Blame SOURCES/libtiff-printdir-width.patch

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Make TIFFPrintDirectory cope with both TIFF_VARIABLE and TIFF_VARIABLE2
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conventions for field_passcount fields, ie, either 16- or 32-bit counts.
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This patch is taken from upstream commits dated 2012-05-23 ("fix crash
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with odd 16bit count types for some custom fields") and 2012-12-12 ("Fix
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TIFF_VARIABLE/TIFF_VARIABLE2 confusion in TIFFPrintDirectory").
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This doesn't qualify as a security issue in itself, mainly because
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TIFFPrintDirectory is unlikely to be used in any security-exposed
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scenarios; but we need to fix it so that our test case for CVE-2012-5581
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works on all platforms.
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diff -Naur tiff-3.9.4.orig/libtiff/tif_print.c tiff-3.9.4/libtiff/tif_print.c
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--- tiff-3.9.4.orig/libtiff/tif_print.c	2010-06-08 14:50:42.000000000 -0400
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+++ tiff-3.9.4/libtiff/tif_print.c	2012-12-13 12:17:33.726765771 -0500
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@@ -518,8 +518,19 @@
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 			continue;
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 		if(fip->field_passcount) {
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-			if(TIFFGetField(tif, tag, &value_count, &raw_data) != 1)
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+			if (fip->field_readcount == TIFF_VARIABLE2 ) {
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+				if(TIFFGetField(tif, tag, &value_count, &raw_data) != 1)
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+					continue;
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+			} else if (fip->field_readcount == TIFF_VARIABLE ) {
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+				uint16 small_value_count;
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+				if(TIFFGetField(tif, tag, &small_value_count, &raw_data) != 1)
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+					continue;
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+				value_count = small_value_count;
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+			} else {
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+				assert (fip->field_readcount == TIFF_VARIABLE
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+					|| fip->field_readcount == TIFF_VARIABLE2);
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 				continue;
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+			} 
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 		} else {
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 			if (fip->field_readcount == TIFF_VARIABLE
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 			    || fip->field_readcount == TIFF_VARIABLE2)