From c493242c56b0beb5984f41b25cdace9938132fe4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: CentOS Sources Date: Jan 23 2023 14:32:07 +0000 Subject: import keylime-6.5.1-1.el9_1.4 --- diff --git a/SOURCES/0001-ima-Fix-log-evaluation-on-quick-succession-execution.patch b/SOURCES/0001-ima-Fix-log-evaluation-on-quick-succession-execution.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5e56e39 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0001-ima-Fix-log-evaluation-on-quick-succession-execution.patch @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ +From de8bbb63dca836bcf07586186218c3227749d2e7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Stefan Berger +Date: Fri, 4 Nov 2022 11:20:15 -0400 +Subject: [PATCH] ima: Fix log evaluation on quick-succession execution of + scripts + +In case the attested-to host quickly executes files measured by IMA we may +run into the case that the keylime agent retrieved the state of the PCR at +'state n' but then IMA appended the log with several entries leading to a +log representing 'state n + x' (with x>=1), which may not just be the +previously anticipated single additional entry (state n+1). Therefore, +remove the check for the number of entries in the log and always compare +the running_hash that iterative attestation was resumed with against the +provided PCR value from 'state n'. + +Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger +--- + keylime/ima/ima.py | 8 +++++--- + 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/keylime/ima/ima.py b/keylime/ima/ima.py +index b88b1af..c4c2ae6 100644 +--- a/keylime/ima/ima.py ++++ b/keylime/ima/ima.py +@@ -299,9 +299,11 @@ def _process_measurement_list( + + # Iterative attestation may send us no log [len(lines) == 1]; compare last know PCR 10 state + # against current PCR state. +- # Since IMA log append and PCR extend is not atomic, we may get a quote that does not yet take +- # into account the next appended measurement's [len(lines) == 2] PCR extension. +- if not found_pcr and len(lines) <= 2: ++ # Since IMA's append to the log and PCR extend as well as Keylime's retrieval of the quote, reading ++ # of PCR 10 and retrieval of the log are not atomic, we may get a quote that does not yet take into ++ # account the next-appended measurements' [len(lines) >= 2] PCR extension(s). In fact, the value of ++ # the PCR may lag the log by several entries. ++ if not found_pcr: + found_pcr = running_hash == pcrval_bytes + + for linenum, line in enumerate(lines): +-- +2.37.3 + diff --git a/SOURCES/0002-tpm_bootlog_enrich-Get-DevicePath-length-from-Length.patch b/SOURCES/0002-tpm_bootlog_enrich-Get-DevicePath-length-from-Length.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..922be54 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0002-tpm_bootlog_enrich-Get-DevicePath-length-from-Length.patch @@ -0,0 +1,70 @@ +From 2fee03637d3a1d0c9c004b958af69f4b0e4b57f3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Anderson Toshiyuki Sasaki +Date: Fri, 4 Nov 2022 17:41:31 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 2/2] tpm_bootlog_enrich: Get DevicePath length from + LengthOfDevicePath + +In enrich_device_path(), get the length of DevicePath from the field +LengthOfDevicePath instead of calculating the length from the bytes +array. + +This avoids a segmentation fault when processing the measured boot event +log in create_mb_refstate script. + +This is called for the events "EV_EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_APPLICATION", +"EV_EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DRIVER", and "EV_EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DRIVER". + +Fixes: #1153 + +Signed-off-by: Anderson Toshiyuki Sasaki +--- + keylime/tpm_bootlog_enrich.py | 11 ++++++----- + 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/keylime/tpm_bootlog_enrich.py b/keylime/tpm_bootlog_enrich.py +index ef8e9f7..621bc67 100644 +--- a/keylime/tpm_bootlog_enrich.py ++++ b/keylime/tpm_bootlog_enrich.py +@@ -46,14 +46,14 @@ yaml.add_representer(hexint, representer) + efivarlib_functions = CDLL(config.LIBEFIVAR) + + +-def getDevicePath(b): +- ret = efivarlib_functions.efidp_format_device_path(0, 0, b, len(b)) ++def getDevicePath(b, l): ++ ret = efivarlib_functions.efidp_format_device_path(0, 0, b, l) + if ret < 0: + raise Exception(f"getDevicePath: efidp_format_device_path({b}) returned {ret}") + + s = create_string_buffer(ret + 1) + +- ret = efivarlib_functions.efidp_format_device_path(s, ret + 1, b, len(b)) ++ ret = efivarlib_functions.efidp_format_device_path(s, ret + 1, b, l) + if ret < 0: + raise Exception(f"getDevicePath: efidp_format_device_path({b}) returned {ret}") + +@@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ def getVar(event, b): + c = w.decode("utf-16", errors="ignore") + description += c + r["Description"] = description +- devicePath = getDevicePath(b[i:]) ++ devicePath = getDevicePath(b[i:], len(b[i:])) + r["DevicePath"] = devicePath + return r + return None +@@ -184,10 +184,11 @@ def enrich_device_path(d: dict) -> None: + if isinstance(d.get("DevicePath"), str): + try: + b = bytes.fromhex(d["DevicePath"]) ++ l = int(d["LengthOfDevicePath"]) + except Exception: + return + try: +- p = getDevicePath(b) ++ p = getDevicePath(b, l) + # Deal with garbage devicePath + except Exception: + return +-- +2.38.1 + diff --git a/SOURCES/0003-Backport-upsteam-PR-1156.patch b/SOURCES/0003-Backport-upsteam-PR-1156.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..60e0f4e --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0003-Backport-upsteam-PR-1156.patch @@ -0,0 +1,672 @@ +From 57c67e2b359e9544ecd5a0ba264adf7aa7c67991 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: rpm-build +Date: Mon, 14 Nov 2022 21:47:40 -0300 +Subject: [PATCH 3/3] Backport upsteam PR#1156 + +From: https://github.com/keylime/keylime/pull/1156 + +We had partially addressed the issue we encountered when parsing some +certificates with python-cryptography by writing cert_utils module that +provided a single helper to parse the pubkey from a certificate. + +However, we still were doing the EK validation in tpm_main using +python-cryptography, which means we would fall into the same parsing +problem again, since during the validation it would read all the certs +in the tpm cert store to check if it is signing the presented EK. + +We address this issue by moving the EK cert verification to cert_utils: +we use the same approach as before, i.e. we parse the cert with pyasn1 +when python-cryptography fails, and then use python-cryptography to do +the actual signature verification, as before. + +By moving the method to cert_utils, it also becomes simpler to test it, +so in this commit we more tests to verify the methods work as expected. + +Additionally, the updated EK verification is also capable of handling +ECDSA signatures +--- + keylime.conf | 2 + + keylime/cert_utils.py | 144 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- + keylime/registrar_common.py | 7 +- + keylime/tenant.py | 21 ++---- + keylime/tpm/tpm_main.py | 47 +----------- + keylime/tpm_ek_ca.py | 10 +-- + scripts/ek-openssl-verify | 98 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ + test/run_tests.sh | 8 +- + test/test_cert_utils.py | 142 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- + 9 files changed, 380 insertions(+), 99 deletions(-) + create mode 100755 scripts/ek-openssl-verify + +diff --git a/keylime.conf b/keylime.conf +index 331e57a..d896f9f 100644 +--- a/keylime.conf ++++ b/keylime.conf +@@ -501,6 +501,8 @@ require_ek_cert = True + # PROVKEYS - contains a json document containing EK, EKcert, and AIK from the + # provider. EK and AIK are in PEM format. The EKcert is in base64 encoded + # DER format. ++# TPM_CERT_STORE - contains the path to the TPM certificates store, e.g.: ++# "/var/lib/keylime/tpm_cert_store". + # + # Set to blank to disable this check. See warning above if require_ek_cert + # is "False". +diff --git a/keylime/cert_utils.py b/keylime/cert_utils.py +index d014aed..d2fc54d 100644 +--- a/keylime/cert_utils.py ++++ b/keylime/cert_utils.py +@@ -1,13 +1,143 @@ +-from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.serialization import load_der_public_key ++import io ++import os.path ++import subprocess ++import sys ++ ++from cryptography import exceptions as crypto_exceptions ++from cryptography import x509 ++from cryptography.hazmat.backends import default_backend ++from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import ec, padding ++from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric.ec import EllipticCurvePublicKey ++from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric.rsa import RSAPublicKey + from pyasn1.codec.der import decoder, encoder +-from pyasn1_modules import rfc2459 ++from pyasn1_modules import pem, rfc2459 + ++from keylime import config, keylime_logging, tpm_ek_ca + + # Issue #944 -- python-cryptography won't parse malformed certs, + # such as some Nuvoton ones we have encountered in the field. + # Unfortunately, we still have to deal with such certs anyway. +-# Let's read the EK cert with pyasn1 instead of python-cryptography. +-def read_x509_der_cert_pubkey(der_cert_data): +- """Returns the public key of a DER-encoded X.509 certificate""" +- der509 = decoder.decode(der_cert_data, asn1Spec=rfc2459.Certificate())[0] +- return load_der_public_key(encoder.encode(der509["tbsCertificate"]["subjectPublicKeyInfo"])) ++ ++# Here we provide some helpers that use pyasn1 to parse the certificates ++# when parsing them with python-cryptography fails, and in this case, we ++# try to read the parsed certificate again into python-cryptograhy. ++ ++logger = keylime_logging.init_logging("cert_utils") ++ ++ ++def x509_der_cert(der_cert_data: bytes): ++ """Load an x509 certificate provided in DER format ++ :param der_cert_data: the DER bytes of the certificate ++ :type der_cert_data: bytes ++ :returns: cryptography.x509.Certificate ++ """ ++ try: ++ return x509.load_der_x509_certificate(data=der_cert_data, backend=default_backend()) ++ except Exception as e: ++ logger.warning("Failed to parse DER data with python-cryptography: %s", e) ++ pyasn1_cert = decoder.decode(der_cert_data, asn1Spec=rfc2459.Certificate())[0] ++ return x509.load_der_x509_certificate(data=encoder.encode(pyasn1_cert), backend=default_backend()) ++ ++ ++def x509_pem_cert(pem_cert_data: str): ++ """Load an x509 certificate provided in PEM format ++ :param pem_cert_data: the base-64 encoded PEM certificate ++ :type pem_cert_data: str ++ :returns: cryptography.x509.Certificate ++ """ ++ try: ++ return x509.load_pem_x509_certificate(data=pem_cert_data.encode("utf-8"), backend=default_backend()) ++ except Exception as e: ++ logger.warning("Failed to parse PEM data with python-cryptography: %s", e) ++ # Let's read the DER bytes from the base-64 PEM. ++ der_data = pem.readPemFromFile(io.StringIO(pem_cert_data)) ++ # Now we can load it as we do in x509_der_cert(). ++ pyasn1_cert = decoder.decode(der_data, asn1Spec=rfc2459.Certificate())[0] ++ return x509.load_der_x509_certificate(data=encoder.encode(pyasn1_cert), backend=default_backend()) ++ ++ ++def verify_ek(ekcert, tpm_cert_store=config.get("tenant", "tpm_cert_store")): ++ """Verify that the provided EK certificate is signed by a trusted root ++ :param ekcert: The Endorsement Key certificate in DER format ++ :returns: True if the certificate can be verified, False otherwise ++ """ ++ try: ++ trusted_certs = tpm_ek_ca.cert_loader(tpm_cert_store) ++ except Exception as e: ++ logger.warning("Error loading trusted certificates from the TPM cert store: %s", e) ++ return False ++ ++ try: ++ ek509 = x509_der_cert(ekcert) ++ for cert_file, pem_cert in trusted_certs.items(): ++ signcert = x509_pem_cert(pem_cert) ++ if ek509.issuer != signcert.subject: ++ continue ++ ++ signcert_pubkey = signcert.public_key() ++ try: ++ if isinstance(signcert_pubkey, RSAPublicKey): ++ signcert_pubkey.verify( ++ ek509.signature, ++ ek509.tbs_certificate_bytes, ++ padding.PKCS1v15(), ++ ek509.signature_hash_algorithm, ++ ) ++ elif isinstance(signcert_pubkey, EllipticCurvePublicKey): ++ signcert_pubkey.verify( ++ ek509.signature, ++ ek509.tbs_certificate_bytes, ++ ec.ECDSA(ek509.signature_hash_algorithm), ++ ) ++ else: ++ logger.warning("Unsupported public key type: %s", type(signcert_pubkey)) ++ continue ++ except crypto_exceptions.InvalidSignature: ++ continue ++ ++ logger.debug("EK cert matched cert: %s", cert_file) ++ return True ++ except Exception as e: ++ # Log the exception so we don't lose the raw message ++ logger.exception(e) ++ raise Exception("Error processing ek/ekcert. Does this TPM have a valid EK?").with_traceback(sys.exc_info()[2]) ++ ++ logger.error("No Root CA matched EK Certificate") ++ return False ++ ++ ++def verify_ek_script(script, env, cwd): ++ if script is None: ++ logger.warning("External check script (%s) not specified", script) ++ return False ++ ++ script_path = os.path.abspath(script) ++ if not os.path.isfile(script_path): ++ if cwd is None or not os.path.isfile(os.path.abspath(os.path.join(cwd, script))): ++ logger.warning("External check script (%s) not found; please make sure its path is correct", script) ++ return False ++ script_path = os.path.abspath(os.path.join(cwd, script)) ++ ++ try: ++ proc = subprocess.run( ++ [script_path], ++ env=env, ++ shell=False, ++ cwd=cwd, ++ stderr=subprocess.STDOUT, ++ stdout=subprocess.PIPE, ++ check=False, ++ ) ++ if proc.returncode != 0: ++ errmsg = "" ++ if proc.stdout is not None: ++ errmsg = proc.stdout.decode("utf-8") ++ logger.error("External check script failed to validate EK: %s", errmsg) ++ return False ++ logger.debug("External check script successfully to validated EK") ++ if proc.stdout is not None: ++ logger.info("ek_check output: %s", proc.stdout.decode("utf-8")) ++ except subprocess.CalledProcessError as e: ++ logger.error("Error while trying to run external check script to validate EK: %s", e) ++ return False ++ return True +diff --git a/keylime/registrar_common.py b/keylime/registrar_common.py +index 2c32d19..fb37e5b 100644 +--- a/keylime/registrar_common.py ++++ b/keylime/registrar_common.py +@@ -261,11 +261,8 @@ class UnprotectedHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler, SessionManager): + # Note, we don't validate the EKCert here, other than the implicit + # "is it a valid x509 cert" check. So it's still untrusted. + # This will be validated by the tenant. +- ek_tpm = base64.b64encode( +- tpm2_objects.ek_low_tpm2b_public_from_pubkey( +- cert_utils.read_x509_der_cert_pubkey(base64.b64decode(ekcert)) +- ) +- ).decode() ++ cert = cert_utils.x509_der_cert(base64.b64decode(ekcert)) ++ ek_tpm = base64.b64encode(tpm2_objects.ek_low_tpm2b_public_from_pubkey(cert.public_key())).decode() + + aik_attrs = tpm2_objects.get_tpm2b_public_object_attributes( + base64.b64decode(aik_tpm), +diff --git a/keylime/tenant.py b/keylime/tenant.py +index cc53623..dd9c09c 100644 +--- a/keylime/tenant.py ++++ b/keylime/tenant.py +@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ import io + import json + import logging + import os +-import subprocess + import sys + import tempfile + import time +@@ -15,7 +14,7 @@ import requests + from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import serialization as crypto_serialization + + from keylime import api_version as keylime_api_version +-from keylime import ca_util, config, crypto, keylime_logging, registrar_client, signing, web_util ++from keylime import ca_util, cert_utils, config, crypto, keylime_logging, registrar_client, signing, web_util + from keylime.agentstates import AgentAttestState + from keylime.cli import options, policies + from keylime.cmd import user_data_encrypt +@@ -516,19 +515,11 @@ class Tenant: + env["EK_CERT"] = "" + + env["PROVKEYS"] = json.dumps(self.registrar_data.get("provider_keys", {})) +- with subprocess.Popen( +- script, env=env, shell=True, cwd=config.WORK_DIR, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.STDOUT +- ) as proc: +- retval = proc.wait() +- if retval != 0: +- raise UserError("External check script failed to validate EK") +- logger.debug("External check script successfully to validated EK") +- while True: +- line = proc.stdout.readline().decode() +- if line == "": +- break +- logger.debug("ek_check output: %s", line.strip()) +- return True ++ ++ # Define the TPM cert store for the external script. ++ env["TPM_CERT_STORE"] = config.get("tenant", "tpm_cert_store") ++ ++ return cert_utils.verify_ek_script(script, env, config.WORK_DIR) + + def do_cv(self): + """Initiate v, agent_id and ip and initiate the cloudinit sequence""" +diff --git a/keylime/tpm/tpm_main.py b/keylime/tpm/tpm_main.py +index 7bab4fd..35f0a2f 100644 +--- a/keylime/tpm/tpm_main.py ++++ b/keylime/tpm/tpm_main.py +@@ -12,14 +12,10 @@ import time + import typing + import zlib + +-from cryptography import exceptions as crypto_exceptions +-from cryptography import x509 +-from cryptography.hazmat.backends import default_backend + from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import serialization as crypto_serialization +-from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import padding + from packaging.version import Version + +-from keylime import cmd_exec, config, keylime_logging, secure_mount, tpm_ek_ca ++from keylime import cert_utils, cmd_exec, config, keylime_logging, secure_mount + from keylime.agentstates import TPMClockInfo + from keylime.common import algorithms, retry + from keylime.failure import Component, Failure +@@ -785,46 +781,7 @@ class tpm(tpm_abstract.AbstractTPM): + :param ekcert: The Endorsement Key certificate in DER format + :returns: True if the certificate can be verified, false otherwise + """ +- # openssl x509 -inform der -in certificate.cer -out certificate.pem +- try: +- tpm_ek_ca.check_tpm_cert_store() +- +- ek509 = x509.load_der_x509_certificate( +- data=ekcert, +- backend=default_backend(), +- ) +- +- trusted_certs = tpm_ek_ca.cert_loader() +- for cert in trusted_certs: +- signcert = x509.load_pem_x509_certificate( +- data=cert.encode(), +- backend=default_backend(), +- ) +- +- if ek509.issuer.rfc4514_string() != signcert.subject.rfc4514_string(): +- continue +- +- try: +- signcert.public_key().verify( +- ek509.signature, +- ek509.tbs_certificate_bytes, +- padding.PKCS1v15(), +- ek509.signature_hash_algorithm, +- ) +- except crypto_exceptions.InvalidSignature: +- continue +- +- logger.debug("EK cert matched cert: %s", cert) +- return True +- except Exception as e: +- # Log the exception so we don't lose the raw message +- logger.exception(e) +- raise Exception("Error processing ek/ekcert. Does this TPM have a valid EK?").with_traceback( +- sys.exc_info()[2] +- ) +- +- logger.error("No Root CA matched EK Certificate") +- return False ++ return cert_utils.verify_ek(ekcert) + + def get_tpm_manufacturer(self, output=None): + vendorStr = None +diff --git a/keylime/tpm_ek_ca.py b/keylime/tpm_ek_ca.py +index 3695f0b..fb66c07 100644 +--- a/keylime/tpm_ek_ca.py ++++ b/keylime/tpm_ek_ca.py +@@ -7,8 +7,7 @@ logger = keylime_logging.init_logging("tpm_ek_ca") + trusted_certs = {} + + +-def check_tpm_cert_store(): +- tpm_cert_store = config.get("tenant", "tpm_cert_store") ++def check_tpm_cert_store(tpm_cert_store=config.get("tenant", "tpm_cert_store")): + if not os.path.isdir(tpm_cert_store): + logger.error("The directory %s does not exist.", tpm_cert_store) + raise Exception(f"The directory {tpm_cert_store} does not exist.") +@@ -21,11 +20,10 @@ def check_tpm_cert_store(): + raise Exception(f"The directory {tpm_cert_store} does not contain " f"any .pem files") + + +-def cert_loader(): +- tpm_cert_store = config.get("tenant", "tpm_cert_store") ++def cert_loader(tpm_cert_store=config.get("tenant", "tpm_cert_store")): + file_list = glob.glob(os.path.join(tpm_cert_store, "*.pem")) +- my_trusted_certs = [] ++ my_trusted_certs = {} + for file_path in file_list: + with open(file_path, encoding="utf-8") as f_input: +- my_trusted_certs.append(f_input.read()) ++ my_trusted_certs[file_path] = f_input.read() + return my_trusted_certs +diff --git a/scripts/ek-openssl-verify b/scripts/ek-openssl-verify +new file mode 100755 +index 0000000..f91e9b5 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/scripts/ek-openssl-verify +@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@ ++#!/bin/sh ++ ++# This script can be used as the `ek_check_script' (tenant configuration), ++# to attempt to verify a provided EK_CERT via env var using openssl. ++ ++# EK - contains a PEM-encoded version of the public EK ++# EK_CERT - contains a base64 DER-encoded EK certificate if one is ++# available. ++# PROVKEYS - contains a json document containing EK, EKcert, and AIK ++# from the provider. EK and AIK are in PEM format. The ++# EKcert is in base64-encoded DER format ++# TPM_CERT_STORE - contains the path of the TPM certificate store. ++EK=${EK:-} ++EK_CERT=${EK_CERT:-} ++PROVKEYS=${PROVKEYS:-} ++ ++EK_VERIFICATION_LOG=${EK_VERIFICATION_LOG:-/var/log/keylime/ek-verification.log} ++LOG="${EK_VERIFICATION_LOG}" ++ ++# Setting log fallback in case we cannot write to the specified file. ++touch "${LOG}" 2>/dev/null || LOG=/dev/stderr ++ ++log() { ++ _stderr=${2:-} ++ echo "[$(date)] ${1}" >&2 >> "${LOG}" ++ [ -n "${_stderr}" ] && [ "${LOG}" != '/dev/stderr' ] && echo "${1}" >&2 ++} ++ ++die() { ++ log "ERROR: ${1}" _ ++ exit 1 ++} ++ ++command -v openssl >/dev/null \ ++ || die "openssl CLI was not found in the PATH; please make sure it is installed" ++ ++[ -n "${EK_CERT}" ] || die "EK_CERT was not provided as an env var" ++ ++# Cert store directory. If one is not provided via TPM_CERT_STORE env var, ++# we start by attempting to read tenant.conf. ++CERT_STORE=${TPM_CERT_STORE:-} ++ ++if [ -z "${CERT_STORE}" ]; then ++ KEYLIME_CONFIG_DIR=${KEYLIME_CONFIG_DIR:-/etc/keylime} ++ [ -d "${KEYLIME_CONFIG_DIR}" ] \ ++ || die "KEYLIME_CONFIG_DIR (${KEYLIME_CONFIG_DIR}) does not seem to exist" ++ ++ if [ -r "${KEYLIME_CONFIG_DIR}"/tenant.conf ]; then ++ CERT_STORE="$(grep -w ^tpm_cert_store "${KEYLIME_CONFIG_DIR}"/tenant.conf \ ++ | tail -1 | cut -d'=' -f2 | tr -d "[:blank:]")" ++ fi ++ ++ # Next we try to read any snippets in tenant.conf.d/ ++ if [ -d "${KEYLIME_CONFIG_DIR}"/tenant.conf.d ]; then ++ for _s in "${KEYLIME_CONFIG_DIR}"/tenant.conf.d/*.conf; do ++ [ -e "${_s}" ] || continue ++ _store="$(grep -w ^tpm_cert_store "${_s}" \ ++ | tail -1 | cut -d'=' -f2 | tr -d "[:blank:]")" ++ [ -n "${_store}" ] && CERT_STORE="${_store}" ++ done ++ fi ++fi ++ ++[ -n "${CERT_STORE}" ] \ ++ || die "It was not possible to determine the TPM cert store dir from tenant.conf or tenant.conf.d/ snippets" ++[ -d "${CERT_STORE}" ] \ ++ || die "TPM cert store is not a valid directory (${CERT_STORE})" ++ ++EK_VERIFICATION_TMPDIR= ++ek_verification_cleanup() { ++ [ -d "${EK_VERIFICATION_TMPDIR}" ] || return 0 ++ rm -rf "${EK_VERIFICATION_TMPDIR}" ++} ++trap ek_verification_cleanup EXIT ++ ++mkdir -p "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}" ++EK_VERIFICATION_TMPDIR="$(mktemp -d)" || \ ++ die "Creating a temp dir for EK verification failed" ++ ++EK_CERT_FILE_DER="${EK_VERIFICATION_TMPDIR}"/ek.der ++EK_CERT_FILE_PEM="${EK_VERIFICATION_TMPDIR}"/ek.pem ++ ++printf '%s' "${EK_CERT}" > "${EK_CERT_FILE_DER}".b64 ++base64 -d "${EK_CERT_FILE_DER}".b64 > "${EK_CERT_FILE_DER}" ++openssl x509 -inform der -in "${EK_CERT_FILE_DER}" > "${EK_CERT_FILE_PEM}" ++ ++for c in "${CERT_STORE}"/*.pem; do ++ [ -e "${c}" ] || continue ++ log "Checking if ${c} is the issuer of EK cert..." ++ if openssl verify -partial_chain -CAfile "${c}" "${EK_CERT_FILE_PEM}" \ ++ >>"${LOG}" 2>>"${LOG}"; then ++ log "${EK_CERT} successfully verified by $(basename "${c}")" _ ++ exit 0 ++ fi ++done ++ ++die "EK signature did not match certificates from TPM cert store" ++# vim:set ts=2 sw=2 et: +diff --git a/test/run_tests.sh b/test/run_tests.sh +index fc43113..81a6dff 100755 +--- a/test/run_tests.sh ++++ b/test/run_tests.sh +@@ -107,19 +107,19 @@ fi + # Set correct dependencies + # Fedora + if [ $PACKAGE_MGR = "dnf" ]; then +- PYTHON_PREIN="python3" ++ PYTHON_PREIN="python3 openssl" + PYTHON_DEPS="python3-pip python3-dbus" + # RHEL / CentOS etc + elif [ $PACKAGE_MGR = "yum" ]; then +- PYTHON_PREIN="epel-release python36" ++ PYTHON_PREIN="epel-release python36 openssl" + PYTHON_DEPS="python36-pip python36-dbus" + # Ubuntu / Debian + elif [ $PACKAGE_MGR = "apt-get" ]; then +- PYTHON_PREIN="python3" ++ PYTHON_PREIN="python3 openssl" + PYTHON_DEPS="python3-pip python3-dbus" + # SUSE + elif [ $PACKAGE_MGR = "zypper" ]; then +- PYTHON_PREIN="python3" ++ PYTHON_PREIN="python3 openssl" + PYTHON_DEPS="python3-pip python3-dbus" + else + echo "No recognized package manager found on this system!" 1>&2 +diff --git a/test/test_cert_utils.py b/test/test_cert_utils.py +index 4666c0f..bdf6090 100644 +--- a/test/test_cert_utils.py ++++ b/test/test_cert_utils.py +@@ -4,17 +4,19 @@ Copyright 2022 Red Hat, Inc. + """ + + import base64 ++import os + import unittest + +-from keylime import cert_utils ++import cryptography + ++from keylime import cert_utils, tpm_ek_ca + +-class Cert_Utils_Test(unittest.TestCase): +- def test_read_x509_der_cert_pubkey(self): +- # The certificate listed in issue #944, from Nuvoton. It fails to +- # be parsed by python-cryptography with the following error: +- # ValueError: error parsing asn1 value: ParseError { kind: InvalidSetOrdering, location: ["RawCertificate::tbs_cert", "TbsCertificate::issuer", "0", "2"] } +- nuvoton_ecdsa_sha256_der = """\ ++CERT_STORE_DIR = os.path.abspath(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), "..", "tpm_cert_store")) ++ ++# The certificate listed in issue #944, from Nuvoton. It fails to ++# be parsed by python-cryptography with the following error: ++# ValueError: error parsing asn1 value: ParseError { kind: InvalidSetOrdering, location: ["RawCertificate::tbs_cert", "TbsCertificate::issuer", "0", "2"] } ++nuvoton_ecdsa_sha256_der = """\ + MIICBjCCAaygAwIBAgIIP5MvnZk8FrswCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIwVTFTMB8GA1UEAxMYTnV2b3RvbiBU + UE0gUm9vdCBDQSAyMTEwMCUGA1UEChMeTnV2b3RvbiBUZWNobm9sb2d5IENvcnBvcmF0aW9uMAkG + A1UEBhMCVFcwHhcNMTUxMDE5MDQzMjAwWhcNMzUxMDE1MDQzMjAwWjBVMVMwHwYDVQQDExhOdXZv +@@ -26,10 +28,10 @@ ajW+9zAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBSfu3mqD1JieL7RUJKacXHpajW+9zAKBggqhkjOPQQDAgNIADBFAiEA + /jiywhOKpiMOUnTfDmXsXfDFokhKVNTXB6Xtqm7J8L4CICjT3/Y+rrSnf8zrBXqWeHDh8Wi41+w2 + ppq6Ev9orZFI + """ +- # This cert from STMicroelectronics presents a different issue when +- # parsed by python-cryptography: +- # ValueError: error parsing asn1 value: ParseError { kind: ExtraData } +- st_sha256_with_rsa_der = """\ ++# This cert from STMicroelectronics presents a different issue when ++# parsed by python-cryptography: ++# ValueError: error parsing asn1 value: ParseError { kind: ExtraData } ++st_sha256_with_rsa_der = """\ + MIIEjTCCA3WgAwIBAgIUTL0P5h7nYu2yjVCyaPw1hv89XoIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQAwVTELMAkG + A1UEBhMCQ0gxHjAcBgNVBAoTFVNUTWljcm9lbGVjdHJvbmljcyBOVjEmMCQGA1UEAxMdU1RNIFRQ + TSBFSyBJbnRlcm1lZGlhdGUgQ0EgMDUwHhcNMTgwNzExMDAwMDAwWhcNMjgwNzExMDAwMDAwWjAA +@@ -60,10 +62,116 @@ rTJ1x4NA2ZtQMYyT29Yy1UlkjocAaXL5u0m3Hvz///////////////////////////////////// + //////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// + /////w== + """ +- certs = [nuvoton_ecdsa_sha256_der, st_sha256_with_rsa_der] +- for c in certs: ++ ++st_ecdsa_sha256_der = """\ ++MIIDAzCCAqmgAwIBAgIUIymn2ai+UaVx1bM26/wU7I+sJd8wCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIwVjELMAkGA1UE ++BhMCQ0gxHjAcBgNVBAoTFVNUTWljcm9lbGVjdHJvbmljcyBOVjEnMCUGA1UEAxMeU1RNIFRQTSBF ++Q0MgSW50ZXJtZWRpYXRlIENBIDAxMB4XDTE4MDcyNjAwMDAwMFoXDTI4MDcyNjAwMDAwMFowADBZ ++MBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHA0IABBsTz5y2cedVZxG/GsbXQ9bL6EQylWNjx1b/SSp2EHlN ++aJjtn43iz2zb+qot2UOhQIwPxS5hMCXhasw4XsFXgnijggGpMIIBpTAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBR+uDbO +++9+KY3H/czP5utcUYWyWyzBCBgNVHSAEOzA5MDcGBFUdIAAwLzAtBggrBgEFBQcCARYhaHR0cDov ++L3d3dy5zdC5jb20vVFBNL3JlcG9zaXRvcnkvMFkGA1UdEQEB/wRPME2kSzBJMRYwFAYFZ4EFAgEM ++C2lkOjUzNTQ0RDIwMRcwFQYFZ4EFAgIMDFNUMzNIVFBIQUhCNDEWMBQGBWeBBQIDDAtpZDowMDQ5 ++MDAwNDBmBgNVHQkEXzBdMBYGBWeBBQIQMQ0wCwwDMi4wAgEAAgF0MEMGBWeBBQISMTowOAIBAAEB ++/6ADCgEBoQMKAQCiAwoBAKMQMA4WAzMuMQoBBAoBAgEB/6QPMA0WBTE0MC0yCgECAQEAMAwGA1Ud ++EwEB/wQCMAAwEAYDVR0lBAkwBwYFZ4EFCAEwDgYDVR0PAQH/BAQDAgMIMEsGCCsGAQUFBwEBBD8w ++PTA7BggrBgEFBQcwAoYvaHR0cDovL3NlY3VyZS5nbG9iYWxzaWduLmNvbS9zdG10cG1lY2NpbnQw ++MS5jcnQwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIDSAAwRQIgcNiZkn7poyk6J8Y1Cnwz4nV7YGPb5pBesBg6bk9n6KIC ++IQCE/jkHb/aPP/T3GtfLNHAdHL4JnofAbsDEuLQxAseeZA== ++""" ++ ++ ++def has_strict_x509_parsing(): ++ """Indicates whether python-cryptography has strict x509 parsing.""" ++ ++ # Major release where python-cryptography started being strict ++ # when parsing x509 certificates. ++ PYCRYPTO_STRICT_X509_MAJOR = 35 ++ return int(cryptography.__version__.split(".", maxsplit=1)[0]) >= PYCRYPTO_STRICT_X509_MAJOR ++ ++ ++def expectedFailureIf(condition): ++ """The test is marked as an expectedFailure if the condition is satisfied.""" ++ ++ def wrapper(func): ++ if condition: ++ return unittest.expectedFailure(func) ++ return func ++ ++ return wrapper ++ ++ ++class Cert_Utils_Test(unittest.TestCase): ++ def test_tpm_cert_store(self): ++ tpm_ek_ca.check_tpm_cert_store(CERT_STORE_DIR) ++ my_trusted_certs = tpm_ek_ca.cert_loader(CERT_STORE_DIR) ++ ++ self.assertNotEqual(len(my_trusted_certs), 0) ++ ++ def test_cert_store_certs(self): ++ my_trusted_certs = tpm_ek_ca.cert_loader(CERT_STORE_DIR) ++ for fname, pem_cert in my_trusted_certs.items(): + try: +- pubkey = cert_utils.read_x509_der_cert_pubkey(base64.b64decode(c)) +- except Exception: +- self.fail("read_x509_der_cert_pubkey() is not expected to raise an exception here") +- self.assertIsNotNone(pubkey) ++ cert = cert_utils.x509_pem_cert(pem_cert) ++ except Exception as e: ++ self.fail(f"Failed to load certificate {fname}: {e}") ++ self.assertIsNotNone(cert) ++ ++ def test_verify_ek(self): ++ tests = [ ++ {"cert": st_sha256_with_rsa_der, "expected": True}, # RSA, signed by STM_RSA_05I.pem. ++ {"cert": st_ecdsa_sha256_der, "expected": True}, # ECC, signed by STM_ECC_01I.pem. ++ ] ++ for t in tests: ++ self.assertEqual( ++ cert_utils.verify_ek(base64.b64decode(t["cert"]), CERT_STORE_DIR), ++ t["expected"], ++ msg=f"Test failed for cert {t['cert']}; expected: {t['expected']}", ++ ) ++ ++ @expectedFailureIf(has_strict_x509_parsing()) ++ def test_verify_ek_expected_failures(self): ++ # The following certificates are not compliant, and will fail the ++ # signature verification with python-cryptography, even though they ++ # should validate. Marking as expected failure for now. ++ tests = [ ++ {"cert": nuvoton_ecdsa_sha256_der, "expected": True}, # ECC, signed by NUVO_2110.pem. ++ ] ++ for t in tests: ++ self.assertEqual( ++ cert_utils.verify_ek(base64.b64decode(t["cert"]), CERT_STORE_DIR), ++ t["expected"], ++ msg=f"Test failed for cert {t['cert']}; expected: {t['expected']}", ++ ) ++ ++ def test_verify_ek_script(self): ++ # We will be using `nuvoton_ecdsa_sha256_der', which is signed by ++ # NUVO_2110.pem but fails verification when using python-cryptography ++ # as it is a malformed cert -- it is the same one we use in ++ # test_verify_ek_expected_failures(). ++ # With an external script `ek_script_check' that uses openssl, the ++ # validation works. ++ cert = nuvoton_ecdsa_sha256_der.replace("\n", "") ++ ++ self.assertFalse(cert_utils.verify_ek_script(None, None, None)) ++ self.assertFalse(cert_utils.verify_ek_script("/foo/bar", None, None)) ++ ++ script = os.path.abspath(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), "..", "scripts", "ek-openssl-verify")) ++ # Testing ek-openssl-verify script, but without specifying the ++ # EK_CERT env var. ++ self.assertFalse(cert_utils.verify_ek_script(script, None, None)) ++ ++ # Now let's specify the EK_CERT. ++ env = os.environ.copy() ++ env["EK_CERT"] = cert ++ env["TPM_CERT_STORE"] = os.path.abspath(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), "..", "tpm_cert_store")) ++ self.assertTrue(cert_utils.verify_ek_script(script, env, None)) ++ ++ # Now, let us specify the ek_check_script with a relative path. ++ script = "ek-openssl-verify" ++ cwd = os.path.abspath(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), "..", "scripts")) ++ self.assertTrue(cert_utils.verify_ek_script(script, env, cwd)) ++ ++ # And now we try a bad TPM cert store. ++ env["TPM_CERT_STORE"] = "/some/bad/directory" ++ self.assertFalse(cert_utils.verify_ek_script(script, env, cwd)) +-- +2.38.1 + diff --git a/SOURCES/0004-Do-not-use-default-values-that-need-reading-the-conf.patch b/SOURCES/0004-Do-not-use-default-values-that-need-reading-the-conf.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..54324d3 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0004-Do-not-use-default-values-that-need-reading-the-conf.patch @@ -0,0 +1,130 @@ +From 76cbd7bbcce1793db9a3d64d962cfdb518ef4eff Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sergio Correia +Date: Tue, 15 Nov 2022 07:09:13 -0300 +Subject: [PATCH 4/4] Do not use default values that need reading the config in + methods + +Following up from the recent refactoring that moved the EK validation +to cert_utils, in a few places were added default method values that +were reading the configuration files directly. + +It was not such a great idea becasue it then made those config files as +required to even import the modules. + +Example "from keylime import cert_utils" now also requires that the +tenant configuration be available for getting the path for the TPM +cert store. + +Let's stop doing that. + +Signed-off-by: Sergio Correia +--- + keylime/cert_utils.py | 5 +++-- + keylime/tenant.py | 2 +- + keylime/tpm/tpm_abstract.py | 2 +- + keylime/tpm/tpm_main.py | 4 ++-- + keylime/tpm_ek_ca.py | 6 +++--- + 5 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/keylime/cert_utils.py b/keylime/cert_utils.py +index d2fc54d..3576c64 100644 +--- a/keylime/cert_utils.py ++++ b/keylime/cert_utils.py +@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric.rsa import RSAPublicKey + from pyasn1.codec.der import decoder, encoder + from pyasn1_modules import pem, rfc2459 + +-from keylime import config, keylime_logging, tpm_ek_ca ++from keylime import keylime_logging, tpm_ek_ca + + # Issue #944 -- python-cryptography won't parse malformed certs, + # such as some Nuvoton ones we have encountered in the field. +@@ -56,9 +56,10 @@ def x509_pem_cert(pem_cert_data: str): + return x509.load_der_x509_certificate(data=encoder.encode(pyasn1_cert), backend=default_backend()) + + +-def verify_ek(ekcert, tpm_cert_store=config.get("tenant", "tpm_cert_store")): ++def verify_ek(ekcert: bytes, tpm_cert_store: str) -> bool: + """Verify that the provided EK certificate is signed by a trusted root + :param ekcert: The Endorsement Key certificate in DER format ++ :param tpm_cert_store: The path for the TPM certificate store + :returns: True if the certificate can be verified, False otherwise + """ + try: +diff --git a/keylime/tenant.py b/keylime/tenant.py +index dd9c09c..118f8c4 100644 +--- a/keylime/tenant.py ++++ b/keylime/tenant.py +@@ -430,7 +430,7 @@ class Tenant: + elif ekcert is None: + logger.warning("No EK cert provided, require_ek_cert option in config set to True") + return False +- elif not self.tpm_instance.verify_ek(base64.b64decode(ekcert)): ++ elif not self.tpm_instance.verify_ek(base64.b64decode(ekcert), config.get("tenant", "tpm_cert_store")): + logger.warning("Invalid EK certificate") + return False + +diff --git a/keylime/tpm/tpm_abstract.py b/keylime/tpm/tpm_abstract.py +index ff41837..df6222c 100644 +--- a/keylime/tpm/tpm_abstract.py ++++ b/keylime/tpm/tpm_abstract.py +@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ class AbstractTPM(metaclass=ABCMeta): + pass + + @abstractmethod +- def verify_ek(self, ekcert): ++ def verify_ek(self, ekcert, tpm_cert_store): + pass + + @abstractmethod +diff --git a/keylime/tpm/tpm_main.py b/keylime/tpm/tpm_main.py +index 35f0a2f..09af0d0 100644 +--- a/keylime/tpm/tpm_main.py ++++ b/keylime/tpm/tpm_main.py +@@ -776,12 +776,12 @@ class tpm(tpm_abstract.AbstractTPM): + os.remove(sesspath) + return key + +- def verify_ek(self, ekcert): ++ def verify_ek(self, ekcert, tpm_cert_store): + """Verify that the provided EK certificate is signed by a trusted root + :param ekcert: The Endorsement Key certificate in DER format + :returns: True if the certificate can be verified, false otherwise + """ +- return cert_utils.verify_ek(ekcert) ++ return cert_utils.verify_ek(ekcert, tpm_cert_store) + + def get_tpm_manufacturer(self, output=None): + vendorStr = None +diff --git a/keylime/tpm_ek_ca.py b/keylime/tpm_ek_ca.py +index fb66c07..bc84571 100644 +--- a/keylime/tpm_ek_ca.py ++++ b/keylime/tpm_ek_ca.py +@@ -1,13 +1,13 @@ + import glob + import os + +-from keylime import config, keylime_logging ++from keylime import keylime_logging + + logger = keylime_logging.init_logging("tpm_ek_ca") + trusted_certs = {} + + +-def check_tpm_cert_store(tpm_cert_store=config.get("tenant", "tpm_cert_store")): ++def check_tpm_cert_store(tpm_cert_store): + if not os.path.isdir(tpm_cert_store): + logger.error("The directory %s does not exist.", tpm_cert_store) + raise Exception(f"The directory {tpm_cert_store} does not exist.") +@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ def check_tpm_cert_store(tpm_cert_store=config.get("tenant", "tpm_cert_store")): + raise Exception(f"The directory {tpm_cert_store} does not contain " f"any .pem files") + + +-def cert_loader(tpm_cert_store=config.get("tenant", "tpm_cert_store")): ++def cert_loader(tpm_cert_store): + file_list = glob.glob(os.path.join(tpm_cert_store, "*.pem")) + my_trusted_certs = {} + for file_path in file_list: +-- +2.38.1 + diff --git a/SPECS/keylime.spec b/SPECS/keylime.spec index 43b6b51..7708fcd 100644 --- a/SPECS/keylime.spec +++ b/SPECS/keylime.spec @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ Name: keylime Version: 6.5.1 -Release: 1%{?dist} +Release: 1%{?dist}.4 Summary: Open source TPM software for Bootstrapping and Maintaining Trust URL: https://github.com/keylime/keylime @@ -18,6 +18,11 @@ Source2: %{srcname}.te Source3: %{srcname}.if Source4: %{srcname}.fc +Patch: 0001-ima-Fix-log-evaluation-on-quick-succession-execution.patch +Patch: 0002-tpm_bootlog_enrich-Get-DevicePath-length-from-Length.patch +Patch: 0003-Backport-upsteam-PR-1156.patch +Patch: 0004-Do-not-use-default-values-that-need-reading-the-conf.patch + License: ASL 2.0 and MIT BuildRequires: git-core @@ -86,6 +91,7 @@ Requires: python3-lark-parser Requires: python3-pyasn1 Requires: python3-pyasn1-modules Requires: tpm2-tools +Requires: openssl %description -n python3-%{srcname} The python3-keylime module implements the functionality used @@ -183,7 +189,8 @@ rm -f %{buildroot}/%{_bindir}/%{srcname}_userdata_encrypt mkdir -p %{buildroot}/%{_datadir}/%{srcname}/scripts for s in create_allowlist.sh \ create_mb_refstate \ - create_policy; do + create_policy \ + ek-openssl-verify; do install -Dpm 755 scripts/${s} \ %{buildroot}/%{_datadir}/%{srcname}/scripts/${s} done @@ -333,11 +340,28 @@ fi %{_tmpfilesdir}/%{srcname}.conf %{_sysusersdir}/%{srcname}.conf %{_datadir}/%{srcname}/scripts/create_allowlist.sh +%{_datadir}/%{srcname}/scripts/ek-openssl-verify %files %license LICENSE %changelog +* Tue Nov 15 2022 Sergio Correia - 6.5.1-1.4 +- Do not use default values that need reading the config in methods + Resolves: rhbz#2142033 - Registrar may crash during EK validation when require_ek_cert is enabled [rhel-9.1.0.z] + +* Mon Nov 14 2022 Sergio Correia - 6.5.1-1.3 +- Backport upstream PR#1156 + Resolves: rhbz#2142033 - Registrar may crash during EK validation when require_ek_cert is enabled [rhel-9.1.0.z] + +* Mon Nov 14 2022 Sergio Correia - 6.5.1-1.2 +- Segmentation fault in create_mb_refstate script + Resolves: rhbz#2142034 - Segmentation fault in /usr/share/keylime/create_mb_refstate script [rhel-9.1.0.z] + +* Mon Nov 14 2022 Sergio Correia - 6.5.1-1.1 +- ima: Fix log evaluation on quick-succession execution of scripts + Resolves: rhbz#2142032 - agent fails IMA attestation when one scripts is executed quickly after the other [rhel-9.1.0.z] + * Thu Oct 13 2022 Sergio Correia - 6.5.1-1 - Update to 6.5.1 Resolves: CVE-2022-3500