diff --git a/.gitignore b/.gitignore
index 4003a06..fb97387 100644
--- a/.gitignore
+++ b/.gitignore
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ SOURCES/cert8.db.xml
SOURCES/cert9.db.xml
SOURCES/key3.db.xml
SOURCES/key4.db.xml
-SOURCES/nss-3.16.2.tar.gz
+SOURCES/nss-3.16.2.3.tar.gz
SOURCES/nss-config.xml
SOURCES/nss-pem-20140125.tar.bz2
SOURCES/secmod.db.xml
diff --git a/.nss.metadata b/.nss.metadata
index 6a80d14..b2fbd5a 100644
--- a/.nss.metadata
+++ b/.nss.metadata
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ bd748cf6e1465a1bbe6e751b72ffc0076aff0b50 SOURCES/blank-secmod.db
7cbb7841b1aefe52534704bf2a4358bfea1aa477 SOURCES/cert9.db.xml
24c123810543ff0f6848647d6d910744e275fb01 SOURCES/key3.db.xml
af51b16a56fda1f7525a0eed3ecbdcbb4133be0c SOURCES/key4.db.xml
-c4e7f007723cfafcf7fe743000e3960cc5086642 SOURCES/nss-3.16.2.tar.gz
+264abc5af31eab16e2245e33a71f77cc7aae5c39 SOURCES/nss-3.16.2.3.tar.gz
2905c9b06e7e686c9e3c0b5736a218766d4ae4c2 SOURCES/nss-config.xml
66f2060c35f4e97bdfa163e8bd7cb2ef5e8125d8 SOURCES/nss-pem-20140125.tar.bz2
ca9ebf79c1437169a02527c18b1e3909943c4be9 SOURCES/secmod.db.xml
diff --git a/SOURCES/Crash-in-stan_GetCERTCertificate-rhbz1139349.patch b/SOURCES/Crash-in-stan_GetCERTCertificate-rhbz1139349.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d3e0f21
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/Crash-in-stan_GetCERTCertificate-rhbz1139349.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,154 @@
+diff --git a/lib/pki/pki3hack.c b/lib/pki/pki3hack.c
+--- a/lib/pki/pki3hack.c
++++ b/lib/pki/pki3hack.c
+@@ -849,18 +849,21 @@ fill_CERTCertificateFields(NSSCertificat
+ }
+
+ static CERTCertificate *
+ stan_GetCERTCertificate(NSSCertificate *c, PRBool forceUpdate)
+ {
+ nssDecodedCert *dc = NULL;
+ CERTCertificate *cc = NULL;
+ CERTCertTrust certTrust;
++ nssPKIObject *object = &c->object;
+
+- nssPKIObject_Lock(&c->object);
++ /* make sure object does not go away until we finish */
++ nssPKIObject_AddRef(object);
++ nssPKIObject_Lock(object);
+
+ dc = c->decoding;
+ if (!dc) {
+ dc = nssDecodedPKIXCertificate_Create(NULL, &c->encoding);
+ if (!dc) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ cc = (CERTCertificate *)dc->data;
+@@ -898,17 +901,18 @@ stan_GetCERTCertificate(NSSCertificate *
+ trust = nssTrust_GetCERTCertTrustForCert(c, cc);
+
+ CERT_LockCertTrust(cc);
+ cc->trust = trust;
+ CERT_UnlockCertTrust(cc);
+ }
+
+ loser:
+- nssPKIObject_Unlock(&c->object);
++ nssPKIObject_Unlock(object);
++ nssPKIObject_Destroy(object);
+ return cc;
+ }
+
+ NSS_IMPLEMENT CERTCertificate *
+ STAN_ForceCERTCertificateUpdate(NSSCertificate *c)
+ {
+ if (c->decoding) {
+ return stan_GetCERTCertificate(c, PR_TRUE);
+@@ -1265,16 +1269,17 @@ done:
+ */
+ static PRStatus
+ DeleteCertTrustMatchingSlot(PK11SlotInfo *pk11slot, nssPKIObject *tObject)
+ {
+ int numNotDestroyed = 0; /* the ones skipped plus the failures */
+ int failureCount = 0; /* actual deletion failures by devices */
+ int index;
+
++ nssPKIObject_AddRef(tObject);
+ nssPKIObject_Lock(tObject);
+ /* Keep going even if a module fails to delete. */
+ for (index = 0; index < tObject->numInstances; index++) {
+ nssCryptokiObject *instance = tObject->instances[index];
+ if (!instance) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+@@ -1298,16 +1303,17 @@ DeleteCertTrustMatchingSlot(PK11SlotInfo
+ if (numNotDestroyed == 0) {
+ nss_ZFreeIf(tObject->instances);
+ tObject->numInstances = 0;
+ } else {
+ tObject->numInstances = numNotDestroyed;
+ }
+
+ nssPKIObject_Unlock(tObject);
++ nssPKIObject_Destroy(tObject);
+
+ return failureCount == 0 ? PR_SUCCESS : PR_FAILURE;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ ** Delete trust objects matching the slot of the given certificate.
+ ** Returns an error if any device fails to delete.
+ */
+@@ -1324,30 +1330,32 @@ STAN_DeleteCertTrustMatchingSlot(NSSCert
+ int i;
+
+ /* Iterate through the cert and trust object instances looking for
+ * those with matching pk11 slots to delete. Even if some device
+ * can't delete we keep going. Keeping a status variable for the
+ * loop so that once it's failed the other gets set.
+ */
+ NSSRWLock_LockRead(td->tokensLock);
++ nssPKIObject_AddRef(cobject);
+ nssPKIObject_Lock(cobject);
+ for (i = 0; i < cobject->numInstances; i++) {
+ nssCryptokiObject *cInstance = cobject->instances[i];
+ if (cInstance && !PK11_IsReadOnly(cInstance->token->pk11slot)) {
+ PRStatus status;
+ if (!tobject->numInstances || !tobject->instances) continue;
+ status = DeleteCertTrustMatchingSlot(cInstance->token->pk11slot, tobject);
+ if (status == PR_FAILURE) {
+ /* set the outer one but keep going */
+ nssrv = PR_FAILURE;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ nssPKIObject_Unlock(cobject);
++ nssPKIObject_Destroy(cobject);
+ NSSRWLock_UnlockRead(td->tokensLock);
+ return nssrv;
+ }
+
+ /* CERT_TraversePermCertsForSubject */
+ NSS_IMPLEMENT PRStatus
+ nssTrustDomain_TraverseCertificatesBySubject (
+ NSSTrustDomain *td,
+diff --git a/lib/pki/tdcache.c b/lib/pki/tdcache.c
+--- a/lib/pki/tdcache.c
++++ b/lib/pki/tdcache.c
+@@ -386,16 +386,17 @@ struct token_cert_dtor {
+
+ static void
+ remove_token_certs(const void *k, void *v, void *a)
+ {
+ NSSCertificate *c = (NSSCertificate *)k;
+ nssPKIObject *object = &c->object;
+ struct token_cert_dtor *dtor = a;
+ PRUint32 i;
++ nssPKIObject_AddRef(object);
+ nssPKIObject_Lock(object);
+ for (i=0; i<object->numInstances; i++) {
+ if (object->instances[i]->token == dtor->token) {
+ nssCryptokiObject_Destroy(object->instances[i]);
+ object->instances[i] = object->instances[object->numInstances-1];
+ object->instances[object->numInstances-1] = NULL;
+ object->numInstances--;
+ dtor->certs[dtor->numCerts++] = c;
+@@ -404,16 +405,17 @@ remove_token_certs(const void *k, void *
+ dtor->certs = nss_ZREALLOCARRAY(dtor->certs,
+ NSSCertificate *,
+ dtor->arrSize);
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ nssPKIObject_Unlock(object);
++ nssPKIObject_Destroy(object);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Remove all certs for the given token from the cache. This is
+ * needed if the token is removed.
+ */
+ NSS_IMPLEMENT PRStatus
diff --git a/SOURCES/certutil-man-supply-missing-options.patch b/SOURCES/certutil-man-supply-missing-options.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..14bf738
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/certutil-man-supply-missing-options.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+diff -up ./nss/doc/certutil.xml.missing_options ./nss/doc/certutil.xml
+--- ./nss/doc/certutil.xml.missing_options 2014-11-25 10:14:22.068846717 -0800
++++ ./nss/doc/certutil.xml 2014-11-25 10:17:49.810974243 -0800
+@@ -204,6 +204,11 @@ If this option is not used, the validity
+ </varlistentry>
+
+ <varlistentry>
++ <term>--dump-ext-val OID </term>
++ <listitem><para>For single cert, print binary DER encoding of extension OID.</para></listitem>
++ </varlistentry>
++
++ <varlistentry>
+ <term>-e </term>
+ <listitem><para>Check a certificate's signature during the process of validating a certificate.</para></listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+@@ -214,6 +219,26 @@ If this option is not used, the validity
+ </varlistentry>
+
+ <varlistentry>
++ <term>--extGeneric OID:critical-flag:filename[,OID:critical-flag:filename]... </term>
++ <listitem>
++ <para>
++Add one or multiple extensions that certutil cannot encode yet, by loading their encodings from external files.
++ </para>
++ <itemizedlist>
++ <listitem>
++<para>OID (example): 1.2.3.4</para>
++ </listitem>
++ <listitem>
++<para>critical-flag: critical or not-critical</para>
++ </listitem>
++ <listitem>
++<para>filename: full path to a file containing an encoded extension</para>
++ </listitem>
++ </itemizedlist>
++ </listitem>
++ </varlistentry>
++
++ <varlistentry>
+ <term>-f password-file</term>
+ <listitem><para>Specify a file that will automatically supply the password to include in a certificate
+ or to access a certificate database. This is a plain-text file containing one password. Be sure to prevent
+@@ -376,6 +401,15 @@ of the attribute codes:
+ <para><command>V</command> (as an SSL server)</para>
+ </listitem>
+ <listitem>
++<para><command>L</command> (as an SSL CA)</para>
++ </listitem>
++ <listitem>
++<para><command>A</command> (as Any CA)</para>
++ </listitem>
++ <listitem>
++<para><command>Y</command> (Verify CA)</para>
++ </listitem>
++ <listitem>
+ <para><command>S</command> (as an email signer)</para>
+ </listitem>
+ <listitem>
+@@ -649,6 +683,17 @@ of the attribute codes:
+ </varlistentry>
+
+ <varlistentry>
++ <term>--extSAN type:name[,type:name]...</term>
++ <listitem><para>
++Create a Subject Alt Name extension with one or multiple names.
++ </para>
++ <para>
++-type: directory, dn, dns, edi, ediparty, email, ip, ipaddr, other, registerid, rfc822, uri, x400, x400addr
++ </para>
++ </listitem>
++ </varlistentry>
++
++ <varlistentry>
+ <term>--empty-password</term>
+ <listitem><para>Use empty password when creating new certificate database with -N.</para></listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
diff --git a/SOURCES/cve-2014-1568-nss-extra.patch b/SOURCES/cve-2014-1568-nss-extra.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 507198e..0000000
--- a/SOURCES/cve-2014-1568-nss-extra.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
-
-# HG changeset patch
-# User Kai Engert <kaie@kuix.de>
-# Date 1411493980 -7200
-# Node ID 8dd6c6ac977d063dbd093f092ba46e50e9bcb80b
-# Parent fb7208e91ae8e819b38a80480f816efb32fbfab3
-Bug 1064636, follow up commit to fix Windows build bustage
-
-diff --git a/lib/cryptohi/secvfy.c b/lib/cryptohi/secvfy.c
---- a/lib/cryptohi/secvfy.c
-+++ b/lib/cryptohi/secvfy.c
-@@ -595,18 +595,18 @@ VFY_EndWithSignature(VFYContext *cx, SEC
- }
- break;
- case rsaKey:
- {
- SECItem digest;
- digest.data = final;
- digest.len = part;
- if (sig) {
-+ SECOidTag hashid;
- PORT_Assert(cx->hashAlg != SEC_OID_UNKNOWN);
-- SECOidTag hashid;
- rv = recoverPKCS1DigestInfo(cx->hashAlg, &hashid,
- &cx->pkcs1RSADigestInfo,
- &cx->pkcs1RSADigestInfoLen,
- cx->key,
- sig, cx->wincx);
- PORT_Assert(cx->hashAlg == hashid);
- if (rv != SECSuccess) {
- return SECFailure;
-
diff --git a/SOURCES/cve-2014-1568-nss.patch b/SOURCES/cve-2014-1568-nss.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index a97e863..0000000
--- a/SOURCES/cve-2014-1568-nss.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,355 +0,0 @@
-
-# HG changeset patch
-# User Kai Engert <kaie@kuix.de>
-# Date 1411493314 -7200
-# Node ID ad411fb64046d987272043f311ca477022c6fef4
-# Parent 70ae6afde27f9c977badc5271efa835c8a4ec4f0
-Fix bug 1064636, patch part 2, r=rrelyea
-
-diff --git a/lib/cryptohi/secvfy.c b/lib/cryptohi/secvfy.c
---- a/lib/cryptohi/secvfy.c
-+++ b/lib/cryptohi/secvfy.c
-@@ -7,121 +7,165 @@
-
- #include <stdio.h>
- #include "cryptohi.h"
- #include "sechash.h"
- #include "keyhi.h"
- #include "secasn1.h"
- #include "secoid.h"
- #include "pk11func.h"
-+#include "pkcs1sig.h"
- #include "secdig.h"
- #include "secerr.h"
- #include "keyi.h"
-
- /*
--** Decrypt signature block using public key
--** Store the hash algorithm oid tag in *tagp
--** Store the digest in the digest buffer
--** Store the digest length in *digestlen
-+** Recover the DigestInfo from an RSA PKCS#1 signature.
-+**
-+** If givenDigestAlg != SEC_OID_UNKNOWN, copy givenDigestAlg to digestAlgOut.
-+** Otherwise, parse the DigestInfo structure and store the decoded digest
-+** algorithm into digestAlgOut.
-+**
-+** Store the encoded DigestInfo into digestInfo.
-+** Store the DigestInfo length into digestInfoLen.
-+**
-+** This function does *not* verify that the AlgorithmIdentifier in the
-+** DigestInfo identifies givenDigestAlg or that the DigestInfo is encoded
-+** correctly; verifyPKCS1DigestInfo does that.
-+**
- ** XXX this is assuming that the signature algorithm has WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION
- */
- static SECStatus
--DecryptSigBlock(SECOidTag *tagp, unsigned char *digest,
-- unsigned int *digestlen, unsigned int maxdigestlen,
-- SECKEYPublicKey *key, const SECItem *sig, char *wincx)
-+recoverPKCS1DigestInfo(SECOidTag givenDigestAlg,
-+ /*out*/ SECOidTag* digestAlgOut,
-+ /*out*/ unsigned char** digestInfo,
-+ /*out*/ unsigned int* digestInfoLen,
-+ SECKEYPublicKey* key,
-+ const SECItem* sig, void* wincx)
- {
-- SGNDigestInfo *di = NULL;
-- unsigned char *buf = NULL;
-- SECStatus rv;
-- SECOidTag tag;
-- SECItem it;
-+ SGNDigestInfo* di = NULL;
-+ SECItem it;
-+ PRBool rv = SECSuccess;
-
-- if (key == NULL) goto loser;
-+ PORT_Assert(digestAlgOut);
-+ PORT_Assert(digestInfo);
-+ PORT_Assert(digestInfoLen);
-+ PORT_Assert(key);
-+ PORT_Assert(key->keyType == rsaKey);
-+ PORT_Assert(sig);
-
-+ it.data = NULL;
- it.len = SECKEY_PublicKeyStrength(key);
-- if (!it.len) goto loser;
-- it.data = buf = (unsigned char *)PORT_Alloc(it.len);
-- if (!buf) goto loser;
-+ if (it.len != 0) {
-+ it.data = (unsigned char *)PORT_Alloc(it.len);
-+ }
-+ if (it.len == 0 || it.data == NULL ) {
-+ rv = SECFailure;
-+ }
-
-- /* decrypt the block */
-- rv = PK11_VerifyRecover(key, (SECItem *)sig, &it, wincx);
-- if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser;
-+ if (rv == SECSuccess) {
-+ /* decrypt the block */
-+ rv = PK11_VerifyRecover(key, sig, &it, wincx);
-+ }
-+
-+ if (rv == SECSuccess) {
-+ if (givenDigestAlg != SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) {
-+ /* We don't need to parse the DigestInfo if the caller gave us the
-+ * digest algorithm to use. Later verifyPKCS1DigestInfo will verify
-+ * that the DigestInfo identifies the given digest algorithm and
-+ * that the DigestInfo is encoded absolutely correctly.
-+ */
-+ *digestInfoLen = it.len;
-+ *digestInfo = (unsigned char*)it.data;
-+ *digestAlgOut = givenDigestAlg;
-+ return SECSuccess;
-+ }
-+ }
-
-- di = SGN_DecodeDigestInfo(&it);
-- if (di == NULL) goto sigloser;
-+ if (rv == SECSuccess) {
-+ /* The caller didn't specify a digest algorithm to use, so choose the
-+ * digest algorithm by parsing the AlgorithmIdentifier within the
-+ * DigestInfo.
-+ */
-+ di = SGN_DecodeDigestInfo(&it);
-+ if (!di) {
-+ rv = SECFailure;
-+ }
-+ }
-
-- /*
-- ** Finally we have the digest info; now we can extract the algorithm
-- ** ID and the signature block
-- */
-- tag = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&di->digestAlgorithm);
-- /* Check that tag is an appropriate algorithm */
-- if (tag == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) {
-- goto sigloser;
-+ if (rv == SECSuccess) {
-+ *digestAlgOut = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&di->digestAlgorithm);
-+ if (*digestAlgOut == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) {
-+ rv = SECFailure;
-+ }
- }
-- /* make sure the "parameters" are not too bogus. */
-- if (di->digestAlgorithm.parameters.len > 2) {
-- goto sigloser;
-+
-+ if (di) {
-+ SGN_DestroyDigestInfo(di);
- }
-- if (di->digest.len > maxdigestlen) {
-- PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_OUTPUT_LEN);
-- goto loser;
-+
-+ if (rv == SECSuccess) {
-+ *digestInfoLen = it.len;
-+ *digestInfo = (unsigned char*)it.data;
-+ } else {
-+ if (it.data) {
-+ PORT_Free(it.data);
-+ }
-+ *digestInfo = NULL;
-+ *digestInfoLen = 0;
-+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE);
- }
-- PORT_Memcpy(digest, di->digest.data, di->digest.len);
-- *tagp = tag;
-- *digestlen = di->digest.len;
-- goto done;
-
-- sigloser:
-- PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE);
--
-- loser:
-- rv = SECFailure;
--
-- done:
-- if (di != NULL) SGN_DestroyDigestInfo(di);
-- if (buf != NULL) PORT_Free(buf);
--
- return rv;
- }
-
--
- struct VFYContextStr {
- SECOidTag hashAlg; /* the hash algorithm */
- SECKEYPublicKey *key;
- /*
- * This buffer holds either the digest or the full signature
- * depending on the type of the signature (key->keyType). It is
- * defined as a union to make sure it always has enough space.
- *
- * Use the "buffer" union member to reference the buffer.
- * Note: do not take the size of the "buffer" union member. Take
- * the size of the union or some other union member instead.
- */
- union {
- unsigned char buffer[1];
-
-- /* the digest in the decrypted RSA signature */
-- unsigned char rsadigest[HASH_LENGTH_MAX];
- /* the full DSA signature... 40 bytes */
- unsigned char dsasig[DSA_MAX_SIGNATURE_LEN];
- /* the full ECDSA signature */
- unsigned char ecdsasig[2 * MAX_ECKEY_LEN];
- } u;
-- unsigned int rsadigestlen;
-+ unsigned int pkcs1RSADigestInfoLen;
-+ /* the encoded DigestInfo from a RSA PKCS#1 signature */
-+ unsigned char *pkcs1RSADigestInfo;
- void * wincx;
- void *hashcx;
- const SECHashObject *hashobj;
- SECOidTag encAlg; /* enc alg */
- PRBool hasSignature; /* true if the signature was provided in the
- * VFY_CreateContext call. If false, the
- * signature must be provided with a
- * VFY_EndWithSignature call. */
- };
-
-+static SECStatus
-+verifyPKCS1DigestInfo(const VFYContext* cx, const SECItem* digest)
-+{
-+ SECItem pkcs1DigestInfo;
-+ pkcs1DigestInfo.data = cx->pkcs1RSADigestInfo;
-+ pkcs1DigestInfo.len = cx->pkcs1RSADigestInfoLen;
-+ return _SGN_VerifyPKCS1DigestInfo(
-+ cx->hashAlg, digest, &pkcs1DigestInfo,
-+ PR_TRUE /*XXX: unsafeAllowMissingParameters*/);
-+}
-+
- /*
- * decode the ECDSA or DSA signature from it's DER wrapping.
- * The unwrapped/raw signature is placed in the buffer pointed
- * to by dsig and has enough room for len bytes.
- */
- static SECStatus
- decodeECorDSASignature(SECOidTag algid, const SECItem *sig, unsigned char *dsig,
- unsigned int len) {
-@@ -371,26 +415,26 @@ vfy_CreateContext(const SECKEYPublicKey
- goto loser;
- }
-
- cx->wincx = wincx;
- cx->hasSignature = (sig != NULL);
- cx->encAlg = encAlg;
- cx->hashAlg = hashAlg;
- cx->key = SECKEY_CopyPublicKey(key);
-+ cx->pkcs1RSADigestInfo = NULL;
- rv = SECSuccess;
- if (sig) {
- switch (type) {
- case rsaKey:
-- rv = DecryptSigBlock(&cx->hashAlg, cx->u.buffer, &cx->rsadigestlen,
-- HASH_LENGTH_MAX, cx->key, sig, (char*)wincx);
-- if (cx->hashAlg != hashAlg && hashAlg != SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) {
-- PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE);
-- rv = SECFailure;
-- }
-+ rv = recoverPKCS1DigestInfo(hashAlg, &cx->hashAlg,
-+ &cx->pkcs1RSADigestInfo,
-+ &cx->pkcs1RSADigestInfoLen,
-+ cx->key,
-+ sig, wincx);
- break;
- case dsaKey:
- case ecKey:
- sigLen = SECKEY_SignatureLen(key);
- if (sigLen == 0) {
- /* error set by SECKEY_SignatureLen */
- rv = SECFailure;
- break;
-@@ -464,16 +508,19 @@ VFY_DestroyContext(VFYContext *cx, PRBoo
- if (cx) {
- if (cx->hashcx != NULL) {
- (*cx->hashobj->destroy)(cx->hashcx, PR_TRUE);
- cx->hashcx = NULL;
- }
- if (cx->key) {
- SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(cx->key);
- }
-+ if (cx->pkcs1RSADigestInfo) {
-+ PORT_Free(cx->pkcs1RSADigestInfo);
-+ }
- if (freeit) {
- PORT_ZFree(cx, sizeof(VFYContext));
- }
- }
- }
-
- SECStatus
- VFY_Begin(VFYContext *cx)
-@@ -543,31 +590,35 @@ VFY_EndWithSignature(VFYContext *cx, SEC
- hash.data = final;
- hash.len = part;
- if (PK11_Verify(cx->key,&dsasig,&hash,cx->wincx) != SECSuccess) {
- PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE);
- return SECFailure;
- }
- break;
- case rsaKey:
-+ {
-+ SECItem digest;
-+ digest.data = final;
-+ digest.len = part;
- if (sig) {
-- SECOidTag hashid = SEC_OID_UNKNOWN;
-- rv = DecryptSigBlock(&hashid, cx->u.buffer, &cx->rsadigestlen,
-- HASH_LENGTH_MAX, cx->key, sig, (char*)cx->wincx);
-- if ((rv != SECSuccess) || (hashid != cx->hashAlg)) {
-- PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE);
-+ PORT_Assert(cx->hashAlg != SEC_OID_UNKNOWN);
-+ SECOidTag hashid;
-+ rv = recoverPKCS1DigestInfo(cx->hashAlg, &hashid,
-+ &cx->pkcs1RSADigestInfo,
-+ &cx->pkcs1RSADigestInfoLen,
-+ cx->key,
-+ sig, cx->wincx);
-+ PORT_Assert(cx->hashAlg == hashid);
-+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
- return SECFailure;
- }
- }
-- if ((part != cx->rsadigestlen) ||
-- PORT_Memcmp(final, cx->u.buffer, part)) {
-- PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE);
-- return SECFailure;
-- }
-- break;
-+ return verifyPKCS1DigestInfo(cx, &digest);
-+ }
- default:
- PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE);
- return SECFailure; /* shouldn't happen */
- }
- return SECSuccess;
- }
-
- SECStatus
-@@ -590,22 +641,17 @@ vfy_VerifyDigest(const SECItem *digest,
- SECItem dsasig; /* also used for ECDSA */
-
- rv = SECFailure;
-
- cx = vfy_CreateContext(key, sig, encAlg, hashAlg, NULL, wincx);
- if (cx != NULL) {
- switch (key->keyType) {
- case rsaKey:
-- if ((digest->len != cx->rsadigestlen) ||
-- PORT_Memcmp(digest->data, cx->u.buffer, digest->len)) {
-- PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE);
-- } else {
-- rv = SECSuccess;
-- }
-+ rv = verifyPKCS1DigestInfo(cx, digest);
- break;
- case dsaKey:
- case ecKey:
- dsasig.data = cx->u.buffer;
- dsasig.len = SECKEY_SignatureLen(cx->key);
- if (dsasig.len == 0) {
- break;
- }
-
diff --git a/SOURCES/manfixes.patch b/SOURCES/manfixes.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index c00b1f9..0000000
--- a/SOURCES/manfixes.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,76 +0,0 @@
-diff -up doc/certutil.xml.missing_options doc/certutil.xml
---- doc/certutil.xml.missing_options 2014-08-06 08:05:31.515329622 -0700
-+++ doc/certutil.xml 2014-08-06 08:06:16.520764486 -0700
-@@ -204,6 +204,11 @@ If this option is not used, the validity
- </varlistentry>
-
- <varlistentry>
-+ <term>--dump-ext-val OID </term>
-+ <listitem><para>For single cert, print binary DER encoding of extension OID.</para></listitem>
-+ </varlistentry>
-+
-+ <varlistentry>
- <term>-e </term>
- <listitem><para>Check a certificate's signature during the process of validating a certificate.</para></listitem>
- </varlistentry>
-@@ -214,6 +219,26 @@ If this option is not used, the validity
- </varlistentry>
-
- <varlistentry>
-+ <term>--extGeneric OID:critical-flag:filename[,OID:critical-flag:filename]... </term>
-+ <listitem>
-+ <para>
-+Add one or multiple extensions that certutil cannot encode yet, by loading their encodings from external files.
-+ </para>
-+ <itemizedlist>
-+ <listitem>
-+<para>OID (example): 1.2.3.4</para>
-+ </listitem>
-+ <listitem>
-+<para>critical-flag: critical or not-critical</para>
-+ </listitem>
-+ <listitem>
-+<para>filename: full path to a file containing an encoded extension</para>
-+ </listitem>
-+ </itemizedlist>
-+ </listitem>
-+ </varlistentry>
-+
-+ <varlistentry>
- <term>-f password-file</term>
- <listitem><para>Specify a file that will automatically supply the password to include in a certificate
- or to access a certificate database. This is a plain-text file containing one password. Be sure to prevent
-@@ -376,6 +401,15 @@ of the attribute codes:
- <para><command>V</command> (as an SSL server)</para>
- </listitem>
- <listitem>
-+<para><command>L</command> (as an SSL CA)</para>
-+ </listitem>
-+ <listitem>
-+<para><command>A</command> (as Any CA)</para>
-+ </listitem>
-+ <listitem>
-+<para><command>Y</command> (Verify CA)</para>
-+ </listitem>
-+ <listitem>
- <para><command>S</command> (as an email signer)</para>
- </listitem>
- <listitem>
-@@ -649,6 +683,17 @@ of the attribute codes:
- </varlistentry>
-
- <varlistentry>
-+ <term>--extSAN type:name[,type:name]...</term>
-+ <listitem><para>
-+Create a Subject Alt Name extension with one or multiple names.
-+ </para>
-+ <para>
-+-type: directory, dn, dns, edi, ediparty, email, ip, ipaddr, other, registerid, rfc822, uri, x400, x400addr
-+ </para>
-+ </listitem>
-+ </varlistentry>
-+
-+ <varlistentry>
- <term>--empty-password</term>
- <listitem><para>Use empty password when creating new certificate database with -N.</para></listitem>
- </varlistentry>
diff --git a/SOURCES/p-1083360.patch b/SOURCES/p-1083360.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ed8c3d4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/p-1083360.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
+diff --git a/cmd/ssltap/ssltap.c b/cmd/ssltap/ssltap.c
+--- a/cmd/ssltap/ssltap.c
++++ b/cmd/ssltap/ssltap.c
+@@ -398,16 +398,17 @@ const char * V2CipherString(int cs_int)
+ case 0x000098: cs_str = "TLS/DH-RSA/SEED-CBC/SHA"; break;
+ case 0x000099: cs_str = "TLS/DHE-DSS/SEED-CBC/SHA"; break;
+ case 0x00009A: cs_str = "TLS/DHE-RSA/SEED-CBC/SHA"; break;
+ case 0x00009B: cs_str = "TLS/DH-ANON/SEED-CBC/SHA"; break;
+ case 0x00009C: cs_str = "TLS/RSA/AES128-GCM/SHA256"; break;
+ case 0x00009E: cs_str = "TLS/DHE-RSA/AES128-GCM/SHA256"; break;
+
+ case 0x0000FF: cs_str = "TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV"; break;
++ case 0x005600: cs_str = "TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV"; break;
+
+ case 0x00C001: cs_str = "TLS/ECDH-ECDSA/NULL/SHA"; break;
+ case 0x00C002: cs_str = "TLS/ECDH-ECDSA/RC4-128/SHA"; break;
+ case 0x00C003: cs_str = "TLS/ECDH-ECDSA/3DES-EDE-CBC/SHA"; break;
+ case 0x00C004: cs_str = "TLS/ECDH-ECDSA/AES128-CBC/SHA"; break;
+ case 0x00C005: cs_str = "TLS/ECDH-ECDSA/AES256-CBC/SHA"; break;
+ case 0x00C006: cs_str = "TLS/ECDHE-ECDSA/NULL/SHA"; break;
+ case 0x00C007: cs_str = "TLS/ECDHE-ECDSA/RC4-128/SHA"; break;
+diff --git a/cmd/tstclnt/tstclnt.c b/cmd/tstclnt/tstclnt.c
+--- a/cmd/tstclnt/tstclnt.c
++++ b/cmd/tstclnt/tstclnt.c
+@@ -175,17 +175,17 @@ handshakeCallback(PRFileDesc *fd, void *
+ }
+ }
+
+ static void PrintUsageHeader(const char *progName)
+ {
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "Usage: %s -h host [-a 1st_hs_name ] [-a 2nd_hs_name ] [-p port]\n"
+ "[-d certdir] [-n nickname] [-Bafosvx] [-c ciphers] [-Y]\n"
+- "[-V [min-version]:[max-version]] [-T]\n"
++ "[-V [min-version]:[max-version]] [-K] [-T]\n"
+ "[-r N] [-w passwd] [-W pwfile] [-q [-t seconds]]\n",
+ progName);
+ }
+
+ static void PrintParameterUsage(void)
+ {
+ fprintf(stderr, "%-20s Send different SNI name. 1st_hs_name - at first\n"
+ "%-20s handshake, 2nd_hs_name - at second handshake.\n"
+@@ -201,16 +201,17 @@ static void PrintParameterUsage(void)
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "%-20s Bypass PKCS11 layer for SSL encryption and MACing.\n", "-B");
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "%-20s Restricts the set of enabled SSL/TLS protocols versions.\n"
+ "%-20s All versions are enabled by default.\n"
+ "%-20s Possible values for min/max: ssl2 ssl3 tls1.0 tls1.1 tls1.2\n"
+ "%-20s Example: \"-V ssl3:\" enables SSL 3 and newer.\n",
+ "-V [min]:[max]", "", "", "");
++ fprintf(stderr, "%-20s Send TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV\n", "-K");
+ fprintf(stderr, "%-20s Prints only payload data. Skips HTTP header.\n", "-S");
+ fprintf(stderr, "%-20s Client speaks first. \n", "-f");
+ fprintf(stderr, "%-20s Use synchronous certificate validation "
+ "(required for SSL2)\n", "-O");
+ fprintf(stderr, "%-20s Override bad server cert. Make it OK.\n", "-o");
+ fprintf(stderr, "%-20s Disable SSL socket locking.\n", "-s");
+ fprintf(stderr, "%-20s Verbose progress reporting.\n", "-v");
+ fprintf(stderr, "%-20s Use export policy.\n", "-x");
+@@ -802,16 +803,17 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
+ PRBool enableSSL2 = PR_TRUE;
+ int bypassPKCS11 = 0;
+ int disableLocking = 0;
+ int useExportPolicy = 0;
+ int enableSessionTickets = 0;
+ int enableCompression = 0;
+ int enableFalseStart = 0;
+ int enableCertStatus = 0;
++ int forceFallbackSCSV = 0;
+ PRSocketOptionData opt;
+ PRNetAddr addr;
+ PRPollDesc pollset[2];
+ PRBool allowIPv4 = PR_TRUE;
+ PRBool allowIPv6 = PR_TRUE;
+ PRBool pingServerFirst = PR_FALSE;
+ int pingTimeoutSeconds = -1;
+ PRBool clientSpeaksFirst = PR_FALSE;
+@@ -847,17 +849,17 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
+ if (sec > 0) {
+ maxInterval = PR_SecondsToInterval(sec);
+ }
+ }
+
+ SSL_VersionRangeGetSupported(ssl_variant_stream, &enabledVersions);
+
+ optstate = PL_CreateOptState(argc, argv,
+- "46BFM:OSTV:W:Ya:c:d:fgh:m:n:op:qr:st:uvw:xz");
++ "46BFKM:OSTV:W:Ya:c:d:fgh:m:n:op:qr:st:uvw:xz");
+ while ((optstatus = PL_GetNextOpt(optstate)) == PL_OPT_OK) {
+ switch (optstate->option) {
+ case '?':
+ default : Usage(progName); break;
+
+ case '4': allowIPv6 = PR_FALSE; if (!allowIPv4) Usage(progName); break;
+ case '6': allowIPv4 = PR_FALSE; if (!allowIPv6) Usage(progName); break;
+
+@@ -869,16 +871,18 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
+ }
+ serverCertAuth.testFreshStatusFromSideChannel = PR_TRUE;
+ break;
+
+ case 'I': /* reserved for OCSP multi-stapling */ break;
+
+ case 'O': serverCertAuth.shouldPause = PR_FALSE; break;
+
++ case 'K': forceFallbackSCSV = PR_TRUE; break;
++
+ case 'M': switch (atoi(optstate->value)) {
+ case 1:
+ serverCertAuth.allowOCSPSideChannelData = PR_TRUE;
+ serverCertAuth.allowCRLSideChannelData = PR_FALSE;
+ break;
+ case 2:
+ serverCertAuth.allowOCSPSideChannelData = PR_FALSE;
+ serverCertAuth.allowCRLSideChannelData = PR_TRUE;
+@@ -1213,16 +1216,24 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
+
+ /* enable false start. */
+ rv = SSL_OptionSet(s, SSL_ENABLE_FALSE_START, enableFalseStart);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ SECU_PrintError(progName, "error enabling false start");
+ return 1;
+ }
+
++ if (forceFallbackSCSV) {
++ rv = SSL_OptionSet(s, SSL_ENABLE_FALLBACK_SCSV, PR_TRUE);
++ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
++ SECU_PrintError(progName, "error forcing fallback scsv");
++ return 1;
++ }
++ }
++
+ /* enable cert status (OCSP stapling). */
+ rv = SSL_OptionSet(s, SSL_ENABLE_OCSP_STAPLING, enableCertStatus);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ SECU_PrintError(progName, "error enabling cert status (OCSP stapling)");
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ SSL_SetPKCS11PinArg(s, &pwdata);
diff --git a/SPECS/nss.spec b/SPECS/nss.spec
index b462558..eb50b36 100644
--- a/SPECS/nss.spec
+++ b/SPECS/nss.spec
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
%global nspr_version 4.10.6
-%global nss_util_version 3.16.2
+%global nss_util_version 3.16.2.3
# adjust to the version that gets submitted for FIPS validation
%global nss_softokn_fips_version 3.16.2
-%global nss_softokn_version 3.16.2
+%global nss_softokn_version 3.16.2.3
%global unsupported_tools_directory %{_libdir}/nss/unsupported-tools
%global allTools "certutil cmsutil crlutil derdump modutil pk12util pp signtool signver ssltap vfychain vfyserv"
@@ -20,8 +20,8 @@
Summary: Network Security Services
Name: nss
-Version: 3.16.2
-Release: 7%{?dist}
+Version: 3.16.2.3
+Release: 2%{?dist}
License: MPLv2.0
URL: http://www.mozilla.org/projects/security/pki/nss/
Group: System Environment/Libraries
@@ -100,11 +100,12 @@ Patch55: enable-fips-when-system-is-in-fips-mode.patch
Patch56: p-ignore-setpolicy.patch
# Upstream: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=921684
Patch62: dont-hold-issuer-cert-handles-in-crl-cache.patch
-# Upstream: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1007126
-Patch63: manfixes.patch
-# Upstream: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1064636
-Patch77: cve-2014-1568-nss.patch
-Patch78: cve-2014-1568-nss-extra.patch
+# Upstream: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1050069
+Patch64: Crash-in-stan_GetCERTCertificate-rhbz1139349.patch
+# Upstream: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1083360
+# support TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV in tstclnt and ssltap
+Patch88: p-1083360.patch
+Patch89: certutil-man-supply-missing-options.patch
%description
Network Security Services (NSS) is a set of libraries designed to
@@ -200,10 +201,10 @@ popd
%patch56 -p0 -b .1026677
%patch62 -p0 -b .1034409
pushd nss
-%patch63 -p0 -b .missing_options
-%patch77 -p1 -b cve-2014-1568-nss
-%patch78 -p1 -b cve-2014-1568-nss-extra
+%patch64 -p1 -b .1139349
+%patch88 -p1 -b .support_tls_fallback_scsv
popd
+%patch89 -p0 -b .missing_options
#########################################################
# Higher-level libraries and test tools need access to
@@ -784,6 +785,19 @@ fi
%changelog
+* Tue Nov 25 2014 Elio Maldonado <emaldona@redhat.com> - 3.16.2.3-2
+- Restore patch for certutil man page
+- supply missing options descriptions
+- Resolves: Bug 1165525 - Upgrade to NSS 3.16.2.3 for Firefox 31.3
+
+* Wed Nov 19 2014 Elio Maldonado <emaldona@redhat.com> - 3.16.2.3-1
+- Resolves: Bug 1165525 - Upgrade to NSS 3.16.2.3 for Firefox 31.3
+- Support TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV in tstclnt and ssltap
+
+* Fri Sep 26 2014 Elio Maldonado <emaldona@redhat.com> - 3.16.2-8
+- Fix crash in stan_GetCERTCertificate
+- Resolves: Bug 1139349
+
* Wed Sep 24 2014 Elio Maldonado <emaldona@redhat.com> - 3.16.2-7
- Resolves: Bug 1145433 - CVE-2014-1568