diff --git a/SOURCES/fix-few-obvious-resource-leaks-covscan.patch b/SOURCES/fix-few-obvious-resource-leaks-covscan.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a503633
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/fix-few-obvious-resource-leaks-covscan.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
+From 9d178fe573818764a2d15e0a39691f5eb4e300f6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Ondrej Dubaj <odubaj@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 27 May 2019 10:52:51 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix a few obvious resource leaks and strcpy() misuses
+
+Per Coverity report.
+---
+ cpio/cpio.c                                      |  4 +++-
+ libarchive/archive_acl.c                         |  8 ++++++--
+ libarchive/archive_write_set_format_iso9660.c    |  4 ++--
+ libarchive/archive_write_set_format_mtree.c      |  4 ++--
+ libarchive/archive_write_set_format_pax.c        |  6 ++++--
+ libarchive/archive_write_set_format_xar.c        | 10 ++++++----
+ 6 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/cpio/cpio.c b/cpio/cpio.c
+index 5beedd0..6696bb5 100644
+--- a/cpio/cpio.c
++++ b/cpio/cpio.c
+@@ -744,8 +744,10 @@ file_to_archive(struct cpio *cpio, const char *srcpath)
+ 	}
+ 	if (cpio->option_rename)
+ 		destpath = cpio_rename(destpath);
+-	if (destpath == NULL)
++	if (destpath == NULL) {
++		archive_entry_free(entry);
+ 		return (0);
++	}
+ 	archive_entry_copy_pathname(entry, destpath);
+ 
+ 	/*
+diff --git a/libarchive/archive_acl.c b/libarchive/archive_acl.c
+index b8b6b63..503f379 100644
+--- a/libarchive/archive_acl.c
++++ b/libarchive/archive_acl.c
+@@ -753,8 +753,10 @@ archive_acl_to_text_w(struct archive_acl *acl, ssize_t *text_len, int flags,
+ 			append_entry_w(&wp, prefix, ap->type, ap->tag, flags,
+ 			    wname, ap->permset, id);
+ 			count++;
+-		} else if (r < 0 && errno == ENOMEM)
++		} else if (r < 0 && errno == ENOMEM) {
++			free(ws);
+ 			return (NULL);
++		}
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	/* Add terminating character */
+@@ -975,8 +977,10 @@ archive_acl_to_text_l(struct archive_acl *acl, ssize_t *text_len, int flags,
+ 			prefix = NULL;
+ 		r = archive_mstring_get_mbs_l(
+ 		    &ap->name, &name, &len, sc);
+-		if (r != 0)
++		if (r != 0) {
++			free(s);
+ 			return (NULL);
++		}
+ 		if (count > 0)
+ 			*p++ = separator;
+ 		if (name == NULL ||
+diff --git a/libarchive/archive_write_set_format_iso9660.c b/libarchive/archive_write_set_format_iso9660.c
+index c0ca435..badc88b 100644
+--- a/libarchive/archive_write_set_format_iso9660.c
++++ b/libarchive/archive_write_set_format_iso9660.c
+@@ -4899,10 +4899,10 @@ isofile_gen_utility_names(struct archive_write *a, struct isofile *file)
+ 		if (p[0] == '/') {
+ 			if (p[1] == '/')
+ 				/* Convert '//' --> '/' */
+-				strcpy(p, p+1);
++				memmove(p, p+1, strlen(p+1) + 1);
+ 			else if (p[1] == '.' && p[2] == '/')
+ 				/* Convert '/./' --> '/' */
+-				strcpy(p, p+2);
++				memmove(p, p+2, strlen(p+2) + 1);
+ 			else if (p[1] == '.' && p[2] == '.' && p[3] == '/') {
+ 				/* Convert 'dir/dir1/../dir2/'
+ 				 *     --> 'dir/dir2/'
+diff --git a/libarchive/archive_write_set_format_mtree.c b/libarchive/archive_write_set_format_mtree.c
+index 493d473..0f2431e 100644
+--- a/libarchive/archive_write_set_format_mtree.c
++++ b/libarchive/archive_write_set_format_mtree.c
+@@ -1810,10 +1810,10 @@ mtree_entry_setup_filenames(struct archive_write *a, struct mtree_entry *file,
+ 		if (p[0] == '/') {
+ 			if (p[1] == '/')
+ 				/* Convert '//' --> '/' */
+-				strcpy(p, p+1);
++				memmove(p, p+1, strlen(p+1) + 1);
+ 			else if (p[1] == '.' && p[2] == '/')
+ 				/* Convert '/./' --> '/' */
+-				strcpy(p, p+2);
++				memmove(p, p+2, strlen(p+2) + 1);
+ 			else if (p[1] == '.' && p[2] == '.' && p[3] == '/') {
+ 				/* Convert 'dir/dir1/../dir2/'
+ 				 *     --> 'dir/dir2/'
+diff --git a/libarchive/archive_write_set_format_pax.c b/libarchive/archive_write_set_format_pax.c
+index 0eaf733..4863e46 100644
+--- a/libarchive/archive_write_set_format_pax.c
++++ b/libarchive/archive_write_set_format_pax.c
+@@ -522,11 +522,13 @@ add_pax_acl(struct archive_write *a,
+ 		    ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT, "%s %s %s",
+ 		    "Can't translate ", attr, " to UTF-8");
+ 		return(ARCHIVE_WARN);
+-	} else if (*p != '\0') {
++	}
++
++	if (*p != '\0') {
+ 		add_pax_attr(&(pax->pax_header),
+ 		    attr, p);
+-		free(p);
+ 	}
++	free(p);
+ 	return(ARCHIVE_OK);
+ }
+ 
+diff --git a/libarchive/archive_write_set_format_xar.c b/libarchive/archive_write_set_format_xar.c
+index 495f0d4..56cd33c 100644
+--- a/libarchive/archive_write_set_format_xar.c
++++ b/libarchive/archive_write_set_format_xar.c
+@@ -2120,10 +2120,10 @@ file_gen_utility_names(struct archive_write *a, struct file *file)
+ 		if (p[0] == '/') {
+ 			if (p[1] == '/')
+ 				/* Convert '//' --> '/' */
+-				strcpy(p, p+1);
++				memmove(p, p+1, strlen(p+1) + 1);
+ 			else if (p[1] == '.' && p[2] == '/')
+ 				/* Convert '/./' --> '/' */
+-				strcpy(p, p+2);
++				memmove(p, p+2, strlen(p+2) + 1);
+ 			else if (p[1] == '.' && p[2] == '.' && p[3] == '/') {
+ 				/* Convert 'dir/dir1/../dir2/'
+ 				 *     --> 'dir/dir2/'
+@@ -3169,8 +3169,10 @@ save_xattrs(struct archive_write *a, struct file *file)
+ 			checksum_update(&(xar->a_sumwrk),
+ 			    xar->wbuff, size);
+ 			if (write_to_temp(a, xar->wbuff, size)
+-			    != ARCHIVE_OK)
+-				return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
++			    != ARCHIVE_OK) {
++					free(heap);
++					return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
++			}
+ 			if (r == ARCHIVE_OK) {
+ 				xar->stream.next_out = xar->wbuff;
+ 				xar->stream.avail_out = sizeof(xar->wbuff);
+-- 
+2.17.1
+
diff --git a/SOURCES/fix-use-after-free-in-delayed-newc.patch b/SOURCES/fix-use-after-free-in-delayed-newc.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2534d32
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/fix-use-after-free-in-delayed-newc.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+From 6a71cce7ed735f83f9a6a6bad8beaa47f8d14734 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Ondrej Dubaj <odubaj@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 27 May 2019 10:06:14 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 1/2] Fix use-after-free in delayed link processing (newc
+ format)
+
+During archiving, if some of the "delayed" hard link entries
+happened to disappear on filesystem (or become unreadable) for
+some reason (most probably race), the old code free()d the 'entry'
+and continued with the loop;  the next loop though dereferenced
+'entry' and crashed the archiver.
+
+Per report from Coverity.
+---
+ tar/write.c | 9 ++++-----
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/tar/write.c b/tar/write.c
+index 9c24566..3970de2 100644
+--- a/tar/write.c
++++ b/tar/write.c
+@@ -540,8 +540,7 @@ write_archive(struct archive *a, struct bsdtar *bsdtar)
+ 			lafe_warnc(archive_errno(disk),
+ 			    "%s", archive_error_string(disk));
+ 			bsdtar->return_value = 1;
+-			archive_entry_free(entry);
+-			continue;
++			goto next_entry;
+ 		}
+ 
+ 		/*
+@@ -559,13 +558,13 @@ write_archive(struct archive *a, struct bsdtar *bsdtar)
+ 				bsdtar->return_value = 1;
+ 			else
+ 				archive_read_close(disk);
+-			archive_entry_free(entry);
+-			continue;
++			goto next_entry;
+ 		}
+ 
+ 		write_file(bsdtar, a, entry);
+-		archive_entry_free(entry);
+ 		archive_read_close(disk);
++next_entry:
++		archive_entry_free(entry);
+ 		entry = NULL;
+ 		archive_entry_linkify(bsdtar->resolver, &entry, &sparse_entry);
+ 	}
+-- 
+2.17.1
+
+
+From a999ca882aeb8fce4f4f2ee1317f528984b47e8e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Ondrej Dubaj <odubaj@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 27 May 2019 10:34:48 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 2/2] call missing archive_read_close() in write_archive()
+
+---
+ tar/write.c | 3 +--
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/tar/write.c b/tar/write.c
+index 3970de2..63c619c 100644
+--- a/tar/write.c
++++ b/tar/write.c
+@@ -556,8 +556,7 @@ write_archive(struct archive *a, struct bsdtar *bsdtar)
+ 			    "%s", archive_error_string(disk));
+ 			if (r == ARCHIVE_FATAL)
+ 				bsdtar->return_value = 1;
+-			else
+-				archive_read_close(disk);
++			archive_read_close(disk);
+ 			goto next_entry;
+ 		}
+ 
+-- 
+2.17.1
+
diff --git a/SOURCES/libarchive-3.1.2-CVE-2017-14503.patch b/SOURCES/libarchive-3.1.2-CVE-2017-14503.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..deebbed
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/libarchive-3.1.2-CVE-2017-14503.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+From 2c8c83b9731ff822fad6cc8c670ea5519c366a14 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Joerg Sonnenberger <joerg@bec.de>
+Date: Thu, 19 Jul 2018 21:14:53 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Reject LHA archive entries with negative size.
+
+---
+ libarchive/archive_read_support_format_lha.c | 6 ++++++
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_lha.c b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_lha.c
+index b8ef4ae1..95c99bb1 100644
+--- a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_lha.c
++++ b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_lha.c
+@@ -701,6 +701,12 @@ archive_read_format_lha_read_header(struct archive_read *a,
+ 	 * Prepare variables used to read a file content.
+ 	 */
+ 	lha->entry_bytes_remaining = lha->compsize;
++	if (lha->entry_bytes_remaining < 0) {
++		archive_set_error(&a->archive,
++		    ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
++		    "Invalid LHa entry size");
++		return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
++	}
+ 	lha->entry_offset = 0;
+ 	lha->entry_crc_calculated = 0;
+ 
+-- 
+2.20.1
+
diff --git a/SOURCES/libarchive-3.1.2-CVE-2019-1000019.patch b/SOURCES/libarchive-3.1.2-CVE-2019-1000019.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f05595e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/libarchive-3.1.2-CVE-2019-1000019.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+From 65a23f5dbee4497064e9bb467f81138a62b0dae1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
+Date: Tue, 1 Jan 2019 16:01:40 +1100
+Subject: [PATCH 2/2] 7zip: fix crash when parsing certain archives
+
+Fuzzing with CRCs disabled revealed that a call to get_uncompressed_data()
+would sometimes fail to return at least 'minimum' bytes. This can cause
+the crc32() invocation in header_bytes to read off into invalid memory.
+
+A specially crafted archive can use this to cause a crash.
+
+An ASAN trace is below, but ASAN is not required - an uninstrumented
+binary will also crash.
+
+==7719==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x631000040000 (pc 0x7fbdb3b3ec1d bp 0x7ffe77a51310 sp 0x7ffe77a51150 T0)
+==7719==The signal is caused by a READ memory access.
+    #0 0x7fbdb3b3ec1c in crc32_z (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libz.so.1+0x2c1c)
+    #1 0x84f5eb in header_bytes (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x84f5eb)
+    #2 0x856156 in read_Header (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x856156)
+    #3 0x84e134 in slurp_central_directory (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x84e134)
+    #4 0x849690 in archive_read_format_7zip_read_header (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x849690)
+    #5 0x5713b7 in _archive_read_next_header2 (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x5713b7)
+    #6 0x570e63 in _archive_read_next_header (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x570e63)
+    #7 0x6f08bd in archive_read_next_header (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x6f08bd)
+    #8 0x52373f in read_archive (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x52373f)
+    #9 0x5257be in tar_mode_x (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x5257be)
+    #10 0x51daeb in main (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x51daeb)
+    #11 0x7fbdb27cab96 in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-OTsEL5/glibc-2.27/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:310
+    #12 0x41dd09 in _start (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x41dd09)
+
+This was primarly done with afl and FairFuzz. Some early corpus entries
+may have been generated by qsym.
+---
+ libarchive/archive_read_support_format_7zip.c | 8 +-------
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 7 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_7zip.c b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_7zip.c
+index bccbf896..b6d1505d 100644
+--- a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_7zip.c
++++ b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_7zip.c
+@@ -2964,13 +2964,7 @@ get_uncompressed_data(struct archive_read *a, const void **buff, size_t size,
+ 	if (zip->codec == _7Z_COPY && zip->codec2 == (unsigned long)-1) {
+ 		/* Copy mode. */
+ 
+-		/*
+-		 * Note: '1' here is a performance optimization.
+-		 * Recall that the decompression layer returns a count of
+-		 * available bytes; asking for more than that forces the
+-		 * decompressor to combine reads by copying data.
+-		 */
+-		*buff = __archive_read_ahead(a, 1, &bytes_avail);
++		*buff = __archive_read_ahead(a, minimum, &bytes_avail);
+ 		if (bytes_avail <= 0) {
+ 			archive_set_error(&a->archive,
+ 			    ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
+-- 
+2.20.1
+
diff --git a/SOURCES/libarchive-3.1.2-CVE-2019-1000020.patch b/SOURCES/libarchive-3.1.2-CVE-2019-1000020.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b314520
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/libarchive-3.1.2-CVE-2019-1000020.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+From 8312eaa576014cd9b965012af51bc1f967b12423 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
+Date: Tue, 1 Jan 2019 17:10:49 +1100
+Subject: [PATCH 1/2] iso9660: Fail when expected Rockridge extensions is
+ missing
+
+A corrupted or malicious ISO9660 image can cause read_CE() to loop
+forever.
+
+read_CE() calls parse_rockridge(), expecting a Rockridge extension
+to be read. However, parse_rockridge() is structured as a while
+loop starting with a sanity check, and if the sanity check fails
+before the loop has run, the function returns ARCHIVE_OK without
+advancing the position in the file. This causes read_CE() to retry
+indefinitely.
+
+Make parse_rockridge() return ARCHIVE_WARN if it didn't read an
+extension. As someone with no real knowledge of the format, this
+seems more apt than ARCHIVE_FATAL, but both the call-sites escalate
+it to a fatal error immediately anyway.
+
+Found with a combination of AFL, afl-rb (FairFuzz) and qsym.
+---
+ libarchive/archive_read_support_format_iso9660.c | 11 ++++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_iso9660.c b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_iso9660.c
+index 28acfefb..bad8f1df 100644
+--- a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_iso9660.c
++++ b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_iso9660.c
+@@ -2102,6 +2102,7 @@ parse_rockridge(struct archive_read *a, struct file_info *file,
+     const unsigned char *p, const unsigned char *end)
+ {
+ 	struct iso9660 *iso9660;
++	int entry_seen = 0;
+ 
+ 	iso9660 = (struct iso9660 *)(a->format->data);
+ 
+@@ -2257,8 +2258,16 @@ parse_rockridge(struct archive_read *a, struct file_info *file,
+ 		}
+ 
+ 		p += p[2];
++		entry_seen = 1;
++	}
++
++	if (entry_seen)
++		return (ARCHIVE_OK);
++	else {
++		archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
++				  "Tried to parse Rockridge extensions, but none found");
++		return (ARCHIVE_WARN);
+ 	}
+-	return (ARCHIVE_OK);
+ }
+ 
+ static int
+-- 
+2.20.1
+
diff --git a/SOURCES/libarchive-3.3.2-CVE-2018-1000877.patch b/SOURCES/libarchive-3.3.2-CVE-2018-1000877.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e980aa6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/libarchive-3.3.2-CVE-2018-1000877.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+From 88311f46cdfc719d26bb99d3b47944eb92ceae02 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Ondrej Dubaj <odubaj@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 30 Apr 2019 11:50:33 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Avoid a double-free when a window size of 0 is specified
+
+new_size can be 0 with a malicious or corrupted RAR archive.
+
+realloc(area, 0) is equivalent to free(area), so the region would
+be free()d here and the free()d again in the cleanup function.
+
+Found with a setup running AFL, afl-rb, and qsym.
+---
+ libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c | 5 +++++
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c
+index c4a8278..3f88eef 100644
+--- a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c
++++ b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c
+@@ -2317,6 +2317,11 @@ parse_codes(struct archive_read *a)
+       new_size = DICTIONARY_MAX_SIZE;
+     else
+       new_size = rar_fls((unsigned int)rar->unp_size) << 1;
++    if (new_size == 0) {
++    archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
++                      "Zero window size is invalid.");
++    return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
++    }
+     new_window = realloc(rar->lzss.window, new_size);
+     if (new_window == NULL) {
+       archive_set_error(&a->archive, ENOMEM,
+-- 
+2.17.1
+
diff --git a/SOURCES/libarchive-3.3.2-CVE-2018-1000878.patch b/SOURCES/libarchive-3.3.2-CVE-2018-1000878.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2736827
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/libarchive-3.3.2-CVE-2018-1000878.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+From d00ccaf8c20efbd009964e3e2697d26907d14163 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Ondrej Dubaj <odubaj@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 30 Apr 2019 11:36:08 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] rar: file split across multi-part archives must match
+
+Fuzzing uncovered some UAF and memory overrun bugs where a file in a
+single file archive reported that it was split across multiple
+volumes. This was caused by ppmd7 operations calling
+rar_br_fillup. This would invoke rar_read_ahead, which would in some
+situations invoke archive_read_format_rar_read_header.  That would
+check the new file name against the old file name, and if they didn't
+match up it would free the ppmd7 buffer and allocate a new
+one. However, because the ppmd7 decoder wasn't actually done with the
+buffer, it would continue to used the freed buffer. Both reads and
+writes to the freed region can be observed.
+
+This is quite tricky to solve: once the buffer has been freed it is
+too late, as the ppmd7 decoder functions almost universally assume
+success - there's no way for ppmd_read to signal error, nor are there
+good ways for functions like Range_Normalise to propagate them. So we
+can't detect after the fact that we're in an invalid state - e.g. by
+checking rar->cursor, we have to prevent ourselves from ever ending up
+there. So, when we are in the dangerous part or rar_read_ahead that
+assumes a valid split, we set a flag force read_header to either go
+down the path for split files or bail. This means that the ppmd7
+decoder keeps a valid buffer and just runs out of data.
+
+Found with a combination of AFL, afl-rb and qsym.
+---
+ libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c | 9 +++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c
+index cbb14c3..c4a8278 100644
+--- a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c
++++ b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c
+@@ -258,6 +258,7 @@ struct rar
+   struct data_block_offsets *dbo;
+   unsigned int cursor;
+   unsigned int nodes;
++  char filename_must_match;
+ 
+   /* LZSS members */
+   struct huffman_code maincode;
+@@ -1570,6 +1571,12 @@ read_header(struct archive_read *a, struct archive_entry *entry,
+     }
+     return ret;
+   }
++  else if (rar->filename_must_match)
++  {
++    archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
++      "Mismatch of file parts split across multi-volume archive");
++    return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
++  }
+ 
+   rar->filename_save = (char*)realloc(rar->filename_save,
+                                       filename_size + 1);
+@@ -2938,12 +2945,14 @@ rar_read_ahead(struct archive_read *a, size_t min, ssize_t *avail)
+     else if (*avail == 0 && rar->main_flags & MHD_VOLUME &&
+       rar->file_flags & FHD_SPLIT_AFTER)
+     {
++      rar->filename_must_match = 1;
+       ret = archive_read_format_rar_read_header(a, a->entry);
+       if (ret == (ARCHIVE_EOF))
+       {
+         rar->has_endarc_header = 1;
+         ret = archive_read_format_rar_read_header(a, a->entry);
+       }
++      rar->filename_must_match = 0;
+       if (ret != (ARCHIVE_OK))
+         return NULL;
+       return rar_read_ahead(a, min, avail);
+-- 
+2.17.1
+
diff --git a/SPECS/libarchive.spec b/SPECS/libarchive.spec
index 0014fb5..977d6e2 100644
--- a/SPECS/libarchive.spec
+++ b/SPECS/libarchive.spec
@@ -2,13 +2,21 @@
 
 Name:           libarchive
 Version:        3.3.2
-Release:        3%{?dist}
+Release:        7%{?dist}
 Summary:        A library for handling streaming archive formats
 
 License:        BSD
 URL:            http://www.libarchive.org/
 Source0:        http://www.libarchive.org/downloads/%{name}-%{version}.tar.gz
 
+Patch0:        libarchive-3.1.2-CVE-2017-14503.patch
+Patch1:        libarchive-3.1.2-CVE-2019-1000019.patch
+Patch2:        libarchive-3.1.2-CVE-2019-1000020.patch
+Patch3:        libarchive-3.3.2-CVE-2018-1000878.patch
+Patch4:        libarchive-3.3.2-CVE-2018-1000877.patch
+Patch5:        fix-use-after-free-in-delayed-newc.patch
+Patch6:        fix-few-obvious-resource-leaks-covscan.patch
+
 BuildRequires:  gcc
 BuildRequires:  bison
 BuildRequires:  sharutils
@@ -211,6 +219,22 @@ run_testsuite
 
 
 %changelog
+* Mon May 27 2019 Ondrej Dubaj <odubaj@redhat.com> - 3.3.2-7
+- fix use-after-free in delayed newc link processing (#1602575)
+- fix a few obvious resource leaks and strcpy() misuses (#1602575)
+
+* Tue Apr 30 2019 Ondrej Dubaj <odubaj@redhat.com> - 3.3.2-6
+- fixed use after free in RAR decoder (#1700752)
+- fixed double free in RAR decoder (#1700753)
+
+* Tue Apr 02 2019 Ondrej Dubaj <odubaj@redhat.com> - 3.3.2-5
+- release bump due to gating (#1680768)
+
+* Fri Feb 22 2019 Pavel Raiskup <praiskup@redhat.com> - 3.3.2-4
+- fix out-of-bounds read within lha_read_data_none() (CVE-2017-14503)
+- fix crash on crafted 7zip archives (CVE-2019-1000019)
+- fix infinite loop in ISO9660 (CVE-2019-1000020)
+
 * Wed Jul 18 2018 Pavel Raiskup <praiskup@redhat.com> - 3.3.2-3
 - drop use of %%ldconfig_scriptlets