Blame SOURCES/0377-acpi-Don-t-register-the-acpi-command-when-locked-dow.patch

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From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
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Date: Mon, 28 Sep 2020 20:08:41 +0200
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Subject: [PATCH] acpi: Don't register the acpi command when locked down
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MIME-Version: 1.0
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Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
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Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
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The command is not allowed when lockdown is enforced. Otherwise an
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attacker can instruct the GRUB to load an SSDT table to overwrite
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the kernel lockdown configuration and later load and execute
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unsigned code.
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Fixes: CVE-2020-14372
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Reported-by: Máté Kukri <km@mkukri.xyz>
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Signed-off-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
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Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
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---
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 grub-core/commands/acpi.c | 15 ++++++++-------
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 docs/grub.texi            |  5 +++++
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 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/grub-core/commands/acpi.c b/grub-core/commands/acpi.c
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index 5a1499aa0..1215f2a62 100644
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--- a/grub-core/commands/acpi.c
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+++ b/grub-core/commands/acpi.c
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@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
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 #include <grub/mm.h>
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 #include <grub/memory.h>
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 #include <grub/i18n.h>
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+#include <grub/lockdown.h>
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 #ifdef GRUB_MACHINE_EFI
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 #include <grub/efi/efi.h>
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@@ -775,13 +776,13 @@ static grub_extcmd_t cmd;
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 GRUB_MOD_INIT(acpi)
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 {
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-  cmd = grub_register_extcmd ("acpi", grub_cmd_acpi, 0,
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-			      N_("[-1|-2] [--exclude=TABLE1,TABLE2|"
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-			      "--load-only=TABLE1,TABLE2] FILE1"
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-			      " [FILE2] [...]"),
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-			      N_("Load host ACPI tables and tables "
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-			      "specified by arguments."),
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-			      options);
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+  cmd = grub_register_extcmd_lockdown ("acpi", grub_cmd_acpi, 0,
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+                                       N_("[-1|-2] [--exclude=TABLE1,TABLE2|"
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+                                          "--load-only=TABLE1,TABLE2] FILE1"
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+                                          " [FILE2] [...]"),
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+                                       N_("Load host ACPI tables and tables "
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+                                          "specified by arguments."),
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+                                       options);
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 }
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 GRUB_MOD_FINI(acpi)
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diff --git a/docs/grub.texi b/docs/grub.texi
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index 755de88d7..01acf672b 100644
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--- a/docs/grub.texi
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+++ b/docs/grub.texi
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@@ -4038,6 +4038,11 @@ Normally, this command will replace the Root System Description Pointer
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 (RSDP) in the Extended BIOS Data Area to point to the new tables. If the
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 @option{--no-ebda} option is used, the new tables will be known only to
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 GRUB, but may be used by GRUB's EFI emulation.
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+
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+Note: The command is not allowed when lockdown is enforced (@pxref{Lockdown}).
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+      Otherwise an attacker can instruct the GRUB to load an SSDT table to
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+      overwrite the kernel lockdown configuration and later load and execute
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+      unsigned code.
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 @end deffn
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