From 43e195d2838ee296c6c9a386dfb7781f5b267449 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: CentOS Sources Date: Mar 17 2015 16:09:44 +0000 Subject: import freetype-2.4.11-10.el7_1.1 --- diff --git a/SOURCES/freetype-2.4.11-CVE-2014-9657.patch b/SOURCES/freetype-2.4.11-CVE-2014-9657.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8954406 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/freetype-2.4.11-CVE-2014-9657.patch @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +From eca0f067068020870a429fe91f6329e499390d55 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Werner Lemberg +Date: Mon, 24 Nov 2014 09:22:08 +0000 +Subject: [truetype] Fix Savannah bug #43679. + +* src/truetype/ttpload.c (tt_face_load_hdmx): Check minimum size of +`record_size'. +--- +diff --git a/src/truetype/ttpload.c b/src/truetype/ttpload.c +index 9723a51..9991925 100644 +--- a/src/truetype/ttpload.c ++++ b/src/truetype/ttpload.c +@@ -508,9 +508,9 @@ + record_size = FT_NEXT_ULONG( p ); + + /* The maximum number of bytes in an hdmx device record is the */ +- /* maximum number of glyphs + 2; this is 0xFFFF + 2; this is */ +- /* the reason why `record_size' is a long (which we read as */ +- /* unsigned long for convenience). In practice, two bytes */ ++ /* maximum number of glyphs + 2; this is 0xFFFF + 2, thus */ ++ /* explaining why `record_size' is a long (which we read as */ ++ /* unsigned long for convenience). In practice, two bytes are */ + /* sufficient to hold the size value. */ + /* */ + /* There are at least two fonts, HANNOM-A and HANNOM-B version */ +@@ -522,8 +522,10 @@ + record_size &= 0xFFFFU; + + /* The limit for `num_records' is a heuristic value. */ +- +- if ( version != 0 || num_records > 255 || record_size > 0x10001L ) ++ if ( version != 0 || ++ num_records > 255 || ++ record_size > 0x10001L || ++ record_size < 4 ) + { + error = TT_Err_Invalid_File_Format; + goto Fail; +-- +cgit v0.9.0.2 diff --git a/SOURCES/freetype-2.4.11-CVE-2014-9658.patch b/SOURCES/freetype-2.4.11-CVE-2014-9658.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7aec5c8 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/freetype-2.4.11-CVE-2014-9658.patch @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +From f70d9342e65cd2cb44e9f26b6d7edeedf191fc6c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Werner Lemberg +Date: Mon, 24 Nov 2014 08:31:32 +0000 +Subject: [sfnt] Fix Savannah bug #43672. + +* src/sfnt/ttkern.c (tt_face_load_kern): Use correct value for +minimum table length test. +--- +diff --git a/src/sfnt/ttkern.c b/src/sfnt/ttkern.c +index 32c4008..455e7b5 100644 +--- a/src/sfnt/ttkern.c ++++ b/src/sfnt/ttkern.c +@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ + length = FT_NEXT_USHORT( p ); + coverage = FT_NEXT_USHORT( p ); + +- if ( length <= 6 ) ++ if ( length <= 6 + 8 ) + break; + + p_next += length; +-- +cgit v0.9.0.2 diff --git a/SOURCES/freetype-2.4.11-CVE-2014-9660.patch b/SOURCES/freetype-2.4.11-CVE-2014-9660.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fc310f7 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/freetype-2.4.11-CVE-2014-9660.patch @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +From af8346172a7b573715134f7a51e6c5c60fa7f2ab Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Werner Lemberg +Date: Sat, 22 Nov 2014 12:29:10 +0000 +Subject: [bdf] Fix Savannah bug #43660. + +* src/bdf/bdflib.c (_bdf_parse_glyphs) <"ENDFONT">: Check +`_BDF_GLYPH_BITS'. +--- +diff --git a/src/bdf/bdflib.c b/src/bdf/bdflib.c +index c128526..369c111 100644 +--- a/src/bdf/bdflib.c ++++ b/src/bdf/bdflib.c +@@ -1549,6 +1549,14 @@ + /* Check for the ENDFONT field. */ + if ( _bdf_strncmp( line, "ENDFONT", 7 ) == 0 ) + { ++ if ( p->flags & _BDF_GLYPH_BITS ) ++ { ++ /* Missing ENDCHAR field. */ ++ FT_ERROR(( "_bdf_parse_glyphs: " ERRMSG1, lineno, "ENDCHAR" )); ++ error = BDF_Err_Corrupted_Font_Glyphs; ++ goto Exit; ++ } ++ + /* Sort the glyphs by encoding. */ + ft_qsort( (char *)font->glyphs, + font->glyphs_used, +-- +cgit v0.9.0.2 diff --git a/SOURCES/freetype-2.4.11-CVE-2014-9661a.patch b/SOURCES/freetype-2.4.11-CVE-2014-9661a.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e6cbe78 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/freetype-2.4.11-CVE-2014-9661a.patch @@ -0,0 +1,108 @@ +From 3788187e0c396952cd7d905c6c61f3ff8e84b2b4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Werner Lemberg +Date: Sat, 22 Nov 2014 09:46:47 +0000 +Subject: [type42] Fix Savannah bug #43659. + +* src/type42/t42objs.c (T42_Open_Face): Initialize `face->ttf_size'. + +* src/type42/t42parse.c (t42_parse_sfnts): Always set +`face->ttf_size' directly. This ensures a correct stream size in +the call to `FT_Open_Face', which follows after parsing, even for +buggy input data. +Fix error messages. +--- +diff --git a/src/type42/t42objs.c b/src/type42/t42objs.c +index 798ebdb..7a9cb57 100644 +--- a/src/type42/t42objs.c ++++ b/src/type42/t42objs.c +@@ -47,6 +47,12 @@ + if ( FT_ALLOC( face->ttf_data, 12 ) ) + goto Exit; + ++ /* while parsing the font we always update `face->ttf_size' so that */ ++ /* even in case of buggy data (which might lead to premature end of */ ++ /* scanning without causing an error) the call to `FT_Open_Face' in */ ++ /* `T42_Face_Init' passes the correct size */ ++ face->ttf_size = 12; ++ + error = t42_parser_init( parser, + face->root.stream, + memory, +diff --git a/src/type42/t42parse.c b/src/type42/t42parse.c +index a60e216..daf304d 100644 +--- a/src/type42/t42parse.c ++++ b/src/type42/t42parse.c +@@ -498,7 +498,7 @@ + FT_Byte* limit = parser->root.limit; + FT_Error error; + FT_Int num_tables = 0; +- FT_ULong count, ttf_size = 0; ++ FT_ULong count; + + FT_Long n, string_size, old_string_size, real_size; + FT_Byte* string_buf = NULL; +@@ -591,7 +591,7 @@ + + if ( limit - parser->root.cursor < string_size ) + { +- FT_ERROR(( "t42_parse_sfnts: too many binary data\n" )); ++ FT_ERROR(( "t42_parse_sfnts: too much binary data\n" )); + error = T42_Err_Invalid_File_Format; + goto Fail; + } +@@ -631,18 +631,18 @@ + } + else + { +- num_tables = 16 * face->ttf_data[4] + face->ttf_data[5]; +- status = BEFORE_TABLE_DIR; +- ttf_size = 12 + 16 * num_tables; ++ num_tables = 16 * face->ttf_data[4] + face->ttf_data[5]; ++ status = BEFORE_TABLE_DIR; ++ face->ttf_size = 12 + 16 * num_tables; + +- if ( FT_REALLOC( face->ttf_data, 12, ttf_size ) ) ++ if ( FT_REALLOC( face->ttf_data, 12, face->ttf_size ) ) + goto Fail; + } + /* fall through */ + + case BEFORE_TABLE_DIR: + /* the offset table is read; read the table directory */ +- if ( count < ttf_size ) ++ if ( count < face->ttf_size ) + { + face->ttf_data[count++] = string_buf[n]; + continue; +@@ -661,24 +661,23 @@ + len = FT_PEEK_ULONG( p ); + + /* Pad to a 4-byte boundary length */ +- ttf_size += ( len + 3 ) & ~3; ++ face->ttf_size += ( len + 3 ) & ~3; + } + +- status = OTHER_TABLES; +- face->ttf_size = ttf_size; ++ status = OTHER_TABLES; + + /* there are no more than 256 tables, so no size check here */ + if ( FT_REALLOC( face->ttf_data, 12 + 16 * num_tables, +- ttf_size + 1 ) ) ++ face->ttf_size + 1 ) ) + goto Fail; + } + /* fall through */ + + case OTHER_TABLES: + /* all other tables are just copied */ +- if ( count >= ttf_size ) ++ if ( count >= face->ttf_size ) + { +- FT_ERROR(( "t42_parse_sfnts: too many binary data\n" )); ++ FT_ERROR(( "t42_parse_sfnts: too much binary data\n" )); + error = T42_Err_Invalid_File_Format; + goto Fail; + } +-- +cgit v0.9.0.2 diff --git a/SOURCES/freetype-2.4.11-CVE-2014-9661b.patch b/SOURCES/freetype-2.4.11-CVE-2014-9661b.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0f62d7f --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/freetype-2.4.11-CVE-2014-9661b.patch @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +From 42fcd6693ec7bd6ffc65ddc63e74287a65dda669 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Werner Lemberg +Date: Sat, 22 Nov 2014 11:44:33 +0000 +Subject: [type42] Allow only embedded TrueType fonts. + +This is a follow-up to Savannah bug #43659. + +* src/type42/t42objs.c (T42_Face_Init): Exclusively use the +`truetype' font driver for loading the font contained in the `sfnts' +array. +--- +diff --git a/src/type42/t42objs.c b/src/type42/t42objs.c +index 7a9cb57..915e81f 100644 +--- a/src/type42/t42objs.c ++++ b/src/type42/t42objs.c +@@ -291,7 +291,9 @@ + FT_Open_Args args; + + +- args.flags = FT_OPEN_MEMORY; ++ args.flags = FT_OPEN_MEMORY | FT_OPEN_DRIVER; ++ args.driver = FT_Get_Module( FT_FACE_LIBRARY( face ), ++ "truetype" ); + args.memory_base = face->ttf_data; + args.memory_size = face->ttf_size; + +-- +cgit v0.9.0.2 diff --git a/SOURCES/freetype-2.4.11-CVE-2014-9663.patch b/SOURCES/freetype-2.4.11-CVE-2014-9663.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9e2496a --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/freetype-2.4.11-CVE-2014-9663.patch @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +From 9bd20b7304aae61de5d50ac359cf27132bafd4c1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Werner Lemberg +Date: Sat, 22 Nov 2014 05:24:45 +0000 +Subject: [sfnt] Fix Savannah bug #43656. + +* src/sfnt/ttcmap.c (tt_cmap4_validate): Fix order of validity +tests. +--- +diff --git a/src/sfnt/ttcmap.c b/src/sfnt/ttcmap.c +index 712bd4f..fb863c3 100644 +--- a/src/sfnt/ttcmap.c ++++ b/src/sfnt/ttcmap.c +@@ -823,9 +823,6 @@ + FT_Error error = SFNT_Err_Ok; + + +- if ( length < 16 ) +- FT_INVALID_TOO_SHORT; +- + /* in certain fonts, the `length' field is invalid and goes */ + /* out of bound. We try to correct this here... */ + if ( table + length > valid->limit ) +@@ -836,6 +833,9 @@ + length = (FT_UInt)( valid->limit - table ); + } + ++ if ( length < 16 ) ++ FT_INVALID_TOO_SHORT; ++ + p = table + 6; + num_segs = TT_NEXT_USHORT( p ); /* read segCountX2 */ + +-- +cgit v0.9.0.2 diff --git a/SOURCES/freetype-2.4.11-CVE-2014-9664a.patch b/SOURCES/freetype-2.4.11-CVE-2014-9664a.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7753f3f --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/freetype-2.4.11-CVE-2014-9664a.patch @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +From 73be9f9ab67842cfbec36ee99e8d2301434c84ca Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Werner Lemberg +Date: Mon, 24 Nov 2014 06:30:05 +0000 +Subject: [type1, type42] Another fix for Savannah bug #43655. + +* src/type1/t1load.c (parse_charstrings), src/type42/t42parse.c +(t42_parse_charstrings): Add another boundary testing. +--- +diff --git a/src/type1/t1load.c b/src/type1/t1load.c +index caa75bd..24b14a8 100644 +--- a/src/type1/t1load.c ++++ b/src/type1/t1load.c +@@ -1589,6 +1589,11 @@ + } + + T1_Skip_PS_Token( parser ); ++ if ( parser->root.cursor >= limit ) ++ { ++ error = T1_Err_Invalid_File_Format; ++ goto Fail; ++ } + if ( parser->root.error ) + return; + +diff --git a/src/type42/t42parse.c b/src/type42/t42parse.c +index daf304d..d45c069 100644 +--- a/src/type42/t42parse.c ++++ b/src/type42/t42parse.c +@@ -823,6 +823,12 @@ + break; + + T1_Skip_PS_Token( parser ); ++ if ( parser->root.cursor >= limit ) ++ { ++ FT_ERROR(( "t42_parse_charstrings: out of bounds\n" )); ++ error = T42_Err_Invalid_File_Format; ++ goto Fail; ++ } + if ( parser->root.error ) + return; + +-- +cgit v0.9.0.2 diff --git a/SOURCES/freetype-2.4.11-CVE-2014-9664b.patch b/SOURCES/freetype-2.4.11-CVE-2014-9664b.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f594fe7 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/freetype-2.4.11-CVE-2014-9664b.patch @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +From dd89710f0f643eb0f99a3830e0712d26c7642acd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Werner Lemberg +Date: Fri, 21 Nov 2014 21:19:28 +0000 +Subject: [type1, type42] Fix Savannah bug #43655. + +* src/type1/t1load.c (parse_charstrings), src/type42/t42parse.c +(t42_parse_charstrings): Fix boundary testing. +--- +diff --git a/src/type1/t1load.c b/src/type1/t1load.c +index fd06432..caa75bd 100644 +--- a/src/type1/t1load.c ++++ b/src/type1/t1load.c +@@ -1602,7 +1602,7 @@ + FT_PtrDist len; + + +- if ( cur + 1 >= limit ) ++ if ( cur + 2 >= limit ) + { + error = T1_Err_Invalid_File_Format; + goto Fail; +diff --git a/src/type42/t42parse.c b/src/type42/t42parse.c +index 9b66888..a60e216 100644 +--- a/src/type42/t42parse.c ++++ b/src/type42/t42parse.c +@@ -837,7 +837,7 @@ + FT_PtrDist len; + + +- if ( cur + 1 >= limit ) ++ if ( cur + 2 >= limit ) + { + FT_ERROR(( "t42_parse_charstrings: out of bounds\n" )); + error = T42_Err_Invalid_File_Format; +-- +cgit v0.9.0.2 diff --git a/SOURCES/freetype-2.4.11-CVE-2014-9667.patch b/SOURCES/freetype-2.4.11-CVE-2014-9667.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1e34940 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/freetype-2.4.11-CVE-2014-9667.patch @@ -0,0 +1,47 @@ +From 677ddf4f1dc1b36cef7c7ddd59a14c508f4b1891 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Werner Lemberg +Date: Wed, 12 Nov 2014 20:26:44 +0000 +Subject: [sfnt] Fix Savannah bug #43590. + +* src/sfnt/ttload.c (check_table_dir, tt_face_load_font_dir): +Protect against addition overflow. +--- +diff --git a/src/sfnt/ttload.c b/src/sfnt/ttload.c +index 0a3cd29..8338150 100644 +--- a/src/sfnt/ttload.c ++++ b/src/sfnt/ttload.c +@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ + /* Load the basic TrueType tables, i.e., tables that can be either in */ + /* TTF or OTF fonts (body). */ + /* */ +-/* Copyright 1996-2010, 2012 by */ ++/* Copyright 1996-2010, 2012-2014 by */ + /* David Turner, Robert Wilhelm, and Werner Lemberg. */ + /* */ + /* This file is part of the FreeType project, and may only be used, */ +@@ -207,7 +207,10 @@ + } + + /* we ignore invalid tables */ +- if ( table.Offset + table.Length > stream->size ) ++ ++ /* table.Offset + table.Length > stream->size ? */ ++ if ( table.Length > stream->size || ++ table.Offset > stream->size - table.Length ) + { + FT_TRACE2(( "check_table_dir: table entry %d invalid\n", nn )); + continue; +@@ -398,7 +398,10 @@ + entry->Length = FT_GET_LONG(); + + /* ignore invalid tables */ +- if ( entry->Offset + entry->Length > stream->size ) ++ ++ /* entry->Offset + entry->Length > stream->size ? */ ++ if ( entry->Length > stream->size || ++ entry->Offset > stream->size - entry->Length ) + continue; + else + { +-- +cgit v0.9.0.2 diff --git a/SOURCES/freetype-2.4.11-CVE-2014-9669.patch b/SOURCES/freetype-2.4.11-CVE-2014-9669.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..59fe8c3 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/freetype-2.4.11-CVE-2014-9669.patch @@ -0,0 +1,117 @@ +From 602040b1112c9f94d68e200be59ea7ac3d104565 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Werner Lemberg +Date: Wed, 12 Nov 2014 19:51:20 +0000 +Subject: [sfnt] Fix Savannah bug #43588. + +* src/sfnt/ttcmap.c (tt_cmap8_validate, tt_cmap10_validate, +tt_cmap12_validate, tt_cmap13_validate, tt_cmap14_validate): Protect +against overflow in additions and multiplications. +--- +diff --git a/src/sfnt/ttcmap.c b/src/sfnt/ttcmap.c +index f9acf5d..712bd4f 100644 +--- a/src/sfnt/ttcmap.c ++++ b/src/sfnt/ttcmap.c +@@ -1647,7 +1647,8 @@ + p = is32 + 8192; /* skip `is32' array */ + num_groups = TT_NEXT_ULONG( p ); + +- if ( p + num_groups * 12 > valid->limit ) ++ /* p + num_groups * 12 > valid->limit ? */ ++ if ( num_groups > (FT_UInt32)( valid->limit - p ) / 12 ) + FT_INVALID_TOO_SHORT; + + /* check groups, they must be in increasing order */ +@@ -1672,7 +1673,12 @@ + + if ( valid->level >= FT_VALIDATE_TIGHT ) + { +- if ( start_id + end - start >= TT_VALID_GLYPH_COUNT( valid ) ) ++ FT_UInt32 d = end - start; ++ ++ ++ /* start_id + end - start >= TT_VALID_GLYPH_COUNT( valid ) ? */ ++ if ( d > TT_VALID_GLYPH_COUNT( valid ) || ++ start_id >= TT_VALID_GLYPH_COUNT( valid ) - d ) + FT_INVALID_GLYPH_ID; + + count = (FT_UInt32)( end - start + 1 ); +@@ -1870,7 +1876,9 @@ + count = TT_NEXT_ULONG( p ); + + if ( length > (FT_ULong)( valid->limit - table ) || +- length < 20 + count * 2 ) ++ /* length < 20 + count * 2 ? */ ++ length < 20 || ++ ( length - 20 ) / 2 < count ) + FT_INVALID_TOO_SHORT; + + /* check glyph indices */ +@@ -2057,7 +2065,9 @@ + num_groups = TT_NEXT_ULONG( p ); + + if ( length > (FT_ULong)( valid->limit - table ) || +- length < 16 + 12 * num_groups ) ++ /* length < 16 + 12 * num_groups ? */ ++ length < 16 || ++ ( length - 16 ) / 12 < num_groups ) + FT_INVALID_TOO_SHORT; + + /* check groups, they must be in increasing order */ +@@ -2079,7 +2089,12 @@ + + if ( valid->level >= FT_VALIDATE_TIGHT ) + { +- if ( start_id + end - start >= TT_VALID_GLYPH_COUNT( valid ) ) ++ FT_UInt32 d = end - start; ++ ++ ++ /* start_id + end - start >= TT_VALID_GLYPH_COUNT( valid ) ? */ ++ if ( d > TT_VALID_GLYPH_COUNT( valid ) || ++ start_id >= TT_VALID_GLYPH_COUNT( valid ) - d ) + FT_INVALID_GLYPH_ID; + } + +@@ -2381,7 +2396,9 @@ + num_groups = TT_NEXT_ULONG( p ); + + if ( length > (FT_ULong)( valid->limit - table ) || +- length < 16 + 12 * num_groups ) ++ /* length < 16 + 12 * num_groups ? */ ++ length < 16 || ++ ( length - 16 ) / 12 < num_groups ) + FT_INVALID_TOO_SHORT; + + /* check groups, they must be in increasing order */ +@@ -2762,7 +2779,9 @@ + + + if ( length > (FT_ULong)( valid->limit - table ) || +- length < 10 + 11 * num_selectors ) ++ /* length < 10 + 11 * num_selectors ? */ ++ length < 10 || ++ ( length - 10 ) / 11 < num_selectors ) + FT_INVALID_TOO_SHORT; + + /* check selectors, they must be in increasing order */ +@@ -2798,7 +2817,8 @@ + FT_ULong lastBase = 0; + + +- if ( defp + numRanges * 4 > valid->limit ) ++ /* defp + numRanges * 4 > valid->limit ? */ ++ if ( numRanges > (FT_ULong)( valid->limit - defp ) / 4 ) + FT_INVALID_TOO_SHORT; + + for ( i = 0; i < numRanges; ++i ) +@@ -2825,7 +2845,8 @@ + FT_ULong i, lastUni = 0; + + +- if ( numMappings * 4 > (FT_ULong)( valid->limit - ndp ) ) ++ /* numMappings * 4 > (FT_ULong)( valid->limit - ndp ) ? */ ++ if ( numMappings > ( (FT_ULong)( valid->limit - ndp ) ) / 4 ) + FT_INVALID_TOO_SHORT; + + for ( i = 0; i < numMappings; ++i ) +-- +cgit v0.9.0.2 diff --git a/SOURCES/freetype-2.4.11-CVE-2014-9670.patch b/SOURCES/freetype-2.4.11-CVE-2014-9670.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0a9b70a --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/freetype-2.4.11-CVE-2014-9670.patch @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +From ef1eba75187adfac750f326b563fe543dd5ff4e6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Werner Lemberg +Date: Thu, 06 Nov 2014 22:25:05 +0000 +Subject: Fix Savannah bug #43548. + +* src/pcf/pcfread (pcf_get_encodings): Add sanity checks for row and +column values. +--- +diff --git a/src/pcf/pcfread.c b/src/pcf/pcfread.c +index 8db31bd..668c962 100644 +--- a/src/pcf/pcfread.c ++++ b/src/pcf/pcfread.c +@@ -812,6 +812,15 @@ THE SOFTWARE. + if ( !PCF_FORMAT_MATCH( format, PCF_DEFAULT_FORMAT ) ) + return PCF_Err_Invalid_File_Format; + ++ /* sanity checks */ ++ if ( firstCol < 0 || ++ firstCol > lastCol || ++ lastCol > 0xFF || ++ firstRow < 0 || ++ firstRow > lastRow || ++ lastRow > 0xFF ) ++ return PCF_Err_Invalid_Table; ++ + FT_TRACE4(( "pdf_get_encodings:\n" )); + + FT_TRACE4(( " firstCol %d, lastCol %d, firstRow %d, lastRow %d\n", +-- +cgit v0.9.0.2 diff --git a/SOURCES/freetype-2.4.11-CVE-2014-9671.patch b/SOURCES/freetype-2.4.11-CVE-2014-9671.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a291150 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/freetype-2.4.11-CVE-2014-9671.patch @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +From 0e2f5d518c60e2978f26400d110eff178fa7e3c3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Werner Lemberg +Date: Thu, 06 Nov 2014 21:32:46 +0000 +Subject: Fix Savannah bug #43547. + +* src/pcf/pcfread.c (pcf_read_TOC): Check `size' and `offset' +values. +--- +diff --git a/src/pcf/pcfread.c b/src/pcf/pcfread.c +index f63377b..8db31bd 100644 +--- a/src/pcf/pcfread.c ++++ b/src/pcf/pcfread.c +@@ -151,6 +151,21 @@ THE SOFTWARE. + break; + } + ++ /* we now check whether the `size' and `offset' values are reasonable: */ ++ /* `offset' + `size' must not exceed the stream size */ ++ tables = face->toc.tables; ++ for ( n = 0; n < toc->count; n++ ) ++ { ++ /* we need two checks to avoid overflow */ ++ if ( ( tables->size > stream->size ) || ++ ( tables->offset > stream->size - tables->size ) ) ++ { ++ error = PCF_Err_Invalid_Table; ++ goto Exit; ++ } ++ tables++; ++ } ++ + #ifdef FT_DEBUG_LEVEL_TRACE + + { +-- +cgit v0.9.0.2 diff --git a/SOURCES/freetype-2.4.11-CVE-2014-9673.patch b/SOURCES/freetype-2.4.11-CVE-2014-9673.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..957ebe3 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/freetype-2.4.11-CVE-2014-9673.patch @@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ +From 35252ae9aa1dd9343e9f4884e9ddb1fee10ef415 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: suzuki toshiya +Date: Wed, 26 Nov 2014 06:52:23 +0000 +Subject: Fix Savannah bug #43539. + +* src/base/ftobjs.c (Mac_Read_POST_Resource): Fix integer overflow +by a broken POST table in resource-fork. +--- +diff --git a/src/base/ftobjs.c b/src/base/ftobjs.c +index ffbbc32..922216e 100644 +--- a/src/base/ftobjs.c ++++ b/src/base/ftobjs.c +@@ -1589,6 +1589,11 @@ + goto Exit2; + if ( FT_READ_LONG( rlen ) ) + goto Exit; ++ if ( rlen < 0 ) ++ { ++ error = FT_Err_Invalid_Offset; ++ goto Exit2; ++ } + if ( FT_READ_USHORT( flags ) ) + goto Exit; + FT_TRACE3(( "POST fragment[%d]: offsets=0x%08x, rlen=0x%08x, flags=0x%04x\n", +@@ -1606,7 +1611,14 @@ + rlen = 0; + + if ( ( flags >> 8 ) == type ) ++ { ++ if ( 0x7FFFFFFFL - rlen < len ) ++ { ++ error = FT_Err_Array_Too_Large; ++ goto Exit2; ++ } + len += rlen; ++ } + else + { + if ( pfb_lenpos + 3 > pfb_len + 2 ) +@@ -1635,6 +1647,11 @@ + } + + error = FT_Err_Cannot_Open_Resource; ++ if ( rlen > 0x7FFFFFFFL - pfb_pos ) ++ { ++ error = FT_Err_Array_Too_Large; ++ goto Exit2; ++ } + if ( pfb_pos > pfb_len || pfb_pos + rlen > pfb_len ) + goto Exit2; + +-- +cgit v0.9.0.2 diff --git a/SOURCES/freetype-2.4.11-CVE-2014-9674a.patch b/SOURCES/freetype-2.4.11-CVE-2014-9674a.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..631a5bf --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/freetype-2.4.11-CVE-2014-9674a.patch @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +From 240c94a185cd8dae7d03059abec8a5662c35ecd3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: suzuki toshiya +Date: Wed, 26 Nov 2014 06:43:29 +0000 +Subject: Fix Savannah bug #43538. + +* src/base/ftobjs.c (Mac_Read_POST_Resource): Fix integer overflow +by a broken POST table in resource-fork. +--- +diff --git a/src/base/ftobjs.c b/src/base/ftobjs.c +index 4d60e88..ffbbc32 100644 +--- a/src/base/ftobjs.c ++++ b/src/base/ftobjs.c +@@ -1565,10 +1565,23 @@ + goto Exit; + if ( FT_READ_LONG( temp ) ) + goto Exit; ++ if ( 0 > temp ) ++ error = FT_Err_Invalid_Offset; ++ else if ( 0x7FFFFFFFL - 6 - pfb_len < temp ) ++ error = FT_Err_Array_Too_Large; ++ ++ if ( error ) ++ goto Exit; ++ + pfb_len += temp + 6; + } + +- if ( FT_ALLOC( pfb_data, (FT_Long)pfb_len + 2 ) ) ++ if ( 0x7FFFFFFFL - 2 < pfb_len ) ++ error = FT_Err_Array_Too_Large; ++ else ++ error = FT_ALLOC( pfb_data, (FT_Long)pfb_len + 2 ); ++ ++ if ( error ) + goto Exit; + + pfb_data[0] = 0x80; +-- +cgit v0.9.0.2 diff --git a/SOURCES/freetype-2.4.11-CVE-2014-9674b.patch b/SOURCES/freetype-2.4.11-CVE-2014-9674b.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..288953a --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/freetype-2.4.11-CVE-2014-9674b.patch @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ +From cd4a5a26e591d01494567df9dec7f72d59551f6e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: suzuki toshiya +Date: Wed, 26 Nov 2014 15:20:48 +0000 +Subject: * src/base/ftobj.c (Mac_Read_POST_Resource): Additional + +overflow check in the summation of POST fragment lengths, +suggested by Mateusz Jurczyk . +--- +diff --git a/src/base/ftobjs.c b/src/base/ftobjs.c +index 4321126..b28216a 100644 +--- a/src/base/ftobjs.c ++++ b/src/base/ftobjs.c +@@ -1566,8 +1566,10 @@ + if ( FT_READ_ULONG( temp ) ) + goto Exit; + FT_TRACE4(( " POST fragment #%d: length=0x%08x\n", i, temp)); +- if ( 0x7FFFFFFFUL < temp ) ++ if ( 0x7FFFFFFFUL < temp || pfb_len + temp + 6 < pfb_len ) + { ++ FT_TRACE2(( " too long fragment length makes" ++ " pfb_len confused: temp=0x%08x\n", temp )); + error = FT_Err_Invalid_Offset; + goto Exit; + } +-- +cgit v0.9.0.2 diff --git a/SOURCES/freetype-2.4.11-CVE-2014-9675.patch b/SOURCES/freetype-2.4.11-CVE-2014-9675.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3c3ea40 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/freetype-2.4.11-CVE-2014-9675.patch @@ -0,0 +1,237 @@ +commit 2c4832d30939b45c05757f0a05128ce64c4cacc7 +Author: Werner Lemberg +Date: Fri Nov 7 07:42:33 2014 +0100 + + Fix Savannah bug #43535. + + * src/bdf/bdflib.c (_bdf_strncmp): New macro that checks one + character more than `strncmp'. + s/ft_strncmp/_bdf_strncmp/ everywhere. + +diff --git a/src/bdf/bdflib.c b/src/bdf/bdflib.c +index 2eda11c..c128526 100644 +--- a/src/bdf/bdflib.c ++++ b/src/bdf/bdflib.c +@@ -169,6 +169,18 @@ + sizeof ( _bdf_properties[0] ); + + ++ /* An auxiliary macro to parse properties, to be used in conditionals. */ ++ /* It behaves like `strncmp' but also tests the following character */ ++ /* whether it is a whitespace or NULL. */ ++ /* `property' is a constant string of length `n' to compare with. */ ++#define _bdf_strncmp( name, property, n ) \ ++ ( ft_strncmp( name, property, n ) || \ ++ !( name[n] == ' ' || \ ++ name[n] == '\0' || \ ++ name[n] == '\n' || \ ++ name[n] == '\r' || \ ++ name[n] == '\t' ) ) ++ + /* Auto correction messages. */ + #define ACMSG1 "FONT_ASCENT property missing. " \ + "Added `FONT_ASCENT %hd'.\n" +@@ -1402,7 +1414,7 @@ + + /* If the property happens to be a comment, then it doesn't need */ + /* to be added to the internal hash table. */ +- if ( ft_strncmp( name, "COMMENT", 7 ) != 0 ) ++ if ( _bdf_strncmp( name, "COMMENT", 7 ) != 0 ) + { + /* Add the property to the font property table. */ + error = hash_insert( fp->name, +@@ -1420,13 +1432,13 @@ + /* FONT_ASCENT and FONT_DESCENT need to be assigned if they are */ + /* present, and the SPACING property should override the default */ + /* spacing. */ +- if ( ft_strncmp( name, "DEFAULT_CHAR", 12 ) == 0 ) ++ if ( _bdf_strncmp( name, "DEFAULT_CHAR", 12 ) == 0 ) + font->default_char = fp->value.l; +- else if ( ft_strncmp( name, "FONT_ASCENT", 11 ) == 0 ) ++ else if ( _bdf_strncmp( name, "FONT_ASCENT", 11 ) == 0 ) + font->font_ascent = fp->value.l; +- else if ( ft_strncmp( name, "FONT_DESCENT", 12 ) == 0 ) ++ else if ( _bdf_strncmp( name, "FONT_DESCENT", 12 ) == 0 ) + font->font_descent = fp->value.l; +- else if ( ft_strncmp( name, "SPACING", 7 ) == 0 ) ++ else if ( _bdf_strncmp( name, "SPACING", 7 ) == 0 ) + { + if ( !fp->value.atom ) + { +@@ -1484,7 +1496,7 @@ + memory = font->memory; + + /* Check for a comment. */ +- if ( ft_strncmp( line, "COMMENT", 7 ) == 0 ) ++ if ( _bdf_strncmp( line, "COMMENT", 7 ) == 0 ) + { + linelen -= 7; + +@@ -1501,7 +1513,7 @@ + /* The very first thing expected is the number of glyphs. */ + if ( !( p->flags & _BDF_GLYPHS ) ) + { +- if ( ft_strncmp( line, "CHARS", 5 ) != 0 ) ++ if ( _bdf_strncmp( line, "CHARS", 5 ) != 0 ) + { + FT_ERROR(( "_bdf_parse_glyphs: " ERRMSG1, lineno, "CHARS" )); + error = BDF_Err_Missing_Chars_Field; +@@ -1535,7 +1547,7 @@ + } + + /* Check for the ENDFONT field. */ +- if ( ft_strncmp( line, "ENDFONT", 7 ) == 0 ) ++ if ( _bdf_strncmp( line, "ENDFONT", 7 ) == 0 ) + { + /* Sort the glyphs by encoding. */ + ft_qsort( (char *)font->glyphs, +@@ -1549,7 +1561,7 @@ + } + + /* Check for the ENDCHAR field. */ +- if ( ft_strncmp( line, "ENDCHAR", 7 ) == 0 ) ++ if ( _bdf_strncmp( line, "ENDCHAR", 7 ) == 0 ) + { + p->glyph_enc = 0; + p->flags &= ~_BDF_GLYPH_BITS; +@@ -1565,7 +1577,7 @@ + goto Exit; + + /* Check for the STARTCHAR field. */ +- if ( ft_strncmp( line, "STARTCHAR", 9 ) == 0 ) ++ if ( _bdf_strncmp( line, "STARTCHAR", 9 ) == 0 ) + { + /* Set the character name in the parse info first until the */ + /* encoding can be checked for an unencoded character. */ +@@ -1599,7 +1611,7 @@ + } + + /* Check for the ENCODING field. */ +- if ( ft_strncmp( line, "ENCODING", 8 ) == 0 ) ++ if ( _bdf_strncmp( line, "ENCODING", 8 ) == 0 ) + { + if ( !( p->flags & _BDF_GLYPH ) ) + { +@@ -1785,7 +1797,7 @@ + } + + /* Expect the SWIDTH (scalable width) field next. */ +- if ( ft_strncmp( line, "SWIDTH", 6 ) == 0 ) ++ if ( _bdf_strncmp( line, "SWIDTH", 6 ) == 0 ) + { + if ( !( p->flags & _BDF_ENCODING ) ) + goto Missing_Encoding; +@@ -1801,7 +1813,7 @@ + } + + /* Expect the DWIDTH (scalable width) field next. */ +- if ( ft_strncmp( line, "DWIDTH", 6 ) == 0 ) ++ if ( _bdf_strncmp( line, "DWIDTH", 6 ) == 0 ) + { + if ( !( p->flags & _BDF_ENCODING ) ) + goto Missing_Encoding; +@@ -1829,7 +1841,7 @@ + } + + /* Expect the BBX field next. */ +- if ( ft_strncmp( line, "BBX", 3 ) == 0 ) ++ if ( _bdf_strncmp( line, "BBX", 3 ) == 0 ) + { + if ( !( p->flags & _BDF_ENCODING ) ) + goto Missing_Encoding; +@@ -1897,7 +1909,7 @@ + } + + /* And finally, gather up the bitmap. */ +- if ( ft_strncmp( line, "BITMAP", 6 ) == 0 ) ++ if ( _bdf_strncmp( line, "BITMAP", 6 ) == 0 ) + { + unsigned long bitmap_size; + +@@ -1972,7 +1984,7 @@ + p = (_bdf_parse_t *) client_data; + + /* Check for the end of the properties. */ +- if ( ft_strncmp( line, "ENDPROPERTIES", 13 ) == 0 ) ++ if ( _bdf_strncmp( line, "ENDPROPERTIES", 13 ) == 0 ) + { + /* If the FONT_ASCENT or FONT_DESCENT properties have not been */ + /* encountered yet, then make sure they are added as properties and */ +@@ -2013,12 +2025,12 @@ + } + + /* Ignore the _XFREE86_GLYPH_RANGES properties. */ +- if ( ft_strncmp( line, "_XFREE86_GLYPH_RANGES", 21 ) == 0 ) ++ if ( _bdf_strncmp( line, "_XFREE86_GLYPH_RANGES", 21 ) == 0 ) + goto Exit; + + /* Handle COMMENT fields and properties in a special way to preserve */ + /* the spacing. */ +- if ( ft_strncmp( line, "COMMENT", 7 ) == 0 ) ++ if ( _bdf_strncmp( line, "COMMENT", 7 ) == 0 ) + { + name = value = line; + value += 7; +@@ -2082,7 +2094,7 @@ + + /* Check for a comment. This is done to handle those fonts that have */ + /* comments before the STARTFONT line for some reason. */ +- if ( ft_strncmp( line, "COMMENT", 7 ) == 0 ) ++ if ( _bdf_strncmp( line, "COMMENT", 7 ) == 0 ) + { + if ( p->opts->keep_comments != 0 && p->font != 0 ) + { +@@ -2108,7 +2120,7 @@ + { + memory = p->memory; + +- if ( ft_strncmp( line, "STARTFONT", 9 ) != 0 ) ++ if ( _bdf_strncmp( line, "STARTFONT", 9 ) != 0 ) + { + /* we don't emit an error message since this code gets */ + /* explicitly caught one level higher */ +@@ -2156,7 +2168,7 @@ + } + + /* Check for the start of the properties. */ +- if ( ft_strncmp( line, "STARTPROPERTIES", 15 ) == 0 ) ++ if ( _bdf_strncmp( line, "STARTPROPERTIES", 15 ) == 0 ) + { + if ( !( p->flags & _BDF_FONT_BBX ) ) + { +@@ -2185,7 +2197,7 @@ + } + + /* Check for the FONTBOUNDINGBOX field. */ +- if ( ft_strncmp( line, "FONTBOUNDINGBOX", 15 ) == 0 ) ++ if ( _bdf_strncmp( line, "FONTBOUNDINGBOX", 15 ) == 0 ) + { + if ( !( p->flags & _BDF_SIZE ) ) + { +@@ -2216,7 +2228,7 @@ + } + + /* The next thing to check for is the FONT field. */ +- if ( ft_strncmp( line, "FONT", 4 ) == 0 ) ++ if ( _bdf_strncmp( line, "FONT", 4 ) == 0 ) + { + error = _bdf_list_split( &p->list, (char *)" +", line, linelen ); + if ( error ) +@@ -2251,7 +2263,7 @@ + } + + /* Check for the SIZE field. */ +- if ( ft_strncmp( line, "SIZE", 4 ) == 0 ) ++ if ( _bdf_strncmp( line, "SIZE", 4 ) == 0 ) + { + if ( !( p->flags & _BDF_FONT_NAME ) ) + { +@@ -2305,7 +2317,7 @@ + } + + /* Check for the CHARS field -- font properties are optional */ +- if ( ft_strncmp( line, "CHARS", 5 ) == 0 ) ++ if ( _bdf_strncmp( line, "CHARS", 5 ) == 0 ) + { + char nbuf[128]; + diff --git a/SOURCES/freetype-2.4.11-ft-strncmp.patch b/SOURCES/freetype-2.4.11-ft-strncmp.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6de33c5 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/freetype-2.4.11-ft-strncmp.patch @@ -0,0 +1,228 @@ +commit 9a56764037dfc01a89fe61f5c67971bf50343d00 +Author: Werner Lemberg +Date: Wed Feb 26 13:08:07 2014 +0100 + + [bdf] Fix Savannah bug #41692. + + bdflib puts data from the input stream into a buffer in chunks of + 1024 bytes. The data itself gets then parsed line by line, simply + increasing the current pointer into the buffer; if the search for + the final newline character exceeds the buffer size, more data gets + read. + + However, in case the current line's end is very near to the buffer + end, and the keyword to compare with is longer than the current + line's length, an out-of-bounds read might happen since `memcmp' + doesn't stop properly at the string end. + + * src/bdf/bdflib.c: s/ft_memcmp/ft_strncmp/ to make comparisons + stop at string ends. + +diff --git a/src/bdf/bdflib.c b/src/bdf/bdflib.c +index c9e231e..b0ec292 100644 +--- a/src/bdf/bdflib.c ++++ b/src/bdf/bdflib.c +@@ -1402,7 +1402,7 @@ + + /* If the property happens to be a comment, then it doesn't need */ + /* to be added to the internal hash table. */ +- if ( ft_memcmp( name, "COMMENT", 7 ) != 0 ) ++ if ( ft_strncmp( name, "COMMENT", 7 ) != 0 ) + { + /* Add the property to the font property table. */ + error = hash_insert( fp->name, +@@ -1420,13 +1420,13 @@ + /* FONT_ASCENT and FONT_DESCENT need to be assigned if they are */ + /* present, and the SPACING property should override the default */ + /* spacing. */ +- if ( ft_memcmp( name, "DEFAULT_CHAR", 12 ) == 0 ) ++ if ( ft_strncmp( name, "DEFAULT_CHAR", 12 ) == 0 ) + font->default_char = fp->value.l; +- else if ( ft_memcmp( name, "FONT_ASCENT", 11 ) == 0 ) ++ else if ( ft_strncmp( name, "FONT_ASCENT", 11 ) == 0 ) + font->font_ascent = fp->value.l; +- else if ( ft_memcmp( name, "FONT_DESCENT", 12 ) == 0 ) ++ else if ( ft_strncmp( name, "FONT_DESCENT", 12 ) == 0 ) + font->font_descent = fp->value.l; +- else if ( ft_memcmp( name, "SPACING", 7 ) == 0 ) ++ else if ( ft_strncmp( name, "SPACING", 7 ) == 0 ) + { + if ( !fp->value.atom ) + { +@@ -1484,7 +1484,7 @@ + memory = font->memory; + + /* Check for a comment. */ +- if ( ft_memcmp( line, "COMMENT", 7 ) == 0 ) ++ if ( ft_strncmp( line, "COMMENT", 7 ) == 0 ) + { + linelen -= 7; + +@@ -1501,7 +1501,7 @@ + /* The very first thing expected is the number of glyphs. */ + if ( !( p->flags & _BDF_GLYPHS ) ) + { +- if ( ft_memcmp( line, "CHARS", 5 ) != 0 ) ++ if ( ft_strncmp( line, "CHARS", 5 ) != 0 ) + { + FT_ERROR(( "_bdf_parse_glyphs: " ERRMSG1, lineno, "CHARS" )); + error = BDF_Err_Missing_Chars_Field; +@@ -1535,7 +1535,7 @@ + } + + /* Check for the ENDFONT field. */ +- if ( ft_memcmp( line, "ENDFONT", 7 ) == 0 ) ++ if ( ft_strncmp( line, "ENDFONT", 7 ) == 0 ) + { + /* Sort the glyphs by encoding. */ + ft_qsort( (char *)font->glyphs, +@@ -1549,7 +1549,7 @@ + } + + /* Check for the ENDCHAR field. */ +- if ( ft_memcmp( line, "ENDCHAR", 7 ) == 0 ) ++ if ( ft_strncmp( line, "ENDCHAR", 7 ) == 0 ) + { + p->glyph_enc = 0; + p->flags &= ~_BDF_GLYPH_BITS; +@@ -1565,7 +1565,7 @@ + goto Exit; + + /* Check for the STARTCHAR field. */ +- if ( ft_memcmp( line, "STARTCHAR", 9 ) == 0 ) ++ if ( ft_strncmp( line, "STARTCHAR", 9 ) == 0 ) + { + /* Set the character name in the parse info first until the */ + /* encoding can be checked for an unencoded character. */ +@@ -1599,7 +1599,7 @@ + } + + /* Check for the ENCODING field. */ +- if ( ft_memcmp( line, "ENCODING", 8 ) == 0 ) ++ if ( ft_strncmp( line, "ENCODING", 8 ) == 0 ) + { + if ( !( p->flags & _BDF_GLYPH ) ) + { +@@ -1785,7 +1785,7 @@ + } + + /* Expect the SWIDTH (scalable width) field next. */ +- if ( ft_memcmp( line, "SWIDTH", 6 ) == 0 ) ++ if ( ft_strncmp( line, "SWIDTH", 6 ) == 0 ) + { + if ( !( p->flags & _BDF_ENCODING ) ) + goto Missing_Encoding; +@@ -1801,7 +1801,7 @@ + } + + /* Expect the DWIDTH (scalable width) field next. */ +- if ( ft_memcmp( line, "DWIDTH", 6 ) == 0 ) ++ if ( ft_strncmp( line, "DWIDTH", 6 ) == 0 ) + { + if ( !( p->flags & _BDF_ENCODING ) ) + goto Missing_Encoding; +@@ -1829,7 +1829,7 @@ + } + + /* Expect the BBX field next. */ +- if ( ft_memcmp( line, "BBX", 3 ) == 0 ) ++ if ( ft_strncmp( line, "BBX", 3 ) == 0 ) + { + if ( !( p->flags & _BDF_ENCODING ) ) + goto Missing_Encoding; +@@ -1897,7 +1897,7 @@ + } + + /* And finally, gather up the bitmap. */ +- if ( ft_memcmp( line, "BITMAP", 6 ) == 0 ) ++ if ( ft_strncmp( line, "BITMAP", 6 ) == 0 ) + { + unsigned long bitmap_size; + +@@ -1972,7 +1972,7 @@ + p = (_bdf_parse_t *) client_data; + + /* Check for the end of the properties. */ +- if ( ft_memcmp( line, "ENDPROPERTIES", 13 ) == 0 ) ++ if ( ft_strncmp( line, "ENDPROPERTIES", 13 ) == 0 ) + { + /* If the FONT_ASCENT or FONT_DESCENT properties have not been */ + /* encountered yet, then make sure they are added as properties and */ +@@ -2013,12 +2013,12 @@ + } + + /* Ignore the _XFREE86_GLYPH_RANGES properties. */ +- if ( ft_memcmp( line, "_XFREE86_GLYPH_RANGES", 21 ) == 0 ) ++ if ( ft_strncmp( line, "_XFREE86_GLYPH_RANGES", 21 ) == 0 ) + goto Exit; + + /* Handle COMMENT fields and properties in a special way to preserve */ + /* the spacing. */ +- if ( ft_memcmp( line, "COMMENT", 7 ) == 0 ) ++ if ( ft_strncmp( line, "COMMENT", 7 ) == 0 ) + { + name = value = line; + value += 7; +@@ -2082,7 +2082,7 @@ + + /* Check for a comment. This is done to handle those fonts that have */ + /* comments before the STARTFONT line for some reason. */ +- if ( ft_memcmp( line, "COMMENT", 7 ) == 0 ) ++ if ( ft_strncmp( line, "COMMENT", 7 ) == 0 ) + { + if ( p->opts->keep_comments != 0 && p->font != 0 ) + { +@@ -2108,7 +2108,7 @@ + { + memory = p->memory; + +- if ( ft_memcmp( line, "STARTFONT", 9 ) != 0 ) ++ if ( ft_strncmp( line, "STARTFONT", 9 ) != 0 ) + { + /* we don't emit an error message since this code gets */ + /* explicitly caught one level higher */ +@@ -2156,7 +2156,7 @@ + } + + /* Check for the start of the properties. */ +- if ( ft_memcmp( line, "STARTPROPERTIES", 15 ) == 0 ) ++ if ( ft_strncmp( line, "STARTPROPERTIES", 15 ) == 0 ) + { + if ( !( p->flags & _BDF_FONT_BBX ) ) + { +@@ -2185,7 +2185,7 @@ + } + + /* Check for the FONTBOUNDINGBOX field. */ +- if ( ft_memcmp( line, "FONTBOUNDINGBOX", 15 ) == 0 ) ++ if ( ft_strncmp( line, "FONTBOUNDINGBOX", 15 ) == 0 ) + { + if ( !( p->flags & _BDF_SIZE ) ) + { +@@ -2216,7 +2216,7 @@ + } + + /* The next thing to check for is the FONT field. */ +- if ( ft_memcmp( line, "FONT", 4 ) == 0 ) ++ if ( ft_strncmp( line, "FONT", 4 ) == 0 ) + { + error = _bdf_list_split( &p->list, (char *)" +", line, linelen ); + if ( error ) +@@ -2251,7 +2251,7 @@ + } + + /* Check for the SIZE field. */ +- if ( ft_memcmp( line, "SIZE", 4 ) == 0 ) ++ if ( ft_strncmp( line, "SIZE", 4 ) == 0 ) + { + if ( !( p->flags & _BDF_FONT_NAME ) ) + { +@@ -2305,7 +2305,7 @@ + } + + /* Check for the CHARS field -- font properties are optional */ +- if ( ft_memcmp( line, "CHARS", 5 ) == 0 ) ++ if ( ft_strncmp( line, "CHARS", 5 ) == 0 ) + { + char nbuf[128]; + diff --git a/SOURCES/freetype-2.4.11-pcf-read-a.patch b/SOURCES/freetype-2.4.11-pcf-read-a.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..34ab2e0 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/freetype-2.4.11-pcf-read-a.patch @@ -0,0 +1,107 @@ +From 74af85c4b62b35e55b0ce9dec55ee10cbc4962a2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Werner Lemberg +Date: Mon, 8 Dec 2014 16:01:50 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] [pcf] Fix Savannah bug #43774. + +Work around `features' of X11's `pcfWriteFont' and `pcfReadFont' +functions. Since the PCF format doesn't have an official +specification, we have to exactly follow these functions' behaviour. + +The problem was unveiled with a patch from 2014-11-06, fixing issue #43547. + +* src/pcf/pcfread.c (pcf_read_TOC): Don't check table size for last +element. Instead, assign real size. +--- + ChangeLog | 14 ++++++++++++++ + src/pcf/pcfread.c | 54 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------- + 2 files changed, 57 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/pcf/pcfread.c b/src/pcf/pcfread.c +index 998cbed..e3caf82 100644 +--- a/src/pcf/pcfread.c ++++ b/src/pcf/pcfread.c +@@ -95,9 +95,11 @@ THE SOFTWARE. + FT_Memory memory = FT_FACE(face)->memory; + FT_UInt n; + ++ FT_ULong size; + +- if ( FT_STREAM_SEEK ( 0 ) || +- FT_STREAM_READ_FIELDS ( pcf_toc_header, toc ) ) ++ ++ if ( FT_STREAM_SEEK( 0 ) || ++ FT_STREAM_READ_FIELDS( pcf_toc_header, toc ) ) + return PCF_Err_Cannot_Open_Resource; + + if ( toc->version != PCF_FILE_VERSION || +@@ -151,14 +153,35 @@ THE SOFTWARE. + break; + } + +- /* we now check whether the `size' and `offset' values are reasonable: */ +- /* `offset' + `size' must not exceed the stream size */ ++ /* ++ * We now check whether the `size' and `offset' values are reasonable: ++ * `offset' + `size' must not exceed the stream size. ++ * ++ * Note, however, that X11's `pcfWriteFont' routine (used by the ++ * `bdftopcf' program to create PDF font files) has two special ++ * features. ++ * ++ * - It always assigns the accelerator table a size of 100 bytes in the ++ * TOC, regardless of its real size, which can vary between 34 and 72 ++ * bytes. ++ * ++ * - Due to the way the routine is designed, it ships out the last font ++ * table with its real size, ignoring the TOC's size value. Since ++ * the TOC size values are always rounded up to a multiple of 4, the ++ * difference can be up to three bytes for all tables except the ++ * accelerator table, for which the difference can be as large as 66 ++ * bytes. ++ * ++ */ ++ + tables = face->toc.tables; +- for ( n = 0; n < toc->count; n++ ) ++ size = stream->size; ++ ++ for ( n = 0; n < toc->count - 1; n++ ) + { + /* we need two checks to avoid overflow */ +- if ( ( tables->size > stream->size ) || +- ( tables->offset > stream->size - tables->size ) ) ++ if ( ( tables->size > size ) || ++ ( tables->offset > size - tables->size ) ) + { + error = PCF_Err_Invalid_Table; + goto Exit; +@@ -166,6 +189,15 @@ THE SOFTWARE. + tables++; + } + ++ /* no check of `tables->size' for last table element ... */ ++ if ( ( tables->offset > size ) ) ++ { ++ error = PCF_Err_Invalid_Table; ++ goto Exit; ++ } ++ /* ... instead, we adjust `tables->size' to the real value */ ++ tables->size = size - tables->offset; ++ + #ifdef FT_DEBUG_LEVEL_TRACE + + { +@@ -714,8 +746,8 @@ THE SOFTWARE. + + FT_TRACE4(( " number of bitmaps: %d\n", nbitmaps )); + +- /* XXX: PCF_Face->nmetrics is singed FT_Long, see pcf.h */ +- if ( face->nmetrics < 0 || nbitmaps != ( FT_ULong )face->nmetrics ) ++ /* XXX: PCF_Face->nmetrics is signed FT_Long, see pcf.h */ ++ if ( face->nmetrics < 0 || nbitmaps != (FT_ULong)face->nmetrics ) + return PCF_Err_Invalid_File_Format; + + if ( FT_NEW_ARRAY( offsets, nbitmaps ) ) +-- +2.1.0 + diff --git a/SOURCES/freetype-2.4.11-pcf-read-b.patch b/SOURCES/freetype-2.4.11-pcf-read-b.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..16c68cc --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/freetype-2.4.11-pcf-read-b.patch @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +From 06842c7b49c21f13c0ab61201daab6ff5a358fcc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Werner Lemberg +Date: Sat, 13 Dec 2014 07:42:51 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] * src/pcf/pcfread.c (pcf_read_TOC): Improve fix from + 2014-12-08. + +--- + ChangeLog | 4 ++++ + src/pcf/pcfread.c | 7 ++++--- + 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/pcf/pcfread.c b/src/pcf/pcfread.c +index e3caf82..a29a9e3 100644 +--- a/src/pcf/pcfread.c ++++ b/src/pcf/pcfread.c +@@ -189,14 +189,15 @@ THE SOFTWARE. + tables++; + } + +- /* no check of `tables->size' for last table element ... */ ++ /* only check `tables->offset' for last table element ... */ + if ( ( tables->offset > size ) ) + { + error = PCF_Err_Invalid_Table; + goto Exit; + } +- /* ... instead, we adjust `tables->size' to the real value */ +- tables->size = size - tables->offset; ++ /* ... and adjust `tables->size' to the real value if necessary */ ++ if ( tables->size > size - tables->offset ) ++ tables->size = size - tables->offset; + + #ifdef FT_DEBUG_LEVEL_TRACE + +-- +2.1.0 + diff --git a/SOURCES/freetype-2.4.11-unsigned-long.patch b/SOURCES/freetype-2.4.11-unsigned-long.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..04db8c1 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/freetype-2.4.11-unsigned-long.patch @@ -0,0 +1,153 @@ +commit 453316792fee912cfced48e9e270e9eb19892e64 +Author: suzuki toshiya +Date: Wed Nov 26 16:02:17 2014 +0900 + + * src/base/ftobjs.c (Mac_Read_POST_Resource): Use unsigned long + variables to read the lengths in POST fragments. Suggested by + Mateusz Jurczyk . + +diff --git a/src/base/ftobjs.c b/src/base/ftobjs.c +index 922216e..dfad24a 100644 +--- a/src/base/ftobjs.c ++++ b/src/base/ftobjs.c +@@ -1545,9 +1545,9 @@ + FT_Memory memory = library->memory; + FT_Byte* pfb_data = NULL; + int i, type, flags; +- FT_Long len; +- FT_Long pfb_len, pfb_pos, pfb_lenpos; +- FT_Long rlen, temp; ++ FT_ULong len; ++ FT_ULong pfb_len, pfb_pos, pfb_lenpos; ++ FT_ULong rlen, temp; + + + if ( face_index == -1 ) +@@ -1563,25 +1563,25 @@ + error = FT_Stream_Seek( stream, offsets[i] ); + if ( error ) + goto Exit; +- if ( FT_READ_LONG( temp ) ) ++ if ( FT_READ_ULONG( temp ) ) + goto Exit; +- if ( 0 > temp ) ++ FT_TRACE4(( " POST fragment #%d: length=0x%08x\n", i, temp)); ++ if ( 0x7FFFFFFFUL < temp ) ++ { + error = FT_Err_Invalid_Offset; +- else if ( 0x7FFFFFFFL - 6 - pfb_len < temp ) +- error = FT_Err_Array_Too_Large; +- +- if ( error ) + goto Exit; ++ } + + pfb_len += temp + 6; + } + +- if ( 0x7FFFFFFFL - 2 < pfb_len ) ++ FT_TRACE2(( " total buffer size to concatenate %d POST fragments: 0x%08x\n", ++ resource_cnt, pfb_len + 2)); ++ if ( pfb_len + 2 < 6 ) { + error = FT_Err_Array_Too_Large; +- else +- error = FT_ALLOC( pfb_data, (FT_Long)pfb_len + 2 ); +- +- if ( error ) ++ goto Exit; ++ } ++ if ( FT_ALLOC( pfb_data, (FT_Long)pfb_len + 2 ) ) + goto Exit; + + pfb_data[0] = 0x80; +@@ -1600,21 +1602,25 @@ + error = FT_Stream_Seek( stream, offsets[i] ); + if ( error ) + goto Exit2; +- if ( FT_READ_LONG( rlen ) ) ++ if ( FT_READ_ULONG( rlen ) ) + goto Exit; +- if ( rlen < 0 ) ++ if ( 0x7FFFFFFFUL < rlen ) + { + error = FT_Err_Invalid_Offset; + goto Exit2; + } + if ( FT_READ_USHORT( flags ) ) + goto Exit; + FT_TRACE3(( "POST fragment[%d]: offsets=0x%08x, rlen=0x%08x, flags=0x%04x\n", + i, offsets[i], rlen, flags )); + ++ error = FT_Err_Array_Too_Large; + /* postpone the check of rlen longer than buffer until FT_Stream_Read() */ + if ( ( flags >> 8 ) == 0 ) /* Comment, should not be loaded */ ++ { ++ FT_TRACE3(( " Skip POST fragment #%d because it is a comment\n", i )); + continue; ++ } + + /* the flags are part of the resource, so rlen >= 2. */ + /* but some fonts declare rlen = 0 for empty fragment */ +@@ -1624,16 +1632,10 @@ + rlen = 0; + + if ( ( flags >> 8 ) == type ) +- { +- if ( 0x7FFFFFFFL - rlen < len ) +- { +- error = FT_Err_Array_Too_Large; +- goto Exit2; +- } + len += rlen; +- } + else + { ++ FT_TRACE3(( " Write POST fragment #%d header (4-byte) to buffer 0x%p + 0x%08x\n", i, pfb_data, pfb_lenpos )); + if ( pfb_lenpos + 3 > pfb_len + 2 ) + goto Exit2; + pfb_data[pfb_lenpos ] = (FT_Byte)( len ); +@@ -1644,6 +1646,7 @@ + if ( ( flags >> 8 ) == 5 ) /* End of font mark */ + break; + ++ FT_TRACE3(( " Write POST fragment #%d header (6-byte) to buffer 0x%p + 0x%08x\n", i, pfb_data, pfb_pos )); + if ( pfb_pos + 6 > pfb_len + 2 ) + goto Exit2; + pfb_data[pfb_pos++] = 0x80; +@@ -1659,21 +1662,17 @@ + pfb_data[pfb_pos++] = 0; + } + +- error = FT_Err_Cannot_Open_Resource; +- if ( rlen > 0x7FFFFFFFL - pfb_pos ) +- { +- error = FT_Err_Array_Too_Large; +- goto Exit2; +- } + if ( pfb_pos > pfb_len || pfb_pos + rlen > pfb_len ) + goto Exit2; + ++ FT_TRACE3(( " Load POST fragment #%d (%d byte) to buffer 0x%p + 0x%08x\n", i, rlen, pfb_data, pfb_pos )); + error = FT_Stream_Read( stream, (FT_Byte *)pfb_data + pfb_pos, rlen ); + if ( error ) + goto Exit2; + pfb_pos += rlen; + } + ++ error = FT_Err_Array_Too_Large; + if ( pfb_pos + 2 > pfb_len + 2 ) + goto Exit2; + pfb_data[pfb_pos++] = 0x80; +@@ -1694,6 +1693,12 @@ + aface ); + + Exit2: ++ if ( error == FT_Err_Array_Too_Large ) ++ FT_TRACE2(( " Abort due to too-short buffer to store all POST fragments\n" )); ++ else if ( error == FT_Err_Invalid_Offset ) ++ FT_TRACE2(( " Abort due to invalid offset in a POST fragment\n" )); ++ if ( error ) ++ error = FT_Err_Cannot_Open_Resource; + FT_FREE( pfb_data ); + + Exit: diff --git a/SPECS/freetype.spec b/SPECS/freetype.spec index 3ea702d..d9773ca 100644 --- a/SPECS/freetype.spec +++ b/SPECS/freetype.spec @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ Summary: A free and portable font rendering engine Name: freetype Version: 2.4.11 -Release: 9%{?dist} +Release: 10%{?dist}.1 License: (FTL or GPLv2+) and BSD and MIT and Public Domain and zlib with acknowledgement Group: System Environment/Libraries URL: http://www.freetype.org @@ -32,6 +32,28 @@ Patch89: freetype-2.4.11-fix-emboldening.patch # https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1010341 Patch90: 0001-Fix-vertical-size-of-emboldened-glyphs.patch +# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1197739 +Patch91: freetype-2.4.11-CVE-2014-9657.patch +Patch92: freetype-2.4.11-CVE-2014-9658.patch +Patch93: freetype-2.4.11-ft-strncmp.patch +Patch94: freetype-2.4.11-CVE-2014-9675.patch +Patch95: freetype-2.4.11-CVE-2014-9660.patch +Patch96: freetype-2.4.11-CVE-2014-9661a.patch +Patch97: freetype-2.4.11-CVE-2014-9661b.patch +Patch98: freetype-2.4.11-CVE-2014-9663.patch +Patch99: freetype-2.4.11-CVE-2014-9664a.patch +Patch100: freetype-2.4.11-CVE-2014-9664b.patch +Patch101: freetype-2.4.11-CVE-2014-9667.patch +Patch102: freetype-2.4.11-CVE-2014-9669.patch +Patch103: freetype-2.4.11-CVE-2014-9670.patch +Patch104: freetype-2.4.11-CVE-2014-9671.patch +Patch105: freetype-2.4.11-CVE-2014-9673.patch +Patch106: freetype-2.4.11-CVE-2014-9674a.patch +Patch107: freetype-2.4.11-unsigned-long.patch +Patch108: freetype-2.4.11-CVE-2014-9674b.patch +Patch109: freetype-2.4.11-pcf-read-a.patch +Patch110: freetype-2.4.11-pcf-read-b.patch + Buildroot: %{_tmppath}/%{name}-%{version}-root-%(%{__id_u} -n) BuildRequires: libX11-devel @@ -94,6 +116,27 @@ popd %patch89 -p1 -b .emboldening %patch90 -p1 -b .emboldened-glyphs +%patch91 -p1 -b .CVE-2014-9657 +%patch92 -p1 -b .CVE-2014-9658 +%patch93 -p1 -b .ft-strncmp +%patch94 -p1 -b .CVE-2014-9675 +%patch95 -p1 -b .CVE-2014-9660 +%patch96 -p1 -b .CVE-2014-9661a +%patch97 -p1 -b .CVE-2014-9661b +%patch98 -p1 -b .CVE-2014-9663 +%patch99 -p1 -b .CVE-2014-9664a +%patch100 -p1 -b .CVE-2014-9664b +%patch101 -p1 -b .CVE-2014-9667 +%patch102 -p1 -b .CVE-2014-9669 +%patch103 -p1 -b .CVE-2014-9670 +%patch104 -p1 -b .CVE-2014-9671 +%patch105 -p1 -b .CVE-2014-9673 +%patch106 -p1 -b .CVE-2014-9674a +%patch107 -p1 -b .unsigned-long +%patch108 -p1 -b .CVE-2014-9674b +%patch109 -p1 -b .pcf-read-a +%patch110 -p1 -b .pcf-read-b + %build %configure --disable-static @@ -140,11 +183,7 @@ rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT %endif # fix multilib issues -%ifarch x86_64 s390x ia64 ppc64 alpha sparc64 aarch64 -%define wordsize 64 -%else -%define wordsize 32 -%endif +%define wordsize %{__isa_bits} mv $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_includedir}/freetype2/freetype/config/ftconfig.h \ $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_includedir}/freetype2/freetype/config/ftconfig-%{wordsize}.h @@ -214,6 +253,45 @@ rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT %doc docs/tutorial %changelog +* Tue Mar 10 2015 Marek Kasik - 2.4.11-10.el7_1.1 +- Fixes CVE-2014-9657 + - Check minimum size of `record_size'. +- Fixes CVE-2014-9658 + - Use correct value for minimum table length test. +- Fixes CVE-2014-9675 + - New macro that checks one character more than `strncmp'. +- Fixes CVE-2014-9660 + - Check `_BDF_GLYPH_BITS'. +- Fixes CVE-2014-9661 + - Initialize `face->ttf_size'. + - Always set `face->ttf_size' directly. + - Exclusively use the `truetype' font driver for loading + the font contained in the `sfnts' array. +- Fixes CVE-2014-9663 + - Fix order of validity tests. +- Fixes CVE-2014-9664 + - Add another boundary testing. + - Fix boundary testing. +- Fixes CVE-2014-9667 + - Protect against addition overflow. +- Fixes CVE-2014-9669 + - Protect against overflow in additions and multiplications. +- Fixes CVE-2014-9670 + - Add sanity checks for row and column values. +- Fixes CVE-2014-9671 + - Check `size' and `offset' values. +- Fixes CVE-2014-9673 + - Fix integer overflow by a broken POST table in resource-fork. +- Fixes CVE-2014-9674 + - Fix integer overflow by a broken POST table in resource-fork. + - Additional overflow check in the summation of POST fragment lengths. +- Work around behaviour of X11's `pcfWriteFont' and `pcfReadFont' functions +- Resolves: #1197739 + +* Mon Aug 18 2014 Peter Robinson - 2.4.11-10 +- Generic 32/64 bit platform detection (fix ppc64le build) +- Resolves: #1126099 + * Fri Jan 24 2014 Daniel Mach - 2.4.11-9 - Mass rebuild 2014-01-24