diff --git a/.gitignore b/.gitignore
index 73b7846..200d924 100644
--- a/.gitignore
+++ b/.gitignore
@@ -1,3 +1,7 @@
 SOURCES/06-2d-07
+SOURCES/06-4e-03
 SOURCES/06-55-04
+SOURCES/06-5e-03
+SOURCES/microcode-20190918.tar.gz
 SOURCES/microcode-20191115.tar.gz
+SOURCES/microcode-20200609.tar.gz
diff --git a/.microcode_ctl.metadata b/.microcode_ctl.metadata
index 49611a4..c0d8e72 100644
--- a/.microcode_ctl.metadata
+++ b/.microcode_ctl.metadata
@@ -1,3 +1,7 @@
 bcf2173cd3dd499c37defbc2533703cfa6ec2430 SOURCES/06-2d-07
+06432a25053c823b0e2a6b8e84e2e2023ee3d43e SOURCES/06-4e-03
 2e405644a145de0f55517b6a9de118eec8ec1e5a SOURCES/06-55-04
+86c60ee7d5d0d7115a4962c1c61ceecb0fd3a95a SOURCES/06-5e-03
+bc20d6789e6614b9d9f88ee321ab82bed220f26f SOURCES/microcode-20190918.tar.gz
 774636f4d440623b0ee6a2dad65260e81208074d SOURCES/microcode-20191115.tar.gz
+c2a433c1f68c2dc5b752bd7dddf204ea89ad5761 SOURCES/microcode-20200609.tar.gz
diff --git a/SOURCES/06-2d-07_config b/SOURCES/06-2d-07_config
index 23e1d08..979455d 100644
--- a/SOURCES/06-2d-07_config
+++ b/SOURCES/06-2d-07_config
@@ -1,3 +1,13 @@
 model GenuineIntel 06-2d-07
 path intel-ucode/06-2d-07
-disable early late
+## The "kernel_early" statements are carried over from the intel caveat config
+## in order to avoid enabling this newer microcode on these problematic kernels;
+## see the caveat description in /usr/share/doc/microcode_ctl/caveats/intel_readme
+## (That also means that this caveat has to be enforced separately on these
+## kernels.)
+kernel_early 4.10.0
+kernel_early 3.10.0-930
+kernel_early 3.10.0-862.14.1
+kernel_early 3.10.0-693.38.1
+kernel_early 3.10.0-514.57.1
+kernel_early 3.10.0-327.73.1
diff --git a/SOURCES/06-2d-07_disclaimer b/SOURCES/06-2d-07_disclaimer
index c8d99c4..ae71a34 100644
--- a/SOURCES/06-2d-07_disclaimer
+++ b/SOURCES/06-2d-07_disclaimer
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
 MDS-related microcode update for Intel Sandy Bridge-EP (family 6, model 45,
-stepping 7; CPUID 0x206d7) CPUs is disabled as it may cause system instability.
+stepping 7; CPUID 0x206d7) CPUs is disabled.
 Please refer to /usr/share/doc/microcode_ctl/caveats/06-2d-07_readme
 and /usr/share/doc/microcode_ctl/README.caveats for details.
diff --git a/SOURCES/06-2d-07_readme b/SOURCES/06-2d-07_readme
index 60c20d4..e5e575b 100644
--- a/SOURCES/06-2d-07_readme
+++ b/SOURCES/06-2d-07_readme
@@ -1,17 +1,23 @@
 Intel Sandy Bridge-E/EN/EP CPU models (SNB-EP, family 6, model 45, stepping 7)
-have issues with MDS-related microcode update that may lead to a system hang
-after a microcode update. In order to address this, microcode update
-to the MDS-related revision 0x718 has been disabled, and the previously
+had issues with MDS-related microcode update that may lead to a system hang
+after a microcode update[1][2].  In order to address this, microcode update
+to the MDS-related revision 0x718 had been disabled, and the previously
 published microcode revision 0x714 is used by default for the OS-driven
-microcode update.
+microcode update.  The revision 0x71a of the microcode is intended to fix
+the aforementioned issue, hence it is enabled by default (but can be disabled
+explicitly; see below).
+
+[1] https://github.com/intel/Intel-Linux-Processor-Microcode-Data-Files/issues/15
+[2] https://access.redhat.com/solutions/4593951
 
 For the reference, SHA1 checksums of 06-2d-07 microcode files containing
 microcode revisions in question are listed below:
  * 06-2d-07, revision 0x714: bcf2173cd3dd499c37defbc2533703cfa6ec2430
  * 06-2d-07, revision 0x718: 837cfebbfc09b911151dfd179082ad99cf87e85d
+ * 06-2d-07, revision 0x71a: 4512c8149e63e5ed15f45005d7fb5be0041f66f6
 
 Please contact your system vendor for a BIOS/firmware update that contains
-the latest microcode version. For the information regarding microcode versions
+the latest microcode version.  For the information regarding microcode versions
 required for mitigating specific side-channel cache attacks, please refer
 to the following knowledge base articles:
  * CVE-2017-5715 ("Spectre"):
@@ -24,30 +30,27 @@ to the following knowledge base articles:
    ("Microarchitectural Data Sampling"):
    https://access.redhat.com/articles/4138151
 
-The information regarding enforcing microcode load is provided below.
+The information regarding disabling microcode update is provided below.
 
-To enforce usage of the 0x718 microcode revision for a specific kernel version,
-please create file "force-intel-06-2d-07" inside /lib/firmware/<kernel_version>
-directory, run "/usr/libexec/microcode_ctl/update_ucode" to add it to firmware
-directory where microcode will be available for late microcode update,
-and run "dracut -f --kver <kernel_version>", so initramfs for this kernel
-version is regenerated and the microcode can be loaded early, for example:
+To disable usage of the newer microcode revision for a specific kernel
+version, please create file "disallow-intel-06-2d-07" inside
+/lib/firmware/<kernel_version> directory, run
+"/usr/libexec/microcode_ctl/update_ucode" to add it to firmware directory
+where microcode will be available for late microcode update, and run
+"dracut -f --kver <kernel_version>", so initramfs for this kernel version
+is regenerated and the microcode can be loaded early, for example:
 
-    touch /lib/firmware/3.10.0-862.9.1/force-intel-06-2d-07
+    touch /lib/firmware/3.10.0-862.9.1/disallow-intel-06-2d-07
     /usr/libexec/microcode_ctl/update_ucode
     dracut -f --kver 3.10.0-862.9.1
 
-After that, it is possible to perform a late microcode update by executing
-"/usr/libexec/microcode_ctl/reload_microcode" or by writing value "1" to
-"/sys/devices/system/cpu/microcode/reload" directly.
-
-To enforce addition of this microcode for all kernels, please create file
-"/etc/microcode_ctl/ucode_with_caveats/force-intel-06-2d-07", run
-"/usr/libexec/microcode_ctl/update_ucode" for enabling late microcode updates,
-and "dracut -f --regenerate-all" for enabling early microcode updates:
+To avoid addition of the newer microcode revision for all kernels, please create
+file "/etc/microcode_ctl/ucode_with_caveats/disallow-intel-06-2d-07", run
+"/usr/libexec/microcode_ctl/update_ucode" for late microcode updates,
+and "dracut -f --regenerate-all" for early microcode updates:
 
     mkdir -p /etc/microcode_ctl/ucode_with_caveats
-    touch /etc/microcode_ctl/ucode_with_caveats/force-intel-06-2d-07
+    touch /etc/microcode_ctl/ucode_with_caveats/disallow-intel-06-2d-07
     /usr/libexec/microcode_ctl/update_ucode
     dracut -f --regenerate-all
 
diff --git a/SOURCES/06-4e-03_config b/SOURCES/06-4e-03_config
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bee51b2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/06-4e-03_config
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+model GenuineIntel 06-4e-03
+path intel-ucode/06-4e-03
+disable early late
diff --git a/SOURCES/06-4e-03_disclaimer b/SOURCES/06-4e-03_disclaimer
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ec27ef7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/06-4e-03_disclaimer
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+Microcode revisions 0xda and higher for Intel Skylake-U/Y (family 6,
+model 78, stepping 3; CPUID 0x406e3) are disabled as they may cause system
+instability; the previously published revision 0xd6 is used instead.
+Please refer to /usr/share/doc/microcode_ctl/caveats/06-4e-03_readme
+and /usr/share/doc/microcode_ctl/README.caveats for details.
diff --git a/SOURCES/06-4e-03_readme b/SOURCES/06-4e-03_readme
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e221544
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/06-4e-03_readme
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+Some Intel Skylake CPU models (SKL-U/Y, family 6, model 78, stepping 3)
+have reports of system hangs when revision 0xdc of microcode, that is included
+since microcode-20200609 update to address CVE-2020-0543, CVE-2020-0548,
+and CVE-2020-0549, is applied[1].  In order to address this, microcode update
+to the newer revision has been disabled by default on these systems,
+and the previously published microcode revision 0xd6 is used by default
+for the OS-driven microcode update.
+
+[1] https://github.com/intel/Intel-Linux-Processor-Microcode-Data-Files/issues/31
+
+For the reference, SHA1 checksums of 06-55-04 microcode files containing
+microcode revisions in question are listed below:
+ * 06-4e-03, revision 0xd6: 06432a25053c823b0e2a6b8e84e2e2023ee3d43e
+ * 06-4e-03, revision 0xdc: cd1733458d187486999337ff8b51eeaa0cfbca6c
+
+Please contact your system vendor for a BIOS/firmware update that contains
+the latest microcode version.  For the information regarding microcode versions
+required for mitigating specific side-channel cache attacks, please refer
+to the following knowledge base articles:
+ * CVE-2017-5715 ("Spectre"):
+   https://access.redhat.com/articles/3436091
+ * CVE-2018-3639 ("Speculative Store Bypass"):
+   https://access.redhat.com/articles/3540901
+ * CVE-2018-3620, CVE-2018-3646 ("L1 Terminal Fault Attack"):
+   https://access.redhat.com/articles/3562741
+ * CVE-2018-12130, CVE-2018-12126, CVE-2018-12127, and CVE-2019-11091
+   ("Microarchitectural Data Sampling"):
+   https://access.redhat.com/articles/4138151
+ * CVE-2019-0117 (Intel SGX Information Leak),
+   CVE-2019-0123 (Intel SGX Privilege Escalation),
+   CVE-2019-11135 (TSX Asynchronous Abort),
+   CVE-2019-11139 (Voltage Setting Modulation):
+   https://access.redhat.com/solutions/2019-microcode-nov
+ * CVE-2020-0543 (Special Register Buffer Data Sampling),
+   CVE-2020-0548 (Vector Register Data Sampling),
+   CVE-2020-0549 (L1D Cache Eviction Sampling):
+   https://access.redhat.com/solutions/5142751
+
+The information regarding enforcing microcode update is provided below.
+
+To enforce usage of the latest 06-4e-03 microcode revision for a specific kernel
+version, please create a file "force-intel-06-4e-03" inside
+/lib/firmware/<kernel_version> directory, run
+"/usr/libexec/microcode_ctl/update_ucode" to add it to firmware directory
+where microcode will be available for late microcode update, and run
+"dracut -f --kver <kernel_version>", so initramfs for this kernel version
+is regenerated and the microcode can be loaded early, for example:
+
+    touch /lib/firmware/3.10.0-862.9.1/force-intel-06-4e-03
+    /usr/libexec/microcode_ctl/update_ucode
+    dracut -f --kver 3.10.0-862.9.1
+
+After that, it is possible to perform a late microcode update by executing
+"/usr/libexec/microcode_ctl/reload_microcode" or by writing value "1" to
+"/sys/devices/system/cpu/microcode/reload" directly.
+
+To enforce addition of this microcode for all kernels, please create file
+"/etc/microcode_ctl/ucode_with_caveats/force-intel-06-4e-03", run
+"/usr/libexec/microcode_ctl/update_ucode" for enabling late microcode updates,
+and "dracut -f --regenerate-all" for enabling early microcode updates:
+
+    mkdir -p /etc/microcode_ctl/ucode_with_caveats
+    touch /etc/microcode_ctl/ucode_with_caveats/force-intel-06-4e-03
+    /usr/libexec/microcode_ctl/update_ucode
+    dracut -f --regenerate-all
+
+Please refer to /usr/share/doc/microcode_ctl/README.caveats for additional
+information.
diff --git a/SOURCES/06-4f-01_disclaimer b/SOURCES/06-4f-01_disclaimer
index d5bc60d..c978958 100644
--- a/SOURCES/06-4f-01_disclaimer
+++ b/SOURCES/06-4f-01_disclaimer
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-microcode update for Intel Broadwell-EP/EX (BDX-ML B/M/R0; family 6, model 79,
+Microcode update for Intel Broadwell-EP/EX (BDX-ML B/M/R0; family 6, model 79,
 stepping 1; CPUID 0x406f1) CPUs is disabled as it may cause system instability.
 Please refer to /usr/share/doc/microcode_ctl/caveats/06-4f-01_readme
 and /usr/share/doc/microcode_ctl/README.caveats for details.
diff --git a/SOURCES/06-55-04_config b/SOURCES/06-55-04_config
index 6ba6d76..373c8ac 100644
--- a/SOURCES/06-55-04_config
+++ b/SOURCES/06-55-04_config
@@ -1,3 +1,22 @@
 model GenuineIntel 06-55-04
 path intel-ucode/06-55-04
-disable early late
+## Bug https://github.com/intel/Intel-Linux-Processor-Microcode-Data-Files/issues/21
+## affects only SKX-W/X (Workstation and HEDT segments); product segment
+## can be determined by checking bits 5..3 of the CAPID0 field in PCU registers
+## device (see https://www.intel.com/content/dam/www/public/us/en/documents/specification-updates/xeon-scalable-spec-update.pdf#page=13
+## for Server/FPGA/Fabric segments description; for SKX-W/X no public
+## documentation seems to be available).  Specific device/function numbers
+## are provided for speeding up the search only, VID:DID is the real selector.
+## Commented out since revision 0x2006906 seems to fix the issue.
+#pci_config_val mode=success-all device=0x1e function=3 vid=0x8086 did=0x2083 offset=0x84 size=4 mask=0x38 val=0x38,0x18,0x8
+## The "kernel_early" statements are carried over from the intel caveat config
+## in order to avoid enabling this newer microcode on these problematic kernels;
+## see the caveat description in /usr/share/doc/microcode_ctl/caveats/intel_readme
+## (That also means that this caveat has to be enforced separately on these
+## kernels.)
+kernel_early 4.10.0
+kernel_early 3.10.0-930
+kernel_early 3.10.0-862.14.1
+kernel_early 3.10.0-693.38.1
+kernel_early 3.10.0-514.57.1
+kernel_early 3.10.0-327.73.1
diff --git a/SOURCES/06-55-04_disclaimer b/SOURCES/06-55-04_disclaimer
index 238d233..66d71bd 100644
--- a/SOURCES/06-55-04_disclaimer
+++ b/SOURCES/06-55-04_disclaimer
@@ -1,6 +1,5 @@
-Microcode revision 0x2000065 for Intel Skylake-SP/X/W (family 6, model 85,
-stepping 4; CPUID 0x50654) CPUs that has been included into microcode-20191112
-release is disabled as it may cause system instability and the previous revision
-0x2000064 is used instead.
+Microcode revisions 0x2000065 and higher for Intel Skylake-X/W (family 6,
+model 85, stepping 4; CPUID 0x50654) were disabled as they could cause system
+hangs on reboot, so the previous revision 0x2000064 was used instead.
 Please refer to /usr/share/doc/microcode_ctl/caveats/06-55-04_readme
 and /usr/share/doc/microcode_ctl/README.caveats for details.
diff --git a/SOURCES/06-55-04_readme b/SOURCES/06-55-04_readme
index 41fb757..097e07b 100644
--- a/SOURCES/06-55-04_readme
+++ b/SOURCES/06-55-04_readme
@@ -1,14 +1,22 @@
-Intel Skulake Scalable Platform CPU models (SKL-SP/W/X, family 6, model 85,
-stepping 4) have reports of system hangs when revision 0x2000065 of microcode,
-that is included since microcode-20191112 update, is applied.  In order
-to address this, microcode update to this revision has been disabled,
-and the previously published microcode revision 0x2000064 is used by default
-for the OS-driven microcode update.
+Intel Skylake Scalable Platform CPU models that belong to Workstation and HEDT
+(Basin Falls) segment (SKL-W/X, family 6, model 85, stepping 4) had reports
+of system hangs on reboot when revision 0x2000065 of microcode, that was included
+from microcode-20191112 update up to microcode-20200520 update, was applied[1].
+In order to address this, microcode update to the newer revision had been
+disabled by default on these systems, and the previously published microcode
+revision 0x2000064 is used by default for the OS-driven microcode update.
+
+Since revision 0x2006906 (included with the microcode-20200609 release)
+it is reported that the issue is no longer present, so the newer microcode
+revision is enabled by default now (but can be disabled explicitly; see below).
+
+[1] https://github.com/intel/Intel-Linux-Processor-Microcode-Data-Files/issues/21
 
 For the reference, SHA1 checksums of 06-55-04 microcode files containing
 microcode revisions in question are listed below:
  * 06-55-04, revision 0x2000064: 2e405644a145de0f55517b6a9de118eec8ec1e5a
  * 06-55-04, revision 0x2000065: f27f12b9d53f492c297afd856cdbc596786fad23
+ * 06-55-04, revision 0x2006906: 5f18f985f6d5ad369b5f6549b7f3ee55acaef967
 
 Please contact your system vendor for a BIOS/firmware update that contains
 the latest microcode version.  For the information regarding microcode versions
@@ -28,32 +36,32 @@ to the following knowledge base articles:
    CVE-2019-11135 (TSX Asynchronous Abort),
    CVE-2019-11139 (Voltage Setting Modulation):
    https://access.redhat.com/solutions/2019-microcode-nov
+ * CVE-2020-0543 (Special Register Buffer Data Sampling),
+   CVE-2020-0548 (Vector Register Data Sampling),
+   CVE-2020-0549 (L1D Cache Eviction Sampling):
+   https://access.redhat.com/solutions/5142751
 
-The information regarding enforcing microcode update is provided below.
+The information regarding disabling microcode update is provided below.
 
-To enforce usage of the 0x2000065 microcode revision for a specific kernel
-version, please create a file "force-intel-06-55-04" inside
+To disable usage of the newer microcode revision for a specific kernel
+version, please create a file "disallow-intel-06-55-04" inside
 /lib/firmware/<kernel_version> directory, run
-"/usr/libexec/microcode_ctl/update_ucode" to add it to firmware directory
-where microcode will be available for late microcode update, and run
-"dracut -f --kver <kernel_version>", so initramfs for this kernel version
-is regenerated and the microcode can be loaded early, for example:
+"/usr/libexec/microcode_ctl/update_ucode" to update firmware directory
+used for late microcode updates, and run "dracut -f --kver <kernel_version>"
+so initramfs for this kernel version is regenerated, for example:
 
-    touch /lib/firmware/3.10.0-862.9.1/force-intel-06-55-04
+    touch /lib/firmware/3.10.0-862.9.1/disallow-intel-06-55-04
     /usr/libexec/microcode_ctl/update_ucode
     dracut -f --kver 3.10.0-862.9.1
 
-After that, it is possible to perform a late microcode update by executing
-"/usr/libexec/microcode_ctl/reload_microcode" or by writing value "1" to
-"/sys/devices/system/cpu/microcode/reload" directly.
-
-To enforce addition of this microcode for all kernels, please create file
-"/etc/microcode_ctl/ucode_with_caveats/force-intel-06-55-04", run
-"/usr/libexec/microcode_ctl/update_ucode" for enabling late microcode updates,
-and "dracut -f --regenerate-all" for enabling early microcode updates:
+To disable usage of the newer microcode revision for all kernels, please create
+file "/etc/microcode_ctl/ucode_with_caveats/disallow-intel-06-55-04", run
+"/usr/libexec/microcode_ctl/update_ucode" to update firmware directories
+used for late microcode updates, and run "dracut -f --regenerate-all"
+so initramfs images get regenerated, for example:
 
     mkdir -p /etc/microcode_ctl/ucode_with_caveats
-    touch /etc/microcode_ctl/ucode_with_caveats/force-intel-06-55-04
+    touch /etc/microcode_ctl/ucode_with_caveats/disallow-intel-06-55-04
     /usr/libexec/microcode_ctl/update_ucode
     dracut -f --regenerate-all
 
diff --git a/SOURCES/06-5e-03_config b/SOURCES/06-5e-03_config
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7482d36
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/06-5e-03_config
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+model GenuineIntel 06-5e-03
+path intel-ucode/06-5e-03
+disable early late
diff --git a/SOURCES/06-5e-03_disclaimer b/SOURCES/06-5e-03_disclaimer
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7e3bb16
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/06-5e-03_disclaimer
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+Microcode revisions 0xda and higher for Intel Skylake-H/S/Xeon E3 v5 (family 6,
+model 94, stepping 3; CPUID 0x506e3) are disabled as they may cause system
+instability; the previously published revision 0xd6 is used instead.
+Please refer to /usr/share/doc/microcode_ctl/caveats/06-5e-03_readme
+and /usr/share/doc/microcode_ctl/README.caveats for details.
diff --git a/SOURCES/06-5e-03_readme b/SOURCES/06-5e-03_readme
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b739bf2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/06-5e-03_readme
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+Some Intel Skylake CPU models (SKL-H/S/Xeon E3 v5, family 6, model 94,
+stepping 3) have reports of possible system hangs when revision 0xdc
+of microcode, that is included in microcode-20200609 update to address
+CVE-2020-0543, CVE-2020-0548, and CVE-2020-0549, is applied[1].  In order
+to address this, microcode update to the newer revision has been disabled
+by default on these systems, and the previously published microcode revision
+0xd6 is used by default for the OS-driven microcode update.
+
+[1] https://github.com/intel/Intel-Linux-Processor-Microcode-Data-Files/issues/31#issuecomment-644885826
+
+For the reference, SHA1 checksums of 06-55-04 microcode files containing
+microcode revisions in question are listed below:
+ * 06-5e-03, revision 0xd6: 86c60ee7d5d0d7115a4962c1c61ceecb0fd3a95a
+ * 06-5e-03, revision 0xdc: 5e1020a10678cfc60980131c3d3a2cfd462b4dd7
+
+Please contact your system vendor for a BIOS/firmware update that contains
+the latest microcode version.  For the information regarding microcode versions
+required for mitigating specific side-channel cache attacks, please refer
+to the following knowledge base articles:
+ * CVE-2017-5715 ("Spectre"):
+   https://access.redhat.com/articles/3436091
+ * CVE-2018-3639 ("Speculative Store Bypass"):
+   https://access.redhat.com/articles/3540901
+ * CVE-2018-3620, CVE-2018-3646 ("L1 Terminal Fault Attack"):
+   https://access.redhat.com/articles/3562741
+ * CVE-2018-12130, CVE-2018-12126, CVE-2018-12127, and CVE-2019-11091
+   ("Microarchitectural Data Sampling"):
+   https://access.redhat.com/articles/4138151
+ * CVE-2019-0117 (Intel SGX Information Leak),
+   CVE-2019-0123 (Intel SGX Privilege Escalation),
+   CVE-2019-11135 (TSX Asynchronous Abort),
+   CVE-2019-11139 (Voltage Setting Modulation):
+   https://access.redhat.com/solutions/2019-microcode-nov
+ * CVE-2020-0543 (Special Register Buffer Data Sampling),
+   CVE-2020-0548 (Vector Register Data Sampling),
+   CVE-2020-0549 (L1D Cache Eviction Sampling):
+   https://access.redhat.com/solutions/5142751
+
+The information regarding enforcing microcode update is provided below.
+
+To enforce usage of the latest 06-5e-03 microcode revision for a specific kernel
+version, please create a file "force-intel-06-5e-03" inside
+/lib/firmware/<kernel_version> directory, run
+"/usr/libexec/microcode_ctl/update_ucode" to add it to firmware directory
+where microcode will be available for late microcode update, and run
+"dracut -f --kver <kernel_version>", so initramfs for this kernel version
+is regenerated and the microcode can be loaded early, for example:
+
+    touch /lib/firmware/3.10.0-862.9.1/force-intel-06-5e-03
+    /usr/libexec/microcode_ctl/update_ucode
+    dracut -f --kver 3.10.0-862.9.1
+
+After that, it is possible to perform a late microcode update by executing
+"/usr/libexec/microcode_ctl/reload_microcode" or by writing value "1" to
+"/sys/devices/system/cpu/microcode/reload" directly.
+
+To enforce addition of this microcode for all kernels, please create file
+"/etc/microcode_ctl/ucode_with_caveats/force-intel-06-5e-03", run
+"/usr/libexec/microcode_ctl/update_ucode" for enabling late microcode updates,
+and "dracut -f --regenerate-all" for enabling early microcode updates:
+
+    mkdir -p /etc/microcode_ctl/ucode_with_caveats
+    touch /etc/microcode_ctl/ucode_with_caveats/force-intel-06-5e-03
+    /usr/libexec/microcode_ctl/update_ucode
+    dracut -f --regenerate-all
+
+Please refer to /usr/share/doc/microcode_ctl/README.caveats for additional
+information.
diff --git a/SOURCES/06-8e-9e-0x-0xca_config b/SOURCES/06-8e-9e-0x-0xca_config
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2dbca4a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/06-8e-9e-0x-0xca_config
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+path intel-ucode/*
+vendor GenuineIntel
+dmi mode=fail-equal key=bios_vendor val="Dell Inc."
+disable early late
diff --git a/SOURCES/06-8e-9e-0x-0xca_disclaimer b/SOURCES/06-8e-9e-0x-0xca_disclaimer
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e69de29
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/06-8e-9e-0x-0xca_disclaimer
diff --git a/SOURCES/06-8e-9e-0x-0xca_readme b/SOURCES/06-8e-9e-0x-0xca_readme
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..aba1bc7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/06-8e-9e-0x-0xca_readme
@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
+Some Dell systems that use some models of Intel CPUs are susceptible to hangs
+and system instability during or after microcode update to revision 0xc6/0xca
+(included as part of microcode-20191113/microcode-20191115 update that addressed
+CVE-2019-0117, CVE-2019-0123, CVE-2019-11135, and CVE-2019-11139)
+and/or revision 0xd6 (included as part of microcode-20200609 update
+that addressed CVE-2020-0543, CVE-2020-0548, and CVE-2020-0549)
+[1][2][3][4][5][6].  In order to address this, microcode update to the newer
+revision has been disabled by default on these systems, and the previously
+published microcode revisions 0xae/0xb4/0xb8 are used by default
+for the OS-driven microcode update.
+
+[1] https://github.com/intel/Intel-Linux-Processor-Microcode-Data-Files/issues/23
+[2] https://github.com/intel/Intel-Linux-Processor-Microcode-Data-Files/issues/24
+[3] https://github.com/intel/Intel-Linux-Processor-Microcode-Data-Files/issues/33
+[4] https://github.com/intel/Intel-Linux-Processor-Microcode-Data-Files/issues/34
+[5] https://github.com/intel/Intel-Linux-Processor-Microcode-Data-Files/issues/35
+[6] https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1846097
+
+This caveat contains revision 0xca of 06-[89]e-0x microcode publicly released
+by Intel; for the latest revision of the microcode files, please refer to caveat
+06-8e-9e-0x-dell.
+
+For the reference, microarchitectures of the affected CPU models:
+ * Amber Lake-Y
+ * Kaby Lake-G/H/S/U/Y/Xeon E3
+ * Coffee Lake-H/S/U/Xeon E
+ * Comet Lake-U 4+2
+ * Whiskey Lake-U
+
+Family names of the affected CPU models:
+ * 7th Generation Intel® Core™ Processor Family
+ * 8th Generation Intel® Core™ Processor Family
+ * 9th Generation Intel® Core™ Processor Family
+ * 10th Generation Intel® Core™ Processor Family (selected models)
+ * Intel® Celeron® Processor G Series
+ * Intel® Celeron® Processor 5000 Series
+ * Intel® Core™ X-series Processors (i7-7740X, i5-7640X only)
+ * Intel® Pentium® Gold Processor Series
+ * Intel® Pentium® Processor Series (selected models)
+ * Intel® Xeon® Processor E Family
+ * Intel® Xeon® Processor E3 v6 Family
+
+SHA1 checksums of the microcode files containing microcode revisions
+in question:
+ * 06-8e-09, revision 0xb4: e253c95c29c3eef6576db851dfa069d82a91256f
+ * 06-8e-0a, revision 0xb4: 45bcba494be07df9eeccff9627578095a97fba4d
+ * 06-8e-0b, revision 0xb8: 3e54bf91d642ad81ff07fe274d0cfb5d10d09c43
+ * 06-8e-0c, revision 0xb8: bf635c87177d6dc4e067ec11e1caeb19d3c325f0
+ * 06-9e-09, revision 0xb4: 42f68eec4ddb79dd6be0c95c4ce60e514e4504b1
+ * 06-9e-0a, revision 0xb4: 37c7cb394dd36610b57943578343723da67d50f0
+ * 06-9e-0b, revision 0xb4: b5399109d0a5ce8f5fb623ff942da0322b438b95
+ * 06-9e-0c, revision 0xae: 131bce89e4d210de8322ffbc6bd787f1af66a7df
+ * 06-9e-0d, revision 0xb8: 22511b007d1df55558d115abb13a1c23ea398317
+
+ * 06-8e-09, revision 0xca: 9afa1bae40995207afef13247f114be042d88083
+ * 06-8e-0a, revision 0xca: 1d90291cc25e17dc6c36c764cf8c06b41fed4c16
+ * 06-8e-0b, revision 0xca: 3fb1246a6594eff5e2c2076c63c600d734f10777
+ * 06-8e-0c, revision 0xca: e871540671f59b4fa5d0d454798f09a4d412aace
+ * 06-9e-09, revision 0xca: b5eed11108ab7ac1e675fe75d0e7454a400ddd35
+ * 06-9e-0a, revision 0xca: e472304aaa2f3815a32822cb111ab3f43bf3dfe4
+ * 06-9e-0b, revision 0xca: 78f47c5162da680878ed057dc7c853f9737c524b
+ * 06-9e-0c, revision 0xca: f23848a009928796a153cb9e8f44522136969408
+ * 06-9e-0d, revision 0xca: c7a3d469469ee828ba9faf91b67af881fceec3b7
+
+ * 06-8e-09, revision 0xd6: 2272c621768437d20e602207752201e0966e5a8c
+ * 06-8e-0a, revision 0xd6: 0b145afb88e028e612f04c2a86385e7d7c3fefc4
+ * 06-8e-0b, revision 0xd6: c3831b05da83be54f3acc451a1bce90f75e2e9e5
+ * 06-8e-0c, revision 0xd6: 4b8938a93e23f4b5a2d9de40b87f6afcfdc27c05
+ * 06-9e-09, revision 0xd6: 4bacba8c598508e7dd4e87e179586abe7a1a987f
+ * 06-9e-0a, revision 0xd6: 4c236afeef9f80ff3a286698fe7cef72926722f0
+ * 06-9e-0b, revision 0xd6: 2f9ab9b2ba29559ce177632281d7290a24fed2ef
+ * 06-9e-0c, revision 0xd6: 4b9059e519bcab6085b6c103f5d99e509fe0b2bb
+ * 06-9e-0d, revision 0xd6: 3a3b7edfd8126bb34b761b46a32102a622047899
+
+Please contact your system vendor for a BIOS/firmware update that contains
+the latest microcode version.  For the information regarding microcode versions
+required for mitigating specific side-channel cache attacks, please refer
+to the following knowledge base articles:
+ * CVE-2017-5715 ("Spectre"):
+   https://access.redhat.com/articles/3436091
+ * CVE-2018-3639 ("Speculative Store Bypass"):
+   https://access.redhat.com/articles/3540901
+ * CVE-2018-3620, CVE-2018-3646 ("L1 Terminal Fault Attack"):
+   https://access.redhat.com/articles/3562741
+ * CVE-2018-12130, CVE-2018-12126, CVE-2018-12127, and CVE-2019-11091
+   ("Microarchitectural Data Sampling"):
+   https://access.redhat.com/articles/4138151
+ * CVE-2019-0117 (Intel SGX Information Leak),
+   CVE-2019-0123 (Intel SGX Privilege Escalation),
+   CVE-2019-11135 (TSX Asynchronous Abort),
+   CVE-2019-11139 (Voltage Setting Modulation):
+   https://access.redhat.com/solutions/2019-microcode-nov
+ * CVE-2020-0543 (Special Register Buffer Data Sampling),
+   CVE-2020-0548 (Vector Register Data Sampling),
+   CVE-2020-0549 (L1D Cache Eviction Sampling):
+   https://access.redhat.com/solutions/5142751
+
+The information regarding disabling microcode update is provided below.
+
+To disable usage of the newer microcode revision for a specific kernel
+version, please create a file "disallow-intel-06-8e-9e-0x-0xca" inside
+/lib/firmware/<kernel_version> directory, run
+"/usr/libexec/microcode_ctl/update_ucode" to update firmware directory
+used for late microcode updates, and run "dracut -f --kver <kernel_version>"
+so initramfs for this kernel version is regenerated, for example:
+
+    touch /lib/firmware/3.10.0-862.9.1/disallow-intel-06-8e-9e-0x-0xca
+    /usr/libexec/microcode_ctl/update_ucode
+    dracut -f --kver 3.10.0-862.9.1
+
+To disable usage of the newer microcode revision for all kernels, please create
+file "/etc/microcode_ctl/ucode_with_caveats/disallow-intel-06-8e-9e-0x-0xca",
+run "/usr/libexec/microcode_ctl/update_ucode" to update firmware directories
+used for late microcode updates, and run "dracut -f --regenerate-all"
+so initramfs images get regenerated, for example:
+
+    mkdir -p /etc/microcode_ctl/ucode_with_caveats
+    touch /etc/microcode_ctl/ucode_with_caveats/disallow-intel-06-8e-9e-0xca
+    /usr/libexec/microcode_ctl/update_ucode
+    dracut -f --regenerate-all
+
+Please refer to /usr/share/doc/microcode_ctl/README.caveats for additional
+information.
diff --git a/SOURCES/06-8e-9e-0x-dell_config b/SOURCES/06-8e-9e-0x-dell_config
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bc1fe2b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/06-8e-9e-0x-dell_config
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+path intel-ucode/*
+vendor GenuineIntel
+## It is deemed that blacklisting all 06-[89]e-0x models on all hardware
+## in cases where no model filter is used is too broad, hence
+## no-model-mode=success.
+dmi mode=fail-equal no-model-mode=success key=bios_vendor val="Dell Inc."
+## The "kernel_early" statements are carried over from the intel caveat config
+## in order to avoid enabling this newer microcode on these problematic kernels;
+## see the caveat description in /usr/share/doc/microcode_ctl/caveats/intel_readme
+## (That also means that this caveat has to be enforced separately on these
+## kernels.)
+kernel_early 4.10.0
+kernel_early 3.10.0-930
+kernel_early 3.10.0-862.14.1
+kernel_early 3.10.0-693.38.1
+kernel_early 3.10.0-514.57.1
+kernel_early 3.10.0-327.73.1
diff --git a/SOURCES/06-8e-9e-0x-dell_disclaimer b/SOURCES/06-8e-9e-0x-dell_disclaimer
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..224a822
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/06-8e-9e-0x-dell_disclaimer
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+Some Dell systems that use some models of Intel CPUs are susceptible to hangs
+and system instability during or after microcode update to newer revisions.
+In order to address this, microcode update to these newer revision
+has been disabled by default on these systems, and the previously published
+microcode revisions are used by default for the OS-driven microcode update.
+Please refer to /usr/share/doc/microcode_ctl/caveats/06-8e-9e-0x-dell_readme
+and /usr/share/doc/microcode_ctl/README.caveats for details.
diff --git a/SOURCES/06-8e-9e-0x-dell_readme b/SOURCES/06-8e-9e-0x-dell_readme
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0c13193
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/06-8e-9e-0x-dell_readme
@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
+Some Dell systems that use some models of Intel CPUs are susceptible to hangs
+and system instability during or after microcode update to revision 0xc6/0xca
+(included as part of microcode-20191113/microcode-20191115 update that addressed
+CVE-2019-0117, CVE-2019-0123, CVE-2019-11135, and CVE-2019-11139)
+and/or revision 0xd6 (included as part of microcode-20200609 update
+that addressed CVE-2020-0543, CVE-2020-0548, and CVE-2020-0549)
+[1][2][3][4][5][6].  In order to address this, microcode update to the newer
+revision has been disabled by default on these systems, and the previously
+published microcode revisions 0xae/0xb4/0xb8 are used by default
+for the OS-driven microcode update.
+
+[1] https://github.com/intel/Intel-Linux-Processor-Microcode-Data-Files/issues/23
+[2] https://github.com/intel/Intel-Linux-Processor-Microcode-Data-Files/issues/24
+[3] https://github.com/intel/Intel-Linux-Processor-Microcode-Data-Files/issues/33
+[4] https://github.com/intel/Intel-Linux-Processor-Microcode-Data-Files/issues/34
+[5] https://github.com/intel/Intel-Linux-Processor-Microcode-Data-Files/issues/35
+[6] https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1846097
+
+This caveat contains latest microcode revisions publicly released by Intel;
+for the revision 0xca of the microcode files, please refer to caveat
+06-8e-9e-0x-0xca.
+
+For the reference, microarchitectures of the affected CPU models:
+ * Amber Lake-Y
+ * Kaby Lake-G/H/S/U/X/Y/Xeon E3
+ * Coffee Lake-H/S/U/Xeon E
+ * Comet Lake-U 4+2
+ * Whiskey Lake-U
+
+Family names of the affected CPU models:
+ * 7th Generation Intel® Core™ Processor Family
+ * 8th Generation Intel® Core™ Processor Family
+ * 9th Generation Intel® Core™ Processor Family
+ * 10th Generation Intel® Core™ Processor Family (selected models)
+ * Intel® Celeron® Processor G Series
+ * Intel® Celeron® Processor 5000 Series
+ * Intel® Core™ X-series Processors (i7-7740X, i5-7640X only)
+ * Intel® Pentium® Gold Processor Series
+ * Intel® Pentium® Processor Series (selected models)
+ * Intel® Xeon® Processor E Family
+ * Intel® Xeon® Processor E3 v6 Family
+
+SHA1 checksums of the microcode files containing microcode revisions
+in question:
+ * 06-8e-09, revision 0xb4: e253c95c29c3eef6576db851dfa069d82a91256f
+ * 06-8e-0a, revision 0xb4: 45bcba494be07df9eeccff9627578095a97fba4d
+ * 06-8e-0b, revision 0xb8: 3e54bf91d642ad81ff07fe274d0cfb5d10d09c43
+ * 06-8e-0c, revision 0xb8: bf635c87177d6dc4e067ec11e1caeb19d3c325f0
+ * 06-9e-09, revision 0xb4: 42f68eec4ddb79dd6be0c95c4ce60e514e4504b1
+ * 06-9e-0a, revision 0xb4: 37c7cb394dd36610b57943578343723da67d50f0
+ * 06-9e-0b, revision 0xb4: b5399109d0a5ce8f5fb623ff942da0322b438b95
+ * 06-9e-0c, revision 0xae: 131bce89e4d210de8322ffbc6bd787f1af66a7df
+ * 06-9e-0d, revision 0xb8: 22511b007d1df55558d115abb13a1c23ea398317
+
+ * 06-8e-09, revision 0xca: 9afa1bae40995207afef13247f114be042d88083
+ * 06-8e-0a, revision 0xca: 1d90291cc25e17dc6c36c764cf8c06b41fed4c16
+ * 06-8e-0b, revision 0xca: 3fb1246a6594eff5e2c2076c63c600d734f10777
+ * 06-8e-0c, revision 0xca: e871540671f59b4fa5d0d454798f09a4d412aace
+ * 06-9e-09, revision 0xca: b5eed11108ab7ac1e675fe75d0e7454a400ddd35
+ * 06-9e-0a, revision 0xca: e472304aaa2f3815a32822cb111ab3f43bf3dfe4
+ * 06-9e-0b, revision 0xca: 78f47c5162da680878ed057dc7c853f9737c524b
+ * 06-9e-0c, revision 0xca: f23848a009928796a153cb9e8f44522136969408
+ * 06-9e-0d, revision 0xca: c7a3d469469ee828ba9faf91b67af881fceec3b7
+
+ * 06-8e-09, revision 0xd6: 2272c621768437d20e602207752201e0966e5a8c
+ * 06-8e-0a, revision 0xd6: 0b145afb88e028e612f04c2a86385e7d7c3fefc4
+ * 06-8e-0b, revision 0xd6: c3831b05da83be54f3acc451a1bce90f75e2e9e5
+ * 06-8e-0c, revision 0xd6: 4b8938a93e23f4b5a2d9de40b87f6afcfdc27c05
+ * 06-9e-09, revision 0xd6: 4bacba8c598508e7dd4e87e179586abe7a1a987f
+ * 06-9e-0a, revision 0xd6: 4c236afeef9f80ff3a286698fe7cef72926722f0
+ * 06-9e-0b, revision 0xd6: 2f9ab9b2ba29559ce177632281d7290a24fed2ef
+ * 06-9e-0c, revision 0xd6: 4b9059e519bcab6085b6c103f5d99e509fe0b2bb
+ * 06-9e-0d, revision 0xd6: 3a3b7edfd8126bb34b761b46a32102a622047899
+
+Please contact your system vendor for a BIOS/firmware update that contains
+the latest microcode version.  For the information regarding microcode versions
+required for mitigating specific side-channel cache attacks, please refer
+to the following knowledge base articles:
+ * CVE-2017-5715 ("Spectre"):
+   https://access.redhat.com/articles/3436091
+ * CVE-2018-3639 ("Speculative Store Bypass"):
+   https://access.redhat.com/articles/3540901
+ * CVE-2018-3620, CVE-2018-3646 ("L1 Terminal Fault Attack"):
+   https://access.redhat.com/articles/3562741
+ * CVE-2018-12130, CVE-2018-12126, CVE-2018-12127, and CVE-2019-11091
+   ("Microarchitectural Data Sampling"):
+   https://access.redhat.com/articles/4138151
+ * CVE-2019-0117 (Intel SGX Information Leak),
+   CVE-2019-0123 (Intel SGX Privilege Escalation),
+   CVE-2019-11135 (TSX Asynchronous Abort),
+   CVE-2019-11139 (Voltage Setting Modulation):
+   https://access.redhat.com/solutions/2019-microcode-nov
+ * CVE-2020-0543 (Special Register Buffer Data Sampling),
+   CVE-2020-0548 (Vector Register Data Sampling),
+   CVE-2020-0549 (L1D Cache Eviction Sampling):
+   https://access.redhat.com/solutions/5142751
+
+The information regarding disabling microcode update is provided below.
+
+To disable usage of the newer microcode revision for a specific kernel
+version, please create a file "disallow-intel-06-8e-9e-0x-dell" inside
+/lib/firmware/<kernel_version> directory, run
+"/usr/libexec/microcode_ctl/update_ucode" to update firmware directory
+used for late microcode updates, and run "dracut -f --kver <kernel_version>"
+so initramfs for this kernel version is regenerated, for example:
+
+    touch /lib/firmware/3.10.0-862.9.1/disallow-intel-06-8e-9e-0x-dell
+    /usr/libexec/microcode_ctl/update_ucode
+    dracut -f --kver 3.10.0-862.9.1
+
+To disable usage of the newer microcode revision for all kernels, please create
+file "/etc/microcode_ctl/ucode_with_caveats/disallow-intel-06-8e-9e-0x-dell",
+run "/usr/libexec/microcode_ctl/update_ucode" to update firmware directories
+used for late microcode updates, and run "dracut -f --regenerate-all"
+so initramfs images get regenerated, for example:
+
+    mkdir -p /etc/microcode_ctl/ucode_with_caveats
+    touch /etc/microcode_ctl/ucode_with_caveats/disallow-intel-06-8e-9e-dell
+    /usr/libexec/microcode_ctl/update_ucode
+    dracut -f --regenerate-all
+
+Please refer to /usr/share/doc/microcode_ctl/README.caveats for additional
+information.
diff --git a/SOURCES/README.caveats b/SOURCES/README.caveats
index 4ead5e5..2220a09 100644
--- a/SOURCES/README.caveats
+++ b/SOURCES/README.caveats
@@ -160,6 +160,83 @@ separated by white space.  Currently, the following options are supported:
    one model name per line. The model name of the running CPU (as reported
    in /proc/cpuinfo) is compared against the names in the provided list, and,
    if there is a match, caveat check fails.
+ * "pci_config_val" performs check for specific values in selected parts
+   of configuration space of specified PCI devices.  If "-m" option
+   is not specified, then the actual check is skipped, and the check returns
+   result in accordance with the provided "mode" option (se below).  Check
+   arguments are a white-space-separated list of "key=value" pairs.
+   The following keys are supported:
+    * "domain" - PCI domain number, or "*" (an asterisk) for any domain.
+      Default is "*".
+    * "bus" - PCI bus number, or "*" (an asterisk) for any bus.  Default is "*".
+    * "device" - PCI device number, or "*" (an asterisk) for any device.
+      Default is "*".
+    * "function" - PCI function number, or "*" (an asterisk) for any function.
+      Default is "*".
+    * "vid" - PCI vendor ID, or empty string for any vendor ID.  Default
+      is empty string.
+    * "did" - PCI device ID, or empty string for any device ID.  Default
+      is empty string.
+    * "offset" - offset in device's configuration space where the value resides.
+      Default is 0.
+    * "size" - field size.  Possible values are 1, 2, 4, or 8.  Default is 4.
+    * "mask" - mask applied to the values during the check.  Default is 0.
+    * "val" - comma-separated list of matching values.  Default is 0.
+    * "mode" - check mode, the way matches are interpreted:
+       * "success-any" - check succeeds if there was at least one match,
+         otherwise it fails.
+       * "success-all" - check succeeds if there was at least one device checked
+         and all the checked devices have matches, otherwise the check fails.
+       * "fail-any" - check fails if there was at least one match, otherwise
+         it succeeds.
+       * "fail-all" - check fails if there was at least one device checked
+         and all the checked devices have matches, otherwise the check succeeds.
+      Default is "success-any".
+   An example of a check:
+       pci_config_val mode=success-all device=30 function=3 vid=0x8086 did=0x2083 offset=0x84 size=4 mask=0x38 val=0x38,0x18,0x8
+   It interprets 4 bytes at offset 0x84 of special files "config" under
+   directories that match glob pattern "/sys/bus/pci/devices/*:*:1e.3"
+   as an unsigned integer value, applies mask 0x38 (thus selecting bit 5..3
+   of it) and checks whether it is one of the values 0x38, 0x18, or 0x8 (0b111,
+   0b011, or 0b001 in bits 5..3, respectively); if there are such files,
+   and all the checked values in every checked file has matched at least one
+   of the aforementioned value, then the check is successful, otherwise
+   it fails (in accordance with "mode=success-all" semantics).  This check fails
+   if "-m" option is not specified.
+ * "dmi" performs checks for specific values available in DMI sysfs files
+   (present under /sys/devices/virtual/dmi/id/).  The check fails if file
+   is not readable.  If "-m" option is specified, then the actual check
+   is skipped, and the check returns value in accordance with "no-model-mode"
+   parameter value (see below).  Check arguments are a white-space-separated
+   list of "key=value" pairs.  The following keys are supported:
+    * "key" - DMI file to check. Value can be one of the following: bios_date,
+      bios_vendor, bios_version, board_asset_tag, board_name, board_serial,
+      board_vendor, board_version, chassis_asset_tag, chassis_serial,
+      chassis_type, chassis_vendor, chassis_version, product_family,
+      product_name, product_serial, product_uuid, product_version, sys_vendor.
+      Default is empty string.
+    * "val" - a string to match DMI data against.  Can be enclosed in single
+      or double quotes.  Default is empty string.
+    * "mode" - check mode, the way matches are interpreted:
+       * "success-equal" - returns 0 if the value present in the file
+         with the name supplied via the "key" parameter file under
+	 /sys/devices/virtual/dmi/id/ is equal to the value supplied as a value
+	 of "val" parameter, otherwise 1.
+       * "success-equal" - returns 1 if the value present in the file
+         with the name supplied via the "key" parameter file under
+	 /sys/devices/virtual/dmi/id/ is equal to the value supplied as a value
+	 of "val" parameter, otherwise 0.
+      Default is "success-any".
+    * "no-model-mode" - return value if model filter ("-m" option)
+      is not enabled:
+       * "success" - return 0.
+       * "fail" - return 1.
+      Default is "success".
+   An example of a check:
+       dmi mode=fail-equal no-model-mode=success key=bios_vendor val="Dell Inc."
+   It checks file /sys/devices/virtual/dmi/id/bios_vendor and fails if its
+   content is "Dell Inc." (without quotes).  It succeeds if "-m" option
+   is not enabled.
 
 
 check_caveats script
@@ -438,38 +515,119 @@ Minimum versions of the kernel package that contain the fix:
 
 Intel Sandy Bridge-E/EN/EP caveat
 ---------------------------------
-MDS-related microcode revision 0x718 for Intel Sandy Bridge-E/EN/EP
-(SNB-EP, family 6, model 45, stepping 7) may lead to system instability.
-In order to address this, this microcode update is not used and the previous
-microcode revision is provided instead by default; the microcode file, however,
-is still shipped as part of microcode_ctl package and can be used for performing
-a microcode update if it is enforced via the aforementioned overrides. (See
-the sections "check_caveats script" and "reload_microcode script" for details.)
+Microcode revision 0x718 for Intel Sandy Bridge-E/EN/EP (SNB-EP, family 6,
+model 45, stepping 7), that was released to address MDS vulnerability,
+and was available from microcode-20190618 up to microcode-20190508 release)
+could lead to system instability[1][2].  In order to address this,
+this microcode update was not used and the previous microcode revision
+was provided instead by default; the microcode file, however, was still shipped
+as part of microcode_ctl package and could be used for performing a microcode
+update if it is enforced via the aforementioned overrides.  With the release
+of 0x71a revision of the microcode (as art of microcode-20200520 release)
+that aims at fixing the aforementioned stability issue, the latest microcode
+revision is again used by default; it is still provided via the caveat
+mechanism, hovewer, in order to enable ability to disable it in case such
+a need arises.  (See the sections "check_caveats script" and "reload_microcode
+script" for details regarding caveats mechanism operation.)
+
+[1] https://github.com/intel/Intel-Linux-Processor-Microcode-Data-Files/issues/15
+[2] https://access.redhat.com/solutions/4593951
 
 Caveat name: intel-06-2d-07
 
 Affected microcode: intel-ucode/06-2d-07.
 
-Mitigation: previously published microcode revision 0x714 is used by default.
+Mitigation: None; the latest revision of the microcode file is used by default;
+previously published microcode revision 0x714 is still available as a fallback
+as part of "intel" caveat.
 
 
 Intel Skylake-SP/W/X caveat
 ---------------------------
-Microcode revision 0x2000065 for Intel Skylake Scalable Platform (SKL-SP/W/X,
-family 6, model 85, stepping 4) may lead to system instability.
-In order to address this, this microcode update is not used and the previous
-microcode revision is provided instead by default; the microcode file, however,
-is still shipped as part of microcode_ctl package and can be used for performing
-a microcode update if it is enforced via the aforementioned overrides.
-(See the sections "check_caveats script" and "reload_microcode script"
-for details.)
+Microcode revision 0x2000065 (that was provided with microcode releases
+microcode-20191112 up to microcode-20200520) for some CPU models that belong
+to Intel Skylake Scalable Platform (SKL-W/X, family 6, model 85, stepping 4,
+Workstation/HEDT segments) could lead to hangs during reboot[1].  In order
+to address this, by default this microcode update was disabled by default and
+and the previous 0x2000064 microcode revision was used instead; the microcode
+file with, however, is still shipped as part of microcode_ctl package and can
+be used for performing a microcode update if it is enforced
+via the aforementioned overrides. With the availability of 0x2006906 revision
+of the microcode (in the microcode-20200609 release) that fixes
+the aforementioned issue, the latest microcode revision is again used
+by default; it is still provided via caveat mechanism, hovewer, in order
+to enable ability to disable it in case such a need arises.  (See the sections
+"check_caveats script" and "reload_microcode script" for details regarding
+caveats mechanism operation.)
+
+[1] https://github.com/intel/Intel-Linux-Processor-Microcode-Data-Files/issues/21
 
 Caveat name: intel-06-55-04
 
 Affected microcode: intel-ucode/06-55-04.
 
-Mitigation: previously published microcode revision 0x2000064 is used
-by default.
+Mitigation: None; the latest revision of the microcode file is used by default;
+previously published microcode revision 0x2000064 is still available
+as a fallback as part of "intel" caveat.
+
+
+Intel Skylake-U/Y/H/S/Xeon E3 v5 caveats
+----------------------------------------
+Some Intel Skylake CPU models (SKL-U/Y, family 6, model 78, stepping 3;
+and SKL-H/S/Xeon E3 v5, family 6, model 94, stepping 3) have reports of system
+hangs when revision 0xdc of microcode, that is included in microcode-20200609
+update to address CVE-2020-0543, CVE-2020-0548, and CVE-2020-0549,
+is applied[1][2].  In order to address this, microcode update to the newer
+revision has been disabled by default on these systems, and the previously
+published microcode revision 0xd6 is used instead; the newer microcode files,
+however, are still shipped as part of microcode_ctl package and can be used
+for performing a microcode update if they are enforced via the aforementioned
+overrides.  (See the sections "check_caveats script" and "reload_microcode
+script" for details.)
+
+[1] https://github.com/intel/Intel-Linux-Processor-Microcode-Data-Files/issues/31
+[2] https://github.com/intel/Intel-Linux-Processor-Microcode-Data-Files/issues/31#issuecomment-644885826
+
+Caveat names: intel-06-4e-03, intel-06-5e-03
+
+Affected microcode: intel-ucode/06-4e-03, intel-ucode/06-5e-03.
+
+Mitigation: previously published microcode revision 0xd6 is used by default.
+
+
+Dell caveats
+------------
+Some Dell systems that use some models of Intel CPUs are susceptible to hangs
+and system instability during or after microcode update to revision 0xc6/0xca
+(included as part of microcode-20191113/microcode-20191115 update that addressed
+CVE-2019-0117, CVE-2019-0123, CVE-2019-11135, and CVE-2019-11139)
+and/or revision 0xd6 (included as part of microcode-20200609 update
+that addressed CVE-2020-0543, CVE-2020-0548, and CVE-2020-0549)
+[1][2][3][4][5][6].  In order to address this, microcode update to the newer
+revision has been disabled by default on these systems, and the previously
+published microcode revisions 0xae/0xb4/0xb8 are used by default
+for the OS-driven microcode update.
+
+[1] https://github.com/intel/Intel-Linux-Processor-Microcode-Data-Files/issues/23
+[2] https://github.com/intel/Intel-Linux-Processor-Microcode-Data-Files/issues/24
+[3] https://github.com/intel/Intel-Linux-Processor-Microcode-Data-Files/issues/33
+[4] https://github.com/intel/Intel-Linux-Processor-Microcode-Data-Files/issues/34
+[5] https://github.com/intel/Intel-Linux-Processor-Microcode-Data-Files/issues/35
+[6] https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1846097
+
+Caveat names: intel-06-8e-9e-0x-dell, intel-06-8e-9e-0x-0xca
+
+Affected microcode: intel-ucode/06-8e-09, intel-ucode/06-8e-0a,
+                    intel-ucode/06-8e-0b, intel-ucode/06-8e-0c,
+                    intel-ucode/06-9e-09, intel-ucode/06-9e-0a,
+                    intel-ucode/06-9e-0b, intel-ucode/06-9e-0c,
+                    intel-ucode/06-9e-0d.
+
+Mitigation: previously published microcode revision 0xac/0xb4/0xb8 is used
+            by default if /sys/devices/virtual/dmi/id/bios_vendor reports
+	    "Dell Inc."; otherwise, the latest microcode revision is used.
+	    Caveat with revision 0xca of microcode files is provided
+	    as a convenience for the cases where it was working well before.
 
 
 
@@ -496,3 +654,7 @@ Intel CPU vulnerabilities is available in the following knowledge base articles:
    CVE-2019-11135 (TSX Asynchronous Abort),
    CVE-2019-11139 (Voltage Setting Modulation):
    https://access.redhat.com/solutions/2019-microcode-nov
+ * CVE-2020-0543 (Special Register Buffer Data Sampling),
+   CVE-2020-0548 (Vector Register Data Sampling),
+   CVE-2020-0549 (L1D Cache Eviction Sampling):
+   https://access.redhat.com/solutions/5142751
diff --git a/SOURCES/check_caveats b/SOURCES/check_caveats
index 462d541..ab02a02 100755
--- a/SOURCES/check_caveats
+++ b/SOURCES/check_caveats
@@ -132,6 +132,226 @@ check_kver()
 	return 1
 }
 
+# It is needed for SKX[1] for which different product segments
+# are differentiated by a value in the CAPID0 field of PCU registers
+# device[2].
+# [1] https://github.com/intel/Intel-Linux-Processor-Microcode-Data-Files/issues/21
+# [2] https://www.intel.com/content/dam/www/public/us/en/documents/specification-updates/xeon-scalable-spec-update.pdf#page=13
+#
+# $1 - params in config file, space-separated, in key=value form:
+#   domain=* - PCI domain, '*' or number
+#   bus=* - PCI bus, '*' or number
+#   device=* - PCI device, '*' or number
+#   function=* - PCI function, '*' or number
+#   vid= - PCI vendor ID, empty or number
+#   did= - PCI device ID, empty or number
+#   offset=0 - offset in configuration space
+#   size=4 - field size
+#   mask=0 - mask applied to the data read
+#   val=0 - comma-separated list of possible values
+#   mode=success-any [ success-ail, fail-any, fail-all ] - matching mode:
+#     success-any: Returns 0 if there was at least one match, otherwise 1.
+#     success-all: Returns 0 if there was at least one device checked and all
+#                  the checked devices have matches, otherwise 1.
+#     fail-any:    Returns 1 if there was at least one match, otherwise 0.
+#     fail-all:    Returns 1 if there was at least one device checked and all
+#                  the checked devices have matches, otherwise 0.
+# $2 - whether model filter is engaged (if it is not '1', just return the result
+#      based on "mode" value that assumes that there were 0 checks/0 matches).
+check_pci_config_val()
+{
+	local domain='*' bus='*' device='*' func='*' vid= did=
+	local offset=0 size=4 mask=0 val=0 mode=success-any
+	local checked=0 matched=0 path=''
+	local dev_path dev_vid dev_did dev_val
+	local opts="${1:-}"
+	local match_model="${2:0}"
+
+	set -- $1
+	while [ "$#" -gt 0 ]; do
+		[ "x${1#domain=}" = "x${1}" ] || domain="${1#domain=}"
+		[ "x${1#bus=}" = "x${1}" ] || bus="${1#bus=}"
+		[ "x${1#device=}" = "x${1}" ] || device="${1#device=}"
+		[ "x${1#function=}" = "x${1}" ] || func="${1#function=}"
+		[ "x${1#vid=}" = "x${1}" ] || vid="${1#vid=}"
+		[ "x${1#did=}" = "x${1}" ] || did="${1#did=}"
+		[ "x${1#offset=}" = "x${1}" ] || offset="${1#offset=}"
+		[ "x${1#size=}" = "x${1}" ] || size="${1#size=}"
+		[ "x${1#mask=}" = "x${1}" ] || mask="${1#mask=}"
+		[ "x${1#val=}" = "x${1}" ] || val="${1#val=}"
+		[ "x${1#mode=}" = "x${1}" ] || mode="${1#mode=}"
+
+		shift
+	done
+
+	path="$domain"
+	if [ "x$bus" = 'x*' ]; then
+		path="$path:$bus";
+	else
+		path=$(printf '%s:%02x' "$path" "$bus")
+	fi
+	if [ "x$device" = 'x*' ]; then
+		path="$path:$device";
+	else
+		path=$(printf '%s:%02x' "$path" "$device")
+	fi
+	if [ "x$func" = 'x*' ]; then
+		path="$path.$func";
+	else
+		path=$(printf '%s.%01x' "$path" "$func")
+	fi
+
+	# Normalise VID, DID
+	[ -n "$vid" ] || vid="$(printf '0x%04x' "$vid")"
+	[ -n "$did" ] || did="$(printf '0x%04x' "$did")"
+
+	( [ 1 != "$match_model" ] \
+	  || /usr/bin/find /sys/bus/pci/devices/ -maxdepth 1 -name "$path" \
+	  || : ) | (
+		while read -r dev_path; do
+			# Filter VID, DID
+			if [ -n "$vid" ]; then
+				dev_vid=$(/bin/cat "$dev_path/vendor")
+				[ "x$vid" = "x$dev_vid" ] || continue
+			fi
+			if [ -n "$did" ]; then
+				dev_did=$(/bin/cat "$dev_path/device")
+				[ "x$did" = "x$dev_did" ] || continue
+			fi
+
+			checked="$((checked + 1))"
+
+			dev_val="$(/usr/bin/od -j "$offset" -N "$size" -A n \
+					       -t "u$size" "$dev_path/config")"
+
+			val_rest="${val}"
+			while :; do
+				cur_val="${val_rest%%,*}"
+				if [ "$((dev_val & mask))" = "$((cur_val & mask))" ]
+				then
+					matched="$((matched + 1))"
+					break
+				fi
+				[ "x${val_rest}" != "x${val_rest#*,}" ] || break
+				val_rest="${val_rest#*,}"
+			done
+
+			case "$mode" in
+			success-any) [ "$matched" -eq 0 ] || { echo 0; exit; } ;;
+			success-all) [ "$matched" -eq "$checked" ] || { echo 1; exit; } ;;
+			fail-any)    [ "$matched" -eq 0 ] || { echo 1; exit; } ;;
+			fail-all)    [ "$matched" -eq "$checked" ] || { echo 0; exit; } ;;
+			*)           echo 2; exit;;
+			esac
+		done
+
+		debug "PCI config value check ($opts): checked $checked," \
+		      "matched $matched (model check is set to $match_model)"
+
+		case "$mode" in
+		success-any) if [ "$matched" -eq 0 ]; then echo 1; else echo 0; fi ;;
+		success-all) if [ "$matched" -gt 0 -a "$matched" -eq "$checked" ]; then echo 0; else echo 1; fi ;;
+		fail-any)    if [ "$matched" -eq 0 ]; then echo 0; else echo 1; fi  ;;
+		fail-all)    if [ "$matched" -gt 0 -a "$matched" -eq "$checked" ]; then echo 1; else echo 0; fi ;;
+		*)           echo 2; exit;;
+		esac
+	)
+}
+
+# It is needed for filtering by BIOS vendor name that is available in DMI data
+#
+# $1 - params in config file, space-separated, in key=value form:
+#   key= - DMI value to check. Can be one of the following: bios_date,
+#          bios_vendor, bios_version, board_asset_tag, board_name, board_serial,
+#          board_vendor, board_version, chassis_asset_tag, chassis_serial,
+#          chassis_type, chassis_vendor, chassis_version, product_family,
+#          product_name, product_serial, product_uuid, product_version,
+#          sys_vendor.
+#   val= - a string to match DMI data against.  Can be enclosed in single
+#          or double quotes.
+#   mode=success-equal [ success-equal, fail-equal ] - matching mode:
+#     success-equal: Returns 0 if the value present in the corresponding file
+#                    under /sys/devices/virtual/dmi/id/<key> is equal
+#                    to the value supplied as a value of "val" parameter,
+#                    otherwise 1.
+#     fail-equal:    Returns 1 if the value present in the corresponding file
+#                    under /sys/devices/virtual/dmi/id/<key> is equal
+#                    to the value supplied as a value of "val" parameter,
+#                    otherwise 0.
+#   no-model-mode=success [ success, fail ] - return value if model filter
+#                                             is not enabled:
+#     success: Return 0.
+#     fail:    Return 1.
+# $2 - whether model filter is engaged (if it is not '1', just return the result
+#      based on "mode" value that assumes that the check has failed).
+check_dmi_val()
+{
+	local key= val= mode='success-equal' nm_mode='success'
+	local opts="${1:-}" opt= opt_=
+	local match_model="${2:0}"
+
+	local valid_keys=" bios_date bios_vendor bios_version board_asset_tag board_name board_serial board_vendor board_version chassis_asset_tag chassis_serial chassis_type chassis_vendor chassis_version product_family product_name product_serial product_uuid product_version sys_vendor "
+	local success=1
+
+	while [ -n "$opts" ]; do
+		opt="${opts%%[ 	]*}"
+		[ -n "${opt}" ] || { opts="${opts#[ 	]}"; continue; }
+
+		[ "x${opt#key=}" = "x${opt}" ] || key="${opt#key=}"
+		[ "x${opt#mode=}" = "x${opt}" ] || mode="${opt#mode=}"
+		[ "x${opt#no-model-mode=}" = "x${opt}" ] || \
+			nm_mode="${opt#no-model-mode=}"
+
+		# Handle possible quoting
+		[ "x${opt#val=}" = "x${opt}" ] || {
+			case "${opt#val=}" in
+			[']*) opt_="${opts#val=\'}"; val="${opt_%%\'*}"; opt="val=\'${val}\'" ;;
+			["]*) opt_="${opts#val=\"}"; val="${opt_%%\"*}"; opt="val=\"${val}\"" ;;
+			*)    val="${opt#val=}" ;;
+			esac
+		}
+
+		opts="${opts#"${opt}"}"
+		continue
+	done
+
+	# Check key for validity
+	[ "x${valid_keys#* ${key} *}" != "x${valid_keys}" ] || {
+		debug "Invalid \"key\" parameter value: \"${key}\""
+		echo 2
+		exit
+	}
+
+	[ 1 = "$match_model" ] || {
+		case "$nm_mode" in
+		success) echo 0 ;;
+		fail)    echo 1 ;;
+		*)
+			debug "Invalid no-model-mode value: \"${nm_mode}\""
+			echo 2
+			;;
+		esac
+
+		exit
+	}
+
+	[ -r "/sys/devices/virtual/dmi/id/${key}" ] || {
+		debug "Can't access /sys/devices/virtual/dmi/id/${key}"
+		echo 3
+		exit
+	}
+
+	file_val="$(cat "/sys/devices/virtual/dmi/id/${key}")"
+
+	[ "x${val}" = "x${file_val}" ] || success=0
+
+	case "$mode" in
+	success-equal) echo "$((1 - $success))" ;;
+	fail-equal)    echo "${success}" ;;
+	*)             debug "Invalid mode value: \"${nm_mode}\""; echo 2 ;;
+	esac
+}
+
 # Provides model in format "VENDOR_ID FAMILY-MODEL-STEPPING"
 #
 # We check only the first processor as we don't expect non-symmetrical setups
@@ -182,7 +402,7 @@ fail()
 	fail_paths="$fail_paths $cfg_path"
 
 	[ 0 -eq "$print_disclaimers" ] || [ ! -e "${dir}/disclaimer" ] \
-		|| cat "${dir}/disclaimer"
+		|| /bin/cat "${dir}/disclaimer"
 }
 
 #check_kver "$@"
@@ -225,7 +445,7 @@ while getopts "dek:c:mv" opt; do
 	esac
 done
 
-: ${configs:=$(find "${MC_CAVEATS_DATA_DIR}" -maxdepth 1 -mindepth 1 -type d -printf "%f\n")}
+: "${configs:=$(find "${MC_CAVEATS_DATA_DIR}" -maxdepth 1 -mindepth 1 -type d -printf "%f\n")}"
 
 cpu_model=$(get_model_string)
 cpu_model_name=$(get_model_name)
@@ -273,6 +493,8 @@ for cfg in $(echo "${configs}"); do
 	cfg_blacklist=
 	cfg_mc_min_ver_late=
 	cfg_disable=
+	cfg_pci=
+	cfg_dmi=
 
 	while read -r key value; do
 		case "$key" in
@@ -299,8 +521,26 @@ for cfg in $(echo "${configs}"); do
 			;;
 		blacklist)
 			cfg_blacklist=1
+			# "blacklist" is special: it stops entity parsing,
+			# and the rest of file is a list of blacklisted model
+			# names.
 			break
 			;;
+		pci_config_val)
+			cfg_pci="$cfg_pci
+				$value"
+			;;
+		dmi)
+			cfg_dmi="$cfg_dmi
+				$value"
+			;;
+		'#'*|'')
+			continue
+			;;
+		*)
+			debug "Unknown key '$key' (value '$value') in config" \
+			      "'$cfg'"
+			;;
 		esac
 	done < "${dir}/config"
 
@@ -388,12 +628,14 @@ for cfg in $(echo "${configs}"); do
 		cfg_mc_present=0
 
 		for p in $(printf "%s" "$cfg_path"); do
-			find "$MC_CAVEATS_DATA_DIR/$cfg" \
-				-path "$MC_CAVEATS_DATA_DIR/$cfg/$p" -print0 \
-			    | grep -zFxq "$cpu_mc_path" \
+			{ /usr/bin/find "$MC_CAVEATS_DATA_DIR/$cfg" \
+				-path "$MC_CAVEATS_DATA_DIR/$cfg/$p" -print0;
+			  /bin/true; } \
+			    | /bin/grep -zFxq "$cpu_mc_path" \
 			    || continue
 
 			cfg_mc_present=1
+			break
 		done
 
 		[ 1 = "$cfg_mc_present" ] || {
@@ -478,6 +720,51 @@ for cfg in $(echo "${configs}"); do
 		}
 	fi
 
+	# Check PCI devices if model filter is enabled
+	# Note that the model filter check is done inside check_pci_config_val
+	# based on the 'mode=' parameter.
+	if [ -n "$cfg_pci" ]; then
+		pci_line="$(printf "%s\n" "$cfg_pci" | while read -r pci_line; do
+				[ -n "$pci_line" ] || continue
+				pci_res=$(check_pci_config_val "$pci_line" \
+							       "$match_model")
+				[ 0 != "$pci_res" ] || continue
+				echo "$pci_res $pci_line"
+				break
+			done
+			echo "0 ")"
+
+		[ -z "${pci_line#* }" ] || {
+			debug "PCI configuration word check '${pci_line#* }'" \
+			      "failed (with return code ${pci_line%% *})"
+			fail
+			continue
+		}
+	fi
+
+	# Check DMI data if model filter is enabled
+	# Note that the model filter check is done inside check_pci_config_val
+	# based on the 'mode=' parameter.
+	if [ -n "$cfg_dmi" ]; then
+		dmi_line="$(printf "%s\n" "$cfg_dmi" | while read -r dmi_line
+			do
+				[ -n "$dmi_line" ] || continue
+				dmi_res=$(check_dmi_val "$dmi_line" \
+							"$match_model")
+				[ 0 != "$dmi_res" ] || continue
+				echo "$dmi_res $dmi_line"
+				break
+			done
+			echo "0 ")"
+
+		[ -z "${dmi_line#* }" ] || {
+			debug "DMI data check '${dmi_line#* }'" \
+			      "failed (with return code ${dmi_line%% *})"
+			fail
+			continue
+		}
+	fi
+
 	ok_cfgs="$ok_cfgs $cfg"
 	ok_paths="$ok_paths $cfg_path"
 done
diff --git a/SOURCES/dracut_99microcode_ctl-fw_dir_override_module_init.sh b/SOURCES/dracut_99microcode_ctl-fw_dir_override_module_init.sh
index 9839d36..854e278 100755
--- a/SOURCES/dracut_99microcode_ctl-fw_dir_override_module_init.sh
+++ b/SOURCES/dracut_99microcode_ctl-fw_dir_override_module_init.sh
@@ -48,29 +48,6 @@ install() {
 		dinfo "    microcode_ctl: processing data directory " \
 		      "\"$DATA_DIR/$i\"..."
 
-		if ! cc_out=$($check_caveats -e -k "$kernel" -c "$i" $verbose_opt)
-		then
-			dinfo "    microcode_ctl: kernel version \"$kernel\"" \
-			      "failed early load check for \"$i\", skipping"
-			continue
-		fi
-
-		path=$(printf "%s" "$cc_out" | sed -n 's/^paths //p')
-		[ -n "$path" ] || {
-			ignored=$(printf "%s" "$cc_out" | \
-					sed -n 's/^skip_cfgs //p')
-
-			if [ -n "$ignored" ]; then
-				dinfo "    microcode_ctl: configuration" \
-				      "\"$i\" is ignored"
-			else
-				dinfo "    microcode_ctl: no microcode paths" \
-				      "are associated with \"$i\", skipping"
-			fi
-
-			continue
-		}
-
 		if [ "x" != "x$hostonly" ]; then
 			do_skip_host_only=0
 
@@ -92,57 +69,33 @@ install() {
 			do_skip_host_only=1
 		fi
 
-		if [ 0 -eq "$do_skip_host_only" ]; then
-			local hostonly_passed=0
-			local ucode
-			local uvendor
-			local ucode_dir=""
-
-			ucode=$(get_ucode_file)
-			uvendor=$(get_cpu_vendor)
-
-			case "$uvendor" in
-			Intel)
-				ucode_dir="intel-ucode"
-				;;
-			AMD)
-				ucode_dir="amd-ucode"
-				;;
-			*)
-				dinfo "    microcode_ctl: unknown CPU" \
-				      "vendor: \"$uvendor\", bailing out of" \
-				      "Host-Only check"
-				continue
-				;;
-			esac
-
-			# $path is a list of globs, so it needs special care
-			for p in $(printf "%s" "$path"); do
-				# "true" is due to sporadic SIGPIPE from find
-				# when "grep -q" exits early.
-				{ find "$DATA_DIR/$i" -path "$DATA_DIR/$i/$p" \
-					-print0; true; } \
-				    | grep -zFxq \
-					"$DATA_DIR/$i/$ucode_dir/$ucode" \
-				    || continue
-
-				dinfo "    microcode_ctl: $i: Host-Only" \
-				      "mode is enabled and" \
-				      "\"$ucode_dir/$ucode\" matches \"$p\""
-
-				hostonly_passed=1
-				break
-			done
+		match_model_opt=""
+		[ 1 = "$do_skip_host_only" ] || match_model_opt="-m"
 
-			[ 1 -eq "$hostonly_passed" ] || {
-				dinfo "    microcode_ctl: $i: Host-Only mode" \
-				      "is enabled and ucode name does not" \
-				      "match the expected one, skipping" \
-				      "caveat (\"$ucode\" not in \"$path\")"
-				continue
-			}
+		if ! cc_out=$($check_caveats -e -k "$kernel" -c "$i" \
+				$verbose_opt $match_model_opt)
+		then
+			dinfo "    microcode_ctl: kernel version \"$kernel\"" \
+			      "failed early load check for \"$i\", skipping"
+			continue
 		fi
 
+		path=$(printf "%s" "$cc_out" | sed -n 's/^paths //p')
+		[ -n "$path" ] || {
+			ignored=$(printf "%s" "$cc_out" | \
+					sed -n 's/^skip_cfgs //p')
+
+			if [ -n "$ignored" ]; then
+				dinfo "    microcode_ctl: configuration" \
+				      "\"$i\" is ignored"
+			else
+				dinfo "    microcode_ctl: no microcode paths" \
+				      "are associated with \"$i\", skipping"
+			fi
+
+			continue
+		}
+
 		dinfo "      microcode_ctl: $i: caveats check for kernel" \
 		      "version \"$kernel\" passed, adding" \
 		      "\"$DATA_DIR/$i\" to fw_dir variable"
diff --git a/SOURCES/gen_provides.sh b/SOURCES/gen_provides.sh
index c0c6b1d..5e2a2a4 100755
--- a/SOURCES/gen_provides.sh
+++ b/SOURCES/gen_provides.sh
@@ -21,31 +21,75 @@ for f in $(grep -E '/intel-ucode.*/[0-9a-f][0-9a-f]-[0-9a-f][0-9a-f]-[0-9a-f][0-
 	ucode_fname="$ucode_caveat/$ucode"
 	file_sz="$(stat -c "%s" "$f")"
 	skip=0
+	ext_hdr=0
+	ext_sig_cnt=0
+	ext_sig_pos=0
+	next_skip=0
 
+	# Microcode header format description:
+	# https://gitlab.com/iucode-tool/iucode-tool/blob/master/intel_microcode.c
 	while :; do
 		[ "$skip" -lt "$file_sz" ] || break
 
-		# Microcode header format description:
-		# https://gitlab.com/iucode-tool/iucode-tool/blob/master/intel_microcode.c
-		IFS=' ' read hdrver rev \
-		       date_y date_d date_m \
-		       cpuid cksum ldrver \
-		       pf_mask datasz totalsz <<- EOF
-		$(dd if="$f" bs=1 skip="$skip" count=36 status=none \
-			| hexdump -e '"" 1/4 "%u " 1/4 "%#x " \
-			                 1/2 "%04x " 1/1 "%02x " 1/1 "%02x " \
-					 1/4 "%08x " 1/4 "%x " 1/4 "%#x " \
-					 1/4 "%u " 1/4 "%u " 1/4 "%u" "\n"')
-		EOF
-
-		[ 0 != "$datasz" ] || datasz=2000
-		[ 0 != "$totalsz" ] || totalsz=2048
-
-		# TODO: add some sanity/safety checks here.  As of now, there's
-		#       a (pretty fragile) assumption that all the matched files
-		#       are valid Intel microcode files in the expected format.
-
-		skip=$((skip + totalsz))
+		# Do we parse ext_sig table or another microcode header?
+		if [ 0 != "$next_skip" ]; then
+			# Check whether we should abort ext_sig table parsing
+			[ \( "${skip}" -lt "${next_skip}" \) -a \
+			  \( "${ext_sig_pos}" -lt "${ext_sig_cnt}" \) ] || {
+				skip="${next_skip}"
+				next_skip=0
+				continue
+			}
+
+			# ext_sig, 12 bytes in size
+			IFS=' ' read cpuid pf_mask <<- EOF
+			$(hexdump -s "$skip" -n 8 \
+				-e '"" 1/4 "%08x " 1/4 "%u" "\n"' "$f")
+			EOF
+
+			skip="$((skip + 12))"
+			ext_sig_pos="$((ext_sig_pos + 1))"
+		else
+			# Microcode header, 48 bytes, last 3 fields reserved
+			IFS=' ' read hdrver rev \
+			       date_y date_d date_m \
+			       cpuid cksum ldrver \
+			       pf_mask datasz totalsz <<- EOF
+			$(hexdump -s "$skip" -n 36 \
+				-e '"" 1/4 "%u " 1/4 "%#x " \
+			               1/2 "%04x " 1/1 "%02x " 1/1 "%02x " \
+				       1/4 "%08x " 1/4 "%x " 1/4 "%#x " \
+				       1/4 "%u " 1/4 "%u " 1/4 "%u" "\n"' "$f")
+			EOF
+
+			[ 0 != "$datasz" ] || datasz=2000
+			[ 0 != "$totalsz" ] || totalsz=2048
+
+			# TODO: add some sanity/safety checks here.  As of now,
+			#       there's a (pretty fragile) assumption that all
+			#       the matched files are valid Intel microcode
+			#       files in the expected format.
+
+			# ext_sig table is after the microcode payload,
+			# check for its presence
+			if [ 48 -lt "$((totalsz - datasz))" ]; then
+				next_skip="$((skip + totalsz))"
+				skip="$((skip + datasz + 48))"
+				ext_sig_pos=0
+
+				# ext_sig table header, 20 bytes in size,
+				# last 3 fields are reserved.
+				IFS=' ' read ext_sig_cnt  <<- EOF
+				$(hexdump -s "$skip" -n 4 \
+					-e '"" 1/4 "%u" "\n"' "$f")
+				EOF
+
+				skip="$((skip + 20))"
+			else
+				skip="$((skip + totalsz))"
+				next_skip=0
+			fi
+		fi
 
 		#[ -n "$rev" ] || continue
 
diff --git a/SOURCES/intel_config b/SOURCES/intel_config
index d37878d..1f47b87 100644
--- a/SOURCES/intel_config
+++ b/SOURCES/intel_config
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 path intel-ucode/*
-vendor_id GenuineIntel
+vendor GenuineIntel
 kernel_early 4.10.0
 kernel_early 3.10.0-930
 kernel_early 3.10.0-862.14.1
diff --git a/SPECS/microcode_ctl.spec b/SPECS/microcode_ctl.spec
index 66933e1..b425ef5 100644
--- a/SPECS/microcode_ctl.spec
+++ b/SPECS/microcode_ctl.spec
@@ -1,5 +1,4 @@
-%define intel_ucode_version 20191115
-%define intel_ucode_file_id 28727
+%define intel_ucode_version 20200609
 %global debug_package %{nil}
 
 %define caveat_dir %{_datarootdir}/microcode_ctl/ucode_with_caveats
@@ -14,10 +13,10 @@
 Summary:        CPU microcode updates for Intel x86 processors
 Name:           microcode_ctl
 Version:        %{intel_ucode_version}
-Release:        4%{?dist}
+Release:        2%{?dist}
 Epoch:          4
 License:        CC0 and Redistributable, no modification permitted
-URL:            https://downloadcenter.intel.com/download/%{intel_ucode_file_id}/Linux-Processor-Microcode-Data-File
+URL:            https://github.com/intel/Intel-Linux-Processor-Microcode-Data-Files
 Source0:        https://github.com/intel/Intel-Linux-Processor-Microcode-Data-Files/archive/microcode-%{intel_ucode_version}.tar.gz
 
 # (Pre-MDS) revision 0x714 of 06-2d-07 microcode
@@ -26,6 +25,15 @@ Source2:        https://github.com/intel/Intel-Linux-Processor-Microcode-Data-Fi
 # (Pre-20191112) revision 0x2000064 of 06-55-04 microcode
 Source3:        https://github.com/intel/Intel-Linux-Processor-Microcode-Data-Files/raw/microcode-20190918/intel-ucode/06-55-04
 
+# (Pre-20200609) revision 0xd6 of 06-4e-03/06-5e-03 microcode
+Source4:        https://github.com/intel/Intel-Linux-Processor-Microcode-Data-Files/raw/microcode-20200520/intel-ucode/06-4e-03
+Source5:        https://github.com/intel/Intel-Linux-Processor-Microcode-Data-Files/raw/microcode-20200520/intel-ucode/06-5e-03
+
+# microcode-20190918 release,containing revision 0xb4/0xb8 of 06-[89]e-0X microcode
+Source6:        https://github.com/intel/Intel-Linux-Processor-Microcode-Data-Files/archive/microcode-20190918.tar.gz
+# microcode-20191115 release,containing revision 0xca of 06-[89]e-0X microcode
+Source7:        https://github.com/intel/Intel-Linux-Processor-Microcode-Data-Files/archive/microcode-20191115.tar.gz
+
 
 # systemd unit
 Source10:       microcode.service
@@ -71,16 +79,50 @@ Source130:      06-55-04_readme
 Source131:      06-55-04_config
 Source132:      06-55-04_disclaimer
 
+# SKL-U/Y (CPUID 0x406e3) post-20200609 hangs
+# https://github.com/intel/Intel-Linux-Processor-Microcode-Data-Files/issues/31
+Source140:      06-4e-03_readme
+Source141:      06-4e-03_config
+Source142:      06-4e-03_disclaimer
+
+# SKL-H/S/Xeon E3 v5 (CPUID 0x506e3) post-20200609 possible hangs
+# https://github.com/intel/Intel-Linux-Processor-Microcode-Data-Files/issues/31#issuecomment-644885826
+Source150:      06-5e-03_readme
+Source151:      06-5e-03_config
+Source152:      06-5e-03_disclaimer
+
+# Dell 06-[89]e-0x hangs - intermediate 0xca microcode revision
+# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1807960
+# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1846097
+# https://github.com/intel/Intel-Linux-Processor-Microcode-Data-Files/issues/23
+# https://github.com/intel/Intel-Linux-Processor-Microcode-Data-Files/issues/24
+# https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/intel-microcode/+bug/1862751
+Source160:      06-8e-9e-0x-0xca_readme
+Source161:      06-8e-9e-0x-0xca_config
+Source162:      06-8e-9e-0x-0xca_disclaimer
+
+# Dell 06-[89]e-0x hangs - latest microcode revision
+# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1807960
+# https://github.com/intel/Intel-Linux-Processor-Microcode-Data-Files/issues/33
+# https://bugs.debian.org/962757
+# https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/intel-microcode/+bug/1882943
+Source170:      06-8e-9e-0x-dell_readme
+Source171:      06-8e-9e-0x-dell_config
+Source172:      06-8e-9e-0x-dell_disclaimer
+
 
 # "Provides:" RPM tags generator
 Source200:      gen_provides.sh
 
 ExclusiveArch:  %{ix86} x86_64
 BuildRequires:  systemd-units
-Requires(post): systemd
-Requires(preun): systemd
-Requires(postun): systemd
-Requires(posttrans): dracut
+# hexdump is used in gen_provides.sh
+BuildRequires:  coreutils util-linux
+Requires:       coreutils
+Requires(post): systemd coreutils
+Requires(preun): systemd coreutils
+Requires(postun): systemd coreutils
+Requires(posttrans): dracut coreutils
 
 %global _use_internal_dependency_generator 0
 %define __find_provides "%{SOURCE200}"
@@ -107,6 +149,26 @@ cp "%{SOURCE2}" intel-ucode/
 mv intel-ucode/06-55-04 intel-ucode-with-caveats/
 cp "%{SOURCE3}" intel-ucode/
 
+# replacing SKL-U/Y (CPUID 0x4063e) microcode with pre-20200609 version
+mv intel-ucode/06-4e-03 intel-ucode-with-caveats/
+cp "%{SOURCE4}" intel-ucode/
+
+# replacing SKL-H/S/Xeon E3 v5 (CPUID 0x5063e) microcode with pre-20200609 version
+mv intel-ucode/06-5e-03 intel-ucode-with-caveats/
+cp "%{SOURCE5}" intel-ucode/
+
+# Replacing the latest 06-[89]e-0x caveat with pre-20191112 version
+mv intel-ucode/06-[89]e-0* intel-ucode-with-caveats/
+tar xvvf "%{SOURCE6}" --wildcards --strip-components=1 \
+	'*/intel-ucode/06-[89]e-0*'
+
+# Unpacking intermediate 06-[89]e-0x microcode revision 0xca (from microcode-20191115)
+mkdir -p intel-ucode-0xca
+pushd intel-ucode-0xca
+tar xvvf "%{SOURCE7}" --wildcards --strip-components=2 \
+	'*/intel-ucode/06-[89]e-0*'
+popd
+
 :
 
 %install
@@ -151,6 +213,7 @@ install -m 644 releasenote \
 
 # caveats
 install -m 644 "%{SOURCE100}" "%{SOURCE110}" "%{SOURCE120}" "%{SOURCE130}" \
+	       "%{SOURCE140}" "%{SOURCE150}" "%{SOURCE160}" "%{SOURCE170}" \
 	-t "%{buildroot}/%{_pkgdocdir}/caveats/"
 
 
@@ -181,12 +244,44 @@ install -m 644 "%{SOURCE121}" "%{snb_inst_dir}/config"
 install -m 644 "%{SOURCE122}" "%{snb_inst_dir}/disclaimer"
 
 # SKL-SP caveat
-%define skl_inst_dir %{buildroot}/%{caveat_dir}/intel-06-55-04/
-install -m 755 -d "%{skl_inst_dir}/intel-ucode"
-install -m 644 intel-ucode-with-caveats/06-55-04 -t "%{skl_inst_dir}/intel-ucode/"
-install -m 644 "%{SOURCE130}" "%{skl_inst_dir}/readme"
-install -m 644 "%{SOURCE131}" "%{skl_inst_dir}/config"
-install -m 644 "%{SOURCE132}" "%{skl_inst_dir}/disclaimer"
+%define skl_sp_inst_dir %{buildroot}/%{caveat_dir}/intel-06-55-04/
+install -m 755 -d "%{skl_sp_inst_dir}/intel-ucode"
+install -m 644 intel-ucode-with-caveats/06-55-04 -t "%{skl_sp_inst_dir}/intel-ucode/"
+install -m 644 "%{SOURCE130}" "%{skl_sp_inst_dir}/readme"
+install -m 644 "%{SOURCE131}" "%{skl_sp_inst_dir}/config"
+install -m 644 "%{SOURCE132}" "%{skl_sp_inst_dir}/disclaimer"
+
+# SKL-U/Y caveat
+%define skl_uy_inst_dir %{buildroot}/%{caveat_dir}/intel-06-4e-03/
+install -m 755 -d "%{skl_uy_inst_dir}/intel-ucode"
+install -m 644 intel-ucode-with-caveats/06-4e-03 -t "%{skl_uy_inst_dir}/intel-ucode/"
+install -m 644 "%{SOURCE140}" "%{skl_uy_inst_dir}/readme"
+install -m 644 "%{SOURCE141}" "%{skl_uy_inst_dir}/config"
+install -m 644 "%{SOURCE142}" "%{skl_uy_inst_dir}/disclaimer"
+
+# SKL-H/S/Xeoon E3 v5 caveat
+%define skl_hs_inst_dir %{buildroot}/%{caveat_dir}/intel-06-5e-03/
+install -m 755 -d "%{skl_hs_inst_dir}/intel-ucode"
+install -m 644 intel-ucode-with-caveats/06-5e-03 -t "%{skl_hs_inst_dir}/intel-ucode/"
+install -m 644 "%{SOURCE150}" "%{skl_hs_inst_dir}/readme"
+install -m 644 "%{SOURCE151}" "%{skl_hs_inst_dir}/config"
+install -m 644 "%{SOURCE152}" "%{skl_hs_inst_dir}/disclaimer"
+
+# Dell 06-[89]e-0x 0xca caveat
+%define dell_0xca_inst_dir %{buildroot}/%{caveat_dir}/intel-06-8e-9e-0x-0xca/
+install -m 755 -d "%{dell_0xca_inst_dir}/intel-ucode"
+install -m 644 intel-ucode-0xca/06-[89]e-0? -t "%{dell_0xca_inst_dir}/intel-ucode/"
+install -m 644 "%{SOURCE160}" "%{dell_0xca_inst_dir}/readme"
+install -m 644 "%{SOURCE161}" "%{dell_0xca_inst_dir}/config"
+install -m 644 "%{SOURCE162}" "%{dell_0xca_inst_dir}/disclaimer"
+
+# Dell 06-[89]e-0x latest caveat
+%define dell_latest_inst_dir %{buildroot}/%{caveat_dir}/intel-06-8e-9e-0x-dell/
+install -m 755 -d "%{dell_latest_inst_dir}/intel-ucode"
+install -m 644 intel-ucode-with-caveats/06-[89]e-0? -t "%{dell_latest_inst_dir}/intel-ucode/"
+install -m 644 "%{SOURCE170}" "%{dell_latest_inst_dir}/readme"
+install -m 644 "%{SOURCE171}" "%{dell_latest_inst_dir}/config"
+install -m 644 "%{SOURCE172}" "%{dell_latest_inst_dir}/disclaimer"
 
 
 %post
@@ -211,21 +306,121 @@ exit 0
 # dependency, it is pointless at best to regenerate the initramfs,
 # and also does not work with rpm-ostree:
 # https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1199582
+# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1530400
+[ -d /run/systemd/system ] || exit 0
+
+# We can't simply update all initramfs images, since "dracut --regenerate-all"
+# generates initramfs even for removed kernels and if dracut generates botched
+# initramfs image, that results in unbootable system, even with older kernels
+# that can't be used as a fallback:
+# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1420180
+# https://access.redhat.com/support/cases/#/case/01779274
+# https://access.redhat.com/support/cases/#/case/01814106
 #
-# Also check that the running kernel is actually installed:
-# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1591664
-# We use the presence of symvers file as an indicator, the check similar
-# to what weak-modules script does.
+# ...and we can't simply limit ourselves to updating only the currently
+# running kernel, as this doesn't work well with cases where kernel
+# is installed before the updated microcode, or in the same transaction.
+# And we can't rely on late update either, due to issues like this:
+# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1710445
 #
-# Now that /boot/symvers-KVER.gz population is now relies on some shell scripts
-# that are triggered by other shell scripts (kernel-install, which is a part
-# of systemd) that called by RPM scripts, and systemd is not inclined to fix
-# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1609698
-# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1609696
-# So, we check for symvers file inside /lib/modules.
-if [ -d /run/systemd/system -a -e "/lib/modules/$(uname -r)/symvers.gz" ]; then
-	dracut -f
-fi
+# ...and there are also issues with setups with increased "installonly_limit"
+# in /etc/yum.conf, which could lead to unacceptably long package installation
+# times.
+#
+# So, in the end, we try to grab no more than 2 most recently installed kernels
+# that are installed after the currently running one (with the currently running
+# kernel that makes up to 3 in total, the default "installonly_limit" value)
+# as a kernel package selection heuristic that tries to accomodate both the need
+# to put the latest microcode in freshly installed kernels and also addresses
+# existing concerns.
+#
+# For RPM selection, kernel flavours (like "debug" or "kdump" or "zfcp",
+# with only the former being relevant to x86 architecture) are a part or RPM
+# name; it's also a part of uname, with different separator used in RHEL 6/7
+# and RHEL 8.  RT kernel, however, is special, as "rt" is another part
+# of RPM name and it has its own versioning scheme both in NVR and uname.
+# And there's the kernel package split in RHEL 8, so one should look for *-core
+# and not the main package.
+pkgs="kernel-core kernel-debug-core kernel-rt-core kernel-rt-debug-core"
+qf='%%{NAME} %%{VERSION}-%%{RELEASE}.%%{ARCH} %%{installtime}\n'
+: "${MICROCODE_RPM_KVER_LIMIT=2}"
+
+rpm -qa --qf "${qf}" ${pkgs} | sort -r -n -k'3,3' | {
+	kver_cnt=0
+	processed=""
+	skipped=""
+	skip=0
+
+	while read -r pkgname vra install_ts; do
+		flavour=''
+
+		# For x86, only "debug" flavour exists in RHEL 8
+		[ "x${pkgname%*-debug-core}" = "x${pkgname}" ] \
+			|| flavour='+debug'
+
+		kver_cnt="$((kver_cnt + 1))"
+		kver_uname="${vra}${flavour}"
+
+		# Also check that the kernel is actually installed:
+		# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1591664
+		# We use the presence of symvers file as an indicator, the check
+		# similar to what weak-modules script does.
+		#
+		# Now that /boot/symvers-KVER.gz population is now relies
+		# on some shell scripts that are triggered by other shell
+		# scripts (kernel-install, which is a part of systemd) that
+		# called by RPM scripts, and systemd is not inclined to fix
+		# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1609698
+		# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1609696
+		# So, we check for symvers file inside /lib/modules.
+		#
+		# XXX: Not sure if this check is still needed, since we now
+		# iterate over the rpm output.
+		[ -e "/lib/modules/${kver_uname}/symvers.gz" ] || continue
+		# Check that modules.dep for the kernel is present as well,
+		# otherwise dracut complains with "/lib/modules/.../modules.dep
+		# is missing. Did you run depmod?".
+		[ -e "/lib/modules/${kver_uname}/modules.dep" ] || continue
+
+		# We update the kernels with the same uname as the running kernel
+		# regardless of the selected limit
+		if [ "x$(uname -r)" = "x${kver_uname}" \
+		     -o \( "${kver_cnt}" -le "${MICROCODE_RPM_KVER_LIMIT}" \
+		           -a "${skip}" = 0 \) ]
+		then
+			dracut -f --kver "${kver_uname}"
+
+			processed="${processed} ${pkgname}-${vra}"
+		else
+			skipped="${skipped} ${pkgname}-${vra}"
+		fi
+
+		# The packages are processed until a package with the same uname
+		# as the running kernel is hit (since they are sorted
+		# in the descending installation time stamp older).
+		[ "x$(uname -r)" != "x${kver_uname}" ] || skip=1
+	done
+
+	if [ -n "${skipped}" ]; then
+		skip_msg="After installation of a new version of microcode_ctl package,
+initramfs hasn't been re-generated for all the installed kernel packages.
+The following kernel packages have been skipped:${skipped}.
+Please re-generate initramfs manually for these kernel packages with the
+\"dracut -f --kver KERNEL_VERSION\" command in order to get the latest
+Intel CPU microcode included into early initramfs image for it, if needed."
+
+		if [ -e /usr/bin/logger ]; then
+			echo "${skip_msg}" |
+				/usr/bin/logger -p syslog.notice -t microcode_ctl
+		fi
+
+		if [ -e /dev/kmsg ]; then
+			echo "${skip_msg}" > /dev/kmsg
+		fi
+	fi
+}
+
+exit 0
 
 %global rpm_state_dir %{_localstatedir}/lib/rpm-state
 
@@ -318,6 +513,95 @@ rm -rf %{buildroot}
 
 
 %changelog
+* Mon Jun 22 2020 Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com> - 4:20200609-2
+- Blacklist latest microcode revision for 06-[89]e-0x CPUs (AML-Y,
+  CFL-H/S/U/Xeon E, CML-Y, KBL-G/H/S/X/U/Y/Xeon E3 v6, WHL-U) on Dell systems,
+  use revision 0xae/0xb4/0xb8 by default, provide the latest revision
+  and intermediate revision 0xca in caveats (#1807960, #1846097).
+
+* Mon Jun 15 2020 Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com> - 4:20200609-1
+- Update Intel CPU microcode to microcode-20200609 release (#1845967):
+  - Fixed a typo in the release note file.
+
+* Mon Jun 15 2020 Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com> - 4:20200602-5
+- Enable 06-2d-07 (SNB-E/EN/EP) caveat by default.
+
+* Mon Jun 15 2020 Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com> - 4:20200602-4
+- Enable 06-55-04 (SKL-X/W) caveat by default.
+
+* Sun Jun 14 2020 Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com> - 4:20200602-3
+- Do not update 06-4e-03 (SKL-U/Y) and 06-5e-03 (SKL-H/S/Xeon E3 v5) to revision
+  0xdc, use 0xd6 by default (#1846119).
+
+* Thu Jun 04 2020 Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com> - 4:20200602-2
+- Avoid temporary file creation, used for here-documents in check_caveats
+  (#1839163).
+
+* Wed Jun 03 2020 Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com> - 4:20200602-1
+- Update Intel CPU microcode to microcode-20200602 release, addresses
+  CVE-2020-0543, CVE-2020-0548, CVE-2020-0549 (#1795354, #1795356, #1827184):
+  - Update of 06-3c-03/0x32 (HSW C0) microcode from revision 0x27 up to 0x28;
+  - Update of 06-3d-04/0xc0 (BDW-U/Y E0/F0) microcode from revision 0x2e
+    up to 0x2f;
+  - Update of 06-45-01/0x72 (HSW-U C0/D0) microcode from revision 0x25
+    up to 0x26;
+  - Update of 06-46-01/0x32 (HSW-H C0) microcode from revision 0x1b up to 0x1c;
+  - Update of 06-47-01/0x22 (BDW-H/Xeon E3 E0/G0) microcode from revision 0x21
+    up to 0x22;
+  - Update of 06-4e-03/0xc0 (SKL-U/Y D0) microcode from revision 0xd6
+    up to 0xdc;
+  - Update of 06-55-03/0x97 (SKX-SP B1) microcode from revision 0x1000151
+    up to 0x1000157;
+  - Update of 06-55-04/0xb7 (SKX-SP H0/M0/U0, SKX-D M1) microcode
+    (in intel-06-55-04/intel-ucode/06-55-04) from revision 0x2000065
+    up to 0x2006906;
+  - Update of 06-55-06/0xbf (CLX-SP B0) microcode from revision 0x400002c
+    up to 0x4002f01;
+  - Update of 06-55-07/0xbf (CLX-SP B1) microcode from revision 0x500002c
+    up to 0x5002f01;
+  - Update of 06-5e-03/0x36 (SKL-H/S R0/N0) microcode from revision 0xd6
+    up to 0xdc;
+  - Update of 06-8e-09/0x10 (AML-Y22 H0) microcode from revision 0xca
+    up to 0xd6;
+  - Update of 06-8e-09/0xc0 (KBL-U/Y H0) microcode from revision 0xca
+    up to 0xd6;
+  - Update of 06-8e-0a/0xc0 (CFL-U43e D0) microcode from revision 0xca
+    up to 0xd6;
+  - Update of 06-8e-0b/0xd0 (WHL-U W0) microcode from revision 0xca
+    up to 0xd6;
+  - Update of 06-8e-0c/0x94 (AML-Y42 V0, CML-Y42 V0, WHL-U V0) microcode
+    from revision 0xca up to 0xd6;
+  - Update of 06-9e-09/0x2a (KBL-G/H/S/X/Xeon E3 B0) microcode from revision
+    0xca up to 0xd6;
+  - Update of 06-9e-0a/0x22 (CFL-H/S/Xeon E3 U0) microcode from revision 0xca
+    up to 0xd6;
+  - Update of 06-9e-0b/0x02 (CFL-S B0) microcode from revision 0xca up to 0xd6;
+  - Update of 06-9e-0c/0x22 (CFL-H/S P0) microcode from revision 0xca
+    up to 0xd6;
+  - Update of 06-9e-0d/0x22 (CFL-H R0) microcode from revision 0xca up to 0xd6.
+
+* Fri May 22 2020 Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com> - 4:20200520-1
+- Update Intel CPU microcode to microcode-20200520 release (#1783103):
+  - Update of 06-2d-06/0x6d (SNB-E/EN/EP C1/M0) microcode from revision 0x61f
+    up to 0x621;
+  - Update of 06-2d-07/0x6d (SNB-E/EN/EP C2/M1) microcode from revision 0x718
+    up to 0x71a.
+
+* Tue May 12 2020 Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com> - 4:20200508-1
+- Update Intel CPU microcode to microcode-20200508 release (#1783103):
+  - Update of 06-7e-05/0x80 (ICL-U/Y D1) microcode from revision 0x46
+    up to 0x78.
+- Change the URL to point to the GitHub repository since the microcode download
+  section at Intel Download Center does not exist anymore.
+
+* Thu May 07 2020 Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com> - 4:20191115-6
+- Narrow down SKL-SP/W/X blacklist to exclude Server/FPGA/Fabric segment
+  models (#1833036).
+
+* Wed Apr 29 2020 Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com> - 4:20191115-5
+- Re-generate initramfs not only for the currently running kernel,
+  but for several recently installed kernels as well (#1773338).
+
 * Mon Dec 09 2019 Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com> - 4:20191115-4
 - Avoid find being SIGPIPE'd on early "grep -q" exit in the dracut script
   (#1781365).