From b5a47e2e46da3ed00874afcdbc8fbafdd8051a29 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: CentOS Sources <bugs@centos.org>
Date: Sep 27 2022 14:50:30 +0000
Subject: import expat-2.4.7-1.el9


---

diff --git a/.expat.metadata b/.expat.metadata
index eb70785..c53b06e 100644
--- a/.expat.metadata
+++ b/.expat.metadata
@@ -1 +1 @@
-a2a0f172dd3346b520918331b7480d4d30557439 SOURCES/expat-2.2.10.tar.gz
+d167305ef621c3633a7e2c207fd45bad5653487d SOURCES/expat-2.4.7.tar.gz
diff --git a/.gitignore b/.gitignore
index b5e40bd..65dd43a 100644
--- a/.gitignore
+++ b/.gitignore
@@ -1 +1 @@
-SOURCES/expat-2.2.10.tar.gz
+SOURCES/expat-2.4.7.tar.gz
diff --git a/SOURCES/expat-2.2.10-Add-missing-validation-of-encoding.patch b/SOURCES/expat-2.2.10-Add-missing-validation-of-encoding.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 2d526c2..0000000
--- a/SOURCES/expat-2.2.10-Add-missing-validation-of-encoding.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,281 +0,0 @@
-From ee2a5b50e7d1940ba8745715b62ceb9efd3a96da Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Sebastian Pipping <sebastian@pipping.org>
-Date: Tue, 8 Feb 2022 17:37:14 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 1/5] lib: Drop unused macro UTF8_GET_NAMING
-
----
- expat/lib/xmltok.c | 5 -----
- 1 file changed, 5 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/lib/xmltok.c b/lib/xmltok.c
-index a72200e8..3bddf125 100644
---- a/lib/xmltok.c
-+++ b/lib/xmltok.c
-@@ -98,11 +98,6 @@
-         + ((((byte)[1]) & 3) << 1) + ((((byte)[2]) >> 5) & 1)]                 \
-    & (1u << (((byte)[2]) & 0x1F)))
- 
--#define UTF8_GET_NAMING(pages, p, n)                                           \
--  ((n) == 2                                                                    \
--       ? UTF8_GET_NAMING2(pages, (const unsigned char *)(p))                   \
--       : ((n) == 3 ? UTF8_GET_NAMING3(pages, (const unsigned char *)(p)) : 0))
--
- /* Detection of invalid UTF-8 sequences is based on Table 3.1B
-    of Unicode 3.2: http://www.unicode.org/unicode/reports/tr28/
-    with the additional restriction of not allowing the Unicode
-
-From 3f0a0cb644438d4d8e3294cd0b1245d0edb0c6c6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Sebastian Pipping <sebastian@pipping.org>
-Date: Tue, 8 Feb 2022 04:32:20 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 2/5] lib: Add missing validation of encoding (CVE-2022-25235)
-
----
- expat/lib/xmltok_impl.c | 8 ++++++--
- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/lib/xmltok_impl.c b/lib/xmltok_impl.c
-index 0430591b..64a3b2c1 100644
---- a/lib/xmltok_impl.c
-+++ b/lib/xmltok_impl.c
-@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@
-   case BT_LEAD##n:                                                             \
-     if (end - ptr < n)                                                         \
-       return XML_TOK_PARTIAL_CHAR;                                             \
--    if (! IS_NAME_CHAR(enc, ptr, n)) {                                         \
-+    if (IS_INVALID_CHAR(enc, ptr, n) || ! IS_NAME_CHAR(enc, ptr, n)) {         \
-       *nextTokPtr = ptr;                                                       \
-       return XML_TOK_INVALID;                                                  \
-     }                                                                          \
-@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@
-   case BT_LEAD##n:                                                             \
-     if (end - ptr < n)                                                         \
-       return XML_TOK_PARTIAL_CHAR;                                             \
--    if (! IS_NMSTRT_CHAR(enc, ptr, n)) {                                       \
-+    if (IS_INVALID_CHAR(enc, ptr, n) || ! IS_NMSTRT_CHAR(enc, ptr, n)) {       \
-       *nextTokPtr = ptr;                                                       \
-       return XML_TOK_INVALID;                                                  \
-     }                                                                          \
-@@ -1142,6 +1142,10 @@ PREFIX(prologTok)(const ENCODING *enc, const char *ptr, const char *end,
-   case BT_LEAD##n:                                                             \
-     if (end - ptr < n)                                                         \
-       return XML_TOK_PARTIAL_CHAR;                                             \
-+    if (IS_INVALID_CHAR(enc, ptr, n)) {                                        \
-+      *nextTokPtr = ptr;                                                       \
-+      return XML_TOK_INVALID;                                                  \
-+    }                                                                          \
-     if (IS_NMSTRT_CHAR(enc, ptr, n)) {                                         \
-       ptr += n;                                                                \
-       tok = XML_TOK_NAME;                                                      \
-
-From c85a3025e7a1be086dc34e7559fbc543914d047f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Sebastian Pipping <sebastian@pipping.org>
-Date: Wed, 9 Feb 2022 01:00:38 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 3/5] lib: Add comments to BT_LEAD* cases where encoding has
- already been validated
-
----
- expat/lib/xmltok_impl.c | 10 +++++-----
- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/lib/xmltok_impl.c b/lib/xmltok_impl.c
-index 64a3b2c1..84ff35f9 100644
---- a/lib/xmltok_impl.c
-+++ b/lib/xmltok_impl.c
-@@ -1274,7 +1274,7 @@ PREFIX(attributeValueTok)(const ENCODING *enc, const char *ptr, const char *end,
-     switch (BYTE_TYPE(enc, ptr)) {
- #  define LEAD_CASE(n)                                                         \
-   case BT_LEAD##n:                                                             \
--    ptr += n;                                                                  \
-+    ptr += n; /* NOTE: The encoding has already been validated. */             \
-     break;
-       LEAD_CASE(2)
-       LEAD_CASE(3)
-@@ -1343,7 +1343,7 @@ PREFIX(entityValueTok)(const ENCODING *enc, const char *ptr, const char *end,
-     switch (BYTE_TYPE(enc, ptr)) {
- #  define LEAD_CASE(n)                                                         \
-   case BT_LEAD##n:                                                             \
--    ptr += n;                                                                  \
-+    ptr += n; /* NOTE: The encoding has already been validated. */             \
-     break;
-       LEAD_CASE(2)
-       LEAD_CASE(3)
-@@ -1522,7 +1522,7 @@ PREFIX(getAtts)(const ENCODING *enc, const char *ptr, int attsMax,
-       state = inName;                                                          \
-     }
- #  define LEAD_CASE(n)                                                         \
--  case BT_LEAD##n:                                                             \
-+  case BT_LEAD##n: /* NOTE: The encoding has already been validated. */        \
-     START_NAME ptr += (n - MINBPC(enc));                                       \
-     break;
-       LEAD_CASE(2)
-@@ -1734,7 +1734,7 @@ PREFIX(nameLength)(const ENCODING *enc, const char *ptr) {
-     switch (BYTE_TYPE(enc, ptr)) {
- #  define LEAD_CASE(n)                                                         \
-   case BT_LEAD##n:                                                             \
--    ptr += n;                                                                  \
-+    ptr += n; /* NOTE: The encoding has already been validated. */             \
-     break;
-       LEAD_CASE(2)
-       LEAD_CASE(3)
-@@ -1779,7 +1779,7 @@ PREFIX(updatePosition)(const ENCODING *enc, const char *ptr, const char *end,
-     switch (BYTE_TYPE(enc, ptr)) {
- #  define LEAD_CASE(n)                                                         \
-   case BT_LEAD##n:                                                             \
--    ptr += n;                                                                  \
-+    ptr += n; /* NOTE: The encoding has already been validated. */             \
-     pos->columnNumber++;                                                       \
-     break;
-       LEAD_CASE(2)
-
-From 6a5510bc6b7efe743356296724e0b38300f05379 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Sebastian Pipping <sebastian@pipping.org>
-Date: Tue, 8 Feb 2022 04:06:21 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 4/5] tests: Cover missing validation of encoding
- (CVE-2022-25235)
-
----
- expat/tests/runtests.c | 109 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- 1 file changed, 109 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/tests/runtests.c b/tests/runtests.c
-index bc5344b1..9b155b82 100644
---- a/tests/runtests.c
-+++ b/tests/runtests.c
-@@ -5998,6 +5998,105 @@ START_TEST(test_utf8_in_cdata_section_2) {
- }
- END_TEST
- 
-+START_TEST(test_utf8_in_start_tags) {
-+  struct test_case {
-+    bool goodName;
-+    bool goodNameStart;
-+    const char *tagName;
-+  };
-+
-+  // The idea with the tests below is this:
-+  // We want to cover 1-, 2- and 3-byte sequences, 4-byte sequences
-+  // go to isNever and are hence not a concern.
-+  //
-+  // We start with a character that is a valid name character
-+  // (or even name-start character, see XML 1.0r4 spec) and then we flip
-+  // single bits at places where (1) the result leaves the UTF-8 encoding space
-+  // and (2) we stay in the same n-byte sequence family.
-+  //
-+  // The flipped bits are highlighted in angle brackets in comments,
-+  // e.g. "[<1>011 1001]" means we had [0011 1001] but we now flipped
-+  // the most significant bit to 1 to leave UTF-8 encoding space.
-+  struct test_case cases[] = {
-+      // 1-byte UTF-8: [0xxx xxxx]
-+      {true, true, "\x3A"},   // [0011 1010] = ASCII colon ':'
-+      {false, false, "\xBA"}, // [<1>011 1010]
-+      {true, false, "\x39"},  // [0011 1001] = ASCII nine '9'
-+      {false, false, "\xB9"}, // [<1>011 1001]
-+
-+      // 2-byte UTF-8: [110x xxxx] [10xx xxxx]
-+      {true, true, "\xDB\xA5"},   // [1101 1011] [1010 0101] =
-+                                  // Arabic small waw U+06E5
-+      {false, false, "\x9B\xA5"}, // [1<0>01 1011] [1010 0101]
-+      {false, false, "\xDB\x25"}, // [1101 1011] [<0>010 0101]
-+      {false, false, "\xDB\xE5"}, // [1101 1011] [1<1>10 0101]
-+      {true, false, "\xCC\x81"},  // [1100 1100] [1000 0001] =
-+                                  // combining char U+0301
-+      {false, false, "\x8C\x81"}, // [1<0>00 1100] [1000 0001]
-+      {false, false, "\xCC\x01"}, // [1100 1100] [<0>000 0001]
-+      {false, false, "\xCC\xC1"}, // [1100 1100] [1<1>00 0001]
-+
-+      // 3-byte UTF-8: [1110 xxxx] [10xx xxxx] [10xxxxxx]
-+      {true, true, "\xE0\xA4\x85"},   // [1110 0000] [1010 0100] [1000 0101] =
-+                                      // Devanagari Letter A U+0905
-+      {false, false, "\xA0\xA4\x85"}, // [1<0>10 0000] [1010 0100] [1000 0101]
-+      {false, false, "\xE0\x24\x85"}, // [1110 0000] [<0>010 0100] [1000 0101]
-+      {false, false, "\xE0\xE4\x85"}, // [1110 0000] [1<1>10 0100] [1000 0101]
-+      {false, false, "\xE0\xA4\x05"}, // [1110 0000] [1010 0100] [<0>000 0101]
-+      {false, false, "\xE0\xA4\xC5"}, // [1110 0000] [1010 0100] [1<1>00 0101]
-+      {true, false, "\xE0\xA4\x81"},  // [1110 0000] [1010 0100] [1000 0001] =
-+                                      // combining char U+0901
-+      {false, false, "\xA0\xA4\x81"}, // [1<0>10 0000] [1010 0100] [1000 0001]
-+      {false, false, "\xE0\x24\x81"}, // [1110 0000] [<0>010 0100] [1000 0001]
-+      {false, false, "\xE0\xE4\x81"}, // [1110 0000] [1<1>10 0100] [1000 0001]
-+      {false, false, "\xE0\xA4\x01"}, // [1110 0000] [1010 0100] [<0>000 0001]
-+      {false, false, "\xE0\xA4\xC1"}, // [1110 0000] [1010 0100] [1<1>00 0001]
-+  };
-+  const bool atNameStart[] = {true, false};
-+
-+  size_t i = 0;
-+  char doc[1024];
-+  size_t failCount = 0;
-+
-+  for (; i < sizeof(cases) / sizeof(cases[0]); i++) {
-+    size_t j = 0;
-+    for (; j < sizeof(atNameStart) / sizeof(atNameStart[0]); j++) {
-+      const bool expectedSuccess
-+          = atNameStart[j] ? cases[i].goodNameStart : cases[i].goodName;
-+      sprintf(doc, "<%s%s><!--", atNameStart[j] ? "" : "a", cases[i].tagName);
-+      XML_Parser parser = XML_ParserCreate(NULL);
-+
-+      const enum XML_Status status
-+          = XML_Parse(parser, doc, (int)strlen(doc), /*isFinal=*/XML_FALSE);
-+
-+      bool success = true;
-+      if ((status == XML_STATUS_OK) != expectedSuccess) {
-+        success = false;
-+      }
-+      if ((status == XML_STATUS_ERROR)
-+          && (XML_GetErrorCode(parser) != XML_ERROR_INVALID_TOKEN)) {
-+        success = false;
-+      }
-+
-+      if (! success) {
-+        fprintf(
-+            stderr,
-+            "FAIL case %2u (%sat name start, %u-byte sequence, error code %d)\n",
-+            (unsigned)i + 1u, atNameStart[j] ? "    " : "not ",
-+            (unsigned)strlen(cases[i].tagName), XML_GetErrorCode(parser));
-+        failCount++;
-+      }
-+
-+      XML_ParserFree(parser);
-+    }
-+  }
-+
-+  if (failCount > 0) {
-+    fail("UTF-8 regression detected");
-+  }
-+}
-+END_TEST
-+
- /* Test trailing spaces in elements are accepted */
- static void XMLCALL
- record_element_end_handler(void *userData, const XML_Char *name) {
-@@ -6175,6 +6274,14 @@ START_TEST(test_bad_doctype) {
- }
- END_TEST
- 
-+START_TEST(test_bad_doctype_utf8) {
-+  const char *text = "<!DOCTYPE \xDB\x25"
-+                     "doc><doc/>"; // [1101 1011] [<0>010 0101]
-+  expect_failure(text, XML_ERROR_INVALID_TOKEN,
-+                 "Invalid UTF-8 in DOCTYPE not faulted");
-+}
-+END_TEST
-+
- START_TEST(test_bad_doctype_utf16) {
-   const char text[] =
-       /* <!DOCTYPE doc [ \x06f2 ]><doc/>
-@@ -11870,6 +11977,7 @@ make_suite(void) {
-   tcase_add_test(tc_basic, test_ext_entity_utf8_non_bom);
-   tcase_add_test(tc_basic, test_utf8_in_cdata_section);
-   tcase_add_test(tc_basic, test_utf8_in_cdata_section_2);
-+  tcase_add_test(tc_basic, test_utf8_in_start_tags);
-   tcase_add_test(tc_basic, test_trailing_spaces_in_elements);
-   tcase_add_test(tc_basic, test_utf16_attribute);
-   tcase_add_test(tc_basic, test_utf16_second_attr);
-@@ -11878,6 +11986,7 @@ make_suite(void) {
-   tcase_add_test(tc_basic, test_bad_attr_desc_keyword);
-   tcase_add_test(tc_basic, test_bad_attr_desc_keyword_utf16);
-   tcase_add_test(tc_basic, test_bad_doctype);
-+  tcase_add_test(tc_basic, test_bad_doctype_utf8);
-   tcase_add_test(tc_basic, test_bad_doctype_utf16);
-   tcase_add_test(tc_basic, test_bad_doctype_plus);
-   tcase_add_test(tc_basic, test_bad_doctype_star);
-
diff --git a/SOURCES/expat-2.2.10-Detect-and-prevent-integer-overflow-in-XML_GetBuffer.patch b/SOURCES/expat-2.2.10-Detect-and-prevent-integer-overflow-in-XML_GetBuffer.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 58d9941..0000000
--- a/SOURCES/expat-2.2.10-Detect-and-prevent-integer-overflow-in-XML_GetBuffer.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,62 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/lib/xmlparse.c b/lib/xmlparse.c
-index d54af683..5ce31402 100644
---- a/lib/xmlparse.c
-+++ b/lib/xmlparse.c
-@@ -2067,6 +2067,11 @@ XML_GetBuffer(XML_Parser parser, int len) {
-     keep = (int)EXPAT_SAFE_PTR_DIFF(parser->m_bufferPtr, parser->m_buffer);
-     if (keep > XML_CONTEXT_BYTES)
-       keep = XML_CONTEXT_BYTES;
-+    /* Detect and prevent integer overflow */
-+    if (keep > INT_MAX - neededSize) {
-+      parser->m_errorCode = XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
-+      return NULL;
-+    }
-     neededSize += keep;
- #endif /* defined XML_CONTEXT_BYTES */
-     if (neededSize
-diff --git a/tests/runtests.c b/tests/runtests.c
-index e89e8220..579dad1a 100644
---- a/tests/runtests.c
-+++ b/tests/runtests.c
-@@ -3847,6 +3847,30 @@ START_TEST(test_get_buffer_2) {
- }
- END_TEST
- 
-+/* Test for signed integer overflow CVE-2022-23852 */
-+#if defined(XML_CONTEXT_BYTES)
-+START_TEST(test_get_buffer_3_overflow) {
-+  XML_Parser parser = XML_ParserCreate(NULL);
-+  assert(parser != NULL);
-+
-+  const char *const text = "\n";
-+  const int expectedKeepValue = (int)strlen(text);
-+
-+  // After this call, variable "keep" in XML_GetBuffer will
-+  // have value expectedKeepValue
-+  if (XML_Parse(parser, text, (int)strlen(text), XML_FALSE /* isFinal */)
-+      == XML_STATUS_ERROR)
-+    xml_failure(parser);
-+
-+  assert(expectedKeepValue > 0);
-+  if (XML_GetBuffer(parser, INT_MAX - expectedKeepValue + 1) != NULL)
-+    fail("enlarging buffer not failed");
-+
-+  XML_ParserFree(parser);
-+}
-+END_TEST
-+#endif // defined(XML_CONTEXT_BYTES)
-+
- /* Test position information macros */
- START_TEST(test_byte_info_at_end) {
-   const char *text = "<doc></doc>";
-@@ -11731,6 +11755,9 @@ make_suite(void) {
-   tcase_add_test(tc_basic, test_empty_parse);
-   tcase_add_test(tc_basic, test_get_buffer_1);
-   tcase_add_test(tc_basic, test_get_buffer_2);
-+#if defined(XML_CONTEXT_BYTES)
-+  tcase_add_test(tc_basic, test_get_buffer_3_overflow);
-+#endif
-   tcase_add_test(tc_basic, test_byte_info_at_end);
-   tcase_add_test(tc_basic, test_byte_info_at_error);
-   tcase_add_test(tc_basic, test_byte_info_at_cdata);
-
diff --git a/SOURCES/expat-2.2.10-Detect-and-prevent-troublesome-left-shifts.patch b/SOURCES/expat-2.2.10-Detect-and-prevent-troublesome-left-shifts.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 1ad6374..0000000
--- a/SOURCES/expat-2.2.10-Detect-and-prevent-troublesome-left-shifts.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,59 +0,0 @@
-From 0adcb34c49bee5b19bd29b16a578c510c23597ea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Sebastian Pipping <sebastian@pipping.org>
-Date: Mon, 27 Dec 2021 20:15:02 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] lib: Detect and prevent troublesome left shifts in function
- storeAtts (CVE-2021-45960)
-
----
- expat/lib/xmlparse.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
- 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/lib/xmlparse.c b/lib/xmlparse.c
-index d730f41c3..b47c31b05 100644
---- a/lib/xmlparse.c
-+++ b/lib/xmlparse.c
-@@ -3414,7 +3414,13 @@ storeAtts(XML_Parser parser, const ENCODING *enc, const char *attStr,
-   if (nPrefixes) {
-     int j; /* hash table index */
-     unsigned long version = parser->m_nsAttsVersion;
--    int nsAttsSize = (int)1 << parser->m_nsAttsPower;
-+
-+    /* Detect and prevent invalid shift */
-+    if (parser->m_nsAttsPower >= sizeof(unsigned int) * 8 /* bits per byte */) {
-+      return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
-+    }
-+
-+    unsigned int nsAttsSize = 1u << parser->m_nsAttsPower;
-     unsigned char oldNsAttsPower = parser->m_nsAttsPower;
-     /* size of hash table must be at least 2 * (# of prefixed attributes) */
-     if ((nPrefixes << 1)
-@@ -3425,7 +3431,28 @@ storeAtts(XML_Parser parser, const ENCODING *enc, const char *attStr,
-         ;
-       if (parser->m_nsAttsPower < 3)
-         parser->m_nsAttsPower = 3;
--      nsAttsSize = (int)1 << parser->m_nsAttsPower;
-+
-+      /* Detect and prevent invalid shift */
-+      if (parser->m_nsAttsPower >= sizeof(nsAttsSize) * 8 /* bits per byte */) {
-+        /* Restore actual size of memory in m_nsAtts */
-+        parser->m_nsAttsPower = oldNsAttsPower;
-+        return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
-+      }
-+
-+      nsAttsSize = 1u << parser->m_nsAttsPower;
-+
-+      /* Detect and prevent integer overflow.
-+       * The preprocessor guard addresses the "always false" warning
-+       * from -Wtype-limits on platforms where
-+       * sizeof(unsigned int) < sizeof(size_t), e.g. on x86_64. */
-+#if UINT_MAX >= SIZE_MAX
-+      if (nsAttsSize > (size_t)(-1) / sizeof(NS_ATT)) {
-+        /* Restore actual size of memory in m_nsAtts */
-+        parser->m_nsAttsPower = oldNsAttsPower;
-+        return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
-+      }
-+#endif
-+
-       temp = (NS_ATT *)REALLOC(parser, parser->m_nsAtts,
-                                nsAttsSize * sizeof(NS_ATT));
-       if (! temp) {
diff --git a/SOURCES/expat-2.2.10-Prevent-integer-overflow-in-storeRawNames.patch b/SOURCES/expat-2.2.10-Prevent-integer-overflow-in-storeRawNames.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 31e35fa..0000000
--- a/SOURCES/expat-2.2.10-Prevent-integer-overflow-in-storeRawNames.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,139 +0,0 @@
-From eb0362808b4f9f1e2345a0cf203b8cc196d776d9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Samanta Navarro <ferivoz@riseup.net>
-Date: Tue, 15 Feb 2022 11:55:46 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH] Prevent integer overflow in storeRawNames
-
-It is possible to use an integer overflow in storeRawNames for out of
-boundary heap writes. Default configuration is affected. If compiled
-with XML_UNICODE then the attack does not work. Compiling with
--fsanitize=address confirms the following proof of concept.
-
-The problem can be exploited by abusing the m_buffer expansion logic.
-Even though the initial size of m_buffer is a power of two, eventually
-it can end up a little bit lower, thus allowing allocations very close
-to INT_MAX (since INT_MAX/2 can be surpassed). This means that tag
-names can be parsed which are almost INT_MAX in size.
-
-Unfortunately (from an attacker point of view) INT_MAX/2 is also a
-limitation in string pools. Having a tag name of INT_MAX/2 characters
-or more is not possible.
-
-Expat can convert between different encodings. UTF-16 documents which
-contain only ASCII representable characters are twice as large as their
-ASCII encoded counter-parts.
-
-The proof of concept works by taking these three considerations into
-account:
-
-1. Move the m_buffer size slightly below a power of two by having a
-   short root node <a>. This allows the m_buffer to grow very close
-   to INT_MAX.
-2. The string pooling forbids tag names longer than or equal to
-   INT_MAX/2, so keep the attack tag name smaller than that.
-3. To be able to still overflow INT_MAX even though the name is
-   limited at INT_MAX/2-1 (nul byte) we use UTF-16 encoding and a tag
-   which only contains ASCII characters. UTF-16 always stores two
-   bytes per character while the tag name is converted to using only
-   one. Our attack node byte count must be a bit higher than
-   2/3 INT_MAX so the converted tag name is around INT_MAX/3 which
-   in sum can overflow INT_MAX.
-
-Thanks to our small root node, m_buffer can handle 2/3 INT_MAX bytes
-without running into INT_MAX boundary check. The string pooling is
-able to store INT_MAX/3 as tag name because the amount is below
-INT_MAX/2 limitation. And creating the sum of both eventually overflows
-in storeRawNames.
-
-Proof of Concept:
-
-1. Compile expat with -fsanitize=address.
-
-2. Create Proof of Concept binary which iterates through input
-   file 16 MB at once for better performance and easier integer
-   calculations:
-
-```
-cat > poc.c << EOF
- #include <err.h>
- #include <expat.h>
- #include <stdlib.h>
- #include <stdio.h>
-
- #define CHUNK (16 * 1024 * 1024)
- int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
-   XML_Parser parser;
-   FILE *fp;
-   char *buf;
-   int i;
-
-   if (argc != 2)
-     errx(1, "usage: poc file.xml");
-   if ((parser = XML_ParserCreate(NULL)) == NULL)
-     errx(1, "failed to create expat parser");
-   if ((fp = fopen(argv[1], "r")) == NULL) {
-     XML_ParserFree(parser);
-     err(1, "failed to open file");
-   }
-   if ((buf = malloc(CHUNK)) == NULL) {
-     fclose(fp);
-     XML_ParserFree(parser);
-     err(1, "failed to allocate buffer");
-   }
-   i = 0;
-   while (fread(buf, CHUNK, 1, fp) == 1) {
-     printf("iteration %d: XML_Parse returns %d\n", ++i,
-       XML_Parse(parser, buf, CHUNK, XML_FALSE));
-   }
-   free(buf);
-   fclose(fp);
-   XML_ParserFree(parser);
-   return 0;
- }
-EOF
-gcc -fsanitize=address -lexpat -o poc poc.c
-```
-
-3. Construct specially prepared UTF-16 XML file:
-
-```
-dd if=/dev/zero bs=1024 count=794624 | tr '\0' 'a' > poc-utf8.xml
-echo -n '<a><' | dd conv=notrunc of=poc-utf8.xml
-echo -n '><' | dd conv=notrunc of=poc-utf8.xml bs=1 seek=805306368
-iconv -f UTF-8 -t UTF-16LE poc-utf8.xml > poc-utf16.xml
-```
-
-4. Run proof of concept:
-
-```
-./poc poc-utf16.xml
-```
----
- expat/lib/xmlparse.c | 7 ++++++-
- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/lib/xmlparse.c b/lib/xmlparse.c
-index 4b43e613..f34d6ab5 100644
---- a/lib/xmlparse.c
-+++ b/lib/xmlparse.c
-@@ -2563,6 +2563,7 @@ storeRawNames(XML_Parser parser) {
-   while (tag) {
-     int bufSize;
-     int nameLen = sizeof(XML_Char) * (tag->name.strLen + 1);
-+    size_t rawNameLen;
-     char *rawNameBuf = tag->buf + nameLen;
-     /* Stop if already stored.  Since m_tagStack is a stack, we can stop
-        at the first entry that has already been copied; everything
-@@ -2574,7 +2575,11 @@ storeRawNames(XML_Parser parser) {
-     /* For re-use purposes we need to ensure that the
-        size of tag->buf is a multiple of sizeof(XML_Char).
-     */
--    bufSize = nameLen + ROUND_UP(tag->rawNameLength, sizeof(XML_Char));
-+    rawNameLen = ROUND_UP(tag->rawNameLength, sizeof(XML_Char));
-+    /* Detect and prevent integer overflow. */
-+    if (rawNameLen > (size_t)INT_MAX - nameLen)
-+      return XML_FALSE;
-+    bufSize = nameLen + (int)rawNameLen;
-     if (bufSize > tag->bufEnd - tag->buf) {
-       char *temp = (char *)REALLOC(parser, tag->buf, bufSize);
-       if (temp == NULL)
-
diff --git a/SOURCES/expat-2.2.10-Prevent-integer-overflow-on-m_groupSize-in-function.patch b/SOURCES/expat-2.2.10-Prevent-integer-overflow-on-m_groupSize-in-function.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 17d192f..0000000
--- a/SOURCES/expat-2.2.10-Prevent-integer-overflow-on-m_groupSize-in-function.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
-From 85ae9a2d7d0e9358f356b33977b842df8ebaec2b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Sebastian Pipping <sebastian@pipping.org>
-Date: Sat, 25 Dec 2021 20:52:08 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] lib: Prevent integer overflow on m_groupSize in function
- doProlog (CVE-2021-46143)
-
----
- expat/lib/xmlparse.c | 15 +++++++++++++++
- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/lib/xmlparse.c b/lib/xmlparse.c
-index b47c31b0..8f243126 100644
---- a/lib/xmlparse.c
-+++ b/lib/xmlparse.c
-@@ -5046,6 +5046,11 @@ doProlog(XML_Parser parser, const ENCODING *enc, const char *s, const char *end,
-       if (parser->m_prologState.level >= parser->m_groupSize) {
-         if (parser->m_groupSize) {
-           {
-+            /* Detect and prevent integer overflow */
-+            if (parser->m_groupSize > (unsigned int)(-1) / 2u) {
-+              return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
-+            }
-+
-             char *const new_connector = (char *)REALLOC(
-                 parser, parser->m_groupConnector, parser->m_groupSize *= 2);
-             if (new_connector == NULL) {
-@@ -5056,6 +5061,16 @@ doProlog(XML_Parser parser, const ENCODING *enc, const char *s, const char *end,
-           }
- 
-           if (dtd->scaffIndex) {
-+            /* Detect and prevent integer overflow.
-+             * The preprocessor guard addresses the "always false" warning
-+             * from -Wtype-limits on platforms where
-+             * sizeof(unsigned int) < sizeof(size_t), e.g. on x86_64. */
-+#if UINT_MAX >= SIZE_MAX
-+            if (parser->m_groupSize > (size_t)(-1) / sizeof(int)) {
-+              return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
-+            }
-+#endif
-+
-             int *const new_scaff_index = (int *)REALLOC(
-                 parser, dtd->scaffIndex, parser->m_groupSize * sizeof(int));
-             if (new_scaff_index == NULL)
diff --git a/SOURCES/expat-2.2.10-Prevent-more-integer-overflows.patch b/SOURCES/expat-2.2.10-Prevent-more-integer-overflows.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 63b5d2f..0000000
--- a/SOURCES/expat-2.2.10-Prevent-more-integer-overflows.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,250 +0,0 @@
-From 9f93e8036e842329863bf20395b8fb8f73834d9e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Sebastian Pipping <sebastian@pipping.org>
-Date: Thu, 30 Dec 2021 22:46:03 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] lib: Prevent integer overflow at multiple places
- (CVE-2022-22822 to CVE-2022-22827)
-
-The involved functions are:
-- addBinding (CVE-2022-22822)
-- build_model (CVE-2022-22823)
-- defineAttribute (CVE-2022-22824)
-- lookup (CVE-2022-22825)
-- nextScaffoldPart (CVE-2022-22826)
-- storeAtts (CVE-2022-22827)
----
- expat/lib/xmlparse.c | 153 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
- 1 file changed, 151 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/lib/xmlparse.c b/lib/xmlparse.c
-index 8f243126..575e73ee 100644
---- a/lib/xmlparse.c
-+++ b/lib/xmlparse.c
-@@ -3261,13 +3261,38 @@ storeAtts(XML_Parser parser, const ENCODING *enc, const char *attStr,
- 
-   /* get the attributes from the tokenizer */
-   n = XmlGetAttributes(enc, attStr, parser->m_attsSize, parser->m_atts);
-+
-+  /* Detect and prevent integer overflow */
-+  if (n > INT_MAX - nDefaultAtts) {
-+    return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
-+  }
-+
-   if (n + nDefaultAtts > parser->m_attsSize) {
-     int oldAttsSize = parser->m_attsSize;
-     ATTRIBUTE *temp;
- #ifdef XML_ATTR_INFO
-     XML_AttrInfo *temp2;
- #endif
-+
-+    /* Detect and prevent integer overflow */
-+    if ((nDefaultAtts > INT_MAX - INIT_ATTS_SIZE)
-+        || (n > INT_MAX - (nDefaultAtts + INIT_ATTS_SIZE))) {
-+      return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
-+    }
-+
-     parser->m_attsSize = n + nDefaultAtts + INIT_ATTS_SIZE;
-+
-+    /* Detect and prevent integer overflow.
-+     * The preprocessor guard addresses the "always false" warning
-+     * from -Wtype-limits on platforms where
-+     * sizeof(unsigned int) < sizeof(size_t), e.g. on x86_64. */
-+#if UINT_MAX >= SIZE_MAX
-+    if ((unsigned)parser->m_attsSize > (size_t)(-1) / sizeof(ATTRIBUTE)) {
-+      parser->m_attsSize = oldAttsSize;
-+      return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
-+    }
-+#endif
-+
-     temp = (ATTRIBUTE *)REALLOC(parser, (void *)parser->m_atts,
-                                 parser->m_attsSize * sizeof(ATTRIBUTE));
-     if (temp == NULL) {
-@@ -3276,6 +3301,17 @@ storeAtts(XML_Parser parser, const ENCODING *enc, const char *attStr,
-     }
-     parser->m_atts = temp;
- #ifdef XML_ATTR_INFO
-+    /* Detect and prevent integer overflow.
-+     * The preprocessor guard addresses the "always false" warning
-+     * from -Wtype-limits on platforms where
-+     * sizeof(unsigned int) < sizeof(size_t), e.g. on x86_64. */
-+#  if UINT_MAX >= SIZE_MAX
-+    if ((unsigned)parser->m_attsSize > (size_t)(-1) / sizeof(XML_AttrInfo)) {
-+      parser->m_attsSize = oldAttsSize;
-+      return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
-+    }
-+#  endif
-+
-     temp2 = (XML_AttrInfo *)REALLOC(parser, (void *)parser->m_attInfo,
-                                     parser->m_attsSize * sizeof(XML_AttrInfo));
-     if (temp2 == NULL) {
-@@ -3610,9 +3646,31 @@ storeAtts(XML_Parser parser, const ENCODING *enc, const char *attStr,
-   tagNamePtr->prefixLen = prefixLen;
-   for (i = 0; localPart[i++];)
-     ; /* i includes null terminator */
-+
-+  /* Detect and prevent integer overflow */
-+  if (binding->uriLen > INT_MAX - prefixLen
-+      || i > INT_MAX - (binding->uriLen + prefixLen)) {
-+    return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
-+  }
-+
-   n = i + binding->uriLen + prefixLen;
-   if (n > binding->uriAlloc) {
-     TAG *p;
-+
-+    /* Detect and prevent integer overflow */
-+    if (n > INT_MAX - EXPAND_SPARE) {
-+      return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
-+    }
-+    /* Detect and prevent integer overflow.
-+     * The preprocessor guard addresses the "always false" warning
-+     * from -Wtype-limits on platforms where
-+     * sizeof(unsigned int) < sizeof(size_t), e.g. on x86_64. */
-+#if UINT_MAX >= SIZE_MAX
-+    if ((unsigned)(n + EXPAND_SPARE) > (size_t)(-1) / sizeof(XML_Char)) {
-+      return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
-+    }
-+#endif
-+
-     uri = (XML_Char *)MALLOC(parser, (n + EXPAND_SPARE) * sizeof(XML_Char));
-     if (! uri)
-       return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
-@@ -3708,6 +3766,21 @@ addBinding(XML_Parser parser, PREFIX *prefix, const ATTRIBUTE_ID *attId,
-   if (parser->m_freeBindingList) {
-     b = parser->m_freeBindingList;
-     if (len > b->uriAlloc) {
-+      /* Detect and prevent integer overflow */
-+      if (len > INT_MAX - EXPAND_SPARE) {
-+        return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
-+      }
-+
-+      /* Detect and prevent integer overflow.
-+       * The preprocessor guard addresses the "always false" warning
-+       * from -Wtype-limits on platforms where
-+       * sizeof(unsigned int) < sizeof(size_t), e.g. on x86_64. */
-+#if UINT_MAX >= SIZE_MAX
-+      if ((unsigned)(len + EXPAND_SPARE) > (size_t)(-1) / sizeof(XML_Char)) {
-+        return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
-+      }
-+#endif
-+
-       XML_Char *temp = (XML_Char *)REALLOC(
-           parser, b->uri, sizeof(XML_Char) * (len + EXPAND_SPARE));
-       if (temp == NULL)
-@@ -3720,6 +3793,21 @@ addBinding(XML_Parser parser, PREFIX *prefix, const ATTRIBUTE_ID *attId,
-     b = (BINDING *)MALLOC(parser, sizeof(BINDING));
-     if (! b)
-       return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
-+
-+    /* Detect and prevent integer overflow */
-+    if (len > INT_MAX - EXPAND_SPARE) {
-+      return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
-+    }
-+    /* Detect and prevent integer overflow.
-+     * The preprocessor guard addresses the "always false" warning
-+     * from -Wtype-limits on platforms where
-+     * sizeof(unsigned int) < sizeof(size_t), e.g. on x86_64. */
-+#if UINT_MAX >= SIZE_MAX
-+    if ((unsigned)(len + EXPAND_SPARE) > (size_t)(-1) / sizeof(XML_Char)) {
-+      return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
-+    }
-+#endif
-+
-     b->uri
-         = (XML_Char *)MALLOC(parser, sizeof(XML_Char) * (len + EXPAND_SPARE));
-     if (! b->uri) {
-@@ -6141,7 +6229,24 @@ defineAttribute(ELEMENT_TYPE *type, ATTRIBUTE_ID *attId, XML_Bool isCdata,
-       }
-     } else {
-       DEFAULT_ATTRIBUTE *temp;
-+
-+      /* Detect and prevent integer overflow */
-+      if (type->allocDefaultAtts > INT_MAX / 2) {
-+        return 0;
-+      }
-+
-       int count = type->allocDefaultAtts * 2;
-+
-+      /* Detect and prevent integer overflow.
-+       * The preprocessor guard addresses the "always false" warning
-+       * from -Wtype-limits on platforms where
-+       * sizeof(unsigned int) < sizeof(size_t), e.g. on x86_64. */
-+#if UINT_MAX >= SIZE_MAX
-+      if ((unsigned)count > (size_t)(-1) / sizeof(DEFAULT_ATTRIBUTE)) {
-+        return 0;
-+      }
-+#endif
-+
-       temp = (DEFAULT_ATTRIBUTE *)REALLOC(parser, type->defaultAtts,
-                                           (count * sizeof(DEFAULT_ATTRIBUTE)));
-       if (temp == NULL)
-@@ -6792,8 +6897,20 @@ lookup(XML_Parser parser, HASH_TABLE *table, KEY name, size_t createSize) {
-     /* check for overflow (table is half full) */
-     if (table->used >> (table->power - 1)) {
-       unsigned char newPower = table->power + 1;
-+
-+      /* Detect and prevent invalid shift */
-+      if (newPower >= sizeof(unsigned long) * 8 /* bits per byte */) {
-+        return NULL;
-+      }
-+
-       size_t newSize = (size_t)1 << newPower;
-       unsigned long newMask = (unsigned long)newSize - 1;
-+
-+      /* Detect and prevent integer overflow */
-+      if (newSize > (size_t)(-1) / sizeof(NAMED *)) {
-+        return NULL;
-+      }
-+
-       size_t tsize = newSize * sizeof(NAMED *);
-       NAMED **newV = (NAMED **)table->mem->malloc_fcn(tsize);
-       if (! newV)
-@@ -7143,6 +7260,20 @@ nextScaffoldPart(XML_Parser parser) {
-   if (dtd->scaffCount >= dtd->scaffSize) {
-     CONTENT_SCAFFOLD *temp;
-     if (dtd->scaffold) {
-+      /* Detect and prevent integer overflow */
-+      if (dtd->scaffSize > UINT_MAX / 2u) {
-+        return -1;
-+      }
-+      /* Detect and prevent integer overflow.
-+       * The preprocessor guard addresses the "always false" warning
-+       * from -Wtype-limits on platforms where
-+       * sizeof(unsigned int) < sizeof(size_t), e.g. on x86_64. */
-+#if UINT_MAX >= SIZE_MAX
-+      if (dtd->scaffSize > (size_t)(-1) / 2u / sizeof(CONTENT_SCAFFOLD)) {
-+        return -1;
-+      }
-+#endif
-+
-       temp = (CONTENT_SCAFFOLD *)REALLOC(
-           parser, dtd->scaffold, dtd->scaffSize * 2 * sizeof(CONTENT_SCAFFOLD));
-       if (temp == NULL)
-@@ -7212,8 +7343,26 @@ build_model(XML_Parser parser) {
-   XML_Content *ret;
-   XML_Content *cpos;
-   XML_Char *str;
--  int allocsize = (dtd->scaffCount * sizeof(XML_Content)
--                   + (dtd->contentStringLen * sizeof(XML_Char)));
-+
-+  /* Detect and prevent integer overflow.
-+   * The preprocessor guard addresses the "always false" warning
-+   * from -Wtype-limits on platforms where
-+   * sizeof(unsigned int) < sizeof(size_t), e.g. on x86_64. */
-+#if UINT_MAX >= SIZE_MAX
-+  if (dtd->scaffCount > (size_t)(-1) / sizeof(XML_Content)) {
-+    return NULL;
-+  }
-+  if (dtd->contentStringLen > (size_t)(-1) / sizeof(XML_Char)) {
-+    return NULL;
-+  }
-+#endif
-+  if (dtd->scaffCount * sizeof(XML_Content)
-+      > (size_t)(-1) - dtd->contentStringLen * sizeof(XML_Char)) {
-+    return NULL;
-+  }
-+
-+  const size_t allocsize = (dtd->scaffCount * sizeof(XML_Content)
-+                            + (dtd->contentStringLen * sizeof(XML_Char)));
- 
-   ret = (XML_Content *)MALLOC(parser, allocsize);
-   if (! ret)
diff --git a/SOURCES/expat-2.2.10-Protect-against-malicious-namespace-declarations.patch b/SOURCES/expat-2.2.10-Protect-against-malicious-namespace-declarations.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 9f68836..0000000
--- a/SOURCES/expat-2.2.10-Protect-against-malicious-namespace-declarations.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,228 +0,0 @@
-commit 5c47ae80738d0985babf06a023b3845169682064
-Author: Tomas Korbar <tkorbar@redhat.com>
-Date:   Mon Mar 14 10:22:37 2022 +0100
-
-    Protect against malicious namespace declarations
-
-diff --git a/lib/xmlparse.c b/lib/xmlparse.c
-index 5c3f573..901abbf 100644
---- a/lib/xmlparse.c
-+++ b/lib/xmlparse.c
-@@ -638,8 +638,7 @@ XML_ParserCreate(const XML_Char *encodingName) {
- 
- XML_Parser XMLCALL
- XML_ParserCreateNS(const XML_Char *encodingName, XML_Char nsSep) {
--  XML_Char tmp[2];
--  *tmp = nsSep;
-+  XML_Char tmp[2] = {nsSep, 0};
-   return XML_ParserCreate_MM(encodingName, NULL, tmp);
- }
- 
-@@ -1253,8 +1252,7 @@ XML_ExternalEntityParserCreate(XML_Parser oldParser, const XML_Char *context,
-      would be otherwise.
-   */
-   if (parser->m_ns) {
--    XML_Char tmp[2];
--    *tmp = parser->m_namespaceSeparator;
-+    XML_Char tmp[2] = {parser->m_namespaceSeparator, 0};
-     parser = parserCreate(encodingName, &parser->m_mem, tmp, newDtd);
-   } else {
-     parser = parserCreate(encodingName, &parser->m_mem, NULL, newDtd);
-@@ -3526,6 +3524,117 @@ storeAtts(XML_Parser parser, const ENCODING *enc, const char *attStr,
-   return XML_ERROR_NONE;
- }
- 
-+static XML_Bool
-+is_rfc3986_uri_char(XML_Char candidate) {
-+  // For the RFC 3986 ANBF grammar see
-+  // https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc3986#appendix-A
-+
-+  switch (candidate) {
-+  // From rule "ALPHA" (uppercase half)
-+  case 'A':
-+  case 'B':
-+  case 'C':
-+  case 'D':
-+  case 'E':
-+  case 'F':
-+  case 'G':
-+  case 'H':
-+  case 'I':
-+  case 'J':
-+  case 'K':
-+  case 'L':
-+  case 'M':
-+  case 'N':
-+  case 'O':
-+  case 'P':
-+  case 'Q':
-+  case 'R':
-+  case 'S':
-+  case 'T':
-+  case 'U':
-+  case 'V':
-+  case 'W':
-+  case 'X':
-+  case 'Y':
-+  case 'Z':
-+
-+  // From rule "ALPHA" (lowercase half)
-+  case 'a':
-+  case 'b':
-+  case 'c':
-+  case 'd':
-+  case 'e':
-+  case 'f':
-+  case 'g':
-+  case 'h':
-+  case 'i':
-+  case 'j':
-+  case 'k':
-+  case 'l':
-+  case 'm':
-+  case 'n':
-+  case 'o':
-+  case 'p':
-+  case 'q':
-+  case 'r':
-+  case 's':
-+  case 't':
-+  case 'u':
-+  case 'v':
-+  case 'w':
-+  case 'x':
-+  case 'y':
-+  case 'z':
-+
-+  // From rule "DIGIT"
-+  case '0':
-+  case '1':
-+  case '2':
-+  case '3':
-+  case '4':
-+  case '5':
-+  case '6':
-+  case '7':
-+  case '8':
-+  case '9':
-+
-+  // From rule "pct-encoded"
-+  case '%':
-+
-+  // From rule "unreserved"
-+  case '-':
-+  case '.':
-+  case '_':
-+  case '~':
-+
-+  // From rule "gen-delims"
-+  case ':':
-+  case '/':
-+  case '?':
-+  case '#':
-+  case '[':
-+  case ']':
-+  case '@':
-+
-+  // From rule "sub-delims"
-+  case '!':
-+  case '$':
-+  case '&':
-+  case '\'':
-+  case '(':
-+  case ')':
-+  case '*':
-+  case '+':
-+  case ',':
-+  case ';':
-+  case '=':
-+    return XML_TRUE;
-+
-+  default:
-+    return XML_FALSE;
-+  }
-+}
-+
- /* addBinding() overwrites the value of prefix->binding without checking.
-    Therefore one must keep track of the old value outside of addBinding().
- */
-@@ -3581,6 +3690,29 @@ addBinding(XML_Parser parser, PREFIX *prefix, const ATTRIBUTE_ID *attId,
-     if (! mustBeXML && isXMLNS
-         && (len > xmlnsLen || uri[len] != xmlnsNamespace[len]))
-       isXMLNS = XML_FALSE;
-+
-+    // NOTE: While Expat does not validate namespace URIs against RFC 3986
-+    //       today (and is not REQUIRED to do so with regard to the XML 1.0
-+    //       namespaces specification) we have to at least make sure, that
-+    //       the application on top of Expat (that is likely splitting expanded
-+    //       element names ("qualified names") of form
-+    //       "[uri sep] local [sep prefix] '\0'" back into 1, 2 or 3 pieces
-+    //       in its element handler code) cannot be confused by an attacker
-+    //       putting additional namespace separator characters into namespace
-+    //       declarations.  That would be ambiguous and not to be expected.
-+    //
-+    //       While the HTML API docs of function XML_ParserCreateNS have been
-+    //       advising against use of a namespace separator character that can
-+    //       appear in a URI for >20 years now, some widespread applications
-+    //       are using URI characters (':' (colon) in particular) for a
-+    //       namespace separator, in practice.  To keep these applications
-+    //       functional, we only reject namespaces URIs containing the
-+    //       application-chosen namespace separator if the chosen separator
-+    //       is a non-URI character with regard to RFC 3986.
-+    if (parser->m_ns && (uri[len] == parser->m_namespaceSeparator)
-+        && ! is_rfc3986_uri_char(uri[len])) {
-+      return XML_ERROR_SYNTAX;
-+    }
-   }
-   isXML = isXML && len == xmlLen;
-   isXMLNS = isXMLNS && len == xmlnsLen;
-diff --git a/tests/runtests.c b/tests/runtests.c
-index f03e008..40172d2 100644
---- a/tests/runtests.c
-+++ b/tests/runtests.c
-@@ -7233,6 +7233,37 @@ START_TEST(test_ns_double_colon_doctype) {
- }
- END_TEST
- 
-+START_TEST(test_ns_separator_in_uri) {
-+  struct test_case {
-+    enum XML_Status expectedStatus;
-+    const char *doc;
-+    XML_Char namesep;
-+  };
-+  struct test_case cases[] = {
-+      {XML_STATUS_OK, "<doc xmlns='one_two' />", XCS('\n')},
-+      {XML_STATUS_ERROR, "<doc xmlns='one&#x0A;two' />", XCS('\n')},
-+      {XML_STATUS_OK, "<doc xmlns='one:two' />", XCS(':')},
-+  };
-+
-+  size_t i = 0;
-+  size_t failCount = 0;
-+  for (; i < sizeof(cases) / sizeof(cases[0]); i++) {
-+    XML_Parser parser = XML_ParserCreateNS(NULL, cases[i].namesep);
-+    XML_SetElementHandler(parser, dummy_start_element, dummy_end_element);
-+    if (XML_Parse(parser, cases[i].doc, (int)strlen(cases[i].doc),
-+                  /*isFinal*/ XML_TRUE)
-+        != cases[i].expectedStatus) {
-+      failCount++;
-+    }
-+    XML_ParserFree(parser);
-+  }
-+
-+  if (failCount) {
-+    fail("Namespace separator handling is broken");
-+  }
-+}
-+END_TEST
-+
- /* Control variable; the number of times duff_allocator() will successfully
-  * allocate */
- #define ALLOC_ALWAYS_SUCCEED (-1)
-@@ -11527,6 +11558,7 @@ make_suite(void) {
-   tcase_add_test(tc_namespace, test_ns_utf16_doctype);
-   tcase_add_test(tc_namespace, test_ns_invalid_doctype);
-   tcase_add_test(tc_namespace, test_ns_double_colon_doctype);
-+  tcase_add_test(tc_namespace, test_ns_separator_in_uri);
- 
-   suite_add_tcase(s, tc_misc);
-   tcase_add_checked_fixture(tc_misc, NULL, basic_teardown);
diff --git a/SOURCES/expat-2.2.10-prevent-integer-overflow-in-doProlog.patch b/SOURCES/expat-2.2.10-prevent-integer-overflow-in-doProlog.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index af9c73c..0000000
--- a/SOURCES/expat-2.2.10-prevent-integer-overflow-in-doProlog.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
-From ede41d1e186ed2aba88a06e84cac839b770af3a1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Sebastian Pipping <sebastian@pipping.org>
-Date: Wed, 26 Jan 2022 02:36:43 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 1/2] lib: Prevent integer overflow in doProlog
- (CVE-2022-23990)
-
-The change from "int nameLen" to "size_t nameLen"
-addresses the overflow on "nameLen++" in code
-"for (; name[nameLen++];)" right above the second
-change in the patch.
----
- expat/lib/xmlparse.c | 10 ++++++++--
- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/lib/xmlparse.c b/lib/xmlparse.c
-index 5ce31402..d1d17005 100644
---- a/lib/xmlparse.c
-+++ b/lib/xmlparse.c
-@@ -5372,7 +5372,7 @@ doProlog(XML_Parser parser, const ENCODING *enc, const char *s, const char *end,
-       if (dtd->in_eldecl) {
-         ELEMENT_TYPE *el;
-         const XML_Char *name;
--        int nameLen;
-+        size_t nameLen;
-         const char *nxt
-             = (quant == XML_CQUANT_NONE ? next : next - enc->minBytesPerChar);
-         int myindex = nextScaffoldPart(parser);
-@@ -5388,7 +5388,13 @@ doProlog(XML_Parser parser, const ENCODING *enc, const char *s, const char *end,
-         nameLen = 0;
-         for (; name[nameLen++];)
-           ;
--        dtd->contentStringLen += nameLen;
-+
-+        /* Detect and prevent integer overflow */
-+        if (nameLen > UINT_MAX - dtd->contentStringLen) {
-+          return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
-+        }
-+
-+        dtd->contentStringLen += (unsigned)nameLen;
-         if (parser->m_elementDeclHandler)
-           handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
-       }
diff --git a/SPECS/expat.spec b/SPECS/expat.spec
index d57f447..634e9b0 100644
--- a/SPECS/expat.spec
+++ b/SPECS/expat.spec
@@ -1,22 +1,14 @@
-%global unversion 2_2_10
+%global unversion 2_4_7
 
 Summary: An XML parser library
 Name: expat
 Version: %(echo %{unversion} | sed 's/_/./g')
-Release: 12%{?dist}
+Release: 1%{?dist}
 Source: https://github.com/libexpat/libexpat/archive/R_%{unversion}.tar.gz#/expat-%{version}.tar.gz
 URL: https://libexpat.github.io/
 License: MIT
 BuildRequires: autoconf, libtool, xmlto, gcc-c++
 BuildRequires: make
-Patch0:	expat-2.2.10-prevent-integer-overflow-in-doProlog.patch
-Patch1:	expat-2.2.10-Prevent-more-integer-overflows.patch
-Patch2:	expat-2.2.10-Prevent-integer-overflow-on-m_groupSize-in-function.patch
-Patch3:	expat-2.2.10-Detect-and-prevent-troublesome-left-shifts.patch
-Patch4:	expat-2.2.10-Detect-and-prevent-integer-overflow-in-XML_GetBuffer.patch
-Patch5: expat-2.2.10-Protect-against-malicious-namespace-declarations.patch
-Patch6: expat-2.2.10-Add-missing-validation-of-encoding.patch
-Patch7: expat-2.2.10-Prevent-integer-overflow-in-storeRawNames.patch
 
 %description
 This is expat, the C library for parsing XML, written by James Clark. Expat
@@ -44,14 +36,6 @@ Install it if you need to link statically with expat.
 
 %prep
 %setup -q -n libexpat-R_%{unversion}/expat
-%patch0 -p1 -b .CVE-2022-23990
-%patch1 -p1 -b .CVE-2022-22822-CVE-2022-22827
-%patch2 -p1 -b .CVE-2021-46143
-%patch3 -p1 -b .CVE-2021-45960
-%patch4 -p1 -b .CVE-2022-23852
-%patch5 -p1 -b .CVE-2022-25236
-%patch6 -p1 -b .CVE-2022-25235
-%patch7 -p1 -b .CVE-2022-25315
 
 sed -i 's/install-data-hook/do-nothing-please/' lib/Makefile.am
 ./buildconf.sh
@@ -80,18 +64,22 @@ make check
 %{_mandir}/*/*
 
 %files devel
-%doc doc/reference.html doc/*.png doc/*.css examples/*.c
+%doc doc/reference.html doc/*.css examples/*.c
 %{_libdir}/lib*.so
 %{_libdir}/pkgconfig/*.pc
 %{_includedir}/*.h
+%{_libdir}/cmake/expat-%{version}
 
 %files static
 %{_libdir}/lib*.a
 
 %changelog
-* Wed Mar 16 2022 Tomas Korbar <tkorbar@redhat.com> -  2.2.10-12
-- Build fix for CVE-2022-25236 in rhel-9.0.0
-- Related: CVE-2022-25236
+* Tue Apr 26 2022 Tomas Korbar <tkorbar@redhat.com> -  2.4.7-1
+- Rebase to version 2.4.7
+- Resolves: rhbz#2067201
+- Resolves: CVE-2022-25313
+- Resolves: CVE-2022-25314
+- Resolves: CVE-2022-25236
 
 * Mon Mar 14 2022 Tomas Korbar <tkorbar@redhat.com> -  2.2.10-11
 - Improve fix for CVE-2022-25236