diff --git a/SOURCES/clevis-7-nospam.patch b/SOURCES/clevis-7-nospam.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..363c4f3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/clevis-7-nospam.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+From e5170e17cac33706836f8b24e0a88e49cd0a47ef Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Nathaniel McCallum <npmccallum@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 13 Feb 2018 13:33:57 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH] Skip uninitialized devices in clevis-luks-askpass
+
+This silences some log spam when using clevis while also having some
+non-clevis LUKS volumes in the same system.
+---
+ src/systemd/clevis-luks-askpass | 3 +++
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/systemd/clevis-luks-askpass b/src/systemd/clevis-luks-askpass
+index 6fe5269..93c59f4 100755
+--- a/src/systemd/clevis-luks-askpass
++++ b/src/systemd/clevis-luks-askpass
+@@ -47,6 +47,9 @@ while true; do
+
+ [ -z "$d" -o -z "$s" ] && continue
+
++ # If the device is not initialized, sliently skip it.
++ luksmeta test -d "$d" || continue
++
+ while read -r slot state uuid; do
+ [ "$state" != "active" ] && continue
+ [ "$uuid" != "$UUID" ] && continue
+--
+2.17.1
+
diff --git a/SOURCES/clevis-7-subshell.patch b/SOURCES/clevis-7-subshell.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f9a905c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/clevis-7-subshell.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+From 7d19c76bfc9a7b569a1077d1e5673a28bf31606f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 6 Mar 2018 13:59:34 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Don't execute clevis-luks-unlock while loop in a subshell
+
+The loop that tries to open the dm-crypt devices using the pins in the
+luksmeta header is executed in a subshell. So on success it calls exit
+to exit the subshell.
+
+But then clevis-luks-unlock has no way to know if the encrypted device
+was opened correctly or not. So run the loop in the main shell process
+and return 0 as exit status if the operation was successful.
+
+Fixes: #36
+
+Signed-off-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
+---
+ src/clevis-luks-unlock | 4 ++--
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/clevis-luks-unlock b/src/clevis-luks-unlock
+index 6396680..7d316cd 100755
+--- a/src/clevis-luks-unlock
++++ b/src/clevis-luks-unlock
+@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ fi
+
+ NAME=${NAME:-luks-`cryptsetup luksUUID $DEV`}
+
+-luksmeta show -d "$DEV" | while read -r slot state uuid; do
++while read -r slot state uuid; do
+ [ "$state" != "active" ] && continue
+ [ "$uuid" != "$UUID" ] && continue
+
+@@ -62,6 +62,6 @@ luksmeta show -d "$DEV" | while read -r slot state uuid; do
+ echo -n "$pt" | cryptsetup open -d- "$DEV" "$NAME"
+ exit 0
+ fi
+-done
++done <<< "$(luksmeta show -d "$DEV")"
+
+ exit 1
+--
+2.17.1
+
diff --git a/SOURCES/clevis-7-tpm2.patch b/SOURCES/clevis-7-tpm2.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a6b1ca6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/clevis-7-tpm2.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,734 @@
+From fb3c135906cab203cfd11b3cb4a502ef8530987a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Nathaniel McCallum <npmccallum@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 9 Jul 2018 08:47:14 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Add support for TPM 2.0
+
+---
+ Makefile.am | 5 ++
+ configure.ac | 11 +++
+ doc/clevis-encrypt-tpm2.1 | 142 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ doc/clevis-encrypt-tpm2.1.md | 108 +++++++++++++++++++++++
+ doc/clevis.1 | 40 ++++++++-
+ src/Makefile.am | 6 ++
+ src/clevis-decrypt-tpm2 | 126 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ src/clevis-encrypt-tpm2 | 156 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ src/dracut/module-setup.sh.in | 23 +++++
+ 9 files changed, 615 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 doc/clevis-encrypt-tpm2.1
+ create mode 100644 doc/clevis-encrypt-tpm2.1.md
+ create mode 100755 src/clevis-decrypt-tpm2
+ create mode 100755 src/clevis-encrypt-tpm2
+
+diff --git a/Makefile.am b/Makefile.am
+index 141642a..75f9745 100644
+--- a/Makefile.am
++++ b/Makefile.am
+@@ -14,3 +14,8 @@ dist_man1_MANS = \
+ doc/clevis-luks-bind.1 \
+ doc/clevis-decrypt.1 \
+ doc/clevis.1
++
++if HAVE_TPM2_TOOLS
++ dist_man1_MANS += \
++ doc/clevis-encrypt-tpm2.1
++endif
+diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
+index f9ed01a..313f64e 100644
+--- a/configure.ac
++++ b/configure.ac
+@@ -54,6 +54,17 @@ fi
+
+ AC_SUBST(SD_ACTIVATE)
+
++for ac_prog in createprimary pcrlist createpolicy create load unseal; do
++ unset TPM2_TOOLS
++ unset ac_cv_prog_TPM2_TOOLS
++ AC_CHECK_PROG([TPM2_TOOLS], [tpm2_$ac_prog], [yes])
++ test -z "$TPM2_TOOLS" && break
++done
++
++test -n "$TPM2_TOOLS" || AC_MSG_WARN([tpm2_$ac_prog not found, tpm2 pin won't be installed])
++
++AM_CONDITIONAL([HAVE_TPM2_TOOLS], [test -n "$TPM2_TOOLS"])
++
+ AC_ARG_ENABLE([user],
+ AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-user=USER],
+ [Set unprivileged user (default: root)]),
+diff --git a/doc/clevis-encrypt-tpm2.1 b/doc/clevis-encrypt-tpm2.1
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..096ad23
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/doc/clevis-encrypt-tpm2.1
+@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
++.\" Automatically generated by Pandoc 1.19.1
++.\"
++.TH "CLEVIS\-ENCRYPT\-TPM2" "1" "November 2017" "" ""
++.hy
++.SH NAME
++.PP
++clevis\-encrypt\-tpm2 \-\- Encrypts using a TPM2.0 chip binding policy
++.SH SYNOPSIS
++.PP
++\f[C]clevis\ encrypt\ tpm2\f[] CONFIG < PT > JWE
++.SH OVERVIEW
++.PP
++The \f[C]clevis\ encrypt\ tpm2\f[] command encrypts using a Trusted
++Platform Module 2.0 (TPM2) chip.
++Its only argument is the JSON configuration object.
++.PP
++When using the tpm2 pin, we create a new, cryptographically\-strong,
++random key.
++This key is encrypted using the TPM2 chip.
++Then at decryption time, the key is decrypted again using the TPM2 chip.
++.IP
++.nf
++\f[C]
++$\ clevis\ encrypt\ tpm2\ \[aq]{}\[aq]\ <\ PT\ >\ JWE
++\f[]
++.fi
++.PP
++The pin has reasonable defaults for its configuration, but a different
++hierarchy, hash, and key algorithms can be chosen if the defaults used
++are not suitable:
++.IP
++.nf
++\f[C]
++$\ clevis\ encrypt\ tpm2\ \[aq]{"hash":"sha1","key":"rsa"}\[aq]\ <\ PT\ >\ JWE
++\f[]
++.fi
++.PP
++To decrypt the data, simply provide the ciphertext (JWE):
++.IP
++.nf
++\f[C]
++$\ clevis\ decrypt\ <\ JWE\ >\ PT
++\f[]
++.fi
++.PP
++Note that like other pins no configuration is used for decryption, this
++is due clevis storing the public and private keys to unseal the TPM2
++encrypted object in the JWE so clevis can fetch that information from
++there.
++.PP
++The pin also supports sealing data to a Platform Configuration Registers
++(PCR) state.
++That way the data can only be unsealed if the PCRs hashes values match
++the policy used when sealing.
++.PP
++For example, to seal the data to the PCR with index 0 and 1 for the SHA1
++bank:
++.IP
++.nf
++\f[C]
++$\ clevis\ encrypt\ tpm2\ \[aq]{"pcr_bank":"sha1","pcr_ids":"0,1"}\[aq]\ <\ PT\ >\ JWE
++\f[]
++.fi
++.PP
++The PCR digest values are looked up from the current hash values for the
++PCRs, but a digest can also be provided if the data needs to be sealed
++with values different to the current ones, by passing the binary hash
++encoded in base64:
++.IP
++.nf
++\f[C]
++$\ clevis\ encrypt\ tpm2\ \[aq]{"pcr_ids":"0","pcr_digest":"xy7J5svCtqlfM03d1lE5gdoA8MI"}\[aq]\ <\ PT\ >\ JWE
++\f[]
++.fi
++.SH Threat model
++.PP
++The Clevis security model relies in the fact that an attacker will not
++be able to access both the encrypted data and the decryption key.
++.PP
++For most Clevis pins, the decryption key is not locally stored, so the
++decryption policy is only satisfied if the decryption key can be
++remotely accessed.
++It could for example be stored in a remote server or in a hardware
++authentication device that has to be plugged into the machine.
++.PP
++The tpm2 pin is different in this regard, since a key is wrapped by a
++TPM2 chip that is always present in the machine.
++This does not mean that there are not use cases for this pin, but it is
++important to understand the fact that an attacker that has access to
++both the encrypted data and the local TPM2 chip will be able to decrypt
++the data.
++.SH CONFIG
++.PP
++This command uses the following configuration properties:
++.IP \[bu] 2
++\f[C]hash\f[] (string) : Hash algorithm used in the computation of the
++object name (default: sha256)
++.PP
++It must be one of the following:
++.IP \[bu] 2
++\f[C]sha1\f[]
++.IP \[bu] 2
++\f[C]sha256\f[]
++.IP \[bu] 2
++\f[C]sha384\f[]
++.IP \[bu] 2
++\f[C]sha512\f[]
++.IP \[bu] 2
++\f[C]sm3_256\f[]
++.IP \[bu] 2
++\f[C]key\f[] (string) : Algorithm type for the generated key (default:
++ecc)
++.PP
++It must be one of the following:
++.IP \[bu] 2
++\f[C]rsa\f[]
++.IP \[bu] 2
++\f[C]keyedhash\f[]
++.IP \[bu] 2
++\f[C]ecc\f[]
++.IP \[bu] 2
++\f[C]symcipher\f[]
++.IP \[bu] 2
++\f[C]pcr_bank\f[] (string) : PCR algorithm bank to use for policy
++(default: sha1)
++.PP
++It must be one of the following:
++.IP \[bu] 2
++\f[C]sha1\f[]
++.IP \[bu] 2
++\f[C]sha256\f[]
++.IP \[bu] 2
++\f[C]pcr_ids\f[] (string) : Comma separated list of PCR used for policy.
++If not present, no policy is used
++.IP \[bu] 2
++\f[C]pcr_digest\f[] (string) : Binary PCR hashes encoded in base64.
++If not present, the hash values are looked up
++.SH SEE ALSO
++.PP
++\f[C]clevis\-decrypt\f[](1)
++.SH AUTHORS
++Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>.
+diff --git a/doc/clevis-encrypt-tpm2.1.md b/doc/clevis-encrypt-tpm2.1.md
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..f533d67
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/doc/clevis-encrypt-tpm2.1.md
+@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
++% CLEVIS-ENCRYPT-TPM2(1)
++% Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
++% November 2017
++
++# NAME
++
++clevis-encrypt-tpm2 -- Encrypts using a TPM2.0 chip binding policy
++
++# SYNOPSIS
++
++`clevis encrypt tpm2` CONFIG < PT > JWE
++
++# OVERVIEW
++
++The `clevis encrypt tpm2` command encrypts using a Trusted Platform Module 2.0
++(TPM2) chip. Its only argument is the JSON configuration object.
++
++When using the tpm2 pin, we create a new, cryptographically-strong, random key.
++This key is encrypted using the TPM2 chip.
++Then at decryption time, the key is decrypted again using the TPM2 chip.
++
++ $ clevis encrypt tpm2 '{}' < PT > JWE
++
++The pin has reasonable defaults for its configuration, but a different hierarchy,
++hash, and key algorithms can be chosen if the defaults used are not suitable:
++
++ $ clevis encrypt tpm2 '{"hash":"sha1","key":"rsa"}' < PT > JWE
++
++To decrypt the data, simply provide the ciphertext (JWE):
++
++ $ clevis decrypt < JWE > PT
++
++Note that like other pins no configuration is used for decryption, this is due
++clevis storing the public and private keys to unseal the TPM2 encrypted object
++in the JWE so clevis can fetch that information from there.
++
++The pin also supports sealing data to a Platform Configuration Registers (PCR)
++state. That way the data can only be unsealed if the PCRs hashes values match
++the policy used when sealing.
++
++For example, to seal the data to the PCR with index 0 and 1 for the SHA1 bank:
++
++ $ clevis encrypt tpm2 '{"pcr_bank":"sha1","pcr_ids":"0,1"}' < PT > JWE
++
++The PCR digest values are looked up from the current hash values for the PCRs,
++but a digest can also be provided if the data needs to be sealed with values
++different to the current ones, by passing the binary hash encoded in base64:
++
++ $ clevis encrypt tpm2 '{"pcr_ids":"0","pcr_digest":"xy7J5svCtqlfM03d1lE5gdoA8MI"}' < PT > JWE
++
++# Threat model
++
++The Clevis security model relies in the fact that an attacker will not be able to
++access both the encrypted data and the decryption key.
++
++For most Clevis pins, the decryption key is not locally stored, so the decryption
++policy is only satisfied if the decryption key can be remotely accessed. It could
++for example be stored in a remote server or in a hardware authentication device
++that has to be plugged into the machine.
++
++The tpm2 pin is different in this regard, since a key is wrapped by a TPM2 chip
++that is always present in the machine. This does not mean that there are not use
++cases for this pin, but it is important to understand the fact that an attacker
++that has access to both the encrypted data and the local TPM2 chip will be able
++to decrypt the data.
++
++# CONFIG
++
++This command uses the following configuration properties:
++
++* `hash` (string) :
++ Hash algorithm used in the computation of the object name (default: sha256)
++
++ It must be one of the following:
++
++ * `sha1`
++ * `sha256`
++ * `sha384`
++ * `sha512`
++ * `sm3_256`
++
++* `key` (string) :
++ Algorithm type for the generated key (default: ecc)
++
++ It must be one of the following:
++
++ * `rsa`
++ * `keyedhash`
++ * `ecc`
++ * `symcipher`
++
++* `pcr_bank` (string) :
++ PCR algorithm bank to use for policy (default: sha1)
++
++ It must be one of the following:
++
++ * `sha1`
++ * `sha256`
++
++* `pcr_ids` (string) :
++ Comma separated list of PCR used for policy. If not present, no policy is used
++
++* `pcr_digest` (string) :
++ Binary PCR hashes encoded in base64. If not present, the hash values are looked up
++
++# SEE ALSO
++
++`clevis-decrypt`(1)
+diff --git a/doc/clevis.1 b/doc/clevis.1
+index 3d4a10d..0937533 100644
+--- a/doc/clevis.1
++++ b/doc/clevis.1
+@@ -80,6 +80,42 @@ $\ clevis\ decrypt\ <\ JWE\ >\ PT
+ .fi
+ .PP
+ For more information, see \f[C]clevis\-encrypt\-tang\f[](1).
++.SH TPM2 BINDING
++.PP
++Clevis provides support to encrypt a key in a Trusted Platform Module
++2.0 (TPM2) chip.
++The cryptographically\-strong, random key used for encryption is
++encrypted using the TPM2 chip, and then at decryption time is decrypted
++using the TPM2 to allow clevis to decrypt the secret stored in the JWE.
++.PP
++Encrypting data using the tpm2 pin works the same than the pins
++mentioned above:
++.IP
++.nf
++\f[C]
++$\ clevis\ encrypt\ tpm2\ \[aq]{}\[aq]\ <\ PT\ >\ JWE
++\f[]
++.fi
++.PP
++The pin has reasonable defaults for its configuration, but a different
++hierarchy, hash, and key algorithms can be chosen if the defaults used
++are not suitable.
++.PP
++Decryption also works similar to other pins, only the JWE needs to be
++provided:
++.IP
++.nf
++\f[C]
++$\ clevis\ decrypt\ <\ JWE\ >\ PT
++\f[]
++.fi
++.PP
++Note that like other pins no configuration is used for decryption, this
++is due clevis storing the public and private keys to unseal the TPM2
++encrypted object in the JWE so clevis can fetch that information from
++there.
++.PP
++For more information see \f[C]clevis\-encrypt\-tpm2\f[](1).
+ .SH SHAMIR\[aq]S SECRET SHARING
+ .PP
+ Clevis provides a way to mix pins together to create sophisticated
+@@ -151,7 +187,7 @@ For more information, see \f[C]clevis\-luks\-bind\f[](1).
+ .SH SEE ALSO
+ .PP
+ \f[C]clevis\-encrypt\-http\f[](1), \f[C]clevis\-encrypt\-tang\f[](1),
+-\f[C]clevis\-encrypt\-sss\f[](1), \f[C]clevis\-luks\-bind\f[](1),
+-\f[C]clevis\-decrypt\f[](1)
++\f[C]clevis\-encrypt\-tpm2\f[](1), \f[C]clevis\-encrypt\-sss\f[](1),
++\f[C]clevis\-luks\-bind\f[](1), \f[C]clevis\-decrypt\f[](1)
+ .SH AUTHORS
+ Nathaniel McCallum <npmccallum@redhat.com>.
+diff --git a/src/Makefile.am b/src/Makefile.am
+index 244874b..8562502 100644
+--- a/src/Makefile.am
++++ b/src/Makefile.am
+@@ -25,6 +25,12 @@ dist_bin_SCRIPTS = \
+ clevis-decrypt \
+ clevis
+
++if HAVE_TPM2_TOOLS
++ dist_bin_SCRIPTS += \
++ clevis-encrypt-tpm2 \
++ clevis-decrypt-tpm2
++endif
++
+ clevis_encrypt_sss_SOURCES = clevis-encrypt-sss.c sss.c sss.h
+ clevis_decrypt_sss_SOURCES = clevis-decrypt-sss.c sss.c sss.h
+ clevis_encrypt_sss_LDADD = @jose_LIBS@ @libcrypto_LIBS@
+diff --git a/src/clevis-decrypt-tpm2 b/src/clevis-decrypt-tpm2
+new file mode 100755
+index 0000000..f3871d8
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/src/clevis-decrypt-tpm2
+@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
++#!/bin/bash -e
++# vim: set tabstop=8 shiftwidth=4 softtabstop=4 expandtab smarttab colorcolumn=80:
++#
++# Copyright (c) 2017 Red Hat, Inc.
++# Author: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
++#
++# This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
++# it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
++# the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
++# (at your option) any later version.
++#
++# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
++# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
++# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
++# GNU General Public License for more details.
++#
++# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
++# along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
++#
++
++# The owner hierarchy is the one that should be used by the Operating System.
++auth="o"
++
++function on_exit() {
++ if ! rm -r $TMP; then
++ echo "Delete temporary files failed!" >&2
++ exit 1
++ fi
++}
++
++[ $# -eq 1 -a "$1" == "--summary" ] && exit 1
++
++if [ -t 0 ]; then
++ echo >&2
++ echo "Usage: clevis decrypt tpm2 < JWE > PLAINTEXT" >&2
++ echo >&2
++ exit 1
++fi
++
++export TPM2TOOLS_TCTI_NAME=device
++export TPM2TOOLS_DEVICE_FILE=`ls /dev/tpmrm? 2>/dev/null`
++
++if [ -z "${TPM2TOOLS_DEVICE_FILE[0]}" ]; then
++ echo "A TPM2 device with the in-kernel resource manager is needed!" >&2
++ exit 1
++fi
++
++if ! [[ -r "${TPM2TOOLS_DEVICE_FILE[0]}" && -w "${TPM2TOOLS_DEVICE_FILE[0]}" ]]; then
++ echo "The ${TPM2TOOLS_DEVICE_FILE[0]} device must be readable and writable!" >&2
++ exit 1
++fi
++
++read -d . hdr
++
++if ! jhd=`jose b64 dec -i- <<< "$hdr"`; then
++ echo "Error decoding JWE protected header!" >&2
++ exit 1
++fi
++
++if [ `jose fmt -j- -Og clevis -g pin -u- <<< "$jhd"` != "tpm2" ]; then
++ echo "JWE pin mismatch!" >&2
++ exit 1
++fi
++
++if ! hash=`jose fmt -j- -Og clevis -g tpm2 -g hash -Su- <<< "$jhd"`; then
++ echo "JWE missing required 'hash' header parameter!" >&2
++ exit 1
++fi
++
++if ! key=`jose fmt -j- -Og clevis -g tpm2 -g key -Su- <<< "$jhd"`; then
++ echo "JWE missing required 'key' header parameter!" >&2
++ exit 1
++fi
++
++if ! jwk_pub=`jose fmt -j- -Og clevis -g tpm2 -g jwk_pub -Su- <<< "$jhd"`; then
++ echo "JWE missing required 'key' header parameter!" >&2
++ exit 1
++fi
++
++if ! jwk_priv=`jose fmt -j- -Og clevis -g tpm2 -g jwk_priv -Su- <<< "$jhd"`; then
++ echo "JWE missing required 'key' header parameter!" >&2
++ exit 1
++fi
++
++if ! TMP=`mktemp -d`; then
++ echo "Creating a temporary dir for TPM files failed!" >&2
++ exit 1
++fi
++
++trap 'on_exit' EXIT
++
++pcr_ids=`jose fmt -j- -Og clevis -g tpm2 -g pcr_ids -Su- <<< "$jhd"` || true
++
++if [ -n "$pcr_ids" ]; then
++ pcr_bank=`jose fmt -j- -Og clevis -g tpm2 -g pcr_bank -Su- <<< "$jhd"`
++ policy_options="-L $pcr_bank:$pcr_ids"
++fi
++
++if ! `jose b64 dec -i- -O $TMP/jwk.pub <<< "$jwk_pub"`; then
++ echo "Decoding jwk.pub from Base64 failed!" >&2
++ exit 1
++fi
++
++if ! `jose b64 dec -i- -O $TMP/jwk.priv <<< "$jwk_priv"`; then
++ echo "Decoding jwk.priv from Base64 failed!" >&2
++ exit 1
++fi
++
++if ! tpm2_createprimary -Q -H "$auth" -g "$hash" -G "$key" \
++ -C $TMP/primary.context 2>/dev/null; then
++ echo "Creating TPM2 primary key failed!" >&2
++ exit 1
++fi
++
++if ! tpm2_load -Q -c $TMP/primary.context -u $TMP/jwk.pub -r $TMP/jwk.priv \
++ -C $TMP/load.context 2>/dev/null; then
++ echo "Loading jwk to TPM2 failed!" >&2
++ exit 1
++fi
++
++if ! jwk=`tpm2_unseal -c $TMP/load.context $policy_options 2>/dev/null`; then
++ echo "Unsealing jwk from TPM failed!" >&2
++ exit 1
++fi
++
++jose jwe dec -k- -i- < <(echo -n "$jwk$hdr."; cat)
+diff --git a/src/clevis-encrypt-tpm2 b/src/clevis-encrypt-tpm2
+new file mode 100755
+index 0000000..b99aa97
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/src/clevis-encrypt-tpm2
+@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
++#!/bin/bash -e
++# vim: set tabstop=8 shiftwidth=4 softtabstop=4 expandtab smarttab colorcolumn=80:
++#
++# Copyright (c) 2017 Red Hat, Inc.
++# Author: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
++#
++# This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
++# it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
++# the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
++# (at your option) any later version.
++#
++# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
++# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
++# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
++# GNU General Public License for more details.
++#
++# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
++# along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
++#
++
++SUMMARY="Encrypts using a TPM2.0 chip binding policy"
++# The owner hierarchy is the one that should be used by the Operating System.
++auth="o"
++# Algorithm type must be keyedhash for object with user provided sensitive data.
++alg_create_key="keyedhash"
++# Attributes for the created TPM2 object with the JWK as sensitive data.
++obj_attr="fixedtpm|fixedparent|sensitivedataorigin|noda|adminwithpolicy"
++
++function on_exit() {
++ if ! rm -rf $TMP; then
++ echo "Delete temporary files failed!" >&2
++ exit 1
++ fi
++}
++
++if [ "$1" == "--summary" ]; then
++ echo "$SUMMARY"
++ exit 0
++fi
++
++if [ -t 0 ]; then
++ echo >&2
++ echo "Usage: clevis encrypt tpm2 CONFIG < PLAINTEXT > JWE" >&2
++ echo >&2
++ echo $SUMMARY >&2
++ echo >&2
++ echo "This command uses the following configuration properties:" >&2
++ echo >&2
++ echo " hash: <string> Hash algorithm used in the computation of the object name (default: sha256)" >&2
++ echo >&2
++ echo " key: <string> Algorithm type for the generated key (default: ecc)" >&2
++ echo >&2
++ echo " pcr_bank: <string> PCR algorithm bank to use for policy (default: sha1)" >&2
++ echo >&2
++ echo " pcr_ids: <string> PCR list used for policy. If not present, no policy is used" >&2
++ echo >&2
++ echo " pcr_digest: <string> Binary PCR hashes encoded in base64. If not present, the hash values are looked up" >&2
++ echo >&2
++ exit 1
++fi
++
++export TPM2TOOLS_TCTI_NAME=device
++export TPM2TOOLS_DEVICE_FILE=`ls /dev/tpmrm? 2>/dev/null`
++
++if [ -z "${TPM2TOOLS_DEVICE_FILE[0]}" ]; then
++ echo "A TPM2 device with the in-kernel resource manager is needed!" >&2
++ exit 1
++fi
++
++if ! [[ -r "${TPM2TOOLS_DEVICE_FILE[0]}" && -w "${TPM2TOOLS_DEVICE_FILE[0]}" ]]; then
++ echo "The ${TPM2TOOLS_DEVICE_FILE[0]} device must be readable and writable!" >&2
++ exit 1
++fi
++
++if ! cfg=`jose fmt -j "$1" -Oo- 2>/dev/null`; then
++ echo "Configuration is malformed!" >&2
++ exit 1
++fi
++
++hash=`jose fmt -j- -Og hash -u- <<< "$cfg"` || hash="sha256"
++
++key=`jose fmt -j- -Og key -u- <<< "$cfg"` || key="ecc"
++
++pcr_bank=`jose fmt -j- -Og pcr_hash -u- <<< "$cfg"` || pcr_bank="sha1"
++
++pcr_ids=`jose fmt -j- -Og pcr_ids -u- <<< "$cfg"` || true
++
++pcr_digest=`jose fmt -j- -Og pcr_digest -u- <<< "$cfg"` || true
++
++if ! jwk=`jose jwk gen -i '{"alg":"A256GCM"}'`; then
++ echo "Generating a jwk failed!" >&2
++ exit 1
++fi
++
++if ! TMP=`mktemp -d`; then
++ echo "Creating a temporary dir for TPM files failed!" >&2
++ exit 1
++fi
++
++trap 'on_exit' EXIT
++
++if ! tpm2_createprimary -Q -H "$auth" -g "$hash" -G "$key" -C $TMP/primary.context; then
++ echo "Creating TPM2 primary key failed!" >&2
++ exit 1
++fi
++
++if [ -n "$pcr_ids" ]; then
++ if [ -z "$pcr_digest" ]; then
++ if ! tpm2_pcrlist -Q -L "$pcr_bank":"$pcr_ids" -o $TMP/pcr.digest; then
++ echo "Creating PCR hashes file failed!" >&2
++ exit 1
++ fi
++ else
++ if ! jose b64 dec -i- -O "$TMP"/pcr.digest <<< "$pcr_digest"; then
++ echo "Error decoding PCR digest!" >&2
++ exit 1
++ fi
++ fi
++
++ if ! tpm2_createpolicy -Q -P -L "$pcr_bank":"$pcr_ids" -F $TMP/pcr.digest -f $TMP/pcr.policy; then
++ echo "create policy fail, please check the environment or parameters!"
++ exit 1
++ fi
++
++ policy_options="-L $TMP/pcr.policy"
++fi
++
++if ! tpm2_create -Q -g "$hash" -G "$alg_create_key" -c $TMP/primary.context -u $TMP/jwk.pub \
++ -r $TMP/jwk.priv -A "$obj_attr" $policy_options -I- <<< "$jwk"; then
++ echo "Creating TPM2 object for jwk failed!" >&2
++ exit 1
++fi
++
++if ! jwk_pub=`jose b64 enc -I $TMP/jwk.pub`; then
++ echo "Encoding jwk.pub in Base64 failed!" >&2
++ exit 1
++fi
++
++if ! jwk_priv=`jose b64 enc -I $TMP/jwk.priv`; then
++ echo "Encoding jwk.priv in Base64 failed!" >&2
++ exit 1
++fi
++
++jwe='{"protected":{"clevis":{"pin":"tpm2","tpm2":{}}}}'
++jwe=`jose fmt -j "$jwe" -g protected -g clevis -g tpm2 -q "$hash" -s hash -UUUUo-`
++jwe=`jose fmt -j "$jwe" -g protected -g clevis -g tpm2 -q "$key" -s key -UUUUo-`
++
++if [ -n "$pcr_ids" ]; then
++ jwe=`jose fmt -j "$jwe" -g protected -g clevis -g tpm2 -q "$pcr_bank" -s pcr_bank -UUUUo-`
++ jwe=`jose fmt -j "$jwe" -g protected -g clevis -g tpm2 -q "$pcr_ids" -s pcr_ids -UUUUo-`
++fi
++
++jwe=`jose fmt -j "$jwe" -g protected -g clevis -g tpm2 -q "$jwk_pub" -s jwk_pub -UUUUo-`
++jwe=`jose fmt -j "$jwe" -g protected -g clevis -g tpm2 -q "$jwk_priv" -s jwk_priv -UUUUo-`
++
++jose jwe enc -i- -k- -I- -c < <(echo -n "$jwe$jwk"; cat)
+diff --git a/src/dracut/module-setup.sh.in b/src/dracut/module-setup.sh.in
+index 5087d56..119762e 100755
+--- a/src/dracut/module-setup.sh.in
++++ b/src/dracut/module-setup.sh.in
+@@ -28,6 +28,8 @@ cmdline() {
+ }
+
+ install() {
++ local ret=0
++
+ cmdline > "${initdir}/etc/cmdline.d/99clevis.conf"
+
+ inst_hook initqueue/online 60 "$moddir/clevis-hook.sh"
+@@ -41,10 +43,31 @@ install() {
+ clevis-decrypt \
+ luksmeta \
+ clevis \
++ mktemp \
+ curl \
+ jose \
+ nc
+
++ for cmd in clevis-decrypt-tpm2 \
++ tpm2_createprimary \
++ tpm2_unseal \
++ tpm2_load; do
++
++ if ! find_binary "$cmd" &>/dev/null; then
++ ((ret++))
++ fi
++ done
++
++ if (($ret == 0)); then
++ inst_multiple clevis-decrypt-tpm2 \
++ tpm2_createprimary \
++ tpm2_unseal \
++ tpm2_load
++ fi
++
+ dracut_need_initqueue
+ }
+
++installkernel() {
++ hostonly='' instmods =drivers/char/tpm
++}
+--
+2.17.1
+
diff --git a/SPECS/clevis.spec b/SPECS/clevis.spec
index c80b6d3..5662291 100644
--- a/SPECS/clevis.spec
+++ b/SPECS/clevis.spec
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
Name: clevis
Version: 7
-Release: 4%{?dist}
+Release: 8%{?dist}
Summary: Automated decryption framework
License: GPLv3+
@@ -10,6 +10,9 @@ URL: https://github.com/latchset/%{name}
Source0: https://github.com/latchset/%{name}/releases/download/v%{version}/%{name}-%{version}.tar.bz2
Patch0: clevis-7-dracut.patch
Patch1: clevis-7-retry.patch
+Patch2: clevis-7-nospam.patch
+Patch3: clevis-7-tpm2.patch
+Patch4: clevis-7-subshell.patch
BuildRequires: libjose-devel >= 8
BuildRequires: libluksmeta-devel >= 8
@@ -17,6 +20,9 @@ BuildRequires: audit-libs-devel >= 2.8.1
BuildRequires: libudisks2-devel
BuildRequires: openssl-devel
+%ifarch i686 x86_64
+BuildRequires: tpm2-tools >= 3.0.0
+%endif
BuildRequires: desktop-file-utils
BuildRequires: pkgconfig
BuildRequires: autoconf
@@ -26,6 +32,9 @@ BuildRequires: dracut
BuildRequires: tang >= 6
BuildRequires: curl
+%ifarch i686 x86_64
+Requires: tpm2-tools >= 3.0.0
+%endif
Requires: coreutils
Requires: jose >= 8
Requires: curl
@@ -118,6 +127,12 @@ exit 0
%{_mandir}/man1/%{name}-decrypt.1*
%{_mandir}/man1/%{name}.1*
+%ifarch i686 x86_64
+%{_bindir}/%{name}-decrypt-tpm2
+%{_bindir}/%{name}-encrypt-tpm2
+%{_mandir}/man1/%{name}-encrypt-tpm2.1*
+%endif
+
%files luks
%{_mandir}/man1/%{name}-luks-unlockers.1*
%{_mandir}/man1/%{name}-luks-unlock.1*
@@ -140,6 +155,22 @@ exit 0
%attr(4755, root, root) %{_libexecdir}/%{name}-luks-udisks2
%changelog
+* Mon Jul 30 2018 Nathaniel McCallum <npmccallum@redhat.com> - 7-8
+- Fix quoting on older bash shells (from previous patch)
+- Resolves: rhbz#1599728
+
+* Tue Jul 24 2018 Nathaniel McCallum <npmccallum@redhat.com> - 7-7
+- Backport subshell fix for clevis-luks-unlock
+- Resolves: rhbz#1599728
+
+* Mon Jul 09 2018 Nathaniel McCallum <npmccallum@redhat.com> - 7-6
+- Backport TPM 2.0 support
+- Resolves: rhbz#1472435
+
+* Mon Jul 09 2018 Nathaniel McCallum <npmccallum@redhat.com> - 7-5
+- Don't spam the log for uninitialized devices.
+- Resolves: rhbz#1538759
+
* Mon Nov 13 2017 Nathaniel McCallum <npmccallum@redhat.com> - 7-4
- Retry unlocking under systemd. This prevents a race condition.
- Resolves: rhbz#1475406