Blame SOURCES/libcgroup-0.41-api.c-fix-potential-buffer-overflow.patch

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From 1b4b4b7f8d4443c3e630838c9b33c9a69fdb6193 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: =?UTF-8?q?Nikola=20Forr=C3=B3?= <nforro@redhat.com>
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Date: Sun, 19 Jun 2016 17:12:01 +0200
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Subject: [PATCH] api.c: fix potential buffer overflow
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MIME-Version: 1.0
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Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
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Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
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It is assumed that arguments read from /proc/<pid>/cmdline don't exceed
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buf_pname buffer size, which is FILENAME_MAX - 1 characters, but that's
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not always the case.
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Add check to prevent buffer overflow and discard the excessive part of
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an argument.
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Signed-off-by: Nikola Forró <nforro@redhat.com>
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---
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 src/api.c | 6 +++++-
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 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
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diff --git a/src/api.c b/src/api.c
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index b40364c..18ce21f 100644
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--- a/src/api.c
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+++ b/src/api.c
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@@ -4055,13 +4055,17 @@ static int cg_get_procname_from_proc_cmdline(pid_t pid,
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 	while (c != EOF) {
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 		c = fgetc(f);
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-		if ((c != EOF) && (c != '\0')) {
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+		if ((c != EOF) && (c != '\0') && (len < FILENAME_MAX - 1)) {
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 			buf_pname[len] = c;
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 			len++;
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 			continue;
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 		}
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 		buf_pname[len] = '\0';
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+		if (len == FILENAME_MAX - 1)
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+			while ((c != EOF) && (c != '\0'))
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+				c = fgetc(f);
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+
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 		/*
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 		 * The taken process name from /proc/<pid>/status is
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 		 * shortened to 15 characters if it is over. So the
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-- 
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2.7.4
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