From 4f14a2f48b52e59c472847a5522fd0cf52927755 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alexander Scheel Date: Fri, 30 Jun 2017 16:03:01 -0400 Subject: [PATCH] Refactor krb5 GSS checksum handling Separate out checksum handling from kg_accept_krb5() into a new helper process_checksum(). [ghudson@mit.edu: simplified checksum processing and made it use k5-input.h instead of TREAD_ macros; moved more flag handling into helper] [iboukris: adjusted helper function arguments, allowing access to the full authenticator for subsequent changes] (cherry picked from commit 64d56233f9816a2a93f6e8d3030c8ed6ce397735) [rharwood@redhat.com: problem with typo fix commit, I think] (cherry picked from commit a34b7c50e62c19f80d39ece6a72017dac781df64) --- src/lib/gssapi/krb5/accept_sec_context.c | 383 +++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 179 insertions(+), 204 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/accept_sec_context.c b/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/accept_sec_context.c index c5bddb1e8..70dd7fc0c 100644 --- a/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/accept_sec_context.c +++ b/src/lib/gssapi/krb5/accept_sec_context.c @@ -98,6 +98,7 @@ */ #include "k5-int.h" +#include "k5-input.h" #include "gssapiP_krb5.h" #ifdef HAVE_MEMORY_H #include @@ -413,6 +414,174 @@ kg_process_extension(krb5_context context, return code; } +/* The length of the MD5 channel bindings in an 0x8003 checksum */ +#define CB_MD5_LEN 16 + +/* The minimum length of an 0x8003 checksum value (4-byte channel bindings + * length, 16-byte channel bindings, 4-byte flags) */ +#define MIN_8003_LEN (4 + CB_MD5_LEN + 4) + +/* The flags we accept from the initiator's authenticator checksum. */ +#define INITIATOR_FLAGS (GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG | GSS_C_CONF_FLAG | \ + GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG | GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG | \ + GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG | GSS_C_DCE_STYLE | \ + GSS_C_IDENTIFY_FLAG | GSS_C_EXTENDED_ERROR_FLAG) + +/* + * The krb5 GSS mech appropriates the authenticator checksum field from RFC + * 4120 to store structured data instead of a checksum, indicated with checksum + * type 0x8003 (see RFC 4121 section 4.1.1). Some implementations instead send + * no checksum, or a regular checksum over empty data. + * + * Interpret the checksum. Read delegated creds into *deleg_out if it is not + * NULL. Set *flags_out to the allowed subset of token flags, plus + * GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG if a delegated credential was present. Process any + * extensions found using exts. On error, set *code_out to a krb5_error code + * for use as a minor status value. + */ +static OM_uint32 +process_checksum(OM_uint32 *minor_status, krb5_context context, + gss_channel_bindings_t acceptor_cb, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, krb5_flags ap_req_options, + krb5_authenticator *authenticator, krb5_gss_ctx_ext_t exts, + krb5_gss_cred_id_t *deleg_out, krb5_ui_4 *flags_out, + krb5_error_code *code_out) +{ + krb5_error_code code = 0; + OM_uint32 status, option_id, token_flags; + size_t cb_len, option_len; + krb5_boolean valid; + krb5_key subkey; + krb5_data option, empty = empty_data(); + krb5_checksum cb_cksum; + const uint8_t *token_cb, *option_bytes; + struct k5input in; + const krb5_checksum *cksum = authenticator->checksum; + + cb_cksum.contents = NULL; + + if (cksum == NULL) { + /* + * Some SMB client implementations use handcrafted GSSAPI code that + * does not provide a checksum. MS-KILE documents that the Microsoft + * implementation considers a missing checksum acceptable; the server + * assumes all flags are unset in this case, and does not check channel + * bindings. + */ + *flags_out = 0; + } else if (cksum->checksum_type != CKSUMTYPE_KG_CB) { + /* Samba sends a regular checksum. */ + code = krb5_auth_con_getkey_k(context, auth_context, &subkey); + if (code) { + status = GSS_S_FAILURE; + goto fail; + } + + /* Verifying the checksum ensures that this authenticator wasn't + * replayed from one with a checksum over actual data. */ + code = krb5_k_verify_checksum(context, subkey, + KRB5_KEYUSAGE_AP_REQ_AUTH_CKSUM, &empty, + cksum, &valid); + krb5_k_free_key(context, subkey); + if (code || !valid) { + status = GSS_S_BAD_SIG; + goto fail; + } + + /* Use ap_options from the request to guess the mutual flag. */ + *flags_out = GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG | GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG; + if (ap_req_options & AP_OPTS_MUTUAL_REQUIRED) + *flags_out |= GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG; + } else { + /* The checksum must contain at least a fixed 24-byte part. */ + if (cksum->length < MIN_8003_LEN) { + status = GSS_S_BAD_BINDINGS; + goto fail; + } + + k5_input_init(&in, cksum->contents, cksum->length); + cb_len = k5_input_get_uint32_le(&in); + if (cb_len != CB_MD5_LEN) { + code = KG_BAD_LENGTH; + status = GSS_S_FAILURE; + goto fail; + } + + token_cb = k5_input_get_bytes(&in, cb_len); + if (acceptor_cb != GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS) { + code = kg_checksum_channel_bindings(context, acceptor_cb, + &cb_cksum); + if (code) { + status = GSS_S_BAD_BINDINGS; + goto fail; + } + assert(cb_cksum.length == cb_len); + if (k5_bcmp(token_cb, cb_cksum.contents, cb_len) != 0) { + status = GSS_S_BAD_BINDINGS; + goto fail; + } + } + + /* Read the token flags and accept some of them as context flags. */ + token_flags = k5_input_get_uint32_le(&in); + *flags_out = token_flags & INITIATOR_FLAGS; + + /* Read the delegated credential if present. */ + if (in.len >= 4 && (token_flags & GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG)) { + option_id = k5_input_get_uint16_le(&in); + option_len = k5_input_get_uint16_le(&in); + option_bytes = k5_input_get_bytes(&in, option_len); + option = make_data((uint8_t *)option_bytes, option_len); + if (in.status) { + code = KG_BAD_LENGTH; + status = GSS_S_FAILURE; + goto fail; + } + if (option_id != KRB5_GSS_FOR_CREDS_OPTION) { + status = GSS_S_FAILURE; + goto fail; + } + + /* Store the delegated credential. */ + code = rd_and_store_for_creds(context, auth_context, &option, + deleg_out); + if (code) { + status = GSS_S_FAILURE; + goto fail; + } + *flags_out |= GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG; + } + + /* Process any extensions at the end of the checksum. Extensions use + * 4-byte big-endian tag and length instead of 2-byte little-endian. */ + while (in.len > 0) { + option_id = k5_input_get_uint32_be(&in); + option_len = k5_input_get_uint32_be(&in); + option_bytes = k5_input_get_bytes(&in, option_len); + option = make_data((uint8_t *)option_bytes, option_len); + if (in.status) { + code = KG_BAD_LENGTH; + status = GSS_S_FAILURE; + goto fail; + } + + code = kg_process_extension(context, auth_context, option_id, + &option, exts); + if (code) { + status = GSS_S_FAILURE; + goto fail; + } + } + } + + status = GSS_S_COMPLETE; + +fail: + free(cb_cksum.contents); + *code_out = code; + return status; +} + static OM_uint32 kg_accept_krb5(minor_status, context_handle, verifier_cred_handle, input_token, @@ -433,17 +602,13 @@ kg_accept_krb5(minor_status, context_handle, krb5_gss_ctx_ext_t exts; { krb5_context context; - unsigned char *ptr, *ptr2; + unsigned char *ptr; char *sptr; - OM_uint32 tmp; - size_t md5len; krb5_gss_cred_id_t cred = 0; krb5_data ap_rep, ap_req; - unsigned int i; krb5_error_code code; krb5_address addr, *paddr; krb5_authenticator *authdat = 0; - krb5_checksum reqcksum; krb5_gss_name_t name = NULL; krb5_ui_4 gss_flags = 0; krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *ctx = NULL; @@ -451,8 +616,6 @@ kg_accept_krb5(minor_status, context_handle, gss_buffer_desc token; krb5_auth_context auth_context = NULL; krb5_ticket * ticket = NULL; - int option_id; - krb5_data option; const gss_OID_desc *mech_used = NULL; OM_uint32 major_status = GSS_S_FAILURE; OM_uint32 tmp_minor_status; @@ -463,7 +626,6 @@ kg_accept_krb5(minor_status, context_handle, krb5int_access kaccess; int cred_rcache = 0; int no_encap = 0; - int token_deleg_flag = 0; krb5_flags ap_req_options = 0; krb5_enctype negotiated_etype; krb5_authdata_context ad_context = NULL; @@ -489,7 +651,6 @@ kg_accept_krb5(minor_status, context_handle, output_token->length = 0; output_token->value = NULL; token.value = 0; - reqcksum.contents = 0; ap_req.data = 0; ap_rep.data = 0; @@ -654,195 +815,16 @@ kg_accept_krb5(minor_status, context_handle, krb5_auth_con_getauthenticator(context, auth_context, &authdat); - if (authdat->checksum == NULL) { - /* - * Some SMB client implementations use handcrafted GSSAPI code that - * does not provide a checksum. MS-KILE documents that the Microsoft - * implementation considers a missing checksum acceptable; the server - * assumes all flags are unset in this case, and does not check channel - * bindings. - */ - gss_flags = 0; - } else if (authdat->checksum->checksum_type != CKSUMTYPE_KG_CB) { - /* Samba does not send 0x8003 GSS-API checksums */ - krb5_boolean valid; - krb5_key subkey; - krb5_data zero; + major_status = process_checksum(minor_status, context, input_chan_bindings, + auth_context, ap_req_options, + authdat, exts, + delegated_cred_handle ? &deleg_cred : NULL, + &gss_flags, &code); - code = krb5_auth_con_getkey_k(context, auth_context, &subkey); - if (code) { - major_status = GSS_S_FAILURE; - goto fail; - } + if (major_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE) + goto fail; - zero.length = 0; - zero.data = ""; - - code = krb5_k_verify_checksum(context, - subkey, - KRB5_KEYUSAGE_AP_REQ_AUTH_CKSUM, - &zero, - authdat->checksum, - &valid); - krb5_k_free_key(context, subkey); - if (code || !valid) { - major_status = GSS_S_BAD_SIG; - goto fail; - } - - /* Use ap_options from the request to guess the mutual flag. */ - gss_flags = GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG | GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG; - if (ap_req_options & AP_OPTS_MUTUAL_REQUIRED) - gss_flags |= GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG; - } else { - /* gss krb5 v1 */ - - /* stash this now, for later. */ - code = krb5_c_checksum_length(context, CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD5, &md5len); - if (code) { - major_status = GSS_S_FAILURE; - goto fail; - } - - /* verify that the checksum is correct */ - - /* - The checksum may be either exactly 24 bytes, in which case - no options are specified, or greater than 24 bytes, in which case - one or more options are specified. Currently, the only valid - option is KRB5_GSS_FOR_CREDS_OPTION ( = 1 ). - */ - - if ((authdat->checksum->checksum_type != CKSUMTYPE_KG_CB) || - (authdat->checksum->length < 24)) { - code = 0; - major_status = GSS_S_BAD_BINDINGS; - goto fail; - } - - ptr = (unsigned char *) authdat->checksum->contents; - - TREAD_INT(ptr, tmp, 0); - - if (tmp != md5len) { - code = KG_BAD_LENGTH; - major_status = GSS_S_FAILURE; - goto fail; - } - - /* - The following section of code attempts to implement the - optional channel binding facility as described in RFC2743. - - Since this facility is optional channel binding may or may - not have been provided by either the client or the server. - - If the server has specified input_chan_bindings equal to - GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS then we skip the check. If - the server does provide channel bindings then we compute - a checksum and compare against those provided by the - client. */ - - if ((code = kg_checksum_channel_bindings(context, - input_chan_bindings, - &reqcksum))) { - major_status = GSS_S_BAD_BINDINGS; - goto fail; - } - - /* Always read the clients bindings - eventhough we might ignore them */ - TREAD_STR(ptr, ptr2, reqcksum.length); - - if (input_chan_bindings != GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS ) { - if (memcmp(ptr2, reqcksum.contents, reqcksum.length) != 0) { - xfree(reqcksum.contents); - reqcksum.contents = 0; - code = 0; - major_status = GSS_S_BAD_BINDINGS; - goto fail; - } - - } - - xfree(reqcksum.contents); - reqcksum.contents = 0; - - /* Read the token flags. Remember if GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG was set, but - * mask it out until we actually read a delegated credential. */ - TREAD_INT(ptr, gss_flags, 0); - token_deleg_flag = (gss_flags & GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG); - gss_flags &= ~GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG; - - /* if the checksum length > 24, there are options to process */ - - i = authdat->checksum->length - 24; - if (i && token_deleg_flag) { - if (i >= 4) { - TREAD_INT16(ptr, option_id, 0); - TREAD_INT16(ptr, option.length, 0); - i -= 4; - - if (i < option.length) { - code = KG_BAD_LENGTH; - major_status = GSS_S_FAILURE; - goto fail; - } - - /* have to use ptr2, since option.data is wrong type and - macro uses ptr as both lvalue and rvalue */ - - TREAD_STR(ptr, ptr2, option.length); - option.data = (char *) ptr2; - - i -= option.length; - - if (option_id != KRB5_GSS_FOR_CREDS_OPTION) { - major_status = GSS_S_FAILURE; - goto fail; - } - - /* store the delegated credential */ - - code = rd_and_store_for_creds(context, auth_context, &option, - (delegated_cred_handle) ? - &deleg_cred : NULL); - if (code) { - major_status = GSS_S_FAILURE; - goto fail; - } - - gss_flags |= GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG; - } /* if i >= 4 */ - /* ignore any additional trailing data, for now */ - } - while (i > 0) { - /* Process Type-Length-Data options */ - if (i < 8) { - code = KG_BAD_LENGTH; - major_status = GSS_S_FAILURE; - goto fail; - } - TREAD_INT(ptr, option_id, 1); - TREAD_INT(ptr, option.length, 1); - i -= 8; - if (i < option.length) { - code = KG_BAD_LENGTH; - major_status = GSS_S_FAILURE; - goto fail; - } - TREAD_STR(ptr, ptr2, option.length); - option.data = (char *)ptr2; - - i -= option.length; - - code = kg_process_extension(context, auth_context, - option_id, &option, exts); - if (code != 0) { - major_status = GSS_S_FAILURE; - goto fail; - } - } - } + major_status = GSS_S_FAILURE; if (exts->iakerb.conv && !exts->iakerb.verified) { major_status = GSS_S_BAD_SIG; @@ -869,12 +851,7 @@ kg_accept_krb5(minor_status, context_handle, ctx->mech_used = (gss_OID) mech_used; ctx->auth_context = auth_context; ctx->initiate = 0; - ctx->gss_flags = (GSS_C_TRANS_FLAG | - ((gss_flags) & (GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG | GSS_C_CONF_FLAG | - GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG | GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG | - GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG | GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG | - GSS_C_DCE_STYLE | GSS_C_IDENTIFY_FLAG | - GSS_C_EXTENDED_ERROR_FLAG))); + ctx->gss_flags = gss_flags | GSS_C_TRANS_FLAG; ctx->seed_init = 0; ctx->cred_rcache = cred_rcache; @@ -1161,8 +1138,6 @@ fail: krb5_auth_con_free(context, auth_context); } - if (reqcksum.contents) - xfree(reqcksum.contents); if (ap_rep.data) krb5_free_data_contents(context, &ap_rep); if (major_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE ||