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% CONTAINERS-POLICY.JSON 5 policy.json Man Page
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% Miloslav Trmač
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% September 2016
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# NAME
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containers-policy.json - syntax for the signature verification policy file
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## DESCRIPTION
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Signature verification policy files are used to specify policy, e.g. trusted keys,
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applicable when deciding whether to accept an image, or individual signatures of that image, as valid.
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By default, the policy is read from `$HOME/.config/containers/policy.json`, if it exists, otherwise from `/etc/containers/policy.json`;  applications performing verification may allow using a different policy instead.
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## FORMAT
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The signature verification policy file, usually called `policy.json`,
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uses a JSON format.  Unlike some other JSON files, its parsing is fairly strict:
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unrecognized, duplicated or otherwise invalid fields cause the entire file,
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and usually the entire operation, to be rejected.
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The purpose of the policy file is to define a set of *policy requirements* for a container image,
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usually depending on its location (where it is being pulled from) or otherwise defined identity.
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Policy requirements can be defined for:
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- An individual *scope* in a *transport*.
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  The *transport* values are the same as the transport prefixes when pushing/pulling images (e.g. `docker:`, `atomic:`),
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  and *scope* values are defined by each transport; see below for more details.
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  Usually, a scope can be defined to match a single image, and various prefixes of
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  such a most specific scope define namespaces of matching images.
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- A default policy for a single transport, expressed using an empty string as a scope
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- A global default policy.
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If multiple policy requirements match a given image, only the requirements from the most specific match apply,
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the more general policy requirements definitions are ignored.
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This is expressed in JSON using the top-level syntax
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```js
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{
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    "default": [/* policy requirements: global default */]
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    "transports": {
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        transport_name: {
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            "": [/* policy requirements: default for transport $transport_name */],
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            scope_1: [/* policy requirements: default for $scope_1 in $transport_name */],
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            scope_2: [/*…*/]
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            /*…*/
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        },
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        transport_name_2: {/*…*/}
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        /*…*/
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    }
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}
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```
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The global `default` set of policy requirements is mandatory; all of the other fields
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(`transports` itself, any specific transport, the transport-specific default, etc.) are optional.
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## Supported transports and their scopes
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### `atomic:`
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The `atomic:` transport refers to images in an Atomic Registry.
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Supported scopes use the form _hostname_[`:`_port_][`/`_namespace_[`/`_imagestream_ [`:`_tag_]]],
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i.e. either specifying a complete name of a tagged image, or prefix denoting
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a host/namespace/image stream or a wildcarded expression for matching all
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subdomains. For wildcarded subdomain matching, `*.example.com` is a valid case, but `example*.*.com` is not.
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*Note:* The _hostname_ and _port_ refer to the container registry host and port (the one used
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e.g. for `docker pull`), _not_ to the OpenShift API host and port.
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### `dir:`
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The `dir:` transport refers to images stored in local directories.
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Supported scopes are paths of directories (either containing a single image or
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subdirectories possibly containing images).
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*Note:* The paths must be absolute and contain no symlinks. Paths violating these requirements may be silently ignored.
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The top-level scope `"/"` is forbidden; use the transport default scope `""`,
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for consistency with other transports.
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### `docker:`
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The `docker:` transport refers to images in a registry implementing the "Docker Registry HTTP API V2".
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Scopes matching individual images are named Docker references *in the fully expanded form*, either
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using a tag or digest. For example, `docker.io/library/busybox:latest` (*not* `busybox:latest`).
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More general scopes are prefixes of individual-image scopes, and specify a repository (by omitting the tag or digest),
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a repository namespace, or a registry host (by only specifying the host name)
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or a wildcarded expression for matching all subdomains. For wildcarded subdomain
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matching, `*.example.com` is a valid case, but `example*.*.com` is not.
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### `oci:`
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The `oci:` transport refers to images in directories compliant with "Open Container Image Layout Specification".
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Supported scopes use the form _directory_`:`_tag_, and _directory_ referring to
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a directory containing one or more tags, or any of the parent directories.
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*Note:* See `dir:` above for semantics and restrictions on the directory paths, they apply to `oci:` equivalently.
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### `tarball:`
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The `tarball:` transport refers to tarred up container root filesystems.
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Scopes are ignored.
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## Policy Requirements
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Using the mechanisms above, a set of policy requirements is looked up.  The policy requirements
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are represented as a JSON array of individual requirement objects.  For an image to be accepted,
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*all* of the requirements must be satisfied simultaneously.
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The policy requirements can also be used to decide whether an individual signature is accepted (= is signed by a recognized key of a known author);
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in that case some requirements may apply only to some signatures, but each signature must be accepted by *at least one* requirement object.
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The following requirement objects are supported:
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### `insecureAcceptAnything`
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A simple requirement with the following syntax
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```json
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{"type":"insecureAcceptAnything"}
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```
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This requirement accepts any image (but note that other requirements in the array still apply).
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When deciding to accept an individual signature, this requirement does not have any effect; it does *not* cause the signature to be accepted, though.
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This is useful primarily for policy scopes where no signature verification is required;
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because the array of policy requirements must not be empty, this requirement is used
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to represent the lack of requirements explicitly.
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### `reject`
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A simple requirement with the following syntax:
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```json
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{"type":"reject"}
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```
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This requirement rejects every image, and every signature.
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### `signedBy`
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This requirement requires an image to be signed using “simple signing” with an expected identity, or accepts a signature if it is using an expected identity and key.
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```js
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{
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    "type":    "signedBy",
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    "keyType": "GPGKeys", /* The only currently supported value */
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    "keyPath": "/path/to/local/keyring/file",
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    "keyPaths": ["/path/to/local/keyring/file1","/path/to/local/keyring/file2"…],
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    "keyData": "base64-encoded-keyring-data",
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    "signedIdentity": identity_requirement
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}
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```
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Exactly one of `keyPath`, `keyPaths` and `keyData` must be present, containing a GPG keyring of one or more public keys.  Only signatures made by these keys are accepted.
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The `signedIdentity` field, a JSON object, specifies what image identity the signature claims about the image.
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One of the following alternatives are supported:
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- The identity in the signature must exactly match the image identity.  Note that with this, referencing an image by digest (with a signature claiming a _repository_`:`_tag_ identity) will fail.
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  ```json
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  {"type":"matchExact"}
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  ```
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- If the image identity carries a tag, the identity in the signature must exactly match;
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  if the image identity uses a digest reference, the identity in the signature must be in the same repository as the image identity (using any tag).
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  (Note that with images identified using digest references, the digest from the reference is validated even before signature verification starts.)
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  ```json
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  {"type":"matchRepoDigestOrExact"}
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  ```
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- The identity in the signature must be in the same repository as the image identity.  This is useful e.g. to pull an image using the `:latest` tag when the image is signed with a tag specifying an exact image version.
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  ```json
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  {"type":"matchRepository"}
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  ```
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- The identity in the signature must exactly match a specified identity.
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  This is useful e.g. when locally mirroring images signed using their public identity.
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  ```js
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  {
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      "type": "exactReference",
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      "dockerReference": docker_reference_value
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  }
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  ```
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- The identity in the signature must be in the same repository as a specified identity.
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  This combines the properties of `matchRepository` and `exactReference`.
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  ```js
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  {
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      "type": "exactRepository",
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      "dockerRepository": docker_repository_value
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  }
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  ```
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- Prefix remapping:
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  If the image identity matches the specified prefix, that prefix is replaced by the specified “signed prefix”
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  (otherwise it is used as unchanged and no remapping takes place);
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  matching then follows the `matchRepoDigestOrExact` semantics documented above
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  (i.e. if the image identity carries a tag, the identity in the signature must exactly match,
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  if it uses a digest reference, the repository must match).
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  The `prefix` and `signedPrefix` values can be either host[:port] values
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  (matching exactly the same host[:port], string),
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  repository namespaces, or repositories (i.e. they must not contain tags/digests),
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  and match as prefixes *of the fully expanded form*.
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  For example, `docker.io/library/busybox` (*not* `busybox`) to specify that single repository,
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  or `docker.io/library` (not an empty string) to specify the parent namespace of `docker.io/library/busybox`==`busybox`).
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  The `prefix` value is usually the same as the scope containing the parent `signedBy` requirement.
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  ```js
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  {
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      "type": "remapIdentity",
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      "prefix": prefix,
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      "signedPrefix": prefix,
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  }
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  ```
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If the `signedIdentity` field is missing, it is treated as `matchRepoDigestOrExact`.
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*Note*: `matchExact`, `matchRepoDigestOrExact` and `matchRepository` can be only used if a Docker-like image identity is
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provided by the transport.  In particular, the `dir:` and `oci:` transports can be only
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used with `exactReference` or `exactRepository`.
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### `sigstoreSigned`
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This requirement requires an image to be signed using a sigstore signature with an expected identity and key.
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```js
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{
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    "type":    "sigstoreSigned",
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    "keyPath": "/path/to/local/keyring/file",
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    "keyData": "base64-encoded-keyring-data",
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    "signedIdentity": identity_requirement
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}
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```
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Exactly one of `keyPath` and `keyData` must be present, containing a sigstore public key.  Only signatures made by this key is accepted.
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The `signedIdentity` field has the same semantics as in the `signedBy` requirement described above.
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Note that `cosign`-created signatures only contain a repository, so only `matchRepository` and `exactRepository` can be used to accept them (and that does not protect against substitution of a signed image with an unexpected tag).
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To use this with images hosted on image registries, the relevant registry or repository must have the `use-sigstore-attachments` option enabled in containers-registries.d(5).
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## Examples
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It is *strongly* recommended to set the `default` policy to `reject`, and then
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selectively allow individual transports and scopes as desired.
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### A reasonably locked-down system
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(Note that the `/*`…`*/` comments are not valid in JSON, and must not be used in real policies.)
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```js
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{
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    "default": [{"type": "reject"}], /* Reject anything not explicitly allowed */
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    "transports": {
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        "docker": {
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            /* Allow installing images from a specific repository namespace, without cryptographic verification.
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               This namespace includes images like openshift/hello-openshift and openshift/origin. */
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            "docker.io/openshift": [{"type": "insecureAcceptAnything"}],
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            /* Similarly, allow installing the “official” busybox images.  Note how the fully expanded
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               form, with the explicit /library/, must be used. */
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            "docker.io/library/busybox": [{"type": "insecureAcceptAnything"}],
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            /* Allow installing images from all subdomains */
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            "*.temporary-project.example.com": [{"type": "insecureAcceptAnything"}],
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            /* A sigstore-signed repository */
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            "hostname:5000/myns/sigstore-signed-with-full-references": [
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                {
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                    "type": "sigstoreSigned",
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                    "keyPath": "/path/to/sigstore-pubkey.pub"
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                }
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            ],
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            /* A sigstore-signed repository, accepts signatures by /usr/bin/cosign */
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            "hostname:5000/myns/sigstore-signed-allows-malicious-tag-substitution": [
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                {
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                    "type": "sigstoreSigned",
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                    "keyPath": "/path/to/sigstore-pubkey.pub",
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                    "signedIdentity": {"type": "matchRepository"}
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                }
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            ]
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            /* Other docker: images use the global default policy and are rejected */
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        },
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        "dir": {
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            "": [{"type": "insecureAcceptAnything"}] /* Allow any images originating in local directories */
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        },
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        "atomic": {
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            /* The common case: using a known key for a repository or set of repositories */
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            "hostname:5000/myns/official": [
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                {
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                    "type": "signedBy",
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                    "keyType": "GPGKeys",
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                    "keyPath": "/path/to/official-pubkey.gpg"
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                }
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            ],
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            /* A more complex example, for a repository which contains a mirror of a third-party product,
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               which must be signed-off by local IT */
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            "hostname:5000/vendor/product": [
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                { /* Require the image to be signed by the original vendor, using the vendor's repository location. */
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                    "type": "signedBy",
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                    "keyType": "GPGKeys",
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                    "keyPath": "/path/to/vendor-pubkey.gpg",
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                    "signedIdentity": {
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                        "type": "exactRepository",
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                        "dockerRepository": "vendor-hostname/product/repository"
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                    }
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                },
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                { /* Require the image to _also_ be signed by a local reviewer. */
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                    "type": "signedBy",
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                    "keyType": "GPGKeys",
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                    "keyPath": "/path/to/reviewer-pubkey.gpg"
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                }
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            ],
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            /* A way to mirror many repositories from a single vendor */
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            "private-mirror:5000/vendor-mirror": [
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                { /* Require the image to be signed by the original vendor, using the vendor's repository location.
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                     For example, private-mirror:5000/vendor-mirror/productA/image1:latest needs to be signed as
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                     vendor.example/productA/image1:latest . */
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                    "type": "signedBy",
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                    "keyType": "GPGKeys",
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                    "keyPath": "/path/to/vendor-pubkey.gpg",
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                    "signedIdentity": {
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                        "type": "remapIdentity",
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                        "prefix": "private-mirror:5000/vendor-mirror",
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                        "signedPrefix": "vendor.example.com"
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                    }
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                }
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            ]
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        }
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    }
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}
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```
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### Completely disable security, allow all images, do not trust any signatures
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```json
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{
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    "default": [{"type": "insecureAcceptAnything"}]
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}
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```
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## SEE ALSO
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  atomic(1)
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## HISTORY
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August 2018, Rename to containers-policy.json(5) by Valentin Rothberg <vrothberg@suse.com>
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September 2016, Originally compiled by Miloslav Trmač <mitr@redhat.com>