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diff -up ntp-4.2.6p5/ntpd/ntp_proto.c.cve-2016-7426 ntp-4.2.6p5/ntpd/ntp_proto.c
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--- ntp-4.2.6p5/ntpd/ntp_proto.c.cve-2016-7426 2016-11-21 16:14:42.804048665 +0100
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+++ ntp-4.2.6p5/ntpd/ntp_proto.c 2016-11-21 17:32:45.619107824 +0100
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@@ -473,30 +473,7 @@ receive(
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}
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/*
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- * Update the MRU list and finger the cloggers. It can be a
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- * little expensive, so turn it off for production use.
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- */
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- restrict_mask = ntp_monitor(rbufp, restrict_mask);
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- if (restrict_mask & RES_LIMITED) {
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- sys_limitrejected++;
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- if (!(restrict_mask & RES_KOD) || MODE_BROADCAST ==
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- hismode || MODE_SERVER == hismode)
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- return; /* rate exceeded */
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-
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- if (hismode == MODE_CLIENT)
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- fast_xmit(rbufp, MODE_SERVER, skeyid,
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- restrict_mask);
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- else
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- fast_xmit(rbufp, MODE_ACTIVE, skeyid,
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- restrict_mask);
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- return; /* rate exceeded */
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- }
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- restrict_mask &= ~RES_KOD;
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-
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- /*
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- * We have tossed out as many buggy packets as possible early in
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- * the game to reduce the exposure to a clogging attack. now we
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- * have to burn some cycles to find the association and
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+ * now we have to burn some cycles to find the association and
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* authenticate the packet if required. Note that we burn only
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* MD5 cycles, again to reduce exposure. There may be no
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* matching association and that's okay.
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@@ -519,6 +496,27 @@ receive(
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NTOHL_FP(&pkt->xmt, &p_xmt);
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/*
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+ * Update the MRU list and finger the cloggers. It can be a
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+ * little expensive, so turn it off for production use.
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+ */
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+ restrict_mask = ntp_monitor(rbufp, restrict_mask);
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+ if (restrict_mask & RES_LIMITED && retcode == AM_FXMIT) {
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+ sys_limitrejected++;
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+ if (!(restrict_mask & RES_KOD) || MODE_BROADCAST ==
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+ hismode || MODE_SERVER == hismode)
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+ return; /* rate exceeded */
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+
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+ if (hismode == MODE_CLIENT)
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+ fast_xmit(rbufp, MODE_SERVER, skeyid,
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+ restrict_mask);
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+ else
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+ fast_xmit(rbufp, MODE_ACTIVE, skeyid,
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+ restrict_mask);
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+ return; /* rate exceeded */
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+ }
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+ restrict_mask &= ~RES_KOD;
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+
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+ /*
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* Authentication is conditioned by three switches:
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*
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* NOPEER (RES_NOPEER) do not mobilize an association unless
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@@ -940,6 +938,10 @@ receive(
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case AM_NEWPASS:
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if (!AUTH(sys_authenticate | (restrict_mask &
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(RES_NOPEER | RES_DONTTRUST)), is_authentic)) {
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+ if (restrict_mask & RES_LIMITED) {
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+ sys_limitrejected++;
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+ return;
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+ }
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/*
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* If authenticated but cannot mobilize an
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