Blame SOURCES/ksh-20120801-cve-2019-14868.patch

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diff --git a/src/cmd/ksh93/sh/arith.c b/src/cmd/ksh93/sh/arith.c
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--- a/src/cmd/ksh93/sh/arith.c
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+++ b/src/cmd/ksh93/sh/arith.c
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@@ -513,21 +513,34 @@ Sfdouble_t sh_strnum(register const char *str, char** ptr, int mode)
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 	char base=(shp->inarith?0:10), *last;
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 	if(*str==0)
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 	{
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-		if(ptr)
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-			*ptr = (char*)str;
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-		return(0);
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-	}
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-	errno = 0;
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-	d = strtonll(str,&last,&base,-1);
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-	if(*last || errno)
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-	{
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-		if(!last || *last!='.' || last[1]!='.')
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-			d = strval(shp,str,&last,arith,mode);
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-		if(!ptr && *last && mode>0)
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-			errormsg(SH_DICT,ERROR_exit(1),e_lexbadchar,*last,str);
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+		d = 0.0;
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+		last = (char*)str;
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+	} else {
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+		errno = 0;
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+		d = strtonll(str,&last,&base,-1);
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+		if (*last && !shp->inarith && sh_isstate(SH_INIT)) {
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+			// This call is to handle "base#value" literals if we're importing untrusted env vars.
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+			errno = 0;
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+			d = strtonll(str, &last, NULL, -1);
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+		}
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+
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+		if(*last || errno)
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+		{
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+			if (sh_isstate(SH_INIT)) {
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+				// Initializing means importing untrusted env vars. Since the string does not appear
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+				// to be a recognized numeric literal give up. We can't safely call strval() since
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+				// that allows arbitrary expressions which would create a security vulnerability.
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+				d = 0.0;
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+			} else {
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+				if(!last || *last!='.' || last[1]!='.')
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+					d = strval(shp,str,&last,arith,mode);
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+				if(!ptr && *last && mode>0)
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+					errormsg(SH_DICT,ERROR_exit(1),e_lexbadchar,*last,str);
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+			}
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+		} else if (!d && *str=='-') {
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+			d = -0.0;
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+		}
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 	}
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-	else if (!d && *str=='-')
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-		d = -0.0;
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 	if(ptr)
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 		*ptr = last;
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 	return(d);