diff --git a/libvirt-0.6.3-refresh-qemu-caps.patch b/libvirt-0.6.3-refresh-qemu-caps.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..804d54e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/libvirt-0.6.3-refresh-qemu-caps.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+commit 0e51348cb9aeafe5e2fd6469a4bde0baa1eb8720
+Author: Cole Robinson <crobinso@redhat.com>
+Date:   Mon May 4 15:06:03 2009 -0400
+
+    Refresh QEMU driver capabilities for each getCapabilities call.
+    
+    Also fix up a couple issues where caps are accessed without locking
+    the driver structure.
+
+diff --git a/src/qemu_driver.c b/src/qemu_driver.c
+index 23ea961..790dac6 100644
+--- a/src/qemu_driver.c
++++ b/src/qemu_driver.c
+@@ -1885,10 +1885,12 @@ static int qemudGetNodeInfo(virConnectPtr conn,
+ 
+ static char *qemudGetCapabilities(virConnectPtr conn) {
+     struct qemud_driver *driver = conn->privateData;
+-    char *xml;
++    char *xml = NULL;
+ 
+     qemuDriverLock(driver);
+-    if ((xml = virCapabilitiesFormatXML(driver->caps)) == NULL)
++    virCapabilitiesFree(qemu_driver->caps);
++    if ((qemu_driver->caps = qemudCapsInit()) == NULL ||
++        (xml = virCapabilitiesFormatXML(driver->caps)) == NULL)
+         virReportOOMError(conn);
+     qemuDriverUnlock(driver);
+ 
+@@ -3169,20 +3171,26 @@ cleanup:
+     return ret;
+ }
+ 
+-static int qemudNodeGetSecurityModel(virConnectPtr conn, virSecurityModelPtr secmodel)
++static int qemudNodeGetSecurityModel(virConnectPtr conn,
++                                     virSecurityModelPtr secmodel)
+ {
+     struct qemud_driver *driver = (struct qemud_driver *)conn->privateData;
+     char *p;
++    int ret = 0;
+ 
+-    if (!driver->securityDriver)
+-        return -2;
++    qemuDriverLock(driver);
++    if (!driver->securityDriver) {
++        ret = -2;
++        goto cleanup;
++    }
+ 
+     p = driver->caps->host.secModel.model;
+     if (strlen(p) >= VIR_SECURITY_MODEL_BUFLEN-1) {
+         qemudReportError(conn, NULL, NULL, VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+                          _("security model string exceeds max %d bytes"),
+                          VIR_SECURITY_MODEL_BUFLEN-1);
+-        return -1;
++        ret = -1;
++        goto cleanup;
+     }
+     strcpy(secmodel->model, p);
+ 
+@@ -3191,10 +3199,14 @@ static int qemudNodeGetSecurityModel(virConnectPtr conn, virSecurityModelPtr sec
+         qemudReportError(conn, NULL, NULL, VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+                          _("security DOI string exceeds max %d bytes"),
+                          VIR_SECURITY_DOI_BUFLEN-1);
+-        return -1;
++        ret = -1;
++        goto cleanup;
+     }
+     strcpy(secmodel->doi, p);
+-    return 0;
++
++cleanup:
++    qemuDriverUnlock(driver);
++    return ret;
+ }
+ 
+ /* TODO: check seclabel restore */
diff --git a/libvirt.spec b/libvirt.spec
index 320218f..1abb74c 100644
--- a/libvirt.spec
+++ b/libvirt.spec
@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@
 Summary: Library providing a simple API virtualization
 Name: libvirt
 Version: 0.6.3
-Release: 5%{?dist}%{?extra_release}
+Release: 6%{?dist}%{?extra_release}
 License: LGPLv2+
 Group: Development/Libraries
 Source: libvirt-%{version}.tar.gz
@@ -63,6 +63,8 @@ Source: libvirt-%{version}.tar.gz
 # Patches cherry-picked from upstream
 Patch1: libvirt-0.6.3-shared-readonly-label.patch
 Patch2: libvirt-0.6.3-hostdev-managed.patch
+# Refresh qemu caps when getCapabilities is called (bz 460649)
+Patch3: libvirt-0.6.3-refresh-qemu-caps.patch
 
 # Not for upstream. Temporary hack till PulseAudio autostart
 # problems are sorted out when SELinux enforcing
@@ -218,6 +220,7 @@ of recent versions of Linux (and other OSes).
 %setup -q
 %patch1 -p1
 %patch2 -p1
+%patch3 -p1
 
 %patch200 -p0
 
@@ -548,6 +551,9 @@ fi
 %endif
 
 %changelog
+* Wed May  6 2009 Cole Robinson <crobinso@redhat.com> - 0.6.3-6.fc12
+- Refresh qemu caps when getCapabilities is called (bug #460649)
+
 * Wed May  6 2009 Mark McLoughlin <markmc@redhat.com> - 0.6.3-5.fc12
 - Fix handling of <hostdev managed='yes'> (bug #499386)