diff --git a/.nss.metadata b/.nss.metadata
index 2bdb864..d94a44d 100644
--- a/.nss.metadata
+++ b/.nss.metadata
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-e8207a278cbed4d97f443289e76b13ddce5850f6 SOURCES/PayPalEE.cert
+bc5c03643bfa1a5ea8519b8e7e2d7d5e30abea30 SOURCES/PayPalEE.cert
7e2f3a4f8fe8fa8a5730aeca029696637e986f3f SOURCES/PayPalICA.cert
706c3f929a1e7eca473be12fcd92620709fdada6 SOURCES/TestOldCA.p12
d272a7b58364862613d44261c5744f7a336bf177 SOURCES/blank-cert8.db
diff --git a/SOURCES/NameConstraints.ipaca.cert b/SOURCES/NameConstraints.ipaca.cert
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4a451f3
Binary files /dev/null and b/SOURCES/NameConstraints.ipaca.cert differ
diff --git a/SOURCES/NameConstraints.ocsp1.cert b/SOURCES/NameConstraints.ocsp1.cert
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..817faaf
Binary files /dev/null and b/SOURCES/NameConstraints.ocsp1.cert differ
diff --git a/SOURCES/nss-3.53.1-fix-deadlock-in-init-context.patch b/SOURCES/nss-3.53.1-fix-deadlock-in-init-context.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5e452d4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/nss-3.53.1-fix-deadlock-in-init-context.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+diff --git a/lib/pk11wrap/pk11cxt.c b/lib/pk11wrap/pk11cxt.c
+--- a/lib/pk11wrap/pk11cxt.c
++++ b/lib/pk11wrap/pk11cxt.c
+@@ -52,16 +52,37 @@ PK11_ExitContextMonitor(PK11Context *cx)
+ if ((cx->ownSession) && (cx->slot->isThreadSafe)) {
+ /* Should this use monitors instead? */
+ PZ_Unlock(cx->sessionLock);
+ } else {
+ PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(cx->slot);
+ }
+ }
+
++static void
++pk11_releaseSlotMonitor(PK11Context *cx)
++{
++ if ((cx->ownSession) && (cx->slot->isThreadSafe)) {
++ return;
++ } else {
++ PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(cx->slot);
++ }
++}
++
++static void
++pk11_reacquireSlotMonitor(PK11Context *cx)
++{
++ if ((cx->ownSession) && (cx->slot->isThreadSafe)) {
++ return;
++ } else {
++ PK11_EnterSlotMonitor(cx->slot);
++ }
++}
++
++
+ /*
+ * Free up a Cipher Context
+ */
+ void
+ PK11_DestroyContext(PK11Context *context, PRBool freeit)
+ {
+ pk11_CloseSession(context->slot, context->session, context->ownSession);
+ /* initialize the critical fields of the context */
+@@ -166,27 +187,33 @@ pk11_contextInitMessage(PK11Context *con
+ context->simulate_message = PR_FALSE;
+ /* check that we can do the Message interface. We need to check
+ * for either 1) are we using a PKCS #11 v3 interface and 2) is the
+ * Message flag set on the mechanism. If either is false we simulate
+ * the message interface for the Encrypt and Decrypt cases using the
+ * PKCS #11 V2 interface.
+ * Sign and verify do not have V2 interfaces, so we go ahead and fail
+ * if those cases */
++ /* release the monitor before calling DoesMechanism */
++ pk11_releaseSlotMonitor(context);
+ if ((version.major >= 3) &&
+ PK11_DoesMechanismFlag(slot, (mech)->mechanism, flags)) {
++ /* restore it before calling the init function */
++ pk11_reacquireSlotMonitor(context);
+ crv = (*initFunc)((context)->session, (mech), (key)->objectID);
+ if ((crv == CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED) ||
+ (crv == CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID)) {
+ /* we have a 3.0 interface, and the flag was set (or ignored)
+ * but the implementation was not there, use the V2 interface */
+ crv = (scrv);
+ context->simulate_message = PR_TRUE;
+ }
+ } else {
++ /* restore the monitor */
++ pk11_reacquireSlotMonitor(context);
+ crv = (scrv);
+ context->simulate_message = PR_TRUE;
+ }
+ return crv;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Context initialization. Used by all flavors of CreateContext
diff --git a/SOURCES/nss-3.53.1-tls-flood-CVE-2020-25648.patch b/SOURCES/nss-3.53.1-tls-flood-CVE-2020-25648.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3902f9f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/nss-3.53.1-tls-flood-CVE-2020-25648.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,161 @@
+
+# HG changeset patch
+# User Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com>
+# Date 1602524521 0
+# Node ID 57bbefa793232586d27cee83e74411171e128361
+# Parent 6e3bc17f05086854ffd2b06f7fae9371f7a0c174
+Bug 1641480, TLS 1.3: tighten CCS handling in compatibility mode, r=mt
+
+This makes the server reject CCS when the client doesn't indicate the
+use of the middlebox compatibility mode with a non-empty
+ClientHello.legacy_session_id, or it sends multiple CCS in a row.
+
+original patch:
+Differential Revision: https://phabricator.services.mozilla.com/D79994
+
+# Modified for nss-3.53.1 by rrelyea
+diff -up ./gtests/ssl_gtest/ssl_tls13compat_unittest.cc.tls-flood ./gtests/ssl_gtest/ssl_tls13compat_unittest.cc
+--- ./gtests/ssl_gtest/ssl_tls13compat_unittest.cc.tls-flood 2020-06-16 15:50:59.000000000 -0700
++++ ./gtests/ssl_gtest/ssl_tls13compat_unittest.cc 2021-02-18 10:54:28.170458465 -0800
+@@ -348,6 +348,85 @@ TEST_F(TlsConnectStreamTls13, ChangeCiph
+ client_->CheckErrorCode(SSL_ERROR_HANDSHAKE_UNEXPECTED_ALERT);
+ }
+
++// The server rejects a ChangeCipherSpec if the client advertises an
++// empty session ID.
++TEST_F(TlsConnectStreamTls13, ChangeCipherSpecAfterClientHelloEmptySid) {
++ EnsureTlsSetup();
++ ConfigureVersion(SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3);
++
++ StartConnect();
++ client_->Handshake(); // Send ClientHello
++ client_->SendDirect(DataBuffer(kCannedCcs, sizeof(kCannedCcs))); // Send CCS
++
++ server_->ExpectSendAlert(kTlsAlertUnexpectedMessage);
++ server_->Handshake(); // Consume ClientHello and CCS
++ server_->CheckErrorCode(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CHANGE_CIPHER);
++}
++
++// The server rejects multiple ChangeCipherSpec even if the client
++// indicates compatibility mode with non-empty session ID.
++TEST_F(Tls13CompatTest, ChangeCipherSpecAfterClientHelloTwice) {
++ EnsureTlsSetup();
++ ConfigureVersion(SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3);
++ EnableCompatMode();
++
++ StartConnect();
++ client_->Handshake(); // Send ClientHello
++ // Send CCS twice in a row
++ client_->SendDirect(DataBuffer(kCannedCcs, sizeof(kCannedCcs)));
++ client_->SendDirect(DataBuffer(kCannedCcs, sizeof(kCannedCcs)));
++
++ server_->ExpectSendAlert(kTlsAlertUnexpectedMessage);
++ server_->Handshake(); // Consume ClientHello and CCS.
++ server_->CheckErrorCode(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CHANGE_CIPHER);
++}
++
++// The client rejects a ChangeCipherSpec if it advertises an empty
++// session ID.
++TEST_F(TlsConnectStreamTls13, ChangeCipherSpecAfterServerHelloEmptySid) {
++ EnsureTlsSetup();
++ ConfigureVersion(SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3);
++
++ // To replace Finished with a CCS below
++ auto filter = MakeTlsFilter<TlsHandshakeDropper>(server_);
++ filter->SetHandshakeTypes({kTlsHandshakeFinished});
++ filter->EnableDecryption();
++
++ StartConnect();
++ client_->Handshake(); // Send ClientHello
++ server_->Handshake(); // Consume ClientHello, and
++ // send ServerHello..CertificateVerify
++ // Send CCS
++ server_->SendDirect(DataBuffer(kCannedCcs, sizeof(kCannedCcs)));
++ client_->ExpectSendAlert(kTlsAlertUnexpectedMessage);
++ client_->Handshake(); // Consume ClientHello and CCS
++ client_->CheckErrorCode(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CHANGE_CIPHER);
++}
++
++// The client rejects multiple ChangeCipherSpec in a row even if the
++// client indicates compatibility mode with non-empty session ID.
++TEST_F(Tls13CompatTest, ChangeCipherSpecAfterServerHelloTwice) {
++ EnsureTlsSetup();
++ ConfigureVersion(SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3);
++ EnableCompatMode();
++
++ // To replace Finished with a CCS below
++ auto filter = MakeTlsFilter<TlsHandshakeDropper>(server_);
++ filter->SetHandshakeTypes({kTlsHandshakeFinished});
++ filter->EnableDecryption();
++
++ StartConnect();
++ client_->Handshake(); // Send ClientHello
++ server_->Handshake(); // Consume ClientHello, and
++ // send ServerHello..CertificateVerify
++ // the ServerHello is followed by CCS
++ // Send another CCS
++ server_->SendDirect(DataBuffer(kCannedCcs, sizeof(kCannedCcs)));
++ client_->ExpectSendAlert(kTlsAlertUnexpectedMessage);
++ client_->Handshake(); // Consume ClientHello and CCS
++ client_->CheckErrorCode(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CHANGE_CIPHER);
++}
++
+ // If we negotiate 1.2, we abort.
+ TEST_F(TlsConnectStreamTls13, ChangeCipherSpecBeforeClientHello12) {
+ EnsureTlsSetup();
+diff -up ./lib/ssl/ssl3con.c.tls-flood ./lib/ssl/ssl3con.c
+--- ./lib/ssl/ssl3con.c.tls-flood 2021-02-18 10:54:28.152458362 -0800
++++ ./lib/ssl/ssl3con.c 2021-02-18 10:59:46.699353968 -0800
+@@ -6621,7 +6621,11 @@ ssl_CheckServerSessionIdCorrectness(sslS
+
+ /* TLS 1.3: We sent a session ID. The server's should match. */
+ if (!IS_DTLS(ss) && (sentRealSid || sentFakeSid)) {
+- return sidMatch;
++ if (sidMatch) {
++ ss->ssl3.hs.allowCcs = PR_TRUE;
++ return PR_TRUE;
++ }
++ return PR_FALSE;
+ }
+
+ /* TLS 1.3 (no SID)/DTLS 1.3: The server shouldn't send a session ID. */
+@@ -8640,6 +8644,7 @@ ssl3_HandleClientHello(sslSocket *ss, PR
+ errCode = PORT_GetError();
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
++ ss->ssl3.hs.allowCcs = PR_TRUE;
+ }
+
+ /* TLS 1.3 requires that compression include only null. */
+@@ -13005,8 +13010,15 @@ ssl3_HandleRecord(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Cip
+ ss->ssl3.hs.ws != idle_handshake &&
+ cText->buf->len == 1 &&
+ cText->buf->buf[0] == change_cipher_spec_choice) {
+- /* Ignore the CCS. */
+- return SECSuccess;
++ if (ss->ssl3.hs.allowCcs) {
++ /* Ignore the first CCS. */
++ ss->ssl3.hs.allowCcs = PR_FALSE;
++ return SECSuccess;
++ }
++
++ /* Compatibility mode is not negotiated. */
++ alert = unexpected_message;
++ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CHANGE_CIPHER);
+ }
+
+ if (IS_DTLS(ss) ||
+diff -up ./lib/ssl/sslimpl.h.tls-flood ./lib/ssl/sslimpl.h
+--- ./lib/ssl/sslimpl.h.tls-flood 2021-02-18 10:54:28.172458477 -0800
++++ ./lib/ssl/sslimpl.h 2021-02-18 11:01:43.100051582 -0800
+@@ -712,6 +712,10 @@ typedef struct SSL3HandshakeStateStr {
+ * or received. */
+ PRBool receivedCcs; /* A server received ChangeCipherSpec
+ * before the handshake started. */
++ PRBool allowCcs; /* A server allows ChangeCipherSpec
++ * as the middlebox compatibility mode
++ * is explicitly indicarted by
++ * legacy_session_id in TLS 1.3 ClientHello. */
+ PRBool clientCertRequested; /* True if CertificateRequest received. */
+ ssl3KEADef kea_def_mutable; /* Used to hold the writable kea_def
+ * we use for TLS 1.3 */
diff --git a/SOURCES/nss-3.53.1-tls-flood-update.patch b/SOURCES/nss-3.53.1-tls-flood-update.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3dd8f11
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/nss-3.53.1-tls-flood-update.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# User Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com>
+# Date 1603691171 -3600
+# Node ID b03a4fc5b902498414b02640dcb2717dfef9682f
+# Parent 6f79a76958129dc09c353c288f115fd9a51ab7d4
+Bug 1672703, always tolerate the first CCS in TLS 1.3, r=mt
+
+Summary:
+This flips the meaning of the flag for checking excessive CCS
+messages, so it only rejects multiple CCS messages while the first CCS
+message is always accepted.
+
+Reviewers: mt
+
+Reviewed By: mt
+
+Bug #: 1672703
+
+Differential Revision: https://phabricator.services.mozilla.com/D94603
+updated by rrelyea for NSS 3.53
+
+diff -up ./gtests/ssl_gtest/ssl_tls13compat_unittest.cc.tls-flood-update ./gtests/ssl_gtest/ssl_tls13compat_unittest.cc
+--- ./gtests/ssl_gtest/ssl_tls13compat_unittest.cc.tls-flood-update 2021-02-22 09:57:04.632375045 -0800
++++ ./gtests/ssl_gtest/ssl_tls13compat_unittest.cc 2021-02-22 09:57:04.635375062 -0800
+@@ -348,8 +348,8 @@ TEST_F(TlsConnectStreamTls13, ChangeCiph
+ client_->CheckErrorCode(SSL_ERROR_HANDSHAKE_UNEXPECTED_ALERT);
+ }
+
+-// The server rejects a ChangeCipherSpec if the client advertises an
+-// empty session ID.
++// The server accepts a ChangeCipherSpec even if the client advertises
++// an empty session ID.
+ TEST_F(TlsConnectStreamTls13, ChangeCipherSpecAfterClientHelloEmptySid) {
+ EnsureTlsSetup();
+ ConfigureVersion(SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3);
+@@ -358,9 +358,8 @@ TEST_F(TlsConnectStreamTls13, ChangeCiph
+ client_->Handshake(); // Send ClientHello
+ client_->SendDirect(DataBuffer(kCannedCcs, sizeof(kCannedCcs))); // Send CCS
+
+- server_->ExpectSendAlert(kTlsAlertUnexpectedMessage);
+- server_->Handshake(); // Consume ClientHello and CCS
+- server_->CheckErrorCode(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CHANGE_CIPHER);
++ Handshake();
++ CheckConnected();
+ }
+
+ // The server rejects multiple ChangeCipherSpec even if the client
+@@ -381,7 +380,7 @@ TEST_F(Tls13CompatTest, ChangeCipherSpec
+ server_->CheckErrorCode(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CHANGE_CIPHER);
+ }
+
+-// The client rejects a ChangeCipherSpec if it advertises an empty
++// The client accepts a ChangeCipherSpec even if it advertises an empty
+ // session ID.
+ TEST_F(TlsConnectStreamTls13, ChangeCipherSpecAfterServerHelloEmptySid) {
+ EnsureTlsSetup();
+@@ -398,9 +397,10 @@ TEST_F(TlsConnectStreamTls13, ChangeCiph
+ // send ServerHello..CertificateVerify
+ // Send CCS
+ server_->SendDirect(DataBuffer(kCannedCcs, sizeof(kCannedCcs)));
+- client_->ExpectSendAlert(kTlsAlertUnexpectedMessage);
+- client_->Handshake(); // Consume ClientHello and CCS
+- client_->CheckErrorCode(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CHANGE_CIPHER);
++
++ // No alert is sent from the client. As Finished is dropped, we
++ // can't use Handshake() and CheckConnected().
++ client_->Handshake();
+ }
+
+ // The client rejects multiple ChangeCipherSpec in a row even if the
+diff -up ./lib/ssl/ssl3con.c.tls-flood-update ./lib/ssl/ssl3con.c
+--- ./lib/ssl/ssl3con.c.tls-flood-update 2021-02-22 09:57:04.633375051 -0800
++++ ./lib/ssl/ssl3con.c 2021-02-22 10:00:18.659488889 -0800
+@@ -6621,11 +6621,7 @@ ssl_CheckServerSessionIdCorrectness(sslS
+
+ /* TLS 1.3: We sent a session ID. The server's should match. */
+ if (!IS_DTLS(ss) && (sentRealSid || sentFakeSid)) {
+- if (sidMatch) {
+- ss->ssl3.hs.allowCcs = PR_TRUE;
+- return PR_TRUE;
+- }
+- return PR_FALSE;
++ return sidMatch;
+ }
+
+ /* TLS 1.3 (no SID)/DTLS 1.3: The server shouldn't send a session ID. */
+@@ -8644,7 +8640,6 @@ ssl3_HandleClientHello(sslSocket *ss, PR
+ errCode = PORT_GetError();
+ goto alert_loser;
+ }
+- ss->ssl3.hs.allowCcs = PR_TRUE;
+ }
+
+ /* TLS 1.3 requires that compression include only null. */
+@@ -13010,15 +13005,14 @@ ssl3_HandleRecord(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Cip
+ ss->ssl3.hs.ws != idle_handshake &&
+ cText->buf->len == 1 &&
+ cText->buf->buf[0] == change_cipher_spec_choice) {
+- if (ss->ssl3.hs.allowCcs) {
+- /* Ignore the first CCS. */
+- ss->ssl3.hs.allowCcs = PR_FALSE;
++ if (!ss->ssl3.hs.rejectCcs) {
++ /* Allow only the first CCS. */
++ ss->ssl3.hs.rejectCcs = PR_TRUE;
+ return SECSuccess;
++ } else {
++ alert = unexpected_message;
++ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CHANGE_CIPHER);
+ }
+-
+- /* Compatibility mode is not negotiated. */
+- alert = unexpected_message;
+- PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CHANGE_CIPHER);
+ }
+
+ if (IS_DTLS(ss) ||
+diff -up ./lib/ssl/sslimpl.h.tls-flood-update ./lib/ssl/sslimpl.h
+--- ./lib/ssl/sslimpl.h.tls-flood-update 2021-02-22 09:57:04.637375073 -0800
++++ ./lib/ssl/sslimpl.h 2021-02-22 10:01:46.451003953 -0800
+@@ -712,10 +712,7 @@ typedef struct SSL3HandshakeStateStr {
+ * or received. */
+ PRBool receivedCcs; /* A server received ChangeCipherSpec
+ * before the handshake started. */
+- PRBool allowCcs; /* A server allows ChangeCipherSpec
+- * as the middlebox compatibility mode
+- * is explicitly indicarted by
+- * legacy_session_id in TLS 1.3 ClientHello. */
++ PRBool rejectCcs; /* Excessive ChangeCipherSpecs are rejected. */
+ PRBool clientCertRequested; /* True if CertificateRequest received. */
+ ssl3KEADef kea_def_mutable; /* Used to hold the writable kea_def
+ * we use for TLS 1.3 */
diff --git a/SOURCES/nss-3.63-profile_fix.patch b/SOURCES/nss-3.63-profile_fix.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..64c54c2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/nss-3.63-profile_fix.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+
+# HG changeset patch
+# User Robert Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com>
+# Date 1614193447 28800
+# Node ID d827295ca19058d6b73692be38d528fd6ae9ab08
+# Parent 80793a75363d262804531f064a1936bf0fbd3d82
+Bug 1694392 NSS does not work with PKCS #11 modules not supporting profiles
+r=ueno,bbeurdouche
+
+User Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:85.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/85.0
+
+Steps to reproduce:
+
+Using NSS with PKCS #11 library that returns CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID when searching for CKA_CLASS = CKO_PROFILE.
+
+Actual results:
+
+PK11_InitToken calls pk11_ReadProfileList and passes on failures. Thus, if the profiles cannot be read the token cannot be initialized.
+pk11_ReadProfileList in turn uses pk11_FindObjectsByTemplate to search for CKO_PROFILE objects. This function fails if C_FindObjectsInit fails.
+However, it should be perfectly ok that C_FindObjectsInit fails if CKO_PROFILE is not known. In fact, CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID is a valid return code here since the library does not know (yet) the value CKO_PROFILE for CKA_CLASS and since the CKA_CLASS is a fixed list it the standard allows to return this error code.
+
+Expected results:
+
+PK11_InitToken should complete successfully.
+
+Differential Revision: https://phabricator.services.mozilla.com/D106167
+
+diff --git a/lib/pk11wrap/pk11slot.c b/lib/pk11wrap/pk11slot.c
+--- a/lib/pk11wrap/pk11slot.c
++++ b/lib/pk11wrap/pk11slot.c
+@@ -1364,20 +1364,19 @@ PK11_InitToken(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBoo
+ if (!slot->isThreadSafe)
+ PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(slot);
+ }
+
+ status = nssToken_Refresh(slot->nssToken);
+ if (status != PR_SUCCESS)
+ return SECFailure;
+
+- rv = pk11_ReadProfileList(slot);
+- if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+- return SECFailure;
+- }
++ /* Not all tokens have profile objects or even recognize what profile
++ * objects are it's OK for pk11_ReadProfileList to fail */
++ (void) pk11_ReadProfileList(slot);
+
+ if (!(slot->isInternal) && (slot->hasRandom)) {
+ /* if this slot has a random number generater, use it to add entropy
+ * to the internal slot. */
+ PK11SlotInfo *int_slot = PK11_GetInternalSlot();
+
+ if (int_slot) {
+ unsigned char random_bytes[32];
+
diff --git a/SPECS/nss.spec b/SPECS/nss.spec
index 1fd6eb5..546ab13 100644
--- a/SPECS/nss.spec
+++ b/SPECS/nss.spec
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ rpm.define(string.format("nss_archive_version %s",
Summary: Network Security Services
Name: nss
Version: %{nss_version}
-Release: 3%{?dist}
+Release: 7%{?dist}
License: MPLv2.0
URL: http://www.mozilla.org/projects/security/pki/nss/
Group: System Environment/Libraries
@@ -103,6 +103,8 @@ Source30: PayPalRootCA.cert
Source31: PayPalICA.cert
Source32: nss-rhel7.config
Source33: TestOldCA.p12
+Source34: NameConstraints.ocsp1.cert
+Source35: NameConstraints.ipaca.cert
Patch2: add-relro-linker-option.patch
Patch3: renegotiate-transitional.patch
@@ -168,10 +170,18 @@ Patch158: nss-sql-default-tests.patch
Patch159: nss-disable-dc.patch
# Upstream: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1648822
Patch160: nss-3.53.1-remove-timing-tests.patch
-# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1884793
+# https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1662738
Patch161: nss-3.53.1-no-small-primes.patch
-# Local patch: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1843417
-Patch162: nss-3.53-strict-proto-fix.patch
+# No upstream bug yet. at least post NSS 3.63
+Patch162: nss-3.53.1-fix-deadlock-in-init-context.patch
+# CVE-2020-25648 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1641480
+Patch163: nss-3.53.1-tls-flood-CVE-2020-25648.patch
+# CVE-2020-25648 update https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1672703
+Patch164: nss-3.53.1-tls-flood-update.patch
+# Upstream: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1694392
+Patch165: nss-3.63-profile_fix.patch
+# Upstream: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1643528
+Patch166: nss-3.53-strict-proto-fix.patch
%description
Network Security Services (NSS) is a set of libraries designed to
@@ -249,6 +259,8 @@ low level services.
%{__cp} %{SOURCE30} -f ./nss/tests/libpkix/certs
%{__cp} %{SOURCE31} -f ./nss/tests/libpkix/certs
%{__cp} %{SOURCE33} -f ./nss/tests/tools
+%{__cp} %{SOURCE34} -f ./nss/tests/libpkix/certs
+%{__cp} %{SOURCE35} -f ./nss/tests/libpkix/certs
%patch2 -p0 -b .relro
%patch3 -p0 -b .transitional
@@ -285,7 +297,11 @@ pushd nss
%patch159 -p1 -b .dc
%patch160 -p1 -b .remove-timing-tests
%patch161 -p1 -b .no-small-primes
-%patch162 -p1 -b .strict-proto-fix
+%patch162 -p1 -b .deadlock
+%patch163 -p1 -b .tls-flood
+%patch164 -p1 -b .tls-flood-update
+%patch165 -p1 -b .cko-profile
+%patch166 -p1 -b .strict-proto
popd
#########################################################
@@ -898,14 +914,19 @@ fi
%changelog
-* Thu Nov 5 2020 Johnny Hughes <johnny@centos.org> - 3.53.1-3
-- much thanks to both Tuomo Soini (foobar.fi) and Pat Riehecky (scientificlinux.org)
- for finding the fix to these issues
-* Fri Oct 2 2020 Tuomo Soini <tis@foobar.fi> - 3.53.1-3
-- Fix tests by updating PayPalEE.cert to valid one
-- Fix tests to expect small primes failing rhbz#1884793
-- Fix Cannot compile code with nss headers and -Werror=strict-prototypes
- rhbz#1885321
+* Wed Mar 03 2021 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.53.1-7
+- Fix HSM load failure because of CKO_Profile
+- Allow builds with strict-proto
+
+* Mon Feb 22 2021 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.53.1-6
+- Update to CVE 2020-256423 TLS flood DOS attack patch.
+
+* Thu Feb 18 2021 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.53.1-5
+- Fix CVE 2020-256423 TLS flood DOS Attack.
+
+* Mon Feb 1 2021 Bob Relyea <rrelyea@redhat.com> - 3.53.1-4
+- Fix deadlock issue
+- Fix 3 FTBS issues, 2 expired certs, one semantic change in nss-softokn.
* Sat Aug 1 2020 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 3.53.1-3
- Disable dh timing test because it's unreliable on s390 (from Bob Relyea)