diff --git a/.cryptsetup.metadata b/.cryptsetup.metadata
index 462e48a..899196b 100644
--- a/.cryptsetup.metadata
+++ b/.cryptsetup.metadata
@@ -1 +1 @@
-d847934311112c7220435b94b44c2b2bb3dca0e1 SOURCES/cryptsetup-2.3.3.tar.xz
+3ce643e82d52b0c0282c2754c4bfa8c15c1f567e SOURCES/cryptsetup-2.3.7.tar.xz
diff --git a/.gitignore b/.gitignore
index 16b2a5f..48e6826 100644
--- a/.gitignore
+++ b/.gitignore
@@ -1 +1 @@
-SOURCES/cryptsetup-2.3.3.tar.xz
+SOURCES/cryptsetup-2.3.7.tar.xz
diff --git a/SOURCES/cryptsetup-2.3.4-fix-crypto-backend-to-properly-handle-ECB-mode.patch b/SOURCES/cryptsetup-2.3.4-fix-crypto-backend-to-properly-handle-ECB-mode.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 8fdfda0..0000000
--- a/SOURCES/cryptsetup-2.3.4-fix-crypto-backend-to-properly-handle-ECB-mode.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,48 +0,0 @@
-From f3906957675e466bbe7fa97a725f56c7c494d4a5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com>
-Date: Tue, 21 Jul 2020 14:14:54 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] Fix crypto backend to properly handle ECB mode.
-
-Despite it should be never used, it should still work :)
-
-Bug introduced in version 2.3.2.
----
- lib/crypto_backend/crypto_storage.c | 2 +-
- tests/compat-test2                  | 9 +++++++++
- 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/lib/crypto_backend/crypto_storage.c b/lib/crypto_backend/crypto_storage.c
-index 8b6c19c..92dbae7 100644
---- a/lib/crypto_backend/crypto_storage.c
-+++ b/lib/crypto_backend/crypto_storage.c
-@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ static int crypt_sector_iv_init(struct crypt_sector_iv *ctx,
- 	memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
- 
- 	ctx->iv_size = crypt_cipher_ivsize(cipher_name, mode_name);
--	if (ctx->iv_size < 8)
-+	if (ctx->iv_size < 0 || (strcmp(mode_name, "ecb") && ctx->iv_size < 8))
- 		return -ENOENT;
- 
- 	if (!strcmp(cipher_name, "cipher_null") ||
-diff --git a/tests/compat-test2 b/tests/compat-test2
-index 0fad999..c3852cd 100755
---- a/tests/compat-test2
-+++ b/tests/compat-test2
-@@ -1023,5 +1023,14 @@ echo $PWD3 | $CRYPTSETUP luksConvertKey --key-slot 22 $LOOPDEV --keyslot-cipher
- [ "$($CRYPTSETUP luksDump $IMG | grep -A8 -m1 "22: luks2" | grep "Cipher:"    | sed -e 's/[[:space:]]\+Cipher:\ \+//g')" = $KEYSLOT_CIPHER ] || fail
- [ "$($CRYPTSETUP luksDump $IMG | grep -A8 -m1 "22: luks2" | grep "Cipher key:"| sed -e 's/[[:space:]]\+Cipher\ key:\ \+//g')" = "128 bits" ] || fail
- 
-+prepare "[42] Some encryption compatibility mode tests" wipe
-+CIPHERS="aes-ecb aes-cbc-null aes-cbc-plain64 aes-cbc-essiv:sha256 aes-xts-plain64"
-+key_size=256
-+for cipher in $CIPHERS ; do
-+	echo -n "[$cipher/$key_size]"
-+	$CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks2 $LOOPDEV $KEY1 $FAST_PBKDF_OPT --cipher $cipher --key-size $key_size || fail
-+done
-+echo
-+
- remove_mapping
- exit 0
--- 
-1.8.3.1
-
diff --git a/SOURCES/cryptsetup-2.3.4-luks2-validation-32bit-fix.patch b/SOURCES/cryptsetup-2.3.4-luks2-validation-32bit-fix.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index f708ba9..0000000
--- a/SOURCES/cryptsetup-2.3.4-luks2-validation-32bit-fix.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,341 +0,0 @@
-From 52f5cb8cedf22fb3e14c744814ec8af7614146c7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Tobias Stoeckmann <tobias@stoeckmann.org>
-Date: Mon, 24 Aug 2020 19:21:43 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 01/11] Check segment gaps regardless of heap space.
-
-Segments are validated in hdr_validate_segments. Gaps in segment keys
-are detected when collecting offsets. But if an invalid segment is very
-large, larger than count, it could happen that cryptsetup is unable to
-allocate enough memory, not giving a clue about what actually is the
-problem.
-
-Therefore check for gaps even if not enough memory is available. This
-gives much more information with debug output enabled.
-
-Obviously cryptsetup still fails if segments are perfectly fine but not
-enough RAM available. But at that stage, the user knows that it's the
-fault of the system, not of an invalid segment.
----
- lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c | 19 ++++++++++++-------
- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c b/lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c
-index 23556f2..ea5c7f7 100644
---- a/lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c
-+++ b/lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c
-@@ -679,11 +679,10 @@ static int hdr_validate_segments(struct crypt_device *cd, json_object *hdr_jobj)
- 	if (first_backup < 0)
- 		first_backup = count;
- 
--	intervals = malloc(first_backup * sizeof(*intervals));
--	if (!intervals) {
--		log_dbg(cd, "Not enough memory.");
--		return 1;
--	}
-+	if (first_backup <= count && (size_t)first_backup < SIZE_MAX / sizeof(*intervals))
-+		intervals = malloc(first_backup * sizeof(*intervals));
-+	else
-+		intervals = NULL;
- 
- 	for (i = 0; i < first_backup; i++) {
- 		jobj = json_segments_get_segment(jobj_segments, i);
-@@ -692,8 +691,14 @@ static int hdr_validate_segments(struct crypt_device *cd, json_object *hdr_jobj)
- 			free(intervals);
- 			return 1;
- 		}
--		intervals[i].offset = json_segment_get_offset(jobj, 0);
--		intervals[i].length = json_segment_get_size(jobj, 0) ?: UINT64_MAX;
-+		if (intervals != NULL) {
-+			intervals[i].offset = json_segment_get_offset(jobj, 0);
-+			intervals[i].length = json_segment_get_size(jobj, 0) ?: UINT64_MAX;
-+		}
-+	}
-+	if (intervals == NULL) {
-+		log_dbg(cd, "Not enough memory.");
-+		return 1;
- 	}
- 
- 	r = !validate_segment_intervals(cd, first_backup, intervals);
--- 
-1.8.3.1
-
-From 46ee71edcd13e1dad50815ad65c28779aa6f7503 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Ondrej Kozina <okozina@redhat.com>
-Date: Tue, 25 Aug 2020 19:32:48 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 07/11] Avoid needlessly large allocations in LUKS2 validation
- code.
-
-In case LUKS2 backup segment creates gap in between last regular
-segment and backup segment report invalid metadata imediately. We stop
-on first error so there's no need to allocate large memory on heap
-(we may ran with mlock(MCL_FUTURE) set).
-
-Example:
-- total segments count is 3
-- regular segments have keys "0" and "1"
-- first backup segment has key "42"
----
- lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c | 8 +++++++-
- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c b/lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c
-index ea5c7f7..5b73b34 100644
---- a/lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c
-+++ b/lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c
-@@ -676,10 +676,16 @@ static int hdr_validate_segments(struct crypt_device *cd, json_object *hdr_jobj)
- 		return 1;
- 	}
- 
-+	/* avoid needlessly large allocation when first backup segment is invalid */
-+	if (first_backup >= count) {
-+		log_dbg(cd, "Gap between last regular segment and backup segment at key %d.", first_backup);
-+		return 1;
-+	}
-+
- 	if (first_backup < 0)
- 		first_backup = count;
- 
--	if (first_backup <= count && (size_t)first_backup < SIZE_MAX / sizeof(*intervals))
-+	if ((size_t)first_backup < SIZE_MAX / sizeof(*intervals))
- 		intervals = malloc(first_backup * sizeof(*intervals));
- 	else
- 		intervals = NULL;
--- 
-1.8.3.1
-
-From 752c9a52798f11d3b765b673ebaa3058eb25316e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Ondrej Kozina <okozina@redhat.com>
-Date: Tue, 25 Aug 2020 19:23:21 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 08/11] Simplify validation code a bit.
-
-Keep it simple. If there's not enough memory we can't validate
-segments. The LUKS2 specification does not recommend to continue
-processing LUKS2 metadata if it can not be properly validated.
----
- lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c | 19 ++++++++-----------
- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c b/lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c
-index 5b73b34..df89401 100644
---- a/lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c
-+++ b/lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c
-@@ -594,9 +594,9 @@ static bool validate_segment_intervals(struct crypt_device *cd,
- static int hdr_validate_segments(struct crypt_device *cd, json_object *hdr_jobj)
- {
- 	json_object *jobj_segments, *jobj_digests, *jobj_offset, *jobj_size, *jobj_type, *jobj_flags, *jobj;
--	struct interval *intervals;
- 	uint64_t offset, size;
- 	int i, r, count, first_backup = -1;
-+	struct interval *intervals = NULL;
- 
- 	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(hdr_jobj, "segments", &jobj_segments)) {
- 		log_dbg(cd, "Missing segments section.");
-@@ -687,8 +687,11 @@ static int hdr_validate_segments(struct crypt_device *cd, json_object *hdr_jobj)
- 
- 	if ((size_t)first_backup < SIZE_MAX / sizeof(*intervals))
- 		intervals = malloc(first_backup * sizeof(*intervals));
--	else
--		intervals = NULL;
-+
-+	if (!intervals) {
-+		log_dbg(cd, "Not enough memory.");
-+		return 1;
-+	}
- 
- 	for (i = 0; i < first_backup; i++) {
- 		jobj = json_segments_get_segment(jobj_segments, i);
-@@ -697,14 +700,8 @@ static int hdr_validate_segments(struct crypt_device *cd, json_object *hdr_jobj)
- 			free(intervals);
- 			return 1;
- 		}
--		if (intervals != NULL) {
--			intervals[i].offset = json_segment_get_offset(jobj, 0);
--			intervals[i].length = json_segment_get_size(jobj, 0) ?: UINT64_MAX;
--		}
--	}
--	if (intervals == NULL) {
--		log_dbg(cd, "Not enough memory.");
--		return 1;
-+		intervals[i].offset = json_segment_get_offset(jobj, 0);
-+		intervals[i].length = json_segment_get_size(jobj, 0) ?: UINT64_MAX;
- 	}
- 
- 	r = !validate_segment_intervals(cd, first_backup, intervals);
--- 
-1.8.3.1
-
-From 96da06430b6f5c2588c619082f2c5880df9cc776 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Ondrej Kozina <okozina@redhat.com>
-Date: Wed, 26 Aug 2020 17:24:05 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 09/11] Add test for LUKS2 segments validation code fix.
-
----
- ...enerate-luks2-segment-wrong-backup-key-0.img.sh | 67 ++++++++++++++++++++++
- ...enerate-luks2-segment-wrong-backup-key-1.img.sh | 67 ++++++++++++++++++++++
- tests/luks2-validation-test                        |  2 +
- 3 files changed, 136 insertions(+)
- create mode 100755 tests/generators/generate-luks2-segment-wrong-backup-key-0.img.sh
- create mode 100755 tests/generators/generate-luks2-segment-wrong-backup-key-1.img.sh
-
-diff --git a/tests/generators/generate-luks2-segment-wrong-backup-key-0.img.sh b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-segment-wrong-backup-key-0.img.sh
-new file mode 100755
-index 0000000..2499a5e
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-segment-wrong-backup-key-0.img.sh
-@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
-+#!/bin/bash
-+
-+. lib.sh
-+
-+#
-+# *** Description ***
-+#
-+# generate primary header with wrong backup segment id
-+#
-+# secondary header is corrupted on purpose as well
-+#
-+
-+# $1 full target dir
-+# $2 full source luks2 image
-+
-+function prepare()
-+{
-+	cp $SRC_IMG $TGT_IMG
-+	test -d $TMPDIR || mkdir $TMPDIR
-+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json0
-+	read_luks2_bin_hdr0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr0
-+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr1
-+}
-+
-+function generate()
-+{
-+	# create illegal backup segment key (used to be bug in 32bit implementations)
-+	json_str=$(jq -c '.segments[(.segments | length + 1 | tostring)] = { "type" : "linear", "offset" : "512", "size" : "512", "flags":["backup-x"]}' $TMPDIR/json0)
-+	test ${#json_str} -lt $((LUKS2_JSON_SIZE*512)) || exit 2
-+
-+	write_luks2_json "$json_str" $TMPDIR/json0
-+
-+	merge_bin_hdr_with_json $TMPDIR/hdr0 $TMPDIR/json0 $TMPDIR/area0
-+	erase_checksum $TMPDIR/area0
-+	chks0=$(calc_sha256_checksum_file $TMPDIR/area0)
-+	write_checksum $chks0 $TMPDIR/area0
-+	write_luks2_hdr0 $TMPDIR/area0 $TGT_IMG
-+	kill_bin_hdr $TMPDIR/hdr1
-+	write_luks2_hdr1 $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TGT_IMG
-+}
-+
-+function check()
-+{
-+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr_res1
-+	local str_res1=$(head -c 6 $TMPDIR/hdr_res1)
-+	test "$str_res1" = "VACUUM" || exit 2
-+
-+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json_res0
-+	jq -c 'if .segments | length < 2
-+	       then error("Unexpected segments count") else empty end' $TMPDIR/json_res0 || exit 5
-+}
-+
-+function cleanup()
-+{
-+	rm -f $TMPDIR/*
-+	rm -fd $TMPDIR
-+}
-+
-+test $# -eq 2 || exit 1
-+
-+TGT_IMG=$1/$(test_img_name $0)
-+SRC_IMG=$2
-+
-+prepare
-+generate
-+check
-+cleanup
-diff --git a/tests/generators/generate-luks2-segment-wrong-backup-key-1.img.sh b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-segment-wrong-backup-key-1.img.sh
-new file mode 100755
-index 0000000..702fe71
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-segment-wrong-backup-key-1.img.sh
-@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
-+#!/bin/bash
-+
-+. lib.sh
-+
-+#
-+# *** Description ***
-+#
-+# generate primary header with wrong backup segment id
-+#
-+# secondary header is corrupted on purpose as well
-+#
-+
-+# $1 full target dir
-+# $2 full source luks2 image
-+
-+function prepare()
-+{
-+	cp $SRC_IMG $TGT_IMG
-+	test -d $TMPDIR || mkdir $TMPDIR
-+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json0
-+	read_luks2_bin_hdr0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr0
-+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr1
-+}
-+
-+function generate()
-+{
-+	# create illegal backup segment key (used to be bug in 32bit implementations)
-+	json_str=$(jq -c '(.segments."0".offset | tonumber) as $i | .segments[range(1;65) | tostring] = { "type" : "linear", "offset" : ($i + 512 | tostring), "size" : "512" } | .segments."268435472" = { "type":"linear","offset":"512","size":"512","flags":["backup-x"]}' $TMPDIR/json0)
-+	test ${#json_str} -lt $((LUKS2_JSON_SIZE*512)) || exit 2
-+
-+	write_luks2_json "$json_str" $TMPDIR/json0
-+
-+	merge_bin_hdr_with_json $TMPDIR/hdr0 $TMPDIR/json0 $TMPDIR/area0
-+	erase_checksum $TMPDIR/area0
-+	chks0=$(calc_sha256_checksum_file $TMPDIR/area0)
-+	write_checksum $chks0 $TMPDIR/area0
-+	write_luks2_hdr0 $TMPDIR/area0 $TGT_IMG
-+	kill_bin_hdr $TMPDIR/hdr1
-+	write_luks2_hdr1 $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TGT_IMG
-+}
-+
-+function check()
-+{
-+	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr_res1
-+	local str_res1=$(head -c 6 $TMPDIR/hdr_res1)
-+	test "$str_res1" = "VACUUM" || exit 2
-+
-+	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json_res0
-+	jq -c 'if .segments | length < 64
-+	       then error("Unexpected segments count") else empty end' $TMPDIR/json_res0 || exit 5
-+}
-+
-+function cleanup()
-+{
-+	rm -f $TMPDIR/*
-+	rm -fd $TMPDIR
-+}
-+
-+test $# -eq 2 || exit 1
-+
-+TGT_IMG=$1/$(test_img_name $0)
-+SRC_IMG=$2
-+
-+prepare
-+generate
-+check
-+cleanup
-diff --git a/tests/luks2-validation-test b/tests/luks2-validation-test
-index 52945ba..04183fb 100755
---- a/tests/luks2-validation-test
-+++ b/tests/luks2-validation-test
-@@ -199,6 +199,8 @@ RUN luks2-segment-unknown-type.img			"R" "Validation rejected segment with all m
- RUN luks2-segment-two.img				"R" "Validation rejected two valid segments"
- RUN luks2-segment-wrong-flags.img			"F" "Failed to detect invalid flags field"
- RUN luks2-segment-wrong-flags-element.img		"F" "Failed to detect invalid flags content"
-+RUN luks2-segment-wrong-backup-key-0.img		"F" "Failed to detect gap in backup segments"
-+RUN luks2-segment-wrong-backup-key-1.img		"F" "Failed to detect gap in backup segments"
- 
- echo "[6] Test metadata size and keyslots size (config section)"
- RUN luks2-invalid-keyslots-size-c0.img			"F" "Failed to detect too large keyslots_size in config section"
--- 
-1.8.3.1
-
diff --git a/SOURCES/cryptsetup-2.3.5-fix-reencryption-cipher_null.patch b/SOURCES/cryptsetup-2.3.5-fix-reencryption-cipher_null.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 3db63c1..0000000
--- a/SOURCES/cryptsetup-2.3.5-fix-reencryption-cipher_null.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,769 +0,0 @@
-diff -rupN cryptsetup-2.3.3.orig/tests/api-test-2.c cryptsetup-2.3.3/tests/api-test-2.c
---- cryptsetup-2.3.3.orig/tests/api-test-2.c	2021-02-17 19:48:46.483519319 +0100
-+++ cryptsetup-2.3.3/tests/api-test-2.c	2021-02-17 19:49:10.527493909 +0100
-@@ -2876,6 +2876,12 @@ static void Luks2KeyslotParams(void)
- 	const char *mk_hex2 = "bb21158c733229347bd4e681891e213d94c685be6a5b84818afe7a78a6de7a1e";
- 	size_t key_size_ret, key_size = strlen(mk_hex) / 2, keyslot_key_size = 16;
- 	uint64_t r_payload_offset;
-+	const struct crypt_pbkdf_type fast_pbkdf = {
-+		.type = "pbkdf2",
-+		.hash = "sha256",
-+		.iterations = 1000,
-+		.flags = CRYPT_PBKDF_NO_BENCHMARK
-+	};
- 
- 	crypt_decode_key(key, mk_hex, key_size);
- 	crypt_decode_key(key2, mk_hex2, key_size);
-@@ -2889,7 +2895,7 @@ static void Luks2KeyslotParams(void)
- 	EQ_(key_size, 2 * keyslot_key_size);
- 	/* test crypt_keyslot_add_by_key */
- 	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_OK));
--	crypt_set_iteration_time(cd, 1);
-+	OK_(crypt_set_pbkdf_type(cd, &fast_pbkdf));
- 	OK_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, key, key_size, NULL));
- 	NULL_(crypt_keyslot_get_encryption(cd, 0, &key_size_ret));
- 	OK_(strcmp(crypt_keyslot_get_encryption(cd, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, &key_size_ret), cipher_spec));
-@@ -2948,7 +2954,7 @@ static void Luks2KeyslotParams(void)
- 	OK_(strcmp(crypt_keyslot_get_encryption(cd, 7, &key_size_ret), cipher_keyslot));
- 	EQ_(key_size_ret, keyslot_key_size);
- 
--	crypt_set_iteration_time(cd, 1);
-+	OK_(crypt_set_pbkdf_type(cd, &fast_pbkdf));
- 	EQ_(8, crypt_keyslot_change_by_passphrase(cd, 1, 8, PASSPHRASE1, strlen(PASSPHRASE1), PASSPHRASE, strlen(PASSPHRASE)));
- 	OK_(strcmp(crypt_keyslot_get_encryption(cd, 8, &key_size_ret), cipher_spec));
- 	EQ_(key_size_ret, key_size);
-@@ -2977,7 +2983,7 @@ static void Luks2KeyslotParams(void)
- 
- 	/* LUKS1 compatible calls */
- 	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_OK));
--	crypt_set_iteration_time(cd, 1);
-+	OK_(crypt_set_pbkdf_type(cd, &fast_pbkdf));
- 	OK_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, key, key_size, NULL));
- 	NULL_(crypt_keyslot_get_encryption(cd, 0, &key_size_ret));
- 	OK_(strcmp(crypt_keyslot_get_encryption(cd, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, &key_size_ret), cipher_spec));
-@@ -2987,6 +2993,18 @@ static void Luks2KeyslotParams(void)
- 	EQ_(key_size_ret, key_size);
- 	CRYPT_FREE(cd);
- 
-+	/* LUKS2 cipher null checks */
-+	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_OK));
-+	OK_(crypt_set_pbkdf_type(cd, &fast_pbkdf));
-+	OK_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, "cipher_null", "ecb", NULL, key, key_size, NULL));
-+	FAIL_(crypt_keyslot_set_encryption(cd, "null", 32), "cipher null is not allowed");
-+	FAIL_(crypt_keyslot_set_encryption(cd, "cipher_null", 32), "cipher null is not allowed");
-+	FAIL_(crypt_keyslot_set_encryption(cd, "cipher_null-ecb", 32), "cipher null is not allowed");
-+	EQ_(0, crypt_keyslot_add_by_volume_key(cd, 0, key, key_size, PASSPHRASE, strlen(PASSPHRASE)));
-+	NOTNULL_(crypt_keyslot_get_encryption(cd, 0, &key_size_ret));
-+	NULL_(strstr(crypt_keyslot_get_encryption(cd, 0, &key_size_ret), "null"));
-+	CRYPT_FREE(cd);
-+
- 	_cleanup_dmdevices();
- 	_remove_keyfiles();
- }
-diff -rupN cryptsetup-2.3.3.orig/tests/luks2-reencryption-test cryptsetup-2.3.3/tests/luks2-reencryption-test
---- cryptsetup-2.3.3.orig/tests/luks2-reencryption-test	2021-02-17 19:48:46.493519309 +0100
-+++ cryptsetup-2.3.3/tests/luks2-reencryption-test	2021-02-17 19:50:13.397427467 +0100
-@@ -1365,6 +1365,33 @@ echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksKillSlot $D
- echo -e "$PWD1\n$PWD1\n$PWD1\n$PWD1\n$PWD1\n$PWD1\n$PWD1\n$PWD1\n$PWD1\n$PWD1\n$PWD1\n$PWD1\n$PWD1\n$PWD2" | $CRYPTSETUP reencrypt $DEV -q 2>/dev/null && fail
- echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP reencrypt $DEV --resume-only -q 2>/dev/null && fail
- echo -e "$PWD1\n$PWD1\n$PWD1\n$PWD1\n$PWD1\n$PWD1\n$PWD1\n$PWD1\n$PWD1\n$PWD1\n$PWD1\n$PWD1\n$PWD1\n$PWD1" | $CRYPTSETUP reencrypt $DEV -q  || fail
-+ 
-+echo "[24] Reencryption with initial cipher_null"
-+# aka custom encryption
-+prepare dev_size_mb=32
-+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks2 -s 128 -c cipher_null-ecb --offset 8192 $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON $DEV || fail
-+wipe $PWD1
-+check_hash $PWD1 $HASH1
-+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP reencrypt $DEV -c aes-xts-plain64 -q $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON || fail
-+check_hash $PWD1 $HASH1
-+
-+# online
-+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks2 -s 128 -c cipher_null-ecb --offset 8192 $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON $DEV || fail
-+wipe $PWD1
-+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP open $DEV $DEV_NAME
-+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP reencrypt $DEV -c aes-xts-plain64 -q $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON || fail
-+check_hash_dev /dev/mapper/$DEV_NAME $HASH1
-+$CRYPTSETUP status $DEV_NAME | grep -q "key location: keyring" || fail
-+$CRYPTSETUP close $DEV_NAME
-+
-+# simulate LUKS2 device with cipher_null in both keyslot and segment (it can be created only by up conversion from LUKS1)
-+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks1 -s 128 -c cipher_null-ecb --offset 8192 $FAST_PBKDF2 $DEV || fail
-+$CRYPTSETUP convert -q --type luks2 $DEV || fail
-+wipe $PWD1
-+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP reencrypt $DEV -c aes-xts-plain64 -q $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON || fail
-+check_hash $PWD1 $HASH1
-+# both keyslot and segment cipher must not be null
-+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $DEV | grep -q "cipher_null" && fail
- 
- remove_mapping
- exit 0
-diff -rupN cryptsetup-2.3.3.orig/lib/utils_crypt.c cryptsetup-2.3.3/lib/utils_crypt.c
---- cryptsetup-2.3.3.orig/lib/utils_crypt.c	2021-02-17 17:48:06.535007396 +0100
-+++ cryptsetup-2.3.3/lib/utils_crypt.c	2021-02-17 17:49:07.552948180 +0100
-@@ -174,3 +174,10 @@ ssize_t crypt_hex_to_bytes(const char *h
- 	*result = bytes;
- 	return i;
- }
-+
-+bool crypt_is_cipher_null(const char *cipher_spec)
-+{
-+	if (!cipher_spec)
-+		return false;
-+	return (strstr(cipher_spec, "cipher_null") || !strcmp(cipher_spec, "null"));
-+}
-diff -rupN cryptsetup-2.3.3.orig/lib/utils_crypt.h cryptsetup-2.3.3/lib/utils_crypt.h
---- cryptsetup-2.3.3.orig/lib/utils_crypt.h	2021-02-17 17:48:06.535007396 +0100
-+++ cryptsetup-2.3.3/lib/utils_crypt.h	2021-02-17 17:49:07.552948180 +0100
-@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
- #ifndef _UTILS_CRYPT_H
- #define _UTILS_CRYPT_H
- 
-+#include <stdbool.h>
- #include <unistd.h>
- 
- #define MAX_CIPHER_LEN		32
-@@ -38,4 +39,6 @@ int crypt_parse_pbkdf(const char *s, con
- 
- ssize_t crypt_hex_to_bytes(const char *hex, char **result, int safe_alloc);
- 
-+bool crypt_is_cipher_null(const char *cipher_spec);
-+
- #endif /* _UTILS_CRYPT_H */
-diff -rupN cryptsetup-2.3.3.orig/src/cryptsetup.c cryptsetup-2.3.3/src/cryptsetup.c
---- cryptsetup-2.3.3.orig/src/cryptsetup.c	2021-02-17 17:48:06.538007393 +0100
-+++ cryptsetup-2.3.3/src/cryptsetup.c	2021-02-17 17:52:54.174722763 +0100
-@@ -1281,7 +1281,7 @@ static int _luksFormat(struct crypt_devi
- 	}
- 
- 	/* Never call pwquality if using null cipher */
--	if (tools_is_cipher_null(cipher))
-+	if (crypt_is_cipher_null(cipher))
- 		opt_force_password = 1;
- 
- 	if ((r = crypt_init(&cd, header_device))) {
-@@ -1679,7 +1679,7 @@ static int luksAddUnboundKey(void)
- 		goto out;
- 
- 	/* Never call pwquality if using null cipher */
--	if (tools_is_cipher_null(crypt_get_cipher(cd)))
-+	if (crypt_is_cipher_null(crypt_get_cipher(cd)))
- 		opt_force_password = 1;
- 
- 	keysize = opt_key_size / 8;
-@@ -1746,7 +1746,7 @@ static int action_luksAddKey(void)
- 		goto out;
- 
- 	/* Never call pwquality if using null cipher */
--	if (tools_is_cipher_null(crypt_get_cipher(cd)))
-+	if (crypt_is_cipher_null(crypt_get_cipher(cd)))
- 		opt_force_password = 1;
- 
- 	keysize = crypt_get_volume_key_size(cd);
-@@ -1849,7 +1849,7 @@ static int action_luksChangeKey(void)
- 		goto out;
- 
- 	/* Never call pwquality if using null cipher */
--	if (tools_is_cipher_null(crypt_get_cipher(cd)))
-+	if (crypt_is_cipher_null(crypt_get_cipher(cd)))
- 		opt_force_password = 1;
- 
- 	r = set_pbkdf_params(cd, crypt_get_type(cd));
-diff -rupN cryptsetup-2.3.3.orig/src/cryptsetup.h cryptsetup-2.3.3/src/cryptsetup.h
---- cryptsetup-2.3.3.orig/src/cryptsetup.h	2021-02-17 17:48:06.538007393 +0100
-+++ cryptsetup-2.3.3/src/cryptsetup.h	2021-02-17 17:54:15.556641129 +0100
-@@ -97,7 +97,6 @@ int tools_get_key(const char *prompt,
- void tools_passphrase_msg(int r);
- int tools_is_stdin(const char *key_file);
- int tools_string_to_size(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *s, uint64_t *size);
--int tools_is_cipher_null(const char *cipher);
- 
- void tools_clear_line(void);
- 
-diff -rupN cryptsetup-2.3.3.orig/src/utils_tools.c cryptsetup-2.3.3/src/utils_tools.c
---- cryptsetup-2.3.3.orig/src/utils_tools.c	2021-02-17 17:48:06.538007393 +0100
-+++ cryptsetup-2.3.3/src/utils_tools.c	2021-02-17 17:49:07.572948160 +0100
-@@ -596,14 +596,6 @@ out:
- 	return r;
- }
- 
--int tools_is_cipher_null(const char *cipher)
--{
--	if (!cipher)
--		return 0;
--
--	return !strcmp(cipher, "cipher_null") ? 1 : 0;
--}
--
- /*
-  * Keyfile - is standard input treated as a binary file (no EOL handling).
-  */
-From 03cc8a9ce4c1e04283eb0e0da658aa4509e74949 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Ondrej Kozina <okozina@redhat.com>
-Date: Wed, 10 Feb 2021 17:50:49 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 3/9] Fix broken detection of null cipher in LUKS2.
-
-This bug enabled to create LUKS2 keyslots encrypted by
-cipher_null when explicitely requested by user. LUKS2
-was never meant to allow keyslot encryption with
-cipher_null. cipher_null is meant for debug purposes
-only as a segment cipher.
----
- lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot.c | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot.c b/lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot.c
-index ed51e24..414189c 100644
---- a/lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot.c
-+++ b/lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot.c
-@@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ int LUKS2_keyslot_cipher_incompatible(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *ciphe
- {
- 	char cipher[MAX_CIPHER_LEN], cipher_mode[MAX_CIPHER_LEN];
- 
--	if (!cipher_spec || !strcmp(cipher_spec, "null") || !strcmp(cipher_spec, "cipher_null"))
-+	if (!cipher_spec || crypt_is_cipher_null(cipher_spec))
- 		return 1;
- 
- 	if (crypt_parse_name_and_mode(cipher_spec, cipher, NULL, cipher_mode) < 0)
--- 
-1.8.3.1
-
-diff -rupN cryptsetup-2.3.3.orig/lib/luks2/luks2_token.c cryptsetup-2.3.3/lib/luks2/luks2_token.c
---- cryptsetup-2.3.3.orig/lib/luks2/luks2_token.c	2021-02-17 17:59:35.532320163 +0100
-+++ cryptsetup-2.3.3/lib/luks2/luks2_token.c	2021-02-17 18:01:49.925185354 +0100
-@@ -383,6 +383,7 @@ int LUKS2_token_open_and_activate(struct
- 		uint32_t flags,
- 		void *usrptr)
- {
-+	bool use_keyring;
- 	int keyslot, r;
- 	char *buffer;
- 	size_t buffer_len;
-@@ -404,7 +405,13 @@ int LUKS2_token_open_and_activate(struct
- 
- 	keyslot = r;
- 
--	if ((name || (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY)) && crypt_use_keyring_for_vk(cd)) {
-+	if (!crypt_use_keyring_for_vk(cd))
-+		use_keyring = false;
-+	else
-+		use_keyring = ((name && !crypt_is_cipher_null(crypt_get_cipher(cd))) ||
-+			       (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY));
-+
-+	if (use_keyring) {
- 		if (!(r = LUKS2_volume_key_load_in_keyring_by_keyslot(cd, hdr, vk, keyslot)))
- 			flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY;
- 	}
-diff -rupN cryptsetup-2.3.3.orig/lib/setup.c cryptsetup-2.3.3/lib/setup.c
---- cryptsetup-2.3.3.orig/lib/setup.c	2021-02-17 17:59:35.529320166 +0100
-+++ cryptsetup-2.3.3/lib/setup.c	2021-02-17 18:00:03.676291932 +0100
-@@ -3879,6 +3879,7 @@ static int _open_and_activate(struct cry
- 	size_t passphrase_size,
- 	uint32_t flags)
- {
-+	bool use_keyring;
- 	int r;
- 	struct volume_key *vk = NULL;
- 
-@@ -3890,8 +3891,13 @@ static int _open_and_activate(struct cry
- 		return r;
- 	keyslot = r;
- 
--	if ((name || (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY)) &&
--	    crypt_use_keyring_for_vk(cd)) {
-+	if (!crypt_use_keyring_for_vk(cd))
-+		use_keyring = false;
-+	else
-+		use_keyring = ((name && !crypt_is_cipher_null(crypt_get_cipher(cd))) ||
-+			       (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY));
-+
-+	if (use_keyring) {
- 		r = LUKS2_volume_key_load_in_keyring_by_keyslot(cd,
- 				&cd->u.luks2.hdr, vk, keyslot);
- 		if (r < 0)
-@@ -4269,6 +4275,7 @@ int crypt_activate_by_volume_key(struct
- 	size_t volume_key_size,
- 	uint32_t flags)
- {
-+	bool use_keyring;
- 	struct volume_key *vk = NULL;
- 	int r;
- 
-@@ -4344,8 +4351,12 @@ int crypt_activate_by_volume_key(struct
- 		if (r > 0)
- 			r = 0;
- 
--		if (!r && (name || (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY)) &&
--		    crypt_use_keyring_for_vk(cd)) {
-+		if (!crypt_use_keyring_for_vk(cd))
-+			use_keyring = false;
-+		else
-+			use_keyring = (name && !crypt_is_cipher_null(crypt_get_cipher(cd))) || (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY);
-+
-+		if (!r && use_keyring) {
- 			r = LUKS2_key_description_by_segment(cd,
- 				&cd->u.luks2.hdr, vk, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT);
- 			if (!r)
-From ed2117c72417d85c7b2f20d5859ca558eaf61c62 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Ondrej Kozina <okozina@redhat.com>
-Date: Thu, 11 Feb 2021 11:43:10 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 5/9] Fix device comparison for dm-crypt with cipher_null.
-
-Do not compare volume keys if segment uses cipher_null.
-The key is ignored by lower layer (internal libdevmapper)
-anyway.
----
- lib/setup.c | 13 ++++++++-----
- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/lib/setup.c b/lib/setup.c
-index ffd9b7b..7286e10 100644
---- a/lib/setup.c
-+++ b/lib/setup.c
-@@ -2380,11 +2380,6 @@ static int _compare_crypt_devices(struct crypt_device *cd,
- 	if (!src->u.crypt.vk || !tgt->u.crypt.vk)
- 		return -EINVAL;
- 
--	if (_compare_volume_keys(src->u.crypt.vk, 0, tgt->u.crypt.vk, tgt->u.crypt.vk->key_description != NULL)) {
--		log_dbg(cd, "Keys in context and target device do not match.");
--		return -EINVAL;
--	}
--
- 	/* CIPHER checks */
- 	if (!src->u.crypt.cipher || !tgt->u.crypt.cipher)
- 		return -EINVAL;
-@@ -2392,6 +2387,14 @@ static int _compare_crypt_devices(struct crypt_device *cd,
- 		log_dbg(cd, "Cipher specs do not match.");
- 		return -EINVAL;
- 	}
-+
-+	if (tgt->u.crypt.vk->keylength == 0 && crypt_is_cipher_null(tgt->u.crypt.cipher))
-+		log_dbg(cd, "Existing device uses cipher null. Skipping key comparison.");
-+	else if (_compare_volume_keys(src->u.crypt.vk, 0, tgt->u.crypt.vk, tgt->u.crypt.vk->key_description != NULL)) {
-+		log_dbg(cd, "Keys in context and target device do not match.");
-+		return -EINVAL;
-+	}
-+
- 	if (crypt_strcmp(src->u.crypt.integrity, tgt->u.crypt.integrity)) {
- 		log_dbg(cd, "Integrity parameters do not match.");
- 		return -EINVAL;
--- 
-1.8.3.1
-
-From 01f896711ed54bff7c1ccf944d2295929af7c75c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Ondrej Kozina <okozina@redhat.com>
-Date: Thu, 11 Feb 2021 12:17:02 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 6/9] Replace bogus cipher_null keyslots before reencryption.
-
-By mistake LUKS2 allowed keyslots 'not-so-encrypted' by
-cipher_null (only explicitly requested by --cipher or
---keyslot-cipher parameters). If we encounter
-such old key during reencryption let's replace the cipher
-for new keyslot with default LUKS2 keyslot cipher.
----
- src/cryptsetup.c | 6 ++++++
- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/src/cryptsetup.c b/src/cryptsetup.c
-index 957c24e..5e22286 100644
---- a/src/cryptsetup.c
-+++ b/src/cryptsetup.c
-@@ -1091,6 +1091,12 @@ static int set_keyslot_params(struct crypt_device *cd, int keyslot)
- 	if (!cipher)
- 		return -EINVAL;
- 
-+	if (crypt_is_cipher_null(cipher)) {
-+		log_dbg("Keyslot %d uses cipher_null. Replacing with default encryption in new keyslot.", keyslot);
-+		cipher = DEFAULT_LUKS2_KEYSLOT_CIPHER;
-+		key_size = DEFAULT_LUKS2_KEYSLOT_KEYBITS / 8;
-+	}
-+
- 	if (crypt_keyslot_set_encryption(cd, cipher, key_size))
- 		return -EINVAL;
- 
--- 
-1.8.3.1
-
-diff -rupN cryptsetup-2.3.3.orig/lib/luks2/luks2_reencrypt.c cryptsetup-2.3.3/lib/luks2/luks2_reencrypt.c
---- cryptsetup-2.3.3.orig/lib/luks2/luks2_reencrypt.c	2021-02-17 18:03:49.547065362 +0100
-+++ cryptsetup-2.3.3/lib/luks2/luks2_reencrypt.c	2021-02-17 18:09:43.610710202 +0100
-@@ -2238,7 +2238,7 @@ static int reencrypt_verify_and_upload_k
- 			if (LUKS2_digest_verify_by_digest(cd, hdr, digest_new, vk) != digest_new)
- 				return -EINVAL;
- 
--			if (crypt_use_keyring_for_vk(cd) &&
-+			if (crypt_use_keyring_for_vk(cd) && !crypt_is_cipher_null(reencrypt_segment_cipher_new(hdr)) &&
- 			    (r = LUKS2_volume_key_load_in_keyring_by_digest(cd, hdr, vk, crypt_volume_key_get_id(vk))))
- 				return r;
- 		}
-@@ -2254,7 +2254,7 @@ static int reencrypt_verify_and_upload_k
- 				r = -EINVAL;
- 				goto err;
- 			}
--			if (crypt_use_keyring_for_vk(cd) &&
-+			if (crypt_use_keyring_for_vk(cd) && !crypt_is_cipher_null(reencrypt_segment_cipher_old(hdr)) &&
- 			    (r = LUKS2_volume_key_load_in_keyring_by_digest(cd, hdr, vk, crypt_volume_key_get_id(vk))))
- 				goto err;
- 		}
-@@ -2664,6 +2664,7 @@ static int reencrypt_load_by_passphrase(
- 	struct luks2_hdr *hdr;
- 	struct crypt_lock_handle *reencrypt_lock;
- 	struct luks2_reenc_context *rh;
-+	const struct volume_key *vk;
- 	struct crypt_dm_active_device dmd_target, dmd_source = {
- 		.uuid = crypt_get_uuid(cd),
- 		.flags = CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SHARED /* turn off exclusive open checks */
-@@ -2730,6 +2731,19 @@ static int reencrypt_load_by_passphrase(
- 			goto err;
- 		flags = dmd_target.flags;
- 
-+		/*
-+		 * By default reencryption code aims to retain flags from existing dm device.
-+		 * The keyring activation flag can not be inherited if original cipher is null.
-+		 *
-+		 * In this case override the flag based on decision made in reencrypt_verify_and_upload_keys
-+		 * above. The code checks if new VK is eligible for keyring.
-+		 */
-+		vk = crypt_volume_key_by_id(*vks, LUKS2_reencrypt_digest_new(hdr));
-+		if (vk && vk->key_description && crypt_is_cipher_null(reencrypt_segment_cipher_old(hdr))) {
-+			flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY;
-+			dmd_source.flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY;
-+		}
-+
- 		r = LUKS2_assembly_multisegment_dmd(cd, hdr, *vks, LUKS2_get_segments_jobj(hdr), &dmd_source);
- 		if (!r) {
- 			r = crypt_compare_dm_devices(cd, &dmd_source, &dmd_target);
-diff -rupN cryptsetup-2.3.3.orig/src/cryptsetup.c cryptsetup-2.3.3/src/cryptsetup.c
---- cryptsetup-2.3.3.orig/src/cryptsetup.c	2021-02-17 18:12:12.162561190 +0100
-+++ cryptsetup-2.3.3/src/cryptsetup.c	2021-02-17 18:19:04.842147234 +0100
-@@ -3142,6 +3142,11 @@ static int action_reencrypt_luks2(struct
- 
- 	_set_reencryption_flags(&params.flags);
- 
-+	if (!opt_cipher && crypt_is_cipher_null(crypt_get_cipher(cd))) {
-+		log_std(_("Switching data encryption cipher to %s.\n"), DEFAULT_CIPHER(LUKS1));
-+		opt_cipher = DEFAULT_CIPHER(LUKS1);
-+	}
-+
- 	if (!opt_cipher) {
- 		strncpy(cipher, crypt_get_cipher(cd), MAX_CIPHER_LEN - 1);
- 		strncpy(mode, crypt_get_cipher_mode(cd), MAX_CIPHER_LEN - 1);
-diff -rupN cryptsetup-2.3.3.orig/tests/luks2-reencryption-test cryptsetup-2.3.3/tests/luks2-reencryption-test
---- cryptsetup-2.3.3.orig/tests/luks2-reencryption-test	2021-02-17 18:25:01.393788684 +0100
-+++ cryptsetup-2.3.3/tests/luks2-reencryption-test	2021-02-17 18:26:00.864726663 +0100
-@@ -1388,9 +1388,9 @@ $CRYPTSETUP close $DEV_NAME
- echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks1 -s 128 -c cipher_null-ecb --offset 8192 $FAST_PBKDF2 $DEV || fail
- $CRYPTSETUP convert -q --type luks2 $DEV || fail
- wipe $PWD1
--echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP reencrypt $DEV -c aes-xts-plain64 -q $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON || fail
-+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP reencrypt $DEV -q $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON >/dev/null || fail
- check_hash $PWD1 $HASH1
--# both keyslot and segment cipher must not be null
-+# both keyslot and segment cipher must not be null after reencryption with default params
- $CRYPTSETUP luksDump $DEV | grep -q "cipher_null" && fail
- 
- remove_mapping
-From 030d50f6baff62466c611c868d860c6c3a3efef9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Ondrej Kozina <okozina@redhat.com>
-Date: Wed, 17 Feb 2021 15:00:19 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] Fix reencryption test on systems w/o keyring.
-
----
- tests/luks2-reencryption-test | 20 ++++++++++++++++++--
- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/tests/luks2-reencryption-test b/tests/luks2-reencryption-test
-index 51b5473..6e6b381 100755
---- a/tests/luks2-reencryption-test
-+++ b/tests/luks2-reencryption-test
-@@ -654,6 +654,18 @@ function reencrypt_online_fixed_size() {
- 	fi
- }
- 
-+function setup_luks2_env() {
-+	echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksFormat --type luks2 $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON $DEV || fail
-+	echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP open $DEV $DEV_NAME || fail
-+	HAVE_KEYRING=$($CRYPTSETUP status $DEV_NAME | grep "key location: keyring")
-+	if [ -n "$HAVE_KEYRING" ]; then
-+		HAVE_KEYRING=1
-+	else
-+		HAVE_KEYRING=0
-+	fi
-+	$CRYPTSETUP close $DEV_NAME || fail
-+}
-+
- function valgrind_setup()
- {
- 	which valgrind >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail "Cannot find valgrind."
-@@ -705,9 +717,11 @@ HASH7=18a393d1a505e22ccf3e29effe3005ea8627e4c36b7cca0e53f58121f49b67e1
- # 60 MiBs of zeroes
- HASH8=cf5ac69ca412f9b3b1a8b8de27d368c5c05ed4b1b6aa40e6c38d9cbf23711342
- 
-+prepare dev_size_mb=32
-+setup_luks2_env
-+
- echo "[1] Reencryption"
- echo -n "[512 sector]"
--prepare dev_size_mb=32
- echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks2 -s 128 -c aes-cbc-essiv:sha256 --offset 8192 $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON $DEV || fail
- wipe $PWD1
- check_hash $PWD1 $HASH1
-@@ -1412,7 +1426,9 @@ wipe $PWD1
- echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP open $DEV $DEV_NAME
- echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP reencrypt $DEV -c aes-xts-plain64 -q $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON || fail
- check_hash_dev /dev/mapper/$DEV_NAME $HASH1
--$CRYPTSETUP status $DEV_NAME | grep -q "key location: keyring" || fail
-+if [ $HAVE_KEYRING -gt 0 ]; then
-+	$CRYPTSETUP status $DEV_NAME | grep -q "key location: keyring" || fail
-+fi
- $CRYPTSETUP close $DEV_NAME
- 
- # simulate LUKS2 device with cipher_null in both keyslot and segment (it can be created only by up conversion from LUKS1)
--- 
-1.8.3.1
-
-diff -rupN cryptsetup-2.3.3.orig/src/cryptsetup.c cryptsetup-2.3.3/src/cryptsetup.c
---- cryptsetup-2.3.3.orig/src/cryptsetup.c	2021-02-18 12:37:44.903909498 +0100
-+++ cryptsetup-2.3.3/src/cryptsetup.c	2021-02-18 12:45:49.208492236 +0100
-@@ -1196,6 +1196,21 @@ static int strcmp_or_null(const char *st
- 	return !str ? 0 : strcmp(str, expected);
- }
- 
-+static int get_adjusted_key_size(const char *cipher_mode, uint32_t default_size_bits, int integrity_keysize)
-+{
-+	int keysize_bits = opt_key_size;
-+
-+#ifdef ENABLE_LUKS_ADJUST_XTS_KEYSIZE
-+	if (!opt_key_size && !strncmp(cipher_mode, "xts-", 4)) {
-+		if (default_size_bits == 128)
-+			keysize_bits = 256;
-+		else if (default_size_bits == 256)
-+			keysize_bits = 512;
-+	}
-+#endif
-+	return (keysize_bits ?: default_size_bits) / 8 + integrity_keysize;
-+}
-+
- static int _luksFormat(struct crypt_device **r_cd, char **r_password, size_t *r_passwordLen)
- {
- 	int r = -EINVAL, keysize, integrity_keysize = 0, fd, created = 0;
-@@ -1328,15 +1343,7 @@ static int _luksFormat(struct crypt_devi
- 			goto out;
- 	}
- 
--#ifdef ENABLE_LUKS_ADJUST_XTS_KEYSIZE
--	if (!opt_key_size && !strncmp(cipher_mode, "xts-", 4)) {
--		if (DEFAULT_LUKS1_KEYBITS == 128)
--			opt_key_size = 256;
--		else if (DEFAULT_LUKS1_KEYBITS == 256)
--			opt_key_size = 512;
--	}
--#endif
--	keysize = (opt_key_size ?: DEFAULT_LUKS1_KEYBITS) / 8 + integrity_keysize;
-+	keysize = get_adjusted_key_size(cipher_mode, DEFAULT_LUKS1_KEYBITS, integrity_keysize);
- 
- 	if (opt_random)
- 		crypt_set_rng_type(cd, CRYPT_RNG_RANDOM);
-@@ -3163,10 +3170,8 @@ static int action_reencrypt_luks2(struct
- 	if (r)
- 		return r;
- 
--	if (opt_key_size)
--		key_size = opt_key_size / 8;
--	else if (opt_cipher)
--		key_size = DEFAULT_LUKS1_KEYBITS / 8;
-+	if (opt_key_size || opt_cipher)
-+		key_size = get_adjusted_key_size(mode, DEFAULT_LUKS1_KEYBITS, 0);
- 	else
- 		key_size = crypt_get_volume_key_size(cd);
- 
-diff -rupN cryptsetup-2.3.3.orig/tests/luks2-reencryption-test cryptsetup-2.3.3/tests/luks2-reencryption-test
---- cryptsetup-2.3.3.orig/tests/luks2-reencryption-test	2021-02-18 12:37:44.916909486 +0100
-+++ cryptsetup-2.3.3/tests/luks2-reencryption-test	2021-02-18 12:39:33.589815857 +0100
-@@ -648,7 +648,7 @@ function reencrypt_online_fixed_size() {
- }
- 
- function setup_luks2_env() {
--	echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksFormat --type luks2 $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON $DEV || fail
-+	echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksFormat --type luks2 -c aes-xts-plain64 $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON $DEV || fail
- 	echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP open $DEV $DEV_NAME || fail
- 	HAVE_KEYRING=$($CRYPTSETUP status $DEV_NAME | grep "key location: keyring")
- 	if [ -n "$HAVE_KEYRING" ]; then
-@@ -656,6 +656,8 @@ function setup_luks2_env() {
- 	else
- 		HAVE_KEYRING=0
- 	fi
-+	DEF_XTS_KEY=$($CRYPTSETUP status $DEV_NAME | grep "keysize:" | sed 's/\(  keysize: \)\([0-9]\+\)\(.*\)/\2/')
-+	[ -n "$DEF_XTS_KEY" ] || fail "Failed to parse xts mode key size."
- 	$CRYPTSETUP close $DEV_NAME || fail
- }
- 
-@@ -730,6 +732,8 @@ check_hash $PWD1 $HASH1
- echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP reencrypt $DEV -q -c aes-xts-plain64 --init-only $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON || fail
- echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP open $DEV $DEV_NAME || fail
- echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP reencrypt --active-name /dev/mapper/$DEV_NAME --resilience none -q || fail
-+XTS_KEY=$($CRYPTSETUP status $DEV_NAME | grep "keysize:" | sed 's/\(  keysize: \)\([0-9]\+\)\(.*\)/\2/')
-+[ "$XTS_KEY" -eq "$DEF_XTS_KEY" ] || fail "xts mode has wrong key size after reencryption ($XTS_KEY != expected $DEF_XTS_KEY)"
- echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP close $DEV_NAME || fail
- echo -n "[OK][4096 sector]"
- prepare sector_size=4096 dev_size_mb=32
-diff -rupN cryptsetup-2.3.3.orig/lib/libdevmapper.c cryptsetup-2.3.3/lib/libdevmapper.c
---- cryptsetup-2.3.3.orig/lib/libdevmapper.c	2021-02-18 16:21:00.863470374 +0100
-+++ cryptsetup-2.3.3/lib/libdevmapper.c	2021-02-18 16:22:36.330393562 +0100
-@@ -639,11 +639,13 @@ static char *get_dm_crypt_params(const s
- 	if (!strncmp(cipher_dm, "cipher_null-", 12))
- 		null_cipher = 1;
- 
--	if (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY) {
-+	if (null_cipher)
-+		hexkey = crypt_safe_alloc(2);
-+	else if (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY) {
- 		keystr_len = strlen(tgt->u.crypt.vk->key_description) + int_log10(tgt->u.crypt.vk->keylength) + 10;
- 		hexkey = crypt_safe_alloc(keystr_len);
- 	} else
--		hexkey = crypt_safe_alloc(null_cipher ? 2 : (tgt->u.crypt.vk->keylength * 2 + 1));
-+		hexkey = crypt_safe_alloc(tgt->u.crypt.vk->keylength * 2 + 1);
- 
- 	if (!hexkey)
- 		return NULL;
-From 284a49443e2a833e33714f9fa0f03b8e0233d68d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Ondrej Kozina <okozina@redhat.com>
-Date: Thu, 18 Feb 2021 15:01:01 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 3/3] Extend LUKS2 reencryption tests w/ cipher_null.
-
----
- tests/luks2-reencryption-test | 106 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
- 1 file changed, 104 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/tests/luks2-reencryption-test b/tests/luks2-reencryption-test
-index 9bdf60a..05c2151 100755
---- a/tests/luks2-reencryption-test
-+++ b/tests/luks2-reencryption-test
-@@ -297,7 +297,7 @@ function reencrypt_recover() { # $1 sector size, $2 resilience, $3 digest, [$4 h
- 	test -z "$4" || _hdr="--header $4"
- 
- 	error_writes $OVRDEV $OLD_DEV $ERROFFSET $ERRLENGTH
--	echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP reencrypt $DEV $_hdr --hotzone-size 1M --resilience $2 --sector-size $1 -q $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON 2>/dev/null && fail
-+	echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP reencrypt $DEV $_hdr --hotzone-size 1M --resilience $2 --sector-size $1 -q $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON >/dev/null 2>&1 && fail
- 	fix_writes $OVRDEV $OLD_DEV
- 
- 	echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q repair $DEV $_hdr || fail
-@@ -318,7 +318,7 @@ function reencrypt_recover_online() { # $1 sector size, $2 resilience, $3 digest
- 	echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP open $DEV $_hdr $DEV_NAME || fail
- 
- 	error_writes $OVRDEV $OLD_DEV $ERROFFSET $ERRLENGTH
--	echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP reencrypt --active-name $DEV_NAME $_hdr --hotzone-size 1M --resilience $2 --sector-size $1 -q $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON 2>/dev/null && fail
-+	echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP reencrypt --active-name $DEV_NAME $_hdr --hotzone-size 1M --resilience $2 --sector-size $1 -q $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON >/dev/null 2>&1 && fail
- 	$CRYPTSETUP status $DEV_NAME $_hdr | grep -q "reencryption:  in-progress" || fail
- 	$CRYPTSETUP close $DEV_NAME || fail
- 	fix_writes $OVRDEV $OLD_DEV
-@@ -1444,5 +1444,107 @@ check_hash $PWD1 $HASH1
- # both keyslot and segment cipher must not be null after reencryption with default params
- $CRYPTSETUP luksDump $DEV | grep -q "cipher_null" && fail
- 
-+# multistep reencryption with initial cipher_null
-+preparebig 64
-+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksFormat --type luks2 $DEV -c null --offset 16384 -q $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON || fail
-+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP open $DEV $DEV_NAME
-+wipe_dev /dev/mapper/$DEV_NAME
-+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP reencrypt $DEV --hotzone-size 1M --resilience none -q $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON >/dev/null || fail
-+$CRYPTSETUP close $DEV_NAME
-+check_hash $PWD1 $HASH5
-+
-+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksFormat --type luks2 $DEV -c null --offset 16384 -q $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON || fail
-+wipe $PWD1
-+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP reencrypt $DEV --hotzone-size 1M --resilience none -q $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON >/dev/null || fail
-+check_hash $PWD1 $HASH5
-+
-+echo "[25] Reencryption recovery with cipher_null"
-+# (check opt-io size optimization in reencryption code does not affect recovery)
-+# device with opt-io size 32k
-+prepare_linear_dev 32 opt_blks=64 $OPT_XFERLEN_EXP
-+OFFSET=8192
-+
-+echo "sector size 512->512"
-+
-+get_error_offsets 32 $OFFSET
-+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks2 -c null --sector-size 512 --offset $OFFSET $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON $DEV || fail
-+wipe $PWD1
-+check_hash $PWD1 $HASH1
-+
-+echo "ERR writes to sectors [$ERROFFSET,$(($ERROFFSET+$ERRLENGTH-1))]"
-+reencrypt_recover 512 checksum $HASH1
-+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks2 -c null --sector-size 512 --offset $OFFSET $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON $DEV || fail
-+wipe $PWD1
-+reencrypt_recover 512 journal $HASH1
-+
-+if [ -n "$DM_SECTOR_SIZE" ]; then
-+	echo "sector size 512->4096"
-+
-+	get_error_offsets 32 $OFFSET 4096
-+	echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks2 -c null --sector-size 512 --offset $OFFSET $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON $DEV || fail
-+	wipe $PWD1
-+	check_hash $PWD1 $HASH1
-+
-+	echo "ERR writes to sectors [$ERROFFSET,$(($ERROFFSET+$ERRLENGTH-1))]"
-+	reencrypt_recover 4096 checksum $HASH1
-+	echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks2 -c null --sector-size 512 --offset $OFFSET $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON $DEV || fail
-+	wipe $PWD1
-+	check_hash $PWD1 $HASH1
-+	reencrypt_recover 4096 journal $HASH1
-+
-+	echo "sector size 4096->4096"
-+
-+	get_error_offsets 32 $OFFSET 4096
-+	echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks2 -c null --sector-size 4096 -c aes-cbc-essiv:sha256 --offset $OFFSET $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON $DEV || fail
-+	wipe $PWD1
-+	check_hash $PWD1 $HASH1
-+
-+	echo "ERR writes to sectors [$ERROFFSET,$(($ERROFFSET+$ERRLENGTH-1))]"
-+	reencrypt_recover 4096 checksum $HASH1
-+	reencrypt_recover 4096 journal $HASH1
-+fi
-+
-+echo "[26] Reencryption recovery with cipher_null (online i/o error)"
-+
-+echo "sector size 512->512"
-+
-+get_error_offsets 32 $OFFSET
-+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks2 --sector-size 512 -c null --offset $OFFSET $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON $DEV || fail
-+wipe $PWD1
-+check_hash $PWD1 $HASH1
-+
-+echo "ERR writes to sectors [$ERROFFSET,$(($ERROFFSET+$ERRLENGTH-1))]"
-+reencrypt_recover_online 512 checksum $HASH1
-+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks2 --sector-size 512 -c null --offset $OFFSET $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON $DEV || fail
-+wipe $PWD1
-+reencrypt_recover_online 512 journal $HASH1
-+
-+if [ -n "$DM_SECTOR_SIZE" ]; then
-+	echo "sector size 512->4096"
-+
-+	get_error_offsets 32 $OFFSET 4096
-+	echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks2 -c null --sector-size 512 --offset $OFFSET $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON $DEV || fail
-+	wipe $PWD1
-+	check_hash $PWD1 $HASH1
-+
-+	echo "ERR writes to sectors [$ERROFFSET,$(($ERROFFSET+$ERRLENGTH-1))]"
-+	reencrypt_recover_online 4096 checksum $HASH1
-+	echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks2 -c null --sector-size 512 --offset $OFFSET $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON $DEV || fail
-+	wipe $PWD1
-+	check_hash $PWD1 $HASH1
-+	reencrypt_recover_online 4096 journal $HASH1
-+
-+	echo "sector size 4096->4096"
-+
-+	get_error_offsets 32 $OFFSET 4096
-+	echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks2 -c null --sector-size 4096 -c aes-cbc-essiv:sha256 --offset $OFFSET $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON $DEV || fail
-+	wipe $PWD1
-+	check_hash $PWD1 $HASH1
-+
-+	echo "ERR writes to sectors [$ERROFFSET,$(($ERROFFSET+$ERRLENGTH-1))]"
-+	reencrypt_recover_online 4096 checksum $HASH1
-+	reencrypt_recover_online 4096 journal $HASH1
-+fi
-+
- remove_mapping
- exit 0
--- 
-1.8.3.1
-
diff --git a/SOURCES/cryptsetup-2.4.2-Do-not-try-to-set-compiler-optimization-flag-if-wipe.patch b/SOURCES/cryptsetup-2.4.2-Do-not-try-to-set-compiler-optimization-flag-if-wipe.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ea52c96
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/cryptsetup-2.4.2-Do-not-try-to-set-compiler-optimization-flag-if-wipe.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+From a76310b53fbb117e620f2c37350b68dd267f1088 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com>
+Date: Mon, 20 Sep 2021 17:42:20 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Do not try to set compiler optimization flag if wipe is
+ implemented in libc.
+
+If zeroing memory is implemented through libc call (like memset_bzero),
+compiler should never remove such call. It is not needed to set O0
+optimization flag explicitly.
+
+Various checkers like annocheck causes problems with these flags,
+just remove it where it makes no sense.
+
+(Moreover, we use the same pattern without compiler magic
+in crypt_backend_memzero() already.)
+---
+ lib/crypto_backend/argon2/core.c | 10 ++++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/crypto_backend/argon2/core.c b/lib/crypto_backend/argon2/core.c
+index b204ba98..db9a7741 100644
+--- a/lib/crypto_backend/argon2/core.c
++++ b/lib/crypto_backend/argon2/core.c
+@@ -120,18 +120,24 @@ void free_memory(const argon2_context *context, uint8_t *memory,
+     }
+ }
+ 
+-void NOT_OPTIMIZED secure_wipe_memory(void *v, size_t n) {
+ #if defined(_MSC_VER) && VC_GE_2005(_MSC_VER)
++void secure_wipe_memory(void *v, size_t n) {
+     SecureZeroMemory(v, n);
++}
+ #elif defined memset_s
++void secure_wipe_memory(void *v, size_t n) {
+     memset_s(v, n, 0, n);
++}
+ #elif defined(HAVE_EXPLICIT_BZERO)
++void secure_wipe_memory(void *v, size_t n) {
+     explicit_bzero(v, n);
++}
+ #else
++void NOT_OPTIMIZED secure_wipe_memory(void *v, size_t n) {
+     static void *(*const volatile memset_sec)(void *, int, size_t) = &memset;
+     memset_sec(v, 0, n);
+-#endif
+ }
++#endif
+ 
+ /* Memory clear flag defaults to true. */
+ int FLAG_clear_internal_memory = 1;
+-- 
+2.27.0
+
diff --git a/SOURCES/cryptsetup-2.4.2-Fix-bogus-memory-allocation-if-LUKS2-header-size-is-.patch b/SOURCES/cryptsetup-2.4.2-Fix-bogus-memory-allocation-if-LUKS2-header-size-is-.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f07fb32
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/cryptsetup-2.4.2-Fix-bogus-memory-allocation-if-LUKS2-header-size-is-.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,295 @@
+From 9576549fee9228cabd9ceee27739a30caab5a7f6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com>
+Date: Tue, 9 Nov 2021 11:54:27 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix bogus memory allocation if LUKS2 header size is invalid.
+
+LUKS2 code read the whole header to buffer to verify checksum,
+so malloc is called on unvalidated input size parameter.
+
+This can cause out of memory or unintentional device reads.
+(Header validation will fail later anyway - the size is unsupported.)
+
+Just do not allow too small and too big allocations here and fail quickly.
+
+Fixes: #683.
+---
+ lib/luks2/luks2_disk_metadata.c               | 20 +++-
+ ...ks2-metadata-size-invalid-secondary.img.sh | 96 +++++++++++++++++++
+ ...enerate-luks2-metadata-size-invalid.img.sh | 94 ++++++++++++++++++
+ tests/luks2-validation-test                   |  2 +
+ 4 files changed, 208 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100755 tests/generators/generate-luks2-metadata-size-invalid-secondary.img.sh
+ create mode 100755 tests/generators/generate-luks2-metadata-size-invalid.img.sh
+
+diff --git a/lib/luks2/luks2_disk_metadata.c b/lib/luks2/luks2_disk_metadata.c
+index 502b0226..0500d5c7 100644
+--- a/lib/luks2/luks2_disk_metadata.c
++++ b/lib/luks2/luks2_disk_metadata.c
+@@ -195,6 +195,8 @@ static int hdr_disk_sanity_check_pre(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ 				     size_t *hdr_json_size, int secondary,
+ 				     uint64_t offset)
+ {
++	uint64_t hdr_size;
++
+ 	if (memcmp(hdr->magic, secondary ? LUKS2_MAGIC_2ND : LUKS2_MAGIC_1ST, LUKS2_MAGIC_L))
+ 		return -EINVAL;
+ 
+@@ -209,19 +211,26 @@ static int hdr_disk_sanity_check_pre(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ 		return -EINVAL;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	if (secondary && (offset != be64_to_cpu(hdr->hdr_size))) {
++	hdr_size = be64_to_cpu(hdr->hdr_size);
++
++	if (hdr_size < LUKS2_HDR_16K_LEN || hdr_size > LUKS2_HDR_OFFSET_MAX) {
++		log_dbg(cd, "LUKS2 header has bogus size 0x%04x.", (unsigned)hdr_size);
++		return -EINVAL;
++	}
++
++	if (secondary && (offset != hdr_size)) {
+ 		log_dbg(cd, "LUKS2 offset 0x%04x in secondary header does not match size 0x%04x.",
+-			(unsigned)offset, (unsigned)be64_to_cpu(hdr->hdr_size));
++			(unsigned)offset, (unsigned)hdr_size);
+ 		return -EINVAL;
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	/* FIXME: sanity check checksum alg. */
+ 
+ 	log_dbg(cd, "LUKS2 header version %u of size %u bytes, checksum %s.",
+-		(unsigned)be16_to_cpu(hdr->version), (unsigned)be64_to_cpu(hdr->hdr_size),
++		(unsigned)be16_to_cpu(hdr->version), (unsigned)hdr_size,
+ 		hdr->checksum_alg);
+ 
+-	*hdr_json_size = be64_to_cpu(hdr->hdr_size) - LUKS2_HDR_BIN_LEN;
++	*hdr_json_size = hdr_size - LUKS2_HDR_BIN_LEN;
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -252,6 +261,9 @@ static int hdr_read_disk(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ 		return -EIO;
+ 	}
+ 
++	/*
++	 * hdr_json_size is validated if this call succeeds
++	 */
+ 	r = hdr_disk_sanity_check_pre(cd, hdr_disk, &hdr_json_size, secondary, offset);
+ 	if (r < 0) {
+ 		return r;
+diff --git a/tests/generators/generate-luks2-metadata-size-invalid-secondary.img.sh b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-metadata-size-invalid-secondary.img.sh
+new file mode 100755
+index 00000000..4dd484e9
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-metadata-size-invalid-secondary.img.sh
+@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
++#!/bin/bash
++
++. lib.sh
++
++#
++# *** Description ***
++#
++# generate primary with predefined json_size. There's only limited
++# set of values allowed as json size in config section of LUKS2
++# metadata
++#
++# secondary header is corrupted on purpose as well
++#
++
++# $1 full target dir
++# $2 full source luks2 image
++
++function prepare()
++{
++	cp $SRC_IMG $TGT_IMG
++	test -d $TMPDIR || mkdir $TMPDIR
++	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json0
++	read_luks2_bin_hdr0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr0
++	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr1
++}
++
++function generate()
++{
++	TEST_MDA_SIZE=$LUKS2_HDR_SIZE_1M
++
++	TEST_MDA_SIZE_BYTES=$((TEST_MDA_SIZE*512))
++	TEST_MDA_SIZE_BOGUS_BYTES=$((TEST_MDA_SIZE*512*2*1024))
++	TEST_JSN_SIZE=$((TEST_MDA_SIZE-LUKS2_BIN_HDR_SIZE))
++	KEYSLOTS_OFFSET=$((TEST_MDA_SIZE*1024))
++	JSON_DIFF=$(((TEST_MDA_SIZE-LUKS2_HDR_SIZE)*1024))
++	JSON_SIZE=$((TEST_JSN_SIZE*512))
++	DATA_OFFSET=16777216
++
++	json_str=$(jq -c --arg jdiff $JSON_DIFF --arg jsize $JSON_SIZE --arg off $DATA_OFFSET \
++		   '.keyslots[].area.offset |= ( . | tonumber + ($jdiff | tonumber) | tostring) |
++		    .config.json_size = $jsize |
++		    .segments."0".offset = $off' $TMPDIR/json0)
++	test -n "$json_str" || exit 2
++	test ${#json_str} -lt $((LUKS2_JSON_SIZE*512)) || exit 2
++
++	write_luks2_json "$json_str" $TMPDIR/json0 $TEST_JSN_SIZE
++
++	write_bin_hdr_size $TMPDIR/hdr0 $TEST_MDA_SIZE_BYTES
++	write_bin_hdr_size $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TEST_MDA_SIZE_BOGUS_BYTES
++
++	write_bin_hdr_offset $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TEST_MDA_SIZE_BYTES
++
++	merge_bin_hdr_with_json $TMPDIR/hdr0 $TMPDIR/json0 $TMPDIR/area0 $TEST_JSN_SIZE
++	merge_bin_hdr_with_json $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TMPDIR/json0 $TMPDIR/area1 $TEST_JSN_SIZE
++
++	erase_checksum $TMPDIR/area0
++	chks0=$(calc_sha256_checksum_file $TMPDIR/area0)
++	write_checksum $chks0 $TMPDIR/area0
++
++	erase_checksum $TMPDIR/area1
++	chks0=$(calc_sha256_checksum_file $TMPDIR/area1)
++	write_checksum $chks0 $TMPDIR/area1
++
++	kill_bin_hdr $TMPDIR/area0
++
++	write_luks2_hdr0 $TMPDIR/area0 $TGT_IMG $TEST_MDA_SIZE
++	write_luks2_hdr1 $TMPDIR/area1 $TGT_IMG $TEST_MDA_SIZE
++}
++
++function check()
++{
++	read_luks2_bin_hdr0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr_res0 $TEST_MDA_SIZE
++	local str_res0=$(head -c 6 $TMPDIR/hdr_res0)
++	test "$str_res0" = "VACUUM" || exit 2
++	read_luks2_json1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json_res1 $TEST_JSN_SIZE
++	jq -c --arg koff $KEYSLOTS_OFFSET --arg jsize $JSON_SIZE \
++		'if ([.keyslots[].area.offset] | map(tonumber) | min | tostring != $koff) or
++		    (.config.json_size != $jsize)
++		then error("Unexpected value in result json") else empty end' $TMPDIR/json_res1 || exit 5
++}
++
++function cleanup()
++{
++	rm -f $TMPDIR/*
++	rm -fd $TMPDIR
++}
++
++test $# -eq 2 || exit 1
++
++TGT_IMG=$1/$(test_img_name $0)
++SRC_IMG=$2
++
++prepare
++generate
++check
++cleanup
+diff --git a/tests/generators/generate-luks2-metadata-size-invalid.img.sh b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-metadata-size-invalid.img.sh
+new file mode 100755
+index 00000000..6b9c0cf7
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-metadata-size-invalid.img.sh
+@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
++#!/bin/bash
++
++. lib.sh
++
++#
++# *** Description ***
++#
++# generate primary with predefined json_size. There's only limited
++# set of values allowed as json size in config section of LUKS2
++# metadata
++#
++# secondary header is corrupted on purpose as well
++#
++
++# $1 full target dir
++# $2 full source luks2 image
++
++function prepare()
++{
++	cp $SRC_IMG $TGT_IMG
++	test -d $TMPDIR || mkdir $TMPDIR
++	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json0
++	read_luks2_bin_hdr0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr0
++	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr1
++}
++
++function generate()
++{
++	TEST_MDA_SIZE=$LUKS2_HDR_SIZE_1M
++
++	TEST_MDA_SIZE_BYTES=$((TEST_MDA_SIZE*512))
++	TEST_MDA_SIZE_BOGUS_BYTES=$((TEST_MDA_SIZE*512*2*1024))
++	TEST_JSN_SIZE=$((TEST_MDA_SIZE-LUKS2_BIN_HDR_SIZE))
++	KEYSLOTS_OFFSET=$((TEST_MDA_SIZE*1024))
++	JSON_DIFF=$(((TEST_MDA_SIZE-LUKS2_HDR_SIZE)*1024))
++	JSON_SIZE=$((TEST_JSN_SIZE*512))
++	DATA_OFFSET=16777216
++
++	json_str=$(jq -c --arg jdiff $JSON_DIFF --arg jsize $JSON_SIZE --arg off $DATA_OFFSET \
++		   '.keyslots[].area.offset |= ( . | tonumber + ($jdiff | tonumber) | tostring) |
++		    .config.json_size = $jsize |
++		    .segments."0".offset = $off' $TMPDIR/json0)
++	test -n "$json_str" || exit 2
++	test ${#json_str} -lt $((LUKS2_JSON_SIZE*512)) || exit 2
++
++	write_luks2_json "$json_str" $TMPDIR/json0 $TEST_JSN_SIZE
++
++	write_bin_hdr_size $TMPDIR/hdr0 $TEST_MDA_SIZE_BOGUS_BYTES
++	write_bin_hdr_size $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TEST_MDA_SIZE_BOGUS_BYTES
++
++	merge_bin_hdr_with_json $TMPDIR/hdr0 $TMPDIR/json0 $TMPDIR/area0 $TEST_JSN_SIZE
++	merge_bin_hdr_with_json $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TMPDIR/json0 $TMPDIR/area1 $TEST_JSN_SIZE
++
++	erase_checksum $TMPDIR/area0
++	chks0=$(calc_sha256_checksum_file $TMPDIR/area0)
++	write_checksum $chks0 $TMPDIR/area0
++
++	erase_checksum $TMPDIR/area1
++	chks0=$(calc_sha256_checksum_file $TMPDIR/area1)
++	write_checksum $chks0 $TMPDIR/area1
++
++	kill_bin_hdr $TMPDIR/area1
++
++	write_luks2_hdr0 $TMPDIR/area0 $TGT_IMG $TEST_MDA_SIZE
++	write_luks2_hdr1 $TMPDIR/area1 $TGT_IMG $TEST_MDA_SIZE
++}
++
++function check()
++{
++	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr_res1 $TEST_MDA_SIZE
++	local str_res1=$(head -c 6 $TMPDIR/hdr_res1)
++	test "$str_res1" = "VACUUM" || exit 2
++	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json_res0 $TEST_JSN_SIZE
++	jq -c --arg koff $KEYSLOTS_OFFSET --arg jsize $JSON_SIZE \
++		'if ([.keyslots[].area.offset] | map(tonumber) | min | tostring != $koff) or
++		    (.config.json_size != $jsize)
++		then error("Unexpected value in result json") else empty end' $TMPDIR/json_res0 || exit 5
++}
++
++function cleanup()
++{
++	rm -f $TMPDIR/*
++	rm -fd $TMPDIR
++}
++
++test $# -eq 2 || exit 1
++
++TGT_IMG=$1/$(test_img_name $0)
++SRC_IMG=$2
++
++prepare
++generate
++check
++cleanup
+diff --git a/tests/luks2-validation-test b/tests/luks2-validation-test
+index 04183fbc..f771e1f9 100755
+--- a/tests/luks2-validation-test
++++ b/tests/luks2-validation-test
+@@ -229,6 +229,8 @@ RUN luks2-metadata-size-512k-secondary.img		"R" "Valid 512KiB metadata size in s
+ RUN luks2-metadata-size-1m-secondary.img		"R" "Valid 1MiB metadata size in secondary hdr failed to validate"
+ RUN luks2-metadata-size-2m-secondary.img		"R" "Valid 2MiB metadata size in secondary hdr failed to validate"
+ RUN luks2-metadata-size-4m-secondary.img		"R" "Valid 4MiB metadata size in secondary hdr failed to validate"
++RUN luks2-metadata-size-invalid.img			"F" "Invalid metadata size in secondary hdr not rejected"
++RUN luks2-metadata-size-invalid-secondary.img		"F" "Invalid metadata size in secondary hdr not rejected"
+ 
+ remove_mapping
+ 
+-- 
+2.27.0
+
diff --git a/SOURCES/cryptsetup-2.5.0-Fix-typo-in-repair-prompt.patch b/SOURCES/cryptsetup-2.5.0-Fix-typo-in-repair-prompt.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a34329b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/cryptsetup-2.5.0-Fix-typo-in-repair-prompt.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+diff -rupN cryptsetup-2.3.7.old/src/cryptsetup.c cryptsetup-2.3.7/src/cryptsetup.c
+--- cryptsetup-2.3.7.old/src/cryptsetup.c	2022-01-20 14:47:13.198475734 +0100
++++ cryptsetup-2.3.7/src/cryptsetup.c	2022-01-20 14:47:24.186505625 +0100
+@@ -1137,7 +1137,7 @@ static int reencrypt_metadata_repair(str
+ 		       _("Operation aborted.\n")))
+ 		return -EINVAL;
+ 
+-	r = tools_get_key(_("Enter passphrase to protect and uppgrade reencryption metadata: "),
++	r = tools_get_key(_("Enter passphrase to protect and upgrade reencryption metadata: "),
+ 			  &password, &passwordLen, opt_keyfile_offset,
+ 			  opt_keyfile_size, opt_key_file, opt_timeout,
+ 			  _verify_passphrase(0), 0, cd);
diff --git a/SPECS/cryptsetup.spec b/SPECS/cryptsetup.spec
index aedeee3..4cad198 100644
--- a/SPECS/cryptsetup.spec
+++ b/SPECS/cryptsetup.spec
@@ -4,8 +4,8 @@ Obsoletes: cryptsetup-python3
 
 Summary: A utility for setting up encrypted disks
 Name: cryptsetup
-Version: 2.3.3
-Release: 4%{?dist}
+Version: 2.3.7
+Release: 1%{?dist}
 License: GPLv2+ and LGPLv2+
 Group: Applications/System
 URL: https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup
@@ -23,9 +23,9 @@ Source0: https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v2.0/cryptsetup-%{ups
 Patch0:  %{name}-add-system-library-paths.patch
 # Remove the patch when (if ever) osci infrastructure gets stable enough
 Patch1:  %{name}-disable-verity-compat-test.patch
-Patch2:  %{name}-2.3.4-luks2-validation-32bit-fix.patch
-Patch3:  %{name}-2.3.4-fix-crypto-backend-to-properly-handle-ECB-mode.patch
-Patch4:  %{name}-2.3.5-fix-reencryption-cipher_null.patch
+Patch2:  %{name}-2.4.2-Do-not-try-to-set-compiler-optimization-flag-if-wipe.patch
+Patch3:  %{name}-2.4.2-Fix-bogus-memory-allocation-if-LUKS2-header-size-is-.patch
+Patch4:  %{name}-2.5.0-Fix-typo-in-repair-prompt.patch
 
 %description
 The cryptsetup package contains a utility for setting up
@@ -144,6 +144,15 @@ rm -rf %{buildroot}/%{_libdir}/*.la
 %clean
 
 %changelog
+* Thu Jan 20 2022 Ondrej Kozina <okozina@redhat.com> - 2.3.7-1
+- update to cryptsetup 2.3.7
+- fixes CVE-2021-4122
+- patch: Fix suboptimal optimization in bundled argon2.
+- patch: Fix bogus memory allocation/device read with
+         invalid LUKS2 headers
+- patch: Fix typo in luksRepair prompt.
+- Resolves: #2021815 #2022301 #2031859
+
 * Wed Feb 17 2021 Ondrej Kozina <okozina@redhat.com> - 2.3.3-4
 - patch: Fix reencryption for custom devices with data segments
   set to use cipher_null.