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diff -up openssl-1.0.2a/README.warning openssl-1.0.2a/README
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--- openssl-1.0.2a/README.warning 2015-03-20 16:00:47.000000000 +0100
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+++ openssl-1.0.2a/README 2015-03-21 09:06:11.000000000 +0100
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@@ -5,6 +5,46 @@
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Copyright (c) 1995-1998 Eric A. Young, Tim J. Hudson
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All rights reserved.
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+ WARNING
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+ -------
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+
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+ This version of OpenSSL is built in a way that supports operation in
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+ the so called FIPS mode. Note though that the library as we build it
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+ is not FIPS 140-2 validated and the FIPS mode is present for testing
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+ purposes only.
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+
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+ This version also contains a few differences from the upstream code
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+ some of which are:
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+ * The FIPS validation support is significantly different from the
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+ upstream FIPS support. For example the FIPS integrity verification
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+ check is implemented differently as the FIPS module is built inside
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+ the shared library. The HMAC-SHA256 checksums of the whole shared
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+ libraries are verified. Also note that the FIPS integrity
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+ verification check requires that the libcrypto and libssl shared
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+ library files are unmodified which means that it will fail if these
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+ files are changed for example by prelink.
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+ * If the file /etc/system-fips is present the integrity verification
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+ and selftests of the crypto algorithms are run inside the library
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+ constructor code.
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+ * With the /etc/system-fips present the module respects the kernel
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+ FIPS flag /proc/sys/crypto/fips and tries to initialize the FIPS mode
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+ if it is set to 1 aborting if the FIPS mode could not be initialized.
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+ With the /etc/system-fips present it is also possible to force the
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+ OpenSSL library to FIPS mode especially for debugging purposes by
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+ setting the environment variable OPENSSL_FORCE_FIPS_MODE.
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+ * If the environment variable OPENSSL_NO_DEFAULT_ZLIB is set the module
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+ will not automatically load the built in compression method ZLIB
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+ when initialized. Applications can still explicitely ask for ZLIB
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+ compression method.
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+ * The library was patched so the certificates, CRLs and other objects
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+ signed with use of MD5 fail verification as the MD5 is too insecure
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+ to be used for signatures. If the environment variable
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+ OPENSSL_ENABLE_MD5_VERIFY is set, the verification can proceed
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+ normally.
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+ * If the OPENSSL_ENFORCE_MODULUS_BITS environment variable is set,
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+ the library will not allow generation of DSA and RSA keys with
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+ other lengths than specified in the FIPS 186-4 standard.
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+
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DESCRIPTION
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-----------
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