From 351970dbd07603ccb345cc9d743c9cd90b9e85e8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: CentOS Sources Date: Apr 23 2024 15:16:12 +0000 Subject: import grub2-2.02-0.87.el7_9.14 --- diff --git a/README.debrand b/README.debrand deleted file mode 100644 index 01c46d2..0000000 --- a/README.debrand +++ /dev/null @@ -1,2 +0,0 @@ -Warning: This package was configured for automatic debranding, but the changes -failed to apply. diff --git a/SOURCES/0487-font-Reject-glyphs-exceeds-font-max_glyph_width-or-f.patch b/SOURCES/0487-font-Reject-glyphs-exceeds-font-max_glyph_width-or-f.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e7f7a0c --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0487-font-Reject-glyphs-exceeds-font-max_glyph_width-or-f.patch @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Zhang Boyang +Date: Wed, 3 Aug 2022 19:45:33 +0800 +Subject: [PATCH] font: Reject glyphs exceeds font->max_glyph_width or + font->max_glyph_height + +Check glyph's width and height against limits specified in font's +metadata. Reject the glyph (and font) if such limits are exceeded. + +Signed-off-by: Zhang Boyang +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper +(cherry picked from commit 5760fcfd466cc757540ea0d591bad6a08caeaa16) +(cherry picked from commit 3b410ef4bb95e607cadeba2193fa90ae9bddb98d) +(cherry picked from commit 8ebe587def61af7893ebcae87d45c883f3cfb713) +--- + grub-core/font/font.c | 4 +++- + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/font/font.c b/grub-core/font/font.c +index b67507fcc8..8d1a990401 100644 +--- a/grub-core/font/font.c ++++ b/grub-core/font/font.c +@@ -760,7 +760,9 @@ grub_font_get_glyph_internal (grub_font_t font, grub_uint32_t code) + || read_be_uint16 (font->file, &height) != 0 + || read_be_int16 (font->file, &xoff) != 0 + || read_be_int16 (font->file, &yoff) != 0 +- || read_be_int16 (font->file, &dwidth) != 0) ++ || read_be_int16 (font->file, &dwidth) != 0 ++ || width > font->max_char_width ++ || height > font->max_char_height) + { + remove_font (font); + return 0; diff --git a/SOURCES/0488-font-Fix-size-overflow-in-grub_font_get_glyph_intern.patch b/SOURCES/0488-font-Fix-size-overflow-in-grub_font_get_glyph_intern.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..df3a705 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0488-font-Fix-size-overflow-in-grub_font_get_glyph_intern.patch @@ -0,0 +1,112 @@ +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Zhang Boyang +Date: Fri, 5 Aug 2022 00:51:20 +0800 +Subject: [PATCH] font: Fix size overflow in grub_font_get_glyph_internal() + +The length of memory allocation and file read may overflow. This patch +fixes the problem by using safemath macros. + +There is a lot of code repetition like "(x * y + 7) / 8". It is unsafe +if overflow happens. This patch introduces grub_video_bitmap_calc_1bpp_bufsz(). +It is safe replacement for such code. It has safemath-like prototype. + +This patch also introduces grub_cast(value, pointer), it casts value to +typeof(*pointer) then store the value to *pointer. It returns true when +overflow occurs or false if there is no overflow. The semantics of arguments +and return value are designed to be consistent with other safemath macros. + +Signed-off-by: Zhang Boyang +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper +(cherry picked from commit 941d10ad6f1dcbd12fb613002249e29ba035f985) +(cherry picked from commit 6bca9693878bdf61dd62b8c784862a48e75f569a) +(cherry picked from commit edbbda5486cf8c3dc2b68fbd3dead822ab448022) +--- + grub-core/font/font.c | 17 +++++++++++++---- + include/grub/bitmap.h | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ + include/grub/safemath.h | 2 ++ + 3 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/font/font.c b/grub-core/font/font.c +index 8d1a990401..d6df79602d 100644 +--- a/grub-core/font/font.c ++++ b/grub-core/font/font.c +@@ -739,7 +739,8 @@ grub_font_get_glyph_internal (grub_font_t font, grub_uint32_t code) + grub_int16_t xoff; + grub_int16_t yoff; + grub_int16_t dwidth; +- int len; ++ grub_ssize_t len; ++ grub_size_t sz; + + if (index_entry->glyph) + /* Return cached glyph. */ +@@ -768,9 +769,17 @@ grub_font_get_glyph_internal (grub_font_t font, grub_uint32_t code) + return 0; + } + +- len = (width * height + 7) / 8; +- glyph = grub_malloc (sizeof (struct grub_font_glyph) + len); +- if (!glyph) ++ /* Calculate real struct size of current glyph. */ ++ if (grub_video_bitmap_calc_1bpp_bufsz (width, height, &len) || ++ grub_add (sizeof (struct grub_font_glyph), len, &sz)) ++ { ++ remove_font (font); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ ++ /* Allocate and initialize the glyph struct. */ ++ glyph = grub_malloc (sz); ++ if (glyph == NULL) + { + remove_font (font); + return 0; +diff --git a/include/grub/bitmap.h b/include/grub/bitmap.h +index 5728f8ca3a..0d9603f619 100644 +--- a/include/grub/bitmap.h ++++ b/include/grub/bitmap.h +@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ + #include + #include + #include ++#include + + struct grub_video_bitmap + { +@@ -79,6 +80,23 @@ grub_video_bitmap_get_height (struct grub_video_bitmap *bitmap) + return bitmap->mode_info.height; + } + ++/* ++ * Calculate and store the size of data buffer of 1bit bitmap in result. ++ * Equivalent to "*result = (width * height + 7) / 8" if no overflow occurs. ++ * Return true when overflow occurs or false if there is no overflow. ++ * This function is intentionally implemented as a macro instead of ++ * an inline function. Although a bit awkward, it preserves data types for ++ * safemath macros and reduces macro side effects as much as possible. ++ * ++ * XXX: Will report false overflow if width * height > UINT64_MAX. ++ */ ++#define grub_video_bitmap_calc_1bpp_bufsz(width, height, result) \ ++({ \ ++ grub_uint64_t _bitmap_pixels; \ ++ grub_mul ((width), (height), &_bitmap_pixels) ? 1 : \ ++ grub_cast (_bitmap_pixels / GRUB_CHAR_BIT + !!(_bitmap_pixels % GRUB_CHAR_BIT), (result)); \ ++}) ++ + void EXPORT_FUNC (grub_video_bitmap_get_mode_info) (struct grub_video_bitmap *bitmap, + struct grub_video_mode_info *mode_info); + +diff --git a/include/grub/safemath.h b/include/grub/safemath.h +index 1ccac276b5..30800ad6a1 100644 +--- a/include/grub/safemath.h ++++ b/include/grub/safemath.h +@@ -30,6 +30,8 @@ + #define grub_sub(a, b, res) __builtin_sub_overflow(a, b, res) + #define grub_mul(a, b, res) __builtin_mul_overflow(a, b, res) + ++#define grub_cast(a, res) grub_add ((a), 0, (res)) ++ + #else + /* + * Copyright 2020 Rasmus Villemoes diff --git a/SOURCES/0489-font-Fix-several-integer-overflows-in-grub_font_cons.patch b/SOURCES/0489-font-Fix-several-integer-overflows-in-grub_font_cons.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0afdf93 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0489-font-Fix-several-integer-overflows-in-grub_font_cons.patch @@ -0,0 +1,81 @@ +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Zhang Boyang +Date: Fri, 5 Aug 2022 01:58:27 +0800 +Subject: [PATCH] font: Fix several integer overflows in + grub_font_construct_glyph() + +This patch fixes several integer overflows in grub_font_construct_glyph(). +Glyphs of invalid size, zero or leading to an overflow, are rejected. +The inconsistency between "glyph" and "max_glyph_size" when grub_malloc() +returns NULL is fixed too. + +Fixes: CVE-2022-2601 + +Reported-by: Zhang Boyang +Signed-off-by: Zhang Boyang +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper +(cherry picked from commit b1805f251b31a9d3cfae5c3572ddfa630145dbbf) +(cherry picked from commit b91eb9bd6c724339b7d7bb4765b9d36f1ee88b84) +(cherry picked from commit 1ebafd82dd19e522f0d753fd9828553fe8bcac78) +--- + grub-core/font/font.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++------------ + 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/font/font.c b/grub-core/font/font.c +index d6df79602d..129aaa3838 100644 +--- a/grub-core/font/font.c ++++ b/grub-core/font/font.c +@@ -1517,6 +1517,7 @@ grub_font_construct_glyph (grub_font_t hinted_font, + struct grub_video_signed_rect bounds; + static struct grub_font_glyph *glyph = 0; + static grub_size_t max_glyph_size = 0; ++ grub_size_t cur_glyph_size; + + ensure_comb_space (glyph_id); + +@@ -1533,29 +1534,33 @@ grub_font_construct_glyph (grub_font_t hinted_font, + if (!glyph_id->ncomb && !glyph_id->attributes) + return main_glyph; + +- if (max_glyph_size < sizeof (*glyph) + (bounds.width * bounds.height + GRUB_CHAR_BIT - 1) / GRUB_CHAR_BIT) ++ if (grub_video_bitmap_calc_1bpp_bufsz (bounds.width, bounds.height, &cur_glyph_size) || ++ grub_add (sizeof (*glyph), cur_glyph_size, &cur_glyph_size)) ++ return main_glyph; ++ ++ if (max_glyph_size < cur_glyph_size) + { + grub_free (glyph); +- max_glyph_size = (sizeof (*glyph) + (bounds.width * bounds.height + GRUB_CHAR_BIT - 1) / GRUB_CHAR_BIT) * 2; +- if (max_glyph_size < 8) +- max_glyph_size = 8; +- glyph = grub_malloc (max_glyph_size); ++ if (grub_mul (cur_glyph_size, 2, &max_glyph_size)) ++ max_glyph_size = 0; ++ glyph = max_glyph_size > 0 ? grub_malloc (max_glyph_size) : NULL; + } + if (!glyph) + { ++ max_glyph_size = 0; + grub_errno = GRUB_ERR_NONE; + return main_glyph; + } + +- grub_memset (glyph, 0, sizeof (*glyph) +- + (bounds.width * bounds.height +- + GRUB_CHAR_BIT - 1) / GRUB_CHAR_BIT); ++ grub_memset (glyph, 0, cur_glyph_size); + + glyph->font = main_glyph->font; +- glyph->width = bounds.width; +- glyph->height = bounds.height; +- glyph->offset_x = bounds.x; +- glyph->offset_y = bounds.y; ++ if (bounds.width == 0 || bounds.height == 0 || ++ grub_cast (bounds.width, &glyph->width) || ++ grub_cast (bounds.height, &glyph->height) || ++ grub_cast (bounds.x, &glyph->offset_x) || ++ grub_cast (bounds.y, &glyph->offset_y)) ++ return main_glyph; + + if (glyph_id->attributes & GRUB_UNICODE_GLYPH_ATTRIBUTE_MIRROR) + grub_font_blit_glyph_mirror (glyph, main_glyph, diff --git a/SOURCES/0490-font-Remove-grub_font_dup_glyph.patch b/SOURCES/0490-font-Remove-grub_font_dup_glyph.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2f9a33e --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0490-font-Remove-grub_font_dup_glyph.patch @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Zhang Boyang +Date: Fri, 5 Aug 2022 02:13:29 +0800 +Subject: [PATCH] font: Remove grub_font_dup_glyph() + +Remove grub_font_dup_glyph() since nobody is using it since 2013, and +I'm too lazy to fix the integer overflow problem in it. + +Signed-off-by: Zhang Boyang +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper +(cherry picked from commit 25ad31c19c331aaa2dbd9bd2b2e2655de5766a9d) +(cherry picked from commit ad950e1e033318bb50222ed268a6dcfb97389035) +(cherry picked from commit 71644fccc1d43309f0a379dcfe9341ec3bd9657d) +--- + grub-core/font/font.c | 14 -------------- + 1 file changed, 14 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/font/font.c b/grub-core/font/font.c +index 129aaa3838..347e9dfa29 100644 +--- a/grub-core/font/font.c ++++ b/grub-core/font/font.c +@@ -1055,20 +1055,6 @@ grub_font_get_glyph_with_fallback (grub_font_t font, grub_uint32_t code) + return best_glyph; + } + +-#if 0 +-static struct grub_font_glyph * +-grub_font_dup_glyph (struct grub_font_glyph *glyph) +-{ +- static struct grub_font_glyph *ret; +- ret = grub_malloc (sizeof (*ret) + (glyph->width * glyph->height + 7) / 8); +- if (!ret) +- return NULL; +- grub_memcpy (ret, glyph, sizeof (*ret) +- + (glyph->width * glyph->height + 7) / 8); +- return ret; +-} +-#endif +- + /* FIXME: suboptimal. */ + static void + grub_font_blit_glyph (struct grub_font_glyph *target, diff --git a/SOURCES/0491-font-Fix-integer-overflow-in-ensure_comb_space.patch b/SOURCES/0491-font-Fix-integer-overflow-in-ensure_comb_space.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..baa2d74 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0491-font-Fix-integer-overflow-in-ensure_comb_space.patch @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Zhang Boyang +Date: Fri, 5 Aug 2022 02:27:05 +0800 +Subject: [PATCH] font: Fix integer overflow in ensure_comb_space() + +In fact it can't overflow at all because glyph_id->ncomb is only 8-bit +wide. But let's keep safe if somebody changes the width of glyph_id->ncomb +in the future. This patch also fixes the inconsistency between +render_max_comb_glyphs and render_combining_glyphs when grub_malloc() +returns NULL. + +Signed-off-by: Zhang Boyang +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper +(cherry picked from commit b2740b7e4a03bb8331d48b54b119afea76bb9d5f) +(cherry picked from commit f66ea1e60c347408e92b6695d5105c7e0f24d568) +(cherry picked from commit 0e07159c24cdbb62a9d19fba8199065b049e03c7) +--- + grub-core/font/font.c | 14 +++++++++----- + 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/font/font.c b/grub-core/font/font.c +index 347e9dfa29..1367e44743 100644 +--- a/grub-core/font/font.c ++++ b/grub-core/font/font.c +@@ -1468,14 +1468,18 @@ ensure_comb_space (const struct grub_unicode_glyph *glyph_id) + if (glyph_id->ncomb <= render_max_comb_glyphs) + return; + +- render_max_comb_glyphs = 2 * glyph_id->ncomb; +- if (render_max_comb_glyphs < 8) ++ if (grub_mul (glyph_id->ncomb, 2, &render_max_comb_glyphs)) ++ render_max_comb_glyphs = 0; ++ if (render_max_comb_glyphs > 0 && render_max_comb_glyphs < 8) + render_max_comb_glyphs = 8; + grub_free (render_combining_glyphs); +- render_combining_glyphs = grub_malloc (render_max_comb_glyphs +- * sizeof (render_combining_glyphs[0])); ++ render_combining_glyphs = (render_max_comb_glyphs > 0) ? ++ grub_calloc (render_max_comb_glyphs, sizeof (render_combining_glyphs[0])) : NULL; + if (!render_combining_glyphs) +- grub_errno = 0; ++ { ++ render_max_comb_glyphs = 0; ++ grub_errno = GRUB_ERR_NONE; ++ } + } + + int diff --git a/SOURCES/0492-font-Fix-integer-overflow-in-BMP-index.patch b/SOURCES/0492-font-Fix-integer-overflow-in-BMP-index.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c28337d --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0492-font-Fix-integer-overflow-in-BMP-index.patch @@ -0,0 +1,65 @@ +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Zhang Boyang +Date: Mon, 15 Aug 2022 02:04:58 +0800 +Subject: [PATCH] font: Fix integer overflow in BMP index + +The BMP index (font->bmp_idx) is designed as a reverse lookup table of +char entries (font->char_index), in order to speed up lookups for BMP +chars (i.e. code < 0x10000). The values in BMP index are the subscripts +of the corresponding char entries, stored in grub_uint16_t, while 0xffff +means not found. + +This patch fixes the problem of large subscript truncated to grub_uint16_t, +leading BMP index to return wrong char entry or report false miss. The +code now checks for bounds and uses BMP index as a hint, and fallbacks +to binary-search if necessary. + +On the occasion add a comment about BMP index is initialized to 0xffff. + +Signed-off-by: Zhang Boyang +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper +(cherry picked from commit afda8b60ba0712abe01ae1e64c5f7a067a0e6492) +(cherry picked from commit 6d90568929e11739b56f09ebbce9185ca9c23519) +(cherry picked from commit b8c47c3dd6894b3135db861e3e563f661efad5c3) +--- + grub-core/font/font.c | 13 +++++++++---- + 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/font/font.c b/grub-core/font/font.c +index 1367e44743..059c23dff7 100644 +--- a/grub-core/font/font.c ++++ b/grub-core/font/font.c +@@ -300,6 +300,8 @@ load_font_index (grub_file_t file, grub_uint32_t sect_length, struct + font->bmp_idx = grub_malloc (0x10000 * sizeof (grub_uint16_t)); + if (!font->bmp_idx) + return 1; ++ ++ /* Init the BMP index array to 0xffff. */ + grub_memset (font->bmp_idx, 0xff, 0x10000 * sizeof (grub_uint16_t)); + + +@@ -328,7 +330,7 @@ load_font_index (grub_file_t file, grub_uint32_t sect_length, struct + return 1; + } + +- if (entry->code < 0x10000) ++ if (entry->code < 0x10000 && i < 0xffff) + font->bmp_idx[entry->code] = i; + + last_code = entry->code; +@@ -696,9 +698,12 @@ find_glyph (const grub_font_t font, grub_uint32_t code) + /* Use BMP index if possible. */ + if (code < 0x10000 && font->bmp_idx) + { +- if (font->bmp_idx[code] == 0xffff) +- return 0; +- return &table[font->bmp_idx[code]]; ++ if (font->bmp_idx[code] < 0xffff) ++ return &table[font->bmp_idx[code]]; ++ /* ++ * When we are here then lookup in BMP index result in miss, ++ * fallthough to binary-search. ++ */ + } + + /* Do a binary search in `char_index', which is ordered by code point. */ diff --git a/SOURCES/0493-font-Fix-integer-underflow-in-binary-search-of-char-.patch b/SOURCES/0493-font-Fix-integer-underflow-in-binary-search-of-char-.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..31b66af --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0493-font-Fix-integer-underflow-in-binary-search-of-char-.patch @@ -0,0 +1,85 @@ +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Zhang Boyang +Date: Sun, 14 Aug 2022 18:09:38 +0800 +Subject: [PATCH] font: Fix integer underflow in binary search of char index + +If search target is less than all entries in font->index then "hi" +variable is set to -1, which translates to SIZE_MAX and leads to errors. + +This patch fixes the problem by replacing the entire binary search code +with the libstdc++'s std::lower_bound() implementation. + +Signed-off-by: Zhang Boyang +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper +(cherry picked from commit c140a086838e7c9af87842036f891b8393a8c4bc) +(cherry picked from commit e110997335b1744464ea232d57a7d86e16ca8dee) +(cherry picked from commit 403053a5116ae945f9515a82c37ff8cfb927362c) +--- + grub-core/font/font.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++------------------ + 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/font/font.c b/grub-core/font/font.c +index 059c23dff7..31786ab339 100644 +--- a/grub-core/font/font.c ++++ b/grub-core/font/font.c +@@ -688,12 +688,12 @@ read_be_int16 (grub_file_t file, grub_int16_t * value) + static inline struct char_index_entry * + find_glyph (const grub_font_t font, grub_uint32_t code) + { +- struct char_index_entry *table; +- grub_size_t lo; +- grub_size_t hi; +- grub_size_t mid; ++ struct char_index_entry *table, *first, *end; ++ grub_size_t len; + + table = font->char_index; ++ if (table == NULL) ++ return NULL; + + /* Use BMP index if possible. */ + if (code < 0x10000 && font->bmp_idx) +@@ -706,25 +706,29 @@ find_glyph (const grub_font_t font, grub_uint32_t code) + */ + } + +- /* Do a binary search in `char_index', which is ordered by code point. */ +- lo = 0; +- hi = font->num_chars - 1; ++ /* ++ * Do a binary search in char_index which is ordered by code point. ++ * The code below is the same as libstdc++'s std::lower_bound(). ++ */ ++ first = table; ++ len = font->num_chars; ++ end = first + len; + +- if (!table) +- return 0; +- +- while (lo <= hi) ++ while (len > 0) + { +- mid = lo + (hi - lo) / 2; +- if (code < table[mid].code) +- hi = mid - 1; +- else if (code > table[mid].code) +- lo = mid + 1; ++ grub_size_t half = len >> 1; ++ struct char_index_entry *middle = first + half; ++ ++ if (middle->code < code) ++ { ++ first = middle + 1; ++ len = len - half - 1; ++ } + else +- return &table[mid]; ++ len = half; + } + +- return 0; ++ return (first < end && first->code == code) ? first : NULL; + } + + /* Get a glyph for the Unicode character CODE in FONT. The glyph is loaded diff --git a/SOURCES/0494-fbutil-Fix-integer-overflow.patch b/SOURCES/0494-fbutil-Fix-integer-overflow.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8854410 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0494-fbutil-Fix-integer-overflow.patch @@ -0,0 +1,85 @@ +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Zhang Boyang +Date: Tue, 6 Sep 2022 03:03:21 +0800 +Subject: [PATCH] fbutil: Fix integer overflow + +Expressions like u64 = u32 * u32 are unsafe because their products are +truncated to u32 even if left hand side is u64. This patch fixes all +problems like that one in fbutil. + +To get right result not only left hand side have to be u64 but it's also +necessary to cast at least one of the operands of all leaf operators of +right hand side to u64, e.g. u64 = u32 * u32 + u32 * u32 should be +u64 = (u64)u32 * u32 + (u64)u32 * u32. + +For 1-bit bitmaps grub_uint64_t have to be used. It's safe because any +combination of values in (grub_uint64_t)u32 * u32 + u32 expression will +not overflow grub_uint64_t. + +Other expressions like ptr + u32 * u32 + u32 * u32 are also vulnerable. +They should be ptr + (grub_addr_t)u32 * u32 + (grub_addr_t)u32 * u32. + +This patch also adds a comment to grub_video_fb_get_video_ptr() which +says it's arguments must be valid and no sanity check is performed +(like its siblings in grub-core/video/fb/fbutil.c). + +Signed-off-by: Zhang Boyang +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper +(cherry picked from commit 50a11a81bc842c58962244a2dc86bbd31a426e12) +(cherry picked from commit 8fa75d647362c938c4cc302cf5945b31fb92c078) +(cherry picked from commit 91005e39b3c8b6ca8dcc84ecb19ac9328966aaea) +--- + grub-core/video/fb/fbutil.c | 4 ++-- + include/grub/fbutil.h | 13 +++++++++---- + 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/video/fb/fbutil.c b/grub-core/video/fb/fbutil.c +index b98bb51fe8..25ef39f47d 100644 +--- a/grub-core/video/fb/fbutil.c ++++ b/grub-core/video/fb/fbutil.c +@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ get_pixel (struct grub_video_fbblit_info *source, + case 1: + if (source->mode_info->blit_format == GRUB_VIDEO_BLIT_FORMAT_1BIT_PACKED) + { +- int bit_index = y * source->mode_info->width + x; ++ grub_uint64_t bit_index = (grub_uint64_t) y * source->mode_info->width + x; + grub_uint8_t *ptr = source->data + bit_index / 8; + int bit_pos = 7 - bit_index % 8; + color = (*ptr >> bit_pos) & 0x01; +@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ set_pixel (struct grub_video_fbblit_info *source, + case 1: + if (source->mode_info->blit_format == GRUB_VIDEO_BLIT_FORMAT_1BIT_PACKED) + { +- int bit_index = y * source->mode_info->width + x; ++ grub_uint64_t bit_index = (grub_uint64_t) y * source->mode_info->width + x; + grub_uint8_t *ptr = source->data + bit_index / 8; + int bit_pos = 7 - bit_index % 8; + *ptr = (*ptr & ~(1 << bit_pos)) | ((color & 0x01) << bit_pos); +diff --git a/include/grub/fbutil.h b/include/grub/fbutil.h +index 4205eb917f..78a1ab3b45 100644 +--- a/include/grub/fbutil.h ++++ b/include/grub/fbutil.h +@@ -31,14 +31,19 @@ struct grub_video_fbblit_info + grub_uint8_t *data; + }; + +-/* Don't use for 1-bit bitmaps, addressing needs to be done at the bit level +- and it doesn't make sense, in general, to ask for a pointer +- to a particular pixel's data. */ ++/* ++ * Don't use for 1-bit bitmaps, addressing needs to be done at the bit level ++ * and it doesn't make sense, in general, to ask for a pointer ++ * to a particular pixel's data. ++ * ++ * This function assumes that bounds checking has been done in previous phase ++ * and they are opted out in here. ++ */ + static inline void * + grub_video_fb_get_video_ptr (struct grub_video_fbblit_info *source, + unsigned int x, unsigned int y) + { +- return source->data + y * source->mode_info->pitch + x * source->mode_info->bytes_per_pixel; ++ return source->data + (grub_addr_t) y * source->mode_info->pitch + (grub_addr_t) x * source->mode_info->bytes_per_pixel; + } + + /* Advance pointer by VAL bytes. If there is no unaligned access available, diff --git a/SOURCES/0495-font-Fix-an-integer-underflow-in-blit_comb.patch b/SOURCES/0495-font-Fix-an-integer-underflow-in-blit_comb.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4658302 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0495-font-Fix-an-integer-underflow-in-blit_comb.patch @@ -0,0 +1,91 @@ +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Zhang Boyang +Date: Mon, 24 Oct 2022 08:05:35 +0800 +Subject: [PATCH] font: Fix an integer underflow in blit_comb() + +The expression (ctx.bounds.height - combining_glyphs[i]->height) / 2 may +evaluate to a very big invalid value even if both ctx.bounds.height and +combining_glyphs[i]->height are small integers. For example, if +ctx.bounds.height is 10 and combining_glyphs[i]->height is 12, this +expression evaluates to 2147483647 (expected -1). This is because +coordinates are allowed to be negative but ctx.bounds.height is an +unsigned int. So, the subtraction operates on unsigned ints and +underflows to a very big value. The division makes things even worse. +The quotient is still an invalid value even if converted back to int. + +This patch fixes the problem by casting ctx.bounds.height to int. As +a result the subtraction will operate on int and grub_uint16_t which +will be promoted to an int. So, the underflow will no longer happen. Other +uses of ctx.bounds.height (and ctx.bounds.width) are also casted to int, +to ensure coordinates are always calculated on signed integers. + +Fixes: CVE-2022-3775 + +Reported-by: Daniel Axtens +Signed-off-by: Zhang Boyang +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper +(cherry picked from commit 6d2668dea3774ed74c4cd1eadd146f1b846bc3d4) +(cherry picked from commit 05e532fb707bbf79aa4e1efbde4d208d7da89d6b) +(cherry picked from commit 0b2592fbb245d53c5c42885d695ece03ddb0eb12) +--- + grub-core/font/font.c | 16 ++++++++-------- + 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/font/font.c b/grub-core/font/font.c +index 049d7fe0bd49..eca7c4748ce6 100644 +--- a/grub-core/font/font.c ++++ b/grub-core/font/font.c +@@ -1202,12 +1202,12 @@ blit_comb (const struct grub_unicode_glyph *glyph_id, + ctx.bounds.height = main_glyph->height; + + above_rightx = main_glyph->offset_x + main_glyph->width; +- above_righty = ctx.bounds.y + ctx.bounds.height; ++ above_righty = ctx.bounds.y + (int) ctx.bounds.height; + + above_leftx = main_glyph->offset_x; +- above_lefty = ctx.bounds.y + ctx.bounds.height; ++ above_lefty = ctx.bounds.y + (int) ctx.bounds.height; + +- below_rightx = ctx.bounds.x + ctx.bounds.width; ++ below_rightx = ctx.bounds.x + (int) ctx.bounds.width; + below_righty = ctx.bounds.y; + + comb = grub_unicode_get_comb (glyph_id); +@@ -1220,7 +1220,7 @@ blit_comb (const struct grub_unicode_glyph *glyph_id, + + if (!combining_glyphs[i]) + continue; +- targetx = (ctx.bounds.width - combining_glyphs[i]->width) / 2 + ctx.bounds.x; ++ targetx = ((int) ctx.bounds.width - combining_glyphs[i]->width) / 2 + ctx.bounds.x; + /* CGJ is to avoid diacritics reordering. */ + if (comb[i].code + == GRUB_UNICODE_COMBINING_GRAPHEME_JOINER) +@@ -1230,8 +1230,8 @@ blit_comb (const struct grub_unicode_glyph *glyph_id, + case GRUB_UNICODE_COMB_OVERLAY: + do_blit (combining_glyphs[i], + targetx, +- (ctx.bounds.height - combining_glyphs[i]->height) / 2 +- - (ctx.bounds.height + ctx.bounds.y), &ctx); ++ ((int) ctx.bounds.height - combining_glyphs[i]->height) / 2 ++ - ((int) ctx.bounds.height + ctx.bounds.y), &ctx); + if (min_devwidth < combining_glyphs[i]->width) + min_devwidth = combining_glyphs[i]->width; + break; +@@ -1304,7 +1304,7 @@ blit_comb (const struct grub_unicode_glyph *glyph_id, + + case GRUB_UNICODE_STACK_ATTACHED_ABOVE: + do_blit (combining_glyphs[i], targetx, +- -(ctx.bounds.height + ctx.bounds.y + space ++ -((int) ctx.bounds.height + ctx.bounds.y + space + + combining_glyphs[i]->height), &ctx); + if (min_devwidth < combining_glyphs[i]->width) + min_devwidth = combining_glyphs[i]->width; +@@ -1312,7 +1312,7 @@ blit_comb (const struct grub_unicode_glyph *glyph_id, + + case GRUB_UNICODE_COMB_HEBREW_DAGESH: + do_blit (combining_glyphs[i], targetx, +- -(ctx.bounds.height / 2 + ctx.bounds.y ++ -((int) ctx.bounds.height / 2 + ctx.bounds.y + + combining_glyphs[i]->height / 2), &ctx); + if (min_devwidth < combining_glyphs[i]->width) + min_devwidth = combining_glyphs[i]->width; diff --git a/SOURCES/0496-font-Harden-grub_font_blit_glyph-and-grub_font_blit_.patch b/SOURCES/0496-font-Harden-grub_font_blit_glyph-and-grub_font_blit_.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..87b8e33 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0496-font-Harden-grub_font_blit_glyph-and-grub_font_blit_.patch @@ -0,0 +1,75 @@ +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Zhang Boyang +Date: Mon, 24 Oct 2022 07:15:41 +0800 +Subject: [PATCH] font: Harden grub_font_blit_glyph() and + grub_font_blit_glyph_mirror() + +As a mitigation and hardening measure add sanity checks to +grub_font_blit_glyph() and grub_font_blit_glyph_mirror(). This patch +makes these two functions do nothing if target blitting area isn't fully +contained in target bitmap. Therefore, if complex calculations in caller +overflows and malicious coordinates are given, we are still safe because +any coordinates which result in out-of-bound-write are rejected. However, +this patch only checks for invalid coordinates, and doesn't provide any +protection against invalid source glyph or destination glyph, e.g. +mismatch between glyph size and buffer size. + +This hardening measure is designed to mitigate possible overflows in +blit_comb(). If overflow occurs, it may return invalid bounding box +during dry run and call grub_font_blit_glyph() with malicious +coordinates during actual blitting. However, we are still safe because +the scratch glyph itself is valid, although its size makes no sense, and +any invalid coordinates are rejected. + +It would be better to call grub_fatal() if illegal parameter is detected. +However, doing this may end up in a dangerous recursion because grub_fatal() +would print messages to the screen and we are in the progress of drawing +characters on the screen. + +Reported-by: Daniel Axtens +Signed-off-by: Zhang Boyang +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper +(cherry picked from commit fcd7aa0c278f7cf3fb9f93f1a3966e1792339eb6) +(cherry picked from commit 1d37ec63a1c76a14fdf70f548eada92667b42ddb) +(cherry picked from commit 686c72ea0a841343b7d8ab64e815751aa36e24b5) +--- + grub-core/font/font.c | 14 ++++++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/grub-core/font/font.c b/grub-core/font/font.c +index fc9d92fce4..cfa4bd5096 100644 +--- a/grub-core/font/font.c ++++ b/grub-core/font/font.c +@@ -1069,8 +1069,15 @@ static void + grub_font_blit_glyph (struct grub_font_glyph *target, + struct grub_font_glyph *src, unsigned dx, unsigned dy) + { ++ grub_uint16_t max_x, max_y; + unsigned src_bit, tgt_bit, src_byte, tgt_byte; + unsigned i, j; ++ ++ /* Harden against out-of-bound writes. */ ++ if ((grub_add (dx, src->width, &max_x) || max_x > target->width) || ++ (grub_add (dy, src->height, &max_y) || max_y > target->height)) ++ return; ++ + for (i = 0; i < src->height; i++) + { + src_bit = (src->width * i) % 8; +@@ -1102,9 +1109,16 @@ grub_font_blit_glyph_mirror (struct grub_font_glyph *target, + struct grub_font_glyph *src, + unsigned dx, unsigned dy) + { ++ grub_uint16_t max_x, max_y; + unsigned tgt_bit, src_byte, tgt_byte; + signed src_bit; + unsigned i, j; ++ ++ /* Harden against out-of-bound writes. */ ++ if ((grub_add (dx, src->width, &max_x) || max_x > target->width) || ++ (grub_add (dy, src->height, &max_y) || max_y > target->height)) ++ return; ++ + for (i = 0; i < src->height; i++) + { + src_bit = (src->width * i + src->width - 1) % 8; diff --git a/SOURCES/0497-font-Assign-null_font-to-glyphs-in-ascii_font_glyph.patch b/SOURCES/0497-font-Assign-null_font-to-glyphs-in-ascii_font_glyph.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..981d5df --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0497-font-Assign-null_font-to-glyphs-in-ascii_font_glyph.patch @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Zhang Boyang +Date: Fri, 28 Oct 2022 17:29:16 +0800 +Subject: [PATCH] font: Assign null_font to glyphs in ascii_font_glyph[] + +The calculations in blit_comb() need information from glyph's font, e.g. +grub_font_get_xheight(main_glyph->font). However, main_glyph->font is +NULL if main_glyph comes from ascii_font_glyph[]. Therefore +grub_font_get_*() crashes because of NULL pointer. + +There is already a solution, the null_font. So, assign it to those glyphs +in ascii_font_glyph[]. + +Reported-by: Daniel Axtens +Signed-off-by: Zhang Boyang +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper +(cherry picked from commit dd539d695482069d28b40f2d3821f710cdcf6ee6) +(cherry picked from commit 87526376857eaceae474c9797e3cee5b50597332) +(cherry picked from commit b4807bbb09d9adf82fe9ae12a3af1c852dc4e32d) +--- + grub-core/font/font.c | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/font/font.c b/grub-core/font/font.c +index cfa4bd5096..30cd1fe07f 100644 +--- a/grub-core/font/font.c ++++ b/grub-core/font/font.c +@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ ascii_glyph_lookup (grub_uint32_t code) + ascii_font_glyph[current]->offset_x = 0; + ascii_font_glyph[current]->offset_y = -2; + ascii_font_glyph[current]->device_width = 8; +- ascii_font_glyph[current]->font = NULL; ++ ascii_font_glyph[current]->font = &null_font; + + grub_memcpy (ascii_font_glyph[current]->bitmap, + &ascii_bitmaps[current * ASCII_BITMAP_SIZE], diff --git a/SOURCES/0498-normal-charset-Fix-an-integer-overflow-in-grub_unico.patch b/SOURCES/0498-normal-charset-Fix-an-integer-overflow-in-grub_unico.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..283d560 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0498-normal-charset-Fix-an-integer-overflow-in-grub_unico.patch @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Zhang Boyang +Date: Fri, 28 Oct 2022 21:31:39 +0800 +Subject: [PATCH] normal/charset: Fix an integer overflow in + grub_unicode_aglomerate_comb() + +The out->ncomb is a bit-field of 8 bits. So, the max possible value is 255. +However, code in grub_unicode_aglomerate_comb() doesn't check for an +overflow when incrementing out->ncomb. If out->ncomb is already 255, +after incrementing it will get 0 instead of 256, and cause illegal +memory access in subsequent processing. + +This patch introduces GRUB_UNICODE_NCOMB_MAX to represent the max +acceptable value of ncomb. The code now checks for this limit and +ignores additional combining characters when limit is reached. + +Reported-by: Daniel Axtens +Signed-off-by: Zhang Boyang +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper +(cherry picked from commit da90d62316a3b105d2fbd7334d6521936bd6dcf6) +(cherry picked from commit 26fafec86000b5322837722a115279ef03922ca6) +(cherry picked from commit 872fba1c44dee2ab5cb36b2c7a883847f91ed907) +--- + grub-core/normal/charset.c | 3 +++ + include/grub/unicode.h | 2 ++ + 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/grub-core/normal/charset.c b/grub-core/normal/charset.c +index 7b2de12001..4849cf06f7 100644 +--- a/grub-core/normal/charset.c ++++ b/grub-core/normal/charset.c +@@ -472,6 +472,9 @@ grub_unicode_aglomerate_comb (const grub_uint32_t *in, grub_size_t inlen, + if (!haveout) + continue; + ++ if (out->ncomb == GRUB_UNICODE_NCOMB_MAX) ++ continue; ++ + if (comb_type == GRUB_UNICODE_COMB_MC + || comb_type == GRUB_UNICODE_COMB_ME + || comb_type == GRUB_UNICODE_COMB_MN) +diff --git a/include/grub/unicode.h b/include/grub/unicode.h +index 4de986a857..c4f6fca043 100644 +--- a/include/grub/unicode.h ++++ b/include/grub/unicode.h +@@ -147,7 +147,9 @@ struct grub_unicode_glyph + grub_uint8_t bidi_level:6; /* minimum: 6 */ + enum grub_bidi_type bidi_type:5; /* minimum: :5 */ + ++#define GRUB_UNICODE_NCOMB_MAX ((1 << 8) - 1) + unsigned ncomb:8; ++ + /* Hint by unicode subsystem how wide this character usually is. + Real width is determined by font. Set only in UTF-8 stream. */ + int estimated_width:8; diff --git a/SOURCES/0499-safemath-add-grub_cast-for-gcc-5.1.patch b/SOURCES/0499-safemath-add-grub_cast-for-gcc-5.1.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f8b7a4c --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/0499-safemath-add-grub_cast-for-gcc-5.1.patch @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Nicolas Frayer +Date: Wed, 31 Jan 2024 15:36:09 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] safemath: add grub_cast for gcc < 5.1 + +Signed-off-by: Nicolas Frayer +--- + include/grub/safemath.h | 2 ++ + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/include/grub/safemath.h b/include/grub/safemath.h +index 30800ad6a141..f7392469739f 100644 +--- a/include/grub/safemath.h ++++ b/include/grub/safemath.h +@@ -151,6 +151,8 @@ + __signed_mul_overflow(a, b, d), \ + __unsigned_mul_overflow(a, b, d)) + ++#define grub_cast(a, res) grub_add ((a), 0, (res)) ++ + #endif + + #endif /* GRUB_SAFEMATH_H */ diff --git a/SOURCES/centos-ca-secureboot.der b/SOURCES/centos-ca-secureboot.der deleted file mode 100644 index 44a2563..0000000 Binary files a/SOURCES/centos-ca-secureboot.der and /dev/null differ diff --git a/SOURCES/centossecureboot001.crt b/SOURCES/centossecureboot001.crt deleted file mode 100644 index 294b05f..0000000 --- a/SOURCES/centossecureboot001.crt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,425 +0,0 @@ - - - - - - Tree - rpms/kernel - CentOS Git server - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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-        Serial Number:
-            b6:16:15:71:72:fb:31:7e
-        Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
-        Issuer: CN=CentOS Secure Boot (CA key 1)/emailAddress=security@centos.org
-        Validity
-            Not Before: Aug  1 11:47:30 2018 GMT
-            Not After : Dec 31 11:47:30 2037 GMT
-        Subject: CN=CentOS Secure Boot (key 1)/emailAddress=security@centos.org
-        Subject Public Key Info:
-            Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption
-            RSA Public Key: (2048 bit)
-                Modulus (2048 bit):
-                    00:c1:a3:6a:f4:2d:71:83:6c:21:ca:0c:b7:ac:fa:
-                    76:80:43:03:40:87:5d:de:e9:1e:df:ad:e7:2b:51:
-                    cb:f8:31:0f:9a:db:ab:23:25:04:11:05:57:7d:f2:
-                    4b:8d:1e:b3:75:78:1d:b9:57:8b:18:0b:bb:7e:e3:
-                    24:0f:6a:40:5f:2b:4f:03:a5:85:94:d2:f9:08:a0:
-                    bc:db:a5:ea:4f:7f:e8:7c:d1:a9:f8:f0:9c:25:18:
-                    00:14:c4:c4:35:7d:1d:4c:8a:8d:95:f8:ed:65:97:
-                    a5:a4:da:7d:cb:f0:33:3b:b7:03:94:68:47:05:57:
-                    6c:96:91:ac:14:f2:e3:f6:6d:4a:18:cf:68:8a:35:
-                    6f:8e:26:99:7f:db:c9:83:54:c2:c3:bf:ad:45:a0:
-                    aa:a0:86:5f:20:b1:86:1b:ae:b7:28:15:11:f9:65:
-                    53:5d:70:33:9b:a3:c7:b5:c8:11:ff:55:3b:e7:46:
-                    f1:6c:6b:8c:bb:f2:9f:36:23:b1:2d:23:2f:8f:4f:
-                    6c:a8:cc:ae:f5:56:9e:22:6c:0e:9a:4a:b1:bd:b2:
-                    76:15:5c:05:85:b8:5e:dc:8c:a5:c3:e0:75:51:a4:
-                    94:9b:03:2e:7b:f8:d3:b9:dd:7f:88:ce:2e:2f:28:
-                    4c:b4:92:2f:e6:e0:67:0a:d0:ff:c5:d2:79:a6:ef:
-                    94:0f
-                Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)
-        X509v3 extensions:
-            X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical
-                CA:FALSE
-            X509v3 Key Usage: 
-                Digital Signature
-            X509v3 Subject Key Identifier: 
-                F0:37:C6:EA:EC:36:D4:05:7A:52:6C:0E:C6:D5:A9:5B:32:4E:E1:29
-            X509v3 Authority Key Identifier: 
-                keyid:54:EC:81:85:89:3E:E9:1A:DB:08:F7:44:88:54:7E:8E:3F:74:3A:F3
-
-    Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
-        97:97:ba:a6:0b:5b:bb:84:39:2e:ef:8b:51:9a:89:bb:65:3c:
-        dc:15:d0:5a:88:c5:af:ce:93:f5:c1:74:98:15:59:a9:38:da:
-        11:fd:46:d5:4f:23:7c:03:1f:ae:0c:70:93:94:a7:61:2f:4b:
-        2f:5f:bb:cc:8a:d7:4a:24:66:73:85:b4:19:13:fc:6a:61:4a:
-        28:1f:a2:38:f4:72:90:03:c4:3e:64:63:8b:fb:15:22:22:4e:
-        b9:43:d9:b4:3d:3a:60:c1:4d:3a:09:85:68:7a:bc:3b:f9:ef:
-        f3:f5:e9:c9:4f:80:8c:c6:e9:cb:ef:28:44:b0:5d:d4:9e:4f:
-        0f:02:9a:65:aa:98:35:b4:6f:d2:80:e3:08:ef:12:d0:17:56:
-        a6:a1:42:1e:1d:ab:e5:33:c0:fd:88:0d:40:42:81:c8:27:30:
-        17:07:57:3e:05:9d:aa:05:0e:5b:3a:79:b4:29:aa:7c:42:5a:
-        ad:43:59:fb:34:4d:dc:62:58:63:e4:fb:de:bb:fd:6c:4e:97:
-        58:f4:b9:99:4a:71:fe:7f:16:50:55:25:46:39:96:9b:88:6c:
-        75:19:33:9e:70:b3:04:82:fe:16:a8:8e:22:47:83:6d:16:77:
-        da:26:ad:31:d8:06:6d:c5:7e:46:4b:21:ab:ae:ec:2a:93:71:
-        da:7f:89:1d
------BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
-MIIDdTCCAl2gAwIBAgIJALYWFXFy+zF+MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAMEwxJjAkBgNV
-BAMMHUNlbnRPUyBTZWN1cmUgQm9vdCAoQ0Ega2V5IDEpMSIwIAYJKoZIhvcNAQkB
-FhNzZWN1cml0eUBjZW50b3Mub3JnMB4XDTE4MDgwMTExNDczMFoXDTM3MTIzMTEx
-NDczMFowSTEjMCEGA1UEAxMaQ2VudE9TIFNlY3VyZSBCb290IChrZXkgMSkxIjAg
-BgkqhkiG9w0BCQEWE3NlY3VyaXR5QGNlbnRvcy5vcmcwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEB
-AQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQDBo2r0LXGDbCHKDLes+naAQwNAh13e6R7frecrUcv4
-MQ+a26sjJQQRBVd98kuNHrN1eB25V4sYC7t+4yQPakBfK08DpYWU0vkIoLzbpepP
-f+h80an48JwlGAAUxMQ1fR1Mio2V+O1ll6Wk2n3L8DM7twOUaEcFV2yWkawU8uP2
-bUoYz2iKNW+OJpl/28mDVMLDv61FoKqghl8gsYYbrrcoFRH5ZVNdcDObo8e1yBH/
-VTvnRvFsa4y78p82I7EtIy+PT2yozK71Vp4ibA6aSrG9snYVXAWFuF7cjKXD4HVR
-pJSbAy57+NO53X+Izi4vKEy0ki/m4GcK0P/F0nmm75QPAgMBAAGjXTBbMAwGA1Ud
-EwEB/wQCMAAwCwYDVR0PBAQDAgeAMB0GA1UdDgQWBBTwN8bq7DbUBXpSbA7G1alb
-Mk7hKTAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBRU7IGFiT7pGtsI90SIVH6OP3Q68zANBgkqhkiG9w0B
-AQsFAAOCAQEAl5e6pgtbu4Q5Lu+LUZqJu2U83BXQWojFr86T9cF0mBVZqTjaEf1G
-1U8jfAMfrgxwk5SnYS9LL1+7zIrXSiRmc4W0GRP8amFKKB+iOPRykAPEPmRji/sV
-IiJOuUPZtD06YMFNOgmFaHq8O/nv8/XpyU+AjMbpy+8oRLBd1J5PDwKaZaqYNbRv
-0oDjCO8S0BdWpqFCHh2r5TPA/YgNQEKByCcwFwdXPgWdqgUOWzp5tCmqfEJarUNZ
-+zRN3GJYY+T73rv9bE6XWPS5mUpx/n8WUFUlRjmWm4hsdRkznnCzBIL+FqiOIkeD
-bRZ32iatMdgGbcV+Rkshq67sKpNx2n+JHQ==
------END CERTIFICATE-----
-
-
-
- -
-
-
-
- -
-
-

- Powered by - Pagure - 5.8.1 -

-

SSH Hostkey/Fingerprint | Documentation

-
-
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/SOURCES/centossecureboot202.crt b/SOURCES/centossecureboot202.crt deleted file mode 100644 index fba3730..0000000 --- a/SOURCES/centossecureboot202.crt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,84 +0,0 @@ -Certificate: - Data: - Version: 3 (0x2) - Serial Number: - 93:c2:04:d8:bd:77:6b:12 - Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption - Issuer: CN=CentOS Secure Boot CA 2/emailAddress=security@centos.org - Validity - Not Before: Jun 9 10:37:54 2020 GMT - Not After : Jan 18 10:37:54 2038 GMT - Subject: CN=CentOS Secure Boot Signing 202/emailAddress=security@centos.org - Subject Public Key Info: - Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption - Public-Key: (2048 bit) - Modulus: - 00:d4:f0:32:4d:50:7a:c0:41:d6:61:68:59:5e:5b: - ce:65:e3:e9:7b:01:e4:53:94:c9:b7:c1:6b:b7:12: - 0b:bc:8f:d7:17:1b:c1:77:3a:08:17:ba:23:f1:bd: - 98:f0:7c:cb:96:70:2e:0e:2e:96:66:b7:9f:29:12: - 6f:ee:30:33:a1:a5:ee:f9:4b:a3:fb:52:45:d8:7e: - c2:e8:a9:20:a9:f2:2e:f4:44:b7:85:3f:34:7c:c0: - 73:1d:73:63:2f:11:a0:7d:df:e7:5a:20:b9:b9:ff: - 5d:0e:6d:90:86:1f:2e:fa:c7:b5:94:37:80:46:0d: - fb:5f:f8:26:f4:ce:2f:0d:5b:bf:e5:8d:a5:12:d7: - ba:cf:16:f2:5c:10:ae:a0:80:a8:dc:c4:6b:00:24: - f4:4b:f0:01:82:7e:4b:1c:b6:d6:ac:e1:72:32:07: - 5d:48:4a:cd:ba:5c:9c:09:72:89:b2:2e:60:f7:b7: - ed:ea:b6:0d:ae:63:f8:09:a1:8f:62:ee:09:d2:cb: - 0a:81:df:7c:72:4b:bf:bd:fb:59:24:84:1f:1d:ce: - 36:bc:4c:13:84:ca:c5:e0:81:bb:ec:61:8f:9f:78: - 88:43:8d:e0:16:b2:ab:90:14:23:29:ce:1d:e7:a1: - bb:4a:93:f9:f8:8d:b8:ff:2f:30:74:66:b2:31:89: - b1:7d - Exponent: 65537 (0x10001) - X509v3 extensions: - X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical - CA:FALSE - X509v3 Key Usage: critical - Digital Signature - X509v3 Extended Key Usage: critical - Code Signing - X509v3 Subject Key Identifier: - 1E:55:FF:FF:01:71:5F:F1:28:7F:C8:A9:7C:AF:83:9F:ED:7A:33:0B - X509v3 Authority Key Identifier: - keyid:70:00:7F:99:20:9C:12:6B:E1:47:74:EA:EC:7B:6D:96:31:F3:4D:CA - - Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption - 6b:1b:fa:f3:a8:c0:1e:e7:55:49:f2:4e:16:1f:9a:1b:22:9c: - ff:c9:81:d0:5b:d6:28:3c:38:91:65:b5:ca:63:e6:9d:13:2d: - 5f:f5:cc:67:c2:82:55:73:8f:8b:0c:0c:a9:60:2a:a8:b2:19: - c1:a7:87:94:d8:69:5e:3c:88:e5:32:8a:4c:a6:6f:69:8b:c5: - f2:7e:8e:d2:af:37:2d:27:73:c7:ad:9d:bc:14:08:a8:aa:57: - 22:37:be:c6:d2:2d:a3:70:81:4a:88:8c:a3:44:89:6c:7d:9d: - 9f:db:ff:5c:c6:ec:6d:97:b0:08:8d:76:c6:14:d0:25:81:a3: - 09:b6:f2:89:32:12:b2:f2:71:71:b6:ac:c1:65:d1:9c:6b:e1: - a4:4e:74:d0:01:17:ad:38:0f:17:86:07:56:b3:a1:86:5d:99: - ef:d6:55:98:b9:ce:63:46:8b:37:c4:53:55:8b:7a:10:75:90: - fd:e6:62:f0:6c:af:89:91:17:34:f7:99:77:6d:29:fa:92:bb: - c3:45:77:fe:a3:15:da:54:7d:47:16:b6:6f:94:09:b8:5f:ca: - e9:34:a2:bf:18:cd:d3:f4:17:2c:98:e4:e4:ca:46:ad:4b:a4: - 34:77:47:ec:5d:21:a6:cf:5c:b9:5a:47:ca:04:a1:93:56:13: - 0a:cc:47:91 ------BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- -MIIDjjCCAnagAwIBAgIJAJPCBNi9d2sSMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAMEYxIDAeBgNV -BAMMF0NlbnRPUyBTZWN1cmUgQm9vdCBDQSAyMSIwIAYJKoZIhvcNAQkBFhNzZWN1 -cml0eUBjZW50b3Mub3JnMB4XDTIwMDYwOTEwMzc1NFoXDTM4MDExODEwMzc1NFow -TTEnMCUGA1UEAwweQ2VudE9TIFNlY3VyZSBCb290IFNpZ25pbmcgMjAyMSIwIAYJ -KoZIhvcNAQkBFhNzZWN1cml0eUBjZW50b3Mub3JnMIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEF -AAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEA1PAyTVB6wEHWYWhZXlvOZePpewHkU5TJt8FrtxILvI/X -FxvBdzoIF7oj8b2Y8HzLlnAuDi6WZrefKRJv7jAzoaXu+Uuj+1JF2H7C6KkgqfIu -9ES3hT80fMBzHXNjLxGgfd/nWiC5uf9dDm2Qhh8u+se1lDeARg37X/gm9M4vDVu/ -5Y2lEte6zxbyXBCuoICo3MRrACT0S/ABgn5LHLbWrOFyMgddSErNulycCXKJsi5g -97ft6rYNrmP4CaGPYu4J0ssKgd98cku/vftZJIQfHc42vEwThMrF4IG77GGPn3iI -Q43gFrKrkBQjKc4d56G7SpP5+I24/y8wdGayMYmxfQIDAQABo3gwdjAMBgNVHRMB -Af8EAjAAMA4GA1UdDwEB/wQEAwIHgDAWBgNVHSUBAf8EDDAKBggrBgEFBQcDAzAd -BgNVHQ4EFgQUHlX//wFxX/Eof8ipfK+Dn+16MwswHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAUcAB/mSCc -EmvhR3Tq7HttljHzTcowDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQADggEBAGsb+vOowB7nVUnyThYf -mhsinP/JgdBb1ig8OJFltcpj5p0TLV/1zGfCglVzj4sMDKlgKqiyGcGnh5TYaV48 -iOUyikymb2mLxfJ+jtKvNy0nc8etnbwUCKiqVyI3vsbSLaNwgUqIjKNEiWx9nZ/b -/1zG7G2XsAiNdsYU0CWBowm28okyErLycXG2rMFl0Zxr4aROdNABF604DxeGB1az -oYZdme/WVZi5zmNGizfEU1WLehB1kP3mYvBsr4mRFzT3mXdtKfqSu8NFd/6jFdpU -fUcWtm+UCbhfyuk0or8YzdP0FyyY5OTKRq1LpDR3R+xdIabPXLlaR8oEoZNWEwrM -R5E= ------END CERTIFICATE----- diff --git a/SOURCES/centossecurebootca2.crt b/SOURCES/centossecurebootca2.crt deleted file mode 100644 index ff4e981..0000000 --- a/SOURCES/centossecurebootca2.crt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,21 +0,0 @@ ------BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- -MIIDYjCCAkqgAwIBAgIJAIlReu6IOzL7MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAMEYxIDAeBgNV -BAMMF0NlbnRPUyBTZWN1cmUgQm9vdCBDQSAyMSIwIAYJKoZIhvcNAQkBFhNzZWN1 -cml0eUBjZW50b3Mub3JnMB4XDTIwMDYwOTA4MTkzMloXDTM4MDExODA4MTkzMlow -RjEgMB4GA1UEAwwXQ2VudE9TIFNlY3VyZSBCb290IENBIDIxIjAgBgkqhkiG9w0B -CQEWE3NlY3VyaXR5QGNlbnRvcy5vcmcwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAw -ggEKAoIBAQChatbNaQDV0RTCqff1tl92xI6gu1k8jYufW8FyzZ6uDnxoGpBT0LiU -WKuGjMQ89JgiApFzDYSLWrZg8NbTnVdz0hny4SMyspe5weUk6IToKXvEejZNFn6i -vae2vfT0/ASKsgIvUcz4sWHMK43vbfv/pVpYGLgoG5aNUkt7VhkeURwJzR3ODgDp -aL4bQ/7qEo8ASHCEvQx6klG330Z06O0kjS6GK12cPC1t5ZlimVXCNWP1jf0pMWmh -aBrZjbyY0j8R7Yns3cEovAM230chsVdyFxSYpqCLzMlmWNxiIlvcAoDIRMWEa7Da -SSAfJWH+ygAzad1PHlnCB0zAFbLAMJH1AgMBAAGjUzBRMB0GA1UdDgQWBBRwAH+Z -IJwSa+FHdOrse22WMfNNyjAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBRwAH+ZIJwSa+FHdOrse22WMfNN -yjAPBgNVHRMBAf8EBTADAQH/MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAA4IBAQAe5NcVSUd/POZs -Jkiep8ATNwXglLAeYxB55F42sXx5OOdKMBmhqWQIVJvaih/wsfKIBfdUGv2L9dH8 -IQgiU1PRYx0baSVJno3HcQTbCqLvnvckusR7IUTDAFj774MvXwS6yV6pXzxDmuh2 -t8hRktOKFeUtdlDYqg9X3Ia3GkoB5huyEbuaZTNcV4TAfU/yAERNIAgRs+fLQU70 -OgGlWsp35J8qPkZKabGf0surDa2xa6iAoFyknxruoKQ8uNSB9KB7/0JvVouNx90+ -ncykWW96GVKs8+H5WGza10FqrchtThSNCSXTtLbTXoK0Atdvu0o04XUbsCGMnlcG -zAVb3/m0 ------END CERTIFICATE----- diff --git a/SOURCES/grub.macros b/SOURCES/grub.macros index a4291b2..0dade27 100644 --- a/SOURCES/grub.macros +++ b/SOURCES/grub.macros @@ -101,6 +101,16 @@ -e 's/-m64//g' \\\ ) %{nil} %endif +%ifarch %{ix86} +%global target_cpu_name %{_arch} +%global grub_target_name %{_arch}-pc + +%global legacy_target_cpu_name i386 +%global legacy_package_arch pc +%global platform pc + +%global with_legacy_arch 0 +%endif %ifarch aarch64 %global efiarch aa64 @@ -152,6 +162,14 @@ %global with_efi_common 1 %global with_legacy_common 0 %endif +%ifarch %{ix86} +%global with_efi_arch 0 +%global with_alt_efi_arch 0 +%global with_efi_common 0 +%global with_legacy_common 1 +%global with_legacy_utils 1 +%global with_legacy_arch 0 +%endif %if 0%{with_efi_common} %global common_srcdir grub-%{grubefiarch}-%{tarversion} @@ -331,7 +349,7 @@ GRUB_MODULES=" all_video boot btrfs cat chain configfile echo \\\ gzio halt hfsplus iso9660 jpeg loadenv loopback \\\ lvm mdraid09 mdraid1x minicmd normal part_apple \\\ part_msdos part_gpt password_pbkdf2 png reboot \\\ - search search_fs_uuid search_fs_file \\\ + regexp search search_fs_uuid search_fs_file \\\ search_label serial sleep syslinuxcfg test tftp \\\ video xfs" \ GRUB_MODULES+=%{efi_modules} \ diff --git a/SOURCES/grub.patches b/SOURCES/grub.patches index 191482a..a566e0f 100644 --- a/SOURCES/grub.patches +++ b/SOURCES/grub.patches @@ -484,3 +484,16 @@ Patch0483: 0483-btrfs-Move-logging-code-in-grub_btrfs_read_logical.patch Patch0484: 0484-btrfs-Move-the-error-logging-from-find_device-to-its.patch Patch0485: 0485-fs-btrfs-Fix-more-ASAN-and-SEGV-issues-found-with-fu.patch Patch0486: 0486-fs-btrfs-Fix-more-fuzz-issues-related-to-chunks.patch +Patch0487: 0487-font-Reject-glyphs-exceeds-font-max_glyph_width-or-f.patch +Patch0488: 0488-font-Fix-size-overflow-in-grub_font_get_glyph_intern.patch +Patch0489: 0489-font-Fix-several-integer-overflows-in-grub_font_cons.patch +Patch0490: 0490-font-Remove-grub_font_dup_glyph.patch +Patch0491: 0491-font-Fix-integer-overflow-in-ensure_comb_space.patch +Patch0492: 0492-font-Fix-integer-overflow-in-BMP-index.patch +Patch0493: 0493-font-Fix-integer-underflow-in-binary-search-of-char-.patch +Patch0494: 0494-fbutil-Fix-integer-overflow.patch +Patch0495: 0495-font-Fix-an-integer-underflow-in-blit_comb.patch +Patch0496: 0496-font-Harden-grub_font_blit_glyph-and-grub_font_blit_.patch +Patch0497: 0497-font-Assign-null_font-to-glyphs-in-ascii_font_glyph.patch +Patch0498: 0498-normal-charset-Fix-an-integer-overflow-in-grub_unico.patch +Patch0499: 0499-safemath-add-grub_cast-for-gcc-5.1.patch diff --git a/SOURCES/sbat.csv.in b/SOURCES/sbat.csv.in index fdc0e9f..808a8f4 100755 --- a/SOURCES/sbat.csv.in +++ b/SOURCES/sbat.csv.in @@ -1,3 +1,3 @@ sbat,1,SBAT Version,sbat,1,https://github.com/rhboot/shim/blob/main/SBAT.md -grub,2,Free Software Foundation,grub,2.02,https://www.gnu.org/software/grub/ +grub,3,Free Software Foundation,grub,2.02,https://www.gnu.org/software/grub/ grub.rhel7,2,Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7,grub2,@@VERSION@@,mail:secalert@redhat.com diff --git a/SPECS/grub2.spec b/SPECS/grub2.spec index f24f119..bb09383 100644 --- a/SPECS/grub2.spec +++ b/SPECS/grub2.spec @@ -1,22 +1,12 @@ %undefine _hardened_build -%global flagday 1:2.02-0.87.el7.centos.2 + %global tarversion 2.02~beta2 %undefine _missing_build_ids_terminate_build -%ifarch i686 -%define platform pc -%define legacy_package_arch i386 -%define legacy_target_cpu_name i386 -%define target_cpu_name i386 -%endif -%ifarch x86_64 -%define mock 1 -%endif - Name: grub2 Epoch: 1 Version: 2.02 -Release: 0.87.0.2%{?dist}%{?buildid}.11 +Release: 0.87%{?dist}%{?buildid}.14 Summary: Bootloader with support for Linux, Multiboot and more Group: System Environment/Base License: GPLv3+ @@ -27,10 +17,10 @@ Source1: grub.macros Source2: grub.patches Source3: http://unifoundry.com/unifont-5.1.20080820.pcf.gz Source4: gitignore -Source5: centos-ca-secureboot.der -Source6: centossecureboot001.crt -Source7: centossecurebootca2.crt -Source8: centossecureboot202.crt +Source5: redhatsecurebootca3.cer +Source6: redhatsecureboot301.cer +Source7: redhatsecurebootca5.cer +Source8: redhatsecureboot502.cer Source9: sbat.csv.in %include %{SOURCE1} @@ -64,11 +54,8 @@ BuildRequires: pesign >= 0.99-8 %if %{?_with_ccache: 1}%{?!_with_ccache: 0} BuildRequires: ccache %endif -%if 0%{?centos} -%global efidir centos -%endif -ExcludeArch: s390 s390x %{arm} +ExcludeArch: s390 s390x %{arm} %{?ix86} Obsoletes: %{name} <= %{flagday} %if 0%{with_legacy_arch} @@ -153,10 +140,6 @@ This subpackage provides tools for support of all platforms. %prep %setup -T -c -n grub-%{tarversion} %do_common_setup -sed -i.orig -e 's@/efi/EFI/redhat/@/efi/EFI/%{efidir}/@' \ - grub-%{tarversion}/util/grub-setpassword.in -touch --reference=grub-%{tarversion}/util/grub-setpassword.in.orig \ - grub-%{tarversion}/util/grub-setpassword.in %if 0%{with_efi_arch} %do_setup %{grubefiarch} sed -e "s,@@VERSION@@,%{evr},g" %{SOURCE9} \ @@ -171,10 +154,10 @@ sed -e "s,@@VERSION@@,%{evr},g" %{SOURCE9} \ %build %if 0%{with_efi_arch} -%do_primary_efi_build %{grubefiarch} %{grubefiname} %{grubeficdname} %{_target_platform} "'%{efi_cflags}'" %{SOURCE5} %{SOURCE6} centossecureboot001 %{SOURCE7} %{SOURCE8} centossecureboot202 +%do_primary_efi_build %{grubefiarch} %{grubefiname} %{grubeficdname} %{_target_platform} "'%{efi_cflags}'" %{SOURCE5} %{SOURCE6} redhatsecureboot301 %{SOURCE7} %{SOURCE8} redhatsecureboot502 %endif %if 0%{with_alt_efi_arch} -%do_alt_efi_build %{grubaltefiarch} %{grubaltefiname} %{grubalteficdname} %{_alt_target_platform} "'%{alt_efi_cflags}'" %{SOURCE5} %{SOURCE6} centossecureboot001 %{SOURCE7} %{SOURCE8} centossecureboot202 +%do_alt_efi_build %{grubaltefiarch} %{grubaltefiname} %{grubalteficdname} %{_alt_target_platform} "'%{alt_efi_cflags}'" %{SOURCE5} %{SOURCE6} redhatsecureboot301 %{SOURCE7} %{SOURCE8} redhatsecureboot502 %endif %if 0%{with_legacy_arch}%{with_legacy_utils} %do_legacy_build %{grublegacyarch} @@ -486,6 +469,18 @@ fi %endif %changelog +* Thu Feb 1 2024 Nicolas Frayer - 2.02-087.el7.14 +- Rebuild for signing +- Related: RHEL-23460 + +* Wed Jan 31 2024 Nicolas Frayer - 2.02-087.el7.13 +- safemath: add grub_cast for gcc < 5.1 +- Related: RHEL-23460 + +* Tue Jan 30 2024 Nicolas Frayer - 2.02-087.el7.12 +- Font CVE fixes and bump SBAT (CVE-2022-2601) +- Resolves: RHEL-23460 + * Wed Nov 16 2022 Robbie Harwood - 2.02-087.el7.11 - Bump sbat - Resolves: CVE-2022-28733