diff --git a/.cryptsetup.metadata b/.cryptsetup.metadata index 462e48a..899196b 100644 --- a/.cryptsetup.metadata +++ b/.cryptsetup.metadata @@ -1 +1 @@ -d847934311112c7220435b94b44c2b2bb3dca0e1 SOURCES/cryptsetup-2.3.3.tar.xz +3ce643e82d52b0c0282c2754c4bfa8c15c1f567e SOURCES/cryptsetup-2.3.7.tar.xz diff --git a/.gitignore b/.gitignore index 16b2a5f..48e6826 100644 --- a/.gitignore +++ b/.gitignore @@ -1 +1 @@ -SOURCES/cryptsetup-2.3.3.tar.xz +SOURCES/cryptsetup-2.3.7.tar.xz diff --git a/SOURCES/cryptsetup-2.3.4-fix-crypto-backend-to-properly-handle-ECB-mode.patch b/SOURCES/cryptsetup-2.3.4-fix-crypto-backend-to-properly-handle-ECB-mode.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 8fdfda0..0000000 --- a/SOURCES/cryptsetup-2.3.4-fix-crypto-backend-to-properly-handle-ECB-mode.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,48 +0,0 @@ -From f3906957675e466bbe7fa97a725f56c7c494d4a5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Milan Broz -Date: Tue, 21 Jul 2020 14:14:54 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH] Fix crypto backend to properly handle ECB mode. - -Despite it should be never used, it should still work :) - -Bug introduced in version 2.3.2. ---- - lib/crypto_backend/crypto_storage.c | 2 +- - tests/compat-test2 | 9 +++++++++ - 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) - -diff --git a/lib/crypto_backend/crypto_storage.c b/lib/crypto_backend/crypto_storage.c -index 8b6c19c..92dbae7 100644 ---- a/lib/crypto_backend/crypto_storage.c -+++ b/lib/crypto_backend/crypto_storage.c -@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ static int crypt_sector_iv_init(struct crypt_sector_iv *ctx, - memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx)); - - ctx->iv_size = crypt_cipher_ivsize(cipher_name, mode_name); -- if (ctx->iv_size < 8) -+ if (ctx->iv_size < 0 || (strcmp(mode_name, "ecb") && ctx->iv_size < 8)) - return -ENOENT; - - if (!strcmp(cipher_name, "cipher_null") || -diff --git a/tests/compat-test2 b/tests/compat-test2 -index 0fad999..c3852cd 100755 ---- a/tests/compat-test2 -+++ b/tests/compat-test2 -@@ -1023,5 +1023,14 @@ echo $PWD3 | $CRYPTSETUP luksConvertKey --key-slot 22 $LOOPDEV --keyslot-cipher - [ "$($CRYPTSETUP luksDump $IMG | grep -A8 -m1 "22: luks2" | grep "Cipher:" | sed -e 's/[[:space:]]\+Cipher:\ \+//g')" = $KEYSLOT_CIPHER ] || fail - [ "$($CRYPTSETUP luksDump $IMG | grep -A8 -m1 "22: luks2" | grep "Cipher key:"| sed -e 's/[[:space:]]\+Cipher\ key:\ \+//g')" = "128 bits" ] || fail - -+prepare "[42] Some encryption compatibility mode tests" wipe -+CIPHERS="aes-ecb aes-cbc-null aes-cbc-plain64 aes-cbc-essiv:sha256 aes-xts-plain64" -+key_size=256 -+for cipher in $CIPHERS ; do -+ echo -n "[$cipher/$key_size]" -+ $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks2 $LOOPDEV $KEY1 $FAST_PBKDF_OPT --cipher $cipher --key-size $key_size || fail -+done -+echo -+ - remove_mapping - exit 0 --- -1.8.3.1 - diff --git a/SOURCES/cryptsetup-2.3.4-luks2-validation-32bit-fix.patch b/SOURCES/cryptsetup-2.3.4-luks2-validation-32bit-fix.patch deleted file mode 100644 index f708ba9..0000000 --- a/SOURCES/cryptsetup-2.3.4-luks2-validation-32bit-fix.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,341 +0,0 @@ -From 52f5cb8cedf22fb3e14c744814ec8af7614146c7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Tobias Stoeckmann -Date: Mon, 24 Aug 2020 19:21:43 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH 01/11] Check segment gaps regardless of heap space. - -Segments are validated in hdr_validate_segments. Gaps in segment keys -are detected when collecting offsets. But if an invalid segment is very -large, larger than count, it could happen that cryptsetup is unable to -allocate enough memory, not giving a clue about what actually is the -problem. - -Therefore check for gaps even if not enough memory is available. This -gives much more information with debug output enabled. - -Obviously cryptsetup still fails if segments are perfectly fine but not -enough RAM available. But at that stage, the user knows that it's the -fault of the system, not of an invalid segment. ---- - lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c | 19 ++++++++++++------- - 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c b/lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c -index 23556f2..ea5c7f7 100644 ---- a/lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c -+++ b/lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c -@@ -679,11 +679,10 @@ static int hdr_validate_segments(struct crypt_device *cd, json_object *hdr_jobj) - if (first_backup < 0) - first_backup = count; - -- intervals = malloc(first_backup * sizeof(*intervals)); -- if (!intervals) { -- log_dbg(cd, "Not enough memory."); -- return 1; -- } -+ if (first_backup <= count && (size_t)first_backup < SIZE_MAX / sizeof(*intervals)) -+ intervals = malloc(first_backup * sizeof(*intervals)); -+ else -+ intervals = NULL; - - for (i = 0; i < first_backup; i++) { - jobj = json_segments_get_segment(jobj_segments, i); -@@ -692,8 +691,14 @@ static int hdr_validate_segments(struct crypt_device *cd, json_object *hdr_jobj) - free(intervals); - return 1; - } -- intervals[i].offset = json_segment_get_offset(jobj, 0); -- intervals[i].length = json_segment_get_size(jobj, 0) ?: UINT64_MAX; -+ if (intervals != NULL) { -+ intervals[i].offset = json_segment_get_offset(jobj, 0); -+ intervals[i].length = json_segment_get_size(jobj, 0) ?: UINT64_MAX; -+ } -+ } -+ if (intervals == NULL) { -+ log_dbg(cd, "Not enough memory."); -+ return 1; - } - - r = !validate_segment_intervals(cd, first_backup, intervals); --- -1.8.3.1 - -From 46ee71edcd13e1dad50815ad65c28779aa6f7503 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Ondrej Kozina -Date: Tue, 25 Aug 2020 19:32:48 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH 07/11] Avoid needlessly large allocations in LUKS2 validation - code. - -In case LUKS2 backup segment creates gap in between last regular -segment and backup segment report invalid metadata imediately. We stop -on first error so there's no need to allocate large memory on heap -(we may ran with mlock(MCL_FUTURE) set). - -Example: -- total segments count is 3 -- regular segments have keys "0" and "1" -- first backup segment has key "42" ---- - lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c | 8 +++++++- - 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) - -diff --git a/lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c b/lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c -index ea5c7f7..5b73b34 100644 ---- a/lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c -+++ b/lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c -@@ -676,10 +676,16 @@ static int hdr_validate_segments(struct crypt_device *cd, json_object *hdr_jobj) - return 1; - } - -+ /* avoid needlessly large allocation when first backup segment is invalid */ -+ if (first_backup >= count) { -+ log_dbg(cd, "Gap between last regular segment and backup segment at key %d.", first_backup); -+ return 1; -+ } -+ - if (first_backup < 0) - first_backup = count; - -- if (first_backup <= count && (size_t)first_backup < SIZE_MAX / sizeof(*intervals)) -+ if ((size_t)first_backup < SIZE_MAX / sizeof(*intervals)) - intervals = malloc(first_backup * sizeof(*intervals)); - else - intervals = NULL; --- -1.8.3.1 - -From 752c9a52798f11d3b765b673ebaa3058eb25316e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Ondrej Kozina -Date: Tue, 25 Aug 2020 19:23:21 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH 08/11] Simplify validation code a bit. - -Keep it simple. If there's not enough memory we can't validate -segments. The LUKS2 specification does not recommend to continue -processing LUKS2 metadata if it can not be properly validated. ---- - lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c | 19 ++++++++----------- - 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c b/lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c -index 5b73b34..df89401 100644 ---- a/lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c -+++ b/lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c -@@ -594,9 +594,9 @@ static bool validate_segment_intervals(struct crypt_device *cd, - static int hdr_validate_segments(struct crypt_device *cd, json_object *hdr_jobj) - { - json_object *jobj_segments, *jobj_digests, *jobj_offset, *jobj_size, *jobj_type, *jobj_flags, *jobj; -- struct interval *intervals; - uint64_t offset, size; - int i, r, count, first_backup = -1; -+ struct interval *intervals = NULL; - - if (!json_object_object_get_ex(hdr_jobj, "segments", &jobj_segments)) { - log_dbg(cd, "Missing segments section."); -@@ -687,8 +687,11 @@ static int hdr_validate_segments(struct crypt_device *cd, json_object *hdr_jobj) - - if ((size_t)first_backup < SIZE_MAX / sizeof(*intervals)) - intervals = malloc(first_backup * sizeof(*intervals)); -- else -- intervals = NULL; -+ -+ if (!intervals) { -+ log_dbg(cd, "Not enough memory."); -+ return 1; -+ } - - for (i = 0; i < first_backup; i++) { - jobj = json_segments_get_segment(jobj_segments, i); -@@ -697,14 +700,8 @@ static int hdr_validate_segments(struct crypt_device *cd, json_object *hdr_jobj) - free(intervals); - return 1; - } -- if (intervals != NULL) { -- intervals[i].offset = json_segment_get_offset(jobj, 0); -- intervals[i].length = json_segment_get_size(jobj, 0) ?: UINT64_MAX; -- } -- } -- if (intervals == NULL) { -- log_dbg(cd, "Not enough memory."); -- return 1; -+ intervals[i].offset = json_segment_get_offset(jobj, 0); -+ intervals[i].length = json_segment_get_size(jobj, 0) ?: UINT64_MAX; - } - - r = !validate_segment_intervals(cd, first_backup, intervals); --- -1.8.3.1 - -From 96da06430b6f5c2588c619082f2c5880df9cc776 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Ondrej Kozina -Date: Wed, 26 Aug 2020 17:24:05 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH 09/11] Add test for LUKS2 segments validation code fix. - ---- - ...enerate-luks2-segment-wrong-backup-key-0.img.sh | 67 ++++++++++++++++++++++ - ...enerate-luks2-segment-wrong-backup-key-1.img.sh | 67 ++++++++++++++++++++++ - tests/luks2-validation-test | 2 + - 3 files changed, 136 insertions(+) - create mode 100755 tests/generators/generate-luks2-segment-wrong-backup-key-0.img.sh - create mode 100755 tests/generators/generate-luks2-segment-wrong-backup-key-1.img.sh - -diff --git a/tests/generators/generate-luks2-segment-wrong-backup-key-0.img.sh b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-segment-wrong-backup-key-0.img.sh -new file mode 100755 -index 0000000..2499a5e ---- /dev/null -+++ b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-segment-wrong-backup-key-0.img.sh -@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@ -+#!/bin/bash -+ -+. lib.sh -+ -+# -+# *** Description *** -+# -+# generate primary header with wrong backup segment id -+# -+# secondary header is corrupted on purpose as well -+# -+ -+# $1 full target dir -+# $2 full source luks2 image -+ -+function prepare() -+{ -+ cp $SRC_IMG $TGT_IMG -+ test -d $TMPDIR || mkdir $TMPDIR -+ read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json0 -+ read_luks2_bin_hdr0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr0 -+ read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr1 -+} -+ -+function generate() -+{ -+ # create illegal backup segment key (used to be bug in 32bit implementations) -+ json_str=$(jq -c '.segments[(.segments | length + 1 | tostring)] = { "type" : "linear", "offset" : "512", "size" : "512", "flags":["backup-x"]}' $TMPDIR/json0) -+ test ${#json_str} -lt $((LUKS2_JSON_SIZE*512)) || exit 2 -+ -+ write_luks2_json "$json_str" $TMPDIR/json0 -+ -+ merge_bin_hdr_with_json $TMPDIR/hdr0 $TMPDIR/json0 $TMPDIR/area0 -+ erase_checksum $TMPDIR/area0 -+ chks0=$(calc_sha256_checksum_file $TMPDIR/area0) -+ write_checksum $chks0 $TMPDIR/area0 -+ write_luks2_hdr0 $TMPDIR/area0 $TGT_IMG -+ kill_bin_hdr $TMPDIR/hdr1 -+ write_luks2_hdr1 $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TGT_IMG -+} -+ -+function check() -+{ -+ read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr_res1 -+ local str_res1=$(head -c 6 $TMPDIR/hdr_res1) -+ test "$str_res1" = "VACUUM" || exit 2 -+ -+ read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json_res0 -+ jq -c 'if .segments | length < 2 -+ then error("Unexpected segments count") else empty end' $TMPDIR/json_res0 || exit 5 -+} -+ -+function cleanup() -+{ -+ rm -f $TMPDIR/* -+ rm -fd $TMPDIR -+} -+ -+test $# -eq 2 || exit 1 -+ -+TGT_IMG=$1/$(test_img_name $0) -+SRC_IMG=$2 -+ -+prepare -+generate -+check -+cleanup -diff --git a/tests/generators/generate-luks2-segment-wrong-backup-key-1.img.sh b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-segment-wrong-backup-key-1.img.sh -new file mode 100755 -index 0000000..702fe71 ---- /dev/null -+++ b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-segment-wrong-backup-key-1.img.sh -@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@ -+#!/bin/bash -+ -+. lib.sh -+ -+# -+# *** Description *** -+# -+# generate primary header with wrong backup segment id -+# -+# secondary header is corrupted on purpose as well -+# -+ -+# $1 full target dir -+# $2 full source luks2 image -+ -+function prepare() -+{ -+ cp $SRC_IMG $TGT_IMG -+ test -d $TMPDIR || mkdir $TMPDIR -+ read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json0 -+ read_luks2_bin_hdr0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr0 -+ read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr1 -+} -+ -+function generate() -+{ -+ # create illegal backup segment key (used to be bug in 32bit implementations) -+ json_str=$(jq -c '(.segments."0".offset | tonumber) as $i | .segments[range(1;65) | tostring] = { "type" : "linear", "offset" : ($i + 512 | tostring), "size" : "512" } | .segments."268435472" = { "type":"linear","offset":"512","size":"512","flags":["backup-x"]}' $TMPDIR/json0) -+ test ${#json_str} -lt $((LUKS2_JSON_SIZE*512)) || exit 2 -+ -+ write_luks2_json "$json_str" $TMPDIR/json0 -+ -+ merge_bin_hdr_with_json $TMPDIR/hdr0 $TMPDIR/json0 $TMPDIR/area0 -+ erase_checksum $TMPDIR/area0 -+ chks0=$(calc_sha256_checksum_file $TMPDIR/area0) -+ write_checksum $chks0 $TMPDIR/area0 -+ write_luks2_hdr0 $TMPDIR/area0 $TGT_IMG -+ kill_bin_hdr $TMPDIR/hdr1 -+ write_luks2_hdr1 $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TGT_IMG -+} -+ -+function check() -+{ -+ read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr_res1 -+ local str_res1=$(head -c 6 $TMPDIR/hdr_res1) -+ test "$str_res1" = "VACUUM" || exit 2 -+ -+ read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json_res0 -+ jq -c 'if .segments | length < 64 -+ then error("Unexpected segments count") else empty end' $TMPDIR/json_res0 || exit 5 -+} -+ -+function cleanup() -+{ -+ rm -f $TMPDIR/* -+ rm -fd $TMPDIR -+} -+ -+test $# -eq 2 || exit 1 -+ -+TGT_IMG=$1/$(test_img_name $0) -+SRC_IMG=$2 -+ -+prepare -+generate -+check -+cleanup -diff --git a/tests/luks2-validation-test b/tests/luks2-validation-test -index 52945ba..04183fb 100755 ---- a/tests/luks2-validation-test -+++ b/tests/luks2-validation-test -@@ -199,6 +199,8 @@ RUN luks2-segment-unknown-type.img "R" "Validation rejected segment with all m - RUN luks2-segment-two.img "R" "Validation rejected two valid segments" - RUN luks2-segment-wrong-flags.img "F" "Failed to detect invalid flags field" - RUN luks2-segment-wrong-flags-element.img "F" "Failed to detect invalid flags content" -+RUN luks2-segment-wrong-backup-key-0.img "F" "Failed to detect gap in backup segments" -+RUN luks2-segment-wrong-backup-key-1.img "F" "Failed to detect gap in backup segments" - - echo "[6] Test metadata size and keyslots size (config section)" - RUN luks2-invalid-keyslots-size-c0.img "F" "Failed to detect too large keyslots_size in config section" --- -1.8.3.1 - diff --git a/SOURCES/cryptsetup-2.3.5-fix-reencryption-cipher_null.patch b/SOURCES/cryptsetup-2.3.5-fix-reencryption-cipher_null.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 3db63c1..0000000 --- a/SOURCES/cryptsetup-2.3.5-fix-reencryption-cipher_null.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,769 +0,0 @@ -diff -rupN cryptsetup-2.3.3.orig/tests/api-test-2.c cryptsetup-2.3.3/tests/api-test-2.c ---- cryptsetup-2.3.3.orig/tests/api-test-2.c 2021-02-17 19:48:46.483519319 +0100 -+++ cryptsetup-2.3.3/tests/api-test-2.c 2021-02-17 19:49:10.527493909 +0100 -@@ -2876,6 +2876,12 @@ static void Luks2KeyslotParams(void) - const char *mk_hex2 = "bb21158c733229347bd4e681891e213d94c685be6a5b84818afe7a78a6de7a1e"; - size_t key_size_ret, key_size = strlen(mk_hex) / 2, keyslot_key_size = 16; - uint64_t r_payload_offset; -+ const struct crypt_pbkdf_type fast_pbkdf = { -+ .type = "pbkdf2", -+ .hash = "sha256", -+ .iterations = 1000, -+ .flags = CRYPT_PBKDF_NO_BENCHMARK -+ }; - - crypt_decode_key(key, mk_hex, key_size); - crypt_decode_key(key2, mk_hex2, key_size); -@@ -2889,7 +2895,7 @@ static void Luks2KeyslotParams(void) - EQ_(key_size, 2 * keyslot_key_size); - /* test crypt_keyslot_add_by_key */ - OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_OK)); -- crypt_set_iteration_time(cd, 1); -+ OK_(crypt_set_pbkdf_type(cd, &fast_pbkdf)); - OK_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, key, key_size, NULL)); - NULL_(crypt_keyslot_get_encryption(cd, 0, &key_size_ret)); - OK_(strcmp(crypt_keyslot_get_encryption(cd, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, &key_size_ret), cipher_spec)); -@@ -2948,7 +2954,7 @@ static void Luks2KeyslotParams(void) - OK_(strcmp(crypt_keyslot_get_encryption(cd, 7, &key_size_ret), cipher_keyslot)); - EQ_(key_size_ret, keyslot_key_size); - -- crypt_set_iteration_time(cd, 1); -+ OK_(crypt_set_pbkdf_type(cd, &fast_pbkdf)); - EQ_(8, crypt_keyslot_change_by_passphrase(cd, 1, 8, PASSPHRASE1, strlen(PASSPHRASE1), PASSPHRASE, strlen(PASSPHRASE))); - OK_(strcmp(crypt_keyslot_get_encryption(cd, 8, &key_size_ret), cipher_spec)); - EQ_(key_size_ret, key_size); -@@ -2977,7 +2983,7 @@ static void Luks2KeyslotParams(void) - - /* LUKS1 compatible calls */ - OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_OK)); -- crypt_set_iteration_time(cd, 1); -+ OK_(crypt_set_pbkdf_type(cd, &fast_pbkdf)); - OK_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, key, key_size, NULL)); - NULL_(crypt_keyslot_get_encryption(cd, 0, &key_size_ret)); - OK_(strcmp(crypt_keyslot_get_encryption(cd, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, &key_size_ret), cipher_spec)); -@@ -2987,6 +2993,18 @@ static void Luks2KeyslotParams(void) - EQ_(key_size_ret, key_size); - CRYPT_FREE(cd); - -+ /* LUKS2 cipher null checks */ -+ OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_OK)); -+ OK_(crypt_set_pbkdf_type(cd, &fast_pbkdf)); -+ OK_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, "cipher_null", "ecb", NULL, key, key_size, NULL)); -+ FAIL_(crypt_keyslot_set_encryption(cd, "null", 32), "cipher null is not allowed"); -+ FAIL_(crypt_keyslot_set_encryption(cd, "cipher_null", 32), "cipher null is not allowed"); -+ FAIL_(crypt_keyslot_set_encryption(cd, "cipher_null-ecb", 32), "cipher null is not allowed"); -+ EQ_(0, crypt_keyslot_add_by_volume_key(cd, 0, key, key_size, PASSPHRASE, strlen(PASSPHRASE))); -+ NOTNULL_(crypt_keyslot_get_encryption(cd, 0, &key_size_ret)); -+ NULL_(strstr(crypt_keyslot_get_encryption(cd, 0, &key_size_ret), "null")); -+ CRYPT_FREE(cd); -+ - _cleanup_dmdevices(); - _remove_keyfiles(); - } -diff -rupN cryptsetup-2.3.3.orig/tests/luks2-reencryption-test cryptsetup-2.3.3/tests/luks2-reencryption-test ---- cryptsetup-2.3.3.orig/tests/luks2-reencryption-test 2021-02-17 19:48:46.493519309 +0100 -+++ cryptsetup-2.3.3/tests/luks2-reencryption-test 2021-02-17 19:50:13.397427467 +0100 -@@ -1365,6 +1365,33 @@ echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksKillSlot $D - echo -e "$PWD1\n$PWD1\n$PWD1\n$PWD1\n$PWD1\n$PWD1\n$PWD1\n$PWD1\n$PWD1\n$PWD1\n$PWD1\n$PWD1\n$PWD1\n$PWD2" | $CRYPTSETUP reencrypt $DEV -q 2>/dev/null && fail - echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP reencrypt $DEV --resume-only -q 2>/dev/null && fail - echo -e "$PWD1\n$PWD1\n$PWD1\n$PWD1\n$PWD1\n$PWD1\n$PWD1\n$PWD1\n$PWD1\n$PWD1\n$PWD1\n$PWD1\n$PWD1\n$PWD1" | $CRYPTSETUP reencrypt $DEV -q || fail -+ -+echo "[24] Reencryption with initial cipher_null" -+# aka custom encryption -+prepare dev_size_mb=32 -+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks2 -s 128 -c cipher_null-ecb --offset 8192 $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON $DEV || fail -+wipe $PWD1 -+check_hash $PWD1 $HASH1 -+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP reencrypt $DEV -c aes-xts-plain64 -q $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON || fail -+check_hash $PWD1 $HASH1 -+ -+# online -+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks2 -s 128 -c cipher_null-ecb --offset 8192 $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON $DEV || fail -+wipe $PWD1 -+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP open $DEV $DEV_NAME -+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP reencrypt $DEV -c aes-xts-plain64 -q $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON || fail -+check_hash_dev /dev/mapper/$DEV_NAME $HASH1 -+$CRYPTSETUP status $DEV_NAME | grep -q "key location: keyring" || fail -+$CRYPTSETUP close $DEV_NAME -+ -+# simulate LUKS2 device with cipher_null in both keyslot and segment (it can be created only by up conversion from LUKS1) -+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks1 -s 128 -c cipher_null-ecb --offset 8192 $FAST_PBKDF2 $DEV || fail -+$CRYPTSETUP convert -q --type luks2 $DEV || fail -+wipe $PWD1 -+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP reencrypt $DEV -c aes-xts-plain64 -q $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON || fail -+check_hash $PWD1 $HASH1 -+# both keyslot and segment cipher must not be null -+$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $DEV | grep -q "cipher_null" && fail - - remove_mapping - exit 0 -diff -rupN cryptsetup-2.3.3.orig/lib/utils_crypt.c cryptsetup-2.3.3/lib/utils_crypt.c ---- cryptsetup-2.3.3.orig/lib/utils_crypt.c 2021-02-17 17:48:06.535007396 +0100 -+++ cryptsetup-2.3.3/lib/utils_crypt.c 2021-02-17 17:49:07.552948180 +0100 -@@ -174,3 +174,10 @@ ssize_t crypt_hex_to_bytes(const char *h - *result = bytes; - return i; - } -+ -+bool crypt_is_cipher_null(const char *cipher_spec) -+{ -+ if (!cipher_spec) -+ return false; -+ return (strstr(cipher_spec, "cipher_null") || !strcmp(cipher_spec, "null")); -+} -diff -rupN cryptsetup-2.3.3.orig/lib/utils_crypt.h cryptsetup-2.3.3/lib/utils_crypt.h ---- cryptsetup-2.3.3.orig/lib/utils_crypt.h 2021-02-17 17:48:06.535007396 +0100 -+++ cryptsetup-2.3.3/lib/utils_crypt.h 2021-02-17 17:49:07.552948180 +0100 -@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ - #ifndef _UTILS_CRYPT_H - #define _UTILS_CRYPT_H - -+#include - #include - - #define MAX_CIPHER_LEN 32 -@@ -38,4 +39,6 @@ int crypt_parse_pbkdf(const char *s, con - - ssize_t crypt_hex_to_bytes(const char *hex, char **result, int safe_alloc); - -+bool crypt_is_cipher_null(const char *cipher_spec); -+ - #endif /* _UTILS_CRYPT_H */ -diff -rupN cryptsetup-2.3.3.orig/src/cryptsetup.c cryptsetup-2.3.3/src/cryptsetup.c ---- cryptsetup-2.3.3.orig/src/cryptsetup.c 2021-02-17 17:48:06.538007393 +0100 -+++ cryptsetup-2.3.3/src/cryptsetup.c 2021-02-17 17:52:54.174722763 +0100 -@@ -1281,7 +1281,7 @@ static int _luksFormat(struct crypt_devi - } - - /* Never call pwquality if using null cipher */ -- if (tools_is_cipher_null(cipher)) -+ if (crypt_is_cipher_null(cipher)) - opt_force_password = 1; - - if ((r = crypt_init(&cd, header_device))) { -@@ -1679,7 +1679,7 @@ static int luksAddUnboundKey(void) - goto out; - - /* Never call pwquality if using null cipher */ -- if (tools_is_cipher_null(crypt_get_cipher(cd))) -+ if (crypt_is_cipher_null(crypt_get_cipher(cd))) - opt_force_password = 1; - - keysize = opt_key_size / 8; -@@ -1746,7 +1746,7 @@ static int action_luksAddKey(void) - goto out; - - /* Never call pwquality if using null cipher */ -- if (tools_is_cipher_null(crypt_get_cipher(cd))) -+ if (crypt_is_cipher_null(crypt_get_cipher(cd))) - opt_force_password = 1; - - keysize = crypt_get_volume_key_size(cd); -@@ -1849,7 +1849,7 @@ static int action_luksChangeKey(void) - goto out; - - /* Never call pwquality if using null cipher */ -- if (tools_is_cipher_null(crypt_get_cipher(cd))) -+ if (crypt_is_cipher_null(crypt_get_cipher(cd))) - opt_force_password = 1; - - r = set_pbkdf_params(cd, crypt_get_type(cd)); -diff -rupN cryptsetup-2.3.3.orig/src/cryptsetup.h cryptsetup-2.3.3/src/cryptsetup.h ---- cryptsetup-2.3.3.orig/src/cryptsetup.h 2021-02-17 17:48:06.538007393 +0100 -+++ cryptsetup-2.3.3/src/cryptsetup.h 2021-02-17 17:54:15.556641129 +0100 -@@ -97,7 +97,6 @@ int tools_get_key(const char *prompt, - void tools_passphrase_msg(int r); - int tools_is_stdin(const char *key_file); - int tools_string_to_size(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *s, uint64_t *size); --int tools_is_cipher_null(const char *cipher); - - void tools_clear_line(void); - -diff -rupN cryptsetup-2.3.3.orig/src/utils_tools.c cryptsetup-2.3.3/src/utils_tools.c ---- cryptsetup-2.3.3.orig/src/utils_tools.c 2021-02-17 17:48:06.538007393 +0100 -+++ cryptsetup-2.3.3/src/utils_tools.c 2021-02-17 17:49:07.572948160 +0100 -@@ -596,14 +596,6 @@ out: - return r; - } - --int tools_is_cipher_null(const char *cipher) --{ -- if (!cipher) -- return 0; -- -- return !strcmp(cipher, "cipher_null") ? 1 : 0; --} -- - /* - * Keyfile - is standard input treated as a binary file (no EOL handling). - */ -From 03cc8a9ce4c1e04283eb0e0da658aa4509e74949 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Ondrej Kozina -Date: Wed, 10 Feb 2021 17:50:49 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 3/9] Fix broken detection of null cipher in LUKS2. - -This bug enabled to create LUKS2 keyslots encrypted by -cipher_null when explicitely requested by user. LUKS2 -was never meant to allow keyslot encryption with -cipher_null. cipher_null is meant for debug purposes -only as a segment cipher. ---- - lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot.c | 2 +- - 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) - -diff --git a/lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot.c b/lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot.c -index ed51e24..414189c 100644 ---- a/lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot.c -+++ b/lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot.c -@@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ int LUKS2_keyslot_cipher_incompatible(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *ciphe - { - char cipher[MAX_CIPHER_LEN], cipher_mode[MAX_CIPHER_LEN]; - -- if (!cipher_spec || !strcmp(cipher_spec, "null") || !strcmp(cipher_spec, "cipher_null")) -+ if (!cipher_spec || crypt_is_cipher_null(cipher_spec)) - return 1; - - if (crypt_parse_name_and_mode(cipher_spec, cipher, NULL, cipher_mode) < 0) --- -1.8.3.1 - -diff -rupN cryptsetup-2.3.3.orig/lib/luks2/luks2_token.c cryptsetup-2.3.3/lib/luks2/luks2_token.c ---- cryptsetup-2.3.3.orig/lib/luks2/luks2_token.c 2021-02-17 17:59:35.532320163 +0100 -+++ cryptsetup-2.3.3/lib/luks2/luks2_token.c 2021-02-17 18:01:49.925185354 +0100 -@@ -383,6 +383,7 @@ int LUKS2_token_open_and_activate(struct - uint32_t flags, - void *usrptr) - { -+ bool use_keyring; - int keyslot, r; - char *buffer; - size_t buffer_len; -@@ -404,7 +405,13 @@ int LUKS2_token_open_and_activate(struct - - keyslot = r; - -- if ((name || (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY)) && crypt_use_keyring_for_vk(cd)) { -+ if (!crypt_use_keyring_for_vk(cd)) -+ use_keyring = false; -+ else -+ use_keyring = ((name && !crypt_is_cipher_null(crypt_get_cipher(cd))) || -+ (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY)); -+ -+ if (use_keyring) { - if (!(r = LUKS2_volume_key_load_in_keyring_by_keyslot(cd, hdr, vk, keyslot))) - flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY; - } -diff -rupN cryptsetup-2.3.3.orig/lib/setup.c cryptsetup-2.3.3/lib/setup.c ---- cryptsetup-2.3.3.orig/lib/setup.c 2021-02-17 17:59:35.529320166 +0100 -+++ cryptsetup-2.3.3/lib/setup.c 2021-02-17 18:00:03.676291932 +0100 -@@ -3879,6 +3879,7 @@ static int _open_and_activate(struct cry - size_t passphrase_size, - uint32_t flags) - { -+ bool use_keyring; - int r; - struct volume_key *vk = NULL; - -@@ -3890,8 +3891,13 @@ static int _open_and_activate(struct cry - return r; - keyslot = r; - -- if ((name || (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY)) && -- crypt_use_keyring_for_vk(cd)) { -+ if (!crypt_use_keyring_for_vk(cd)) -+ use_keyring = false; -+ else -+ use_keyring = ((name && !crypt_is_cipher_null(crypt_get_cipher(cd))) || -+ (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY)); -+ -+ if (use_keyring) { - r = LUKS2_volume_key_load_in_keyring_by_keyslot(cd, - &cd->u.luks2.hdr, vk, keyslot); - if (r < 0) -@@ -4269,6 +4275,7 @@ int crypt_activate_by_volume_key(struct - size_t volume_key_size, - uint32_t flags) - { -+ bool use_keyring; - struct volume_key *vk = NULL; - int r; - -@@ -4344,8 +4351,12 @@ int crypt_activate_by_volume_key(struct - if (r > 0) - r = 0; - -- if (!r && (name || (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY)) && -- crypt_use_keyring_for_vk(cd)) { -+ if (!crypt_use_keyring_for_vk(cd)) -+ use_keyring = false; -+ else -+ use_keyring = (name && !crypt_is_cipher_null(crypt_get_cipher(cd))) || (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY); -+ -+ if (!r && use_keyring) { - r = LUKS2_key_description_by_segment(cd, - &cd->u.luks2.hdr, vk, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT); - if (!r) -From ed2117c72417d85c7b2f20d5859ca558eaf61c62 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Ondrej Kozina -Date: Thu, 11 Feb 2021 11:43:10 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 5/9] Fix device comparison for dm-crypt with cipher_null. - -Do not compare volume keys if segment uses cipher_null. -The key is ignored by lower layer (internal libdevmapper) -anyway. ---- - lib/setup.c | 13 ++++++++----- - 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/lib/setup.c b/lib/setup.c -index ffd9b7b..7286e10 100644 ---- a/lib/setup.c -+++ b/lib/setup.c -@@ -2380,11 +2380,6 @@ static int _compare_crypt_devices(struct crypt_device *cd, - if (!src->u.crypt.vk || !tgt->u.crypt.vk) - return -EINVAL; - -- if (_compare_volume_keys(src->u.crypt.vk, 0, tgt->u.crypt.vk, tgt->u.crypt.vk->key_description != NULL)) { -- log_dbg(cd, "Keys in context and target device do not match."); -- return -EINVAL; -- } -- - /* CIPHER checks */ - if (!src->u.crypt.cipher || !tgt->u.crypt.cipher) - return -EINVAL; -@@ -2392,6 +2387,14 @@ static int _compare_crypt_devices(struct crypt_device *cd, - log_dbg(cd, "Cipher specs do not match."); - return -EINVAL; - } -+ -+ if (tgt->u.crypt.vk->keylength == 0 && crypt_is_cipher_null(tgt->u.crypt.cipher)) -+ log_dbg(cd, "Existing device uses cipher null. Skipping key comparison."); -+ else if (_compare_volume_keys(src->u.crypt.vk, 0, tgt->u.crypt.vk, tgt->u.crypt.vk->key_description != NULL)) { -+ log_dbg(cd, "Keys in context and target device do not match."); -+ return -EINVAL; -+ } -+ - if (crypt_strcmp(src->u.crypt.integrity, tgt->u.crypt.integrity)) { - log_dbg(cd, "Integrity parameters do not match."); - return -EINVAL; --- -1.8.3.1 - -From 01f896711ed54bff7c1ccf944d2295929af7c75c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Ondrej Kozina -Date: Thu, 11 Feb 2021 12:17:02 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 6/9] Replace bogus cipher_null keyslots before reencryption. - -By mistake LUKS2 allowed keyslots 'not-so-encrypted' by -cipher_null (only explicitly requested by --cipher or ---keyslot-cipher parameters). If we encounter -such old key during reencryption let's replace the cipher -for new keyslot with default LUKS2 keyslot cipher. ---- - src/cryptsetup.c | 6 ++++++ - 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) - -diff --git a/src/cryptsetup.c b/src/cryptsetup.c -index 957c24e..5e22286 100644 ---- a/src/cryptsetup.c -+++ b/src/cryptsetup.c -@@ -1091,6 +1091,12 @@ static int set_keyslot_params(struct crypt_device *cd, int keyslot) - if (!cipher) - return -EINVAL; - -+ if (crypt_is_cipher_null(cipher)) { -+ log_dbg("Keyslot %d uses cipher_null. Replacing with default encryption in new keyslot.", keyslot); -+ cipher = DEFAULT_LUKS2_KEYSLOT_CIPHER; -+ key_size = DEFAULT_LUKS2_KEYSLOT_KEYBITS / 8; -+ } -+ - if (crypt_keyslot_set_encryption(cd, cipher, key_size)) - return -EINVAL; - --- -1.8.3.1 - -diff -rupN cryptsetup-2.3.3.orig/lib/luks2/luks2_reencrypt.c cryptsetup-2.3.3/lib/luks2/luks2_reencrypt.c ---- cryptsetup-2.3.3.orig/lib/luks2/luks2_reencrypt.c 2021-02-17 18:03:49.547065362 +0100 -+++ cryptsetup-2.3.3/lib/luks2/luks2_reencrypt.c 2021-02-17 18:09:43.610710202 +0100 -@@ -2238,7 +2238,7 @@ static int reencrypt_verify_and_upload_k - if (LUKS2_digest_verify_by_digest(cd, hdr, digest_new, vk) != digest_new) - return -EINVAL; - -- if (crypt_use_keyring_for_vk(cd) && -+ if (crypt_use_keyring_for_vk(cd) && !crypt_is_cipher_null(reencrypt_segment_cipher_new(hdr)) && - (r = LUKS2_volume_key_load_in_keyring_by_digest(cd, hdr, vk, crypt_volume_key_get_id(vk)))) - return r; - } -@@ -2254,7 +2254,7 @@ static int reencrypt_verify_and_upload_k - r = -EINVAL; - goto err; - } -- if (crypt_use_keyring_for_vk(cd) && -+ if (crypt_use_keyring_for_vk(cd) && !crypt_is_cipher_null(reencrypt_segment_cipher_old(hdr)) && - (r = LUKS2_volume_key_load_in_keyring_by_digest(cd, hdr, vk, crypt_volume_key_get_id(vk)))) - goto err; - } -@@ -2664,6 +2664,7 @@ static int reencrypt_load_by_passphrase( - struct luks2_hdr *hdr; - struct crypt_lock_handle *reencrypt_lock; - struct luks2_reenc_context *rh; -+ const struct volume_key *vk; - struct crypt_dm_active_device dmd_target, dmd_source = { - .uuid = crypt_get_uuid(cd), - .flags = CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SHARED /* turn off exclusive open checks */ -@@ -2730,6 +2731,19 @@ static int reencrypt_load_by_passphrase( - goto err; - flags = dmd_target.flags; - -+ /* -+ * By default reencryption code aims to retain flags from existing dm device. -+ * The keyring activation flag can not be inherited if original cipher is null. -+ * -+ * In this case override the flag based on decision made in reencrypt_verify_and_upload_keys -+ * above. The code checks if new VK is eligible for keyring. -+ */ -+ vk = crypt_volume_key_by_id(*vks, LUKS2_reencrypt_digest_new(hdr)); -+ if (vk && vk->key_description && crypt_is_cipher_null(reencrypt_segment_cipher_old(hdr))) { -+ flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY; -+ dmd_source.flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY; -+ } -+ - r = LUKS2_assembly_multisegment_dmd(cd, hdr, *vks, LUKS2_get_segments_jobj(hdr), &dmd_source); - if (!r) { - r = crypt_compare_dm_devices(cd, &dmd_source, &dmd_target); -diff -rupN cryptsetup-2.3.3.orig/src/cryptsetup.c cryptsetup-2.3.3/src/cryptsetup.c ---- cryptsetup-2.3.3.orig/src/cryptsetup.c 2021-02-17 18:12:12.162561190 +0100 -+++ cryptsetup-2.3.3/src/cryptsetup.c 2021-02-17 18:19:04.842147234 +0100 -@@ -3142,6 +3142,11 @@ static int action_reencrypt_luks2(struct - - _set_reencryption_flags(¶ms.flags); - -+ if (!opt_cipher && crypt_is_cipher_null(crypt_get_cipher(cd))) { -+ log_std(_("Switching data encryption cipher to %s.\n"), DEFAULT_CIPHER(LUKS1)); -+ opt_cipher = DEFAULT_CIPHER(LUKS1); -+ } -+ - if (!opt_cipher) { - strncpy(cipher, crypt_get_cipher(cd), MAX_CIPHER_LEN - 1); - strncpy(mode, crypt_get_cipher_mode(cd), MAX_CIPHER_LEN - 1); -diff -rupN cryptsetup-2.3.3.orig/tests/luks2-reencryption-test cryptsetup-2.3.3/tests/luks2-reencryption-test ---- cryptsetup-2.3.3.orig/tests/luks2-reencryption-test 2021-02-17 18:25:01.393788684 +0100 -+++ cryptsetup-2.3.3/tests/luks2-reencryption-test 2021-02-17 18:26:00.864726663 +0100 -@@ -1388,9 +1388,9 @@ $CRYPTSETUP close $DEV_NAME - echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks1 -s 128 -c cipher_null-ecb --offset 8192 $FAST_PBKDF2 $DEV || fail - $CRYPTSETUP convert -q --type luks2 $DEV || fail - wipe $PWD1 --echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP reencrypt $DEV -c aes-xts-plain64 -q $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON || fail -+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP reencrypt $DEV -q $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON >/dev/null || fail - check_hash $PWD1 $HASH1 --# both keyslot and segment cipher must not be null -+# both keyslot and segment cipher must not be null after reencryption with default params - $CRYPTSETUP luksDump $DEV | grep -q "cipher_null" && fail - - remove_mapping -From 030d50f6baff62466c611c868d860c6c3a3efef9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Ondrej Kozina -Date: Wed, 17 Feb 2021 15:00:19 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH] Fix reencryption test on systems w/o keyring. - ---- - tests/luks2-reencryption-test | 20 ++++++++++++++++++-- - 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/tests/luks2-reencryption-test b/tests/luks2-reencryption-test -index 51b5473..6e6b381 100755 ---- a/tests/luks2-reencryption-test -+++ b/tests/luks2-reencryption-test -@@ -654,6 +654,18 @@ function reencrypt_online_fixed_size() { - fi - } - -+function setup_luks2_env() { -+ echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksFormat --type luks2 $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON $DEV || fail -+ echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP open $DEV $DEV_NAME || fail -+ HAVE_KEYRING=$($CRYPTSETUP status $DEV_NAME | grep "key location: keyring") -+ if [ -n "$HAVE_KEYRING" ]; then -+ HAVE_KEYRING=1 -+ else -+ HAVE_KEYRING=0 -+ fi -+ $CRYPTSETUP close $DEV_NAME || fail -+} -+ - function valgrind_setup() - { - which valgrind >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail "Cannot find valgrind." -@@ -705,9 +717,11 @@ HASH7=18a393d1a505e22ccf3e29effe3005ea8627e4c36b7cca0e53f58121f49b67e1 - # 60 MiBs of zeroes - HASH8=cf5ac69ca412f9b3b1a8b8de27d368c5c05ed4b1b6aa40e6c38d9cbf23711342 - -+prepare dev_size_mb=32 -+setup_luks2_env -+ - echo "[1] Reencryption" - echo -n "[512 sector]" --prepare dev_size_mb=32 - echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks2 -s 128 -c aes-cbc-essiv:sha256 --offset 8192 $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON $DEV || fail - wipe $PWD1 - check_hash $PWD1 $HASH1 -@@ -1412,7 +1426,9 @@ wipe $PWD1 - echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP open $DEV $DEV_NAME - echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP reencrypt $DEV -c aes-xts-plain64 -q $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON || fail - check_hash_dev /dev/mapper/$DEV_NAME $HASH1 --$CRYPTSETUP status $DEV_NAME | grep -q "key location: keyring" || fail -+if [ $HAVE_KEYRING -gt 0 ]; then -+ $CRYPTSETUP status $DEV_NAME | grep -q "key location: keyring" || fail -+fi - $CRYPTSETUP close $DEV_NAME - - # simulate LUKS2 device with cipher_null in both keyslot and segment (it can be created only by up conversion from LUKS1) --- -1.8.3.1 - -diff -rupN cryptsetup-2.3.3.orig/src/cryptsetup.c cryptsetup-2.3.3/src/cryptsetup.c ---- cryptsetup-2.3.3.orig/src/cryptsetup.c 2021-02-18 12:37:44.903909498 +0100 -+++ cryptsetup-2.3.3/src/cryptsetup.c 2021-02-18 12:45:49.208492236 +0100 -@@ -1196,6 +1196,21 @@ static int strcmp_or_null(const char *st - return !str ? 0 : strcmp(str, expected); - } - -+static int get_adjusted_key_size(const char *cipher_mode, uint32_t default_size_bits, int integrity_keysize) -+{ -+ int keysize_bits = opt_key_size; -+ -+#ifdef ENABLE_LUKS_ADJUST_XTS_KEYSIZE -+ if (!opt_key_size && !strncmp(cipher_mode, "xts-", 4)) { -+ if (default_size_bits == 128) -+ keysize_bits = 256; -+ else if (default_size_bits == 256) -+ keysize_bits = 512; -+ } -+#endif -+ return (keysize_bits ?: default_size_bits) / 8 + integrity_keysize; -+} -+ - static int _luksFormat(struct crypt_device **r_cd, char **r_password, size_t *r_passwordLen) - { - int r = -EINVAL, keysize, integrity_keysize = 0, fd, created = 0; -@@ -1328,15 +1343,7 @@ static int _luksFormat(struct crypt_devi - goto out; - } - --#ifdef ENABLE_LUKS_ADJUST_XTS_KEYSIZE -- if (!opt_key_size && !strncmp(cipher_mode, "xts-", 4)) { -- if (DEFAULT_LUKS1_KEYBITS == 128) -- opt_key_size = 256; -- else if (DEFAULT_LUKS1_KEYBITS == 256) -- opt_key_size = 512; -- } --#endif -- keysize = (opt_key_size ?: DEFAULT_LUKS1_KEYBITS) / 8 + integrity_keysize; -+ keysize = get_adjusted_key_size(cipher_mode, DEFAULT_LUKS1_KEYBITS, integrity_keysize); - - if (opt_random) - crypt_set_rng_type(cd, CRYPT_RNG_RANDOM); -@@ -3163,10 +3170,8 @@ static int action_reencrypt_luks2(struct - if (r) - return r; - -- if (opt_key_size) -- key_size = opt_key_size / 8; -- else if (opt_cipher) -- key_size = DEFAULT_LUKS1_KEYBITS / 8; -+ if (opt_key_size || opt_cipher) -+ key_size = get_adjusted_key_size(mode, DEFAULT_LUKS1_KEYBITS, 0); - else - key_size = crypt_get_volume_key_size(cd); - -diff -rupN cryptsetup-2.3.3.orig/tests/luks2-reencryption-test cryptsetup-2.3.3/tests/luks2-reencryption-test ---- cryptsetup-2.3.3.orig/tests/luks2-reencryption-test 2021-02-18 12:37:44.916909486 +0100 -+++ cryptsetup-2.3.3/tests/luks2-reencryption-test 2021-02-18 12:39:33.589815857 +0100 -@@ -648,7 +648,7 @@ function reencrypt_online_fixed_size() { - } - - function setup_luks2_env() { -- echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksFormat --type luks2 $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON $DEV || fail -+ echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksFormat --type luks2 -c aes-xts-plain64 $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON $DEV || fail - echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP open $DEV $DEV_NAME || fail - HAVE_KEYRING=$($CRYPTSETUP status $DEV_NAME | grep "key location: keyring") - if [ -n "$HAVE_KEYRING" ]; then -@@ -656,6 +656,8 @@ function setup_luks2_env() { - else - HAVE_KEYRING=0 - fi -+ DEF_XTS_KEY=$($CRYPTSETUP status $DEV_NAME | grep "keysize:" | sed 's/\( keysize: \)\([0-9]\+\)\(.*\)/\2/') -+ [ -n "$DEF_XTS_KEY" ] || fail "Failed to parse xts mode key size." - $CRYPTSETUP close $DEV_NAME || fail - } - -@@ -730,6 +732,8 @@ check_hash $PWD1 $HASH1 - echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP reencrypt $DEV -q -c aes-xts-plain64 --init-only $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON || fail - echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP open $DEV $DEV_NAME || fail - echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP reencrypt --active-name /dev/mapper/$DEV_NAME --resilience none -q || fail -+XTS_KEY=$($CRYPTSETUP status $DEV_NAME | grep "keysize:" | sed 's/\( keysize: \)\([0-9]\+\)\(.*\)/\2/') -+[ "$XTS_KEY" -eq "$DEF_XTS_KEY" ] || fail "xts mode has wrong key size after reencryption ($XTS_KEY != expected $DEF_XTS_KEY)" - echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP close $DEV_NAME || fail - echo -n "[OK][4096 sector]" - prepare sector_size=4096 dev_size_mb=32 -diff -rupN cryptsetup-2.3.3.orig/lib/libdevmapper.c cryptsetup-2.3.3/lib/libdevmapper.c ---- cryptsetup-2.3.3.orig/lib/libdevmapper.c 2021-02-18 16:21:00.863470374 +0100 -+++ cryptsetup-2.3.3/lib/libdevmapper.c 2021-02-18 16:22:36.330393562 +0100 -@@ -639,11 +639,13 @@ static char *get_dm_crypt_params(const s - if (!strncmp(cipher_dm, "cipher_null-", 12)) - null_cipher = 1; - -- if (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY) { -+ if (null_cipher) -+ hexkey = crypt_safe_alloc(2); -+ else if (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY) { - keystr_len = strlen(tgt->u.crypt.vk->key_description) + int_log10(tgt->u.crypt.vk->keylength) + 10; - hexkey = crypt_safe_alloc(keystr_len); - } else -- hexkey = crypt_safe_alloc(null_cipher ? 2 : (tgt->u.crypt.vk->keylength * 2 + 1)); -+ hexkey = crypt_safe_alloc(tgt->u.crypt.vk->keylength * 2 + 1); - - if (!hexkey) - return NULL; -From 284a49443e2a833e33714f9fa0f03b8e0233d68d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Ondrej Kozina -Date: Thu, 18 Feb 2021 15:01:01 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH 3/3] Extend LUKS2 reencryption tests w/ cipher_null. - ---- - tests/luks2-reencryption-test | 106 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- - 1 file changed, 104 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/tests/luks2-reencryption-test b/tests/luks2-reencryption-test -index 9bdf60a..05c2151 100755 ---- a/tests/luks2-reencryption-test -+++ b/tests/luks2-reencryption-test -@@ -297,7 +297,7 @@ function reencrypt_recover() { # $1 sector size, $2 resilience, $3 digest, [$4 h - test -z "$4" || _hdr="--header $4" - - error_writes $OVRDEV $OLD_DEV $ERROFFSET $ERRLENGTH -- echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP reencrypt $DEV $_hdr --hotzone-size 1M --resilience $2 --sector-size $1 -q $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON 2>/dev/null && fail -+ echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP reencrypt $DEV $_hdr --hotzone-size 1M --resilience $2 --sector-size $1 -q $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON >/dev/null 2>&1 && fail - fix_writes $OVRDEV $OLD_DEV - - echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q repair $DEV $_hdr || fail -@@ -318,7 +318,7 @@ function reencrypt_recover_online() { # $1 sector size, $2 resilience, $3 digest - echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP open $DEV $_hdr $DEV_NAME || fail - - error_writes $OVRDEV $OLD_DEV $ERROFFSET $ERRLENGTH -- echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP reencrypt --active-name $DEV_NAME $_hdr --hotzone-size 1M --resilience $2 --sector-size $1 -q $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON 2>/dev/null && fail -+ echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP reencrypt --active-name $DEV_NAME $_hdr --hotzone-size 1M --resilience $2 --sector-size $1 -q $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON >/dev/null 2>&1 && fail - $CRYPTSETUP status $DEV_NAME $_hdr | grep -q "reencryption: in-progress" || fail - $CRYPTSETUP close $DEV_NAME || fail - fix_writes $OVRDEV $OLD_DEV -@@ -1444,5 +1444,107 @@ check_hash $PWD1 $HASH1 - # both keyslot and segment cipher must not be null after reencryption with default params - $CRYPTSETUP luksDump $DEV | grep -q "cipher_null" && fail - -+# multistep reencryption with initial cipher_null -+preparebig 64 -+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksFormat --type luks2 $DEV -c null --offset 16384 -q $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON || fail -+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP open $DEV $DEV_NAME -+wipe_dev /dev/mapper/$DEV_NAME -+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP reencrypt $DEV --hotzone-size 1M --resilience none -q $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON >/dev/null || fail -+$CRYPTSETUP close $DEV_NAME -+check_hash $PWD1 $HASH5 -+ -+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksFormat --type luks2 $DEV -c null --offset 16384 -q $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON || fail -+wipe $PWD1 -+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP reencrypt $DEV --hotzone-size 1M --resilience none -q $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON >/dev/null || fail -+check_hash $PWD1 $HASH5 -+ -+echo "[25] Reencryption recovery with cipher_null" -+# (check opt-io size optimization in reencryption code does not affect recovery) -+# device with opt-io size 32k -+prepare_linear_dev 32 opt_blks=64 $OPT_XFERLEN_EXP -+OFFSET=8192 -+ -+echo "sector size 512->512" -+ -+get_error_offsets 32 $OFFSET -+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks2 -c null --sector-size 512 --offset $OFFSET $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON $DEV || fail -+wipe $PWD1 -+check_hash $PWD1 $HASH1 -+ -+echo "ERR writes to sectors [$ERROFFSET,$(($ERROFFSET+$ERRLENGTH-1))]" -+reencrypt_recover 512 checksum $HASH1 -+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks2 -c null --sector-size 512 --offset $OFFSET $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON $DEV || fail -+wipe $PWD1 -+reencrypt_recover 512 journal $HASH1 -+ -+if [ -n "$DM_SECTOR_SIZE" ]; then -+ echo "sector size 512->4096" -+ -+ get_error_offsets 32 $OFFSET 4096 -+ echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks2 -c null --sector-size 512 --offset $OFFSET $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON $DEV || fail -+ wipe $PWD1 -+ check_hash $PWD1 $HASH1 -+ -+ echo "ERR writes to sectors [$ERROFFSET,$(($ERROFFSET+$ERRLENGTH-1))]" -+ reencrypt_recover 4096 checksum $HASH1 -+ echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks2 -c null --sector-size 512 --offset $OFFSET $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON $DEV || fail -+ wipe $PWD1 -+ check_hash $PWD1 $HASH1 -+ reencrypt_recover 4096 journal $HASH1 -+ -+ echo "sector size 4096->4096" -+ -+ get_error_offsets 32 $OFFSET 4096 -+ echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks2 -c null --sector-size 4096 -c aes-cbc-essiv:sha256 --offset $OFFSET $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON $DEV || fail -+ wipe $PWD1 -+ check_hash $PWD1 $HASH1 -+ -+ echo "ERR writes to sectors [$ERROFFSET,$(($ERROFFSET+$ERRLENGTH-1))]" -+ reencrypt_recover 4096 checksum $HASH1 -+ reencrypt_recover 4096 journal $HASH1 -+fi -+ -+echo "[26] Reencryption recovery with cipher_null (online i/o error)" -+ -+echo "sector size 512->512" -+ -+get_error_offsets 32 $OFFSET -+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks2 --sector-size 512 -c null --offset $OFFSET $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON $DEV || fail -+wipe $PWD1 -+check_hash $PWD1 $HASH1 -+ -+echo "ERR writes to sectors [$ERROFFSET,$(($ERROFFSET+$ERRLENGTH-1))]" -+reencrypt_recover_online 512 checksum $HASH1 -+echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks2 --sector-size 512 -c null --offset $OFFSET $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON $DEV || fail -+wipe $PWD1 -+reencrypt_recover_online 512 journal $HASH1 -+ -+if [ -n "$DM_SECTOR_SIZE" ]; then -+ echo "sector size 512->4096" -+ -+ get_error_offsets 32 $OFFSET 4096 -+ echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks2 -c null --sector-size 512 --offset $OFFSET $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON $DEV || fail -+ wipe $PWD1 -+ check_hash $PWD1 $HASH1 -+ -+ echo "ERR writes to sectors [$ERROFFSET,$(($ERROFFSET+$ERRLENGTH-1))]" -+ reencrypt_recover_online 4096 checksum $HASH1 -+ echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks2 -c null --sector-size 512 --offset $OFFSET $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON $DEV || fail -+ wipe $PWD1 -+ check_hash $PWD1 $HASH1 -+ reencrypt_recover_online 4096 journal $HASH1 -+ -+ echo "sector size 4096->4096" -+ -+ get_error_offsets 32 $OFFSET 4096 -+ echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks2 -c null --sector-size 4096 -c aes-cbc-essiv:sha256 --offset $OFFSET $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON $DEV || fail -+ wipe $PWD1 -+ check_hash $PWD1 $HASH1 -+ -+ echo "ERR writes to sectors [$ERROFFSET,$(($ERROFFSET+$ERRLENGTH-1))]" -+ reencrypt_recover_online 4096 checksum $HASH1 -+ reencrypt_recover_online 4096 journal $HASH1 -+fi -+ - remove_mapping - exit 0 --- -1.8.3.1 - diff --git a/SOURCES/cryptsetup-2.4.2-Do-not-try-to-set-compiler-optimization-flag-if-wipe.patch b/SOURCES/cryptsetup-2.4.2-Do-not-try-to-set-compiler-optimization-flag-if-wipe.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ea52c96 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/cryptsetup-2.4.2-Do-not-try-to-set-compiler-optimization-flag-if-wipe.patch @@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ +From a76310b53fbb117e620f2c37350b68dd267f1088 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Milan Broz +Date: Mon, 20 Sep 2021 17:42:20 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] Do not try to set compiler optimization flag if wipe is + implemented in libc. + +If zeroing memory is implemented through libc call (like memset_bzero), +compiler should never remove such call. It is not needed to set O0 +optimization flag explicitly. + +Various checkers like annocheck causes problems with these flags, +just remove it where it makes no sense. + +(Moreover, we use the same pattern without compiler magic +in crypt_backend_memzero() already.) +--- + lib/crypto_backend/argon2/core.c | 10 ++++++++-- + 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/lib/crypto_backend/argon2/core.c b/lib/crypto_backend/argon2/core.c +index b204ba98..db9a7741 100644 +--- a/lib/crypto_backend/argon2/core.c ++++ b/lib/crypto_backend/argon2/core.c +@@ -120,18 +120,24 @@ void free_memory(const argon2_context *context, uint8_t *memory, + } + } + +-void NOT_OPTIMIZED secure_wipe_memory(void *v, size_t n) { + #if defined(_MSC_VER) && VC_GE_2005(_MSC_VER) ++void secure_wipe_memory(void *v, size_t n) { + SecureZeroMemory(v, n); ++} + #elif defined memset_s ++void secure_wipe_memory(void *v, size_t n) { + memset_s(v, n, 0, n); ++} + #elif defined(HAVE_EXPLICIT_BZERO) ++void secure_wipe_memory(void *v, size_t n) { + explicit_bzero(v, n); ++} + #else ++void NOT_OPTIMIZED secure_wipe_memory(void *v, size_t n) { + static void *(*const volatile memset_sec)(void *, int, size_t) = &memset; + memset_sec(v, 0, n); +-#endif + } ++#endif + + /* Memory clear flag defaults to true. */ + int FLAG_clear_internal_memory = 1; +-- +2.27.0 + diff --git a/SOURCES/cryptsetup-2.4.2-Fix-bogus-memory-allocation-if-LUKS2-header-size-is-.patch b/SOURCES/cryptsetup-2.4.2-Fix-bogus-memory-allocation-if-LUKS2-header-size-is-.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f07fb32 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/cryptsetup-2.4.2-Fix-bogus-memory-allocation-if-LUKS2-header-size-is-.patch @@ -0,0 +1,295 @@ +From 9576549fee9228cabd9ceee27739a30caab5a7f6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Milan Broz +Date: Tue, 9 Nov 2021 11:54:27 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] Fix bogus memory allocation if LUKS2 header size is invalid. + +LUKS2 code read the whole header to buffer to verify checksum, +so malloc is called on unvalidated input size parameter. + +This can cause out of memory or unintentional device reads. +(Header validation will fail later anyway - the size is unsupported.) + +Just do not allow too small and too big allocations here and fail quickly. + +Fixes: #683. +--- + lib/luks2/luks2_disk_metadata.c | 20 +++- + ...ks2-metadata-size-invalid-secondary.img.sh | 96 +++++++++++++++++++ + ...enerate-luks2-metadata-size-invalid.img.sh | 94 ++++++++++++++++++ + tests/luks2-validation-test | 2 + + 4 files changed, 208 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + create mode 100755 tests/generators/generate-luks2-metadata-size-invalid-secondary.img.sh + create mode 100755 tests/generators/generate-luks2-metadata-size-invalid.img.sh + +diff --git a/lib/luks2/luks2_disk_metadata.c b/lib/luks2/luks2_disk_metadata.c +index 502b0226..0500d5c7 100644 +--- a/lib/luks2/luks2_disk_metadata.c ++++ b/lib/luks2/luks2_disk_metadata.c +@@ -195,6 +195,8 @@ static int hdr_disk_sanity_check_pre(struct crypt_device *cd, + size_t *hdr_json_size, int secondary, + uint64_t offset) + { ++ uint64_t hdr_size; ++ + if (memcmp(hdr->magic, secondary ? LUKS2_MAGIC_2ND : LUKS2_MAGIC_1ST, LUKS2_MAGIC_L)) + return -EINVAL; + +@@ -209,19 +211,26 @@ static int hdr_disk_sanity_check_pre(struct crypt_device *cd, + return -EINVAL; + } + +- if (secondary && (offset != be64_to_cpu(hdr->hdr_size))) { ++ hdr_size = be64_to_cpu(hdr->hdr_size); ++ ++ if (hdr_size < LUKS2_HDR_16K_LEN || hdr_size > LUKS2_HDR_OFFSET_MAX) { ++ log_dbg(cd, "LUKS2 header has bogus size 0x%04x.", (unsigned)hdr_size); ++ return -EINVAL; ++ } ++ ++ if (secondary && (offset != hdr_size)) { + log_dbg(cd, "LUKS2 offset 0x%04x in secondary header does not match size 0x%04x.", +- (unsigned)offset, (unsigned)be64_to_cpu(hdr->hdr_size)); ++ (unsigned)offset, (unsigned)hdr_size); + return -EINVAL; + } + + /* FIXME: sanity check checksum alg. */ + + log_dbg(cd, "LUKS2 header version %u of size %u bytes, checksum %s.", +- (unsigned)be16_to_cpu(hdr->version), (unsigned)be64_to_cpu(hdr->hdr_size), ++ (unsigned)be16_to_cpu(hdr->version), (unsigned)hdr_size, + hdr->checksum_alg); + +- *hdr_json_size = be64_to_cpu(hdr->hdr_size) - LUKS2_HDR_BIN_LEN; ++ *hdr_json_size = hdr_size - LUKS2_HDR_BIN_LEN; + return 0; + } + +@@ -252,6 +261,9 @@ static int hdr_read_disk(struct crypt_device *cd, + return -EIO; + } + ++ /* ++ * hdr_json_size is validated if this call succeeds ++ */ + r = hdr_disk_sanity_check_pre(cd, hdr_disk, &hdr_json_size, secondary, offset); + if (r < 0) { + return r; +diff --git a/tests/generators/generate-luks2-metadata-size-invalid-secondary.img.sh b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-metadata-size-invalid-secondary.img.sh +new file mode 100755 +index 00000000..4dd484e9 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-metadata-size-invalid-secondary.img.sh +@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@ ++#!/bin/bash ++ ++. lib.sh ++ ++# ++# *** Description *** ++# ++# generate primary with predefined json_size. There's only limited ++# set of values allowed as json size in config section of LUKS2 ++# metadata ++# ++# secondary header is corrupted on purpose as well ++# ++ ++# $1 full target dir ++# $2 full source luks2 image ++ ++function prepare() ++{ ++ cp $SRC_IMG $TGT_IMG ++ test -d $TMPDIR || mkdir $TMPDIR ++ read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json0 ++ read_luks2_bin_hdr0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr0 ++ read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr1 ++} ++ ++function generate() ++{ ++ TEST_MDA_SIZE=$LUKS2_HDR_SIZE_1M ++ ++ TEST_MDA_SIZE_BYTES=$((TEST_MDA_SIZE*512)) ++ TEST_MDA_SIZE_BOGUS_BYTES=$((TEST_MDA_SIZE*512*2*1024)) ++ TEST_JSN_SIZE=$((TEST_MDA_SIZE-LUKS2_BIN_HDR_SIZE)) ++ KEYSLOTS_OFFSET=$((TEST_MDA_SIZE*1024)) ++ JSON_DIFF=$(((TEST_MDA_SIZE-LUKS2_HDR_SIZE)*1024)) ++ JSON_SIZE=$((TEST_JSN_SIZE*512)) ++ DATA_OFFSET=16777216 ++ ++ json_str=$(jq -c --arg jdiff $JSON_DIFF --arg jsize $JSON_SIZE --arg off $DATA_OFFSET \ ++ '.keyslots[].area.offset |= ( . | tonumber + ($jdiff | tonumber) | tostring) | ++ .config.json_size = $jsize | ++ .segments."0".offset = $off' $TMPDIR/json0) ++ test -n "$json_str" || exit 2 ++ test ${#json_str} -lt $((LUKS2_JSON_SIZE*512)) || exit 2 ++ ++ write_luks2_json "$json_str" $TMPDIR/json0 $TEST_JSN_SIZE ++ ++ write_bin_hdr_size $TMPDIR/hdr0 $TEST_MDA_SIZE_BYTES ++ write_bin_hdr_size $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TEST_MDA_SIZE_BOGUS_BYTES ++ ++ write_bin_hdr_offset $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TEST_MDA_SIZE_BYTES ++ ++ merge_bin_hdr_with_json $TMPDIR/hdr0 $TMPDIR/json0 $TMPDIR/area0 $TEST_JSN_SIZE ++ merge_bin_hdr_with_json $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TMPDIR/json0 $TMPDIR/area1 $TEST_JSN_SIZE ++ ++ erase_checksum $TMPDIR/area0 ++ chks0=$(calc_sha256_checksum_file $TMPDIR/area0) ++ write_checksum $chks0 $TMPDIR/area0 ++ ++ erase_checksum $TMPDIR/area1 ++ chks0=$(calc_sha256_checksum_file $TMPDIR/area1) ++ write_checksum $chks0 $TMPDIR/area1 ++ ++ kill_bin_hdr $TMPDIR/area0 ++ ++ write_luks2_hdr0 $TMPDIR/area0 $TGT_IMG $TEST_MDA_SIZE ++ write_luks2_hdr1 $TMPDIR/area1 $TGT_IMG $TEST_MDA_SIZE ++} ++ ++function check() ++{ ++ read_luks2_bin_hdr0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr_res0 $TEST_MDA_SIZE ++ local str_res0=$(head -c 6 $TMPDIR/hdr_res0) ++ test "$str_res0" = "VACUUM" || exit 2 ++ read_luks2_json1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json_res1 $TEST_JSN_SIZE ++ jq -c --arg koff $KEYSLOTS_OFFSET --arg jsize $JSON_SIZE \ ++ 'if ([.keyslots[].area.offset] | map(tonumber) | min | tostring != $koff) or ++ (.config.json_size != $jsize) ++ then error("Unexpected value in result json") else empty end' $TMPDIR/json_res1 || exit 5 ++} ++ ++function cleanup() ++{ ++ rm -f $TMPDIR/* ++ rm -fd $TMPDIR ++} ++ ++test $# -eq 2 || exit 1 ++ ++TGT_IMG=$1/$(test_img_name $0) ++SRC_IMG=$2 ++ ++prepare ++generate ++check ++cleanup +diff --git a/tests/generators/generate-luks2-metadata-size-invalid.img.sh b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-metadata-size-invalid.img.sh +new file mode 100755 +index 00000000..6b9c0cf7 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-metadata-size-invalid.img.sh +@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@ ++#!/bin/bash ++ ++. lib.sh ++ ++# ++# *** Description *** ++# ++# generate primary with predefined json_size. There's only limited ++# set of values allowed as json size in config section of LUKS2 ++# metadata ++# ++# secondary header is corrupted on purpose as well ++# ++ ++# $1 full target dir ++# $2 full source luks2 image ++ ++function prepare() ++{ ++ cp $SRC_IMG $TGT_IMG ++ test -d $TMPDIR || mkdir $TMPDIR ++ read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json0 ++ read_luks2_bin_hdr0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr0 ++ read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr1 ++} ++ ++function generate() ++{ ++ TEST_MDA_SIZE=$LUKS2_HDR_SIZE_1M ++ ++ TEST_MDA_SIZE_BYTES=$((TEST_MDA_SIZE*512)) ++ TEST_MDA_SIZE_BOGUS_BYTES=$((TEST_MDA_SIZE*512*2*1024)) ++ TEST_JSN_SIZE=$((TEST_MDA_SIZE-LUKS2_BIN_HDR_SIZE)) ++ KEYSLOTS_OFFSET=$((TEST_MDA_SIZE*1024)) ++ JSON_DIFF=$(((TEST_MDA_SIZE-LUKS2_HDR_SIZE)*1024)) ++ JSON_SIZE=$((TEST_JSN_SIZE*512)) ++ DATA_OFFSET=16777216 ++ ++ json_str=$(jq -c --arg jdiff $JSON_DIFF --arg jsize $JSON_SIZE --arg off $DATA_OFFSET \ ++ '.keyslots[].area.offset |= ( . | tonumber + ($jdiff | tonumber) | tostring) | ++ .config.json_size = $jsize | ++ .segments."0".offset = $off' $TMPDIR/json0) ++ test -n "$json_str" || exit 2 ++ test ${#json_str} -lt $((LUKS2_JSON_SIZE*512)) || exit 2 ++ ++ write_luks2_json "$json_str" $TMPDIR/json0 $TEST_JSN_SIZE ++ ++ write_bin_hdr_size $TMPDIR/hdr0 $TEST_MDA_SIZE_BOGUS_BYTES ++ write_bin_hdr_size $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TEST_MDA_SIZE_BOGUS_BYTES ++ ++ merge_bin_hdr_with_json $TMPDIR/hdr0 $TMPDIR/json0 $TMPDIR/area0 $TEST_JSN_SIZE ++ merge_bin_hdr_with_json $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TMPDIR/json0 $TMPDIR/area1 $TEST_JSN_SIZE ++ ++ erase_checksum $TMPDIR/area0 ++ chks0=$(calc_sha256_checksum_file $TMPDIR/area0) ++ write_checksum $chks0 $TMPDIR/area0 ++ ++ erase_checksum $TMPDIR/area1 ++ chks0=$(calc_sha256_checksum_file $TMPDIR/area1) ++ write_checksum $chks0 $TMPDIR/area1 ++ ++ kill_bin_hdr $TMPDIR/area1 ++ ++ write_luks2_hdr0 $TMPDIR/area0 $TGT_IMG $TEST_MDA_SIZE ++ write_luks2_hdr1 $TMPDIR/area1 $TGT_IMG $TEST_MDA_SIZE ++} ++ ++function check() ++{ ++ read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr_res1 $TEST_MDA_SIZE ++ local str_res1=$(head -c 6 $TMPDIR/hdr_res1) ++ test "$str_res1" = "VACUUM" || exit 2 ++ read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json_res0 $TEST_JSN_SIZE ++ jq -c --arg koff $KEYSLOTS_OFFSET --arg jsize $JSON_SIZE \ ++ 'if ([.keyslots[].area.offset] | map(tonumber) | min | tostring != $koff) or ++ (.config.json_size != $jsize) ++ then error("Unexpected value in result json") else empty end' $TMPDIR/json_res0 || exit 5 ++} ++ ++function cleanup() ++{ ++ rm -f $TMPDIR/* ++ rm -fd $TMPDIR ++} ++ ++test $# -eq 2 || exit 1 ++ ++TGT_IMG=$1/$(test_img_name $0) ++SRC_IMG=$2 ++ ++prepare ++generate ++check ++cleanup +diff --git a/tests/luks2-validation-test b/tests/luks2-validation-test +index 04183fbc..f771e1f9 100755 +--- a/tests/luks2-validation-test ++++ b/tests/luks2-validation-test +@@ -229,6 +229,8 @@ RUN luks2-metadata-size-512k-secondary.img "R" "Valid 512KiB metadata size in s + RUN luks2-metadata-size-1m-secondary.img "R" "Valid 1MiB metadata size in secondary hdr failed to validate" + RUN luks2-metadata-size-2m-secondary.img "R" "Valid 2MiB metadata size in secondary hdr failed to validate" + RUN luks2-metadata-size-4m-secondary.img "R" "Valid 4MiB metadata size in secondary hdr failed to validate" ++RUN luks2-metadata-size-invalid.img "F" "Invalid metadata size in secondary hdr not rejected" ++RUN luks2-metadata-size-invalid-secondary.img "F" "Invalid metadata size in secondary hdr not rejected" + + remove_mapping + +-- +2.27.0 + diff --git a/SOURCES/cryptsetup-2.5.0-Fix-typo-in-repair-prompt.patch b/SOURCES/cryptsetup-2.5.0-Fix-typo-in-repair-prompt.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a34329b --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/cryptsetup-2.5.0-Fix-typo-in-repair-prompt.patch @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +diff -rupN cryptsetup-2.3.7.old/src/cryptsetup.c cryptsetup-2.3.7/src/cryptsetup.c +--- cryptsetup-2.3.7.old/src/cryptsetup.c 2022-01-20 14:47:13.198475734 +0100 ++++ cryptsetup-2.3.7/src/cryptsetup.c 2022-01-20 14:47:24.186505625 +0100 +@@ -1137,7 +1137,7 @@ static int reencrypt_metadata_repair(str + _("Operation aborted.\n"))) + return -EINVAL; + +- r = tools_get_key(_("Enter passphrase to protect and uppgrade reencryption metadata: "), ++ r = tools_get_key(_("Enter passphrase to protect and upgrade reencryption metadata: "), + &password, &passwordLen, opt_keyfile_offset, + opt_keyfile_size, opt_key_file, opt_timeout, + _verify_passphrase(0), 0, cd); diff --git a/SPECS/cryptsetup.spec b/SPECS/cryptsetup.spec index aedeee3..4cad198 100644 --- a/SPECS/cryptsetup.spec +++ b/SPECS/cryptsetup.spec @@ -4,8 +4,8 @@ Obsoletes: cryptsetup-python3 Summary: A utility for setting up encrypted disks Name: cryptsetup -Version: 2.3.3 -Release: 4%{?dist} +Version: 2.3.7 +Release: 1%{?dist} License: GPLv2+ and LGPLv2+ Group: Applications/System URL: https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup @@ -23,9 +23,9 @@ Source0: https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v2.0/cryptsetup-%{ups Patch0: %{name}-add-system-library-paths.patch # Remove the patch when (if ever) osci infrastructure gets stable enough Patch1: %{name}-disable-verity-compat-test.patch -Patch2: %{name}-2.3.4-luks2-validation-32bit-fix.patch -Patch3: %{name}-2.3.4-fix-crypto-backend-to-properly-handle-ECB-mode.patch -Patch4: %{name}-2.3.5-fix-reencryption-cipher_null.patch +Patch2: %{name}-2.4.2-Do-not-try-to-set-compiler-optimization-flag-if-wipe.patch +Patch3: %{name}-2.4.2-Fix-bogus-memory-allocation-if-LUKS2-header-size-is-.patch +Patch4: %{name}-2.5.0-Fix-typo-in-repair-prompt.patch %description The cryptsetup package contains a utility for setting up @@ -144,6 +144,15 @@ rm -rf %{buildroot}/%{_libdir}/*.la %clean %changelog +* Thu Jan 20 2022 Ondrej Kozina - 2.3.7-1 +- update to cryptsetup 2.3.7 +- fixes CVE-2021-4122 +- patch: Fix suboptimal optimization in bundled argon2. +- patch: Fix bogus memory allocation/device read with + invalid LUKS2 headers +- patch: Fix typo in luksRepair prompt. +- Resolves: #2021815 #2022301 #2031859 + * Wed Feb 17 2021 Ondrej Kozina - 2.3.3-4 - patch: Fix reencryption for custom devices with data segments set to use cipher_null.