diff --git a/SOURCES/libarchive-3.1.2-CVE-2017-14503.patch b/SOURCES/libarchive-3.1.2-CVE-2017-14503.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..deebbed
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/libarchive-3.1.2-CVE-2017-14503.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+From 2c8c83b9731ff822fad6cc8c670ea5519c366a14 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Joerg Sonnenberger <joerg@bec.de>
+Date: Thu, 19 Jul 2018 21:14:53 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Reject LHA archive entries with negative size.
+
+---
+ libarchive/archive_read_support_format_lha.c | 6 ++++++
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_lha.c b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_lha.c
+index b8ef4ae1..95c99bb1 100644
+--- a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_lha.c
++++ b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_lha.c
+@@ -701,6 +701,12 @@ archive_read_format_lha_read_header(struct archive_read *a,
+ * Prepare variables used to read a file content.
+ */
+ lha->entry_bytes_remaining = lha->compsize;
++ if (lha->entry_bytes_remaining < 0) {
++ archive_set_error(&a->archive,
++ ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
++ "Invalid LHa entry size");
++ return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
++ }
+ lha->entry_offset = 0;
+ lha->entry_crc_calculated = 0;
+
+--
+2.20.1
+
diff --git a/SOURCES/libarchive-3.1.2-CVE-2019-1000019.patch b/SOURCES/libarchive-3.1.2-CVE-2019-1000019.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f05595e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/libarchive-3.1.2-CVE-2019-1000019.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+From 65a23f5dbee4497064e9bb467f81138a62b0dae1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
+Date: Tue, 1 Jan 2019 16:01:40 +1100
+Subject: [PATCH 2/2] 7zip: fix crash when parsing certain archives
+
+Fuzzing with CRCs disabled revealed that a call to get_uncompressed_data()
+would sometimes fail to return at least 'minimum' bytes. This can cause
+the crc32() invocation in header_bytes to read off into invalid memory.
+
+A specially crafted archive can use this to cause a crash.
+
+An ASAN trace is below, but ASAN is not required - an uninstrumented
+binary will also crash.
+
+==7719==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x631000040000 (pc 0x7fbdb3b3ec1d bp 0x7ffe77a51310 sp 0x7ffe77a51150 T0)
+==7719==The signal is caused by a READ memory access.
+ #0 0x7fbdb3b3ec1c in crc32_z (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libz.so.1+0x2c1c)
+ #1 0x84f5eb in header_bytes (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x84f5eb)
+ #2 0x856156 in read_Header (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x856156)
+ #3 0x84e134 in slurp_central_directory (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x84e134)
+ #4 0x849690 in archive_read_format_7zip_read_header (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x849690)
+ #5 0x5713b7 in _archive_read_next_header2 (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x5713b7)
+ #6 0x570e63 in _archive_read_next_header (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x570e63)
+ #7 0x6f08bd in archive_read_next_header (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x6f08bd)
+ #8 0x52373f in read_archive (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x52373f)
+ #9 0x5257be in tar_mode_x (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x5257be)
+ #10 0x51daeb in main (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x51daeb)
+ #11 0x7fbdb27cab96 in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-OTsEL5/glibc-2.27/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:310
+ #12 0x41dd09 in _start (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x41dd09)
+
+This was primarly done with afl and FairFuzz. Some early corpus entries
+may have been generated by qsym.
+---
+ libarchive/archive_read_support_format_7zip.c | 8 +-------
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 7 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_7zip.c b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_7zip.c
+index bccbf896..b6d1505d 100644
+--- a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_7zip.c
++++ b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_7zip.c
+@@ -2964,13 +2964,7 @@ get_uncompressed_data(struct archive_read *a, const void **buff, size_t size,
+ if (zip->codec == _7Z_COPY && zip->codec2 == (unsigned long)-1) {
+ /* Copy mode. */
+
+- /*
+- * Note: '1' here is a performance optimization.
+- * Recall that the decompression layer returns a count of
+- * available bytes; asking for more than that forces the
+- * decompressor to combine reads by copying data.
+- */
+- *buff = __archive_read_ahead(a, 1, &bytes_avail);
++ *buff = __archive_read_ahead(a, minimum, &bytes_avail);
+ if (bytes_avail <= 0) {
+ archive_set_error(&a->archive,
+ ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
+--
+2.20.1
+
diff --git a/SOURCES/libarchive-3.1.2-CVE-2019-1000020.patch b/SOURCES/libarchive-3.1.2-CVE-2019-1000020.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b314520
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/libarchive-3.1.2-CVE-2019-1000020.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+From 8312eaa576014cd9b965012af51bc1f967b12423 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
+Date: Tue, 1 Jan 2019 17:10:49 +1100
+Subject: [PATCH 1/2] iso9660: Fail when expected Rockridge extensions is
+ missing
+
+A corrupted or malicious ISO9660 image can cause read_CE() to loop
+forever.
+
+read_CE() calls parse_rockridge(), expecting a Rockridge extension
+to be read. However, parse_rockridge() is structured as a while
+loop starting with a sanity check, and if the sanity check fails
+before the loop has run, the function returns ARCHIVE_OK without
+advancing the position in the file. This causes read_CE() to retry
+indefinitely.
+
+Make parse_rockridge() return ARCHIVE_WARN if it didn't read an
+extension. As someone with no real knowledge of the format, this
+seems more apt than ARCHIVE_FATAL, but both the call-sites escalate
+it to a fatal error immediately anyway.
+
+Found with a combination of AFL, afl-rb (FairFuzz) and qsym.
+---
+ libarchive/archive_read_support_format_iso9660.c | 11 ++++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_iso9660.c b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_iso9660.c
+index 28acfefb..bad8f1df 100644
+--- a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_iso9660.c
++++ b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_iso9660.c
+@@ -2102,6 +2102,7 @@ parse_rockridge(struct archive_read *a, struct file_info *file,
+ const unsigned char *p, const unsigned char *end)
+ {
+ struct iso9660 *iso9660;
++ int entry_seen = 0;
+
+ iso9660 = (struct iso9660 *)(a->format->data);
+
+@@ -2257,8 +2258,16 @@ parse_rockridge(struct archive_read *a, struct file_info *file,
+ }
+
+ p += p[2];
++ entry_seen = 1;
++ }
++
++ if (entry_seen)
++ return (ARCHIVE_OK);
++ else {
++ archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
++ "Tried to parse Rockridge extensions, but none found");
++ return (ARCHIVE_WARN);
+ }
+- return (ARCHIVE_OK);
+ }
+
+ static int
+--
+2.20.1
+
diff --git a/SOURCES/libarchive-3.3.2-CVE-2018-1000877.patch b/SOURCES/libarchive-3.3.2-CVE-2018-1000877.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e980aa6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/libarchive-3.3.2-CVE-2018-1000877.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+From 88311f46cdfc719d26bb99d3b47944eb92ceae02 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Ondrej Dubaj <odubaj@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 30 Apr 2019 11:50:33 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Avoid a double-free when a window size of 0 is specified
+
+new_size can be 0 with a malicious or corrupted RAR archive.
+
+realloc(area, 0) is equivalent to free(area), so the region would
+be free()d here and the free()d again in the cleanup function.
+
+Found with a setup running AFL, afl-rb, and qsym.
+---
+ libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c | 5 +++++
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c
+index c4a8278..3f88eef 100644
+--- a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c
++++ b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c
+@@ -2317,6 +2317,11 @@ parse_codes(struct archive_read *a)
+ new_size = DICTIONARY_MAX_SIZE;
+ else
+ new_size = rar_fls((unsigned int)rar->unp_size) << 1;
++ if (new_size == 0) {
++ archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
++ "Zero window size is invalid.");
++ return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
++ }
+ new_window = realloc(rar->lzss.window, new_size);
+ if (new_window == NULL) {
+ archive_set_error(&a->archive, ENOMEM,
+--
+2.17.1
+
diff --git a/SOURCES/libarchive-3.3.2-CVE-2018-1000878.patch b/SOURCES/libarchive-3.3.2-CVE-2018-1000878.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2736827
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/libarchive-3.3.2-CVE-2018-1000878.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+From d00ccaf8c20efbd009964e3e2697d26907d14163 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Ondrej Dubaj <odubaj@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 30 Apr 2019 11:36:08 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] rar: file split across multi-part archives must match
+
+Fuzzing uncovered some UAF and memory overrun bugs where a file in a
+single file archive reported that it was split across multiple
+volumes. This was caused by ppmd7 operations calling
+rar_br_fillup. This would invoke rar_read_ahead, which would in some
+situations invoke archive_read_format_rar_read_header. That would
+check the new file name against the old file name, and if they didn't
+match up it would free the ppmd7 buffer and allocate a new
+one. However, because the ppmd7 decoder wasn't actually done with the
+buffer, it would continue to used the freed buffer. Both reads and
+writes to the freed region can be observed.
+
+This is quite tricky to solve: once the buffer has been freed it is
+too late, as the ppmd7 decoder functions almost universally assume
+success - there's no way for ppmd_read to signal error, nor are there
+good ways for functions like Range_Normalise to propagate them. So we
+can't detect after the fact that we're in an invalid state - e.g. by
+checking rar->cursor, we have to prevent ourselves from ever ending up
+there. So, when we are in the dangerous part or rar_read_ahead that
+assumes a valid split, we set a flag force read_header to either go
+down the path for split files or bail. This means that the ppmd7
+decoder keeps a valid buffer and just runs out of data.
+
+Found with a combination of AFL, afl-rb and qsym.
+---
+ libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c | 9 +++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c
+index cbb14c3..c4a8278 100644
+--- a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c
++++ b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c
+@@ -258,6 +258,7 @@ struct rar
+ struct data_block_offsets *dbo;
+ unsigned int cursor;
+ unsigned int nodes;
++ char filename_must_match;
+
+ /* LZSS members */
+ struct huffman_code maincode;
+@@ -1570,6 +1571,12 @@ read_header(struct archive_read *a, struct archive_entry *entry,
+ }
+ return ret;
+ }
++ else if (rar->filename_must_match)
++ {
++ archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
++ "Mismatch of file parts split across multi-volume archive");
++ return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
++ }
+
+ rar->filename_save = (char*)realloc(rar->filename_save,
+ filename_size + 1);
+@@ -2938,12 +2945,14 @@ rar_read_ahead(struct archive_read *a, size_t min, ssize_t *avail)
+ else if (*avail == 0 && rar->main_flags & MHD_VOLUME &&
+ rar->file_flags & FHD_SPLIT_AFTER)
+ {
++ rar->filename_must_match = 1;
+ ret = archive_read_format_rar_read_header(a, a->entry);
+ if (ret == (ARCHIVE_EOF))
+ {
+ rar->has_endarc_header = 1;
+ ret = archive_read_format_rar_read_header(a, a->entry);
+ }
++ rar->filename_must_match = 0;
+ if (ret != (ARCHIVE_OK))
+ return NULL;
+ return rar_read_ahead(a, min, avail);
+--
+2.17.1
+
diff --git a/SPECS/libarchive.spec b/SPECS/libarchive.spec
index 347c162..608e3c3 100644
--- a/SPECS/libarchive.spec
+++ b/SPECS/libarchive.spec
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
Name: libarchive
Version: 3.1.2
-Release: 10%{?dist}
+Release: 12%{?dist}
Summary: A library for handling streaming archive formats
Group: System Environment/Libraries
@@ -54,6 +54,11 @@ Patch21: libarchive-3.1.2-CVE-2016-5844.patch
Patch22: libarchive-3.1.2-CVE-2016-1541.patch
Patch23: libarchive-3.1.2-CVE-2016-5418.patch
Patch24: libarchive-3.1.2-CVE-2016-5418-variation.patch
+Patch25: libarchive-3.1.2-CVE-2017-14503.patch
+Patch26: libarchive-3.1.2-CVE-2019-1000019.patch
+Patch27: libarchive-3.1.2-CVE-2019-1000020.patch
+Patch28: libarchive-3.3.2-CVE-2018-1000878.patch
+Patch29: libarchive-3.3.2-CVE-2018-1000877.patch
%description
Libarchive is a programming library that can create and read several different
@@ -122,6 +127,11 @@ libarchive packages.
%patch22 -p1 -b .CVE-2016-1541
%patch23 -p1 -b .CVE-2016-5418
%patch24 -p1 -b .CVE-2016-5418-var
+%patch25 -p1 -b .CVE-2017-14503
+%patch26 -p1 -b .CVE-2019-1000019
+%patch27 -p1 -b .CVE-2019-1000020
+%patch28 -p1 -b .CVE-2019-1000878
+%patch29 -p1 -b .CVE-2019-1000877
%build
@@ -215,6 +225,15 @@ rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT
%changelog
+* Tue Apr 30 2019 Ondrej Dubaj <odubaj@redhat.com> - 3.1.2-12
+- fixed use after free in RAR decoder (#1700749)
+- fixed double free in RAR decoder (#1700748)
+
+* Fri Feb 22 2019 Pavel Raiskup <praiskup@redhat.com> - 3.1.2-11
+- fix out-of-bounds read within lha_read_data_none() (CVE-2017-14503)
+- fix crash on crafted 7zip archives (CVE-2019-1000019)
+- fix infinite loop in ISO9660 (CVE-2019-1000020)
+
* Fri Aug 12 2016 Petr Kubat <pkubat@redhat.com> - 3.1.2-10
- Fixes variation of CVE-2016-5418: Hard links could include ".." in their path.