diff --git a/README.debrand b/README.debrand
deleted file mode 100644
index 01c46d2..0000000
--- a/README.debrand
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
-Warning: This package was configured for automatic debranding, but the changes
-failed to apply.
diff --git a/SOURCES/0290-x86-efi-Fix-an-incorrect-array-size-in-kernel-alloca.patch b/SOURCES/0290-x86-efi-Fix-an-incorrect-array-size-in-kernel-alloca.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..12c3525
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/0290-x86-efi-Fix-an-incorrect-array-size-in-kernel-alloca.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 11 Oct 2022 17:00:50 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH] x86-efi: Fix an incorrect array size in kernel allocation
+
+In 81a6ebf62bbe166ddc968463df2e8bd481bf697c ("efi: split allocation
+policy for kernel vs initrd memories."), I introduced a split in the
+kernel allocator to allow for different dynamic policies for the kernel
+and the initrd allocations.
+
+Unfortunately, that change increased the size of the policy data used to
+make decisions, but did not change the size of the temporary storage we
+use to back it up and restore. This results in some of .data getting
+clobbered at runtime, and hilarity ensues.
+
+This patch makes the size of the backup storage be based on the size of
+the initial policy data.
+
+Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 37747b22342499a798ca3a8895770cd93b6e1258)
+---
+ grub-core/loader/i386/efi/linux.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/loader/i386/efi/linux.c b/grub-core/loader/i386/efi/linux.c
+index f23b3f7b01..18aadc3e07 100644
+--- a/grub-core/loader/i386/efi/linux.c
++++ b/grub-core/loader/i386/efi/linux.c
+@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ static struct allocation_choice max_addresses[] =
+ { INITRD_MEM, GRUB_EFI_MAX_ALLOCATION_ADDRESS, GRUB_EFI_ALLOCATE_MAX_ADDRESS },
+ { NO_MEM, 0, 0 }
+ };
+-static struct allocation_choice saved_addresses[4];
++static struct allocation_choice saved_addresses[sizeof(max_addresses) / sizeof(max_addresses[0])];
+
+ #define save_addresses() grub_memcpy(saved_addresses, max_addresses, sizeof(max_addresses))
+ #define restore_addresses() grub_memcpy(max_addresses, saved_addresses, sizeof(max_addresses))
diff --git a/SOURCES/0291-commands-efi-tpm-Refine-the-status-of-log-event.patch b/SOURCES/0291-commands-efi-tpm-Refine-the-status-of-log-event.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..12315fd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/0291-commands-efi-tpm-Refine-the-status-of-log-event.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Lu Ken <ken.lu@intel.com>
+Date: Wed, 13 Jul 2022 10:06:10 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH] commands/efi/tpm: Refine the status of log event
+
+1. Use macro GRUB_ERR_NONE instead of hard code 0.
+2. Keep lowercase of the first char for the status string of log event.
+
+Signed-off-by: Lu Ken <ken.lu@intel.com>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 922898573e37135f5dedc16f3e15a1d1d4c53f8a)
+(cherry picked from commit a326f1247c4d3a1d1079eacbe7e58b35b9a287e2)
+---
+ grub-core/commands/efi/tpm.c | 10 +++++-----
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/commands/efi/tpm.c b/grub-core/commands/efi/tpm.c
+index a97d85368a..7acf510499 100644
+--- a/grub-core/commands/efi/tpm.c
++++ b/grub-core/commands/efi/tpm.c
+@@ -135,17 +135,17 @@ grub_efi_log_event_status (grub_efi_status_t status)
+ switch (status)
+ {
+ case GRUB_EFI_SUCCESS:
+- return 0;
++ return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+ case GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_ERROR:
+- return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_IO, N_("Command failed"));
++ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_IO, N_("command failed"));
+ case GRUB_EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER:
+- return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, N_("Invalid parameter"));
++ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, N_("invalid parameter"));
+ case GRUB_EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL:
+- return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, N_("Output buffer too small"));
++ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, N_("output buffer too small"));
+ case GRUB_EFI_NOT_FOUND:
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_UNKNOWN_DEVICE, N_("TPM unavailable"));
+ default:
+- return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_UNKNOWN_DEVICE, N_("Unknown TPM error"));
++ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_UNKNOWN_DEVICE, N_("unknown TPM error"));
+ }
+ }
+
diff --git a/SOURCES/0292-commands-efi-tpm-Use-grub_strcpy-instead-of-grub_mem.patch b/SOURCES/0292-commands-efi-tpm-Use-grub_strcpy-instead-of-grub_mem.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3e8d899
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/0292-commands-efi-tpm-Use-grub_strcpy-instead-of-grub_mem.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Lu Ken <ken.lu@intel.com>
+Date: Wed, 13 Jul 2022 10:06:11 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH] commands/efi/tpm: Use grub_strcpy() instead of grub_memcpy()
+
+The event description is a string, so using grub_strcpy() is cleaner than
+using grub_memcpy().
+
+Signed-off-by: Lu Ken <ken.lu@intel.com>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
+(cherry picked from commit ef8679b645a63eb9eb191bb9539d7d25a9d6ff3b)
+(cherry picked from commit 6d0d478585c435cce50d4025d2301dc0413bc5c0)
+---
+ grub-core/commands/efi/tpm.c | 4 ++--
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/commands/efi/tpm.c b/grub-core/commands/efi/tpm.c
+index 7acf510499..bb59599721 100644
+--- a/grub-core/commands/efi/tpm.c
++++ b/grub-core/commands/efi/tpm.c
+@@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ grub_tpm1_log_event (grub_efi_handle_t tpm_handle, unsigned char *buf,
+ event->PCRIndex = pcr;
+ event->EventType = EV_IPL;
+ event->EventSize = grub_strlen (description) + 1;
+- grub_memcpy (event->Event, description, event->EventSize);
++ grub_strcpy ((char *) event->Event, description);
+
+ algorithm = TCG_ALG_SHA;
+ status = efi_call_7 (tpm->log_extend_event, tpm, (grub_addr_t) buf, (grub_uint64_t) size,
+@@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ grub_tpm2_log_event (grub_efi_handle_t tpm_handle, unsigned char *buf,
+ event->Header.EventType = EV_IPL;
+ event->Size =
+ sizeof (*event) - sizeof (event->Event) + grub_strlen (description) + 1;
+- grub_memcpy (event->Event, description, grub_strlen (description) + 1);
++ grub_strcpy ((char *) event->Event, description);
+
+ status = efi_call_5 (tpm->hash_log_extend_event, tpm, 0, (grub_addr_t) buf,
+ (grub_uint64_t) size, event);
diff --git a/SOURCES/0293-efi-tpm-Add-EFI_CC_MEASUREMENT_PROTOCOL-support.patch b/SOURCES/0293-efi-tpm-Add-EFI_CC_MEASUREMENT_PROTOCOL-support.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c8b703b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/0293-efi-tpm-Add-EFI_CC_MEASUREMENT_PROTOCOL-support.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,259 @@
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Lu Ken <ken.lu@intel.com>
+Date: Wed, 13 Jul 2022 10:06:12 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH] efi/tpm: Add EFI_CC_MEASUREMENT_PROTOCOL support
+
+The EFI_CC_MEASUREMENT_PROTOCOL abstracts the measurement for virtual firmware
+in confidential computing environment. It is similar to the EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL.
+It was proposed by Intel and ARM and approved by UEFI organization.
+
+It is defined in Intel GHCI specification: https://cdrdv2.intel.com/v1/dl/getContent/726790 .
+The EDKII header file is available at https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/blob/master/MdePkg/Include/Protocol/CcMeasurement.h .
+
+Signed-off-by: Lu Ken <ken.lu@intel.com>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 4c76565b6cb885b7e144dc27f3612066844e2d19)
+(cherry picked from commit cad2fc1ff659390a228efb474a72f7ed7ab21697)
+---
+ grub-core/commands/efi/tpm.c | 48 ++++++++++++++
+ include/grub/efi/cc.h | 151 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 199 insertions(+)
+ create mode 100644 include/grub/efi/cc.h
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/commands/efi/tpm.c b/grub-core/commands/efi/tpm.c
+index bb59599721..ae09c1bf8b 100644
+--- a/grub-core/commands/efi/tpm.c
++++ b/grub-core/commands/efi/tpm.c
+@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
+ #include <grub/i18n.h>
+ #include <grub/efi/api.h>
+ #include <grub/efi/efi.h>
++#include <grub/efi/cc.h>
+ #include <grub/efi/tpm.h>
+ #include <grub/mm.h>
+ #include <grub/tpm.h>
+@@ -31,6 +32,7 @@ typedef TCG_PCR_EVENT grub_tpm_event_t;
+
+ static grub_efi_guid_t tpm_guid = EFI_TPM_GUID;
+ static grub_efi_guid_t tpm2_guid = EFI_TPM2_GUID;
++static grub_efi_guid_t cc_measurement_guid = GRUB_EFI_CC_MEASUREMENT_PROTOCOL_GUID;
+
+ static grub_efi_handle_t *grub_tpm_handle;
+ static grub_uint8_t grub_tpm_version;
+@@ -221,6 +223,50 @@ grub_tpm2_log_event (grub_efi_handle_t tpm_handle, unsigned char *buf,
+ return grub_efi_log_event_status (status);
+ }
+
++static void
++grub_cc_log_event (unsigned char *buf, grub_size_t size, grub_uint8_t pcr,
++ const char *description)
++{
++ grub_efi_cc_event_t *event;
++ grub_efi_status_t status;
++ grub_efi_cc_protocol_t *cc;
++ grub_efi_cc_mr_index_t mr;
++
++ cc = grub_efi_locate_protocol (&cc_measurement_guid, NULL);
++ if (cc == NULL)
++ return;
++
++ status = efi_call_3 (cc->map_pcr_to_mr_index, cc, pcr, &mr);
++ if (status != GRUB_EFI_SUCCESS)
++ {
++ grub_efi_log_event_status (status);
++ return;
++ }
++
++ event = grub_zalloc (sizeof (grub_efi_cc_event_t) +
++ grub_strlen (description) + 1);
++ if (event == NULL)
++ {
++ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY, N_("cannot allocate CC event buffer"));
++ return;
++ }
++
++ event->Header.HeaderSize = sizeof (grub_efi_cc_event_header_t);
++ event->Header.HeaderVersion = GRUB_EFI_CC_EVENT_HEADER_VERSION;
++ event->Header.MrIndex = mr;
++ event->Header.EventType = EV_IPL;
++ event->Size = sizeof (*event) + grub_strlen (description) + 1;
++ grub_strcpy ((char *) event->Event, description);
++
++ status = efi_call_5 (cc->hash_log_extend_event, cc, 0,
++ (grub_efi_physical_address_t)(grub_addr_t) buf,
++ (grub_efi_uint64_t) size, event);
++ grub_free (event);
++
++ if (status != GRUB_EFI_SUCCESS)
++ grub_efi_log_event_status (status);
++}
++
+ grub_err_t
+ grub_tpm_measure (unsigned char *buf, grub_size_t size, grub_uint8_t pcr,
+ const char *description)
+@@ -228,6 +274,8 @@ grub_tpm_measure (unsigned char *buf, grub_size_t size, grub_uint8_t pcr,
+ grub_efi_handle_t tpm_handle;
+ grub_efi_uint8_t protocol_version;
+
++ grub_cc_log_event(buf, size, pcr, description);
++
+ if (!grub_tpm_handle_find (&tpm_handle, &protocol_version))
+ return 0;
+
+diff --git a/include/grub/efi/cc.h b/include/grub/efi/cc.h
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000000..8960306890
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/include/grub/efi/cc.h
+@@ -0,0 +1,151 @@
++/*
++ * GRUB -- GRand Unified Bootloader
++ * Copyright (C) 2022 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
++ *
++ * GRUB is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
++ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
++ * the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
++ * (at your option) any later version.
++ *
++ * GRUB is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
++ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
++ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
++ * GNU General Public License for more details.
++ *
++ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
++ * along with GRUB. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
++ */
++
++#ifndef GRUB_EFI_CC_H
++#define GRUB_EFI_CC_H 1
++
++#include <grub/efi/api.h>
++#include <grub/efi/efi.h>
++#include <grub/err.h>
++
++#define GRUB_EFI_CC_MEASUREMENT_PROTOCOL_GUID \
++ { 0x96751a3d, 0x72f4, 0x41a6, \
++ { 0xa7, 0x94, 0xed, 0x5d, 0x0e, 0x67, 0xae, 0x6b } \
++ };
++
++struct grub_efi_cc_version
++{
++ grub_efi_uint8_t Major;
++ grub_efi_uint8_t Minor;
++};
++typedef struct grub_efi_cc_version grub_efi_cc_version_t;
++
++/* EFI_CC Type/SubType definition. */
++#define GRUB_EFI_CC_TYPE_NONE 0
++#define GRUB_EFI_CC_TYPE_SEV 1
++#define GRUB_EFI_CC_TYPE_TDX 2
++
++struct grub_efi_cc_type
++{
++ grub_efi_uint8_t Type;
++ grub_efi_uint8_t SubType;
++};
++typedef struct grub_efi_cc_type grub_efi_cc_type_t;
++
++typedef grub_efi_uint32_t grub_efi_cc_event_log_bitmap_t;
++typedef grub_efi_uint32_t grub_efi_cc_event_log_format_t;
++typedef grub_efi_uint32_t grub_efi_cc_event_algorithm_bitmap_t;
++typedef grub_efi_uint32_t grub_efi_cc_mr_index_t;
++
++/* Intel TDX measure register index. */
++#define GRUB_TDX_MR_INDEX_MRTD 0
++#define GRUB_TDX_MR_INDEX_RTMR0 1
++#define GRUB_TDX_MR_INDEX_RTMR1 2
++#define GRUB_TDX_MR_INDEX_RTMR2 3
++#define GRUB_TDX_MR_INDEX_RTMR3 4
++
++#define GRUB_EFI_CC_EVENT_LOG_FORMAT_TCG_2 0x00000002
++#define GRUB_EFI_CC_BOOT_HASH_ALG_SHA384 0x00000004
++#define GRUB_EFI_CC_EVENT_HEADER_VERSION 1
++
++struct grub_efi_cc_event_header
++{
++ /* Size of the event header itself (sizeof(EFI_TD_EVENT_HEADER)). */
++ grub_efi_uint32_t HeaderSize;
++
++ /*
++ * Header version. For this version of this specification,
++ * the value shall be 1.
++ */
++ grub_efi_uint16_t HeaderVersion;
++
++ /* Index of the MR that shall be extended. */
++ grub_efi_cc_mr_index_t MrIndex;
++
++ /* Type of the event that shall be extended (and optionally logged). */
++ grub_efi_uint32_t EventType;
++} GRUB_PACKED;
++typedef struct grub_efi_cc_event_header grub_efi_cc_event_header_t;
++
++struct grub_efi_cc_event
++{
++ /* Total size of the event including the Size component, the header and the Event data. */
++ grub_efi_uint32_t Size;
++ grub_efi_cc_event_header_t Header;
++ grub_efi_uint8_t Event[0];
++} GRUB_PACKED;
++typedef struct grub_efi_cc_event grub_efi_cc_event_t;
++
++struct grub_efi_cc_boot_service_capability
++{
++ /* Allocated size of the structure. */
++ grub_efi_uint8_t Size;
++
++ /*
++ * Version of the grub_efi_cc_boot_service_capability_t structure itself.
++ * For this version of the protocol, the Major version shall be set to 1
++ * and the Minor version shall be set to 1.
++ */
++ grub_efi_cc_version_t StructureVersion;
++
++ /*
++ * Version of the EFI TD protocol.
++ * For this version of the protocol, the Major version shall be set to 1
++ * and the Minor version shall be set to 1.
++ */
++ grub_efi_cc_version_t ProtocolVersion;
++
++ /* Supported hash algorithms. */
++ grub_efi_cc_event_algorithm_bitmap_t HashAlgorithmBitmap;
++
++ /* Bitmap of supported event log formats. */
++ grub_efi_cc_event_log_bitmap_t SupportedEventLogs;
++
++ /* Indicates the CC type. */
++ grub_efi_cc_type_t CcType;
++};
++typedef struct grub_efi_cc_boot_service_capability grub_efi_cc_boot_service_capability_t;
++
++struct grub_efi_cc_protocol
++{
++ grub_efi_status_t
++ (*get_capability) (struct grub_efi_cc_protocol *this,
++ grub_efi_cc_boot_service_capability_t *ProtocolCapability);
++
++ grub_efi_status_t
++ (*get_event_log) (struct grub_efi_cc_protocol *this,
++ grub_efi_cc_event_log_format_t EventLogFormat,
++ grub_efi_physical_address_t *EventLogLocation,
++ grub_efi_physical_address_t *EventLogLastEntry,
++ grub_efi_boolean_t *EventLogTruncated);
++
++ grub_efi_status_t
++ (*hash_log_extend_event) (struct grub_efi_cc_protocol *this,
++ grub_efi_uint64_t Flags,
++ grub_efi_physical_address_t DataToHash,
++ grub_efi_uint64_t DataToHashLen,
++ grub_efi_cc_event_t *EfiCcEvent);
++
++ grub_efi_status_t
++ (*map_pcr_to_mr_index) (struct grub_efi_cc_protocol *this,
++ grub_efi_uint32_t PcrIndex,
++ grub_efi_cc_mr_index_t *MrIndex);
++};
++typedef struct grub_efi_cc_protocol grub_efi_cc_protocol_t;
++
++#endif
diff --git a/SOURCES/0294-font-Reject-glyphs-exceeds-font-max_glyph_width-or-f.patch b/SOURCES/0294-font-Reject-glyphs-exceeds-font-max_glyph_width-or-f.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e264b09
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/0294-font-Reject-glyphs-exceeds-font-max_glyph_width-or-f.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Zhang Boyang <zhangboyang.id@gmail.com>
+Date: Wed, 3 Aug 2022 19:45:33 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH] font: Reject glyphs exceeds font->max_glyph_width or
+ font->max_glyph_height
+
+Check glyph's width and height against limits specified in font's
+metadata. Reject the glyph (and font) if such limits are exceeded.
+
+Signed-off-by: Zhang Boyang <zhangboyang.id@gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 5760fcfd466cc757540ea0d591bad6a08caeaa16)
+(cherry picked from commit 3b410ef4bb95e607cadeba2193fa90ae9bddb98d)
+---
+ grub-core/font/font.c | 4 +++-
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/font/font.c b/grub-core/font/font.c
+index d09bb38d89..2f09a4a55b 100644
+--- a/grub-core/font/font.c
++++ b/grub-core/font/font.c
+@@ -760,7 +760,9 @@ grub_font_get_glyph_internal (grub_font_t font, grub_uint32_t code)
+ || read_be_uint16 (font->file, &height) != 0
+ || read_be_int16 (font->file, &xoff) != 0
+ || read_be_int16 (font->file, &yoff) != 0
+- || read_be_int16 (font->file, &dwidth) != 0)
++ || read_be_int16 (font->file, &dwidth) != 0
++ || width > font->max_char_width
++ || height > font->max_char_height)
+ {
+ remove_font (font);
+ return 0;
diff --git a/SOURCES/0295-font-Fix-size-overflow-in-grub_font_get_glyph_intern.patch b/SOURCES/0295-font-Fix-size-overflow-in-grub_font_get_glyph_intern.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7ec23ab
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/0295-font-Fix-size-overflow-in-grub_font_get_glyph_intern.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Zhang Boyang <zhangboyang.id@gmail.com>
+Date: Fri, 5 Aug 2022 00:51:20 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH] font: Fix size overflow in grub_font_get_glyph_internal()
+
+The length of memory allocation and file read may overflow. This patch
+fixes the problem by using safemath macros.
+
+There is a lot of code repetition like "(x * y + 7) / 8". It is unsafe
+if overflow happens. This patch introduces grub_video_bitmap_calc_1bpp_bufsz().
+It is safe replacement for such code. It has safemath-like prototype.
+
+This patch also introduces grub_cast(value, pointer), it casts value to
+typeof(*pointer) then store the value to *pointer. It returns true when
+overflow occurs or false if there is no overflow. The semantics of arguments
+and return value are designed to be consistent with other safemath macros.
+
+Signed-off-by: Zhang Boyang <zhangboyang.id@gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 941d10ad6f1dcbd12fb613002249e29ba035f985)
+(cherry picked from commit 6bca9693878bdf61dd62b8c784862a48e75f569a)
+---
+ grub-core/font/font.c | 17 +++++++++++++----
+ include/grub/bitmap.h | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
+ include/grub/safemath.h | 2 ++
+ 3 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/font/font.c b/grub-core/font/font.c
+index 2f09a4a55b..6a3fbebbd8 100644
+--- a/grub-core/font/font.c
++++ b/grub-core/font/font.c
+@@ -739,7 +739,8 @@ grub_font_get_glyph_internal (grub_font_t font, grub_uint32_t code)
+ grub_int16_t xoff;
+ grub_int16_t yoff;
+ grub_int16_t dwidth;
+- int len;
++ grub_ssize_t len;
++ grub_size_t sz;
+
+ if (index_entry->glyph)
+ /* Return cached glyph. */
+@@ -768,9 +769,17 @@ grub_font_get_glyph_internal (grub_font_t font, grub_uint32_t code)
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+- len = (width * height + 7) / 8;
+- glyph = grub_malloc (sizeof (struct grub_font_glyph) + len);
+- if (!glyph)
++ /* Calculate real struct size of current glyph. */
++ if (grub_video_bitmap_calc_1bpp_bufsz (width, height, &len) ||
++ grub_add (sizeof (struct grub_font_glyph), len, &sz))
++ {
++ remove_font (font);
++ return 0;
++ }
++
++ /* Allocate and initialize the glyph struct. */
++ glyph = grub_malloc (sz);
++ if (glyph == NULL)
+ {
+ remove_font (font);
+ return 0;
+diff --git a/include/grub/bitmap.h b/include/grub/bitmap.h
+index 5728f8ca3a..0d9603f619 100644
+--- a/include/grub/bitmap.h
++++ b/include/grub/bitmap.h
+@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
+ #include <grub/symbol.h>
+ #include <grub/types.h>
+ #include <grub/video.h>
++#include <grub/safemath.h>
+
+ struct grub_video_bitmap
+ {
+@@ -79,6 +80,23 @@ grub_video_bitmap_get_height (struct grub_video_bitmap *bitmap)
+ return bitmap->mode_info.height;
+ }
+
++/*
++ * Calculate and store the size of data buffer of 1bit bitmap in result.
++ * Equivalent to "*result = (width * height + 7) / 8" if no overflow occurs.
++ * Return true when overflow occurs or false if there is no overflow.
++ * This function is intentionally implemented as a macro instead of
++ * an inline function. Although a bit awkward, it preserves data types for
++ * safemath macros and reduces macro side effects as much as possible.
++ *
++ * XXX: Will report false overflow if width * height > UINT64_MAX.
++ */
++#define grub_video_bitmap_calc_1bpp_bufsz(width, height, result) \
++({ \
++ grub_uint64_t _bitmap_pixels; \
++ grub_mul ((width), (height), &_bitmap_pixels) ? 1 : \
++ grub_cast (_bitmap_pixels / GRUB_CHAR_BIT + !!(_bitmap_pixels % GRUB_CHAR_BIT), (result)); \
++})
++
+ void EXPORT_FUNC (grub_video_bitmap_get_mode_info) (struct grub_video_bitmap *bitmap,
+ struct grub_video_mode_info *mode_info);
+
+diff --git a/include/grub/safemath.h b/include/grub/safemath.h
+index c17b89bba1..bb0f826de1 100644
+--- a/include/grub/safemath.h
++++ b/include/grub/safemath.h
+@@ -30,6 +30,8 @@
+ #define grub_sub(a, b, res) __builtin_sub_overflow(a, b, res)
+ #define grub_mul(a, b, res) __builtin_mul_overflow(a, b, res)
+
++#define grub_cast(a, res) grub_add ((a), 0, (res))
++
+ #else
+ #error gcc 5.1 or newer or clang 3.8 or newer is required
+ #endif
diff --git a/SOURCES/0296-font-Fix-several-integer-overflows-in-grub_font_cons.patch b/SOURCES/0296-font-Fix-several-integer-overflows-in-grub_font_cons.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fcc1d3c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/0296-font-Fix-several-integer-overflows-in-grub_font_cons.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Zhang Boyang <zhangboyang.id@gmail.com>
+Date: Fri, 5 Aug 2022 01:58:27 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH] font: Fix several integer overflows in
+ grub_font_construct_glyph()
+
+This patch fixes several integer overflows in grub_font_construct_glyph().
+Glyphs of invalid size, zero or leading to an overflow, are rejected.
+The inconsistency between "glyph" and "max_glyph_size" when grub_malloc()
+returns NULL is fixed too.
+
+Fixes: CVE-2022-2601
+
+Reported-by: Zhang Boyang <zhangboyang.id@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Zhang Boyang <zhangboyang.id@gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
+(cherry picked from commit b1805f251b31a9d3cfae5c3572ddfa630145dbbf)
+(cherry picked from commit b91eb9bd6c724339b7d7bb4765b9d36f1ee88b84)
+---
+ grub-core/font/font.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++------------
+ 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/font/font.c b/grub-core/font/font.c
+index 6a3fbebbd8..1fa181d4ca 100644
+--- a/grub-core/font/font.c
++++ b/grub-core/font/font.c
+@@ -1517,6 +1517,7 @@ grub_font_construct_glyph (grub_font_t hinted_font,
+ struct grub_video_signed_rect bounds;
+ static struct grub_font_glyph *glyph = 0;
+ static grub_size_t max_glyph_size = 0;
++ grub_size_t cur_glyph_size;
+
+ ensure_comb_space (glyph_id);
+
+@@ -1533,29 +1534,33 @@ grub_font_construct_glyph (grub_font_t hinted_font,
+ if (!glyph_id->ncomb && !glyph_id->attributes)
+ return main_glyph;
+
+- if (max_glyph_size < sizeof (*glyph) + (bounds.width * bounds.height + GRUB_CHAR_BIT - 1) / GRUB_CHAR_BIT)
++ if (grub_video_bitmap_calc_1bpp_bufsz (bounds.width, bounds.height, &cur_glyph_size) ||
++ grub_add (sizeof (*glyph), cur_glyph_size, &cur_glyph_size))
++ return main_glyph;
++
++ if (max_glyph_size < cur_glyph_size)
+ {
+ grub_free (glyph);
+- max_glyph_size = (sizeof (*glyph) + (bounds.width * bounds.height + GRUB_CHAR_BIT - 1) / GRUB_CHAR_BIT) * 2;
+- if (max_glyph_size < 8)
+- max_glyph_size = 8;
+- glyph = grub_malloc (max_glyph_size);
++ if (grub_mul (cur_glyph_size, 2, &max_glyph_size))
++ max_glyph_size = 0;
++ glyph = max_glyph_size > 0 ? grub_malloc (max_glyph_size) : NULL;
+ }
+ if (!glyph)
+ {
++ max_glyph_size = 0;
+ grub_errno = GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+ return main_glyph;
+ }
+
+- grub_memset (glyph, 0, sizeof (*glyph)
+- + (bounds.width * bounds.height
+- + GRUB_CHAR_BIT - 1) / GRUB_CHAR_BIT);
++ grub_memset (glyph, 0, cur_glyph_size);
+
+ glyph->font = main_glyph->font;
+- glyph->width = bounds.width;
+- glyph->height = bounds.height;
+- glyph->offset_x = bounds.x;
+- glyph->offset_y = bounds.y;
++ if (bounds.width == 0 || bounds.height == 0 ||
++ grub_cast (bounds.width, &glyph->width) ||
++ grub_cast (bounds.height, &glyph->height) ||
++ grub_cast (bounds.x, &glyph->offset_x) ||
++ grub_cast (bounds.y, &glyph->offset_y))
++ return main_glyph;
+
+ if (glyph_id->attributes & GRUB_UNICODE_GLYPH_ATTRIBUTE_MIRROR)
+ grub_font_blit_glyph_mirror (glyph, main_glyph,
diff --git a/SOURCES/0297-font-Remove-grub_font_dup_glyph.patch b/SOURCES/0297-font-Remove-grub_font_dup_glyph.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a3493f6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/0297-font-Remove-grub_font_dup_glyph.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Zhang Boyang <zhangboyang.id@gmail.com>
+Date: Fri, 5 Aug 2022 02:13:29 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH] font: Remove grub_font_dup_glyph()
+
+Remove grub_font_dup_glyph() since nobody is using it since 2013, and
+I'm too lazy to fix the integer overflow problem in it.
+
+Signed-off-by: Zhang Boyang <zhangboyang.id@gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 25ad31c19c331aaa2dbd9bd2b2e2655de5766a9d)
+(cherry picked from commit ad950e1e033318bb50222ed268a6dcfb97389035)
+---
+ grub-core/font/font.c | 14 --------------
+ 1 file changed, 14 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/font/font.c b/grub-core/font/font.c
+index 1fa181d4ca..a115a63b0c 100644
+--- a/grub-core/font/font.c
++++ b/grub-core/font/font.c
+@@ -1055,20 +1055,6 @@ grub_font_get_glyph_with_fallback (grub_font_t font, grub_uint32_t code)
+ return best_glyph;
+ }
+
+-#if 0
+-static struct grub_font_glyph *
+-grub_font_dup_glyph (struct grub_font_glyph *glyph)
+-{
+- static struct grub_font_glyph *ret;
+- ret = grub_malloc (sizeof (*ret) + (glyph->width * glyph->height + 7) / 8);
+- if (!ret)
+- return NULL;
+- grub_memcpy (ret, glyph, sizeof (*ret)
+- + (glyph->width * glyph->height + 7) / 8);
+- return ret;
+-}
+-#endif
+-
+ /* FIXME: suboptimal. */
+ static void
+ grub_font_blit_glyph (struct grub_font_glyph *target,
diff --git a/SOURCES/0298-font-Fix-integer-overflow-in-ensure_comb_space.patch b/SOURCES/0298-font-Fix-integer-overflow-in-ensure_comb_space.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..af5eedb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/0298-font-Fix-integer-overflow-in-ensure_comb_space.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Zhang Boyang <zhangboyang.id@gmail.com>
+Date: Fri, 5 Aug 2022 02:27:05 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH] font: Fix integer overflow in ensure_comb_space()
+
+In fact it can't overflow at all because glyph_id->ncomb is only 8-bit
+wide. But let's keep safe if somebody changes the width of glyph_id->ncomb
+in the future. This patch also fixes the inconsistency between
+render_max_comb_glyphs and render_combining_glyphs when grub_malloc()
+returns NULL.
+
+Signed-off-by: Zhang Boyang <zhangboyang.id@gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
+(cherry picked from commit b2740b7e4a03bb8331d48b54b119afea76bb9d5f)
+(cherry picked from commit f66ea1e60c347408e92b6695d5105c7e0f24d568)
+---
+ grub-core/font/font.c | 14 +++++++++-----
+ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/font/font.c b/grub-core/font/font.c
+index a115a63b0c..d0e6340404 100644
+--- a/grub-core/font/font.c
++++ b/grub-core/font/font.c
+@@ -1468,14 +1468,18 @@ ensure_comb_space (const struct grub_unicode_glyph *glyph_id)
+ if (glyph_id->ncomb <= render_max_comb_glyphs)
+ return;
+
+- render_max_comb_glyphs = 2 * glyph_id->ncomb;
+- if (render_max_comb_glyphs < 8)
++ if (grub_mul (glyph_id->ncomb, 2, &render_max_comb_glyphs))
++ render_max_comb_glyphs = 0;
++ if (render_max_comb_glyphs > 0 && render_max_comb_glyphs < 8)
+ render_max_comb_glyphs = 8;
+ grub_free (render_combining_glyphs);
+- render_combining_glyphs = grub_malloc (render_max_comb_glyphs
+- * sizeof (render_combining_glyphs[0]));
++ render_combining_glyphs = (render_max_comb_glyphs > 0) ?
++ grub_calloc (render_max_comb_glyphs, sizeof (render_combining_glyphs[0])) : NULL;
+ if (!render_combining_glyphs)
+- grub_errno = 0;
++ {
++ render_max_comb_glyphs = 0;
++ grub_errno = GRUB_ERR_NONE;
++ }
+ }
+
+ int
diff --git a/SOURCES/0299-font-Fix-integer-overflow-in-BMP-index.patch b/SOURCES/0299-font-Fix-integer-overflow-in-BMP-index.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bb22749
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/0299-font-Fix-integer-overflow-in-BMP-index.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Zhang Boyang <zhangboyang.id@gmail.com>
+Date: Mon, 15 Aug 2022 02:04:58 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH] font: Fix integer overflow in BMP index
+
+The BMP index (font->bmp_idx) is designed as a reverse lookup table of
+char entries (font->char_index), in order to speed up lookups for BMP
+chars (i.e. code < 0x10000). The values in BMP index are the subscripts
+of the corresponding char entries, stored in grub_uint16_t, while 0xffff
+means not found.
+
+This patch fixes the problem of large subscript truncated to grub_uint16_t,
+leading BMP index to return wrong char entry or report false miss. The
+code now checks for bounds and uses BMP index as a hint, and fallbacks
+to binary-search if necessary.
+
+On the occasion add a comment about BMP index is initialized to 0xffff.
+
+Signed-off-by: Zhang Boyang <zhangboyang.id@gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
+(cherry picked from commit afda8b60ba0712abe01ae1e64c5f7a067a0e6492)
+(cherry picked from commit 6d90568929e11739b56f09ebbce9185ca9c23519)
+---
+ grub-core/font/font.c | 13 +++++++++----
+ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/font/font.c b/grub-core/font/font.c
+index d0e6340404..b208a28717 100644
+--- a/grub-core/font/font.c
++++ b/grub-core/font/font.c
+@@ -300,6 +300,8 @@ load_font_index (grub_file_t file, grub_uint32_t sect_length, struct
+ font->bmp_idx = grub_malloc (0x10000 * sizeof (grub_uint16_t));
+ if (!font->bmp_idx)
+ return 1;
++
++ /* Init the BMP index array to 0xffff. */
+ grub_memset (font->bmp_idx, 0xff, 0x10000 * sizeof (grub_uint16_t));
+
+
+@@ -328,7 +330,7 @@ load_font_index (grub_file_t file, grub_uint32_t sect_length, struct
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+- if (entry->code < 0x10000)
++ if (entry->code < 0x10000 && i < 0xffff)
+ font->bmp_idx[entry->code] = i;
+
+ last_code = entry->code;
+@@ -696,9 +698,12 @@ find_glyph (const grub_font_t font, grub_uint32_t code)
+ /* Use BMP index if possible. */
+ if (code < 0x10000 && font->bmp_idx)
+ {
+- if (font->bmp_idx[code] == 0xffff)
+- return 0;
+- return &table[font->bmp_idx[code]];
++ if (font->bmp_idx[code] < 0xffff)
++ return &table[font->bmp_idx[code]];
++ /*
++ * When we are here then lookup in BMP index result in miss,
++ * fallthough to binary-search.
++ */
+ }
+
+ /* Do a binary search in `char_index', which is ordered by code point. */
diff --git a/SOURCES/0300-font-Fix-integer-underflow-in-binary-search-of-char-.patch b/SOURCES/0300-font-Fix-integer-underflow-in-binary-search-of-char-.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5c25e09
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/0300-font-Fix-integer-underflow-in-binary-search-of-char-.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Zhang Boyang <zhangboyang.id@gmail.com>
+Date: Sun, 14 Aug 2022 18:09:38 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH] font: Fix integer underflow in binary search of char index
+
+If search target is less than all entries in font->index then "hi"
+variable is set to -1, which translates to SIZE_MAX and leads to errors.
+
+This patch fixes the problem by replacing the entire binary search code
+with the libstdc++'s std::lower_bound() implementation.
+
+Signed-off-by: Zhang Boyang <zhangboyang.id@gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
+(cherry picked from commit c140a086838e7c9af87842036f891b8393a8c4bc)
+(cherry picked from commit e110997335b1744464ea232d57a7d86e16ca8dee)
+---
+ grub-core/font/font.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++------------------
+ 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/font/font.c b/grub-core/font/font.c
+index b208a28717..193dfec045 100644
+--- a/grub-core/font/font.c
++++ b/grub-core/font/font.c
+@@ -688,12 +688,12 @@ read_be_int16 (grub_file_t file, grub_int16_t * value)
+ static inline struct char_index_entry *
+ find_glyph (const grub_font_t font, grub_uint32_t code)
+ {
+- struct char_index_entry *table;
+- grub_size_t lo;
+- grub_size_t hi;
+- grub_size_t mid;
++ struct char_index_entry *table, *first, *end;
++ grub_size_t len;
+
+ table = font->char_index;
++ if (table == NULL)
++ return NULL;
+
+ /* Use BMP index if possible. */
+ if (code < 0x10000 && font->bmp_idx)
+@@ -706,25 +706,29 @@ find_glyph (const grub_font_t font, grub_uint32_t code)
+ */
+ }
+
+- /* Do a binary search in `char_index', which is ordered by code point. */
+- lo = 0;
+- hi = font->num_chars - 1;
++ /*
++ * Do a binary search in char_index which is ordered by code point.
++ * The code below is the same as libstdc++'s std::lower_bound().
++ */
++ first = table;
++ len = font->num_chars;
++ end = first + len;
+
+- if (!table)
+- return 0;
+-
+- while (lo <= hi)
++ while (len > 0)
+ {
+- mid = lo + (hi - lo) / 2;
+- if (code < table[mid].code)
+- hi = mid - 1;
+- else if (code > table[mid].code)
+- lo = mid + 1;
++ grub_size_t half = len >> 1;
++ struct char_index_entry *middle = first + half;
++
++ if (middle->code < code)
++ {
++ first = middle + 1;
++ len = len - half - 1;
++ }
+ else
+- return &table[mid];
++ len = half;
+ }
+
+- return 0;
++ return (first < end && first->code == code) ? first : NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* Get a glyph for the Unicode character CODE in FONT. The glyph is loaded
diff --git a/SOURCES/0301-kern-efi-sb-Enforce-verification-of-font-files.patch b/SOURCES/0301-kern-efi-sb-Enforce-verification-of-font-files.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..42fea35
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/0301-kern-efi-sb-Enforce-verification-of-font-files.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Zhang Boyang <zhangboyang.id@gmail.com>
+Date: Sun, 14 Aug 2022 15:51:54 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH] kern/efi/sb: Enforce verification of font files
+
+As a mitigation and hardening measure enforce verification of font
+files. Then only trusted font files can be load. This will reduce the
+attack surface at cost of losing the ability of end-users to customize
+fonts if e.g. UEFI Secure Boot is enabled. Vendors can always customize
+fonts because they have ability to pack fonts into their GRUB bundles.
+
+This goal is achieved by:
+
+ * Removing GRUB_FILE_TYPE_FONT from shim lock verifier's
+ skip-verification list.
+
+ * Adding GRUB_FILE_TYPE_FONT to lockdown verifier's defer-auth list,
+ so font files must be verified by a verifier before they can be loaded.
+
+Suggested-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
+Signed-off-by: Zhang Boyang <zhangboyang.id@gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 630deb8c0d8b02b670ced4b7030414bcf17aa080)
+(cherry picked from commit 37257e0ee45b9029b62f4046c983481d063b821d)
+---
+ grub-core/kern/efi/sb.c | 1 -
+ grub-core/kern/lockdown.c | 1 +
+ 2 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/kern/efi/sb.c b/grub-core/kern/efi/sb.c
+index 89c4bb3fd1..db42c2539f 100644
+--- a/grub-core/kern/efi/sb.c
++++ b/grub-core/kern/efi/sb.c
+@@ -145,7 +145,6 @@ shim_lock_verifier_init (grub_file_t io __attribute__ ((unused)),
+ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_PRINT_BLOCKLIST:
+ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_TESTLOAD:
+ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_GET_SIZE:
+- case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_FONT:
+ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_ZFS_ENCRYPTION_KEY:
+ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_CAT:
+ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_HEXCAT:
+diff --git a/grub-core/kern/lockdown.c b/grub-core/kern/lockdown.c
+index 0bc70fd42d..af6d493cd3 100644
+--- a/grub-core/kern/lockdown.c
++++ b/grub-core/kern/lockdown.c
+@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ lockdown_verifier_init (grub_file_t io __attribute__ ((unused)),
+ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_EFI_CHAINLOADED_IMAGE:
+ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_ACPI_TABLE:
+ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_DEVICE_TREE_IMAGE:
++ case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_FONT:
+ *flags = GRUB_VERIFY_FLAGS_DEFER_AUTH;
+
+ /* Fall through. */
diff --git a/SOURCES/0302-fbutil-Fix-integer-overflow.patch b/SOURCES/0302-fbutil-Fix-integer-overflow.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f8e82e5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/0302-fbutil-Fix-integer-overflow.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Zhang Boyang <zhangboyang.id@gmail.com>
+Date: Tue, 6 Sep 2022 03:03:21 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH] fbutil: Fix integer overflow
+
+Expressions like u64 = u32 * u32 are unsafe because their products are
+truncated to u32 even if left hand side is u64. This patch fixes all
+problems like that one in fbutil.
+
+To get right result not only left hand side have to be u64 but it's also
+necessary to cast at least one of the operands of all leaf operators of
+right hand side to u64, e.g. u64 = u32 * u32 + u32 * u32 should be
+u64 = (u64)u32 * u32 + (u64)u32 * u32.
+
+For 1-bit bitmaps grub_uint64_t have to be used. It's safe because any
+combination of values in (grub_uint64_t)u32 * u32 + u32 expression will
+not overflow grub_uint64_t.
+
+Other expressions like ptr + u32 * u32 + u32 * u32 are also vulnerable.
+They should be ptr + (grub_addr_t)u32 * u32 + (grub_addr_t)u32 * u32.
+
+This patch also adds a comment to grub_video_fb_get_video_ptr() which
+says it's arguments must be valid and no sanity check is performed
+(like its siblings in grub-core/video/fb/fbutil.c).
+
+Signed-off-by: Zhang Boyang <zhangboyang.id@gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 50a11a81bc842c58962244a2dc86bbd31a426e12)
+(cherry picked from commit 8fa75d647362c938c4cc302cf5945b31fb92c078)
+---
+ grub-core/video/fb/fbutil.c | 4 ++--
+ include/grub/fbutil.h | 13 +++++++++----
+ 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/video/fb/fbutil.c b/grub-core/video/fb/fbutil.c
+index b98bb51fe8..25ef39f47d 100644
+--- a/grub-core/video/fb/fbutil.c
++++ b/grub-core/video/fb/fbutil.c
+@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ get_pixel (struct grub_video_fbblit_info *source,
+ case 1:
+ if (source->mode_info->blit_format == GRUB_VIDEO_BLIT_FORMAT_1BIT_PACKED)
+ {
+- int bit_index = y * source->mode_info->width + x;
++ grub_uint64_t bit_index = (grub_uint64_t) y * source->mode_info->width + x;
+ grub_uint8_t *ptr = source->data + bit_index / 8;
+ int bit_pos = 7 - bit_index % 8;
+ color = (*ptr >> bit_pos) & 0x01;
+@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ set_pixel (struct grub_video_fbblit_info *source,
+ case 1:
+ if (source->mode_info->blit_format == GRUB_VIDEO_BLIT_FORMAT_1BIT_PACKED)
+ {
+- int bit_index = y * source->mode_info->width + x;
++ grub_uint64_t bit_index = (grub_uint64_t) y * source->mode_info->width + x;
+ grub_uint8_t *ptr = source->data + bit_index / 8;
+ int bit_pos = 7 - bit_index % 8;
+ *ptr = (*ptr & ~(1 << bit_pos)) | ((color & 0x01) << bit_pos);
+diff --git a/include/grub/fbutil.h b/include/grub/fbutil.h
+index 4205eb917f..78a1ab3b45 100644
+--- a/include/grub/fbutil.h
++++ b/include/grub/fbutil.h
+@@ -31,14 +31,19 @@ struct grub_video_fbblit_info
+ grub_uint8_t *data;
+ };
+
+-/* Don't use for 1-bit bitmaps, addressing needs to be done at the bit level
+- and it doesn't make sense, in general, to ask for a pointer
+- to a particular pixel's data. */
++/*
++ * Don't use for 1-bit bitmaps, addressing needs to be done at the bit level
++ * and it doesn't make sense, in general, to ask for a pointer
++ * to a particular pixel's data.
++ *
++ * This function assumes that bounds checking has been done in previous phase
++ * and they are opted out in here.
++ */
+ static inline void *
+ grub_video_fb_get_video_ptr (struct grub_video_fbblit_info *source,
+ unsigned int x, unsigned int y)
+ {
+- return source->data + y * source->mode_info->pitch + x * source->mode_info->bytes_per_pixel;
++ return source->data + (grub_addr_t) y * source->mode_info->pitch + (grub_addr_t) x * source->mode_info->bytes_per_pixel;
+ }
+
+ /* Advance pointer by VAL bytes. If there is no unaligned access available,
diff --git a/SOURCES/0303-font-Fix-an-integer-underflow-in-blit_comb.patch b/SOURCES/0303-font-Fix-an-integer-underflow-in-blit_comb.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b8a0e9e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/0303-font-Fix-an-integer-underflow-in-blit_comb.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Zhang Boyang <zhangboyang.id@gmail.com>
+Date: Mon, 24 Oct 2022 08:05:35 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH] font: Fix an integer underflow in blit_comb()
+
+The expression (ctx.bounds.height - combining_glyphs[i]->height) / 2 may
+evaluate to a very big invalid value even if both ctx.bounds.height and
+combining_glyphs[i]->height are small integers. For example, if
+ctx.bounds.height is 10 and combining_glyphs[i]->height is 12, this
+expression evaluates to 2147483647 (expected -1). This is because
+coordinates are allowed to be negative but ctx.bounds.height is an
+unsigned int. So, the subtraction operates on unsigned ints and
+underflows to a very big value. The division makes things even worse.
+The quotient is still an invalid value even if converted back to int.
+
+This patch fixes the problem by casting ctx.bounds.height to int. As
+a result the subtraction will operate on int and grub_uint16_t which
+will be promoted to an int. So, the underflow will no longer happen. Other
+uses of ctx.bounds.height (and ctx.bounds.width) are also casted to int,
+to ensure coordinates are always calculated on signed integers.
+
+Fixes: CVE-2022-3775
+
+Reported-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
+Signed-off-by: Zhang Boyang <zhangboyang.id@gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
+(cherry picked from commit 6d2668dea3774ed74c4cd1eadd146f1b846bc3d4)
+(cherry picked from commit 05e532fb707bbf79aa4e1efbde4d208d7da89d6b)
+---
+ grub-core/font/font.c | 16 ++++++++--------
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/font/font.c b/grub-core/font/font.c
+index 193dfec045..12a5f0d08c 100644
+--- a/grub-core/font/font.c
++++ b/grub-core/font/font.c
+@@ -1203,12 +1203,12 @@ blit_comb (const struct grub_unicode_glyph *glyph_id,
+ ctx.bounds.height = main_glyph->height;
+
+ above_rightx = main_glyph->offset_x + main_glyph->width;
+- above_righty = ctx.bounds.y + ctx.bounds.height;
++ above_righty = ctx.bounds.y + (int) ctx.bounds.height;
+
+ above_leftx = main_glyph->offset_x;
+- above_lefty = ctx.bounds.y + ctx.bounds.height;
++ above_lefty = ctx.bounds.y + (int) ctx.bounds.height;
+
+- below_rightx = ctx.bounds.x + ctx.bounds.width;
++ below_rightx = ctx.bounds.x + (int) ctx.bounds.width;
+ below_righty = ctx.bounds.y;
+
+ comb = grub_unicode_get_comb (glyph_id);
+@@ -1221,7 +1221,7 @@ blit_comb (const struct grub_unicode_glyph *glyph_id,
+
+ if (!combining_glyphs[i])
+ continue;
+- targetx = (ctx.bounds.width - combining_glyphs[i]->width) / 2 + ctx.bounds.x;
++ targetx = ((int) ctx.bounds.width - combining_glyphs[i]->width) / 2 + ctx.bounds.x;
+ /* CGJ is to avoid diacritics reordering. */
+ if (comb[i].code
+ == GRUB_UNICODE_COMBINING_GRAPHEME_JOINER)
+@@ -1231,8 +1231,8 @@ blit_comb (const struct grub_unicode_glyph *glyph_id,
+ case GRUB_UNICODE_COMB_OVERLAY:
+ do_blit (combining_glyphs[i],
+ targetx,
+- (ctx.bounds.height - combining_glyphs[i]->height) / 2
+- - (ctx.bounds.height + ctx.bounds.y), &ctx);
++ ((int) ctx.bounds.height - combining_glyphs[i]->height) / 2
++ - ((int) ctx.bounds.height + ctx.bounds.y), &ctx);
+ if (min_devwidth < combining_glyphs[i]->width)
+ min_devwidth = combining_glyphs[i]->width;
+ break;
+@@ -1305,7 +1305,7 @@ blit_comb (const struct grub_unicode_glyph *glyph_id,
+ /* Fallthrough. */
+ case GRUB_UNICODE_STACK_ATTACHED_ABOVE:
+ do_blit (combining_glyphs[i], targetx,
+- -(ctx.bounds.height + ctx.bounds.y + space
++ -((int) ctx.bounds.height + ctx.bounds.y + space
+ + combining_glyphs[i]->height), &ctx);
+ if (min_devwidth < combining_glyphs[i]->width)
+ min_devwidth = combining_glyphs[i]->width;
+@@ -1313,7 +1313,7 @@ blit_comb (const struct grub_unicode_glyph *glyph_id,
+
+ case GRUB_UNICODE_COMB_HEBREW_DAGESH:
+ do_blit (combining_glyphs[i], targetx,
+- -(ctx.bounds.height / 2 + ctx.bounds.y
++ -((int) ctx.bounds.height / 2 + ctx.bounds.y
+ + combining_glyphs[i]->height / 2), &ctx);
+ if (min_devwidth < combining_glyphs[i]->width)
+ min_devwidth = combining_glyphs[i]->width;
diff --git a/SOURCES/0304-font-Harden-grub_font_blit_glyph-and-grub_font_blit_.patch b/SOURCES/0304-font-Harden-grub_font_blit_glyph-and-grub_font_blit_.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..307572c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/0304-font-Harden-grub_font_blit_glyph-and-grub_font_blit_.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Zhang Boyang <zhangboyang.id@gmail.com>
+Date: Mon, 24 Oct 2022 07:15:41 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH] font: Harden grub_font_blit_glyph() and
+ grub_font_blit_glyph_mirror()
+
+As a mitigation and hardening measure add sanity checks to
+grub_font_blit_glyph() and grub_font_blit_glyph_mirror(). This patch
+makes these two functions do nothing if target blitting area isn't fully
+contained in target bitmap. Therefore, if complex calculations in caller
+overflows and malicious coordinates are given, we are still safe because
+any coordinates which result in out-of-bound-write are rejected. However,
+this patch only checks for invalid coordinates, and doesn't provide any
+protection against invalid source glyph or destination glyph, e.g.
+mismatch between glyph size and buffer size.
+
+This hardening measure is designed to mitigate possible overflows in
+blit_comb(). If overflow occurs, it may return invalid bounding box
+during dry run and call grub_font_blit_glyph() with malicious
+coordinates during actual blitting. However, we are still safe because
+the scratch glyph itself is valid, although its size makes no sense, and
+any invalid coordinates are rejected.
+
+It would be better to call grub_fatal() if illegal parameter is detected.
+However, doing this may end up in a dangerous recursion because grub_fatal()
+would print messages to the screen and we are in the progress of drawing
+characters on the screen.
+
+Reported-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
+Signed-off-by: Zhang Boyang <zhangboyang.id@gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
+(cherry picked from commit fcd7aa0c278f7cf3fb9f93f1a3966e1792339eb6)
+(cherry picked from commit 1d37ec63a1c76a14fdf70f548eada92667b42ddb)
+---
+ grub-core/font/font.c | 14 ++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/font/font.c b/grub-core/font/font.c
+index 12a5f0d08c..29fbb94294 100644
+--- a/grub-core/font/font.c
++++ b/grub-core/font/font.c
+@@ -1069,8 +1069,15 @@ static void
+ grub_font_blit_glyph (struct grub_font_glyph *target,
+ struct grub_font_glyph *src, unsigned dx, unsigned dy)
+ {
++ grub_uint16_t max_x, max_y;
+ unsigned src_bit, tgt_bit, src_byte, tgt_byte;
+ unsigned i, j;
++
++ /* Harden against out-of-bound writes. */
++ if ((grub_add (dx, src->width, &max_x) || max_x > target->width) ||
++ (grub_add (dy, src->height, &max_y) || max_y > target->height))
++ return;
++
+ for (i = 0; i < src->height; i++)
+ {
+ src_bit = (src->width * i) % 8;
+@@ -1102,9 +1109,16 @@ grub_font_blit_glyph_mirror (struct grub_font_glyph *target,
+ struct grub_font_glyph *src,
+ unsigned dx, unsigned dy)
+ {
++ grub_uint16_t max_x, max_y;
+ unsigned tgt_bit, src_byte, tgt_byte;
+ signed src_bit;
+ unsigned i, j;
++
++ /* Harden against out-of-bound writes. */
++ if ((grub_add (dx, src->width, &max_x) || max_x > target->width) ||
++ (grub_add (dy, src->height, &max_y) || max_y > target->height))
++ return;
++
+ for (i = 0; i < src->height; i++)
+ {
+ src_bit = (src->width * i + src->width - 1) % 8;
diff --git a/SOURCES/0305-font-Assign-null_font-to-glyphs-in-ascii_font_glyph.patch b/SOURCES/0305-font-Assign-null_font-to-glyphs-in-ascii_font_glyph.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..368b9d0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/0305-font-Assign-null_font-to-glyphs-in-ascii_font_glyph.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Zhang Boyang <zhangboyang.id@gmail.com>
+Date: Fri, 28 Oct 2022 17:29:16 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH] font: Assign null_font to glyphs in ascii_font_glyph[]
+
+The calculations in blit_comb() need information from glyph's font, e.g.
+grub_font_get_xheight(main_glyph->font). However, main_glyph->font is
+NULL if main_glyph comes from ascii_font_glyph[]. Therefore
+grub_font_get_*() crashes because of NULL pointer.
+
+There is already a solution, the null_font. So, assign it to those glyphs
+in ascii_font_glyph[].
+
+Reported-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
+Signed-off-by: Zhang Boyang <zhangboyang.id@gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
+(cherry picked from commit dd539d695482069d28b40f2d3821f710cdcf6ee6)
+(cherry picked from commit 87526376857eaceae474c9797e3cee5b50597332)
+---
+ grub-core/font/font.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/font/font.c b/grub-core/font/font.c
+index 29fbb94294..e6616e610c 100644
+--- a/grub-core/font/font.c
++++ b/grub-core/font/font.c
+@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ ascii_glyph_lookup (grub_uint32_t code)
+ ascii_font_glyph[current]->offset_x = 0;
+ ascii_font_glyph[current]->offset_y = -2;
+ ascii_font_glyph[current]->device_width = 8;
+- ascii_font_glyph[current]->font = NULL;
++ ascii_font_glyph[current]->font = &null_font;
+
+ grub_memcpy (ascii_font_glyph[current]->bitmap,
+ &ascii_bitmaps[current * ASCII_BITMAP_SIZE],
diff --git a/SOURCES/0306-normal-charset-Fix-an-integer-overflow-in-grub_unico.patch b/SOURCES/0306-normal-charset-Fix-an-integer-overflow-in-grub_unico.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..96f2f94
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/0306-normal-charset-Fix-an-integer-overflow-in-grub_unico.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Zhang Boyang <zhangboyang.id@gmail.com>
+Date: Fri, 28 Oct 2022 21:31:39 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH] normal/charset: Fix an integer overflow in
+ grub_unicode_aglomerate_comb()
+
+The out->ncomb is a bit-field of 8 bits. So, the max possible value is 255.
+However, code in grub_unicode_aglomerate_comb() doesn't check for an
+overflow when incrementing out->ncomb. If out->ncomb is already 255,
+after incrementing it will get 0 instead of 256, and cause illegal
+memory access in subsequent processing.
+
+This patch introduces GRUB_UNICODE_NCOMB_MAX to represent the max
+acceptable value of ncomb. The code now checks for this limit and
+ignores additional combining characters when limit is reached.
+
+Reported-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
+Signed-off-by: Zhang Boyang <zhangboyang.id@gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
+(cherry picked from commit da90d62316a3b105d2fbd7334d6521936bd6dcf6)
+(cherry picked from commit 26fafec86000b5322837722a115279ef03922ca6)
+---
+ grub-core/normal/charset.c | 3 +++
+ include/grub/unicode.h | 2 ++
+ 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/normal/charset.c b/grub-core/normal/charset.c
+index 7a5a7c153c..c243ca6dae 100644
+--- a/grub-core/normal/charset.c
++++ b/grub-core/normal/charset.c
+@@ -472,6 +472,9 @@ grub_unicode_aglomerate_comb (const grub_uint32_t *in, grub_size_t inlen,
+ if (!haveout)
+ continue;
+
++ if (out->ncomb == GRUB_UNICODE_NCOMB_MAX)
++ continue;
++
+ if (comb_type == GRUB_UNICODE_COMB_MC
+ || comb_type == GRUB_UNICODE_COMB_ME
+ || comb_type == GRUB_UNICODE_COMB_MN)
+diff --git a/include/grub/unicode.h b/include/grub/unicode.h
+index 4de986a857..c4f6fca043 100644
+--- a/include/grub/unicode.h
++++ b/include/grub/unicode.h
+@@ -147,7 +147,9 @@ struct grub_unicode_glyph
+ grub_uint8_t bidi_level:6; /* minimum: 6 */
+ enum grub_bidi_type bidi_type:5; /* minimum: :5 */
+
++#define GRUB_UNICODE_NCOMB_MAX ((1 << 8) - 1)
+ unsigned ncomb:8;
++
+ /* Hint by unicode subsystem how wide this character usually is.
+ Real width is determined by font. Set only in UTF-8 stream. */
+ int estimated_width:8;
diff --git a/SOURCES/701-ca.cer b/SOURCES/701-ca.cer
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0e6e79b
Binary files /dev/null and b/SOURCES/701-ca.cer differ
diff --git a/SOURCES/701-cer.cer b/SOURCES/701-cer.cer
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..25e3743
Binary files /dev/null and b/SOURCES/701-cer.cer differ
diff --git a/SOURCES/grub.patches b/SOURCES/grub.patches
index c08b18b..e38c069 100644
--- a/SOURCES/grub.patches
+++ b/SOURCES/grub.patches
@@ -287,3 +287,20 @@ Patch0286: 0286-ieee1275-implement-vec5-for-cas-negotiation.patch
Patch0287: 0287-squish-don-t-dup-rhgb-quiet-check-mtimes.patch
Patch0288: 0288-squish-give-up-on-rhgb-quiet.patch
Patch0289: 0289-squish-BLS-only-write-etc-kernel-cmdline-if-writable.patch
+Patch0290: 0290-x86-efi-Fix-an-incorrect-array-size-in-kernel-alloca.patch
+Patch0291: 0291-commands-efi-tpm-Refine-the-status-of-log-event.patch
+Patch0292: 0292-commands-efi-tpm-Use-grub_strcpy-instead-of-grub_mem.patch
+Patch0293: 0293-efi-tpm-Add-EFI_CC_MEASUREMENT_PROTOCOL-support.patch
+Patch0294: 0294-font-Reject-glyphs-exceeds-font-max_glyph_width-or-f.patch
+Patch0295: 0295-font-Fix-size-overflow-in-grub_font_get_glyph_intern.patch
+Patch0296: 0296-font-Fix-several-integer-overflows-in-grub_font_cons.patch
+Patch0297: 0297-font-Remove-grub_font_dup_glyph.patch
+Patch0298: 0298-font-Fix-integer-overflow-in-ensure_comb_space.patch
+Patch0299: 0299-font-Fix-integer-overflow-in-BMP-index.patch
+Patch0300: 0300-font-Fix-integer-underflow-in-binary-search-of-char-.patch
+Patch0301: 0301-kern-efi-sb-Enforce-verification-of-font-files.patch
+Patch0302: 0302-fbutil-Fix-integer-overflow.patch
+Patch0303: 0303-font-Fix-an-integer-underflow-in-blit_comb.patch
+Patch0304: 0304-font-Harden-grub_font_blit_glyph-and-grub_font_blit_.patch
+Patch0305: 0305-font-Assign-null_font-to-glyphs-in-ascii_font_glyph.patch
+Patch0306: 0306-normal-charset-Fix-an-integer-overflow-in-grub_unico.patch
diff --git a/SOURCES/sbat.csv.in b/SOURCES/sbat.csv.in
index 55b3d10..b338b5f 100755
--- a/SOURCES/sbat.csv.in
+++ b/SOURCES/sbat.csv.in
@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
sbat,1,SBAT Version,sbat,1,https://github.com/rhboot/shim/blob/main/SBAT.md
-grub,2,Free Software Foundation,grub,@@VERSION@@,https//www.gnu.org/software/grub/
+grub,3,Free Software Foundation,grub,@@VERSION@@,https//www.gnu.org/software/grub/
grub.rh,2,Red Hat,grub2,@@VERSION_RELEASE@@,mailto:secalert@redhat.com
diff --git a/SPECS/grub2.spec b/SPECS/grub2.spec
index 97f3882..dc72182 100644
--- a/SPECS/grub2.spec
+++ b/SPECS/grub2.spec
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
Name: grub2
Epoch: 1
Version: 2.06
-Release: 46%{?dist}
+Release: 46%{?dist}.3
Summary: Bootloader with support for Linux, Multiboot and more
License: GPLv3+
URL: http://www.gnu.org/software/grub/
@@ -32,14 +32,21 @@ Source9: strtoull_test.c
Source10: 20-grub.install
Source11: grub.patches
Source12: sbat.csv.in
+Source13: 701-ca.cer
+Source14: 701-cer.cer
%include %{SOURCE1}
-%ifarch x86_64 aarch64 ppc64le
+%ifarch x86_64 aarch64
%define sb_ca %{_datadir}/pki/sb-certs/secureboot-ca-%{_arch}.cer
%define sb_cer %{_datadir}/pki/sb-certs/secureboot-grub2-%{_arch}.cer
%endif
+%ifarch ppc64le
+%define sb_ca %{SOURCE13}
+%define sb_cer %{SOURCE14}
+%endif
+
%if 0%{?centos}
%ifarch x86_64 aarch64 ppc64le
@@ -532,6 +539,14 @@ mv ${EFI_HOME}/grub.cfg.stb ${EFI_HOME}/grub.cfg
%endif
%changelog
+* Fri Nov 11 2022 Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com> - 2.06-46.el9_1.3
+- Give up on redhat-sb-certs
+- Resolves: CVE-2022-2601
+
+* Thu Nov 03 2022 Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com> - 2.06-46.el9_1.2
+- CVE update (actually 2.06-49)
+- Resolves: CVE-2022-2601
+
* Thu Aug 25 2022 Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com> - 2.06-46
- Sync /etc/kernel/cmdline generation with 2.06-52.fc38
- Resolves: #1969362