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67fa04 |
diff --git a/programs/pluto/ikev1.c b/programs/pluto/ikev1.c
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index e0615323ed..401618b6dd 100644
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--- a/programs/pluto/ikev1.c
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+++ b/programs/pluto/ikev1.c
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@@ -1101,10 +1101,20 @@ void process_v1_packet(struct msg_digest *md)
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struct state *st = NULL;
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enum state_kind from_state = STATE_UNDEFINED; /* state we started in */
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+ /*
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+ * For the initial responses, don't leak the responder's SPI.
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+ * Hence the use of send_v1_notification_from_md().
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+ *
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+ * AGGR mode is a mess in that the R0->R1 transition happens
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+ * well before the transition succeeds.
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+ */
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#define SEND_NOTIFICATION(t) \
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{ \
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pstats(ikev1_sent_notifies_e, t); \
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- if (st != NULL) \
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+ if (st != NULL && \
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+ st->st_state->kind != STATE_AGGR_R0 && \
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+ st->st_state->kind != STATE_AGGR_R1 && \
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+ st->st_state->kind != STATE_MAIN_R0) \
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send_v1_notification_from_state(st, from_state, t); \
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else \
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send_v1_notification_from_md(md, t); \
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@@ -1168,17 +1178,26 @@ void process_v1_packet(struct msg_digest *md)
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from_state = (md->hdr.isa_xchg == ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT ?
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STATE_MAIN_R0 : STATE_AGGR_R0);
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} else {
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- /* not an initial message */
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+ /*
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+ * Possibly not an initial message. Possibly
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+ * from initiator. Possibly from responder.
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+ *
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+ * Possibly. Which is probably hopeless.
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+ */
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st = find_state_ikev1(&md->hdr.isa_ike_spis,
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md->hdr.isa_msgid);
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if (st == NULL) {
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/*
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- * perhaps this is a first message
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+ * Perhaps this is a first message
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* from the responder and contains a
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* responder cookie that we've not yet
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* seen.
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+ *
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+ * Perhaps this is a random message
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+ * with a bogus non-zero responder IKE
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+ * SPI.
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*/
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st = find_state_ikev1_init(&md->hdr.isa_ike_initiator_spi,
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md->hdr.isa_msgid);
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@@ -1189,6 +1208,21 @@ void process_v1_packet(struct msg_digest *md)
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/* XXX Could send notification back */
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return;
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}
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+ if (st->st_state->kind == STATE_AGGR_R0) {
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+ /*
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+ * The only way for this to
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+ * happen is for the attacker
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+ * to guess the responder's
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+ * IKE SPI that hasn't been
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+ * sent over the wire?
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+ *
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+ * Well that or played 1/2^32
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+ * odds.
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+ */
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+ llog_pexpect(md->md_logger, HERE,
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+ "phase 1 message matching AGGR_R0 state");
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+ return;
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+ }
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}
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from_state = st->st_state->kind;
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}
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@@ -2870,7 +2904,28 @@ void complete_v1_state_transition(struct state *st, struct msg_digest *md, stf_s
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delete_state(st);
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/* wipe out dangling pointer to st */
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md->v1_st = NULL;
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+ } else if (st->st_state->kind == STATE_AGGR_R0 ||
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+ st->st_state->kind == STATE_AGGR_R1 ||
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+ st->st_state->kind == STATE_MAIN_R0) {
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+ /*
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+ *
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+ * Wipe out the incomplete larval state.
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+ *
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+ * ARGH! In <=v4.10, the aggr code flipped the
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+ * larval state to R1 right at the start of
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+ * the transition and not the end, so using
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+ * state to figure things out is close to
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+ * useless.
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+ *
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+ * Deleting the state means that pluto has no
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+ * way to detect and ignore amplification
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+ * attacks.
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+ */
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+ delete_state(st);
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+ /* wipe out dangling pointer to st */
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+ md->v1_st = NULL;
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}
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+
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break;
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}
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}
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diff --git a/programs/pluto/ikev1_aggr.c b/programs/pluto/ikev1_aggr.c
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index 2732951beb..87be80cb6c 100644
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--- a/programs/pluto/ikev1_aggr.c
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+++ b/programs/pluto/ikev1_aggr.c
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@@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ stf_status aggr_inI1_outR1(struct state *null_st UNUSED,
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/* Set up state */
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struct ike_sa *ike = new_v1_rstate(c, md);
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md->v1_st = &ike->sa; /* (caller will reset cur_state) */
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- change_v1_state(&ike->sa, STATE_AGGR_R1);
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+ change_v1_state(&ike->sa, STATE_AGGR_R0);
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/*
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* Warn when peer is expected to use especially dangerous
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@@ -197,7 +197,8 @@ stf_status aggr_inI1_outR1(struct state *null_st UNUSED,
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if (!v1_decode_certs(md)) {
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llog_sa(RC_LOG, ike, "X509: CERT payload bogus or revoked");
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- return false;
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+ /* XXX notification is in order! */
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+ return STF_FAIL_v1N + v1N_INVALID_ID_INFORMATION;
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}
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/*
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