diff --git a/SOURCES/gnutls-3.7.8-rsa-kx-timing.patch b/SOURCES/gnutls-3.7.8-rsa-kx-timing.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9107321
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/gnutls-3.7.8-rsa-kx-timing.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
+From c149dd0767f32789e391280cb1eb06b7eb7c6bce Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alexander Sosedkin <asosedkin@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 9 Aug 2022 16:05:53 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 1/2] auth/rsa: side-step potential side-channel
+
+Remove branching that depends on secret data.
+
+Signed-off-by: Alexander Sosedkin <asosedkin@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
+Tested-by: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
+---
+ lib/auth/rsa.c | 10 ----------
+ 1 file changed, 10 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/auth/rsa.c b/lib/auth/rsa.c
+index 8108ee841d..6b158bacb2 100644
+--- a/lib/auth/rsa.c
++++ b/lib/auth/rsa.c
+@@ -155,7 +155,6 @@ static int
+ proc_rsa_client_kx(gnutls_session_t session, uint8_t * data,
+ size_t _data_size)
+ {
+- const char attack_error[] = "auth_rsa: Possible PKCS #1 attack\n";
+ gnutls_datum_t ciphertext;
+ int ret, dsize;
+ ssize_t data_size = _data_size;
+@@ -235,15 +234,6 @@ proc_rsa_client_kx(gnutls_session_t session, uint8_t * data,
+ ok &= CONSTCHECK_NOT_EQUAL(check_ver_min, 0) &
+ CONSTCHECK_EQUAL(session->key.key.data[1], ver_min);
+
+- if (ok) {
+- /* call logging function unconditionally so all branches are
+- * indistinguishable for timing and cache access when debug
+- * logging is disabled */
+- _gnutls_no_log("%s", attack_error);
+- } else {
+- _gnutls_debug_log("%s", attack_error);
+- }
+-
+ /* This is here to avoid the version check attack
+ * discussed above.
+ */
+--
+2.39.1
+
+
+From 7c963102ec2119eecc1789b993aabe5edfd75f3b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 8 Feb 2023 14:32:09 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 2/2] rsa: remove dead code
+
+since the `ok` variable isn't used any more, we can remove all code
+used to calculate it
+
+Signed-off-by: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
+---
+ lib/auth/rsa.c | 20 +++-----------------
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/auth/rsa.c b/lib/auth/rsa.c
+index 6b158bacb2..858701fe6e 100644
+--- a/lib/auth/rsa.c
++++ b/lib/auth/rsa.c
+@@ -159,8 +159,6 @@ proc_rsa_client_kx(gnutls_session_t session, uint8_t * data,
+ int ret, dsize;
+ ssize_t data_size = _data_size;
+ volatile uint8_t ver_maj, ver_min;
+- volatile uint8_t check_ver_min;
+- volatile uint32_t ok;
+
+ #ifdef ENABLE_SSL3
+ if (get_num_version(session) == GNUTLS_SSL3) {
+@@ -186,7 +184,6 @@ proc_rsa_client_kx(gnutls_session_t session, uint8_t * data,
+
+ ver_maj = _gnutls_get_adv_version_major(session);
+ ver_min = _gnutls_get_adv_version_minor(session);
+- check_ver_min = (session->internals.allow_wrong_pms == 0);
+
+ session->key.key.data = gnutls_malloc(GNUTLS_MASTER_SIZE);
+ if (session->key.key.data == NULL) {
+@@ -205,10 +202,9 @@ proc_rsa_client_kx(gnutls_session_t session, uint8_t * data,
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+- ret =
+- gnutls_privkey_decrypt_data2(session->internals.selected_key,
+- 0, &ciphertext, session->key.key.data,
+- session->key.key.size);
++ gnutls_privkey_decrypt_data2(session->internals.selected_key,
++ 0, &ciphertext, session->key.key.data,
++ session->key.key.size);
+ /* After this point, any conditional on failure that cause differences
+ * in execution may create a timing or cache access pattern side
+ * channel that can be used as an oracle, so treat very carefully */
+@@ -224,16 +220,6 @@ proc_rsa_client_kx(gnutls_session_t session, uint8_t * data,
+ * Vlastimil Klima, Ondej Pokorny and Tomas Rosa.
+ */
+
+- /* ok is 0 in case of error and 1 in case of success. */
+-
+- /* if ret < 0 */
+- ok = CONSTCHECK_EQUAL(ret, 0);
+- /* session->key.key.data[0] must equal ver_maj */
+- ok &= CONSTCHECK_EQUAL(session->key.key.data[0], ver_maj);
+- /* if check_ver_min then session->key.key.data[1] must equal ver_min */
+- ok &= CONSTCHECK_NOT_EQUAL(check_ver_min, 0) &
+- CONSTCHECK_EQUAL(session->key.key.data[1], ver_min);
+-
+ /* This is here to avoid the version check attack
+ * discussed above.
+ */
+--
+2.39.1
+
diff --git a/SPECS/gnutls.spec b/SPECS/gnutls.spec
index 2391c51..d44e573 100644
--- a/SPECS/gnutls.spec
+++ b/SPECS/gnutls.spec
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ Patch13: gnutls-3.6.16-trust-ca-sha1.patch
Patch14: gnutls-3.6.16-doc-p11tool-ckaid.patch
Patch15: gnutls-3.6.16-pkcs7-verify.patch
Patch16: gnutls-3.6.16-cpuid.patch
+Patch17: gnutls-3.7.8-rsa-kx-timing.patch
%bcond_without dane
%if 0%{?rhel}
%bcond_with guile
@@ -294,8 +295,9 @@ fi
%endif
%changelog
-* Mon Dec 19 2022 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 3.6.16-6
-- Fix x86_64 CPU feature detection when AVX is not available (#2116610)
+* Thu Feb 23 2023 Zoltan Fridrich <zfridric@redhat.com> - 3.6.16-6
+- Fix x86_64 CPU feature detection when AVX is not available (#2131152)
+- Fix timing side-channel in TLS RSA key exchange (#2162598)
* Mon Aug 29 2022 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 3.6.16-5
- Fix double-free in gnutls_pkcs7_verify (#2109788)