Blame SOURCES/dnsmasq-2.77-underflow.patch

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From c82a594d95431e8615126621397ea595eb037a6b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Doran Moppert <dmoppert@redhat.com>
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Date: Tue, 26 Sep 2017 14:48:20 +0930
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Subject: [PATCH] google patch hand-applied
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---
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 src/edns0.c   | 10 +++++-----
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 src/forward.c |  4 ++++
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 src/rfc1035.c |  2 ++
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 3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/src/edns0.c b/src/edns0.c
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index af33877..ba6ff0c 100644
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--- a/src/edns0.c
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+++ b/src/edns0.c
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@@ -212,11 +212,11 @@ size_t add_pseudoheader(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, unsigned char *l
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       /* Copy back any options */
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       if (buff)
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 	{
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-          if (p + rdlen > limit)
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-          {
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-            free(buff);
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-            return plen; /* Too big */
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-          }
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+	  if (p + rdlen > limit)
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+	  {
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+	    free(buff);
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+	    return plen; /* Too big */
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+	  }
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 	  memcpy(p, buff, rdlen);
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 	  free(buff);
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 	  p += rdlen;
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diff --git a/src/forward.c b/src/forward.c
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index cdd11d3..3078f64 100644
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--- a/src/forward.c
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+++ b/src/forward.c
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@@ -1438,6 +1438,10 @@ void receive_query(struct listener *listen, time_t now)
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 	udp_size = PACKETSZ; /* Sanity check - can't reduce below default. RFC 6891 6.2.3 */
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     }
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+  // Make sure the udp size is not smaller than the incoming message so that we
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+  // do not underflow
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+  if (udp_size < n) udp_size = n;
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+
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 #ifdef HAVE_AUTH
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   if (auth_dns)
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     {
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diff --git a/src/rfc1035.c b/src/rfc1035.c
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index b078b59..777911b 100644
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--- a/src/rfc1035.c
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+++ b/src/rfc1035.c
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@@ -1281,6 +1281,8 @@ size_t answer_request(struct dns_header *header, char *limit, size_t qlen,
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   int nxdomain = 0, auth = 1, trunc = 0, sec_data = 1;
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   struct mx_srv_record *rec;
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   size_t len;
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+  // Make sure we do not underflow here too.
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+  if (qlen > (limit - ((char *)header))) return 0;
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   if (ntohs(header->ancount) != 0 ||
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       ntohs(header->nscount) != 0 ||
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-- 
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2.14.3
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