diff --git a/SOURCES/0002-fix-CVE-2021-3672.patch b/SOURCES/0002-fix-CVE-2021-3672.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9dc7f31
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/0002-fix-CVE-2021-3672.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,198 @@
+From 4bde615c5fa2a6a6f61ca533e46a062691d83f45 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: bradh352 <brad@brad-house.com>
+Date: Fri, 11 Jun 2021 11:27:45 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH 1/2] ares_expand_name() should escape more characters
+
+RFC1035 5.1 specifies some reserved characters and escaping sequences
+that are allowed to be specified. Expand the list of reserved characters
+and also escape non-printable characters using the \DDD format as
+specified in the RFC.
+
+Bug Reported By: philipp.jeitner@sit.fraunhofer.de
+Fix By: Brad House (@bradh352)
+---
+ ares_expand_name.c | 41 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
+ 1 file changed, 38 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/ares_expand_name.c b/ares_expand_name.c
+index 3a38e67..8604543 100644
+--- a/ares_expand_name.c
++++ b/ares_expand_name.c
+@@ -38,6 +38,26 @@
+ static int name_length(const unsigned char *encoded, const unsigned char *abuf,
+ int alen);
+
++/* Reserved characters for names that need to be escaped */
++static int is_reservedch(int ch)
++{
++ switch (ch) {
++ case '"':
++ case '.':
++ case ';':
++ case '\\':
++ case '(':
++ case ')':
++ case '@':
++ case '$':
++ return 1;
++ default:
++ break;
++ }
++
++ return 0;
++}
++
+ /* Expand an RFC1035-encoded domain name given by encoded. The
+ * containing message is given by abuf and alen. The result given by
+ * *s, which is set to a NUL-terminated allocated buffer. *enclen is
+@@ -117,9 +137,18 @@ int ares_expand_name(const unsigned char *encoded, const unsigned char *abuf,
+ p++;
+ while (len--)
+ {
+- if (*p == '.' || *p == '\\')
++ if (!isprint(*p)) {
++ /* Output as \DDD for consistency with RFC1035 5.1 */
++ *q++ = '\\';
++ *q++ = '0' + *p / 100;
++ *q++ = '0' + (*p % 100) / 10;
++ *q++ = '0' + (*p % 10);
++ } else if (is_reservedch(*p)) {
+ *q++ = '\\';
+- *q++ = *p;
++ *q++ = *p;
++ } else {
++ *q++ = *p;
++ }
+ p++;
+ }
+ *q++ = '.';
+@@ -177,7 +206,13 @@ static int name_length(const unsigned char *encoded, const unsigned char *abuf,
+ encoded++;
+ while (offset--)
+ {
+- n += (*encoded == '.' || *encoded == '\\') ? 2 : 1;
++ if (!isprint(*encoded)) {
++ n += 4;
++ } else if (is_reservedch(*encoded)) {
++ n += 2;
++ } else {
++ n += 1;
++ }
+ encoded++;
+ }
+ n++;
+--
+2.26.3
+
+
+From 86cc9241f89c1155111b992ccc03bf76d8ae634a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: bradh352 <brad@brad-house.com>
+Date: Fri, 11 Jun 2021 12:39:24 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH 2/2] ares_expand_name(): fix formatting and handling of root
+ name response
+
+Fixes issue introduced in prior commit with formatting and handling
+of parsing a root name response which should not be escaped.
+
+Fix By: Brad House
+---
+ ares_expand_name.c | 62 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
+ 1 file changed, 40 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/ares_expand_name.c b/ares_expand_name.c
+index 8604543..f89ee3f 100644
+--- a/ares_expand_name.c
++++ b/ares_expand_name.c
+@@ -133,27 +133,37 @@ int ares_expand_name(const unsigned char *encoded, const unsigned char *abuf,
+ }
+ else
+ {
+- len = *p;
++ int name_len = *p;
++ len = name_len;
+ p++;
++
+ while (len--)
+ {
+- if (!isprint(*p)) {
+- /* Output as \DDD for consistency with RFC1035 5.1 */
+- *q++ = '\\';
+- *q++ = '0' + *p / 100;
+- *q++ = '0' + (*p % 100) / 10;
+- *q++ = '0' + (*p % 10);
+- } else if (is_reservedch(*p)) {
+- *q++ = '\\';
+- *q++ = *p;
+- } else {
+- *q++ = *p;
+- }
++ /* Output as \DDD for consistency with RFC1035 5.1, except
++ * for the special case of a root name response */
++ if (!isprint(*p) && !(name_len == 1 && *p == 0))
++ {
++
++ *q++ = '\\';
++ *q++ = '0' + *p / 100;
++ *q++ = '0' + (*p % 100) / 10;
++ *q++ = '0' + (*p % 10);
++ }
++ else if (is_reservedch(*p))
++ {
++ *q++ = '\\';
++ *q++ = *p;
++ }
++ else
++ {
++ *q++ = *p;
++ }
+ p++;
+ }
+ *q++ = '.';
+ }
+- }
++ }
++
+ if (!indir)
+ *enclen = aresx_uztosl(p + 1U - encoded);
+
+@@ -200,21 +210,29 @@ static int name_length(const unsigned char *encoded, const unsigned char *abuf,
+ }
+ else if (top == 0x00)
+ {
+- offset = *encoded;
++ int name_len = *encoded;
++ offset = name_len;
+ if (encoded + offset + 1 >= abuf + alen)
+ return -1;
+ encoded++;
++
+ while (offset--)
+ {
+- if (!isprint(*encoded)) {
+- n += 4;
+- } else if (is_reservedch(*encoded)) {
+- n += 2;
+- } else {
+- n += 1;
+- }
++ if (!isprint(*encoded) && !(name_len == 1 && *encoded == 0))
++ {
++ n += 4;
++ }
++ else if (is_reservedch(*encoded))
++ {
++ n += 2;
++ }
++ else
++ {
++ n += 1;
++ }
+ encoded++;
+ }
++
+ n++;
+ }
+ else
+--
+2.26.3
+
diff --git a/SPECS/c-ares.spec b/SPECS/c-ares.spec
index 3ae25ce..0a692cf 100644
--- a/SPECS/c-ares.spec
+++ b/SPECS/c-ares.spec
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
Summary: A library that performs asynchronous DNS operations
Name: c-ares
Version: 1.13.0
-Release: 5%{?dist}
+Release: 6%{?dist}
License: MIT
Group: System Environment/Libraries
URL: http://c-ares.haxx.se/
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ Source0: http://c-ares.haxx.se/download/%{name}-%{version}.tar.gz
# The license can be obtained at http://c-ares.haxx.se/license.html
Source1: LICENSE
Patch0: 0001-Use-RPM-compiler-options.patch
+Patch1: 0002-fix-CVE-2021-3672.patch
BuildRoot: %{_tmppath}/%{name}-%{version}-%{release}-root-%(%{__id_u} -n)
@@ -34,6 +35,7 @@ compile applications or shared objects that use c-ares.
%prep
%setup -q
%patch0 -p1 -b .optflags
+%patch1 -p1 -b .dns
cp %{SOURCE1} .
f=CHANGES ; iconv -f iso-8859-1 -t utf-8 $f -o $f.utf8 ; mv $f.utf8 $f
@@ -72,6 +74,9 @@ rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT
%{_mandir}/man3/ares_*
%changelog
+* Fri Oct 15 2021 Alexey Tikhonov <atikhono@redhat.com> - 1.13.0-6
+- Resolves: rhbz#1989425 - CVE-2021-3672 c-ares: missing input validation of host names may lead to Domain Hijacking [rhel-8]
+
* Mon Aug 13 2018 Jakub Hrozek <jhrozek@redhat.com> - 1.13.0-5
- Drop an unused patch