diff --git a/SOURCES/cryptsetup-2.3.4-fix-crypto-backend-to-properly-handle-ECB-mode.patch b/SOURCES/cryptsetup-2.3.4-fix-crypto-backend-to-properly-handle-ECB-mode.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8fdfda0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/cryptsetup-2.3.4-fix-crypto-backend-to-properly-handle-ECB-mode.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+From f3906957675e466bbe7fa97a725f56c7c494d4a5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com>
+Date: Tue, 21 Jul 2020 14:14:54 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix crypto backend to properly handle ECB mode.
+
+Despite it should be never used, it should still work :)
+
+Bug introduced in version 2.3.2.
+---
+ lib/crypto_backend/crypto_storage.c | 2 +-
+ tests/compat-test2                  | 9 +++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/crypto_backend/crypto_storage.c b/lib/crypto_backend/crypto_storage.c
+index 8b6c19c..92dbae7 100644
+--- a/lib/crypto_backend/crypto_storage.c
++++ b/lib/crypto_backend/crypto_storage.c
+@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ static int crypt_sector_iv_init(struct crypt_sector_iv *ctx,
+ 	memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
+ 
+ 	ctx->iv_size = crypt_cipher_ivsize(cipher_name, mode_name);
+-	if (ctx->iv_size < 8)
++	if (ctx->iv_size < 0 || (strcmp(mode_name, "ecb") && ctx->iv_size < 8))
+ 		return -ENOENT;
+ 
+ 	if (!strcmp(cipher_name, "cipher_null") ||
+diff --git a/tests/compat-test2 b/tests/compat-test2
+index 0fad999..c3852cd 100755
+--- a/tests/compat-test2
++++ b/tests/compat-test2
+@@ -1023,5 +1023,14 @@ echo $PWD3 | $CRYPTSETUP luksConvertKey --key-slot 22 $LOOPDEV --keyslot-cipher
+ [ "$($CRYPTSETUP luksDump $IMG | grep -A8 -m1 "22: luks2" | grep "Cipher:"    | sed -e 's/[[:space:]]\+Cipher:\ \+//g')" = $KEYSLOT_CIPHER ] || fail
+ [ "$($CRYPTSETUP luksDump $IMG | grep -A8 -m1 "22: luks2" | grep "Cipher key:"| sed -e 's/[[:space:]]\+Cipher\ key:\ \+//g')" = "128 bits" ] || fail
+ 
++prepare "[42] Some encryption compatibility mode tests" wipe
++CIPHERS="aes-ecb aes-cbc-null aes-cbc-plain64 aes-cbc-essiv:sha256 aes-xts-plain64"
++key_size=256
++for cipher in $CIPHERS ; do
++	echo -n "[$cipher/$key_size]"
++	$CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks2 $LOOPDEV $KEY1 $FAST_PBKDF_OPT --cipher $cipher --key-size $key_size || fail
++done
++echo
++
+ remove_mapping
+ exit 0
+-- 
+1.8.3.1
+
diff --git a/SOURCES/cryptsetup-2.3.4-luks2-validation-32bit-fix.patch b/SOURCES/cryptsetup-2.3.4-luks2-validation-32bit-fix.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f708ba9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/cryptsetup-2.3.4-luks2-validation-32bit-fix.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,341 @@
+From 52f5cb8cedf22fb3e14c744814ec8af7614146c7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tobias Stoeckmann <tobias@stoeckmann.org>
+Date: Mon, 24 Aug 2020 19:21:43 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 01/11] Check segment gaps regardless of heap space.
+
+Segments are validated in hdr_validate_segments. Gaps in segment keys
+are detected when collecting offsets. But if an invalid segment is very
+large, larger than count, it could happen that cryptsetup is unable to
+allocate enough memory, not giving a clue about what actually is the
+problem.
+
+Therefore check for gaps even if not enough memory is available. This
+gives much more information with debug output enabled.
+
+Obviously cryptsetup still fails if segments are perfectly fine but not
+enough RAM available. But at that stage, the user knows that it's the
+fault of the system, not of an invalid segment.
+---
+ lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c | 19 ++++++++++++-------
+ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c b/lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c
+index 23556f2..ea5c7f7 100644
+--- a/lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c
++++ b/lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c
+@@ -679,11 +679,10 @@ static int hdr_validate_segments(struct crypt_device *cd, json_object *hdr_jobj)
+ 	if (first_backup < 0)
+ 		first_backup = count;
+ 
+-	intervals = malloc(first_backup * sizeof(*intervals));
+-	if (!intervals) {
+-		log_dbg(cd, "Not enough memory.");
+-		return 1;
+-	}
++	if (first_backup <= count && (size_t)first_backup < SIZE_MAX / sizeof(*intervals))
++		intervals = malloc(first_backup * sizeof(*intervals));
++	else
++		intervals = NULL;
+ 
+ 	for (i = 0; i < first_backup; i++) {
+ 		jobj = json_segments_get_segment(jobj_segments, i);
+@@ -692,8 +691,14 @@ static int hdr_validate_segments(struct crypt_device *cd, json_object *hdr_jobj)
+ 			free(intervals);
+ 			return 1;
+ 		}
+-		intervals[i].offset = json_segment_get_offset(jobj, 0);
+-		intervals[i].length = json_segment_get_size(jobj, 0) ?: UINT64_MAX;
++		if (intervals != NULL) {
++			intervals[i].offset = json_segment_get_offset(jobj, 0);
++			intervals[i].length = json_segment_get_size(jobj, 0) ?: UINT64_MAX;
++		}
++	}
++	if (intervals == NULL) {
++		log_dbg(cd, "Not enough memory.");
++		return 1;
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	r = !validate_segment_intervals(cd, first_backup, intervals);
+-- 
+1.8.3.1
+
+From 46ee71edcd13e1dad50815ad65c28779aa6f7503 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Ondrej Kozina <okozina@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 25 Aug 2020 19:32:48 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 07/11] Avoid needlessly large allocations in LUKS2 validation
+ code.
+
+In case LUKS2 backup segment creates gap in between last regular
+segment and backup segment report invalid metadata imediately. We stop
+on first error so there's no need to allocate large memory on heap
+(we may ran with mlock(MCL_FUTURE) set).
+
+Example:
+- total segments count is 3
+- regular segments have keys "0" and "1"
+- first backup segment has key "42"
+---
+ lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c | 8 +++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c b/lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c
+index ea5c7f7..5b73b34 100644
+--- a/lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c
++++ b/lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c
+@@ -676,10 +676,16 @@ static int hdr_validate_segments(struct crypt_device *cd, json_object *hdr_jobj)
+ 		return 1;
+ 	}
+ 
++	/* avoid needlessly large allocation when first backup segment is invalid */
++	if (first_backup >= count) {
++		log_dbg(cd, "Gap between last regular segment and backup segment at key %d.", first_backup);
++		return 1;
++	}
++
+ 	if (first_backup < 0)
+ 		first_backup = count;
+ 
+-	if (first_backup <= count && (size_t)first_backup < SIZE_MAX / sizeof(*intervals))
++	if ((size_t)first_backup < SIZE_MAX / sizeof(*intervals))
+ 		intervals = malloc(first_backup * sizeof(*intervals));
+ 	else
+ 		intervals = NULL;
+-- 
+1.8.3.1
+
+From 752c9a52798f11d3b765b673ebaa3058eb25316e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Ondrej Kozina <okozina@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 25 Aug 2020 19:23:21 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 08/11] Simplify validation code a bit.
+
+Keep it simple. If there's not enough memory we can't validate
+segments. The LUKS2 specification does not recommend to continue
+processing LUKS2 metadata if it can not be properly validated.
+---
+ lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c | 19 ++++++++-----------
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c b/lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c
+index 5b73b34..df89401 100644
+--- a/lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c
++++ b/lib/luks2/luks2_json_metadata.c
+@@ -594,9 +594,9 @@ static bool validate_segment_intervals(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ static int hdr_validate_segments(struct crypt_device *cd, json_object *hdr_jobj)
+ {
+ 	json_object *jobj_segments, *jobj_digests, *jobj_offset, *jobj_size, *jobj_type, *jobj_flags, *jobj;
+-	struct interval *intervals;
+ 	uint64_t offset, size;
+ 	int i, r, count, first_backup = -1;
++	struct interval *intervals = NULL;
+ 
+ 	if (!json_object_object_get_ex(hdr_jobj, "segments", &jobj_segments)) {
+ 		log_dbg(cd, "Missing segments section.");
+@@ -687,8 +687,11 @@ static int hdr_validate_segments(struct crypt_device *cd, json_object *hdr_jobj)
+ 
+ 	if ((size_t)first_backup < SIZE_MAX / sizeof(*intervals))
+ 		intervals = malloc(first_backup * sizeof(*intervals));
+-	else
+-		intervals = NULL;
++
++	if (!intervals) {
++		log_dbg(cd, "Not enough memory.");
++		return 1;
++	}
+ 
+ 	for (i = 0; i < first_backup; i++) {
+ 		jobj = json_segments_get_segment(jobj_segments, i);
+@@ -697,14 +700,8 @@ static int hdr_validate_segments(struct crypt_device *cd, json_object *hdr_jobj)
+ 			free(intervals);
+ 			return 1;
+ 		}
+-		if (intervals != NULL) {
+-			intervals[i].offset = json_segment_get_offset(jobj, 0);
+-			intervals[i].length = json_segment_get_size(jobj, 0) ?: UINT64_MAX;
+-		}
+-	}
+-	if (intervals == NULL) {
+-		log_dbg(cd, "Not enough memory.");
+-		return 1;
++		intervals[i].offset = json_segment_get_offset(jobj, 0);
++		intervals[i].length = json_segment_get_size(jobj, 0) ?: UINT64_MAX;
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	r = !validate_segment_intervals(cd, first_backup, intervals);
+-- 
+1.8.3.1
+
+From 96da06430b6f5c2588c619082f2c5880df9cc776 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Ondrej Kozina <okozina@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 26 Aug 2020 17:24:05 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 09/11] Add test for LUKS2 segments validation code fix.
+
+---
+ ...enerate-luks2-segment-wrong-backup-key-0.img.sh | 67 ++++++++++++++++++++++
+ ...enerate-luks2-segment-wrong-backup-key-1.img.sh | 67 ++++++++++++++++++++++
+ tests/luks2-validation-test                        |  2 +
+ 3 files changed, 136 insertions(+)
+ create mode 100755 tests/generators/generate-luks2-segment-wrong-backup-key-0.img.sh
+ create mode 100755 tests/generators/generate-luks2-segment-wrong-backup-key-1.img.sh
+
+diff --git a/tests/generators/generate-luks2-segment-wrong-backup-key-0.img.sh b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-segment-wrong-backup-key-0.img.sh
+new file mode 100755
+index 0000000..2499a5e
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-segment-wrong-backup-key-0.img.sh
+@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
++#!/bin/bash
++
++. lib.sh
++
++#
++# *** Description ***
++#
++# generate primary header with wrong backup segment id
++#
++# secondary header is corrupted on purpose as well
++#
++
++# $1 full target dir
++# $2 full source luks2 image
++
++function prepare()
++{
++	cp $SRC_IMG $TGT_IMG
++	test -d $TMPDIR || mkdir $TMPDIR
++	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json0
++	read_luks2_bin_hdr0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr0
++	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr1
++}
++
++function generate()
++{
++	# create illegal backup segment key (used to be bug in 32bit implementations)
++	json_str=$(jq -c '.segments[(.segments | length + 1 | tostring)] = { "type" : "linear", "offset" : "512", "size" : "512", "flags":["backup-x"]}' $TMPDIR/json0)
++	test ${#json_str} -lt $((LUKS2_JSON_SIZE*512)) || exit 2
++
++	write_luks2_json "$json_str" $TMPDIR/json0
++
++	merge_bin_hdr_with_json $TMPDIR/hdr0 $TMPDIR/json0 $TMPDIR/area0
++	erase_checksum $TMPDIR/area0
++	chks0=$(calc_sha256_checksum_file $TMPDIR/area0)
++	write_checksum $chks0 $TMPDIR/area0
++	write_luks2_hdr0 $TMPDIR/area0 $TGT_IMG
++	kill_bin_hdr $TMPDIR/hdr1
++	write_luks2_hdr1 $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TGT_IMG
++}
++
++function check()
++{
++	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr_res1
++	local str_res1=$(head -c 6 $TMPDIR/hdr_res1)
++	test "$str_res1" = "VACUUM" || exit 2
++
++	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json_res0
++	jq -c 'if .segments | length < 2
++	       then error("Unexpected segments count") else empty end' $TMPDIR/json_res0 || exit 5
++}
++
++function cleanup()
++{
++	rm -f $TMPDIR/*
++	rm -fd $TMPDIR
++}
++
++test $# -eq 2 || exit 1
++
++TGT_IMG=$1/$(test_img_name $0)
++SRC_IMG=$2
++
++prepare
++generate
++check
++cleanup
+diff --git a/tests/generators/generate-luks2-segment-wrong-backup-key-1.img.sh b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-segment-wrong-backup-key-1.img.sh
+new file mode 100755
+index 0000000..702fe71
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/tests/generators/generate-luks2-segment-wrong-backup-key-1.img.sh
+@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
++#!/bin/bash
++
++. lib.sh
++
++#
++# *** Description ***
++#
++# generate primary header with wrong backup segment id
++#
++# secondary header is corrupted on purpose as well
++#
++
++# $1 full target dir
++# $2 full source luks2 image
++
++function prepare()
++{
++	cp $SRC_IMG $TGT_IMG
++	test -d $TMPDIR || mkdir $TMPDIR
++	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json0
++	read_luks2_bin_hdr0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr0
++	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr1
++}
++
++function generate()
++{
++	# create illegal backup segment key (used to be bug in 32bit implementations)
++	json_str=$(jq -c '(.segments."0".offset | tonumber) as $i | .segments[range(1;65) | tostring] = { "type" : "linear", "offset" : ($i + 512 | tostring), "size" : "512" } | .segments."268435472" = { "type":"linear","offset":"512","size":"512","flags":["backup-x"]}' $TMPDIR/json0)
++	test ${#json_str} -lt $((LUKS2_JSON_SIZE*512)) || exit 2
++
++	write_luks2_json "$json_str" $TMPDIR/json0
++
++	merge_bin_hdr_with_json $TMPDIR/hdr0 $TMPDIR/json0 $TMPDIR/area0
++	erase_checksum $TMPDIR/area0
++	chks0=$(calc_sha256_checksum_file $TMPDIR/area0)
++	write_checksum $chks0 $TMPDIR/area0
++	write_luks2_hdr0 $TMPDIR/area0 $TGT_IMG
++	kill_bin_hdr $TMPDIR/hdr1
++	write_luks2_hdr1 $TMPDIR/hdr1 $TGT_IMG
++}
++
++function check()
++{
++	read_luks2_bin_hdr1 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/hdr_res1
++	local str_res1=$(head -c 6 $TMPDIR/hdr_res1)
++	test "$str_res1" = "VACUUM" || exit 2
++
++	read_luks2_json0 $TGT_IMG $TMPDIR/json_res0
++	jq -c 'if .segments | length < 64
++	       then error("Unexpected segments count") else empty end' $TMPDIR/json_res0 || exit 5
++}
++
++function cleanup()
++{
++	rm -f $TMPDIR/*
++	rm -fd $TMPDIR
++}
++
++test $# -eq 2 || exit 1
++
++TGT_IMG=$1/$(test_img_name $0)
++SRC_IMG=$2
++
++prepare
++generate
++check
++cleanup
+diff --git a/tests/luks2-validation-test b/tests/luks2-validation-test
+index 52945ba..04183fb 100755
+--- a/tests/luks2-validation-test
++++ b/tests/luks2-validation-test
+@@ -199,6 +199,8 @@ RUN luks2-segment-unknown-type.img			"R" "Validation rejected segment with all m
+ RUN luks2-segment-two.img				"R" "Validation rejected two valid segments"
+ RUN luks2-segment-wrong-flags.img			"F" "Failed to detect invalid flags field"
+ RUN luks2-segment-wrong-flags-element.img		"F" "Failed to detect invalid flags content"
++RUN luks2-segment-wrong-backup-key-0.img		"F" "Failed to detect gap in backup segments"
++RUN luks2-segment-wrong-backup-key-1.img		"F" "Failed to detect gap in backup segments"
+ 
+ echo "[6] Test metadata size and keyslots size (config section)"
+ RUN luks2-invalid-keyslots-size-c0.img			"F" "Failed to detect too large keyslots_size in config section"
+-- 
+1.8.3.1
+
diff --git a/SOURCES/cryptsetup-2.3.5-fix-reencryption-cipher_null.patch b/SOURCES/cryptsetup-2.3.5-fix-reencryption-cipher_null.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3db63c1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/cryptsetup-2.3.5-fix-reencryption-cipher_null.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,769 @@
+diff -rupN cryptsetup-2.3.3.orig/tests/api-test-2.c cryptsetup-2.3.3/tests/api-test-2.c
+--- cryptsetup-2.3.3.orig/tests/api-test-2.c	2021-02-17 19:48:46.483519319 +0100
++++ cryptsetup-2.3.3/tests/api-test-2.c	2021-02-17 19:49:10.527493909 +0100
+@@ -2876,6 +2876,12 @@ static void Luks2KeyslotParams(void)
+ 	const char *mk_hex2 = "bb21158c733229347bd4e681891e213d94c685be6a5b84818afe7a78a6de7a1e";
+ 	size_t key_size_ret, key_size = strlen(mk_hex) / 2, keyslot_key_size = 16;
+ 	uint64_t r_payload_offset;
++	const struct crypt_pbkdf_type fast_pbkdf = {
++		.type = "pbkdf2",
++		.hash = "sha256",
++		.iterations = 1000,
++		.flags = CRYPT_PBKDF_NO_BENCHMARK
++	};
+ 
+ 	crypt_decode_key(key, mk_hex, key_size);
+ 	crypt_decode_key(key2, mk_hex2, key_size);
+@@ -2889,7 +2895,7 @@ static void Luks2KeyslotParams(void)
+ 	EQ_(key_size, 2 * keyslot_key_size);
+ 	/* test crypt_keyslot_add_by_key */
+ 	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_OK));
+-	crypt_set_iteration_time(cd, 1);
++	OK_(crypt_set_pbkdf_type(cd, &fast_pbkdf));
+ 	OK_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, key, key_size, NULL));
+ 	NULL_(crypt_keyslot_get_encryption(cd, 0, &key_size_ret));
+ 	OK_(strcmp(crypt_keyslot_get_encryption(cd, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, &key_size_ret), cipher_spec));
+@@ -2948,7 +2954,7 @@ static void Luks2KeyslotParams(void)
+ 	OK_(strcmp(crypt_keyslot_get_encryption(cd, 7, &key_size_ret), cipher_keyslot));
+ 	EQ_(key_size_ret, keyslot_key_size);
+ 
+-	crypt_set_iteration_time(cd, 1);
++	OK_(crypt_set_pbkdf_type(cd, &fast_pbkdf));
+ 	EQ_(8, crypt_keyslot_change_by_passphrase(cd, 1, 8, PASSPHRASE1, strlen(PASSPHRASE1), PASSPHRASE, strlen(PASSPHRASE)));
+ 	OK_(strcmp(crypt_keyslot_get_encryption(cd, 8, &key_size_ret), cipher_spec));
+ 	EQ_(key_size_ret, key_size);
+@@ -2977,7 +2983,7 @@ static void Luks2KeyslotParams(void)
+ 
+ 	/* LUKS1 compatible calls */
+ 	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_OK));
+-	crypt_set_iteration_time(cd, 1);
++	OK_(crypt_set_pbkdf_type(cd, &fast_pbkdf));
+ 	OK_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_LUKS1, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, key, key_size, NULL));
+ 	NULL_(crypt_keyslot_get_encryption(cd, 0, &key_size_ret));
+ 	OK_(strcmp(crypt_keyslot_get_encryption(cd, CRYPT_ANY_SLOT, &key_size_ret), cipher_spec));
+@@ -2987,6 +2993,18 @@ static void Luks2KeyslotParams(void)
+ 	EQ_(key_size_ret, key_size);
+ 	CRYPT_FREE(cd);
+ 
++	/* LUKS2 cipher null checks */
++	OK_(crypt_init(&cd, DMDIR L_DEVICE_OK));
++	OK_(crypt_set_pbkdf_type(cd, &fast_pbkdf));
++	OK_(crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_LUKS2, "cipher_null", "ecb", NULL, key, key_size, NULL));
++	FAIL_(crypt_keyslot_set_encryption(cd, "null", 32), "cipher null is not allowed");
++	FAIL_(crypt_keyslot_set_encryption(cd, "cipher_null", 32), "cipher null is not allowed");
++	FAIL_(crypt_keyslot_set_encryption(cd, "cipher_null-ecb", 32), "cipher null is not allowed");
++	EQ_(0, crypt_keyslot_add_by_volume_key(cd, 0, key, key_size, PASSPHRASE, strlen(PASSPHRASE)));
++	NOTNULL_(crypt_keyslot_get_encryption(cd, 0, &key_size_ret));
++	NULL_(strstr(crypt_keyslot_get_encryption(cd, 0, &key_size_ret), "null"));
++	CRYPT_FREE(cd);
++
+ 	_cleanup_dmdevices();
+ 	_remove_keyfiles();
+ }
+diff -rupN cryptsetup-2.3.3.orig/tests/luks2-reencryption-test cryptsetup-2.3.3/tests/luks2-reencryption-test
+--- cryptsetup-2.3.3.orig/tests/luks2-reencryption-test	2021-02-17 19:48:46.493519309 +0100
++++ cryptsetup-2.3.3/tests/luks2-reencryption-test	2021-02-17 19:50:13.397427467 +0100
+@@ -1365,6 +1365,33 @@ echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksKillSlot $D
+ echo -e "$PWD1\n$PWD1\n$PWD1\n$PWD1\n$PWD1\n$PWD1\n$PWD1\n$PWD1\n$PWD1\n$PWD1\n$PWD1\n$PWD1\n$PWD1\n$PWD2" | $CRYPTSETUP reencrypt $DEV -q 2>/dev/null && fail
+ echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP reencrypt $DEV --resume-only -q 2>/dev/null && fail
+ echo -e "$PWD1\n$PWD1\n$PWD1\n$PWD1\n$PWD1\n$PWD1\n$PWD1\n$PWD1\n$PWD1\n$PWD1\n$PWD1\n$PWD1\n$PWD1\n$PWD1" | $CRYPTSETUP reencrypt $DEV -q  || fail
++ 
++echo "[24] Reencryption with initial cipher_null"
++# aka custom encryption
++prepare dev_size_mb=32
++echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks2 -s 128 -c cipher_null-ecb --offset 8192 $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON $DEV || fail
++wipe $PWD1
++check_hash $PWD1 $HASH1
++echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP reencrypt $DEV -c aes-xts-plain64 -q $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON || fail
++check_hash $PWD1 $HASH1
++
++# online
++echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks2 -s 128 -c cipher_null-ecb --offset 8192 $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON $DEV || fail
++wipe $PWD1
++echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP open $DEV $DEV_NAME
++echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP reencrypt $DEV -c aes-xts-plain64 -q $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON || fail
++check_hash_dev /dev/mapper/$DEV_NAME $HASH1
++$CRYPTSETUP status $DEV_NAME | grep -q "key location: keyring" || fail
++$CRYPTSETUP close $DEV_NAME
++
++# simulate LUKS2 device with cipher_null in both keyslot and segment (it can be created only by up conversion from LUKS1)
++echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks1 -s 128 -c cipher_null-ecb --offset 8192 $FAST_PBKDF2 $DEV || fail
++$CRYPTSETUP convert -q --type luks2 $DEV || fail
++wipe $PWD1
++echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP reencrypt $DEV -c aes-xts-plain64 -q $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON || fail
++check_hash $PWD1 $HASH1
++# both keyslot and segment cipher must not be null
++$CRYPTSETUP luksDump $DEV | grep -q "cipher_null" && fail
+ 
+ remove_mapping
+ exit 0
+diff -rupN cryptsetup-2.3.3.orig/lib/utils_crypt.c cryptsetup-2.3.3/lib/utils_crypt.c
+--- cryptsetup-2.3.3.orig/lib/utils_crypt.c	2021-02-17 17:48:06.535007396 +0100
++++ cryptsetup-2.3.3/lib/utils_crypt.c	2021-02-17 17:49:07.552948180 +0100
+@@ -174,3 +174,10 @@ ssize_t crypt_hex_to_bytes(const char *h
+ 	*result = bytes;
+ 	return i;
+ }
++
++bool crypt_is_cipher_null(const char *cipher_spec)
++{
++	if (!cipher_spec)
++		return false;
++	return (strstr(cipher_spec, "cipher_null") || !strcmp(cipher_spec, "null"));
++}
+diff -rupN cryptsetup-2.3.3.orig/lib/utils_crypt.h cryptsetup-2.3.3/lib/utils_crypt.h
+--- cryptsetup-2.3.3.orig/lib/utils_crypt.h	2021-02-17 17:48:06.535007396 +0100
++++ cryptsetup-2.3.3/lib/utils_crypt.h	2021-02-17 17:49:07.552948180 +0100
+@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
+ #ifndef _UTILS_CRYPT_H
+ #define _UTILS_CRYPT_H
+ 
++#include <stdbool.h>
+ #include <unistd.h>
+ 
+ #define MAX_CIPHER_LEN		32
+@@ -38,4 +39,6 @@ int crypt_parse_pbkdf(const char *s, con
+ 
+ ssize_t crypt_hex_to_bytes(const char *hex, char **result, int safe_alloc);
+ 
++bool crypt_is_cipher_null(const char *cipher_spec);
++
+ #endif /* _UTILS_CRYPT_H */
+diff -rupN cryptsetup-2.3.3.orig/src/cryptsetup.c cryptsetup-2.3.3/src/cryptsetup.c
+--- cryptsetup-2.3.3.orig/src/cryptsetup.c	2021-02-17 17:48:06.538007393 +0100
++++ cryptsetup-2.3.3/src/cryptsetup.c	2021-02-17 17:52:54.174722763 +0100
+@@ -1281,7 +1281,7 @@ static int _luksFormat(struct crypt_devi
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	/* Never call pwquality if using null cipher */
+-	if (tools_is_cipher_null(cipher))
++	if (crypt_is_cipher_null(cipher))
+ 		opt_force_password = 1;
+ 
+ 	if ((r = crypt_init(&cd, header_device))) {
+@@ -1679,7 +1679,7 @@ static int luksAddUnboundKey(void)
+ 		goto out;
+ 
+ 	/* Never call pwquality if using null cipher */
+-	if (tools_is_cipher_null(crypt_get_cipher(cd)))
++	if (crypt_is_cipher_null(crypt_get_cipher(cd)))
+ 		opt_force_password = 1;
+ 
+ 	keysize = opt_key_size / 8;
+@@ -1746,7 +1746,7 @@ static int action_luksAddKey(void)
+ 		goto out;
+ 
+ 	/* Never call pwquality if using null cipher */
+-	if (tools_is_cipher_null(crypt_get_cipher(cd)))
++	if (crypt_is_cipher_null(crypt_get_cipher(cd)))
+ 		opt_force_password = 1;
+ 
+ 	keysize = crypt_get_volume_key_size(cd);
+@@ -1849,7 +1849,7 @@ static int action_luksChangeKey(void)
+ 		goto out;
+ 
+ 	/* Never call pwquality if using null cipher */
+-	if (tools_is_cipher_null(crypt_get_cipher(cd)))
++	if (crypt_is_cipher_null(crypt_get_cipher(cd)))
+ 		opt_force_password = 1;
+ 
+ 	r = set_pbkdf_params(cd, crypt_get_type(cd));
+diff -rupN cryptsetup-2.3.3.orig/src/cryptsetup.h cryptsetup-2.3.3/src/cryptsetup.h
+--- cryptsetup-2.3.3.orig/src/cryptsetup.h	2021-02-17 17:48:06.538007393 +0100
++++ cryptsetup-2.3.3/src/cryptsetup.h	2021-02-17 17:54:15.556641129 +0100
+@@ -97,7 +97,6 @@ int tools_get_key(const char *prompt,
+ void tools_passphrase_msg(int r);
+ int tools_is_stdin(const char *key_file);
+ int tools_string_to_size(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *s, uint64_t *size);
+-int tools_is_cipher_null(const char *cipher);
+ 
+ void tools_clear_line(void);
+ 
+diff -rupN cryptsetup-2.3.3.orig/src/utils_tools.c cryptsetup-2.3.3/src/utils_tools.c
+--- cryptsetup-2.3.3.orig/src/utils_tools.c	2021-02-17 17:48:06.538007393 +0100
++++ cryptsetup-2.3.3/src/utils_tools.c	2021-02-17 17:49:07.572948160 +0100
+@@ -596,14 +596,6 @@ out:
+ 	return r;
+ }
+ 
+-int tools_is_cipher_null(const char *cipher)
+-{
+-	if (!cipher)
+-		return 0;
+-
+-	return !strcmp(cipher, "cipher_null") ? 1 : 0;
+-}
+-
+ /*
+  * Keyfile - is standard input treated as a binary file (no EOL handling).
+  */
+From 03cc8a9ce4c1e04283eb0e0da658aa4509e74949 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Ondrej Kozina <okozina@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 10 Feb 2021 17:50:49 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 3/9] Fix broken detection of null cipher in LUKS2.
+
+This bug enabled to create LUKS2 keyslots encrypted by
+cipher_null when explicitely requested by user. LUKS2
+was never meant to allow keyslot encryption with
+cipher_null. cipher_null is meant for debug purposes
+only as a segment cipher.
+---
+ lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot.c b/lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot.c
+index ed51e24..414189c 100644
+--- a/lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot.c
++++ b/lib/luks2/luks2_keyslot.c
+@@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ int LUKS2_keyslot_cipher_incompatible(struct crypt_device *cd, const char *ciphe
+ {
+ 	char cipher[MAX_CIPHER_LEN], cipher_mode[MAX_CIPHER_LEN];
+ 
+-	if (!cipher_spec || !strcmp(cipher_spec, "null") || !strcmp(cipher_spec, "cipher_null"))
++	if (!cipher_spec || crypt_is_cipher_null(cipher_spec))
+ 		return 1;
+ 
+ 	if (crypt_parse_name_and_mode(cipher_spec, cipher, NULL, cipher_mode) < 0)
+-- 
+1.8.3.1
+
+diff -rupN cryptsetup-2.3.3.orig/lib/luks2/luks2_token.c cryptsetup-2.3.3/lib/luks2/luks2_token.c
+--- cryptsetup-2.3.3.orig/lib/luks2/luks2_token.c	2021-02-17 17:59:35.532320163 +0100
++++ cryptsetup-2.3.3/lib/luks2/luks2_token.c	2021-02-17 18:01:49.925185354 +0100
+@@ -383,6 +383,7 @@ int LUKS2_token_open_and_activate(struct
+ 		uint32_t flags,
+ 		void *usrptr)
+ {
++	bool use_keyring;
+ 	int keyslot, r;
+ 	char *buffer;
+ 	size_t buffer_len;
+@@ -404,7 +405,13 @@ int LUKS2_token_open_and_activate(struct
+ 
+ 	keyslot = r;
+ 
+-	if ((name || (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY)) && crypt_use_keyring_for_vk(cd)) {
++	if (!crypt_use_keyring_for_vk(cd))
++		use_keyring = false;
++	else
++		use_keyring = ((name && !crypt_is_cipher_null(crypt_get_cipher(cd))) ||
++			       (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY));
++
++	if (use_keyring) {
+ 		if (!(r = LUKS2_volume_key_load_in_keyring_by_keyslot(cd, hdr, vk, keyslot)))
+ 			flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY;
+ 	}
+diff -rupN cryptsetup-2.3.3.orig/lib/setup.c cryptsetup-2.3.3/lib/setup.c
+--- cryptsetup-2.3.3.orig/lib/setup.c	2021-02-17 17:59:35.529320166 +0100
++++ cryptsetup-2.3.3/lib/setup.c	2021-02-17 18:00:03.676291932 +0100
+@@ -3879,6 +3879,7 @@ static int _open_and_activate(struct cry
+ 	size_t passphrase_size,
+ 	uint32_t flags)
+ {
++	bool use_keyring;
+ 	int r;
+ 	struct volume_key *vk = NULL;
+ 
+@@ -3890,8 +3891,13 @@ static int _open_and_activate(struct cry
+ 		return r;
+ 	keyslot = r;
+ 
+-	if ((name || (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY)) &&
+-	    crypt_use_keyring_for_vk(cd)) {
++	if (!crypt_use_keyring_for_vk(cd))
++		use_keyring = false;
++	else
++		use_keyring = ((name && !crypt_is_cipher_null(crypt_get_cipher(cd))) ||
++			       (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY));
++
++	if (use_keyring) {
+ 		r = LUKS2_volume_key_load_in_keyring_by_keyslot(cd,
+ 				&cd->u.luks2.hdr, vk, keyslot);
+ 		if (r < 0)
+@@ -4269,6 +4275,7 @@ int crypt_activate_by_volume_key(struct
+ 	size_t volume_key_size,
+ 	uint32_t flags)
+ {
++	bool use_keyring;
+ 	struct volume_key *vk = NULL;
+ 	int r;
+ 
+@@ -4344,8 +4351,12 @@ int crypt_activate_by_volume_key(struct
+ 		if (r > 0)
+ 			r = 0;
+ 
+-		if (!r && (name || (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY)) &&
+-		    crypt_use_keyring_for_vk(cd)) {
++		if (!crypt_use_keyring_for_vk(cd))
++			use_keyring = false;
++		else
++			use_keyring = (name && !crypt_is_cipher_null(crypt_get_cipher(cd))) || (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY);
++
++		if (!r && use_keyring) {
+ 			r = LUKS2_key_description_by_segment(cd,
+ 				&cd->u.luks2.hdr, vk, CRYPT_DEFAULT_SEGMENT);
+ 			if (!r)
+From ed2117c72417d85c7b2f20d5859ca558eaf61c62 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Ondrej Kozina <okozina@redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 11 Feb 2021 11:43:10 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 5/9] Fix device comparison for dm-crypt with cipher_null.
+
+Do not compare volume keys if segment uses cipher_null.
+The key is ignored by lower layer (internal libdevmapper)
+anyway.
+---
+ lib/setup.c | 13 ++++++++-----
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/setup.c b/lib/setup.c
+index ffd9b7b..7286e10 100644
+--- a/lib/setup.c
++++ b/lib/setup.c
+@@ -2380,11 +2380,6 @@ static int _compare_crypt_devices(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ 	if (!src->u.crypt.vk || !tgt->u.crypt.vk)
+ 		return -EINVAL;
+ 
+-	if (_compare_volume_keys(src->u.crypt.vk, 0, tgt->u.crypt.vk, tgt->u.crypt.vk->key_description != NULL)) {
+-		log_dbg(cd, "Keys in context and target device do not match.");
+-		return -EINVAL;
+-	}
+-
+ 	/* CIPHER checks */
+ 	if (!src->u.crypt.cipher || !tgt->u.crypt.cipher)
+ 		return -EINVAL;
+@@ -2392,6 +2387,14 @@ static int _compare_crypt_devices(struct crypt_device *cd,
+ 		log_dbg(cd, "Cipher specs do not match.");
+ 		return -EINVAL;
+ 	}
++
++	if (tgt->u.crypt.vk->keylength == 0 && crypt_is_cipher_null(tgt->u.crypt.cipher))
++		log_dbg(cd, "Existing device uses cipher null. Skipping key comparison.");
++	else if (_compare_volume_keys(src->u.crypt.vk, 0, tgt->u.crypt.vk, tgt->u.crypt.vk->key_description != NULL)) {
++		log_dbg(cd, "Keys in context and target device do not match.");
++		return -EINVAL;
++	}
++
+ 	if (crypt_strcmp(src->u.crypt.integrity, tgt->u.crypt.integrity)) {
+ 		log_dbg(cd, "Integrity parameters do not match.");
+ 		return -EINVAL;
+-- 
+1.8.3.1
+
+From 01f896711ed54bff7c1ccf944d2295929af7c75c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Ondrej Kozina <okozina@redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 11 Feb 2021 12:17:02 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 6/9] Replace bogus cipher_null keyslots before reencryption.
+
+By mistake LUKS2 allowed keyslots 'not-so-encrypted' by
+cipher_null (only explicitly requested by --cipher or
+--keyslot-cipher parameters). If we encounter
+such old key during reencryption let's replace the cipher
+for new keyslot with default LUKS2 keyslot cipher.
+---
+ src/cryptsetup.c | 6 ++++++
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/cryptsetup.c b/src/cryptsetup.c
+index 957c24e..5e22286 100644
+--- a/src/cryptsetup.c
++++ b/src/cryptsetup.c
+@@ -1091,6 +1091,12 @@ static int set_keyslot_params(struct crypt_device *cd, int keyslot)
+ 	if (!cipher)
+ 		return -EINVAL;
+ 
++	if (crypt_is_cipher_null(cipher)) {
++		log_dbg("Keyslot %d uses cipher_null. Replacing with default encryption in new keyslot.", keyslot);
++		cipher = DEFAULT_LUKS2_KEYSLOT_CIPHER;
++		key_size = DEFAULT_LUKS2_KEYSLOT_KEYBITS / 8;
++	}
++
+ 	if (crypt_keyslot_set_encryption(cd, cipher, key_size))
+ 		return -EINVAL;
+ 
+-- 
+1.8.3.1
+
+diff -rupN cryptsetup-2.3.3.orig/lib/luks2/luks2_reencrypt.c cryptsetup-2.3.3/lib/luks2/luks2_reencrypt.c
+--- cryptsetup-2.3.3.orig/lib/luks2/luks2_reencrypt.c	2021-02-17 18:03:49.547065362 +0100
++++ cryptsetup-2.3.3/lib/luks2/luks2_reencrypt.c	2021-02-17 18:09:43.610710202 +0100
+@@ -2238,7 +2238,7 @@ static int reencrypt_verify_and_upload_k
+ 			if (LUKS2_digest_verify_by_digest(cd, hdr, digest_new, vk) != digest_new)
+ 				return -EINVAL;
+ 
+-			if (crypt_use_keyring_for_vk(cd) &&
++			if (crypt_use_keyring_for_vk(cd) && !crypt_is_cipher_null(reencrypt_segment_cipher_new(hdr)) &&
+ 			    (r = LUKS2_volume_key_load_in_keyring_by_digest(cd, hdr, vk, crypt_volume_key_get_id(vk))))
+ 				return r;
+ 		}
+@@ -2254,7 +2254,7 @@ static int reencrypt_verify_and_upload_k
+ 				r = -EINVAL;
+ 				goto err;
+ 			}
+-			if (crypt_use_keyring_for_vk(cd) &&
++			if (crypt_use_keyring_for_vk(cd) && !crypt_is_cipher_null(reencrypt_segment_cipher_old(hdr)) &&
+ 			    (r = LUKS2_volume_key_load_in_keyring_by_digest(cd, hdr, vk, crypt_volume_key_get_id(vk))))
+ 				goto err;
+ 		}
+@@ -2664,6 +2664,7 @@ static int reencrypt_load_by_passphrase(
+ 	struct luks2_hdr *hdr;
+ 	struct crypt_lock_handle *reencrypt_lock;
+ 	struct luks2_reenc_context *rh;
++	const struct volume_key *vk;
+ 	struct crypt_dm_active_device dmd_target, dmd_source = {
+ 		.uuid = crypt_get_uuid(cd),
+ 		.flags = CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SHARED /* turn off exclusive open checks */
+@@ -2730,6 +2731,19 @@ static int reencrypt_load_by_passphrase(
+ 			goto err;
+ 		flags = dmd_target.flags;
+ 
++		/*
++		 * By default reencryption code aims to retain flags from existing dm device.
++		 * The keyring activation flag can not be inherited if original cipher is null.
++		 *
++		 * In this case override the flag based on decision made in reencrypt_verify_and_upload_keys
++		 * above. The code checks if new VK is eligible for keyring.
++		 */
++		vk = crypt_volume_key_by_id(*vks, LUKS2_reencrypt_digest_new(hdr));
++		if (vk && vk->key_description && crypt_is_cipher_null(reencrypt_segment_cipher_old(hdr))) {
++			flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY;
++			dmd_source.flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY;
++		}
++
+ 		r = LUKS2_assembly_multisegment_dmd(cd, hdr, *vks, LUKS2_get_segments_jobj(hdr), &dmd_source);
+ 		if (!r) {
+ 			r = crypt_compare_dm_devices(cd, &dmd_source, &dmd_target);
+diff -rupN cryptsetup-2.3.3.orig/src/cryptsetup.c cryptsetup-2.3.3/src/cryptsetup.c
+--- cryptsetup-2.3.3.orig/src/cryptsetup.c	2021-02-17 18:12:12.162561190 +0100
++++ cryptsetup-2.3.3/src/cryptsetup.c	2021-02-17 18:19:04.842147234 +0100
+@@ -3142,6 +3142,11 @@ static int action_reencrypt_luks2(struct
+ 
+ 	_set_reencryption_flags(&params.flags);
+ 
++	if (!opt_cipher && crypt_is_cipher_null(crypt_get_cipher(cd))) {
++		log_std(_("Switching data encryption cipher to %s.\n"), DEFAULT_CIPHER(LUKS1));
++		opt_cipher = DEFAULT_CIPHER(LUKS1);
++	}
++
+ 	if (!opt_cipher) {
+ 		strncpy(cipher, crypt_get_cipher(cd), MAX_CIPHER_LEN - 1);
+ 		strncpy(mode, crypt_get_cipher_mode(cd), MAX_CIPHER_LEN - 1);
+diff -rupN cryptsetup-2.3.3.orig/tests/luks2-reencryption-test cryptsetup-2.3.3/tests/luks2-reencryption-test
+--- cryptsetup-2.3.3.orig/tests/luks2-reencryption-test	2021-02-17 18:25:01.393788684 +0100
++++ cryptsetup-2.3.3/tests/luks2-reencryption-test	2021-02-17 18:26:00.864726663 +0100
+@@ -1388,9 +1388,9 @@ $CRYPTSETUP close $DEV_NAME
+ echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks1 -s 128 -c cipher_null-ecb --offset 8192 $FAST_PBKDF2 $DEV || fail
+ $CRYPTSETUP convert -q --type luks2 $DEV || fail
+ wipe $PWD1
+-echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP reencrypt $DEV -c aes-xts-plain64 -q $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON || fail
++echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP reencrypt $DEV -q $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON >/dev/null || fail
+ check_hash $PWD1 $HASH1
+-# both keyslot and segment cipher must not be null
++# both keyslot and segment cipher must not be null after reencryption with default params
+ $CRYPTSETUP luksDump $DEV | grep -q "cipher_null" && fail
+ 
+ remove_mapping
+From 030d50f6baff62466c611c868d860c6c3a3efef9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Ondrej Kozina <okozina@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 17 Feb 2021 15:00:19 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix reencryption test on systems w/o keyring.
+
+---
+ tests/luks2-reencryption-test | 20 ++++++++++++++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/tests/luks2-reencryption-test b/tests/luks2-reencryption-test
+index 51b5473..6e6b381 100755
+--- a/tests/luks2-reencryption-test
++++ b/tests/luks2-reencryption-test
+@@ -654,6 +654,18 @@ function reencrypt_online_fixed_size() {
+ 	fi
+ }
+ 
++function setup_luks2_env() {
++	echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksFormat --type luks2 $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON $DEV || fail
++	echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP open $DEV $DEV_NAME || fail
++	HAVE_KEYRING=$($CRYPTSETUP status $DEV_NAME | grep "key location: keyring")
++	if [ -n "$HAVE_KEYRING" ]; then
++		HAVE_KEYRING=1
++	else
++		HAVE_KEYRING=0
++	fi
++	$CRYPTSETUP close $DEV_NAME || fail
++}
++
+ function valgrind_setup()
+ {
+ 	which valgrind >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail "Cannot find valgrind."
+@@ -705,9 +717,11 @@ HASH7=18a393d1a505e22ccf3e29effe3005ea8627e4c36b7cca0e53f58121f49b67e1
+ # 60 MiBs of zeroes
+ HASH8=cf5ac69ca412f9b3b1a8b8de27d368c5c05ed4b1b6aa40e6c38d9cbf23711342
+ 
++prepare dev_size_mb=32
++setup_luks2_env
++
+ echo "[1] Reencryption"
+ echo -n "[512 sector]"
+-prepare dev_size_mb=32
+ echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks2 -s 128 -c aes-cbc-essiv:sha256 --offset 8192 $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON $DEV || fail
+ wipe $PWD1
+ check_hash $PWD1 $HASH1
+@@ -1412,7 +1426,9 @@ wipe $PWD1
+ echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP open $DEV $DEV_NAME
+ echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP reencrypt $DEV -c aes-xts-plain64 -q $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON || fail
+ check_hash_dev /dev/mapper/$DEV_NAME $HASH1
+-$CRYPTSETUP status $DEV_NAME | grep -q "key location: keyring" || fail
++if [ $HAVE_KEYRING -gt 0 ]; then
++	$CRYPTSETUP status $DEV_NAME | grep -q "key location: keyring" || fail
++fi
+ $CRYPTSETUP close $DEV_NAME
+ 
+ # simulate LUKS2 device with cipher_null in both keyslot and segment (it can be created only by up conversion from LUKS1)
+-- 
+1.8.3.1
+
+diff -rupN cryptsetup-2.3.3.orig/src/cryptsetup.c cryptsetup-2.3.3/src/cryptsetup.c
+--- cryptsetup-2.3.3.orig/src/cryptsetup.c	2021-02-18 12:37:44.903909498 +0100
++++ cryptsetup-2.3.3/src/cryptsetup.c	2021-02-18 12:45:49.208492236 +0100
+@@ -1196,6 +1196,21 @@ static int strcmp_or_null(const char *st
+ 	return !str ? 0 : strcmp(str, expected);
+ }
+ 
++static int get_adjusted_key_size(const char *cipher_mode, uint32_t default_size_bits, int integrity_keysize)
++{
++	int keysize_bits = opt_key_size;
++
++#ifdef ENABLE_LUKS_ADJUST_XTS_KEYSIZE
++	if (!opt_key_size && !strncmp(cipher_mode, "xts-", 4)) {
++		if (default_size_bits == 128)
++			keysize_bits = 256;
++		else if (default_size_bits == 256)
++			keysize_bits = 512;
++	}
++#endif
++	return (keysize_bits ?: default_size_bits) / 8 + integrity_keysize;
++}
++
+ static int _luksFormat(struct crypt_device **r_cd, char **r_password, size_t *r_passwordLen)
+ {
+ 	int r = -EINVAL, keysize, integrity_keysize = 0, fd, created = 0;
+@@ -1328,15 +1343,7 @@ static int _luksFormat(struct crypt_devi
+ 			goto out;
+ 	}
+ 
+-#ifdef ENABLE_LUKS_ADJUST_XTS_KEYSIZE
+-	if (!opt_key_size && !strncmp(cipher_mode, "xts-", 4)) {
+-		if (DEFAULT_LUKS1_KEYBITS == 128)
+-			opt_key_size = 256;
+-		else if (DEFAULT_LUKS1_KEYBITS == 256)
+-			opt_key_size = 512;
+-	}
+-#endif
+-	keysize = (opt_key_size ?: DEFAULT_LUKS1_KEYBITS) / 8 + integrity_keysize;
++	keysize = get_adjusted_key_size(cipher_mode, DEFAULT_LUKS1_KEYBITS, integrity_keysize);
+ 
+ 	if (opt_random)
+ 		crypt_set_rng_type(cd, CRYPT_RNG_RANDOM);
+@@ -3163,10 +3170,8 @@ static int action_reencrypt_luks2(struct
+ 	if (r)
+ 		return r;
+ 
+-	if (opt_key_size)
+-		key_size = opt_key_size / 8;
+-	else if (opt_cipher)
+-		key_size = DEFAULT_LUKS1_KEYBITS / 8;
++	if (opt_key_size || opt_cipher)
++		key_size = get_adjusted_key_size(mode, DEFAULT_LUKS1_KEYBITS, 0);
+ 	else
+ 		key_size = crypt_get_volume_key_size(cd);
+ 
+diff -rupN cryptsetup-2.3.3.orig/tests/luks2-reencryption-test cryptsetup-2.3.3/tests/luks2-reencryption-test
+--- cryptsetup-2.3.3.orig/tests/luks2-reencryption-test	2021-02-18 12:37:44.916909486 +0100
++++ cryptsetup-2.3.3/tests/luks2-reencryption-test	2021-02-18 12:39:33.589815857 +0100
+@@ -648,7 +648,7 @@ function reencrypt_online_fixed_size() {
+ }
+ 
+ function setup_luks2_env() {
+-	echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksFormat --type luks2 $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON $DEV || fail
++	echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksFormat --type luks2 -c aes-xts-plain64 $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON $DEV || fail
+ 	echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP open $DEV $DEV_NAME || fail
+ 	HAVE_KEYRING=$($CRYPTSETUP status $DEV_NAME | grep "key location: keyring")
+ 	if [ -n "$HAVE_KEYRING" ]; then
+@@ -656,6 +656,8 @@ function setup_luks2_env() {
+ 	else
+ 		HAVE_KEYRING=0
+ 	fi
++	DEF_XTS_KEY=$($CRYPTSETUP status $DEV_NAME | grep "keysize:" | sed 's/\(  keysize: \)\([0-9]\+\)\(.*\)/\2/')
++	[ -n "$DEF_XTS_KEY" ] || fail "Failed to parse xts mode key size."
+ 	$CRYPTSETUP close $DEV_NAME || fail
+ }
+ 
+@@ -730,6 +732,8 @@ check_hash $PWD1 $HASH1
+ echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP reencrypt $DEV -q -c aes-xts-plain64 --init-only $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON || fail
+ echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP open $DEV $DEV_NAME || fail
+ echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP reencrypt --active-name /dev/mapper/$DEV_NAME --resilience none -q || fail
++XTS_KEY=$($CRYPTSETUP status $DEV_NAME | grep "keysize:" | sed 's/\(  keysize: \)\([0-9]\+\)\(.*\)/\2/')
++[ "$XTS_KEY" -eq "$DEF_XTS_KEY" ] || fail "xts mode has wrong key size after reencryption ($XTS_KEY != expected $DEF_XTS_KEY)"
+ echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP close $DEV_NAME || fail
+ echo -n "[OK][4096 sector]"
+ prepare sector_size=4096 dev_size_mb=32
+diff -rupN cryptsetup-2.3.3.orig/lib/libdevmapper.c cryptsetup-2.3.3/lib/libdevmapper.c
+--- cryptsetup-2.3.3.orig/lib/libdevmapper.c	2021-02-18 16:21:00.863470374 +0100
++++ cryptsetup-2.3.3/lib/libdevmapper.c	2021-02-18 16:22:36.330393562 +0100
+@@ -639,11 +639,13 @@ static char *get_dm_crypt_params(const s
+ 	if (!strncmp(cipher_dm, "cipher_null-", 12))
+ 		null_cipher = 1;
+ 
+-	if (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY) {
++	if (null_cipher)
++		hexkey = crypt_safe_alloc(2);
++	else if (flags & CRYPT_ACTIVATE_KEYRING_KEY) {
+ 		keystr_len = strlen(tgt->u.crypt.vk->key_description) + int_log10(tgt->u.crypt.vk->keylength) + 10;
+ 		hexkey = crypt_safe_alloc(keystr_len);
+ 	} else
+-		hexkey = crypt_safe_alloc(null_cipher ? 2 : (tgt->u.crypt.vk->keylength * 2 + 1));
++		hexkey = crypt_safe_alloc(tgt->u.crypt.vk->keylength * 2 + 1);
+ 
+ 	if (!hexkey)
+ 		return NULL;
+From 284a49443e2a833e33714f9fa0f03b8e0233d68d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Ondrej Kozina <okozina@redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 18 Feb 2021 15:01:01 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 3/3] Extend LUKS2 reencryption tests w/ cipher_null.
+
+---
+ tests/luks2-reencryption-test | 106 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 104 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/tests/luks2-reencryption-test b/tests/luks2-reencryption-test
+index 9bdf60a..05c2151 100755
+--- a/tests/luks2-reencryption-test
++++ b/tests/luks2-reencryption-test
+@@ -297,7 +297,7 @@ function reencrypt_recover() { # $1 sector size, $2 resilience, $3 digest, [$4 h
+ 	test -z "$4" || _hdr="--header $4"
+ 
+ 	error_writes $OVRDEV $OLD_DEV $ERROFFSET $ERRLENGTH
+-	echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP reencrypt $DEV $_hdr --hotzone-size 1M --resilience $2 --sector-size $1 -q $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON 2>/dev/null && fail
++	echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP reencrypt $DEV $_hdr --hotzone-size 1M --resilience $2 --sector-size $1 -q $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON >/dev/null 2>&1 && fail
+ 	fix_writes $OVRDEV $OLD_DEV
+ 
+ 	echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q repair $DEV $_hdr || fail
+@@ -318,7 +318,7 @@ function reencrypt_recover_online() { # $1 sector size, $2 resilience, $3 digest
+ 	echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP open $DEV $_hdr $DEV_NAME || fail
+ 
+ 	error_writes $OVRDEV $OLD_DEV $ERROFFSET $ERRLENGTH
+-	echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP reencrypt --active-name $DEV_NAME $_hdr --hotzone-size 1M --resilience $2 --sector-size $1 -q $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON 2>/dev/null && fail
++	echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP reencrypt --active-name $DEV_NAME $_hdr --hotzone-size 1M --resilience $2 --sector-size $1 -q $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON >/dev/null 2>&1 && fail
+ 	$CRYPTSETUP status $DEV_NAME $_hdr | grep -q "reencryption:  in-progress" || fail
+ 	$CRYPTSETUP close $DEV_NAME || fail
+ 	fix_writes $OVRDEV $OLD_DEV
+@@ -1444,5 +1444,107 @@ check_hash $PWD1 $HASH1
+ # both keyslot and segment cipher must not be null after reencryption with default params
+ $CRYPTSETUP luksDump $DEV | grep -q "cipher_null" && fail
+ 
++# multistep reencryption with initial cipher_null
++preparebig 64
++echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksFormat --type luks2 $DEV -c null --offset 16384 -q $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON || fail
++echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP open $DEV $DEV_NAME
++wipe_dev /dev/mapper/$DEV_NAME
++echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP reencrypt $DEV --hotzone-size 1M --resilience none -q $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON >/dev/null || fail
++$CRYPTSETUP close $DEV_NAME
++check_hash $PWD1 $HASH5
++
++echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP luksFormat --type luks2 $DEV -c null --offset 16384 -q $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON || fail
++wipe $PWD1
++echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP reencrypt $DEV --hotzone-size 1M --resilience none -q $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON >/dev/null || fail
++check_hash $PWD1 $HASH5
++
++echo "[25] Reencryption recovery with cipher_null"
++# (check opt-io size optimization in reencryption code does not affect recovery)
++# device with opt-io size 32k
++prepare_linear_dev 32 opt_blks=64 $OPT_XFERLEN_EXP
++OFFSET=8192
++
++echo "sector size 512->512"
++
++get_error_offsets 32 $OFFSET
++echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks2 -c null --sector-size 512 --offset $OFFSET $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON $DEV || fail
++wipe $PWD1
++check_hash $PWD1 $HASH1
++
++echo "ERR writes to sectors [$ERROFFSET,$(($ERROFFSET+$ERRLENGTH-1))]"
++reencrypt_recover 512 checksum $HASH1
++echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks2 -c null --sector-size 512 --offset $OFFSET $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON $DEV || fail
++wipe $PWD1
++reencrypt_recover 512 journal $HASH1
++
++if [ -n "$DM_SECTOR_SIZE" ]; then
++	echo "sector size 512->4096"
++
++	get_error_offsets 32 $OFFSET 4096
++	echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks2 -c null --sector-size 512 --offset $OFFSET $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON $DEV || fail
++	wipe $PWD1
++	check_hash $PWD1 $HASH1
++
++	echo "ERR writes to sectors [$ERROFFSET,$(($ERROFFSET+$ERRLENGTH-1))]"
++	reencrypt_recover 4096 checksum $HASH1
++	echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks2 -c null --sector-size 512 --offset $OFFSET $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON $DEV || fail
++	wipe $PWD1
++	check_hash $PWD1 $HASH1
++	reencrypt_recover 4096 journal $HASH1
++
++	echo "sector size 4096->4096"
++
++	get_error_offsets 32 $OFFSET 4096
++	echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks2 -c null --sector-size 4096 -c aes-cbc-essiv:sha256 --offset $OFFSET $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON $DEV || fail
++	wipe $PWD1
++	check_hash $PWD1 $HASH1
++
++	echo "ERR writes to sectors [$ERROFFSET,$(($ERROFFSET+$ERRLENGTH-1))]"
++	reencrypt_recover 4096 checksum $HASH1
++	reencrypt_recover 4096 journal $HASH1
++fi
++
++echo "[26] Reencryption recovery with cipher_null (online i/o error)"
++
++echo "sector size 512->512"
++
++get_error_offsets 32 $OFFSET
++echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks2 --sector-size 512 -c null --offset $OFFSET $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON $DEV || fail
++wipe $PWD1
++check_hash $PWD1 $HASH1
++
++echo "ERR writes to sectors [$ERROFFSET,$(($ERROFFSET+$ERRLENGTH-1))]"
++reencrypt_recover_online 512 checksum $HASH1
++echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks2 --sector-size 512 -c null --offset $OFFSET $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON $DEV || fail
++wipe $PWD1
++reencrypt_recover_online 512 journal $HASH1
++
++if [ -n "$DM_SECTOR_SIZE" ]; then
++	echo "sector size 512->4096"
++
++	get_error_offsets 32 $OFFSET 4096
++	echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks2 -c null --sector-size 512 --offset $OFFSET $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON $DEV || fail
++	wipe $PWD1
++	check_hash $PWD1 $HASH1
++
++	echo "ERR writes to sectors [$ERROFFSET,$(($ERROFFSET+$ERRLENGTH-1))]"
++	reencrypt_recover_online 4096 checksum $HASH1
++	echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks2 -c null --sector-size 512 --offset $OFFSET $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON $DEV || fail
++	wipe $PWD1
++	check_hash $PWD1 $HASH1
++	reencrypt_recover_online 4096 journal $HASH1
++
++	echo "sector size 4096->4096"
++
++	get_error_offsets 32 $OFFSET 4096
++	echo $PWD1 | $CRYPTSETUP -q luksFormat --type luks2 -c null --sector-size 4096 -c aes-cbc-essiv:sha256 --offset $OFFSET $FAST_PBKDF_ARGON $DEV || fail
++	wipe $PWD1
++	check_hash $PWD1 $HASH1
++
++	echo "ERR writes to sectors [$ERROFFSET,$(($ERROFFSET+$ERRLENGTH-1))]"
++	reencrypt_recover_online 4096 checksum $HASH1
++	reencrypt_recover_online 4096 journal $HASH1
++fi
++
+ remove_mapping
+ exit 0
+-- 
+1.8.3.1
+
diff --git a/SPECS/cryptsetup.spec b/SPECS/cryptsetup.spec
index 1f84918..aedeee3 100644
--- a/SPECS/cryptsetup.spec
+++ b/SPECS/cryptsetup.spec
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ Obsoletes: cryptsetup-python3
 Summary: A utility for setting up encrypted disks
 Name: cryptsetup
 Version: 2.3.3
-Release: 1%{?dist}
+Release: 4%{?dist}
 License: GPLv2+ and LGPLv2+
 Group: Applications/System
 URL: https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup
@@ -23,6 +23,9 @@ Source0: https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/cryptsetup/v2.0/cryptsetup-%{ups
 Patch0:  %{name}-add-system-library-paths.patch
 # Remove the patch when (if ever) osci infrastructure gets stable enough
 Patch1:  %{name}-disable-verity-compat-test.patch
+Patch2:  %{name}-2.3.4-luks2-validation-32bit-fix.patch
+Patch3:  %{name}-2.3.4-fix-crypto-backend-to-properly-handle-ECB-mode.patch
+Patch4:  %{name}-2.3.5-fix-reencryption-cipher_null.patch
 
 %description
 The cryptsetup package contains a utility for setting up
@@ -79,6 +82,9 @@ can be used for offline reencryption of disk in situ.
 %prep
 %setup -q -n cryptsetup-%{upstream_version}
 %patch1 -p1
+%patch2 -p1
+%patch3 -p1
+%patch4 -p1
 %patch0 -p1
 chmod -x misc/dracut_90reencrypt/*
 
@@ -138,6 +144,20 @@ rm -rf %{buildroot}/%{_libdir}/*.la
 %clean
 
 %changelog
+* Wed Feb 17 2021 Ondrej Kozina <okozina@redhat.com> - 2.3.3-4
+- patch: Fix reencryption for custom devices with data segments
+  set to use cipher_null.
+- Resolves: #1927409
+
+* Wed Feb 03 2021 Ondrej Kozina <okozina@redhat.com> - 2.3.3-3
+- patch: Fix crypto backend to properly handle ECB mode.
+- Resolves: #1859091
+
+* Thu Aug 27 2020 Ondrej Kozina <okozina@redhat.com> - 2.3.3-2
+- patch: Fix possible memory corruption in LUKS2 validation
+	 code in 32bit library.
+- Resolves: #1872294
+
 * Thu May 28 2020 Ondrej Kozina <okozina@redhat.com> - 2.3.3-1
 - Update to cryptsetup 2.3.3
 - Resolves: #1796826 #1743891 #1785748