) {exit(0);}
-- ],
-+ ])],
- [
- AC_MSG_RESULT(no)
- ],
-@@ -2720,7 +2721,7 @@ fi
- dnl make sure we're using the real structure members and not defines
- AC_CACHE_CHECK([for msg_accrights field in struct msghdr],
- ac_cv_have_accrights_in_msghdr, [
-- AC_COMPILE_IFELSE(
-+ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE(
- [
- #include <sys/types.h>
- #include <sys/socket.h>
-@@ -2734,7 +2735,7 @@ struct msghdr m;
- m.msg_accrights = 0;
- exit(0);
- }
-- ],
-+ ])],
- [ ac_cv_have_accrights_in_msghdr="yes" ],
- [ ac_cv_have_accrights_in_msghdr="no" ]
- )
-@@ -2747,7 +2748,7 @@ fi
-
- AC_CACHE_CHECK([for msg_control field in struct msghdr],
- ac_cv_have_control_in_msghdr, [
-- AC_COMPILE_IFELSE(
-+ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE(
- [
- #include <sys/types.h>
- #include <sys/socket.h>
-@@ -2761,7 +2762,7 @@ struct msghdr m;
- m.msg_control = 0;
- exit(0);
- }
-- ],
-+ ])],
- [ ac_cv_have_control_in_msghdr="yes" ],
- [ ac_cv_have_control_in_msghdr="no" ]
- )
-@@ -2891,14 +2892,14 @@ AC_SEARCH_LIBS(getrrsetbyname, resolv,
- saved_LIBS="$LIBS"
- LIBS="$LIBS -lresolv"
- AC_MSG_CHECKING(for res_query in -lresolv)
-- AC_LINK_IFELSE([
-+ AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE([
- #include <resolv.h>
- int main()
- {
- res_query (0, 0, 0, 0, 0);
- return 0;
- }
-- ],
-+ ])],
- [LIBS="$LIBS -lresolv"
- AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)],
- [LIBS="$saved_LIBS"
-@@ -2915,7 +2916,7 @@ int main()
- ])
-
- AC_MSG_CHECKING(if struct __res_state _res is an extern)
--AC_LINK_IFELSE([
-+AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE([
- #include <stdio.h>
- #if HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
- # include <sys/types.h>
-@@ -2925,7 +2926,7 @@ AC_LINK_IFELSE([
- #include <resolv.h>
- extern struct __res_state _res;
- int main() { return 0; }
-- ],
-+ ])],
- [AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)
- AC_DEFINE(HAVE__RES_EXTERN, 1,
- [Define if you have struct __res_state _res as an extern])
-diff --git a/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/get_command_line.c b/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/get_command_line.c
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..e880fee
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/get_command_line.c
-@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
-+/*
-+ * Copyright (c) 2014, Jamie Beverly.
-+ * All rights reserved.
-+ *
-+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, are
-+ * permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
-+ *
-+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, this list of
-+ * conditions and the following disclaimer.
-+ *
-+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, this list
-+ * of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation and/or other materials
-+ * provided with the distribution.
-+ *
-+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY Jamie Beverly ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
-+ * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND
-+ * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL Jamie Beverly OR
-+ * CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
-+ * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR
-+ * SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON
-+ * ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING
-+ * NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF
-+ * ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
-+ *
-+ * The views and conclusions contained in the software and documentation are those of the
-+ * authors and should not be interpreted as representing official policies, either expressed
-+ * or implied, of Jamie Beverly.
-+ */
-+
-+#include <stdio.h>
-+#include <errno.h>
-+#include <string.h>
-+
-+#include "includes.h"
-+#include "xmalloc.h"
-+#include "get_command_line.h"
-+
-+#ifdef HAVE_PROC_PID_CMDLINE
-+
-+static size_t
-+proc_pid_cmdline(char *** inargv)
-+{
-+ pid_t pid;
-+ FILE *f = NULL;
-+ char filename[64] = { 0 }, c = '\0';
-+ char ** argv;
-+ char argbuf[MAX_LEN_PER_CMDLINE_ARG + 1] = { 0 };
-+ size_t count = 0, len = 0;
-+
-+ pid = getpid();
-+ argv = NULL;
-+
-+ snprintf(filename, sizeof(filename), "/proc/%d/cmdline", pid);
-+ f = fopen(filename, "r");
-+
-+ if (f) {
-+ while (!feof(f) && count < MAX_CMDLINE_ARGS) {
-+ if (len > MAX_LEN_PER_CMDLINE_ARG) {
-+ while (!feof(f) && (c = fgetc(f)) != '\0');
-+ }
-+ else {
-+ c = fgetc(f);
-+ }
-+ switch (c) {
-+ case EOF:
-+ case '\0':
-+ if (len > 0) {
-+ argv = xrealloc(argv, count + 1, sizeof(*argv));
-+ argv[count] = xcalloc(len + 1, sizeof(*argv[count]));
-+ strncpy(argv[count++], argbuf, len);
-+ memset(argbuf, '\0', MAX_LEN_PER_CMDLINE_ARG + 1);
-+ len = 0;
-+ }
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ argbuf[len++] = c;
-+ break;
-+ }
-+ }
-+ fclose(f);
-+ }
-+ *inargv = argv;
-+ return count;
-+}
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+/*
-+ * takes a pointer to an unallocated array of arrays of strings, populates the
-+ * given pointer with the address of the allocated array of strings collected
-+ */
-+size_t
-+pamsshagentauth_get_command_line(char *** argv)
-+{
-+#ifdef HAVE_PROC_PID_CMDLINE
-+ return proc_pid_cmdline(argv);
-+#else
-+ /* No other supported implementations at this time */
-+ return 0;
-+#endif
-+}
-+
-+void
-+pamsshagentauth_free_command_line(char ** argv, size_t n_args)
-+{
-+ size_t i;
-+ for (i = 0; i < n_args; i++)
-+ free(argv[i]);
-+
-+ free(argv);
-+ return;
-+}
-+
-diff --git a/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/get_command_line.h b/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/get_command_line.h
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..37cd077
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/get_command_line.h
-@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
-+/*
-+ * Copyright (c) 2014, Jamie Beverly.
-+ * All rights reserved.
-+ *
-+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, are
-+ * permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
-+ *
-+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, this list of
-+ * conditions and the following disclaimer.
-+ *
-+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, this list
-+ * of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation and/or other materials
-+ * provided with the distribution.
-+ *
-+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY Jamie Beverly ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
-+ * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND
-+ * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL Jamie Beverly OR
-+ * CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
-+ * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR
-+ * SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON
-+ * ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING
-+ * NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF
-+ * ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
-+ *
-+ * The views and conclusions contained in the software and documentation are those of the
-+ * authors and should not be interpreted as representing official policies, either expressed
-+ * or implied, of Jamie Beverly.
-+ */
-+
-+#ifndef _GET_COMMAND_LINE_H
-+#define _GET_COMMAND_LINE_H
-+
-+#include "includes.h"
-+
-+size_t pamsshagentauth_get_command_line(char ***);
-+void pamsshagentauth_free_command_line(char **, size_t);
-+#define MAX_CMDLINE_ARGS 255
-+#define MAX_LEN_PER_CMDLINE_ARG 255
-+
-+#endif
-diff --git a/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/identity.h b/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/identity.h
-index eb21320..0bde782 100644
---- a/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/identity.h
-+++ b/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/identity.h
-@@ -1,3 +1,27 @@
-+/*
-+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
-+ *
-+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-+ * are met:
-+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
-+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
-+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
-+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
-+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
-+ *
-+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
-+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
-+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
-+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
-+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
-+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
-+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
-+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
-+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
-+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
-+ */
-+
- #ifndef _IDENTITY_H
- #define _IDENTITY_H
- #include "includes.h"
-diff --git a/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c b/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c
-index 11ab6e2..6b4d531 100644
---- a/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c
-+++ b/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c
-@@ -28,6 +28,8 @@
- */
-
-
-+#include <string.h>
-+
- #include "includes.h"
- #include "config.h"
-
-@@ -48,26 +50,75 @@
- #include <errno.h>
- #include <fcntl.h>
- #include <openssl/evp.h>
-+#include "ssh2.h"
-+#include "misc.h"
-
- #include "userauth_pubkey_from_id.h"
- #include "identity.h"
-+#include "get_command_line.h"
-+extern char **environ;
-+
-+#define PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_REQUESTv1 101
-+
-+static char *
-+log_action(char ** action, size_t count)
-+{
-+ size_t i;
-+ char *buf = NULL;
-+
-+ if (count == 0)
-+ return NULL;
-+
-+ buf = xcalloc((count * MAX_LEN_PER_CMDLINE_ARG) + (count * 3), sizeof(*buf));
-+ for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
-+ strcat(buf, (i > 0) ? " '" : "'");
-+ strncat(buf, action[i], MAX_LEN_PER_CMDLINE_ARG);
-+ strcat(buf, "'");
-+ }
-+ return buf;
-+}
-+
-+void
-+agent_action(Buffer *buf, char ** action, size_t count)
-+{
-+ size_t i;
-+ buffer_init(buf);
-
--u_char * session_id2 = NULL;
--uint8_t session_id_len = 0;
-+ buffer_put_int(buf, count);
-+
-+ for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
-+ buffer_put_cstring(buf, action[i]);
-+ }
-+}
-
--u_char *
--session_id2_gen()
-+void
-+session_id2_gen(Buffer * session_id2, const char * user,
-+ const char * ruser, const char * servicename)
- {
- char *cookie = NULL;
- uint8_t i = 0;
- uint32_t rnd = 0;
-+ uint8_t cookie_len;
-+ char hostname[256] = { 0 };
-+ char pwd[1024] = { 0 };
-+ time_t ts;
-+ char ** reported_argv = NULL;
-+ size_t count = 0;
-+ char * action_logbuf = NULL;
-+ Buffer action_agentbuf;
-+ uint8_t free_logbuf = 0;
-+ char * retc;
-+ int32_t reti;
-
- rnd = arc4random();
-- session_id_len = (uint8_t) rnd;
-+ cookie_len = ((uint8_t) rnd);
-+ while (cookie_len < 16) {
-+ cookie_len += 16; /* Add 16 bytes to the size to ensure that while the length is random, the length is always reasonable; ticket #18 */
-+ }
-
-- cookie = calloc(1,session_id_len);
-+ cookie = xcalloc(1, cookie_len);
-
-- for (i = 0; i < session_id_len; i++) {
-+ for (i = 0; i < cookie_len; i++) {
- if (i % 4 == 0) {
- rnd = arc4random();
- }
-@@ -75,7 +126,64 @@ session_id2_gen()
- rnd >>= 8;
- }
-
-- return cookie;
-+ count = pamsshagentauth_get_command_line(&reported_argv);
-+ if (count > 0) {
-+ free_logbuf = 1;
-+ action_logbuf = log_action(reported_argv, count);
-+ agent_action(&action_agentbuf, reported_argv, count);
-+ pamsshagentauth_free_command_line(reported_argv, count);
-+ }
-+ else {
-+ action_logbuf = "unknown on this platform";
-+ buffer_init(&action_agentbuf); /* stays empty, means unavailable */
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ action = getenv("SUDO_COMMAND");
-+ if(!action) {
-+ action = getenv("PAM_AUTHORIZED_ACTION");
-+ if(!action) {
-+ action = empty;
-+ }
-+ }
-+ */
-+
-+ reti = gethostname(hostname, sizeof(hostname) - 1);
-+ retc = getcwd(pwd, sizeof(pwd) - 1);
-+ time(&ts);
-+
-+ buffer_init(session_id2);
-+
-+ buffer_put_int(session_id2, PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_REQUESTv1);
-+ /* debug3("cookie: %s", tohex(cookie, cookie_len)); */
-+ buffer_put_string(session_id2, cookie, cookie_len);
-+ /* debug3("user: %s", user); */
-+ buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, user);
-+ /* debug3("ruser: %s", ruser); */
-+ buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, ruser);
-+ /* debug3("servicename: %s", servicename); */
-+ buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, servicename);
-+ /* debug3("pwd: %s", pwd); */
-+ if(retc)
-+ buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, pwd);
-+ else
-+ buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, "");
-+ /* debug3("action: %s", action_logbuf); */
-+ buffer_put_string(session_id2, action_agentbuf.buf + action_agentbuf.offset, action_agentbuf.end - action_agentbuf.offset);
-+ if (free_logbuf) {
-+ free(action_logbuf);
-+ buffer_free(&action_agentbuf);
-+ }
-+ /* debug3("hostname: %s", hostname); */
-+ if(reti >= 0)
-+ buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, hostname);
-+ else
-+ buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, "");
-+ /* debug3("ts: %ld", ts); */
-+ buffer_put_int64(session_id2, (uint64_t) ts);
-+
-+ free(cookie);
-+ return;
- }
-
- /*
-@@ -174,19 +282,21 @@ ssh_get_authentication_connection_for_uid(uid_t uid)
- }
-
- int
--find_authorized_keys(uid_t uid)
-+find_authorized_keys(const char * user, const char * ruser, const char * servicename)
- {
-+ Buffer session_id2 = { 0 };
- Identity *id;
- Key *key;
- AuthenticationConnection *ac;
- char *comment;
- uint8_t retval = 0;
-+ uid_t uid = getpwnam(ruser)->pw_uid;
-
- OpenSSL_add_all_digests();
-- session_id2 = session_id2_gen();
-+ session_id2_gen(&session_id2, user, ruser, servicename);
-
- if ((ac = ssh_get_authentication_connection_for_uid(uid))) {
-- verbose("Contacted ssh-agent of user %s (%u)", getpwuid(uid)->pw_name, uid);
-+ verbose("Contacted ssh-agent of user %s (%u)", ruser, uid);
- for (key = ssh_get_first_identity(ac, &comment, 2); key != NULL; key = ssh_get_next_identity(ac, &comment, 2))
- {
- if(key != NULL) {
-@@ -194,7 +304,7 @@ find_authorized_keys(uid_t uid)
- id->key = key;
- id->filename = comment;
- id->ac = ac;
-- if(userauth_pubkey_from_id(id)) {
-+ if(userauth_pubkey_from_id(ruser, id, &session_id2)) {
- retval = 1;
- }
- free(id->filename);
-@@ -204,12 +314,13 @@ find_authorized_keys(uid_t uid)
- break;
- }
- }
-+ buffer_free(&session_id2);
- ssh_close_authentication_connection(ac);
- }
- else {
- verbose("No ssh-agent could be contacted");
- }
-- free(session_id2);
-+ /*free(session_id2);*/
- EVP_cleanup();
- return retval;
- }
-diff --git a/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.h b/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.h
-index ed7549e..e6c75aa 100644
---- a/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.h
-+++ b/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.h
-@@ -31,6 +31,6 @@
- #ifndef _ITERATE_SSH_AGENT_KEYS_H
- #define _ITERATE_SSH_AGENT_KEYS_H
-
--int find_authorized_keys(uid_t);
-+int find_authorized_keys(const char * user, const char * ruser, const char * servicename);
-
- #endif
-diff --git a/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c b/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c
-index d3f4325..37309f7 100644
---- a/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c
-+++ b/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c
-@@ -59,9 +59,12 @@
- #include "pam_user_authorized_keys.h"
-
- #define strncasecmp_literal(A,B) strncasecmp( A, B, sizeof(B) - 1)
-+#define UNUSED(expr) do { (void)(expr); } while (0)
-
- char *authorized_keys_file = NULL;
- uint8_t allow_user_owned_authorized_keys_file = 0;
-+char *authorized_keys_command = NULL;
-+char *authorized_keys_command_user = NULL;
-
- #if ! HAVE___PROGNAME || HAVE_BUNDLE
- char *__progname;
-@@ -90,6 +93,7 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh, int flags, int argc, const char **argv)
- facility = SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTHPRIV;
- #endif
-
-+ UNUSED(flags);
- pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_SERVICE, (void *) &servicename);
- /*
- * XXX:
-@@ -113,6 +117,12 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh, int flags, int argc, const char **argv)
- if(strncasecmp_literal(*argv_ptr, "file=") == 0 ) {
- authorized_keys_file_input = *argv_ptr + sizeof("file=") - 1;
- }
-+ if(strncasecmp_literal(*argv_ptr, "authorized_keys_command=") == 0 ) {
-+ authorized_keys_command = *argv_ptr + sizeof("authorized_keys_command=") - 1;
-+ }
-+ if(strncasecmp_literal(*argv_ptr, "authorized_keys_command_user=") == 0 ) {
-+ authorized_keys_command_user = *argv_ptr + sizeof("authorized_keys_command_user=") - 1;
-+ }
- #ifdef ENABLE_SUDO_HACK
- if(strncasecmp_literal(*argv_ptr, "sudo_service_name=") == 0) {
- strncpy( sudo_service_name, *argv_ptr + sizeof("sudo_service_name=") - 1, sizeof(sudo_service_name) - 1);
-@@ -182,7 +192,7 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh, int flags, int argc, const char **argv)
- /*
- * this pw_uid is used to validate the SSH_AUTH_SOCK, and so must be the uid of the ruser invoking the program, not the target-user
- */
-- if(find_authorized_keys(getpwnam(ruser)->pw_uid)) {
-+ if(find_authorized_keys(user, ruser, servicename)) { /* getpwnam(ruser)->pw_uid)) { */
- logit("Authenticated: `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);
- retval = PAM_SUCCESS;
- } else {
-@@ -207,6 +217,10 @@ cleanexit:
- PAM_EXTERN int __attribute__ ((visibility ("default")))
- pam_sm_setcred(pam_handle_t * pamh, int flags, int argc, const char **argv)
- {
-+ UNUSED(pamh);
-+ UNUSED(flags);
-+ UNUSED(argc);
-+ UNUSED(argv);
- return PAM_SUCCESS;
- }
-
-diff --git a/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/pam_ssh_agent_auth.pod b/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/pam_ssh_agent_auth.pod
-index 4570746..76b1f0f 100644
---- a/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/pam_ssh_agent_auth.pod
-+++ b/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/pam_ssh_agent_auth.pod
-@@ -1,8 +1,12 @@
--=head1 PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH
-+=head1 NAME
-+
-+pam_ssh_agent_auth - PAM module for granting permissions based on SSH agent requests
-+
-+=head1 DESCRIPTION
-
- This module provides authentication via ssh-agent. If an ssh-agent listening at SSH_AUTH_SOCK can successfully authenticate that it has the secret key for a public key in the specified file, authentication is granted, otherwise authentication fails.
-
--=head1 SUMMARY
-+=head1 CONFIGURATION
-
- =over
-
-@@ -10,7 +14,8 @@ This module provides authentication via ssh-agent. If an ssh-agent listening at
- auth sufficient pam_ssh_agent_auth.so file=/etc/security/authorized_keys
-
- =item /etc/sudoers:
--
-+
-+In older versions of sudo (< 1.8.5) it was necessary to set:
- Defaults env_keep += "SSH_AUTH_SOCK"
-
- =back
-@@ -33,6 +38,15 @@ Specify the path to the authorized_keys file(s) you would like to use for authen
- A flag which enables authorized_keys files to be owned by the invoking user, instead of root. This flag is enabled automatically whenever
- the expansions %h or ~ are used.
-
-+=item authorized_keys_command=<path to executable>
-+
-+Specify an external command to run, which should take a single argument, the username of the person being authenticated, and emit to its stdout a file in authorized_keys format.
-+This is ideally suited for use with sssd's sss_ssh_authorizedkeys, for authenticating users via authorized_keys stored in ldap or other sssd supported security service.
-+
-+=item authorized_keys_command_user=<username>
-+
-+Specify a user to run the authorized_keys_command as. If this option is not specified, the authorized_keys_command will be run as the user being authenticated.
-+
- =item debug
-
- A flag which enables verbose logging
-@@ -105,4 +119,34 @@ so this file must be owned by root.
-
- =back
-
-+=head1 COPYRIGHT
-+
-+ Copyright (c) 2008-2014, Jamie Beverly.
-+ And is based on openssh, and the included works by Markus Friedl, Darren Tucker,
-+ Todd C. Miller, Ben Lindstrom, Tim Rice, Damien Miller, and many others.
-+
-+ All rights reserved.
-+
-+ See sources for complete attributions.
-+
-+ Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, are
-+ permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
-+
-+ 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, this list of
-+ conditions and the following disclaimer.
-+
-+ 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, this list
-+ of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation and/or other materials
-+ provided with the distribution.
-+
-+ THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY Jamie Beverly ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
-+ WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND
-+ FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL Jamie Beverly OR
-+ CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
-+ CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR
-+ SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON
-+ ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING
-+ NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF
-+ ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
-+
- =cut
-diff --git a/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/pam_static_macros.h b/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/pam_static_macros.h
-index a4938d3..a991704 100644
---- a/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/pam_static_macros.h
-+++ b/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/pam_static_macros.h
-@@ -1,3 +1,32 @@
-+/*
-+ * Copyright (c) 2008, Jamie Beverly.
-+ * All rights reserved.
-+ *
-+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, are
-+ * permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
-+ *
-+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, this list of
-+ * conditions and the following disclaimer.
-+ *
-+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, this list
-+ * of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation and/or other materials
-+ * provided with the distribution.
-+ *
-+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY Jamie Beverly ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
-+ * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND
-+ * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL Jamie Beverly OR
-+ * CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
-+ * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR
-+ * SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON
-+ * ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING
-+ * NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF
-+ * ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
-+ *
-+ * The views and conclusions contained in the software and documentation are those of the
-+ * authors and should not be interpreted as representing official policies, either expressed
-+ * or implied, of Jamie Beverly.
-+ */
-+
- #ifndef __PAM_STATIC_MACROS_H
- #define __PAM_STATIC_MACROS_H
-
-diff --git a/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/pam_user_authorized_keys.c b/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/pam_user_authorized_keys.c
-index 60bef68..abc0a62 100644
---- a/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/pam_user_authorized_keys.c
-+++ b/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/pam_user_authorized_keys.c
-@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
--/*
-+/*
- * Copyright (c) 2008, Jamie Beverly.
- * All rights reserved.
- *
-@@ -80,9 +80,15 @@
- #include "identity.h"
- #include "pam_user_key_allowed2.h"
-
--extern char *authorized_keys_file;
--extern uint8_t allow_user_owned_authorized_keys_file;
--uid_t authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid;
-+extern char *authorized_keys_file;
-+
-+extern char *authorized_keys_command;
-+
-+extern char *authorized_keys_command_user;
-+
-+extern uint8_t allow_user_owned_authorized_keys_file;
-+
-+uid_t authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid;
-
- void
- parse_authorized_key_file(const char *user, const char *authorized_keys_file_input)
-@@ -137,8 +143,11 @@ parse_authorized_key_file(const char *user, const char *authorized_keys_file_inp
- }
-
- int
--pam_user_key_allowed(Key * key)
-+pam_user_key_allowed(const char *ruser, Key * key)
- {
- return pam_user_key_allowed2(getpwuid(authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid), key, authorized_keys_file)
-- || pam_user_key_allowed2(getpwuid(0), key, authorized_keys_file);
-+ || pam_user_key_allowed2(getpwuid(0), key, authorized_keys_file)
-+ || pam_user_key_command_allowed2(authorized_keys_command,
-+ authorized_keys_command_user,
-+ getpwnam(ruser), key);
- }
-diff --git a/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/pam_user_authorized_keys.h b/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/pam_user_authorized_keys.h
-index ae9a4b8..a871bf0 100644
---- a/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/pam_user_authorized_keys.h
-+++ b/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/pam_user_authorized_keys.h
-@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
- #define _PAM_USER_KEY_ALLOWED_H
-
- #include "identity.h"
--int pam_user_key_allowed(Key *);
-+int pam_user_key_allowed(const char *, Key *);
- void parse_authorized_key_file(const char *, const char *);
-
- #endif
-diff --git a/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/pam_user_key_allowed2.c b/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/pam_user_key_allowed2.c
-index c6680e4..4aceecb 100644
---- a/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/pam_user_key_allowed2.c
-+++ b/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/pam_user_key_allowed2.c
-@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
--/*
-+/*
- * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-@@ -33,9 +33,14 @@
-
- #include <sys/types.h>
- #include <sys/stat.h>
-+#include <sys/wait.h>
-+#include <fcntl.h>
-
- #include <pwd.h>
- #include <stdio.h>
-+#include <signal.h>
-+#include <errno.h>
-+#include <string.h>
-
- #include "xmalloc.h"
- #include "ssh.h"
-@@ -48,87 +53,263 @@
- #include "pathnames.h"
- #include "misc.h"
- #include "secure_filename.h"
-+#include "uidswap.h"
-+#include <unistd.h>
-
- #include "identity.h"
-
- /* return 1 if user allows given key */
- /* Modified slightly from original found in auth2-pubkey.c */
-+static int
-+pamsshagentauth_check_authkeys_file(FILE * f, char *file, Key * key)
-+{
-+ char line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES];
-+ int found_key = 0;
-+ u_long linenum = 0;
-+ Key *found;
-+ char *fp;
-+
-+ found_key = 0;
-+ found = key_new(key->type);
-+
-+ while(read_keyfile_line(f, file, line, sizeof(line), &linenum) != -1) {
-+ char *cp = NULL; /* *key_options = NULL; */
-+
-+ /* Skip leading whitespace, empty and comment lines. */
-+ for(cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++);
-+ if(!*cp || *cp == '\n' || *cp == '#')
-+ continue;
-+
-+ if(key_read(found, &cp) != 1) {
-+ /* no key? check if there are options for this key */
-+ int quoted = 0;
-+
-+ verbose("user_key_allowed: check options: '%s'", cp);
-+ /* key_options = cp; */
-+ for(; *cp && (quoted || (*cp != ' ' && *cp != '\t')); cp++) {
-+ if(*cp == '\\' && cp[1] == '"')
-+ cp++; /* Skip both */
-+ else if(*cp == '"')
-+ quoted = !quoted;
-+ }
-+ /* Skip remaining whitespace. */
-+ for(; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++);
-+ if(key_read(found, &cp) != 1) {
-+ verbose("user_key_allowed: advance: '%s'", cp);
-+ /* still no key? advance to next line */
-+ continue;
-+ }
-+ }
-+ if(key_equal(found, key)) {
-+ found_key = 1;
-+ logit("matching key found: file/command %s, line %lu", file,
-+ linenum);
-+ fp = key_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
-+ logit("Found matching %s key: %s",
-+ key_type(found), fp);
-+ free(fp);
-+ break;
-+ }
-+ }
-+ key_free(found);
-+ if(!found_key)
-+ verbose("key not found");
-+ return found_key;
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Checks whether key is allowed in file.
-+ * returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise.
-+ */
- int
- pam_user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, char *file)
- {
-- char line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES];
-- int found_key = 0;
-- FILE *f;
-- u_long linenum = 0;
-- struct stat st;
-- Key *found;
-- char *fp;
--
-- verbose("trying public key file %s", file);
--
-- /* Fail not so quietly if file does not exist */
-- if (stat(file, &st) < 0) {
-+ FILE *f;
-+ int found_key = 0;
-+ struct stat st;
-+ char buf[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES];
-+
-+ /* Temporarily use the user's uid. */
-+ verbose("trying public key file %s", file);
-+
-+ /* Fail not so quietly if file does not exist */
-+ if(stat(file, &st) < 0) {
- verbose("File not found: %s", file);
-- return 0;
-- }
-- /* Open the file containing the authorized keys. */
-- f = fopen(file, "r");
-- if (!f) {
-- return 0;
-- }
-- if (
-- secure_filename(f, file, pw, line, sizeof(line)) != 0) {
-- fclose(f);
-- logit("Authentication refused: %s", line);
-- return 0;
-- }
--
-- found_key = 0;
-- found = key_new(key->type);
--
-- while (read_keyfile_line(f, file, line, sizeof(line), &linenum) != -1) {
-- char *cp, *key_options = NULL;
--
-- /* Skip leading whitespace, empty and comment lines. */
-- for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
-- ;
-- if (!*cp || *cp == '\n' || *cp == '#')
-- continue;
--
-- if (key_read(found, &cp) != 1) {
-- /* no key? check if there are options for this key */
-- int quoted = 0;
-- verbose("user_key_allowed: check options: '%s'", cp);
-- key_options = cp;
-- for (; *cp && (quoted || (*cp != ' ' && *cp != '\t')); cp++) {
-- if (*cp == '\\' && cp[1] == '"')
-- cp++; /* Skip both */
-- else if (*cp == '"')
-- quoted = !quoted;
-- }
-- /* Skip remaining whitespace. */
-- for (; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
-- ;
-- if (key_read(found, &cp) != 1) {
-- verbose("user_key_allowed: advance: '%s'", cp);
-- /* still no key? advance to next line*/
-- continue;
-- }
-- }
-- if (key_equal(found, key)) {
-- found_key = 1;
-- logit("matching key found: file %s, line %lu",
-- file, linenum);
-- fp = key_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
-- logit("Found matching %s key: %s",
-- key_type(found), fp);
-- free(fp);
-- break;
-- }
-- }
-- fclose(f);
-- key_free(found);
-- if (!found_key)
-- verbose("key not found");
-- return found_key;
-+ return 0;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* Open the file containing the authorized keys. */
-+ f = fopen(file, "r");
-+ if(!f) {
-+ return 0;
-+ }
-+
-+ if(secure_filename(f, file, pw, buf, sizeof(buf)) != 0) {
-+ fclose(f);
-+ logit("Authentication refused: %s", buf);
-+ return 0;
-+ }
-+
-+ found_key = pamsshagentauth_check_authkeys_file(f, file, key);
-+ fclose(f);
-+ return found_key;
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Checks whether key is allowed in output of command.
-+ * returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise.
-+ */
-+int
-+pam_user_key_command_allowed2(char *authorized_keys_command,
-+ char *authorized_keys_command_user,
-+ struct passwd *user_pw, Key * key)
-+{
-+ FILE *f;
-+ int ok, found_key = 0;
-+ struct passwd *pw;
-+ struct stat st;
-+ int status, devnull, p[2], i;
-+ pid_t pid;
-+ char errmsg[512];
-+ char username[512] = { 0 };
-+
-+
-+
-+ if(authorized_keys_command == NULL || authorized_keys_command[0] != '/')
-+ return 0;
-+
-+
-+ /* getpwnam of authorized_keys_command_user will overwrite the statics used by getpwnam (including pw_name) */
-+ strncpy(username, user_pw->pw_name, sizeof(username) - 1);
-+
-+ /* If no user specified to run commands the default to target user */
-+ if(authorized_keys_command_user == NULL) {
-+ pw = user_pw;
-+ }
-+ else {
-+ pw = getpwnam(authorized_keys_command_user);
-+ if(pw == NULL) {
-+ error("authorized_keys_command_user \"%s\" not found: %s",
-+ authorized_keys_command_user, strerror(errno));
-+ return 0;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
-+ temporarily_use_uid(pw);
-+
-+ if(stat(authorized_keys_command, &st) < 0) {
-+ error
-+ ("Could not stat AuthorizedKeysCommand \"%s\": %s",
-+ authorized_keys_command, strerror(errno));
-+ goto out;
-+ }
-+ if(pamsshagentauth_auth_secure_path
-+ (authorized_keys_command, &st, NULL, 0, errmsg, sizeof(errmsg)) != 0) {
-+ error("Unsafe AuthorizedKeysCommand: %s", errmsg);
-+ goto out;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* open the pipe and read the keys */
-+ if(pipe(p) != 0) {
-+ error("%s: pipe: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
-+ goto out;
-+ }
-+
-+ debug("Running AuthorizedKeysCommand: \"%s\" as \"%s\" with argument: \"%s\"",
-+ authorized_keys_command, pw->pw_name, username);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Don't want to call this in the child, where it can fatal() and
-+ * run cleanup_exit() code.
-+ */
-+ restore_uid();
-+
-+ switch ((pid = fork())) {
-+ case -1: /* error */
-+ error("%s: fork: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
-+ close(p[0]);
-+ close(p[1]);
-+ return 0;
-+ case 0: /* child */
-+ for(i = 0; i < NSIG; i++)
-+ signal(i, SIG_DFL);
-+
-+ /* do this before the setresuid so thta they can be logged */
-+ if((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) == -1) {
-+ error("%s: open %s: %s", __func__, _PATH_DEVNULL,
-+ strerror(errno));
-+ _exit(1);
-+ }
-+ if(dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1 || dup2(p[1], STDOUT_FILENO) == -1
-+ || dup2(devnull, STDERR_FILENO) == -1) {
-+ error("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
-+ _exit(1);
-+ }
-+#if defined(HAVE_SETRESGID) && !defined(BROKEN_SETRESGID)
-+ if (setresgid(pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid) != 0) {
-+#else
-+ if (setgid(pw->pw_gid) != 0 || setegid(pw->pw_gid) != 0) {
-+#endif
-+ error("setresgid %u: %s", (u_int) pw->pw_gid,
-+ strerror(errno));
-+ _exit(1);
-+ }
-+
-+#ifdef HAVE_SETRESUID
-+ if(setresuid(pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid) != 0) {
-+#else
-+ if (setuid(pw->pw_uid) != 0 || seteuid(pw->pw_uid) != 0) {
-+#endif
-+ error("setresuid %u: %s", (u_int) pw->pw_uid,
-+ strerror(errno));
-+ _exit(1);
-+ }
-+
-+ close(p[0]);
-+ closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
-+
-+ execl(authorized_keys_command, authorized_keys_command, username, (char *)NULL);
-+
-+ /* pretty sure this will barf because we are now suid, but since we
-+ should't reach this anyway, I'll leave it here */
-+ error("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s exec failed: %s",
-+ authorized_keys_command, strerror(errno));
-+ _exit(127);
-+ default: /* parent */
-+ break;
-+ }
-+
-+ temporarily_use_uid(pw);
-+
-+ close(p[1]);
-+ if((f = fdopen(p[0], "r")) == NULL) {
-+ error("%s: fdopen: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
-+ close(p[0]);
-+ /* Don't leave zombie child */
-+ while(waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) == -1 && errno == EINTR);
-+ goto out;
-+ }
-+ ok = pamsshagentauth_check_authkeys_file(f, authorized_keys_command, key);
-+ fclose(f);
-+
-+ while(waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) {
-+ if(errno != EINTR) {
-+ error("%s: waitpid: %s", __func__,
-+ strerror(errno));
-+ goto out;
-+ }
-+ }
-+ if(WIFSIGNALED(status)) {
-+ error("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s exited on signal %d",
-+ authorized_keys_command, WTERMSIG(status));
-+ goto out;
-+ } else if(WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) {
-+ error("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s returned status %d",
-+ authorized_keys_command, WEXITSTATUS(status));
-+ goto out;
-+ }
-+ found_key = ok;
-+ out:
-+ restore_uid();
-+ return found_key;
- }
-diff --git a/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/pam_user_key_allowed2.h b/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/pam_user_key_allowed2.h
-index 416d055..24533a0 100644
---- a/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/pam_user_key_allowed2.h
-+++ b/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/pam_user_key_allowed2.h
-@@ -32,5 +32,6 @@
-
- #include "identity.h"
- int pam_user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *, Key *, char *);
-+int pam_user_key_command_allowed2(char *, char *, struct passwd *, Key *);
-
- #endif
-diff --git a/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/secure_filename.c b/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/secure_filename.c
-index c24cab2..d685599 100644
---- a/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/secure_filename.c
-+++ b/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/secure_filename.c
-@@ -71,29 +71,38 @@
- * Returns 0 on success and -1 on failure
- */
- int
--secure_filename(FILE *f, const char *file, struct passwd *pw,
-- char *err, size_t errlen)
-+pamsshagentauth_auth_secure_path(const char *name, struct stat *stp,
-+ const char *pw_dir, uid_t uid, char *err, size_t errlen)
- {
-- uid_t uid = pw->pw_uid;
- char buf[MAXPATHLEN], homedir[MAXPATHLEN];
- char *cp;
- int comparehome = 0;
- struct stat st;
-
-- verbose("secure_filename: checking for uid: %u", uid);
-+ verbose("auth_secure_filename: checking for uid: %u", uid);
-
-- if (realpath(file, buf) == NULL) {
-- snprintf(err, errlen, "realpath %s failed: %s", file,
-+ /* if (realpath(pw->pw_dir, homedir) != NULL) */
-+ if (realpath(name, buf) == NULL) {
-+ snprintf(err, errlen, "realpath %s failed: %s", name,
- strerror(errno));
- return -1;
- }
-- if (realpath(pw->pw_dir, homedir) != NULL)
-+ if (pw_dir != NULL && realpath(pw_dir, homedir) != NULL)
- comparehome = 1;
-
- /* check the open file to avoid races */
-- if (fstat(fileno(f), &st) < 0 ||
-- (st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != uid) ||
-- (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) {
-+ /*
-+ * if (fstat(fileno(f), &st) < 0 ||
-+ * (st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != uid) ||
-+ * (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) {
-+ */
-+ if (!S_ISREG(stp->st_mode)) {
-+ snprintf(err, errlen, "%s is not a regular file", buf);
-+ return -1;
-+ }
-+
-+ if ((stp->st_uid != 0 && stp->st_uid != uid) ||
-+ (stp->st_mode & 022) != 0) {
- snprintf(err, errlen, "bad ownership or modes for file %s",
- buf);
- return -1;
-@@ -132,3 +141,25 @@ secure_filename(FILE *f, const char *file, struct passwd *pw,
- return 0;
- }
-
-+/*
-+ * Version of secure_path() that accepts an open file descriptor to
-+ * avoid races.
-+ *
-+ * Returns 0 on success and -1 on failure
-+ */
-+int
-+secure_filename(FILE *f, const char *file, struct passwd *pw,
-+ char *err, size_t errlen)
-+{
-+ struct stat st;
-+ char buf[MAXPATHLEN] = { 0 };
-+
-+ /* check the open file to avoid races */
-+ if (fstat(fileno(f), &st) < 0) {
-+ snprintf(err, errlen, "cannot stat file %s: %s",
-+ buf, strerror(errno));
-+ return -1;
-+ }
-+ return pamsshagentauth_auth_secure_path(file, &st, pw->pw_dir, pw->pw_uid, err, errlen);
-+}
-+
-diff --git a/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/secure_filename.h b/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/secure_filename.h
-index 198c13d..4c1a208 100644
---- a/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/secure_filename.h
-+++ b/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/secure_filename.h
-@@ -28,5 +28,7 @@
- #define _SECURE_FILENAME_H
- #include <pwd.h>
- #include <stdio.h>
-+struct stat;
- int secure_filename(FILE *, const char *, struct passwd *, char *, size_t);
-+int pamsshagentauth_auth_secure_path(const char *, struct stat *, const char *, uid_t, char *, size_t);
- #endif
-diff --git a/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c b/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c
-index 163278b..31849f8 100644
---- a/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c
-+++ b/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c
-@@ -48,11 +48,14 @@
- #include "identity.h"
- #include "pam_user_authorized_keys.h"
-
--extern u_char *session_id2;
-+#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_TRUST_REQUEST 54
-+
-+/* extern u_char *session_id2;
- extern uint8_t session_id_len;
-+ */
-
- int
--userauth_pubkey_from_id(Identity * id)
-+userauth_pubkey_from_id(const char *ruser, Identity * id, Buffer * session_id2)
- {
- Buffer b = { 0 };
- char *pkalg = NULL;
-@@ -63,7 +66,7 @@ userauth_pubkey_from_id(Identity * id)
- pkalg = (char *) key_ssh_name(id->key);
-
- /* first test if this key is even allowed */
-- if(! pam_user_key_allowed(id->key))
-+ if(! pam_user_key_allowed(ruser, id->key))
- goto user_auth_clean_exit;
-
- if(key_to_blob(id->key, &pkblob, &blen) == 0)
-@@ -72,10 +75,10 @@ userauth_pubkey_from_id(Identity * id)
- /* construct packet to sign and test */
- buffer_init(&b);
-
-- buffer_put_string(&b, session_id2, session_id_len);
-- buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
-- buffer_put_cstring(&b, "root");
-- buffer_put_cstring(&b, "ssh-userauth");
-+ buffer_put_string(&b, session_id2->buf + session_id2->offset, session_id2->end - session_id2->offset);
-+ buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_TRUST_REQUEST);
-+ buffer_put_cstring(&b, ruser);
-+ buffer_put_cstring(&b, "pam_ssh_agent_auth");
- buffer_put_cstring(&b, "publickey");
- buffer_put_char(&b, 1);
- buffer_put_cstring(&b, pkalg);
-@@ -89,8 +92,7 @@ userauth_pubkey_from_id(Identity * id)
- authenticated = 1;
-
- user_auth_clean_exit:
-- if(&b != NULL)
-- buffer_free(&b);
-+ buffer_free(&b);
- if(sig != NULL)
- free(sig);
- if(pkblob != NULL)
-diff --git a/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/userauth_pubkey_from_id.h b/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/userauth_pubkey_from_id.h
-index 1e14231..7758808 100644
---- a/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/userauth_pubkey_from_id.h
-+++ b/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/userauth_pubkey_from_id.h
-@@ -32,6 +32,6 @@
- #define _USERAUTH_PUBKEY_FROM_ID_H
-
- #include <identity.h>
--int userauth_pubkey_from_id(Identity *);
-+int userauth_pubkey_from_id(const char *, Identity *, Buffer *);
-
- #endif
---
-2.5.0
-
---- openssh-6.6p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/pam_user_authorized_keys.c.psaa-command 2016-04-20 09:31:32.164686370 +0200
-+++ openssh-6.6p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3/pam_user_authorized_keys.c 2016-04-20 09:35:49.778344576 +0200
-@@ -145,8 +145,12 @@
- int
- pam_user_key_allowed(const char *ruser, Key * key)
- {
-- return pam_user_key_allowed2(getpwuid(authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid), key, authorized_keys_file)
-- || pam_user_key_allowed2(getpwuid(0), key, authorized_keys_file)
-+ struct passwd *pw;
-+ return
-+ ((pw = getpwuid(authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid)) &&
-+ pam_user_key_allowed2(pw, key, authorized_keys_file))
-+ || ((pw = getpwuid(0)) &&
-+ pam_user_key_allowed2(pw, key, authorized_keys_file))
- || pam_user_key_command_allowed2(authorized_keys_command,
- authorized_keys_command_user,
- getpwnam(ruser), key);
diff --git a/SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3-no-xfree.patch b/SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3-no-xfree.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index ba67c33..0000000
--- a/SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3-no-xfree.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,430 +0,0 @@
---- pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3.orig/authfd.c 2013-10-30 17:14:26.013615342 +0100
-+++ pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3.orig/authfd.c 2013-10-30 17:15:07.353327799 +0100
-@@ -260,7 +260,7 @@
- {
- buffer_free(&auth->identities);
- close(auth->fd);
-- xfree(auth);
-+ free(auth);
- }
-
- /* Lock/unlock agent */
-@@ -379,7 +379,7 @@
- blob = buffer_get_string(&auth->identities, &blen);
- *comment = buffer_get_string(&auth->identities, NULL);
- key = key_from_blob(blob, blen);
-- xfree(blob);
-+ free(blob);
- break;
- default:
- return NULL;
-@@ -472,7 +472,7 @@
- buffer_put_string(&msg, blob, blen);
- buffer_put_string(&msg, data, datalen);
- buffer_put_int(&msg, flags);
-- xfree(blob);
-+ free(blob);
-
- if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &msg, &msg) == 0) {
- buffer_free(&msg);
-@@ -612,7 +612,7 @@
- key_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen);
- buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_IDENTITY);
- buffer_put_string(&msg, blob, blen);
-- xfree(blob);
-+ free(blob);
- } else {
- buffer_free(&msg);
- return 0;
---- pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3.orig/bufaux.c 2013-10-30 17:14:26.014615310 +0100
-+++ pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3.orig/bufaux.c 2013-10-30 17:15:07.354327768 +0100
-@@ -176,7 +176,7 @@
- /* Get the string. */
- if (buffer_get_ret(buffer, value, len) == -1) {
- logerror("buffer_get_string_ret: buffer_get failed");
-- xfree(value);
-+ free(value);
- return (NULL);
- }
- /* Append a null character to make processing easier. */
---- pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3.orig/bufbn.c 2013-10-30 17:14:26.014615310 +0100
-+++ pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3.orig/bufbn.c 2013-10-30 17:15:07.354327768 +0100
-@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@
- if (oi != bin_size) {
- logerror("buffer_put_bignum_ret: BN_bn2bin() failed: oi %d != bin_size %d",
- oi, bin_size);
-- xfree(buf);
-+ free(buf);
- return (-1);
- }
-
-@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@
- buffer_append(buffer, buf, oi);
-
- memset(buf, 0, bin_size);
-- xfree(buf);
-+ free(buf);
-
- return (0);
- }
-@@ -167,13 +167,13 @@
- if (oi < 0 || (u_int)oi != bytes - 1) {
- logerror("buffer_put_bignum2_ret: BN_bn2bin() failed: "
- "oi %d != bin_size %d", oi, bytes);
-- xfree(buf);
-+ free(buf);
- return (-1);
- }
- hasnohigh = (buf[1] & 0x80) ? 0 : 1;
- buffer_put_string(buffer, buf+hasnohigh, bytes-hasnohigh);
- memset(buf, 0, bytes);
-- xfree(buf);
-+ free(buf);
- return (0);
- }
-
-@@ -197,21 +197,21 @@
-
- if (len > 0 && (bin[0] & 0x80)) {
- logerror("buffer_get_bignum2_ret: negative numbers not supported");
-- xfree(bin);
-+ free(bin);
- return (-1);
- }
- if (len > 8 * 1024) {
- logerror("buffer_get_bignum2_ret: cannot handle BN of size %d",
- len);
-- xfree(bin);
-+ free(bin);
- return (-1);
- }
- if (BN_bin2bn(bin, len, value) == NULL) {
- logerror("buffer_get_bignum2_ret: BN_bin2bn failed");
-- xfree(bin);
-+ free(bin);
- return (-1);
- }
-- xfree(bin);
-+ free(bin);
- return (0);
- }
-
---- pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3.orig/buffer.c 2013-10-30 17:14:26.014615310 +0100
-+++ pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3.orig/buffer.c 2013-10-30 17:15:07.355327737 +0100
-@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@
- if (buffer->alloc > 0) {
- memset(buffer->buf, 0, buffer->alloc);
- buffer->alloc = 0;
-- xfree(buffer->buf);
-+ free(buffer->buf);
- }
- }
-
---- pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3.orig/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c 2013-10-30 17:14:26.031614782 +0100
-+++ pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3.orig/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c 2013-10-30 17:15:07.357327674 +0100
-@@ -197,9 +197,9 @@
- if(userauth_pubkey_from_id(id)) {
- retval = 1;
- }
-- xfree(id->filename);
-+ free(id->filename);
- key_free(id->key);
-- xfree(id);
-+ free(id);
- if(retval == 1)
- break;
- }
-@@ -209,7 +209,7 @@
- else {
- verbose("No ssh-agent could be contacted");
- }
-- xfree(session_id2);
-+ free(session_id2);
- EVP_cleanup();
- return retval;
- }
---- pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3.orig/key.c 2013-10-30 17:14:26.017615218 +0100
-+++ pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3.orig/key.c 2013-10-30 17:15:07.358327643 +0100
-@@ -154,7 +154,7 @@
- fatal("key_free: bad key type %d", k->type);
- break;
- }
-- xfree(k);
-+ free(k);
- }
-
- int
-@@ -229,7 +229,7 @@
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, blob, len);
- EVP_DigestFinal(&ctx, retval, dgst_raw_length);
- memset(blob, 0, len);
-- xfree(blob);
-+ free(blob);
- } else {
- fatal("key_fingerprint_raw: blob is null");
- }
-@@ -324,7 +324,7 @@
- break;
- }
- memset(dgst_raw, 0, dgst_raw_len);
-- xfree(dgst_raw);
-+ free(dgst_raw);
- return retval;
- }
-
-@@ -447,11 +447,11 @@
- n = uudecode(cp, blob, len);
- if (n < 0) {
- logerror("key_read: uudecode %s failed", cp);
-- xfree(blob);
-+ free(blob);
- return -1;
- }
- k = key_from_blob(blob, (u_int)n);
-- xfree(blob);
-+ free(blob);
- if (k == NULL) {
- logerror("key_read: key_from_blob %s failed", cp);
- return -1;
-@@ -526,8 +526,8 @@
- fprintf(f, "%s %s", key_ssh_name(key), uu);
- success = 1;
- }
-- xfree(blob);
-- xfree(uu);
-+ free(blob);
-+ free(uu);
- }
- return success;
- }
-@@ -673,12 +673,12 @@
- switch (key_type_from_name(p)) {
- case KEY_RSA1:
- case KEY_UNSPEC:
-- xfree(s);
-+ free(s);
- return 0;
- }
- }
- verbose("key names ok: [%s]", names);
-- xfree(s);
-+ free(s);
- return 1;
- }
-
-@@ -743,7 +743,7 @@
- logerror("key_from_blob: remaining bytes in key blob %d", rlen);
- out:
- if (ktype != NULL)
-- xfree(ktype);
-+ free(ktype);
- buffer_free(&b);
- return key;
- }
---- pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3.orig/misc.c 2013-10-30 17:14:26.017615218 +0100
-+++ pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3.orig/misc.c 2013-10-30 17:15:07.360327581 +0100
-@@ -251,13 +251,13 @@
- *remote = SSH_TUNID_ANY;
- sp = xstrdup(s);
- if ((ep = strchr(sp, ':')) == NULL) {
-- xfree(sp);
-+ free(sp);
- return (a2tun(s, NULL));
- }
- ep[0] = '\0'; ep++;
- *remote = a2tun(ep, NULL);
- tun = a2tun(sp, NULL);
-- xfree(sp);
-+ free(sp);
- return (*remote == SSH_TUNID_ERR ? *remote : tun);
- }
-
-@@ -490,7 +490,7 @@
- if (which >= args->num)
- fatal("replacearg: tried to replace invalid arg %d >= %d",
- which, args->num);
-- xfree(args->list[which]);
-+ free(args->list[which]);
- args->list[which] = cp;
- }
-
-@@ -501,8 +501,8 @@
-
- if (args->list != NULL) {
- for (i = 0; i < args->num; i++)
-- xfree(args->list[i]);
-- xfree(args->list);
-+ free(args->list[i]);
-+ free(args->list);
- args->nalloc = args->num = 0;
- args->list = NULL;
- }
---- pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3.orig/pam_user_authorized_keys.c 2013-10-30 17:14:26.017615218 +0100
-+++ pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3.orig/pam_user_authorized_keys.c 2013-10-30 17:15:07.361327550 +0100
-@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@
- }
- authorized_keys_file = tilde_expand_filename(auth_keys_file_buf, authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid);
- strncpy(auth_keys_file_buf, authorized_keys_file, sizeof(auth_keys_file_buf) - 1 );
-- xfree(authorized_keys_file) /* when we percent_expand later, we'd step on this, so free it immediately */;
-+ free(authorized_keys_file) /* when we percent_expand later, we'd step on this, so free it immediately */;
- }
-
- if(strstr(auth_keys_file_buf, "%h")) {
---- pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3.orig/pam_user_key_allowed2.c 2013-10-30 17:14:26.018615187 +0100
-+++ pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3.orig/pam_user_key_allowed2.c 2013-10-30 17:15:07.361327550 +0100
-@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@
- fp = key_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
- logit("Found matching %s key: %s",
- key_type(found), fp);
-- xfree(fp);
-+ free(fp);
- break;
- }
- }
---- pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3.orig/ssh-dss.c 2013-10-30 17:14:26.014615310 +0100
-+++ pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3.orig/ssh-dss.c 2013-10-30 17:15:07.361327550 +0100
-@@ -135,17 +135,17 @@
- if (strcmp("ssh-dss", ktype) != 0) {
- logerror("ssh_dss_verify: cannot handle type %s", ktype);
- buffer_free(&b);
-- xfree(ktype);
-+ free(ktype);
- return -1;
- }
-- xfree(ktype);
-+ free(ktype);
- sigblob = buffer_get_string(&b, &len);
- rlen = buffer_len(&b);
- buffer_free(&b);
- if (rlen != 0) {
- logerror("ssh_dss_verify: "
- "remaining bytes in signature %d", rlen);
-- xfree(sigblob);
-+ free(sigblob);
- return -1;
- }
- }
-@@ -167,7 +167,7 @@
-
- /* clean up */
- memset(sigblob, 0, len);
-- xfree(sigblob);
-+ free(sigblob);
-
- /* sha1 the data */
- EVP_DigestInit(&md, evp_md);
---- pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3.orig/ssh-rsa.c 2013-10-30 17:14:26.015615278 +0100
-+++ pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3.orig/ssh-rsa.c 2013-10-30 17:15:07.362327518 +0100
-@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@
-
- logerror("ssh_rsa_sign: RSA_sign failed: %s",
- ERR_error_string(ecode, NULL));
-- xfree(sig);
-+ free(sig);
- return -1;
- }
- if (len < slen) {
-@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@
- memset(sig, 0, diff);
- } else if (len > slen) {
- logerror("ssh_rsa_sign: slen %u slen2 %u", slen, len);
-- xfree(sig);
-+ free(sig);
- return -1;
- }
- /* encode signature */
-@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@
- }
- buffer_free(&b);
- memset(sig, 's', slen);
-- xfree(sig);
-+ free(sig);
-
- return 0;
- }
-@@ -128,23 +128,23 @@
- if (strcmp("ssh-rsa", ktype) != 0) {
- logerror("ssh_rsa_verify: cannot handle type %s", ktype);
- buffer_free(&b);
-- xfree(ktype);
-+ free(ktype);
- return -1;
- }
-- xfree(ktype);
-+ free(ktype);
- sigblob = buffer_get_string(&b, &len);
- rlen = buffer_len(&b);
- buffer_free(&b);
- if (rlen != 0) {
- logerror("ssh_rsa_verify: remaining bytes in signature %d", rlen);
-- xfree(sigblob);
-+ free(sigblob);
- return -1;
- }
- /* RSA_verify expects a signature of RSA_size */
- modlen = RSA_size(key->rsa);
- if (len > modlen) {
- logerror("ssh_rsa_verify: len %u > modlen %u", len, modlen);
-- xfree(sigblob);
-+ free(sigblob);
- return -1;
- } else if (len < modlen) {
- u_int diff = modlen - len;
-@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@
- nid = (datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) ? NID_md5 : NID_sha1;
- if ((evp_md = EVP_get_digestbynid(nid)) == NULL) {
- logerror("ssh_rsa_verify: EVP_get_digestbynid %d failed", nid);
-- xfree(sigblob);
-+ free(sigblob);
- return -1;
- }
- EVP_DigestInit(&md, evp_md);
-@@ -168,7 +168,7 @@
- ret = openssh_RSA_verify(nid, digest, dlen, sigblob, len, key->rsa);
- memset(digest, 'd', sizeof(digest));
- memset(sigblob, 's', len);
-- xfree(sigblob);
-+ free(sigblob);
- verbose("ssh_rsa_verify: signature %scorrect", (ret==0) ? "in" : "");
- return ret;
- }
-@@ -258,6 +258,6 @@
- ret = 1;
- done:
- if (decrypted)
-- xfree(decrypted);
-+ free(decrypted);
- return ret;
- }
---- pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3.orig/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c 2013-10-30 17:14:26.014615310 +0100
-+++ pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3.orig/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c 2013-10-30 17:15:07.362327518 +0100
-@@ -92,9 +92,9 @@
- if(&b != NULL)
- buffer_free(&b);
- if(sig != NULL)
-- xfree(sig);
-+ free(sig);
- if(pkblob != NULL)
-- xfree(pkblob);
-+ free(pkblob);
- CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data();
- return authenticated;
- }
---- pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3.orig/uuencode.c 2013-10-30 17:14:26.015615278 +0100
-+++ pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3.orig/uuencode.c 2013-10-30 17:15:07.362327518 +0100
-@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@
- /* and remove trailing whitespace because __b64_pton needs this */
- *p = '\0';
- len = __b64_pton(encoded, target, targsize);
-- xfree(encoded);
-+ free(encoded);
- return len;
- }
-
-@@ -79,5 +79,5 @@
- }
- if (i % 70 != 69)
- fprintf(fp, "\n");
-- xfree(buf);
-+ free(buf);
- }
diff --git a/SOURCES/sshd.service b/SOURCES/sshd.service
index ce0cdee..af7845c 100644
--- a/SOURCES/sshd.service
+++ b/SOURCES/sshd.service
@@ -12,7 +12,6 @@ ExecReload=/bin/kill -HUP $MAINPID
KillMode=process
Restart=on-failure
RestartSec=42s
-RestartPreventExitStatus=255
[Install]
WantedBy=multi-user.target
diff --git a/SPECS/openssh.spec b/SPECS/openssh.spec
index 4738d20..6f417e6 100644
--- a/SPECS/openssh.spec
+++ b/SPECS/openssh.spec
@@ -63,10 +63,10 @@
%endif
# Do not forget to bump pam_ssh_agent_auth release if you rewind the main package release to 1
-%define openssh_ver 6.6.1p1
-%define openssh_rel 35
-%define pam_ssh_agent_ver 0.9.3
-%define pam_ssh_agent_rel 9
+%define openssh_ver 7.4p1
+%define openssh_rel 11
+%define pam_ssh_agent_ver 0.10.3
+%define pam_ssh_agent_rel 1
Summary: An open source implementation of SSH protocol versions 1 and 2
Name: openssh
@@ -74,8 +74,7 @@ Version: %{openssh_ver}
Release: %{openssh_rel}%{?dist}%{?rescue_rel}
URL: http://www.openssh.com/portable.html
#URL1: http://pamsshagentauth.sourceforge.net
-# Source0: ftp://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-%{version}.tar.gz
-Source0: ftp://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-6.6p1.tar.gz
+Source0: ftp://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-%{version}.tar.gz
#Source1: ftp://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-%{version}.tar.gz.asc
Source2: sshd.pam
Source3: sshd.init
@@ -93,34 +92,35 @@ Source13: sshd-keygen
Patch0: openssh-5.9p1-wIm.patch
#?
-Patch100: openssh-6.6.1p1-coverity.patch
-#https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1872
-Patch101: openssh-6.6p1-fingerprint.patch
+Patch100: openssh-7.4p1-coverity.patch
#https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1889
Patch103: openssh-5.8p1-packet.patch
#https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1402
-Patch200: openssh-6.6p1-audit.patch
# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1171248
# record pfs= field in CRYPTO_SESSION audit event
-Patch201: openssh-6.6.1p1-audit-pfs.patch
+Patch200: openssh-7.4p1-audit.patch
# Do not write to one socket from more processes (#1310684)
Patch202: openssh-6.6p1-audit-race-condition.patch
# --- pam_ssh-agent ---
# make it build reusing the openssh sources
-Patch300: pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3-build.patch
+Patch300: pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3-build.patch
# check return value of seteuid()
-Patch301: pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2-seteuid.patch
+Patch301: pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3-seteuid.patch
# explicitly make pam callbacks visible
Patch302: pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2-visibility.patch
# don't use xfree (#1024965)
-Patch303: pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3-no-xfree.patch
-# don't use xfree (#1024965)
-Patch304: pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3-command.patch
+Patch303: pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3-no-xfree.patch
+# update to current version of agent structure
+Patch304: pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3-agent_structure.patch
+# do not directly dereference return value of getpwuid()
+Patch305: pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3-dereference.patch
+# Use hardcoded date -- getting it from file is broken on i386
+Patch306: pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3-man-date.patch
#https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1641 (WONTFIX)
-Patch400: openssh-6.6p1-role-mls.patch
+Patch400: openssh-7.4p1-role-mls.patch
#https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=781634
Patch404: openssh-6.6p1-privsep-selinux.patch
@@ -137,13 +137,11 @@ Patch604: openssh-6.6p1-keyperm.patch
Patch606: openssh-5.9p1-ipv6man.patch
#?
Patch607: openssh-5.8p2-sigpipe.patch
-#?
-Patch608: openssh-6.1p1-askpass-ld.patch
#https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1789
Patch609: openssh-5.5p1-x11.patch
#?
-Patch700: openssh-6.6p1-fips.patch
+Patch700: openssh-7.4p1-fips.patch
#?
# drop? Patch701: openssh-5.6p1-exit-deadlock.patch
#?
@@ -165,12 +163,14 @@ Patch711: openssh-6.6p1-log-usepam-no.patch
# make aes-ctr ciphers use EVP engines such as AES-NI from OpenSSL
Patch712: openssh-6.3p1-ctr-evp-fast.patch
# add cavs test binary for the aes-ctr
-Patch713: openssh-6.6p1-ctr-cavstest.patch
+Patch713: openssh-7.4p1-ctr-cavstest.patch
+# add SSH KDF CAVS test driver
+Patch714: openssh-7.4p1-kdf-cavs.patch
#http://www.sxw.org.uk/computing/patches/openssh.html
#changed cache storage type - #848228
-Patch800: openssh-6.6p1-gsskex.patch
+Patch800: openssh-7.4p1-gsskex.patch
#http://www.mail-archive.com/kerberos@mit.edu/msg17591.html
Patch801: openssh-6.6p1-force_krb.patch
# add new option GSSAPIEnablek5users and disable using ~/.k5users by default (#1169843)
@@ -180,97 +180,63 @@ Patch802: openssh-6.6p1-GSSAPIEnablek5users.patch
Patch803: openssh-6.6p1-k5login_directory.patch
Patch900: openssh-6.1p1-gssapi-canohost.patch
#https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1780
-Patch901: openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch
+Patch901: openssh-7.4p1-kuserok.patch
# use default_ccache_name from /etc/krb5.conf (#991186)
Patch902: openssh-6.3p1-krb5-use-default_ccache_name.patch
# Run ssh-copy-id in the legacy mode when SSH_COPY_ID_LEGACY variable is set (#969375
-Patch905: openssh-6.4p1-legacy-ssh-copy-id.patch
+Patch905: openssh-7.4p1-legacy-ssh-copy-id.patch
# Use tty allocation for a remote scp (#985650)
Patch906: openssh-6.4p1-fromto-remote.patch
-# Try CLOCK_BOOTTIME with fallback (#1091992)
-Patch907: openssh-6.4p1-CLOCK_BOOTTIME.patch
-# Prevents a server from skipping SSHFP lookup and forcing a new-hostkey
-# dialog by offering only certificate keys. (#1081338)
-Patch908: openssh-6.6p1-CVE-2014-2653.patch
-# OpenSSH 6.5 and 6.6 sometimes encode a value used in the curve25519 key exchange incorrectly
-# Disable the curve25519 KEX when speaking to OpenSSH 6.5 or 6.6
-Patch909: openssh-5618210618256bbf5f4f71b2887ff186fd451736.patch
-# standardise on NI_MAXHOST for gethostname() string lengths (#1051490)
-Patch910: openssh-6.6.1p1-NI_MAXHOST.patch
-# set a client's address right after a connection is set
-# http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2257
-Patch911: openssh-6.6p1-set_remote_ipaddr.patch
-# apply RFC3454 stringprep to banners when possible
-# https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2058
-# slightly changed patch from comment 10
-Patch912: openssh-6.6.1p1-utf8-banner.patch
-# don't consider a partial success as a failure
-# https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2270
-Patch913: openssh-6.6.1p1-partial-success.patch
# log when a client requests an interactive session and only sftp is allowed (#1130198)
Patch914: openssh-6.6.1p1-log-sftp-only-connections.patch
-# fix parsing of empty options in sshd_conf
-# https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2281
-Patch915: openssh-6.6.1p1-servconf-parser.patch
-# Ignore SIGXFSZ in postauth monitor
-# https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2263
-Patch916: openssh-6.6.1p1-ignore-SIGXFSZ-in-postauth.patch
# log via monitor in chroots without /dev/log (#1083482)
-Patch918: openssh-6.6.1p1-log-in-chroot.patch
+Patch918: openssh-7.4p1-log-in-chroot.patch
# MLS labeling according to chosen sensitivity (#1202843)
Patch919: openssh-6.6.1p1-mls-fix-labeling.patch
# sshd test mode show all config values (#1187597)
Patch920: openssh-6.6p1-test-mode-all-values.patch
# Add sftp option to force mode of created files (#1191055)
Patch921: openssh-6.6p1-sftp-force-permission.patch
-# TERM env variable is always accepted by sshd, regardless the empty AcceptEnv setting (#1162683)
-Patch922: openssh-6.6p1-document-TERM-env.patch
-# fix ssh-copy-id on non-sh remote shells (#1201758)
-Patch923: openssh-6.6p1-fix-ssh-copy-id-on-non-sh-shell.patch
# fix memory problem (#1223218)
Patch924: openssh-6.6p1-memory-problems.patch
# Enhance AllowGroups documentation in man page (#1150007)
Patch925: openssh-6.6p1-allowGroups-documentation.patch
-# authentication limits (MaxAuthTries) bypass [security] (#1246521)
-Patch926: openssh-6.6p1-authentication-limits-bypass.patch
-# CVE-2015-5352: Security fixes backported from openssh-6.9 (#1247864)
-# XSECURITY restrictions bypass under certain conditions in ssh(1) (#1238231)
-# weakness of agent locking (ssh-add -x) to password guessing (#1238238)
-Patch927: openssh-6.6p1-ssh-agent-and-xsecurity-bypass.patch
# provide option GssKexAlgorithms to disable vulnerable groun1 kex
-Patch928: openssh-6.6p1-gssKexAlgorithms.patch
-# Vulnerabilities published with openssh-7.0 (#1265807):
-# Privilege separation weakness related to PAM support
-# Use-after-free bug related to PAM support
-Patch929: openssh-6.6p1-security-7.0.patch
-# Disable completely Roaming feature on client (#1298218) (#1298217)
-# Mitigates CVE-2016-0777 and CVE-2016-0778
-Patch930: openssh-6.6p1-disable-roaming.patch
-# CVE-2016-3115: missing sanitisation of input for X11 forwarding (#1316829)
-Patch931: openssh-6.6p1-CVE-2016-3115.patch
-# CVE-2016-1908: possible fallback from untrusted X11 forwarding (#1298741)
-Patch932: openssh-6.6p1-fallback-X11-untrusted.patch
-# CVE-2015-8325: privilege escalation via user's PAM environment and UseLogin=yes (#1328012)
-Patch933: openssh-6.6p1-CVE-2015-8325.patch
-# close ControlPersist background process stderr when not in debug mode (#1335540)
-Patch934: openssh-6.6p1-ControlPersist-stderr.patch
+Patch928: openssh-7.4p1-gssKexAlgorithms.patch
# make s390 use /dev/ crypto devices -- ignore closefrom (#1318760)
Patch935: openssh-6.6p1-s390-closefrom.patch
-# Default value and proper dump of AuthenticationMethods (#1237129)
-Patch936: openssh-6.6p1-AuthenticationMethods.patch
-# ssh-copy-id does not work with LogLevel=quiet (#1349556)
-Patch937: openssh-6.6p1-ssh-copy-id-quiet.patch
# expose more information to PAM (#1312304)
-Patch938: openssh-6.6p1-expose-auth-information.patch
+Patch938: openssh-7.4p1-expose-pam.patch
# Move MAX_DISPLAYS to a configuration option (#1341302)
Patch939: openssh-6.6p1-x11-max-displays.patch
-# Add a wildcard option to PermitOpen directive (#1344106)
-Patch940: openssh-6.6p1-permitopen-any-host.patch
-# Rework capabilities handling for SELinux confined users (#1357859)
-Patch941: openssh-6.6p1-chroot-capabilities.patch
# Add systemd stuff so it can track running service (#1381997)
Patch942: openssh-6.6p1-systemd.patch
-
+# Permit root login to preserve backward compatibility
+Patch943: openssh-7.4p1-permit-root-login.patch
+# Restore TCP wrappers support
+Patch944: openssh-7.4p1-debian-restore-tcp-wrappers.patch
+# Set sane whitelist for PKCS#11 modules in ssh-agent
+Patch945: openssh-7.4p1-pkcs11-whitelist.patch
+# Allow legacy algorithms and formats for key exchange after rebase
+Patch946: openssh-7.4p1-legacy-algorithms.patch
+# Show more fingerprints
+Patch947: openssh-7.4p1-show-more-fingerprints.patch
+# Fix newline in the end of server ident banner (upstream 5b9070)
+Patch948: openssh-7.4p1-newline-banner.patch
+# Do not utilize SHA1 by default for digital signatures (#1322911)
+Patch949: openssh-7.4p1-sha2-signatures.patch
+# Canonize pkcs11 provider path when removing smartcard (#2682)
+Patch950: openssh-7.4p1-canonize-pkcs11-provider.patch
+# Do not segfault sshd if it loads RSA1 keys (#2686)
+Patch951: openssh-7.4p1-rsa1-segfault.patch
+# OpenSSH 7.5 fixes CBC cipher weakness
+Patch952: openssh-7.4p1-cbc-weakness.patch
+# sandbox-seccomp filter is not denying socketcall() on ppc64le (#1443916)
+Patch953: openssh-7.4p1-sandbox-ppc64le.patch
+# ControlPath too long should not be fatal (#1447561)
+Patch954: openssh-7.4p1-ControlPath_too_long.patch
+# sandbox-seccomp for ibmca engine from upstream (#1451809)
+Patch955: openssh-7.4p1-sandbox-ibmca.patch
License: BSD
Group: Applications/Internet
@@ -313,7 +279,6 @@ Requires: libselinux >= 1.27.7
BuildRequires: libselinux-devel >= 1.27.7
Requires: audit-libs >= 1.0.8
BuildRequires: audit-libs >= 1.0.8
-BuildRequires: libcap-ng-devel
%endif
BuildRequires: xauth
@@ -359,6 +324,11 @@ Requires: openssh = %{version}-%{release}
Obsoletes: openssh-askpass-gnome
Provides: openssh-askpass-gnome
+%package cavs
+Summary: CAVS tests for FIPS validation
+Group: Applications/Internet
+Requires: openssh = %{version}-%{release}
+
%package -n pam_ssh_agent_auth
Summary: PAM module for authentication with ssh-agent
Group: System Environment/Base
@@ -414,6 +384,10 @@ OpenSSH is a free version of SSH (Secure SHell), a program for logging
into and executing commands on a remote machine. This package contains
an X11 passphrase dialog for OpenSSH.
+%description cavs
+This package contains test binaries and scripts to make FIPS validation
+easier. Now contains CTR and KDF CAVS test driver.
+
%description -n pam_ssh_agent_auth
This package contains a PAM module which can be used to authenticate
users using ssh keys stored in a ssh-agent. Through the use of the
@@ -423,22 +397,23 @@ remote ssh-agent instance.
The module is most useful for su and sudo service stacks.
%prep
-%setup -q -a 4 -n openssh-6.6p1
+%setup -q -a 4
#Do not enable by default
%if 0
%patch0 -p1 -b .wIm
%endif
-%patch101 -p1 -b .fingerprint
%patch103 -p1 -b .packet
%if %{pam_ssh_agent}
pushd pam_ssh_agent_auth-%{pam_ssh_agent_ver}
-%patch300 -p1 -b .psaa-build
-%patch301 -p1 -b .psaa-seteuid
+%patch300 -p2 -b .psaa-build
+%patch301 -p2 -b .psaa-seteuid
%patch302 -p1 -b .psaa-visibility
-%patch303 -p1 -b .psaa-xfree
-%patch304 -p2 -b .psaa-command
+%patch303 -p2 -b .psaa-xfree
+%patch304 -p2 -b .psaa-agent
+%patch305 -p2 -b .psaa-dereference
+%patch306 -p2 -b .psaa-pod
# Remove duplicate headers
rm -f $(cat %{SOURCE5})
popd
@@ -458,7 +433,6 @@ popd
%patch604 -p1 -b .keyperm
%patch606 -p1 -b .ipv6man
%patch607 -p1 -b .sigpipe
-%patch608 -p1 -b .askpass-ld
%patch609 -p1 -b .x11
#
# drop? %patch701 -p1 -b .exit-deadlock
@@ -473,6 +447,7 @@ popd
%patch711 -p1 -b .log-usepam-no
%patch712 -p1 -b .evp-ctr
%patch713 -p1 -b .ctr-cavs
+%patch714 -p1 -b .kdf-cavs
#
%patch800 -p1 -b .gsskex
%patch801 -p1 -b .force_krb
@@ -482,46 +457,35 @@ popd
%patch902 -p1 -b .ccache_name
%patch905 -p1 -b .legacy-ssh-copy-id
%patch906 -p1 -b .fromto-remote
-%patch907 -p1 -b .CLOCK_BOOTTIME
-%patch908 -p1 -b .CVE-2014-2653
-%patch909 -p1 -b .6.6.1
-%patch910 -p1 -b .NI_MAXHOST
-%patch911 -p1 -b .set_remote_ipaddr
-%patch912 -p1 -b .utf8-banner
-%patch913 -p1 -b .partial-success
%patch914 -p1 -b .log-sftp-only
-%patch915 -p1 -b .servconf
-%patch916 -p1 -b .SIGXFSZ
%patch918 -p1 -b .log-in-chroot
%patch919 -p1 -b .mls-labels
%patch802 -p1 -b .GSSAPIEnablek5users
%patch803 -p1 -b .k5login
%patch920 -p1 -b .sshd-t
%patch921 -p1 -b .sftp-force-mode
-%patch922 -p1 -b .term
-%patch923 -p1 -b .ssh-copy-id
%patch924 -p1 -b .memory-problems
%patch925 -p1 -b .allowGroups
-%patch926 -p1 -b .kbd
-%patch927 -p1 -b .xsecurity
%patch928 -p1 -b .gsskexalg
-%patch929 -p1 -b .security7
-%patch930 -p1 -b .roaming
-%patch931 -p1 -b .xauth
-%patch932 -p1 -b .untrusted
-%patch933 -p1 -b .uselogin
-%patch934 -p1 -b .stderr
%patch935 -p1 -b .s390
-%patch936 -p1 -b .auth_meth
-%patch937 -p1 -b .quiet
-%patch938 -p1 -b .expose-auth
+%patch938 -p1 -b .expose-pam
%patch939 -p1 -b .x11max
-%patch940 -p1 -b .permitopen
-%patch941 -p1 -b .chroot-cap
%patch942 -p1 -b .patch
+%patch943 -p1 -b .permit-root
+%patch944 -p1 -b .tcp_wrappers
+%patch945 -p1 -b .pkcs11-whitelist
+%patch946 -p1 -b .legacy
+%patch947 -p1 -b .fingerprint
+%patch948 -p1 -b .newline-banner
+%patch949 -p1 -b .sha2
+%patch950 -p1 -b .smartcard
+%patch951 -p1 -b .rsa1
+%patch952 -p1 -b .cbc
+%patch953 -p1 -b .seccomp
+%patch954 -p1 -b .ControlPath
+%patch955 -p1 -b .ibmca
%patch200 -p1 -b .audit
-%patch201 -p1 -b .audit-fps
%patch202 -p1 -b .audit-race
%patch700 -p1 -b .fips
@@ -586,6 +550,7 @@ fi
--with-ssl-engine \
--with-ipaddr-display \
--with-systemd \
+ --with-ssh1 \
%if %{ldap}
--with-ldap \
%endif
@@ -596,8 +561,7 @@ fi
%endif
%if %{WITH_SELINUX}
--with-selinux --with-audit=linux \
-%if 0
-#seccomp_filter cannot be build right now
+%ifnarch ppc
--with-sandbox=seccomp_filter \
%else
--with-sandbox=rlimit \
@@ -688,6 +652,13 @@ install -m644 %{SOURCE12} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_unitdir}/sshd-keygen.service
install -m755 contrib/ssh-copy-id $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_bindir}/
install contrib/ssh-copy-id.1 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man1/
+#restore slogin symlink
+pushd $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_bindir}
+ln -s ./ssh slogin
+pushd $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man1
+ln -s ./ssh.1 slogin.1
+popd; popd;
+
%if ! %{no_gnome_askpass}
install contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/openssh/gnome-ssh-askpass
%endif
@@ -823,6 +794,11 @@ getent passwd sshd >/dev/null || \
%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-askpass
%endif
+%files cavs
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/ctr-cavstest
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-cavs
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-cavs_driver.pl
+
%if %{pam_ssh_agent}
%files -n pam_ssh_agent_auth
%defattr(-,root,root)
@@ -833,6 +809,43 @@ getent passwd sshd >/dev/null || \
%endif
%changelog
+* Mon May 22 2017 Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com> - 7.4p1-11 + 0.10.3-1
+- Compiler warnings (#1341754)
+
+* Mon May 22 2017 Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com> - 7.4p1-10 + 0.10.3-1
+- Add missing messages in FIPS mode (#1341754)
+
+* Fri May 19 2017 Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com> - 7.4p1-9 + 0.10.3-1
+- Allow harmless syscalls for s390 crypto modules (#1451809)
+
+* Mon May 15 2017 Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com> - 7.4p1-8 + 0.10.3-1
+- Fix multilib issue in documentation (#1450361)
+
+* Thu May 04 2017 Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com> - 7.4p1-6 + 0.10.3-1
+- ControlPath too long should not be a fatal error (#1447561)
+
+* Wed Apr 26 2017 Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com> - 7.4p1-5 + 0.10.3-1
+- Fix the default key exchange proposal in FIPS mode (#1438414)
+- Remove another wrong coverity chunk to unbreak gsskex (#1438414)
+
+* Mon Apr 24 2017 Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com> - 7.4p1-4 + 0.10.3-1
+- Update seccomp filter to work on ppc64le (#1443916)
+
+* Wed Apr 05 2017 Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com> - 7.4p1-3 + 0.10.3-1
+- Do not completely disable SHA-1 key exchange methods in FIPS (#1324493)
+- Remove wrong coverity patches
+
+* Thu Mar 23 2017 Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com> - 7.4p1-2 + 0.10.3-1
+- Fix coverity scan results
+- Adjust FIPS algorithms list (#1420910)
+- Revert problematic feature for chroot(#1418062)
+- Fix CBC weakness in released OpenSSH 7.5
+
+* Wed Mar 01 2017 Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com> - 7.4p1-1 + 0.10.3-1
+- Rebase to openssh 7.4 and pam_ssh_agent_auth 0.10.3 (#1341754)
+- detach -cavs subpackage
+- enable seccomp filter for sandboxed child
+
* Wed Mar 01 2017 Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com> - 6.6.1p1-35 + 0.9.3-9
- Do not send SD_NOTIFY from forked childern (#1381997)