diff --git a/README.debrand b/README.debrand deleted file mode 100644 index 01c46d2..0000000 --- a/README.debrand +++ /dev/null @@ -1,2 +0,0 @@ -Warning: This package was configured for automatic debranding, but the changes -failed to apply. diff --git a/SOURCES/httpd-2.4.53-CVE-2006-20001.patch b/SOURCES/httpd-2.4.53-CVE-2006-20001.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..26c9363 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/httpd-2.4.53-CVE-2006-20001.patch @@ -0,0 +1,20 @@ +diff --git a/modules/dav/main/util.c b/modules/dav/main/util.c +index 1ae5914027c..3f7822fc931 100644 +--- a/modules/dav/main/util.c ++++ b/modules/dav/main/util.c +@@ -801,8 +801,14 @@ static dav_error * dav_process_if_header(request_rec *r, dav_if_header **p_ih) + "for the same state."); + } + condition = DAV_IF_COND_NOT; ++ list += 2; ++ } ++ else { ++ return dav_new_error(r->pool, HTTP_BAD_REQUEST, ++ DAV_ERR_IF_UNK_CHAR, 0, ++ "Invalid \"If:\" header: " ++ "Unexpected character in List"); + } +- list += 2; + break; + + case ' ': diff --git a/SOURCES/httpd-2.4.53-CVE-2022-36760.patch b/SOURCES/httpd-2.4.53-CVE-2022-36760.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5a34c30 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/httpd-2.4.53-CVE-2022-36760.patch @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +From 5efc9507c487c37dfe2a279a4a0335cad701cd5f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Eric Covener +Date: Tue, 10 Jan 2023 13:19:07 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] cleanup on error + +git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1906540 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68 +--- + modules/proxy/mod_proxy_ajp.c | 2 ++ + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_ajp.c b/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_ajp.c +index 9cd7adbcbbf..07f37392d88 100644 +--- a/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_ajp.c ++++ b/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_ajp.c +@@ -255,6 +255,8 @@ static int ap_proxy_ajp_request(apr_pool_t *p, request_rec *r, + ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, APLOGNO(10396) + "%s Transfer-Encoding is not supported", + tenc); ++ /* We had a failure: Close connection to backend */ ++ conn->close = 1; + return HTTP_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR; + } + } else { diff --git a/SOURCES/httpd-2.4.53-CVE-2022-37436.patch b/SOURCES/httpd-2.4.53-CVE-2022-37436.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..26311e8 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/httpd-2.4.53-CVE-2022-37436.patch @@ -0,0 +1,129 @@ +From 8b6d55f6a047acf62675e32606b037f5eea8ccc7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Eric Covener +Date: Tue, 10 Jan 2023 13:20:09 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] Merge r1906539 from trunk: + +fail on bad header + +Submitted By: covener +Reviewed By: covener, rpluem, gbechis + + +git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/branches/2.4.x@1906541 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68 +--- + modules/proxy/mod_proxy_http.c | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++-------------- + server/protocol.c | 2 ++ + 2 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_http.c b/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_http.c +index d74ae054ac9..ec4e7fb06b5 100644 +--- a/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_http.c ++++ b/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_http.c +@@ -788,7 +788,7 @@ static void process_proxy_header(request_rec *r, proxy_dir_conf *c, + * any sense at all, since we depend on buffer still containing + * what was read by ap_getline() upon return. + */ +-static void ap_proxy_read_headers(request_rec *r, request_rec *rr, ++static apr_status_t ap_proxy_read_headers(request_rec *r, request_rec *rr, + char *buffer, int size, + conn_rec *c, int *pread_len) + { +@@ -820,19 +820,26 @@ static void ap_proxy_read_headers(request_rec *r, request_rec *rr, + rc = ap_proxygetline(tmp_bb, buffer, size, rr, + AP_GETLINE_FOLD | AP_GETLINE_NOSPC_EOL, &len); + +- if (len <= 0) +- break; + +- if (APR_STATUS_IS_ENOSPC(rc)) { +- /* The header could not fit in the provided buffer, warn. +- * XXX: falls through with the truncated header, 5xx instead? +- */ +- int trunc = (len > 128 ? 128 : len) / 2; +- ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, rc, r, APLOGNO(10124) +- "header size is over the limit allowed by " +- "ResponseFieldSize (%d bytes). " +- "Bad response header: '%.*s[...]%s'", +- size, trunc, buffer, buffer + len - trunc); ++ if (rc != APR_SUCCESS) { ++ if (APR_STATUS_IS_ENOSPC(rc)) { ++ int trunc = (len > 128 ? 128 : len) / 2; ++ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, rc, r, APLOGNO(10124) ++ "header size is over the limit allowed by " ++ "ResponseFieldSize (%d bytes). " ++ "Bad response header: '%.*s[...]%s'", ++ size, trunc, buffer, buffer + len - trunc); ++ } ++ else { ++ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, rc, r, APLOGNO(10404) ++ "Error reading headers from backend"); ++ } ++ r->headers_out = NULL; ++ return rc; ++ } ++ ++ if (len <= 0) { ++ break; + } + else { + ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_TRACE4, 0, r, "%s", buffer); +@@ -855,7 +862,7 @@ static void ap_proxy_read_headers(request_rec *r, request_rec *rr, + if (psc->badopt == bad_error) { + /* Nope, it wasn't even an extra HTTP header. Give up. */ + r->headers_out = NULL; +- return; ++ return APR_EINVAL; + } + else if (psc->badopt == bad_body) { + /* if we've already started loading headers_out, then +@@ -869,13 +876,13 @@ static void ap_proxy_read_headers(request_rec *r, request_rec *rr, + "in headers returned by %s (%s)", + r->uri, r->method); + *pread_len = len; +- return; ++ return APR_SUCCESS; + } + else { + ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, 0, r, APLOGNO(01099) + "No HTTP headers returned by %s (%s)", + r->uri, r->method); +- return; ++ return APR_SUCCESS; + } + } + } +@@ -905,6 +912,7 @@ static void ap_proxy_read_headers(request_rec *r, request_rec *rr, + process_proxy_header(r, dconf, buffer, value); + saw_headers = 1; + } ++ return APR_SUCCESS; + } + + +@@ -1218,10 +1226,10 @@ int ap_proxy_http_process_response(proxy_http_req_t *req) + "Set-Cookie", NULL); + + /* shove the headers direct into r->headers_out */ +- ap_proxy_read_headers(r, backend->r, buffer, response_field_size, +- origin, &pread_len); ++ rc = ap_proxy_read_headers(r, backend->r, buffer, response_field_size, ++ origin, &pread_len); + +- if (r->headers_out == NULL) { ++ if (rc != APR_SUCCESS || r->headers_out == NULL) { + ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, 0, r, APLOGNO(01106) + "bad HTTP/%d.%d header returned by %s (%s)", + major, minor, r->uri, r->method); +diff --git a/server/protocol.c b/server/protocol.c +index 7adc7f75c10..6f9540ad1de 100644 +--- a/server/protocol.c ++++ b/server/protocol.c +@@ -508,6 +508,8 @@ AP_DECLARE(apr_status_t) ap_rgetline_core(char **s, apr_size_t n, + /* PR#43039: We shouldn't accept NULL bytes within the line */ + bytes_handled = strlen(*s); + if (bytes_handled < *read) { ++ ap_log_data(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, ap_server_conf, ++ "NULL bytes in header", *s, *read, 0); + *read = bytes_handled; + if (rv == APR_SUCCESS) { + rv = APR_EINVAL; diff --git a/SOURCES/httpd-init.service b/SOURCES/httpd-init.service index 3074778..704c314 100644 --- a/SOURCES/httpd-init.service +++ b/SOURCES/httpd-init.service @@ -8,5 +8,6 @@ ConditionPathExists=|!/etc/pki/tls/private/localhost.key [Service] Type=oneshot RemainAfterExit=no +PrivateTmp=true ExecStart=/usr/libexec/httpd-ssl-gencerts diff --git a/SOURCES/httpd-ssl-gencerts b/SOURCES/httpd-ssl-gencerts index 350f5b5..5c271f7 100755 --- a/SOURCES/httpd-ssl-gencerts +++ b/SOURCES/httpd-ssl-gencerts @@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ sscg -q \ --cert-file /etc/pki/tls/certs/localhost.crt \ --cert-key-file /etc/pki/tls/private/localhost.key \ --ca-file /etc/pki/tls/certs/localhost.crt \ + --dhparams-file /tmp/dhparams.pem \ --lifetime 365 \ --hostname $FQDN \ --email root@$FQDN diff --git a/SPECS/httpd.spec b/SPECS/httpd.spec index 1e0e486..1831235 100644 --- a/SPECS/httpd.spec +++ b/SPECS/httpd.spec @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ Summary: Apache HTTP Server Name: httpd Version: 2.4.53 -Release: 7%{?dist} +Release: 7%{?dist}.1 URL: https://httpd.apache.org/ Source0: https://www.apache.org/dist/httpd/httpd-%{version}.tar.bz2 Source1: https://www.apache.org/dist/httpd/httpd-%{version}.tar.bz2.asc @@ -130,6 +130,12 @@ Patch204: httpd-2.4.53-CVE-2022-29404.patch Patch205: httpd-2.4.53-CVE-2022-30522.patch # https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2095018 Patch206: httpd-2.4.53-CVE-2022-30556.patch +# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2161773 +Patch207: httpd-2.4.53-CVE-2022-37436.patch +# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2161774 +Patch208: httpd-2.4.53-CVE-2006-20001.patch +# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2161777 +Patch209: httpd-2.4.53-CVE-2022-36760.patch License: ASL 2.0 BuildRequires: gcc, autoconf, pkgconfig, findutils, xmlto @@ -304,6 +310,9 @@ written in the Lua programming language. %patch204 -p1 -b .CVE-2022-29404 %patch205 -p1 -b .CVE-2022-30522 %patch206 -p1 -b .CVE-2022-30556 +%patch207 -p1 -b .CVE-2022-37436 +%patch208 -p1 -b .CVE-2006-20001 +%patch209 -p1 -b .CVE-2022-36760 # Patch in the vendor string sed -i '/^#define PLATFORM/s/Unix/%{vstring}/' os/unix/os.h @@ -863,6 +872,14 @@ exit $rv %{_rpmconfigdir}/macros.d/macros.httpd %changelog +* Tue Jan 31 2023 Luboš Uhliarik - 2.4.53-7.1 +- Resolves: #2165975 - prevent sscg creating /dhparams.pem +- Resolves: #2165970 - CVE-2006-20001 httpd: mod_dav: out-of-bounds read/write + of zero byte +- Resolves: #2165973 - CVE-2022-37436 httpd: mod_proxy: HTTP response splitting +- Resolves: #2165974 - CVE-2022-36760 httpd: mod_proxy_ajp: Possible request + smuggling + * Wed Jul 20 2022 Luboš Uhliarik - 2.4.53-7 - Resolves: #2094997 - CVE-2022-26377 httpd: mod_proxy_ajp: Possible request smuggling