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diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c
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index c7f1dc3..aa8a7c0 100644
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--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c
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+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c
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@@ -177,6 +177,17 @@ static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value,
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BIGNUM *pr0, *d, *p;
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int bitsp, bitsq, ok = -1, n = 0;
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BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
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+ unsigned long error = 0;
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+
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+ /*
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+ * When generating ridiculously small keys, we can get stuck
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+ * continually regenerating the same prime values.
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+ */
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+ if (bits < 16) {
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+ ok = 0; /* we set our own err */
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+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_BUILTIN_KEYGEN, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
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+ goto err;
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+ }
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#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
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if (FIPS_module_mode()) {
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@@ -233,45 +244,55 @@ static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value,
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if (BN_copy(rsa->e, e_value) == NULL)
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goto err;
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+ BN_set_flags(rsa->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
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+ BN_set_flags(rsa->q, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
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+ BN_set_flags(r2, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
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/* generate p and q */
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for (;;) {
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if (!BN_generate_prime_ex(rsa->p, bitsp, 0, NULL, NULL, cb))
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goto err;
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if (!BN_sub(r2, rsa->p, BN_value_one()))
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goto err;
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- if (!BN_gcd(r1, r2, rsa->e, ctx))
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- goto err;
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- if (BN_is_one(r1))
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+ ERR_set_mark();
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+ if (BN_mod_inverse(r1, r2, rsa->e, ctx) != NULL) {
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+ /* GCD == 1 since inverse exists */
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break;
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+ }
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+ error = ERR_peek_last_error();
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+ if (ERR_GET_LIB(error) == ERR_LIB_BN
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+ && ERR_GET_REASON(error) == BN_R_NO_INVERSE) {
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+ /* GCD != 1 */
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+ ERR_pop_to_mark();
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+ } else {
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+ goto err;
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+ }
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if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, n++))
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goto err;
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}
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if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 0))
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goto err;
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for (;;) {
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- /*
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- * When generating ridiculously small keys, we can get stuck
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- * continually regenerating the same prime values. Check for this and
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- * bail if it happens 3 times.
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- */
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- unsigned int degenerate = 0;
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do {
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if (!BN_generate_prime_ex(rsa->q, bitsq, 0, NULL, NULL, cb))
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goto err;
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if (!BN_sub(r2, rsa->q, rsa->p))
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goto err;
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- } while ((BN_ucmp(r2, r3) <= 0) && (++degenerate < 3));
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- if (degenerate == 3) {
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- ok = 0; /* we set our own err */
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- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_BUILTIN_KEYGEN, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
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- goto err;
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- }
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+ } while (BN_ucmp(r2, r3) <= 0);
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if (!BN_sub(r2, rsa->q, BN_value_one()))
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goto err;
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- if (!BN_gcd(r1, r2, rsa->e, ctx))
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- goto err;
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- if (BN_is_one(r1))
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+ ERR_set_mark();
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+ if (BN_mod_inverse(r1, r2, rsa->e, ctx) != NULL) {
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+ /* GCD == 1 since inverse exists */
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break;
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+ }
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+ error = ERR_peek_last_error();
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+ if (ERR_GET_LIB(error) == ERR_LIB_BN
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+ && ERR_GET_REASON(error) == BN_R_NO_INVERSE) {
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+ /* GCD != 1 */
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+ ERR_pop_to_mark();
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+ } else {
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+ goto err;
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+ }
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if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, n++))
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goto err;
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}
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