diff --git a/SOURCES/gnutls-3.6.16-cpuid.patch b/SOURCES/gnutls-3.6.16-cpuid.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e18853b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/gnutls-3.6.16-cpuid.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,247 @@
+From 300c6315d2e644ae81b43fa2dd7bbf68b3afb5b2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
+Date: Thu, 18 Nov 2021 19:02:03 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 1/2] accelerated: fix CPU feature detection for Intel CPUs
+
+This fixes read_cpuid_vals to correctly read the CPUID quadruple, as
+well as to set the bit the ustream CRYPTOGAMS uses to identify Intel
+CPUs.
+
+Suggested by Rafael Gieschke in:
+https://gitlab.com/gnutls/gnutls/-/issues/1282
+
+Signed-off-by: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
+---
+ lib/accelerated/x86/x86-common.c | 91 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
+ 1 file changed, 71 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/accelerated/x86/x86-common.c b/lib/accelerated/x86/x86-common.c
+index 3845c6b4c9..cf615ef24f 100644
+--- a/lib/accelerated/x86/x86-common.c
++++ b/lib/accelerated/x86/x86-common.c
+@@ -81,15 +81,38 @@ unsigned int _gnutls_x86_cpuid_s[4];
+ # define bit_AVX 0x10000000
+ #endif
+
+-#ifndef OSXSAVE_MASK
+-/* OSXSAVE|FMA|MOVBE */
+-# define OSXSAVE_MASK (0x8000000|0x1000|0x400000)
++#ifndef bit_AVX2
++# define bit_AVX2 0x00000020
++#endif
++
++#ifndef bit_AVX512F
++# define bit_AVX512F 0x00010000
++#endif
++
++#ifndef bit_AVX512IFMA
++# define bit_AVX512IFMA 0x00200000
++#endif
++
++#ifndef bit_AVX512BW
++# define bit_AVX512BW 0x40000000
++#endif
++
++#ifndef bit_AVX512VL
++# define bit_AVX512VL 0x80000000
++#endif
++
++#ifndef bit_OSXSAVE
++# define bit_OSXSAVE 0x8000000
+ #endif
+
+ #ifndef bit_MOVBE
+ # define bit_MOVBE 0x00400000
+ #endif
+
++#ifndef OSXSAVE_MASK
++# define OSXSAVE_MASK (bit_OSXSAVE|bit_MOVBE)
++#endif
++
+ #define via_bit_PADLOCK (0x3 << 6)
+ #define via_bit_PADLOCK_PHE (0x3 << 10)
+ #define via_bit_PADLOCK_PHE_SHA512 (0x3 << 25)
+@@ -127,7 +150,7 @@ static unsigned read_cpuid_vals(unsigned int vals[4])
+ unsigned t1, t2, t3;
+ vals[0] = vals[1] = vals[2] = vals[3] = 0;
+
+- if (!__get_cpuid(1, &t1, &vals[0], &vals[1], &t2))
++ if (!__get_cpuid(1, &t1, &t2, &vals[1], &vals[0]))
+ return 0;
+ /* suppress AVX512; it works conditionally on certain CPUs on the original code */
+ vals[1] &= 0xfffff7ff;
+@@ -145,7 +168,7 @@ static unsigned check_4th_gen_intel_features(unsigned ecx)
+ {
+ uint32_t xcr0;
+
+- if ((ecx & OSXSAVE_MASK) != OSXSAVE_MASK)
++ if ((ecx & bit_OSXSAVE) != bit_OSXSAVE)
+ return 0;
+
+ #if defined(_MSC_VER) && !defined(__clang__)
+@@ -233,10 +256,7 @@ static unsigned check_sha(void)
+ #ifdef ASM_X86_64
+ static unsigned check_avx_movbe(void)
+ {
+- if (check_4th_gen_intel_features(_gnutls_x86_cpuid_s[1]) == 0)
+- return 0;
+-
+- return ((_gnutls_x86_cpuid_s[1] & bit_AVX));
++ return (_gnutls_x86_cpuid_s[1] & bit_AVX);
+ }
+
+ static unsigned check_pclmul(void)
+@@ -514,33 +534,47 @@ void register_x86_padlock_crypto(unsigned capabilities)
+ }
+ #endif
+
+-static unsigned check_intel_or_amd(void)
++enum x86_cpu_vendor {
++ X86_CPU_VENDOR_OTHER,
++ X86_CPU_VENDOR_INTEL,
++ X86_CPU_VENDOR_AMD,
++};
++
++static enum x86_cpu_vendor check_x86_cpu_vendor(void)
+ {
+ unsigned int a, b, c, d;
+
+- if (!__get_cpuid(0, &a, &b, &c, &d))
+- return 0;
++ if (!__get_cpuid(0, &a, &b, &c, &d)) {
++ return X86_CPU_VENDOR_OTHER;
++ }
+
+- if ((memcmp(&b, "Genu", 4) == 0 &&
+- memcmp(&d, "ineI", 4) == 0 &&
+- memcmp(&c, "ntel", 4) == 0) ||
+- (memcmp(&b, "Auth", 4) == 0 &&
+- memcmp(&d, "enti", 4) == 0 && memcmp(&c, "cAMD", 4) == 0)) {
+- return 1;
++ if (memcmp(&b, "Genu", 4) == 0 &&
++ memcmp(&d, "ineI", 4) == 0 &&
++ memcmp(&c, "ntel", 4) == 0) {
++ return X86_CPU_VENDOR_INTEL;
+ }
+
+- return 0;
++ if (memcmp(&b, "Auth", 4) == 0 &&
++ memcmp(&d, "enti", 4) == 0 &&
++ memcmp(&c, "cAMD", 4) == 0) {
++ return X86_CPU_VENDOR_AMD;
++ }
++
++ return X86_CPU_VENDOR_OTHER;
+ }
+
+ static
+ void register_x86_intel_crypto(unsigned capabilities)
+ {
+ int ret;
++ enum x86_cpu_vendor vendor;
+
+ memset(_gnutls_x86_cpuid_s, 0, sizeof(_gnutls_x86_cpuid_s));
+
+- if (check_intel_or_amd() == 0)
++ vendor = check_x86_cpu_vendor();
++ if (vendor == X86_CPU_VENDOR_OTHER) {
+ return;
++ }
+
+ if (capabilities == 0) {
+ if (!read_cpuid_vals(_gnutls_x86_cpuid_s))
+@@ -549,6 +583,23 @@ void register_x86_intel_crypto(unsigned capabilities)
+ capabilities_to_intel_cpuid(capabilities);
+ }
+
++ /* CRYPTOGAMS uses the (1 << 30) bit as an indicator of Intel CPUs */
++ if (vendor == X86_CPU_VENDOR_INTEL) {
++ _gnutls_x86_cpuid_s[0] |= 1 << 30;
++ } else {
++ _gnutls_x86_cpuid_s[0] &= ~(1 << 30);
++ }
++
++ if (!check_4th_gen_intel_features(_gnutls_x86_cpuid_s[1])) {
++ _gnutls_x86_cpuid_s[1] &= ~bit_AVX;
++
++ /* Clear AVX2 bits as well, according to what OpenSSL does.
++ * Should we clear bit_AVX512DQ, bit_AVX512PF, bit_AVX512ER, and
++ * bit_AVX512CD? */
++ _gnutls_x86_cpuid_s[2] &= ~(bit_AVX2|bit_AVX512F|bit_AVX512IFMA|
++ bit_AVX512BW|bit_AVX512BW);
++ }
++
+ if (check_ssse3()) {
+ _gnutls_debug_log("Intel SSSE3 was detected\n");
+
+--
+2.37.3
+
+
+From cd509dac9e6d1bf76fd12c72c1fd61f1708c254a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
+Date: Mon, 15 Aug 2022 09:39:18 +0900
+Subject: [PATCH 2/2] accelerated: clear AVX bits if it cannot be queried
+ through XSAVE
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+The algorithm to detect AVX is described in 14.3 of "Intel® 64 and IA-32
+Architectures Software Developer’s Manual".
+
+GnuTLS previously only followed that algorithm when registering the
+crypto backend, while the CRYPTOGAMS derived SHA code assembly expects
+that the extension bits are propagated to _gnutls_x86_cpuid_s.
+
+Signed-off-by: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
+---
+ lib/accelerated/x86/x86-common.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/accelerated/x86/x86-common.c b/lib/accelerated/x86/x86-common.c
+index cf615ef24f..655d0c65f2 100644
+--- a/lib/accelerated/x86/x86-common.c
++++ b/lib/accelerated/x86/x86-common.c
+@@ -210,7 +210,8 @@ static void capabilities_to_intel_cpuid(unsigned capabilities)
+ }
+
+ if (capabilities & INTEL_AVX) {
+- if ((a[1] & bit_AVX) && check_4th_gen_intel_features(a[1])) {
++ if ((a[1] & bit_AVX) && (a[1] & bit_MOVBE) &&
++ check_4th_gen_intel_features(a[1])) {
+ _gnutls_x86_cpuid_s[1] |= bit_AVX|bit_MOVBE;
+ } else {
+ _gnutls_debug_log
+@@ -256,7 +257,7 @@ static unsigned check_sha(void)
+ #ifdef ASM_X86_64
+ static unsigned check_avx_movbe(void)
+ {
+- return (_gnutls_x86_cpuid_s[1] & bit_AVX);
++ return (_gnutls_x86_cpuid_s[1] & (bit_AVX|bit_MOVBE)) == (bit_AVX|bit_MOVBE);
+ }
+
+ static unsigned check_pclmul(void)
+@@ -579,6 +580,19 @@ void register_x86_intel_crypto(unsigned capabilities)
+ if (capabilities == 0) {
+ if (!read_cpuid_vals(_gnutls_x86_cpuid_s))
+ return;
++ if (!check_4th_gen_intel_features(_gnutls_x86_cpuid_s[1])) {
++ _gnutls_x86_cpuid_s[1] &= ~bit_AVX;
++
++ /* Clear AVX2 bits as well, according to what
++ * OpenSSL does. Should we clear
++ * bit_AVX512DQ, bit_AVX512PF, bit_AVX512ER,
++ * and bit_AVX512CD? */
++ _gnutls_x86_cpuid_s[2] &= ~(bit_AVX2|
++ bit_AVX512F|
++ bit_AVX512IFMA|
++ bit_AVX512BW|
++ bit_AVX512BW);
++ }
+ } else {
+ capabilities_to_intel_cpuid(capabilities);
+ }
+--
+2.37.3
+
diff --git a/SOURCES/gnutls-3.7.8-rsa-kx-timing.patch b/SOURCES/gnutls-3.7.8-rsa-kx-timing.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9107321
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/gnutls-3.7.8-rsa-kx-timing.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
+From c149dd0767f32789e391280cb1eb06b7eb7c6bce Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alexander Sosedkin <asosedkin@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 9 Aug 2022 16:05:53 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 1/2] auth/rsa: side-step potential side-channel
+
+Remove branching that depends on secret data.
+
+Signed-off-by: Alexander Sosedkin <asosedkin@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
+Tested-by: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
+---
+ lib/auth/rsa.c | 10 ----------
+ 1 file changed, 10 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/auth/rsa.c b/lib/auth/rsa.c
+index 8108ee841d..6b158bacb2 100644
+--- a/lib/auth/rsa.c
++++ b/lib/auth/rsa.c
+@@ -155,7 +155,6 @@ static int
+ proc_rsa_client_kx(gnutls_session_t session, uint8_t * data,
+ size_t _data_size)
+ {
+- const char attack_error[] = "auth_rsa: Possible PKCS #1 attack\n";
+ gnutls_datum_t ciphertext;
+ int ret, dsize;
+ ssize_t data_size = _data_size;
+@@ -235,15 +234,6 @@ proc_rsa_client_kx(gnutls_session_t session, uint8_t * data,
+ ok &= CONSTCHECK_NOT_EQUAL(check_ver_min, 0) &
+ CONSTCHECK_EQUAL(session->key.key.data[1], ver_min);
+
+- if (ok) {
+- /* call logging function unconditionally so all branches are
+- * indistinguishable for timing and cache access when debug
+- * logging is disabled */
+- _gnutls_no_log("%s", attack_error);
+- } else {
+- _gnutls_debug_log("%s", attack_error);
+- }
+-
+ /* This is here to avoid the version check attack
+ * discussed above.
+ */
+--
+2.39.1
+
+
+From 7c963102ec2119eecc1789b993aabe5edfd75f3b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 8 Feb 2023 14:32:09 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 2/2] rsa: remove dead code
+
+since the `ok` variable isn't used any more, we can remove all code
+used to calculate it
+
+Signed-off-by: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
+---
+ lib/auth/rsa.c | 20 +++-----------------
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/auth/rsa.c b/lib/auth/rsa.c
+index 6b158bacb2..858701fe6e 100644
+--- a/lib/auth/rsa.c
++++ b/lib/auth/rsa.c
+@@ -159,8 +159,6 @@ proc_rsa_client_kx(gnutls_session_t session, uint8_t * data,
+ int ret, dsize;
+ ssize_t data_size = _data_size;
+ volatile uint8_t ver_maj, ver_min;
+- volatile uint8_t check_ver_min;
+- volatile uint32_t ok;
+
+ #ifdef ENABLE_SSL3
+ if (get_num_version(session) == GNUTLS_SSL3) {
+@@ -186,7 +184,6 @@ proc_rsa_client_kx(gnutls_session_t session, uint8_t * data,
+
+ ver_maj = _gnutls_get_adv_version_major(session);
+ ver_min = _gnutls_get_adv_version_minor(session);
+- check_ver_min = (session->internals.allow_wrong_pms == 0);
+
+ session->key.key.data = gnutls_malloc(GNUTLS_MASTER_SIZE);
+ if (session->key.key.data == NULL) {
+@@ -205,10 +202,9 @@ proc_rsa_client_kx(gnutls_session_t session, uint8_t * data,
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+- ret =
+- gnutls_privkey_decrypt_data2(session->internals.selected_key,
+- 0, &ciphertext, session->key.key.data,
+- session->key.key.size);
++ gnutls_privkey_decrypt_data2(session->internals.selected_key,
++ 0, &ciphertext, session->key.key.data,
++ session->key.key.size);
+ /* After this point, any conditional on failure that cause differences
+ * in execution may create a timing or cache access pattern side
+ * channel that can be used as an oracle, so treat very carefully */
+@@ -224,16 +220,6 @@ proc_rsa_client_kx(gnutls_session_t session, uint8_t * data,
+ * Vlastimil Klima, Ondej Pokorny and Tomas Rosa.
+ */
+
+- /* ok is 0 in case of error and 1 in case of success. */
+-
+- /* if ret < 0 */
+- ok = CONSTCHECK_EQUAL(ret, 0);
+- /* session->key.key.data[0] must equal ver_maj */
+- ok &= CONSTCHECK_EQUAL(session->key.key.data[0], ver_maj);
+- /* if check_ver_min then session->key.key.data[1] must equal ver_min */
+- ok &= CONSTCHECK_NOT_EQUAL(check_ver_min, 0) &
+- CONSTCHECK_EQUAL(session->key.key.data[1], ver_min);
+-
+ /* This is here to avoid the version check attack
+ * discussed above.
+ */
+--
+2.39.1
+
diff --git a/SPECS/gnutls.spec b/SPECS/gnutls.spec
index 47b5062..d44e573 100644
--- a/SPECS/gnutls.spec
+++ b/SPECS/gnutls.spec
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
Version: 3.6.16
-Release: 5%{?dist}
+Release: 6%{?dist}
Patch1: gnutls-3.2.7-rpath.patch
Patch2: gnutls-3.6.4-no-now-guile.patch
Patch3: gnutls-3.6.13-enable-intel-cet.patch
@@ -9,6 +9,8 @@ Patch12: gnutls-3.6.16-tls12-cert-type.patch
Patch13: gnutls-3.6.16-trust-ca-sha1.patch
Patch14: gnutls-3.6.16-doc-p11tool-ckaid.patch
Patch15: gnutls-3.6.16-pkcs7-verify.patch
+Patch16: gnutls-3.6.16-cpuid.patch
+Patch17: gnutls-3.7.8-rsa-kx-timing.patch
%bcond_without dane
%if 0%{?rhel}
%bcond_with guile
@@ -293,8 +295,12 @@ fi
%endif
%changelog
+* Thu Feb 23 2023 Zoltan Fridrich <zfridric@redhat.com> - 3.6.16-6
+- Fix x86_64 CPU feature detection when AVX is not available (#2131152)
+- Fix timing side-channel in TLS RSA key exchange (#2162598)
+
* Mon Aug 29 2022 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 3.6.16-5
-- Fix double-free in gnutls_pkcs7_verify (#2109787)
+- Fix double-free in gnutls_pkcs7_verify (#2109788)
* Mon Jun 28 2021 Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com> - 3.6.16-4
- p11tool: Document ID reuse behavior when importing certs (#1776250)