Blame SOURCES/cve-2022-1271-part1.patch

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From dc9740df61e575e8c3148b7bd3c147a81ea00c7c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Lasse Collin <lasse.collin@tukaani.org>
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Date: Mon, 4 Apr 2022 23:52:49 -0700
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Subject: zgrep: avoid exploit via multi-newline file names
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* zgrep.in: The issue with the old code is that with multiple
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newlines, the N-command will read the second line of input,
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then the s-commands will be skipped because it's not the end
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of the file yet, then a new sed cycle starts and the pattern
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space is printed and emptied. So only the last line or two get
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escaped. This patch makes sed read all lines into the pattern
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space and then do the escaping.
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This vulnerability was discovered by:
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cleemy desu wayo working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
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---
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 zgrep.in | 10 +++++++---
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 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/zgrep.in b/zgrep.in
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index 345dae3..bdf7da2 100644
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--- a/zgrep.in
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+++ b/zgrep.in
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@@ -222,9 +222,13 @@ do
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 '* | *'&'* | *'\'* | *'|'*)
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         i=$(printf '%s\n' "$i" |
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             sed '
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-              $!N
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-              $s/[&\|]/\\&/g
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-              $s/\n/\\n/g
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+              :start
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+              $!{
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+                N
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+                b start
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+              }
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+              s/[&\|]/\\&/g
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+              s/\n/\\n/g
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             ');;
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       esac
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       sed_script="s|^|$i:|"
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-- 
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cgit v1.1
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