From 56fe7a769db7442f11b2e75768352d2c192a5a7c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: CentOS Sources Date: May 09 2023 05:21:18 +0000 Subject: import haproxy-2.4.17-6.el9 --- diff --git a/SOURCES/bz2161140-refuse-response-end-stream-flag.patch b/SOURCES/bz2161140-refuse-response-end-stream-flag.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e3e83d9 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/bz2161140-refuse-response-end-stream-flag.patch @@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ +From 2c681c6f30fb90adab4701e287ff7a7db669b2e7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Christopher Faulet +Date: Thu, 22 Dec 2022 09:47:01 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] BUG/MEDIUM: mux-h2: Refuse interim responses with end-stream + flag set + +As state in RFC9113#8.1, HEADERS frame with the ES flag set that carries an +informational status code is malformed. However, there is no test on this +condition. + +On 2.4 and higher, it is hard to predict consequences of this bug because +end of the message is only reported with a flag. But on 2.2 and lower, it +leads to a crash because there is an unexpected extra EOM block at the end +of an interim response. + +Now, when a ES flag is detected on a HEADERS frame for an interim message, a +stream error is sent (RST_STREAM/PROTOCOL_ERROR). + +This patch should solve the issue #1972. It should be backported as far as +2.0. + +(cherry picked from commit 827a6299e6995c5c3ba620d8b7cbacdaef67f2c4) +Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau +(cherry picked from commit ebfae006c6b5de1d1fe0cdd51847ec1e39d5cf59) +Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet +(cherry picked from commit 84f5cba24f59b1c8339bb38323fcb01f434ba8e5) +Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet +(cherry picked from commit f5748a98c34bc889cae9386ca4f7073ab3f4c6b1) +Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet +--- + src/mux_h2.c | 5 +++++ + 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/src/mux_h2.c b/src/mux_h2.c +index 7d23e5abd..7dbbfefec 100644 +--- a/src/mux_h2.c ++++ b/src/mux_h2.c +@@ -4942,6 +4942,11 @@ static int h2c_decode_headers(struct h2c *h2c, struct buffer *rxbuf, uint32_t *f + *flags |= H2_SF_HEADERS_RCVD; + + if (h2c->dff & H2_F_HEADERS_END_STREAM) { ++ if (msgf & H2_MSGF_RSP_1XX) { ++ /* RFC9113#8.1 : HEADERS frame with the ES flag set that carries an informational status code is malformed */ ++ TRACE_STATE("invalid interim response with ES flag!", H2_EV_RX_FRAME|H2_EV_RX_HDR|H2_EV_H2C_ERR|H2_EV_PROTO_ERR, h2c->conn); ++ goto fail; ++ } + /* no more data are expected for this message */ + htx->flags |= HTX_FL_EOM; + } +-- +2.37.3 + diff --git a/SOURCES/bz2169510-reject-empty-http-header-fields.patch b/SOURCES/bz2169510-reject-empty-http-header-fields.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5623d7a --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/bz2169510-reject-empty-http-header-fields.patch @@ -0,0 +1,164 @@ +From 486cd730485c8a119ef65b3f792134b56e7941b4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Willy Tarreau +Date: Thu, 9 Feb 2023 21:36:54 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] BUG/CRITICAL: http: properly reject empty http header field + names + +The HTTP header parsers surprizingly accepts empty header field names, +and this is a leftover from the original code that was agnostic to this. + +When muxes were introduced, for H2 first, the HPACK decompressor needed +to feed headers lists, and since empty header names were strictly +forbidden by the protocol, the lists of headers were purposely designed +to be terminated by an empty header field name (a principle that is +similar to H1's empty line termination). This principle was preserved +and generalized to other protocols migrated to muxes (H1/FCGI/H3 etc) +without anyone ever noticing that the H1 parser was still able to deliver +empty header field names to this list. In addition to this it turns out +that the HPACK decompressor, despite a comment in the code, may +successfully decompress an empty header field name, and this mistake +was propagated to the QPACK decompressor as well. + +The impact is that an empty header field name may be used to truncate +the list of headers and thus make some headers disappear. While for +H2/H3 the impact is limited as haproxy sees a request with missing +headers, and headers are not used to delimit messages, in the case of +HTTP/1, the impact is significant because the presence (and sometimes +contents) of certain sensitive headers is detected during the parsing. +Thus, some of these headers may be seen, marked as present, their value +extracted, but never delivered to upper layers and obviously not +forwarded to the other side either. This can have for consequence that +certain important header fields such as Connection, Upgrade, Host, +Content-length, Transfer-Encoding etc are possibly seen as different +between what haproxy uses to parse/forward/route and what is observed +in http-request rules and of course, forwarded. One direct consequence +is that it is possible to exploit this property in HTTP/1 to make +affected versions of haproxy forward more data than is advertised on +the other side, and bypass some access controls or routing rules by +crafting extraneous requests. Note, however, that responses to such +requests will normally not be passed back to the client, but this can +still cause some harm. + +This specific risk can be mostly worked around in configuration using +the following rule that will rely on the bug's impact to precisely +detect the inconsistency between the known body size and the one +expected to be advertised to the server (the rule works from 2.0 to +2.8-dev): + + http-request deny if { fc_http_major 1 } !{ req.body_size 0 } !{ req.hdr(content-length) -m found } !{ req.hdr(transfer-encoding) -m found } !{ method CONNECT } + +This will exclusively block such carefully crafted requests delivered +over HTTP/1. HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 do not need content-length, and a body +that arrives without being announced with a content-length will be +forwarded using transfer-encoding, hence will not cause discrepancies. +In HAProxy 2.0 in legacy mode ("no option http-use-htx"), this rule will +simply have no effect but will not cause trouble either. + +A clean solution would consist in modifying the loops iterating over +these headers lists to check the header name's pointer instead of its +length (since both are zero at the end of the list), but this requires +to touch tens of places and it's very easy to miss one. Functions such +as htx_add_header(), htx_add_trailer(), htx_add_all_headers() would be +good starting points for such a possible future change. + +Instead the current fix focuses on blocking empty headers where they +are first inserted, hence in the H1/HPACK/QPACK decoders. One benefit +of the current solution (for H1) is that it allows "show errors" to +report a precise diagnostic when facing such invalid HTTP/1 requests, +with the exact location of the problem and the originating address: + + $ printf "GET / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: localhost\r\n:empty header\r\n\r\n" | nc 0 8001 + HTTP/1.1 400 Bad request + Content-length: 90 + Cache-Control: no-cache + Connection: close + Content-Type: text/html + +

400 Bad request

+ Your browser sent an invalid request. + + + $ socat /var/run/haproxy.stat <<< "show errors" + Total events captured on [10/Feb/2023:16:29:37.530] : 1 + + [10/Feb/2023:16:29:34.155] frontend decrypt (#2): invalid request + backend (#-1), server (#-1), event #0, src 127.0.0.1:31092 + buffer starts at 0 (including 0 out), 16334 free, + len 50, wraps at 16336, error at position 33 + H1 connection flags 0x00000000, H1 stream flags 0x00000810 + H1 msg state MSG_HDR_NAME(17), H1 msg flags 0x00001410 + H1 chunk len 0 bytes, H1 body len 0 bytes : + + 00000 GET / HTTP/1.1\r\n + 00016 Host: localhost\r\n + 00033 :empty header\r\n + 00048 \r\n + +I want to address sincere and warm thanks for their great work to the +team composed of the following security researchers who found the issue +together and reported it: Bahruz Jabiyev, Anthony Gavazzi, and Engin +Kirda from Northeastern University, Kaan Onarlioglu from Akamai +Technologies, Adi Peleg and Harvey Tuch from Google. And kudos to Amaury +Denoyelle from HAProxy Technologies for spotting that the HPACK and +QPACK decoders would let this pass despite the comment explicitly +saying otherwise. + +This fix must be backported as far as 2.0. The QPACK changes can be +dropped before 2.6. In 2.0 there is also the equivalent code for legacy +mode, which doesn't suffer from the list truncation, but it would better +be fixed regardless. + +CVE-2023-25725 was assigned to this issue. + +(cherry picked from commit a8598a2eb11b6c989e81f0dbf10be361782e8d32) +Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau +(cherry picked from commit a0e561ad7f29ed50c473f5a9da664267b60d1112) +Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau +(cherry picked from commit 73be199c4f5f1ed468161a4c5e10ca77cd5989d8) +[wt: dropped QPACK changes for 2.5] +Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau +(cherry picked from commit f8b2b88aeae15dc3b261cd3749277ae75caf9db8) +Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau +--- + src/h1.c | 4 ++++ + src/hpack-dec.c | 9 +++++++++ + 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/src/h1.c b/src/h1.c +index 4c2e234c5..73de48be0 100644 +--- a/src/h1.c ++++ b/src/h1.c +@@ -750,6 +750,10 @@ int h1_headers_to_hdr_list(char *start, const char *stop, + + if (likely(*ptr == ':')) { + col = ptr - start; ++ if (col <= sol) { ++ state = H1_MSG_HDR_NAME; ++ goto http_msg_invalid; ++ } + EAT_AND_JUMP_OR_RETURN(ptr, end, http_msg_hdr_l1_sp, http_msg_ood, state, H1_MSG_HDR_L1_SP); + } + +diff --git a/src/hpack-dec.c b/src/hpack-dec.c +index 04f3d9ffa..ed39007d1 100644 +--- a/src/hpack-dec.c ++++ b/src/hpack-dec.c +@@ -420,6 +420,15 @@ int hpack_decode_frame(struct hpack_dht *dht, const uint8_t *raw, uint32_t len, + /* and are correctly filled here */ + } + ++ /* We must not accept empty header names (forbidden by the spec and used ++ * as a list termination). ++ */ ++ if (!name.len) { ++ hpack_debug_printf("##ERR@%d##\n", __LINE__); ++ ret = -HPACK_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; ++ goto leave; ++ } ++ + /* here's what we have here : + * - name.len > 0 + * - value is filled with either const data or data allocated from tmp +-- +2.37.3 + diff --git a/SOURCES/bz2174172-refuse-response-end-stream-flag.patch b/SOURCES/bz2174172-refuse-response-end-stream-flag.patch deleted file mode 100644 index e3e83d9..0000000 --- a/SOURCES/bz2174172-refuse-response-end-stream-flag.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,52 +0,0 @@ -From 2c681c6f30fb90adab4701e287ff7a7db669b2e7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Christopher Faulet -Date: Thu, 22 Dec 2022 09:47:01 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH] BUG/MEDIUM: mux-h2: Refuse interim responses with end-stream - flag set - -As state in RFC9113#8.1, HEADERS frame with the ES flag set that carries an -informational status code is malformed. However, there is no test on this -condition. - -On 2.4 and higher, it is hard to predict consequences of this bug because -end of the message is only reported with a flag. But on 2.2 and lower, it -leads to a crash because there is an unexpected extra EOM block at the end -of an interim response. - -Now, when a ES flag is detected on a HEADERS frame for an interim message, a -stream error is sent (RST_STREAM/PROTOCOL_ERROR). - -This patch should solve the issue #1972. It should be backported as far as -2.0. - -(cherry picked from commit 827a6299e6995c5c3ba620d8b7cbacdaef67f2c4) -Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau -(cherry picked from commit ebfae006c6b5de1d1fe0cdd51847ec1e39d5cf59) -Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet -(cherry picked from commit 84f5cba24f59b1c8339bb38323fcb01f434ba8e5) -Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet -(cherry picked from commit f5748a98c34bc889cae9386ca4f7073ab3f4c6b1) -Signed-off-by: Christopher Faulet ---- - src/mux_h2.c | 5 +++++ - 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) - -diff --git a/src/mux_h2.c b/src/mux_h2.c -index 7d23e5abd..7dbbfefec 100644 ---- a/src/mux_h2.c -+++ b/src/mux_h2.c -@@ -4942,6 +4942,11 @@ static int h2c_decode_headers(struct h2c *h2c, struct buffer *rxbuf, uint32_t *f - *flags |= H2_SF_HEADERS_RCVD; - - if (h2c->dff & H2_F_HEADERS_END_STREAM) { -+ if (msgf & H2_MSGF_RSP_1XX) { -+ /* RFC9113#8.1 : HEADERS frame with the ES flag set that carries an informational status code is malformed */ -+ TRACE_STATE("invalid interim response with ES flag!", H2_EV_RX_FRAME|H2_EV_RX_HDR|H2_EV_H2C_ERR|H2_EV_PROTO_ERR, h2c->conn); -+ goto fail; -+ } - /* no more data are expected for this message */ - htx->flags |= HTX_FL_EOM; - } --- -2.37.3 - diff --git a/SOURCES/bz2174174-reject-empty-http-header-fields.patch b/SOURCES/bz2174174-reject-empty-http-header-fields.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 5623d7a..0000000 --- a/SOURCES/bz2174174-reject-empty-http-header-fields.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,164 +0,0 @@ -From 486cd730485c8a119ef65b3f792134b56e7941b4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Willy Tarreau -Date: Thu, 9 Feb 2023 21:36:54 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH] BUG/CRITICAL: http: properly reject empty http header field - names - -The HTTP header parsers surprizingly accepts empty header field names, -and this is a leftover from the original code that was agnostic to this. - -When muxes were introduced, for H2 first, the HPACK decompressor needed -to feed headers lists, and since empty header names were strictly -forbidden by the protocol, the lists of headers were purposely designed -to be terminated by an empty header field name (a principle that is -similar to H1's empty line termination). This principle was preserved -and generalized to other protocols migrated to muxes (H1/FCGI/H3 etc) -without anyone ever noticing that the H1 parser was still able to deliver -empty header field names to this list. In addition to this it turns out -that the HPACK decompressor, despite a comment in the code, may -successfully decompress an empty header field name, and this mistake -was propagated to the QPACK decompressor as well. - -The impact is that an empty header field name may be used to truncate -the list of headers and thus make some headers disappear. While for -H2/H3 the impact is limited as haproxy sees a request with missing -headers, and headers are not used to delimit messages, in the case of -HTTP/1, the impact is significant because the presence (and sometimes -contents) of certain sensitive headers is detected during the parsing. -Thus, some of these headers may be seen, marked as present, their value -extracted, but never delivered to upper layers and obviously not -forwarded to the other side either. This can have for consequence that -certain important header fields such as Connection, Upgrade, Host, -Content-length, Transfer-Encoding etc are possibly seen as different -between what haproxy uses to parse/forward/route and what is observed -in http-request rules and of course, forwarded. One direct consequence -is that it is possible to exploit this property in HTTP/1 to make -affected versions of haproxy forward more data than is advertised on -the other side, and bypass some access controls or routing rules by -crafting extraneous requests. Note, however, that responses to such -requests will normally not be passed back to the client, but this can -still cause some harm. - -This specific risk can be mostly worked around in configuration using -the following rule that will rely on the bug's impact to precisely -detect the inconsistency between the known body size and the one -expected to be advertised to the server (the rule works from 2.0 to -2.8-dev): - - http-request deny if { fc_http_major 1 } !{ req.body_size 0 } !{ req.hdr(content-length) -m found } !{ req.hdr(transfer-encoding) -m found } !{ method CONNECT } - -This will exclusively block such carefully crafted requests delivered -over HTTP/1. HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 do not need content-length, and a body -that arrives without being announced with a content-length will be -forwarded using transfer-encoding, hence will not cause discrepancies. -In HAProxy 2.0 in legacy mode ("no option http-use-htx"), this rule will -simply have no effect but will not cause trouble either. - -A clean solution would consist in modifying the loops iterating over -these headers lists to check the header name's pointer instead of its -length (since both are zero at the end of the list), but this requires -to touch tens of places and it's very easy to miss one. Functions such -as htx_add_header(), htx_add_trailer(), htx_add_all_headers() would be -good starting points for such a possible future change. - -Instead the current fix focuses on blocking empty headers where they -are first inserted, hence in the H1/HPACK/QPACK decoders. One benefit -of the current solution (for H1) is that it allows "show errors" to -report a precise diagnostic when facing such invalid HTTP/1 requests, -with the exact location of the problem and the originating address: - - $ printf "GET / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: localhost\r\n:empty header\r\n\r\n" | nc 0 8001 - HTTP/1.1 400 Bad request - Content-length: 90 - Cache-Control: no-cache - Connection: close - Content-Type: text/html - -

400 Bad request

- Your browser sent an invalid request. - - - $ socat /var/run/haproxy.stat <<< "show errors" - Total events captured on [10/Feb/2023:16:29:37.530] : 1 - - [10/Feb/2023:16:29:34.155] frontend decrypt (#2): invalid request - backend (#-1), server (#-1), event #0, src 127.0.0.1:31092 - buffer starts at 0 (including 0 out), 16334 free, - len 50, wraps at 16336, error at position 33 - H1 connection flags 0x00000000, H1 stream flags 0x00000810 - H1 msg state MSG_HDR_NAME(17), H1 msg flags 0x00001410 - H1 chunk len 0 bytes, H1 body len 0 bytes : - - 00000 GET / HTTP/1.1\r\n - 00016 Host: localhost\r\n - 00033 :empty header\r\n - 00048 \r\n - -I want to address sincere and warm thanks for their great work to the -team composed of the following security researchers who found the issue -together and reported it: Bahruz Jabiyev, Anthony Gavazzi, and Engin -Kirda from Northeastern University, Kaan Onarlioglu from Akamai -Technologies, Adi Peleg and Harvey Tuch from Google. And kudos to Amaury -Denoyelle from HAProxy Technologies for spotting that the HPACK and -QPACK decoders would let this pass despite the comment explicitly -saying otherwise. - -This fix must be backported as far as 2.0. The QPACK changes can be -dropped before 2.6. In 2.0 there is also the equivalent code for legacy -mode, which doesn't suffer from the list truncation, but it would better -be fixed regardless. - -CVE-2023-25725 was assigned to this issue. - -(cherry picked from commit a8598a2eb11b6c989e81f0dbf10be361782e8d32) -Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau -(cherry picked from commit a0e561ad7f29ed50c473f5a9da664267b60d1112) -Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau -(cherry picked from commit 73be199c4f5f1ed468161a4c5e10ca77cd5989d8) -[wt: dropped QPACK changes for 2.5] -Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau -(cherry picked from commit f8b2b88aeae15dc3b261cd3749277ae75caf9db8) -Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau ---- - src/h1.c | 4 ++++ - src/hpack-dec.c | 9 +++++++++ - 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+) - -diff --git a/src/h1.c b/src/h1.c -index 4c2e234c5..73de48be0 100644 ---- a/src/h1.c -+++ b/src/h1.c -@@ -750,6 +750,10 @@ int h1_headers_to_hdr_list(char *start, const char *stop, - - if (likely(*ptr == ':')) { - col = ptr - start; -+ if (col <= sol) { -+ state = H1_MSG_HDR_NAME; -+ goto http_msg_invalid; -+ } - EAT_AND_JUMP_OR_RETURN(ptr, end, http_msg_hdr_l1_sp, http_msg_ood, state, H1_MSG_HDR_L1_SP); - } - -diff --git a/src/hpack-dec.c b/src/hpack-dec.c -index 04f3d9ffa..ed39007d1 100644 ---- a/src/hpack-dec.c -+++ b/src/hpack-dec.c -@@ -420,6 +420,15 @@ int hpack_decode_frame(struct hpack_dht *dht, const uint8_t *raw, uint32_t len, - /* and are correctly filled here */ - } - -+ /* We must not accept empty header names (forbidden by the spec and used -+ * as a list termination). -+ */ -+ if (!name.len) { -+ hpack_debug_printf("##ERR@%d##\n", __LINE__); -+ ret = -HPACK_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; -+ goto leave; -+ } -+ - /* here's what we have here : - * - name.len > 0 - * - value is filled with either const data or data allocated from tmp --- -2.37.3 - diff --git a/SOURCES/haproxy.sysusers b/SOURCES/haproxy.sysusers new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f17003a --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/haproxy.sysusers @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +u haproxy - "haproxy" /var/lib/haproxy diff --git a/SPECS/haproxy.spec b/SPECS/haproxy.spec index 85a28e7..a9671a1 100644 --- a/SPECS/haproxy.spec +++ b/SPECS/haproxy.spec @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ Name: haproxy Version: 2.4.17 -Release: 3%{?dist}.2 +Release: 6%{?dist} Summary: HAProxy reverse proxy for high availability environments License: GPLv2+ @@ -19,10 +19,11 @@ Source1: %{name}.service Source2: %{name}.cfg Source3: %{name}.logrotate Source4: %{name}.sysconfig -Source5: halog.1 +Source5: %{name}.sysusers +Source6: halog.1 -Patch0: bz2174172-refuse-response-end-stream-flag.patch -Patch1: bz2174174-reject-empty-http-header-fields.patch +Patch0: bz2161140-refuse-response-end-stream-flag.patch +Patch1: bz2169510-reject-empty-http-header-fields.patch BuildRequires: gcc BuildRequires: lua-devel @@ -30,6 +31,7 @@ BuildRequires: pcre2-devel BuildRequires: openssl-devel BuildRequires: systemd-devel BuildRequires: systemd +BuildRequires: systemd-rpm-macros BuildRequires: make Requires(pre): shadow-utils @@ -76,7 +78,8 @@ popd %{__install} -p -D -m 0644 %{SOURCE2} %{buildroot}%{haproxy_confdir}/%{name}.cfg %{__install} -p -D -m 0644 %{SOURCE3} %{buildroot}%{_sysconfdir}/logrotate.d/%{name} %{__install} -p -D -m 0644 %{SOURCE4} %{buildroot}%{_sysconfdir}/sysconfig/%{name} -%{__install} -p -D -m 0644 %{SOURCE5} %{buildroot}%{_mandir}/man1/halog.1 +%{__install} -p -D -m 0644 %{SOURCE5} %{buildroot}%{_sysusersdir}/%{name}.conf +%{__install} -p -D -m 0644 %{SOURCE6} %{buildroot}%{_mandir}/man1/halog.1 %{__install} -d -m 0755 %{buildroot}%{haproxy_homedir} %{__install} -d -m 0755 %{buildroot}%{haproxy_datadir} %{__install} -d -m 0755 %{buildroot}%{haproxy_confdir}/conf.d @@ -102,12 +105,7 @@ do done %pre -getent group %{haproxy_group} >/dev/null || \ - groupadd -r %{haproxy_group} -getent passwd %{haproxy_user} >/dev/null || \ - useradd -r -g %{haproxy_user} -d %{haproxy_homedir} \ - -s /sbin/nologin -c "haproxy" %{haproxy_user} -exit 0 +%sysusers_create_compat %{SOURCE5} %post %systemd_post %{name}.service @@ -136,13 +134,17 @@ exit 0 %{_bindir}/iprange %{_bindir}/ip6range %{_mandir}/man1/* +%{_sysusersdir}/%{name}.conf %changelog -* Thu Mar 02 2023 Ryan O'Hara - 2.4.17-3.2 -- Reject empty http header field names (CVE-2023-25725, #2174174) +* Mon Feb 27 2023 Ryan O'Hara - 2.4.17-6 +- Reject empty http header field names (CVE-2023-25725, #2169510) -* Thu Mar 02 2023 Ryan O'Hara - 2.4.17-3.1 -- Refuse interim responses with end-stream flag set (CVE-2023-0056, #2174172) +* Mon Feb 27 2023 Ryan O'Hara - 2.4.17-5 +- Refuse interim responses with end-stream flag set (CVE-2023-0056, #2161140) + +* Wed Nov 30 2022 Ryan O'Hara - 2.4.17-4 +- Use systemd-sysusers for user/group creation (#2095422) * Mon Jul 25 2022 Ryan O'Hara - 2.4.17-3 - Fix changelog and rebuild