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From 6d69680505dbbc484178105815ed624fab40b2de Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Petr Stodulka <pstodulk@redhat.com>
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Date: Wed, 28 Oct 2015 15:03:01 +0100
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Subject: [PATCH 1/5] submodule: allow only certain protocols for submodule
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fetches
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Some protocols (like git-remote-ext) can execute arbitrary
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code found in the URL. The URLs that submodules use may come
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from arbitrary sources (e.g., .gitmodules files in a remote
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repository). Let's restrict submodules to fetching from a
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known-good subset of protocols.
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Note that we apply this restriction to all submodule
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commands, whether the URL comes from .gitmodules or not.
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This is more restrictive than we need to be; for example, in
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the tests we run:
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git submodule add ext::...
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which should be trusted, as the URL comes directly from the
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command line provided by the user. But doing it this way is
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simpler, and makes it much less likely that we would miss a
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case. And since such protocols should be an exception
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(especially because nobody who clones from them will be able
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to update the submodules!), it's not likely to inconvenience
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anyone in practice.
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---
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git-submodule.sh | 9 +++++++++
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t/t5815-submodule-protos-sh | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
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2 files changed, 52 insertions(+)
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create mode 100644 t/t5815-submodule-protos-sh
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diff --git a/git-submodule.sh b/git-submodule.sh
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index 79bfaac..bec3362 100755
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--- a/git-submodule.sh
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+++ b/git-submodule.sh
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@@ -19,6 +19,15 @@ OPTIONS_SPEC=
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. git-parse-remote
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require_work_tree
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+# Restrict ourselves to a vanilla subset of protocols; the URLs
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+# we get are under control of a remote repository, and we do not
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+# want them kicking off arbitrary git-remote-* programs.
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+#
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+# If the user has already specified a set of allowed protocols,
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+# we assume they know what they're doing and use that instead.
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+: ${GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL=file:git:http:https:ssh}
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+export GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL
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+
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command=
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branch=
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force=
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diff --git a/t/t5815-submodule-protos-sh b/t/t5815-submodule-protos-sh
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new file mode 100644
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index 0000000..06f55a1
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--- /dev/null
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+++ b/t/t5815-submodule-protos-sh
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@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
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+#!/bin/sh
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+
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+test_description='test protocol whitelisting with submodules'
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+. ./test-lib.sh
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+. "$TEST_DIRECTORY"/lib-proto-disable.sh
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+
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+setup_ext_wrapper
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+setup_ssh_wrapper
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+
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+test_expect_success 'setup repository with submodules' '
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+ mkdir remote &&
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+ git init remote/repo.git &&
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+ (cd remote/repo.git && test_commit one) &&
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+ # submodule-add should probably trust what we feed it on the cmdline,
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+ # but its implementation is overly conservative.
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+ GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL=ssh git submodule add remote:repo.git ssh-module &&
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+ GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL=ext git submodule add "ext::fake-remote %S repo.git" ext-module &&
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+ git commit -m "add submodules"
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+'
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+
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+test_expect_success 'clone with recurse-submodules fails' '
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+ test_must_fail git clone --recurse-submodules . dst
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+'
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+
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+test_expect_success 'setup individual updates' '
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+ rm -rf dst &&
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+ git clone . dst &&
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+ git -C dst submodule init
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+'
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+
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+test_expect_success 'update of ssh allowed' '
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+ git -C dst submodule update ssh-module
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+'
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+
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+test_expect_success 'update of ext not allowed' '
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+ test_must_fail git -C dst submodule update ext-module
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+'
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+
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+test_expect_success 'user can override whitelist' '
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+ GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL=ext git -C dst submodule update ext-module
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+'
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+
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+test_done
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--
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2.1.0
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