From 8c01aa5dc0dfae5608fc86207ee9b0f80e3f6c49 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: CentOS Sources Date: May 24 2023 08:45:38 +0000 Subject: import httpd24-httpd-2.4.34-23.el7.6 --- diff --git a/SOURCES/httpd-2.4.34-CVE-2023-25690.patch b/SOURCES/httpd-2.4.34-CVE-2023-25690.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..41d5d85 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/httpd-2.4.34-CVE-2023-25690.patch @@ -0,0 +1,318 @@ +diff --git a/docs/manual/rewrite/flags.html.en b/docs/manual/rewrite/flags.html.en +index 80d0759..9673094 100644 +--- a/docs/manual/rewrite/flags.html.en ++++ b/docs/manual/rewrite/flags.html.en +@@ -85,10 +85,6 @@ of how you might use them.

+

B (escape backreferences)

+

The [B] flag instructs RewriteRule to escape non-alphanumeric + characters before applying the transformation.

+-

In 2.4.26 and later, you can limit the escaping to specific characters +-in backreferences by listing them: [B=#?;]. Note: The space +-character can be used in the list of characters to escape, but it cannot be +-the last character in the list.

+ +

mod_rewrite has to unescape URLs before mapping them, + so backreferences are unescaped at the time they are applied. +@@ -120,6 +116,16 @@ when the backend may break if presented with an unescaped URL.

+ +

An alternative to this flag is using a RewriteCond to capture against %{THE_REQUEST} which will capture + strings in the encoded form.

++ ++

In 2.4.26 and later, you can limit the escaping to specific characters ++in backreferences by listing them: [B=#?;]. Note: The space ++character can be used in the list of characters to escape, but you must quote ++the entire third argument of RewriteRule ++and the space must not be the last character in the list.

++ ++
# Escape spaces and question marks.
++RewriteRule "^search/(.*)$" "/search.php?term=$1" "[B= ?]"
++ +
top
+
+

BNP|backrefnoplus (don't escape space to +)

+diff --git a/modules/http2/mod_proxy_http2.c b/modules/http2/mod_proxy_http2.c +index a7e0dcd..9aa1f89 100644 +--- a/modules/http2/mod_proxy_http2.c ++++ b/modules/http2/mod_proxy_http2.c +@@ -178,6 +178,16 @@ static int proxy_http2_canon(request_rec *r, char *url) + path = ap_proxy_canonenc(r->pool, url, (int)strlen(url), + enc_path, 0, r->proxyreq); + search = r->args; ++ if (search && *(ap_scan_vchar_obstext(search))) { ++ /* ++ * We have a raw control character or a ' ' in r->args. ++ * Correct encoding was missed. ++ */ ++ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, APLOGNO(10412) ++ "To be forwarded query string contains control " ++ "characters or spaces"); ++ return HTTP_FORBIDDEN; ++ } + } + break; + case PROXYREQ_PROXY: +diff --git a/modules/mappers/mod_rewrite.c b/modules/mappers/mod_rewrite.c +index 38dbb24..7e2b452 100644 +--- a/modules/mappers/mod_rewrite.c ++++ b/modules/mappers/mod_rewrite.c +@@ -168,6 +168,7 @@ static const char* really_last_key = "rewrite_really_last"; + #define RULEFLAG_END (1<<17) + #define RULEFLAG_ESCAPENOPLUS (1<<18) + #define RULEFLAG_QSLAST (1<<19) ++#define RULEFLAG_QSNONE (1<<20) /* programattic only */ + + /* return code of the rewrite rule + * the result may be escaped - or not +@@ -761,15 +762,24 @@ static char *escape_absolute_uri(apr_pool_t *p, char *uri, unsigned scheme) + ap_escape_uri(p, cp), NULL); + } + ++ + /* + * split out a QUERY_STRING part from + * the current URI string + */ +-static void splitout_queryargs(request_rec *r, int qsappend, int qsdiscard, +- int qslast) ++static void splitout_queryargs(request_rec *r, int flags) + { + char *q; + int split; ++ int qsappend = flags & RULEFLAG_QSAPPEND; ++ int qsdiscard = flags & RULEFLAG_QSDISCARD; ++ int qslast = flags & RULEFLAG_QSLAST; ++ ++ if (flags & RULEFLAG_QSNONE) { ++ rewritelog((r, 2, NULL, "discarding query string, no parse from substitution")); ++ r->args = NULL; ++ return; ++ } + + /* don't touch, unless it's a scheme for which a query string makes sense. + * See RFC 1738 and RFC 2368. +@@ -794,7 +804,7 @@ static void splitout_queryargs(request_rec *r, int qsappend, int qsdiscard, + olduri = apr_pstrdup(r->pool, r->filename); + *q++ = '\0'; + if (qsappend) { +- if (*q) { ++ if (*q) { + r->args = apr_pstrcat(r->pool, q, "&" , r->args, NULL); + } + } +@@ -802,9 +812,9 @@ static void splitout_queryargs(request_rec *r, int qsappend, int qsdiscard, + r->args = apr_pstrdup(r->pool, q); + } + +- if (r->args) { ++ if (r->args) { + len = strlen(r->args); +- ++ + if (!len) { + r->args = NULL; + } +@@ -2733,7 +2743,7 @@ static apr_status_t rewritelock_remove(void *data) + * XXX: what an inclined parser. Seems we have to leave it so + * for backwards compat. *sigh* + */ +-static int parseargline(char *str, char **a1, char **a2, char **a3) ++static int parseargline(char *str, char **a1, char **a2, char **a2_end, char **a3) + { + char quote; + +@@ -2784,8 +2794,10 @@ static int parseargline(char *str, char **a1, char **a2, char **a3) + + if (!*str) { + *a3 = NULL; /* 3rd argument is optional */ ++ *a2_end = str; + return 0; + } ++ *a2_end = str; + *str++ = '\0'; + + while (apr_isspace(*str)) { +@@ -3323,7 +3335,7 @@ static const char *cmd_rewritecond(cmd_parms *cmd, void *in_dconf, + rewrite_server_conf *sconf; + rewritecond_entry *newcond; + ap_regex_t *regexp; +- char *a1 = NULL, *a2 = NULL, *a3 = NULL; ++ char *a1 = NULL, *a2 = NULL, *a2_end, *a3 = NULL; + const char *err; + + sconf = ap_get_module_config(cmd->server->module_config, &rewrite_module); +@@ -3341,7 +3353,7 @@ static const char *cmd_rewritecond(cmd_parms *cmd, void *in_dconf, + * of the argument line. So we can use a1 .. a3 without + * copying them again. + */ +- if (parseargline(str, &a1, &a2, &a3)) { ++ if (parseargline(str, &a1, &a2, &a2_end, &a3)) { + return apr_pstrcat(cmd->pool, "RewriteCond: bad argument line '", str, + "'", NULL); + } +@@ -3749,7 +3761,7 @@ static const char *cmd_rewriterule(cmd_parms *cmd, void *in_dconf, + rewrite_server_conf *sconf; + rewriterule_entry *newrule; + ap_regex_t *regexp; +- char *a1 = NULL, *a2 = NULL, *a3 = NULL; ++ char *a1 = NULL, *a2 = NULL, *a2_end, *a3 = NULL; + const char *err; + + sconf = ap_get_module_config(cmd->server->module_config, &rewrite_module); +@@ -3763,7 +3775,7 @@ static const char *cmd_rewriterule(cmd_parms *cmd, void *in_dconf, + } + + /* parse the argument line ourself */ +- if (parseargline(str, &a1, &a2, &a3)) { ++ if (parseargline(str, &a1, &a2, &a2_end, &a3)) { + return apr_pstrcat(cmd->pool, "RewriteRule: bad argument line '", str, + "'", NULL); + } +@@ -3810,6 +3822,17 @@ static const char *cmd_rewriterule(cmd_parms *cmd, void *in_dconf, + newrule->flags |= RULEFLAG_NOSUB; + } + ++ if (*(a2_end-1) == '?') { ++ /* a literal ? at the end of the unsubstituted rewrite rule */ ++ newrule->flags |= RULEFLAG_QSNONE; ++ *(a2_end-1) = '\0'; /* trailing ? has done its job */ ++ } ++ else if (newrule->flags & RULEFLAG_QSDISCARD) { ++ if (NULL == ap_strchr(newrule->output, '?')) { ++ newrule->flags |= RULEFLAG_QSNONE; ++ } ++ } ++ + /* now, if the server or per-dir config holds an + * array of RewriteCond entries, we take it for us + * and clear the array +@@ -4215,9 +4238,7 @@ static int apply_rewrite_rule(rewriterule_entry *p, rewrite_ctx *ctx) + r->path_info = NULL; + } + +- splitout_queryargs(r, p->flags & RULEFLAG_QSAPPEND, +- p->flags & RULEFLAG_QSDISCARD, +- p->flags & RULEFLAG_QSLAST); ++ splitout_queryargs(r, p->flags); + + /* Add the previously stripped per-directory location prefix, unless + * (1) it's an absolute URL path and +@@ -4699,6 +4720,17 @@ static int hook_uri2file(request_rec *r) + unsigned skip; + apr_size_t flen; + ++ if (r->args && *(ap_scan_vchar_obstext(r->args))) { ++ /* ++ * We have a raw control character or a ' ' in r->args. ++ * Correct encoding was missed. ++ */ ++ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, APLOGNO(10410) ++ "Rewritten query string contains control " ++ "characters or spaces"); ++ return HTTP_FORBIDDEN; ++ } ++ + if (ACTION_STATUS == rulestatus) { + int n = r->status; + +@@ -4983,6 +5015,17 @@ static int hook_fixup(request_rec *r) + if (rulestatus) { + unsigned skip; + ++ if (r->args && *(ap_scan_vchar_obstext(r->args))) { ++ /* ++ * We have a raw control character or a ' ' in r->args. ++ * Correct encoding was missed. ++ */ ++ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, APLOGNO(10411) ++ "Rewritten query string contains control " ++ "characters or spaces"); ++ return HTTP_FORBIDDEN; ++ } ++ + if (ACTION_STATUS == rulestatus) { + int n = r->status; + +diff --git a/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_ajp.c b/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_ajp.c +index eb550e5..8b8d09e 100644 +--- a/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_ajp.c ++++ b/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_ajp.c +@@ -69,6 +69,16 @@ static int proxy_ajp_canon(request_rec *r, char *url) + path = ap_proxy_canonenc(r->pool, url, strlen(url), enc_path, 0, + r->proxyreq); + search = r->args; ++ if (search && *(ap_scan_vchar_obstext(search))) { ++ /* ++ * We have a raw control character or a ' ' in r->args. ++ * Correct encoding was missed. ++ */ ++ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, APLOGNO(10406) ++ "To be forwarded query string contains control " ++ "characters or spaces"); ++ return HTTP_FORBIDDEN; ++ } + } + if (path == NULL) + return HTTP_BAD_REQUEST; +diff --git a/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_balancer.c b/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_balancer.c +index c6c7e89..9a5cb08 100644 +--- a/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_balancer.c ++++ b/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_balancer.c +@@ -106,6 +106,16 @@ static int proxy_balancer_canon(request_rec *r, char *url) + path = ap_proxy_canonenc(r->pool, url, strlen(url), enc_path, 0, + r->proxyreq); + search = r->args; ++ if (search && *(ap_scan_vchar_obstext(search))) { ++ /* ++ * We have a raw control character or a ' ' in r->args. ++ * Correct encoding was missed. ++ */ ++ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, APLOGNO(10407) ++ "To be forwarded query string contains control " ++ "characters or spaces"); ++ return HTTP_FORBIDDEN; ++ } + } + if (path == NULL) + return HTTP_BAD_REQUEST; +diff --git a/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_http.c b/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_http.c +index a33b57b..f528d94 100644 +--- a/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_http.c ++++ b/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_http.c +@@ -90,6 +90,16 @@ static int proxy_http_canon(request_rec *r, char *url) + path = ap_proxy_canonenc(r->pool, url, strlen(url), + enc_path, 0, r->proxyreq); + search = r->args; ++ if (search && *(ap_scan_vchar_obstext(search))) { ++ /* ++ * We have a raw control character or a ' ' in r->args. ++ * Correct encoding was missed. ++ */ ++ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, APLOGNO(10408) ++ "To be forwarded query string contains control " ++ "characters or spaces"); ++ return HTTP_FORBIDDEN; ++ } + } + break; + case PROXYREQ_PROXY: +diff --git a/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_wstunnel.c b/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_wstunnel.c +index 9dda010..05f5d1e 100644 +--- a/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_wstunnel.c ++++ b/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_wstunnel.c +@@ -73,6 +73,16 @@ static int proxy_wstunnel_canon(request_rec *r, char *url) + path = ap_proxy_canonenc(r->pool, url, strlen(url), enc_path, 0, + r->proxyreq); + search = r->args; ++ if (search && *(ap_scan_vchar_obstext(search))) { ++ /* ++ * We have a raw control character or a ' ' in r->args. ++ * Correct encoding was missed. ++ */ ++ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, APLOGNO(10409) ++ "To be forwarded query string contains control " ++ "characters or spaces"); ++ return HTTP_FORBIDDEN; ++ } + } + if (path == NULL) + return HTTP_BAD_REQUEST; diff --git a/SPECS/httpd.spec b/SPECS/httpd.spec index c192171..9fdd96e 100644 --- a/SPECS/httpd.spec +++ b/SPECS/httpd.spec @@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ Summary: Apache HTTP Server Name: %{?scl:%scl_prefix}httpd Version: 2.4.34 -Release: 23%{?dist}.5 +Release: 23%{?dist}.6 URL: http://httpd.apache.org/ Source0: http://www.apache.org/dist/httpd/httpd-%{version}.tar.bz2 Source1: index.html @@ -212,6 +212,8 @@ Patch228: httpd-2.4.34-CVE-2022-30522.patch Patch229: httpd-2.4.34-CVE-2022-30556.patch # https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2098249 Patch230: httpd-2.4.34-CVE-2022-31813.patch +# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2176209 +Patch231: httpd-2.4.34-CVE-2023-25690.patch License: ASL 2.0 Group: System Environment/Daemons @@ -449,6 +451,7 @@ export LD_LIBRARY_PATH=%{_libdir}:$LD_LIBRARY_PATH %patch228 -p1 -b .CVE-2022-30522 %patch229 -p1 -b .CVE-2022-30556 %patch230 -p1 -b .CVE-2022-31813 +%patch231 -p1 -b .CVE-2023-25690 # Patch in the vendor string and the release string sed -i '/^#define PLATFORM/s/Unix/%{vstring}/' os/unix/os.h @@ -1107,6 +1110,10 @@ rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT %endif %changelog +* Thu Apr 13 2023 Luboš Uhliarik - 2.4.34-23.6 +- Resolves: #2176722 - CVE-2023-25690 httpd24-httpd: httpd: HTTP request + splitting with mod_rewrite and mod_proxy + * Tue Sep 20 2022 Luboš Uhliarik - 2.4.34-23.5 - Related: #2035029 - CVE-2021-44224 httpd24-httpd: httpd: possible NULL dereference or SSRF in forward proxy configurations