Paul Wouters

placeholder to suppress warning

IPSEC_RANBITS 8 6 Sep 2013 libreswan Executable programs
ipsec newhostkey generate a new raw RSA authentication key for a host
`ipsec` newhostkey --configdirnssdbdir --password password --quiet --verbose --bits bits --random device --hostname hostname --output filename

## DESCRIPTION

newhostkey outputs (into filename, which can be '-' for standard output) an RSA private key suitable for this host, in /etc/ipsec.secrets format (see ipsec.secrets 5) using the `--quiet` option per default.

The `--output` option is mandatory. The specified filename is created under umask 077 if nonexistent; if it already exists and is non-empty, a warning message about that is sent to standard error, and the output is appended to the file.

The `--quiet` option suppresses both the rsasigkey narrative and the existing-file warning message.

When compiled with NSS support (the default), `--configdir` specifies the nss configuration directory where the certificate key, and modsec databases reside. There is no default value, though /etc/ipsec.d might be sensible choice.

When compiled with NSS support (the default), `--password` specifies a module authentication password that may be required if FIPS mode is enabled

The `--bits` option specifies the number of bits in the RSA key; the current default is a random (multiple of 16) value between 3072 and 4096. The minimum allowed is 2172.

The `--random` is used to specify the random device (default `/dev/random` used to seed the crypto library RNG.

The `--hostname` option is passed through to rsasigkey to tell it what host name to label the output with (via its `--hostname` option).

The output format is that of rsasigkey, with bracketing added to complete the ipsec.secrets format. In the usual case, where ipsec.secrets contains only the host’s own private key, the output of newhostkey is sufficient as a complete ipsec.secrets file.

## FILES

/dev/random, /dev/urandom

## SEE ALSO

ipsec_rsasigkey 8, ipsec.secrets 5

## HISTORY

Originally written for the Linux FreeS/WAN project <http://www.freeswan.org> by Henry Spencer. Updated by Paul Wouters

## BUGS

As with rsasigkey, the run time is difficult to predict, since depletion of the system’s randomness pool can cause arbitrarily long waits for random bits, and the prime-number searches can also take unpre dictable (and potentially large) amounts of CPU time. See ipsec_rsasigkey 8 .

A higher-level tool which could handle the clerical details of changing to a new key would be helpful.