diff --git a/SOURCES/CVE-2019-15605-HTTP-request-smuggling.patch b/SOURCES/CVE-2019-15605-HTTP-request-smuggling.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..47c6d94 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/CVE-2019-15605-HTTP-request-smuggling.patch @@ -0,0 +1,450 @@ +From da1a281f71b0ae0eb519cf5ce578395056864113 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sergio Correia +Date: Wed, 26 Feb 2020 16:39:48 -0300 +Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2019-15605 - HTTP request smuggling + +Upstream: https://github.com/nodejs/http-parser/commit/7d5c99d09f6743b055d53fc3f642746d9801479b + +Support multi-coding Transfer-Encoding + +`Transfer-Encoding` header might have multiple codings in it. Even +though llhttp cares only about `chunked`, it must check that `chunked` +is the last coding (if present). + +ABNF from RFC 7230: + +``` +Transfer-Encoding = *( "," OWS ) transfer-coding *( OWS "," [ OWS + transfer-coding ] ) +transfer-coding = "chunked" / "compress" / "deflate" / "gzip" / + transfer-extension + transfer-extension = token *( OWS ";" OWS transfer-parameter ) + transfer-parameter = token BWS "=" BWS ( token / quoted-string ) +``` + +However, if `chunked` is not last - llhttp must assume that the encoding +and size of the body is unknown (according to 3.3.3 of RFC 7230) and +read the response until EOF. For request - the error must be raised for +an unknown `Transfer-Encoding`. + +Furthermore, 3.3.3 of RFC 7230 explicitly states that presence of both +`Transfer-Encoding` and `Content-Length` indicates the smuggling attack +and "ought to be handled as an error". + +For the lenient mode: + +* Unknown `Transfer-Encoding` in requests is not an error and request + body is simply read until EOF (end of connection) +* Only `Transfer-Encoding: chunked` together with `Content-Length` would + result an error (just like before the patch) + +PR-URL: nodejs-private/http-parser-private#4 +Reviewed-By: Matteo Collina +Reviewed-By: Sam Roberts +Reviewed-By: James M Snell +--- + http_parser.c | 110 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------- + http_parser.h | 8 +++-- + test.c | 90 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- + 3 files changed, 189 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/http_parser.c b/http_parser.c +index e5fc1a3..7845cfd 100644 +--- a/http_parser.c ++++ b/http_parser.c +@@ -180,6 +180,22 @@ static const char *method_strings[] = + #undef XX + }; + ++/* Added for handling CVE-2019-15605. */ ++static void reset_flags(http_parser* p) ++{ ++ p->flags = 0; ++ p->transfer_encoding = 0; ++} ++ ++static void set_transfer_encoding(http_parser* p) ++{ ++ p->transfer_encoding = 1; ++} ++ ++static int is_transfer_encoding(const http_parser* p) ++{ ++ return p->transfer_encoding; ++} + + /* Tokens as defined by rfc 2616. Also lowercases them. + * token = 1* +@@ -382,6 +398,7 @@ enum header_states + , h_upgrade + + , h_matching_transfer_encoding_chunked ++ + , h_matching_connection_token_start + , h_matching_connection_keep_alive + , h_matching_connection_close +@@ -392,6 +409,10 @@ enum header_states + , h_connection_keep_alive + , h_connection_close + , h_connection_upgrade ++ ++ /* CVE-2019-15605 */ ++ , h_matching_transfer_encoding_token_start ++ , h_matching_transfer_encoding_token + }; + + enum http_host_state +@@ -726,7 +747,7 @@ reexecute: + { + if (ch == CR || ch == LF) + break; +- parser->flags = 0; ++ reset_flags(parser); + parser->content_length = ULLONG_MAX; + + if (ch == 'H') { +@@ -761,7 +782,7 @@ reexecute: + + case s_start_res: + { +- parser->flags = 0; ++ reset_flags(parser); + parser->content_length = ULLONG_MAX; + + switch (ch) { +@@ -959,7 +980,7 @@ reexecute: + { + if (ch == CR || ch == LF) + break; +- parser->flags = 0; ++ reset_flags(parser); + parser->content_length = ULLONG_MAX; + + if (UNLIKELY(!IS_ALPHA(ch))) { +@@ -1383,6 +1404,7 @@ reexecute: + parser->header_state = h_general; + } else if (parser->index == sizeof(TRANSFER_ENCODING)-2) { + parser->header_state = h_transfer_encoding; ++ set_transfer_encoding(parser); + } + break; + +@@ -1463,10 +1485,14 @@ reexecute: + if ('c' == c) { + parser->header_state = h_matching_transfer_encoding_chunked; + } else { +- parser->header_state = h_general; ++ parser->header_state = h_matching_transfer_encoding_token; + } + break; + ++ /* Multi-value `Transfer-Encoding` header */ ++ case h_matching_transfer_encoding_token_start: ++ break; ++ + case h_content_length: + if (UNLIKELY(!IS_NUM(ch))) { + SET_ERRNO(HPE_INVALID_CONTENT_LENGTH); +@@ -1614,16 +1640,41 @@ reexecute: + goto error; + + /* Transfer-Encoding: chunked */ ++ case h_matching_transfer_encoding_token_start: ++ /* looking for 'Transfer-Encoding: chunked' */ ++ if ('c' == c) { ++ h_state = h_matching_transfer_encoding_chunked; ++ } else if (STRICT_TOKEN(c)) { ++ /* TODO(indutny): similar code below does this, but why? ++ * At the very least it seems to be inconsistent given that ++ * h_matching_transfer_encoding_token does not check for ++ * `STRICT_TOKEN` ++ */ ++ h_state = h_matching_transfer_encoding_token; ++ } else if (c == ' ' || c == '\t') { ++ /* Skip lws */ ++ } else { ++ h_state = h_general; ++ } ++ break; ++ + case h_matching_transfer_encoding_chunked: + parser->index++; + if (parser->index > sizeof(CHUNKED)-1 + || c != CHUNKED[parser->index]) { +- h_state = h_general; ++ h_state = h_matching_transfer_encoding_token; + } else if (parser->index == sizeof(CHUNKED)-2) { + h_state = h_transfer_encoding_chunked; + } + break; + ++ case h_matching_transfer_encoding_token: ++ if (ch == ',') { ++ h_state = h_matching_transfer_encoding_token_start; ++ parser->index = 0; ++ } ++ break; ++ + case h_matching_connection_token_start: + /* looking for 'Connection: keep-alive' */ + if (c == 'k') { +@@ -1682,7 +1733,7 @@ reexecute: + break; + + case h_transfer_encoding_chunked: +- if (ch != ' ') h_state = h_general; ++ if (ch != ' ') h_state = h_matching_transfer_encoding_token; + break; + + case h_connection_keep_alive: +@@ -1816,12 +1867,17 @@ reexecute: + REEXECUTE(); + } + +- /* Cannot use chunked encoding and a content-length header together +- per the HTTP specification. */ +- if ((parser->flags & F_CHUNKED) && ++ /* Cannot use transfer-encoding and a content-length header together ++ per the HTTP specification. (RFC 7230 Section 3.3.3) */ ++ if ((is_transfer_encoding(parser)) && + (parser->flags & F_CONTENTLENGTH)) { +- SET_ERRNO(HPE_UNEXPECTED_CONTENT_LENGTH); +- goto error; ++ /* Allow it for lenient parsing as long as `Transfer-Encoding` is ++ * not `chunked` ++ */ ++ if (!lenient || (parser->flags & F_CHUNKED)) { ++ SET_ERRNO(HPE_UNEXPECTED_CONTENT_LENGTH); ++ goto error; ++ } + } + + UPDATE_STATE(s_headers_done); +@@ -1887,8 +1943,31 @@ reexecute: + UPDATE_STATE(NEW_MESSAGE()); + CALLBACK_NOTIFY(message_complete); + } else if (parser->flags & F_CHUNKED) { +- /* chunked encoding - ignore Content-Length header */ ++ /* chunked encoding - ignore Content-Length header, ++ * prepare for a chunk */ + UPDATE_STATE(s_chunk_size_start); ++ } else if (is_transfer_encoding(parser)) { ++ if (parser->type == HTTP_REQUEST && !lenient) { ++ /* RFC 7230 3.3.3 */ ++ ++ /* If a Transfer-Encoding header field ++ * is present in a request and the chunked transfer coding is not ++ * the final encoding, the message body length cannot be determined ++ * reliably; the server MUST respond with the 400 (Bad Request) ++ * status code and then close the connection. ++ */ ++ SET_ERRNO(HPE_INVALID_TRANSFER_ENCODING); ++ RETURN(p - data); /* Error */ ++ } else { ++ /* RFC 7230 3.3.3 */ ++ ++ /* If a Transfer-Encoding header field is present in a response and ++ * the chunked transfer coding is not the final encoding, the ++ * message body length is determined by reading the connection until ++ * it is closed by the server. ++ */ ++ UPDATE_STATE(s_body_identity_eof); ++ } + } else { + if (parser->content_length == 0) { + /* Content-Length header given but zero: Content-Length: 0\r\n */ +@@ -2140,6 +2219,12 @@ http_message_needs_eof (const http_parser *parser) + return 0; + } + ++ /* RFC 7230 3.3.3, see `s_headers_almost_done` */ ++ if ((is_transfer_encoding(parser)) && ++ (parser->flags & F_CHUNKED) == 0) { ++ return 1; ++ } ++ + if ((parser->flags & F_CHUNKED) || parser->content_length != ULLONG_MAX) { + return 0; + } +@@ -2183,6 +2268,7 @@ http_parser_init (http_parser *parser, enum http_parser_type t) + parser->type = t; + parser->state = (t == HTTP_REQUEST ? s_start_req : (t == HTTP_RESPONSE ? s_start_res : s_start_req_or_res)); + parser->http_errno = HPE_OK; ++ reset_flags(parser); + } + + void +diff --git a/http_parser.h b/http_parser.h +index c30f6c2..0cd3605 100644 +--- a/http_parser.h ++++ b/http_parser.h +@@ -274,8 +274,9 @@ enum flags + XX(INVALID_INTERNAL_STATE, "encountered unexpected internal state")\ + XX(STRICT, "strict mode assertion failed") \ + XX(PAUSED, "parser is paused") \ +- XX(UNKNOWN, "an unknown error occurred") +- ++ XX(UNKNOWN, "an unknown error occurred") \ ++ XX(INVALID_TRANSFER_ENCODING, \ ++ "request has invalid transfer-encoding") + + /* Define HPE_* values for each errno value above */ + #define HTTP_ERRNO_GEN(n, s) HPE_##n, +@@ -292,7 +293,7 @@ enum http_errno { + struct http_parser { + /** PRIVATE **/ + unsigned int type : 2; /* enum http_parser_type */ +- unsigned int flags : 8; /* F_* values from 'flags' enum; semi-public */ ++ unsigned int flags : 8; /* F_* values from 'flags' enum; semi-public */ + unsigned int state : 7; /* enum state from http_parser.c */ + unsigned int header_state : 7; /* enum header_state from http_parser.c */ + unsigned int index : 7; /* index into current matcher */ +@@ -317,6 +318,7 @@ struct http_parser { + + /** PUBLIC **/ + void *data; /* A pointer to get hook to the "connection" or "socket" object */ ++ unsigned int transfer_encoding : 8; /* CVE-2019-15605 */ + }; + + +diff --git a/test.c b/test.c +index 1b79612..0b6326c 100644 +--- a/test.c ++++ b/test.c +@@ -261,7 +261,6 @@ const struct message requests[] = + ,.type= HTTP_REQUEST + ,.raw= "POST /post_identity_body_world?q=search#hey HTTP/1.1\r\n" + "Accept: */*\r\n" +- "Transfer-Encoding: identity\r\n" + "Content-Length: 5\r\n" + "\r\n" + "World" +@@ -274,10 +273,9 @@ const struct message requests[] = + ,.fragment= "hey" + ,.request_path= "/post_identity_body_world" + ,.request_url= "/post_identity_body_world?q=search#hey" +- ,.num_headers= 3 ++ ,.num_headers= 2 + ,.headers= + { { "Accept", "*/*" } +- , { "Transfer-Encoding", "identity" } + , { "Content-Length", "5" } + } + ,.body= "World" +@@ -1153,6 +1151,61 @@ const struct message requests[] = + ,.body= "" + } + ++#define POST_MULTI_TE_LAST_CHUNKED 43 ++, {.name= "post - multi coding transfer-encoding chunked body" ++ ,.type= HTTP_REQUEST ++ ,.raw= "POST / HTTP/1.1\r\n" ++ "Transfer-Encoding: deflate, chunked\r\n" ++ "\r\n" ++ "1e\r\nall your base are belong to us\r\n" ++ "0\r\n" ++ "\r\n" ++ ,.should_keep_alive= TRUE ++ ,.message_complete_on_eof= FALSE ++ ,.http_major= 1 ++ ,.http_minor= 1 ++ ,.method= HTTP_POST ++ ,.query_string= "" ++ ,.fragment= "" ++ ,.request_path= "/" ++ ,.request_url= "/" ++ ,.num_headers= 1 ++ ,.headers= ++ { { "Transfer-Encoding" , "deflate, chunked" } ++ } ++ ,.body= "all your base are belong to us" ++ ,.num_chunks_complete= 2 ++ ,.chunk_lengths= { 0x1e } ++ } ++ ++#define POST_MULTI_LINE_TE_LAST_CHUNKED 43 ++, {.name= "post - multi coding transfer-encoding chunked body" ++ ,.type= HTTP_REQUEST ++ ,.raw= "POST / HTTP/1.1\r\n" ++ "Transfer-Encoding: deflate,\r\n" ++ " chunked\r\n" ++ "\r\n" ++ "1e\r\nall your base are belong to us\r\n" ++ "0\r\n" ++ "\r\n" ++ ,.should_keep_alive= TRUE ++ ,.message_complete_on_eof= FALSE ++ ,.http_major= 1 ++ ,.http_minor= 1 ++ ,.method= HTTP_POST ++ ,.query_string= "" ++ ,.fragment= "" ++ ,.request_path= "/" ++ ,.request_url= "/" ++ ,.num_headers= 1 ++ ,.headers= ++ { { "Transfer-Encoding" , "deflate, chunked" } ++ } ++ ,.body= "all your base are belong to us" ++ ,.num_chunks_complete= 2 ++ ,.chunk_lengths= { 0x1e } ++ } ++ + , {.name= NULL } /* sentinel */ + }; + +@@ -1771,6 +1824,29 @@ const struct message responses[] = + ,.chunk_lengths= { 2 } + } + ++#define HTTP_200_MULTI_TE_NOT_LAST_CHUNKED 28 ++, {.name= "HTTP 200 response with `chunked` being *not last* Transfer-Encoding" ++ ,.type= HTTP_RESPONSE ++ ,.raw= "HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\n" ++ "Transfer-Encoding: chunked, identity\r\n" ++ "\r\n" ++ "2\r\n" ++ "OK\r\n" ++ "0\r\n" ++ "\r\n" ++ ,.should_keep_alive= FALSE ++ ,.message_complete_on_eof= TRUE ++ ,.http_major= 1 ++ ,.http_minor= 1 ++ ,.status_code= 200 ++ ,.response_status= "OK" ++ ,.num_headers= 1 ++ ,.headers= { { "Transfer-Encoding", "chunked, identity" } ++ } ++ ,.body= "2\r\nOK\r\n0\r\n\r\n" ++ ,.num_chunks_complete= 0 ++ } ++ + , {.name= NULL } /* sentinel */ + }; + +@@ -3453,7 +3529,7 @@ test_chunked_content_length_error (int req) + parsed = http_parser_execute(&parser, &settings_null, buf, strlen(buf)); + assert(parsed == strlen(buf)); + +- buf = "Transfer-Encoding: chunked\r\nContent-Length: 1\r\n\r\n"; ++ buf = "Transfer-Encoding: anything\r\nContent-Length: 1\r\n\r\n"; + size_t buflen = strlen(buf); + + parsed = http_parser_execute(&parser, &settings_null, buf, buflen); +@@ -4088,6 +4164,12 @@ main (void) + "fooba", + HPE_OK); + ++ // Unknown Transfer-Encoding in request ++ test_simple("GET / HTTP/1.1\r\n" ++ "Transfer-Encoding: unknown\r\n" ++ "\r\n", ++ HPE_INVALID_TRANSFER_ENCODING); ++ + static const char *all_methods[] = { + "DELETE", + "GET", +-- +1.8.3.1 + diff --git a/SPECS/http-parser.spec b/SPECS/http-parser.spec index 1479589..67017f1 100644 --- a/SPECS/http-parser.spec +++ b/SPECS/http-parser.spec @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ Name: http-parser Version: %{somajor}.%{sominor}.%{sopoint} -Release: 8%{?dist} +Release: 9%{?dist} Summary: HTTP request/response parser for C License: MIT @@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ Patch0003: CVE-2018-7159-reject-interior-blanks-in-Content-Length-backport. Patch0004: CVE-2018-7159-Fix-Content-Lenght-with-obsolete-line-folding-backport.patch Patch0005: CVE-2018-7159-Dissallow-empty-Content-Length.patch Patch0006: cve-tests-backport.patch +Patch0007: CVE-2019-15605-HTTP-request-smuggling.patch BuildRequires: gcc BuildRequires: cmake @@ -106,6 +107,13 @@ make test -C %{_target_platform} %{_libdir}/libhttp_parser_strict.so %changelog +* Thu Mar 26 2020 Sergio Correia - 2.7.1-9 +- Do not break ABI with CVE-2019-15605 fix + +* Fri Feb 21 2020 Sergio Corrreia - 2.7.1-8.1 +- Resolves: CVE-2019-15605 http-parser: nodejs: HTTP request + smuggling using malformed Transfer-Encoding header + * Mon Apr 1 2019 Jakub Hrozek - 2.7.1-8 - Backport needed test fixes - Related: rhbz#1666024 - CVE-2018-7159 http-parser: nodejs: HTTP parser