diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in index 8e11217..9311e16 100644 --- a/Makefile.in +++ b/Makefile.in @@ -92,7 +92,8 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=${LIBOPENSSH_OBJS} \ ssh-pkcs11.o krl.o smult_curve25519_ref.o \ kexc25519.o kexc25519c.o poly1305.o chacha.o cipher-chachapoly.o \ ssh-ed25519.o digest-openssl.o hmac.o utf8_stringprep.o \ - sc25519.o ge25519.o fe25519.o ed25519.o verify.o hash.o blocks.o + sc25519.o ge25519.o fe25519.o ed25519.o verify.o hash.o blocks.o \ + auditstub.o SSHOBJS= ssh.o readconf.o clientloop.o sshtty.o \ sshconnect.o sshconnect1.o sshconnect2.o mux.o \ diff --git a/audit-bsm.c b/audit-bsm.c index 6135591..c7a1b47 100644 --- a/audit-bsm.c +++ b/audit-bsm.c @@ -375,10 +375,23 @@ audit_connection_from(const char *host, int port) #endif } -void +int audit_run_command(const char *command) { /* not implemented */ + return 0; +} + +void +audit_end_command(int handle, const char *command) +{ + /* not implemented */ +} + +void +audit_count_session_open(void) +{ + /* not necessary */ } void @@ -393,6 +406,12 @@ audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li) /* not implemented */ } +int +audit_keyusage(int host_user, const char *type, unsigned bits, char *fp, int rv) +{ + /* not implemented */ +} + void audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event) { @@ -454,4 +473,40 @@ audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event) debug("%s: unhandled event %d", __func__, event); } } + +void +audit_unsupported_body(int what) +{ + /* not implemented */ +} + +void +audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress, char *pfs, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) +{ + /* not implemented */ +} + +void +audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) +{ + /* not implemented */ +} + +void +audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *fp) +{ + /* not implemented */ +} + +void +audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *fp, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) +{ + /* not implemented */ +} + +void +audit_generate_ephemeral_server_key(const char *fp) +{ + /* not implemented */ +} #endif /* BSM */ diff --git a/audit-linux.c b/audit-linux.c index b3ee2f4..bff8180 100644 --- a/audit-linux.c +++ b/audit-linux.c @@ -35,13 +35,25 @@ #include "log.h" #include "audit.h" +#include "key.h" +#include "hostfile.h" +#include "auth.h" +#include "misc.h" /* servconf.h needs misc.h for struct ForwardOptions */ +#include "servconf.h" #include "canohost.h" +#include "packet.h" +#include "cipher.h" +#define AUDIT_LOG_SIZE 256 + +extern ServerOptions options; +extern Authctxt *the_authctxt; +extern u_int utmp_len; const char* audit_username(void); -int -linux_audit_record_event(int uid, const char *username, - const char *hostname, const char *ip, const char *ttyn, int success) +static void +linux_audit_user_logxxx(int uid, const char *username, + const char *hostname, const char *ip, const char *ttyn, int success, int event) { int audit_fd, rc, saved_errno; @@ -49,11 +61,11 @@ linux_audit_record_event(int uid, const char *username, if (audit_fd < 0) { if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT || errno == EAFNOSUPPORT) - return 1; /* No audit support in kernel */ + return; /* No audit support in kernel */ else - return 0; /* Must prevent login */ + goto fatal_report; /* Must prevent login */ } - rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN, + rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, event, NULL, "login", username ? username : "(unknown)", username == NULL ? uid : -1, hostname, ip, ttyn, success); saved_errno = errno; @@ -65,35 +77,154 @@ linux_audit_record_event(int uid, const char *username, if ((rc == -EPERM) && (geteuid() != 0)) rc = 0; errno = saved_errno; - return (rc >= 0); + if (rc < 0) { +fatal_report: + fatal("linux_audit_write_entry failed: %s", strerror(errno)); + } } +static void +linux_audit_user_auth(int uid, const char *username, + const char *hostname, const char *ip, const char *ttyn, int success, int event) +{ + int audit_fd, rc, saved_errno; + static const char *event_name[] = { + "maxtries exceeded", + "root denied", + "success", + "none", + "password", + "challenge-response", + "pubkey", + "hostbased", + "gssapi", + "invalid user", + "nologin", + "connection closed", + "connection abandoned", + "unknown" + }; + + audit_fd = audit_open(); + if (audit_fd < 0) { + if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT || + errno == EAFNOSUPPORT) + return; /* No audit support in kernel */ + else + goto fatal_report; /* Must prevent login */ + } + + if ((event < 0) || (event > SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN)) + event = SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN; + + rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_AUTH, + NULL, event_name[event], username ? username : "(unknown)", + username == NULL ? uid : -1, hostname, ip, ttyn, success); + saved_errno = errno; + close(audit_fd); + /* + * Do not report error if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non + * root user. + */ + if ((rc == -EPERM) && (geteuid() != 0)) + rc = 0; + errno = saved_errno; + if (rc < 0) { +fatal_report: + fatal("linux_audit_write_entry failed: %s", strerror(errno)); + } +} + +int +audit_keyusage(int host_user, const char *type, unsigned bits, char *fp, int rv) +{ + char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE]; + int audit_fd, rc, saved_errno; + + audit_fd = audit_open(); + if (audit_fd < 0) { + if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT || + errno == EAFNOSUPPORT) + return 1; /* No audit support in kernel */ + else + return 0; /* Must prevent login */ + } + snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s_auth rport=%d", host_user ? "pubkey" : "hostbased", get_remote_port()); + rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_AUTH, NULL, + buf, audit_username(), -1, NULL, get_remote_ipaddr(), NULL, rv); + if ((rc < 0) && ((rc != -1) || (getuid() == 0))) + goto out; + /* is the fingerprint_prefix() still needed? + snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "key algo=%s size=%d fp=%s%s rport=%d", + type, bits, key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp, get_remote_port()); + */ + snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "key algo=%s size=%d fp=%s rport=%d", + type, bits, fp, get_remote_port()); + rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_AUTH, NULL, + buf, audit_username(), -1, NULL, get_remote_ipaddr(), NULL, rv); +out: + saved_errno = errno; + audit_close(audit_fd); + errno = saved_errno; + /* do not report error if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */ + return (rc >= 0) || ((rc == -EPERM) && (getuid() != 0)); +} + +static int user_login_count = 0; + /* Below is the sshd audit API code */ void audit_connection_from(const char *host, int port) { -} /* not implemented */ +} -void +int audit_run_command(const char *command) { - /* not implemented */ + if (!user_login_count++) + linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns), + NULL, "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN); + linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns), + NULL, "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_START); + return 0; +} + +void +audit_end_command(int handle, const char *command) +{ + linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns), + NULL, "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_END); + if (user_login_count && !--user_login_count) + linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns), + NULL, "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGOUT); +} + +void +audit_count_session_open(void) +{ + user_login_count++; } void audit_session_open(struct logininfo *li) { - if (linux_audit_record_event(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname, - NULL, li->line, 1) == 0) - fatal("linux_audit_write_entry failed: %s", strerror(errno)); + if (!user_login_count++) + linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname, + NULL, li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN); + linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname, + NULL, li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_START); } void audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li) { - /* not implemented */ + linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname, + NULL, li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_END); + if (user_login_count && !--user_login_count) + linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname, + NULL, li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGOUT); } void @@ -101,21 +232,43 @@ audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event) { switch(event) { case SSH_AUTH_SUCCESS: - case SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE: + linux_audit_user_auth(-1, audit_username(), NULL, + get_remote_ipaddr(), "ssh", 1, event); + break; + case SSH_NOLOGIN: - case SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES: case SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED: + linux_audit_user_auth(-1, audit_username(), NULL, + get_remote_ipaddr(), "ssh", 0, event); + linux_audit_user_logxxx(-1, audit_username(), NULL, + get_remote_ipaddr(), "ssh", 0, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN); break; + case SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES: case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_NONE: case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD: case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT: case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY: case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED: case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI: + linux_audit_user_auth(-1, audit_username(), NULL, + get_remote_ipaddr(), "ssh", 0, event); + break; + + case SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE: + if (user_login_count) { + while (user_login_count--) + linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns), + NULL, "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_END); + linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns), + NULL, "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGOUT); + } + break; + + case SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON: case SSH_INVALID_USER: - linux_audit_record_event(-1, audit_username(), NULL, - get_remote_ipaddr(), "sshd", 0); + linux_audit_user_logxxx(-1, audit_username(), NULL, + get_remote_ipaddr(), "ssh", 0, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN); break; default: @@ -123,4 +276,135 @@ audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event) } } +void +audit_unsupported_body(int what) +{ +#ifdef AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION + char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE]; + const static char *name[] = { "cipher", "mac", "comp" }; + char *s; + int audit_fd; + + snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=unsupported-%s direction=? cipher=? ksize=? rport=%d laddr=%s lport=%d ", + name[what], get_remote_port(), (s = get_local_ipaddr(packet_get_connection_in())), + get_local_port()); + free(s); + audit_fd = audit_open(); + if (audit_fd < 0) + /* no problem, the next instruction will be fatal() */ + return; + audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION, + buf, NULL, get_remote_ipaddr(), NULL, 0); + audit_close(audit_fd); +#endif +} + +const static char *direction[] = { "from-server", "from-client", "both" }; + +void +audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress, char *pfs, pid_t pid, + uid_t uid) +{ +#ifdef AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION + char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE]; + int audit_fd, audit_ok; + const Cipher *cipher = cipher_by_name(enc); + char *s; + + snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=start direction=%s cipher=%s ksize=%d mac=%s pfs=%s spid=%jd suid=%jd rport=%d laddr=%s lport=%d ", + direction[ctos], enc, cipher ? 8 * cipher->key_len : 0, mac, pfs, + (intmax_t)pid, (intmax_t)uid, + get_remote_port(), (s = get_local_ipaddr(packet_get_connection_in())), get_local_port()); + free(s); + audit_fd = audit_open(); + if (audit_fd < 0) { + if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT || + errno == EAFNOSUPPORT) + return; /* No audit support in kernel */ + else + fatal("cannot open audit"); /* Must prevent login */ + } + audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION, + buf, NULL, get_remote_ipaddr(), NULL, 1); + audit_close(audit_fd); + /* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */ + if ((audit_ok < 0) && ((audit_ok != -1) || (getuid() == 0))) + fatal("cannot write into audit"); /* Must prevent login */ +#endif +} + +void +audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) +{ + char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE]; + int audit_fd, audit_ok; + char *s; + + snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=destroy kind=session fp=? direction=%s spid=%jd suid=%jd rport=%d laddr=%s lport=%d ", + direction[ctos], (intmax_t)pid, (intmax_t)uid, + get_remote_port(), + (s = get_local_ipaddr(packet_get_connection_in())), + get_local_port()); + free(s); + audit_fd = audit_open(); + if (audit_fd < 0) { + if (errno != EINVAL && errno != EPROTONOSUPPORT && + errno != EAFNOSUPPORT) + error("cannot open audit"); + return; + } + audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_KEY_USER, + buf, NULL, get_remote_ipaddr(), NULL, 1); + audit_close(audit_fd); + /* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */ + if ((audit_ok < 0) && ((audit_ok != -1) || (getuid() == 0))) + error("cannot write into audit"); +} + +void +audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *fp, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) +{ + char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE]; + int audit_fd, audit_ok; + + snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=destroy kind=server fp=%s direction=? spid=%jd suid=%jd ", + fp, (intmax_t)pid, (intmax_t)uid); + audit_fd = audit_open(); + if (audit_fd < 0) { + if (errno != EINVAL && errno != EPROTONOSUPPORT && + errno != EAFNOSUPPORT) + error("cannot open audit"); + return; + } + audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_KEY_USER, + buf, NULL, + listening_for_clients() ? NULL : get_remote_ipaddr(), + NULL, 1); + audit_close(audit_fd); + /* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */ + if ((audit_ok < 0) && ((audit_ok != -1) || (getuid() == 0))) + error("cannot write into audit"); +} + +void +audit_generate_ephemeral_server_key(const char *fp) +{ + char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE]; + int audit_fd, audit_ok; + + snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=create kind=server fp=%s direction=? ", fp); + audit_fd = audit_open(); + if (audit_fd < 0) { + if (errno != EINVAL && errno != EPROTONOSUPPORT && + errno != EAFNOSUPPORT) + error("cannot open audit"); + return; + } + audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_KEY_USER, + buf, NULL, 0, NULL, 1); + audit_close(audit_fd); + /* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */ + if ((audit_ok < 0) && ((audit_ok != -1) || (getuid() == 0))) + error("cannot write into audit"); +} #endif /* USE_LINUX_AUDIT */ diff --git a/audit.c b/audit.c index ced57fa..18908b4 100644 --- a/audit.c +++ b/audit.c @@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ #include #include +#include #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS @@ -36,6 +37,11 @@ #include "key.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "auth.h" +#include "ssh-gss.h" +#include "monitor_wrap.h" +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "servconf.h" /* * Care must be taken when using this since it WILL NOT be initialized when @@ -43,6 +49,7 @@ * audit_event(CONNECTION_ABANDON) is called. Test for NULL before using. */ extern Authctxt *the_authctxt; +extern ServerOptions options; /* Maybe add the audit class to struct Authmethod? */ ssh_audit_event_t @@ -71,13 +78,10 @@ audit_classify_auth(const char *method) const char * audit_username(void) { - static const char unknownuser[] = "(unknown user)"; - static const char invaliduser[] = "(invalid user)"; + static const char unknownuser[] = "(unknown)"; - if (the_authctxt == NULL || the_authctxt->user == NULL) + if (the_authctxt == NULL || the_authctxt->user == NULL || !the_authctxt->valid) return (unknownuser); - if (!the_authctxt->valid) - return (invaliduser); return (the_authctxt->user); } @@ -111,6 +115,40 @@ audit_event_lookup(ssh_audit_event_t ev) return(event_lookup[i].name); } +void +audit_key(int host_user, int *rv, const Key *key) +{ + char *fp; + const char *crypto_name; + + fp = key_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_HEX); + if (key->type == KEY_RSA1) + crypto_name = "ssh-rsa1"; + else + crypto_name = key_ssh_name(key); + if (audit_keyusage(host_user, crypto_name, key_size(key), fp, *rv) == 0) + *rv = 0; + free(fp); +} + +void +audit_unsupported(int what) +{ + PRIVSEP(audit_unsupported_body(what)); +} + +void +audit_kex(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *comp, char *pfs) +{ + PRIVSEP(audit_kex_body(ctos, enc, mac, comp, pfs, getpid(), getuid())); +} + +void +audit_session_key_free(int ctos) +{ + PRIVSEP(audit_session_key_free_body(ctos, getpid(), getuid())); +} + # ifndef CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS /* * Null implementations of audit functions. @@ -140,6 +178,17 @@ audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event) } /* + * Called when a child process has called, or will soon call, + * audit_session_open. + */ +void +audit_count_session_open(void) +{ + debug("audit count session open euid %d user %s", geteuid(), + audit_username()); +} + +/* * Called when a user session is started. Argument is the tty allocated to * the session, or NULL if no tty was allocated. * @@ -174,13 +223,91 @@ audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li) /* * This will be called when a user runs a non-interactive command. Note that * it may be called multiple times for a single connection since SSH2 allows - * multiple sessions within a single connection. + * multiple sessions within a single connection. Returns a "handle" for + * audit_end_command. */ -void +int audit_run_command(const char *command) { debug("audit run command euid %d user %s command '%.200s'", geteuid(), audit_username(), command); + return 0; +} + +/* + * This will be called when the non-interactive command finishes. Note that + * it may be called multiple times for a single connection since SSH2 allows + * multiple sessions within a single connection. "handle" should come from + * the corresponding audit_run_command. + */ +void +audit_end_command(int handle, const char *command) +{ + debug("audit end nopty exec euid %d user %s command '%.200s'", geteuid(), + audit_username(), command); +} + +/* + * This will be called when user is successfully autherized by the RSA1/RSA/DSA key. + * + * Type is the key type, len is the key length(byte) and fp is the fingerprint of the key. + */ +int +audit_keyusage(int host_user, const char *type, unsigned bits, char *fp, int rv) +{ + debug("audit %s key usage euid %d user %s key type %s key length %d fingerprint %s%s, result %d", + host_user ? "pubkey" : "hostbased", geteuid(), audit_username(), type, bits, + key_fingerprint_prefix(), fp, rv); +} + +/* + * This will be called when the protocol negotiation fails. + */ +void +audit_unsupported_body(int what) +{ + debug("audit unsupported protocol euid %d type %d", geteuid(), what); +} + +/* + * This will be called on succesfull protocol negotiation. + */ +void +audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress, char *pfs, pid_t pid, + uid_t uid) +{ + debug("audit protocol negotiation euid %d direction %d cipher %s mac %s compresion %s pfs %s from pid %ld uid %u", + (unsigned)geteuid(), ctos, enc, mac, compress, pfs, (long)pid, + (unsigned)uid); +} + +/* + * This will be called on succesfull session key discard + */ +void +audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) +{ + debug("audit session key discard euid %u direction %d from pid %ld uid %u", + (unsigned)geteuid(), ctos, (long)pid, (unsigned)uid); +} + +/* + * This will be called on destroy private part of the server key + */ +void +audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *fp, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) +{ + debug("audit destroy sensitive data euid %d fingerprint %s from pid %ld uid %u", + geteuid(), fp, (long)pid, (unsigned)uid); +} + +/* + * This will be called on generation of the ephemeral server key + */ +void +audit_generate_ephemeral_server_key(const char *) +{ + debug("audit create ephemeral server key euid %d fingerprint %s", geteuid(), fp); } # endif /* !defined CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */ #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */ diff --git a/audit.h b/audit.h index 92ede5b..903df66 100644 --- a/audit.h +++ b/audit.h @@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ # define _SSH_AUDIT_H #include "loginrec.h" +#include "key.h" enum ssh_audit_event_type { SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES, @@ -47,11 +48,25 @@ enum ssh_audit_event_type { }; typedef enum ssh_audit_event_type ssh_audit_event_t; +int listening_for_clients(void); + void audit_connection_from(const char *, int); void audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t); +void audit_count_session_open(void); void audit_session_open(struct logininfo *); void audit_session_close(struct logininfo *); -void audit_run_command(const char *); +int audit_run_command(const char *); +void audit_end_command(int, const char *); ssh_audit_event_t audit_classify_auth(const char *); +int audit_keyusage(int, const char *, unsigned, char *, int); +void audit_key(int, int *, const Key *); +void audit_unsupported(int); +void audit_kex(int, char *, char *, char *, char *); +void audit_unsupported_body(int); +void audit_kex_body(int, char *, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t); +void audit_session_key_free(int ctos); +void audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t, uid_t); +void audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *, pid_t, uid_t); +void audit_generate_ephemeral_server_key(const char *); #endif /* _SSH_AUDIT_H */ diff --git a/auditstub.c b/auditstub.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..116f460 --- /dev/null +++ b/auditstub.c @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +/* $Id: auditstub.c,v 1.1 jfch Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright 2010 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved. + * Use is subject to license terms. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * Red Hat author: Jan F. Chadima + */ + +#include + +void +audit_unsupported(int n) +{ +} + +void +audit_kex(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *comp, char *pfs) +{ +} + +void +audit_session_key_free(int ctos) +{ +} + +void +audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) +{ +} diff --git a/auth-rsa.c b/auth-rsa.c index ff7a132..1e12515 100644 --- a/auth-rsa.c +++ b/auth-rsa.c @@ -93,7 +93,10 @@ auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *key, BIGNUM *challenge, u_char response[16]) { u_char buf[32], mdbuf[16]; struct ssh_digest_ctx *md; - int len; + int len, rv; +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + char *fp; +#endif /* don't allow short keys */ if (BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE) { @@ -117,12 +120,18 @@ auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *key, BIGNUM *challenge, u_char response[16]) ssh_digest_free(md); /* Verify that the response is the original challenge. */ - if (timingsafe_bcmp(response, mdbuf, 16) != 0) { - /* Wrong answer. */ - return (0); + rv = timingsafe_bcmp(response, mdbuf, 16) == 0; + +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + fp = key_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_HEX); + if (audit_keyusage(1, "ssh-rsa1", RSA_size(key->rsa) * 8, fp, rv) == 0) { + debug("unsuccessful audit"); + rv = 0; } - /* Correct answer. */ - return (1); + free(fp); +#endif + + return rv; } /* diff --git a/auth.c b/auth.c index 5a9acd3..7eba5d4 100644 --- a/auth.c +++ b/auth.c @@ -642,9 +642,6 @@ getpwnamallow(const char *user) record_failed_login(user, get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns), "ssh"); #endif -#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS - audit_event(SSH_INVALID_USER); -#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */ return (NULL); } if (!allowed_user(pw)) diff --git a/auth.h b/auth.h index 847cffd..19fbcf5 100644 --- a/auth.h +++ b/auth.h @@ -187,6 +187,7 @@ void abandon_challenge_response(Authctxt *); char *expand_authorized_keys(const char *, struct passwd *pw); char *authorized_principals_file(struct passwd *); +int user_key_verify(const Key *, const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int); FILE *auth_openkeyfile(const char *, struct passwd *, int); FILE *auth_openprincipals(const char *, struct passwd *, int); @@ -204,6 +205,7 @@ Key *get_hostkey_private_by_type(int); int get_hostkey_index(Key *); int ssh1_session_key(BIGNUM *); void sshd_hostkey_sign(Key *, Key *, u_char **, u_int *, u_char *, u_int); +int hostbased_key_verify(const Key *, const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int); /* debug messages during authentication */ void auth_debug_add(const char *fmt,...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2))); diff --git a/auth2-hostbased.c b/auth2-hostbased.c index 41f1a3f..80d9802 100644 --- a/auth2-hostbased.c +++ b/auth2-hostbased.c @@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *authctxt) /* test for allowed key and correct signature */ authenticated = 0; if (PRIVSEP(hostbased_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, cuser, chost, key)) && - PRIVSEP(key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b), + PRIVSEP(hostbased_key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b))) == 1) authenticated = 1; @@ -155,6 +155,18 @@ done: return authenticated; } +int +hostbased_key_verify(const Key *key, const u_char *sig, u_int slen, const u_char *data, u_int datalen) +{ + int rv; + + rv = key_verify(key, sig, slen, data, datalen); +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + audit_key(0, &rv, key); +#endif + return rv; +} + /* return 1 if given hostkey is allowed */ int hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, const char *cuser, char *chost, diff --git a/auth2-pubkey.c b/auth2-pubkey.c index 269e642..110ec48 100644 --- a/auth2-pubkey.c +++ b/auth2-pubkey.c @@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt) /* test for correct signature */ authenticated = 0; if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key)) && - PRIVSEP(key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b), + PRIVSEP(user_key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b))) == 1) authenticated = 1; buffer_free(&b); @@ -232,6 +232,18 @@ pubkey_auth_info(Authctxt *authctxt, const Key *key, const char *fmt, ...) free(extra); } +int +user_key_verify(const Key *key, const u_char *sig, u_int slen, const u_char *data, u_int datalen) +{ + int rv; + + rv = key_verify(key, sig, slen, data, datalen); +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + audit_key(1, &rv, key); +#endif + return rv; +} + static int match_principals_option(const char *principal_list, struct sshkey_cert *cert) { diff --git a/auth2.c b/auth2.c index ec4ff8a..9e6e815 100644 --- a/auth2.c +++ b/auth2.c @@ -250,9 +250,6 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) } else { logit("input_userauth_request: invalid user %s", user); authctxt->pw = fakepw(); -#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS - PRIVSEP(audit_event(SSH_INVALID_USER)); -#endif } #ifdef USE_PAM if (options.use_pam) diff --git a/cipher.c b/cipher.c index 638ca2d..9cc7cf8 100644 --- a/cipher.c +++ b/cipher.c @@ -57,26 +57,6 @@ extern const EVP_CIPHER *evp_ssh1_3des(void); extern int ssh1_3des_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int, u_char *, int); #endif -struct sshcipher { - char *name; - int number; /* for ssh1 only */ - u_int block_size; - u_int key_len; - u_int iv_len; /* defaults to block_size */ - u_int auth_len; - u_int discard_len; - u_int flags; -#define CFLAG_CBC (1<<0) -#define CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY (1<<1) -#define CFLAG_AESCTR (1<<2) -#define CFLAG_NONE (1<<3) -#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL - const EVP_CIPHER *(*evptype)(void); -#else - void *ignored; -#endif -}; - static const struct sshcipher ciphers[] = { #ifdef WITH_SSH1 { "des", SSH_CIPHER_DES, 8, 8, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_des_cbc }, diff --git a/cipher.h b/cipher.h index de74c1e..26ed4cb 100644 --- a/cipher.h +++ b/cipher.h @@ -62,7 +62,26 @@ #define CIPHER_ENCRYPT 1 #define CIPHER_DECRYPT 0 -struct sshcipher; +struct sshcipher { + char *name; + int number; /* for ssh1 only */ + u_int block_size; + u_int key_len; + u_int iv_len; /* defaults to block_size */ + u_int auth_len; + u_int discard_len; + u_int flags; +#define CFLAG_CBC (1<<0) +#define CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY (1<<1) +#define CFLAG_AESCTR (1<<2) +#define CFLAG_NONE (1<<3) +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + const EVP_CIPHER *(*evptype)(void); +#else + void *ignored; +#endif +}; + struct sshcipher_ctx { int plaintext; int encrypt; diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c index 4563920..e0cf3de 100644 --- a/kex.c +++ b/kex.c @@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ #include "monitor.h" #include "roaming.h" #include "digest.h" +#include "audit.h" #ifdef GSSAPI #include "ssh-gss.h" @@ -370,9 +371,13 @@ static void choose_enc(Enc *enc, char *client, char *server) { char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL); - if (name == NULL) + if (name == NULL) { +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + audit_unsupported(0); +#endif fatal("no matching cipher found: client %s server %s", client, server); + } if ((enc->cipher = cipher_by_name(name)) == NULL) fatal("matching cipher is not supported: %s", name); enc->name = name; @@ -388,9 +393,13 @@ static void choose_mac(Mac *mac, char *client, char *server) { char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL); - if (name == NULL) + if (name == NULL) { +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + audit_unsupported(1); +#endif fatal("no matching mac found: client %s server %s", client, server); + } if (mac_setup(mac, name) < 0) fatal("unsupported mac %s", name); /* truncate the key */ @@ -405,8 +414,12 @@ static void choose_comp(Comp *comp, char *client, char *server) { char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL); - if (name == NULL) + if (name == NULL) { +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + audit_unsupported(2); +#endif fatal("no matching comp found: client %s server %s", client, server); + } if (strcmp(name, "zlib@openssh.com") == 0) { comp->type = COMP_DELAYED; } else if (strcmp(name, "zlib") == 0) { @@ -522,9 +535,11 @@ kex_choose_conf(Kex *kex) authlen == 0 ? newkeys->mac.name : "", newkeys->comp.name); } + choose_kex(kex, cprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS], sprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]); choose_hostkeyalg(kex, cprop[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS], sprop[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]); + need = dh_need = 0; for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) { newkeys = kex->newkeys[mode]; @@ -536,11 +551,16 @@ kex_choose_conf(Kex *kex) dh_need = MAX(dh_need, newkeys->enc.block_size); dh_need = MAX(dh_need, newkeys->enc.iv_len); dh_need = MAX(dh_need, newkeys->mac.key_len); + debug("kex: %s need=%d dh_need=%d", kex->name, need, dh_need); +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + audit_kex(mode, newkeys->enc.name, newkeys->mac.name, newkeys->comp.name, kex->name); +#endif } /* XXX need runden? */ kex->we_need = need; kex->dh_need = dh_need; + /* ignore the next message if the proposals do not match */ if (first_kex_follows && !proposals_match(my, peer) && !(datafellows & SSH_BUG_FIRSTKEX)) { @@ -710,3 +730,34 @@ dump_digest(char *msg, u_char *digest, int len) fprintf(stderr, "\n"); } #endif + +static void +enc_destroy(Enc *enc) +{ + if (enc == NULL) + return; + + if (enc->key) { + memset(enc->key, 0, enc->key_len); + free(enc->key); + } + + if (enc->iv) { + memset(enc->iv, 0, enc->block_size); + free(enc->iv); + } + + memset(enc, 0, sizeof(*enc)); +} + +void +newkeys_destroy(Newkeys *newkeys) +{ + if (newkeys == NULL) + return; + + enc_destroy(&newkeys->enc); + mac_destroy(&newkeys->mac); + memset(&newkeys->comp, 0, sizeof(newkeys->comp)); +} + diff --git a/kex.h b/kex.h index 1c76c08..e015d27 100644 --- a/kex.h +++ b/kex.h @@ -182,6 +182,8 @@ void kexgss_client(Kex *); void kexgss_server(Kex *); #endif +void newkeys_destroy(Newkeys *newkeys); + void kex_dh_hash(char *, char *, char *, int, char *, int, u_char *, int, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, u_char **, u_int *); diff --git a/key.h b/key.h index e1a3625..4a90e1e 100644 --- a/key.h +++ b/key.h @@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ typedef struct sshkey Key; #define key_ecdsa_key_to_nid sshkey_ecdsa_key_to_nid #define key_names_valid2 sshkey_names_valid2 #define key_is_cert sshkey_is_cert +#define key_is_private sshkey_is_private #define key_type_plain sshkey_type_plain #define key_cert_is_legacy sshkey_cert_is_legacy #define key_curve_name_to_nid sshkey_curve_name_to_nid diff --git a/mac.c b/mac.c index 402dc98..fd07bf2 100644 --- a/mac.c +++ b/mac.c @@ -223,6 +223,20 @@ mac_clear(Mac *mac) mac->umac_ctx = NULL; } +void +mac_destroy(Mac *mac) +{ + if (mac == NULL) + return; + + if (mac->key) { + memset(mac->key, 0, mac->key_len); + free(mac->key); + } + + memset(mac, 0, sizeof(*mac)); +} + /* XXX copied from ciphers_valid */ #define MAC_SEP "," int diff --git a/mac.h b/mac.h index fbe18c4..7dc7f43 100644 --- a/mac.h +++ b/mac.h @@ -29,3 +29,4 @@ int mac_setup(Mac *, char *); int mac_init(Mac *); u_char *mac_compute(Mac *, u_int32_t, u_char *, int); void mac_clear(Mac *); +void mac_destroy(Mac *); diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c index d97e640..07fa655 100644 --- a/monitor.c +++ b/monitor.c @@ -100,6 +100,7 @@ #include "ssh2.h" #include "roaming.h" #include "authfd.h" +#include "audit.h" #ifdef GSSAPI static Gssctxt *gsscontext = NULL; @@ -116,6 +117,8 @@ extern Buffer auth_debug; extern int auth_debug_init; extern Buffer loginmsg; +extern void destroy_sensitive_data(int); + /* State exported from the child */ struct { @@ -188,6 +191,11 @@ int mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(int, Buffer *); #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS int mm_answer_audit_event(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_audit_command(int, Buffer *); +int mm_answer_audit_end_command(int, Buffer *); +int mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body(int, Buffer *); +int mm_answer_audit_kex_body(int, Buffer *); +int mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body(int, Buffer *); +int mm_answer_audit_server_key_free(int, Buffer *); #endif static int monitor_read_log(struct monitor *); @@ -247,6 +255,10 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = { #endif #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event}, + {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body}, + {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body}, + {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body}, + {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_server_key_free}, #endif #ifdef BSD_AUTH {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery}, @@ -285,6 +297,11 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = { #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event}, {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_command}, + {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_end_command}, + {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body}, + {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body}, + {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body}, + {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_server_key_free}, #endif {0, 0, NULL} }; @@ -317,6 +334,10 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto15[] = { #endif #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event}, + {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body}, + {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body}, + {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body}, + {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_server_key_free}, #endif #endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ {0, 0, NULL} @@ -330,6 +351,11 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth15[] = { #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event}, {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT|MON_ONCE, mm_answer_audit_command}, + {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_end_command}, + {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body}, + {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body}, + {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body}, + {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_server_key_free}, #endif #endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ {0, 0, NULL} @@ -1416,9 +1442,11 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, Buffer *m) Key *key; u_char *signature, *data, *blob; u_int signaturelen, datalen, bloblen; + int type = 0; int verified = 0; int valid_data = 0; + type = buffer_get_int(m); blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen); signature = buffer_get_string(m, &signaturelen); data = buffer_get_string(m, &datalen); @@ -1426,6 +1454,8 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, Buffer *m) if (hostbased_cuser == NULL || hostbased_chost == NULL || !monitor_allowed_key(blob, bloblen)) fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__); + if (type != key_blobtype) + fatal("%s: bad key type", __func__); key = key_from_blob(blob, bloblen); if (key == NULL) @@ -1446,7 +1476,17 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, Buffer *m) if (!valid_data) fatal("%s: bad signature data blob", __func__); - verified = key_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen); + switch (key_blobtype) { + case MM_USERKEY: + verified = user_key_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen); + break; + case MM_HOSTKEY: + verified = hostbased_key_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen); + break; + default: + verified = 0; + break; + } debug3("%s: key %p signature %s", __func__, key, (verified == 1) ? "verified" : "unverified"); @@ -1499,6 +1539,12 @@ mm_session_close(Session *s) debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d", __func__, s->tty, s->ptyfd); session_pty_cleanup2(s); } +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + if (s->command != NULL) { + debug3("%s: command %d", __func__, s->command_handle); + session_end_command2(s); + } +#endif session_unused(s->self); } @@ -1781,6 +1827,8 @@ mm_answer_term(int sock, Buffer *req) sshpam_cleanup(); #endif + destroy_sensitive_data(0); + while (waitpid(pmonitor->m_pid, &status, 0) == -1) if (errno != EINTR) exit(1); @@ -1823,11 +1871,43 @@ mm_answer_audit_command(int socket, Buffer *m) { u_int len; char *cmd; + Session *s; debug3("%s entering", __func__); cmd = buffer_get_string(m, &len); + /* sanity check command, if so how? */ - audit_run_command(cmd); + s = session_new(); + if (s == NULL) + fatal("%s: error allocating a session", __func__); + s->command = cmd; + s->command_handle = audit_run_command(cmd); + + buffer_clear(m); + buffer_put_int(m, s->self); + + mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_COMMAND, m); + + return (0); +} + +int +mm_answer_audit_end_command(int socket, Buffer *m) +{ + int handle; + u_int len; + char *cmd; + Session *s; + + debug3("%s entering", __func__); + handle = buffer_get_int(m); + cmd = buffer_get_string(m, &len); + + s = session_by_id(handle); + if (s == NULL || s->ttyfd != -1 || s->command == NULL || + strcmp(s->command, cmd) != 0) + fatal("%s: invalid handle", __func__); + mm_session_close(s); free(cmd); return (0); } @@ -1975,11 +2055,13 @@ mm_get_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor) blob = buffer_get_string(&m, &bloblen); current_keys[MODE_OUT] = mm_newkeys_from_blob(blob, bloblen); + memset(blob, 0, bloblen); free(blob); debug3("%s: Waiting for second key", __func__); blob = buffer_get_string(&m, &bloblen); current_keys[MODE_IN] = mm_newkeys_from_blob(blob, bloblen); + memset(blob, 0, bloblen); free(blob); /* Now get sequence numbers for the packets */ @@ -2025,6 +2107,21 @@ mm_get_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor) } buffer_free(&m); + +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + if (compat20) { + buffer_init(&m); + mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_sendfd, + MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, &m); + mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body(pmonitor->m_sendfd, &m); + buffer_free(&m); + } +#endif + + /* Drain any buffered messages from the child */ + while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd >= 0 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0) + ; + } @@ -2321,3 +2418,87 @@ mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(int socket, Buffer *m) { #endif /* GSSAPI */ +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS +int +mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body(int sock, Buffer *m) +{ + int what; + + what = buffer_get_int(m); + + audit_unsupported_body(what); + + buffer_clear(m); + + mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, m); + return 0; +} + +int +mm_answer_audit_kex_body(int sock, Buffer *m) +{ + int ctos, len; + char *cipher, *mac, *compress, *pfs; + pid_t pid; + uid_t uid; + + ctos = buffer_get_int(m); + cipher = buffer_get_string(m, &len); + mac = buffer_get_string(m, &len); + compress = buffer_get_string(m, &len); + pfs = buffer_get_string(m, &len); + pid = buffer_get_int64(m); + uid = buffer_get_int64(m); + + audit_kex_body(ctos, cipher, mac, compress, pfs, pid, uid); + + free(cipher); + free(mac); + free(compress); + free(pfs); + buffer_clear(m); + + mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_KEX, m); + return 0; +} + +int +mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body(int sock, Buffer *m) +{ + int ctos; + pid_t pid; + uid_t uid; + + ctos = buffer_get_int(m); + pid = buffer_get_int64(m); + uid = buffer_get_int64(m); + + audit_session_key_free_body(ctos, pid, uid); + + buffer_clear(m); + + mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, m); + return 0; +} + +int +mm_answer_audit_server_key_free(int sock, Buffer *m) +{ + int len; + char *fp; + pid_t pid; + uid_t uid; + + fp = buffer_get_string(m, &len); + pid = buffer_get_int64(m); + uid = buffer_get_int64(m); + + audit_destroy_sensitive_data(fp, pid, uid); + + free(fp); + buffer_clear(m); + + mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, m); + return 0; +} +#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */ diff --git a/monitor.h b/monitor.h index 00c2028..cc8da6a 100644 --- a/monitor.h +++ b/monitor.h @@ -69,7 +69,13 @@ enum monitor_reqtype { MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY = 106, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_QUERY = 107, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND = 108, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_RESPOND = 109, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX = 110, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX = 111, - MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT = 112, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND = 113, + MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT = 112, + MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND = 114, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_COMMAND = 115, + MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND = 116, + MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED = 118, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED = 119, + MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX = 120, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_KEX = 121, + MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE = 122, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE = 123, + MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE = 124, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE = 125 }; diff --git a/monitor_wrap.c b/monitor_wrap.c index 7e991e6..ba4ecd7 100644 --- a/monitor_wrap.c +++ b/monitor_wrap.c @@ -456,7 +456,7 @@ mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype type, char *user, char *host, Key *key) */ int -mm_key_verify(Key *key, u_char *sig, u_int siglen, u_char *data, u_int datalen) +mm_key_verify(enum mm_keytype type, Key *key, u_char *sig, u_int siglen, u_char *data, u_int datalen) { Buffer m; u_char *blob; @@ -470,6 +470,7 @@ mm_key_verify(Key *key, u_char *sig, u_int siglen, u_char *data, u_int datalen) return (0); buffer_init(&m); + buffer_put_int(&m, type); buffer_put_string(&m, blob, len); buffer_put_string(&m, sig, siglen); buffer_put_string(&m, data, datalen); @@ -487,6 +488,19 @@ mm_key_verify(Key *key, u_char *sig, u_int siglen, u_char *data, u_int datalen) return (verified); } +int +mm_hostbased_key_verify(Key *key, u_char *sig, u_int siglen, u_char *data, u_int datalen) +{ + return mm_key_verify(MM_HOSTKEY, key, sig, siglen, data, datalen); +} + +int +mm_user_key_verify(Key *key, u_char *sig, u_int siglen, u_char *data, u_int datalen) +{ + return mm_key_verify(MM_USERKEY, key, sig, siglen, data, datalen); +} + + /* Export key state after authentication */ Newkeys * mm_newkeys_from_blob(u_char *blob, int blen) @@ -665,12 +679,14 @@ mm_send_keystate(struct monitor *monitor) fatal("%s: conversion of newkeys failed", __func__); buffer_put_string(&m, blob, bloblen); + memset(blob, 0, bloblen); free(blob); if (!mm_newkeys_to_blob(MODE_IN, &blob, &bloblen)) fatal("%s: conversion of newkeys failed", __func__); buffer_put_string(&m, blob, bloblen); + memset(blob, 0, bloblen); free(blob); packet_get_state(MODE_OUT, &seqnr, &blocks, &packets, &bytes); @@ -1218,10 +1234,11 @@ mm_audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event) buffer_free(&m); } -void +int mm_audit_run_command(const char *command) { Buffer m; + int handle; debug3("%s entering command %s", __func__, command); @@ -1229,6 +1246,26 @@ mm_audit_run_command(const char *command) buffer_put_cstring(&m, command); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, &m); + mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_COMMAND, &m); + + handle = buffer_get_int(&m); + buffer_free(&m); + + return (handle); +} + +void +mm_audit_end_command(int handle, const char *command) +{ + Buffer m; + + debug3("%s entering command %s", __func__, command); + + buffer_init(&m); + buffer_put_int(&m, handle); + buffer_put_cstring(&m, command); + + mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND, &m); buffer_free(&m); } #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */ @@ -1364,3 +1401,72 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store) #endif /* GSSAPI */ +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS +void +mm_audit_unsupported_body(int what) +{ + Buffer m; + + buffer_init(&m); + buffer_put_int(&m, what); + + mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, &m); + mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, + &m); + + buffer_free(&m); +} + +void +mm_audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *cipher, char *mac, char *compress, char *fps, pid_t pid, + uid_t uid) +{ + Buffer m; + + buffer_init(&m); + buffer_put_int(&m, ctos); + buffer_put_cstring(&m, cipher); + buffer_put_cstring(&m, (mac ? mac : "")); + buffer_put_cstring(&m, compress); + buffer_put_cstring(&m, fps); + buffer_put_int64(&m, pid); + buffer_put_int64(&m, uid); + + mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, &m); + mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_KEX, + &m); + + buffer_free(&m); +} + +void +mm_audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) +{ + Buffer m; + + buffer_init(&m); + buffer_put_int(&m, ctos); + buffer_put_int64(&m, pid); + buffer_put_int64(&m, uid); + mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, &m); + mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, + &m); + buffer_free(&m); +} + +void +mm_audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *fp, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) +{ + Buffer m; + + buffer_init(&m); + buffer_put_cstring(&m, fp); + buffer_put_int64(&m, pid); + buffer_put_int64(&m, uid); + + mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, &m); + mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, + &m); + buffer_free(&m); +} +#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */ diff --git a/monitor_wrap.h b/monitor_wrap.h index 93929e0..e43109f 100644 --- a/monitor_wrap.h +++ b/monitor_wrap.h @@ -52,7 +52,8 @@ int mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype, char *, char *, Key *); int mm_user_key_allowed(struct passwd *, Key *); int mm_hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *, char *, char *, Key *); int mm_auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *, char *, char *, Key *); -int mm_key_verify(Key *, u_char *, u_int, u_char *, u_int); +int mm_hostbased_key_verify(Key *, u_char *, u_int, u_char *, u_int); +int mm_user_key_verify(Key *, u_char *, u_int, u_char *, u_int); int mm_auth_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *, BIGNUM *, Key **); int mm_auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *, BIGNUM *, u_char *); BIGNUM *mm_auth_rsa_generate_challenge(Key *); @@ -79,7 +80,12 @@ void mm_sshpam_free_ctx(void *); #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS #include "audit.h" void mm_audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t); -void mm_audit_run_command(const char *); +int mm_audit_run_command(const char *); +void mm_audit_end_command(int, const char *); +void mm_audit_unsupported_body(int); +void mm_audit_kex_body(int, char *, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t); +void mm_audit_session_key_free_body(int, pid_t, uid_t); +void mm_audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *, pid_t, uid_t); #endif struct Session; diff --git a/packet.c b/packet.c index 9b7abd1..f1e00f7 100644 --- a/packet.c +++ b/packet.c @@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ #include #include "xmalloc.h" +#include "audit.h" #include "buffer.h" #include "packet.h" #include "crc32.h" @@ -483,6 +484,13 @@ packet_get_connection_out(void) return active_state->connection_out; } +static int +packet_state_has_keys (const struct session_state *state) +{ + return state != NULL && + (state->newkeys[MODE_IN] != NULL || state->newkeys[MODE_OUT] != NULL); +} + /* Closes the connection and clears and frees internal data structures. */ void @@ -491,13 +499,6 @@ packet_close(void) if (!active_state->initialized) return; active_state->initialized = 0; - if (active_state->connection_in == active_state->connection_out) { - shutdown(active_state->connection_out, SHUT_RDWR); - close(active_state->connection_out); - } else { - close(active_state->connection_in); - close(active_state->connection_out); - } buffer_free(&active_state->input); buffer_free(&active_state->output); buffer_free(&active_state->outgoing_packet); @@ -506,8 +507,18 @@ packet_close(void) buffer_free(&active_state->compression_buffer); buffer_compress_uninit(); } - cipher_cleanup(&active_state->send_context); - cipher_cleanup(&active_state->receive_context); + if (packet_state_has_keys(active_state)) { + cipher_cleanup(&active_state->send_context); + cipher_cleanup(&active_state->receive_context); + audit_session_key_free(2); + } + if (active_state->connection_in == active_state->connection_out) { + shutdown(active_state->connection_out, SHUT_RDWR); + close(active_state->connection_out); + } else { + close(active_state->connection_in); + close(active_state->connection_out); + } } /* Sets remote side protocol flags. */ @@ -747,6 +758,25 @@ packet_send1(void) */ } +static void +newkeys_destroy_and_free(Newkeys *newkeys) +{ + if (newkeys == NULL) + return; + + free(newkeys->enc.name); + + if (newkeys->mac.enabled) { + mac_clear(&newkeys->mac); + free(newkeys->mac.name); + } + + free(newkeys->comp.name); + + newkeys_destroy(newkeys); + free(newkeys); +} + void set_newkeys(int mode) { @@ -772,6 +802,7 @@ set_newkeys(int mode) } if (active_state->newkeys[mode] != NULL) { debug("set_newkeys: rekeying"); + audit_session_key_free(mode); cipher_cleanup(cc); enc = &active_state->newkeys[mode]->enc; mac = &active_state->newkeys[mode]->mac; @@ -2025,6 +2056,48 @@ packet_get_newkeys(int mode) return (void *)active_state->newkeys[mode]; } +static void +packet_destroy_state(struct session_state *state) +{ + if (state == NULL) + return; + + cipher_cleanup(&state->receive_context); + cipher_cleanup(&state->send_context); + + buffer_free(&state->input); + buffer_free(&state->output); + buffer_free(&state->outgoing_packet); + buffer_free(&state->incoming_packet); + if( state->compression_buffer_ready ) + buffer_free(&state->compression_buffer); + newkeys_destroy_and_free(state->newkeys[MODE_IN]); + state->newkeys[MODE_IN] = NULL; + newkeys_destroy_and_free(state->newkeys[MODE_OUT]); + state->newkeys[MODE_OUT] = NULL; + mac_destroy(state->packet_discard_mac); +// TAILQ_HEAD(, packet) outgoing; +// memset(state, 0, sizeof(state)); +} + +void +packet_destroy_all(int audit_it, int privsep) +{ + if (audit_it) + audit_it = packet_state_has_keys (active_state) || + packet_state_has_keys (backup_state); + packet_destroy_state(active_state); + packet_destroy_state(backup_state); + if (audit_it) { +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + if (privsep) + audit_session_key_free(2); + else + audit_session_key_free_body(2, getpid(), getuid()); +#endif + } +} + /* * Save the state for the real connection, and use a separate state when * resuming a suspended connection. @@ -2032,18 +2104,12 @@ packet_get_newkeys(int mode) void packet_backup_state(void) { - struct session_state *tmp; - close(active_state->connection_in); active_state->connection_in = -1; close(active_state->connection_out); active_state->connection_out = -1; - if (backup_state) - tmp = backup_state; - else - tmp = alloc_session_state(); backup_state = active_state; - active_state = tmp; + active_state = alloc_session_state(); } /* @@ -2060,9 +2126,7 @@ packet_restore_state(void) backup_state = active_state; active_state = tmp; active_state->connection_in = backup_state->connection_in; - backup_state->connection_in = -1; active_state->connection_out = backup_state->connection_out; - backup_state->connection_out = -1; len = buffer_len(&backup_state->input); if (len > 0) { buf = buffer_ptr(&backup_state->input); @@ -2070,6 +2134,11 @@ packet_restore_state(void) buffer_clear(&backup_state->input); add_recv_bytes(len); } + backup_state->connection_in = -1; + backup_state->connection_out = -1; + packet_destroy_state(backup_state); + free(backup_state); + backup_state = NULL; } /* Reset after_authentication and reset compression in post-auth privsep */ diff --git a/packet.h b/packet.h index e7b5fcb..45a6ce6 100644 --- a/packet.h +++ b/packet.h @@ -125,4 +125,5 @@ void packet_set_postauth(void); void *packet_get_input(void); void *packet_get_output(void); +void packet_destroy_all(int, int); #endif /* PACKET_H */ diff --git a/session.c b/session.c index 40a681e..acd87d5 100644 --- a/session.c +++ b/session.c @@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ extern int log_stderr; extern int debug_flag; extern u_int utmp_len; extern int startup_pipe; -extern void destroy_sensitive_data(void); +extern void destroy_sensitive_data(int); extern Buffer loginmsg; /* original command from peer. */ @@ -730,6 +730,14 @@ do_exec_pty(Session *s, const char *command) /* Parent. Close the slave side of the pseudo tty. */ close(ttyfd); +#ifndef HAVE_OSF_SIA + /* do_login in the child did not affect state in this process, + compensate. From an architectural standpoint, this is extremely + ugly. */ + if (!(options.use_login && command == NULL)) + audit_count_session_open(); +#endif + /* Enter interactive session. */ s->ptymaster = ptymaster; packet_set_interactive(1, @@ -852,15 +860,19 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command) get_remote_port()); #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + if (s->command != NULL || s->command_handle != -1) + fatal("do_exec: command already set"); if (command != NULL) - PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(command)); + s->command = xstrdup(command); else if (s->ttyfd == -1) { char *shell = s->pw->pw_shell; if (shell[0] == '\0') /* empty shell means /bin/sh */ shell =_PATH_BSHELL; - PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(shell)); + s->command = xstrdup(shell); } + if (s->command != NULL && s->ttyfd == -1) + s->command_handle = PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(s->command)); #endif if (s->ttyfd != -1) ret = do_exec_pty(s, command); @@ -1703,7 +1715,10 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command) int r = 0; /* remove hostkey from the child's memory */ - destroy_sensitive_data(); + destroy_sensitive_data(1); + /* Don't audit this - both us and the parent would be talking to the + monitor over a single socket, with no synchronization. */ + packet_destroy_all(0, 1); /* Force a password change */ if (s->authctxt->force_pwchange) { @@ -1933,6 +1948,7 @@ session_unused(int id) sessions[id].ttyfd = -1; sessions[id].ptymaster = -1; sessions[id].x11_chanids = NULL; + sessions[id].command_handle = -1; sessions[id].next_unused = sessions_first_unused; sessions_first_unused = id; } @@ -2015,6 +2031,19 @@ session_open(Authctxt *authctxt, int chanid) } Session * +session_by_id(int id) +{ + if (id >= 0 && id < sessions_nalloc) { + Session *s = &sessions[id]; + if (s->used) + return s; + } + debug("session_by_id: unknown id %d", id); + session_dump(); + return NULL; +} + +Session * session_by_tty(char *tty) { int i; @@ -2531,6 +2560,30 @@ session_exit_message(Session *s, int status) chan_write_failed(c); } +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS +void +session_end_command2(Session *s) +{ + if (s->command != NULL && s->ttyfd == -1) { + audit_end_command(s->command_handle, s->command); + free(s->command); + s->command = NULL; + s->command_handle = -1; + } +} + +static void +session_end_command(Session *s) +{ + if (s->command != NULL) { + PRIVSEP(audit_end_command(s->command_handle, s->command)); + free(s->command); + s->command = NULL; + s->command_handle = -1; + } +} +#endif + void session_close(Session *s) { @@ -2539,6 +2592,10 @@ session_close(Session *s) debug("session_close: session %d pid %ld", s->self, (long)s->pid); if (s->ttyfd != -1) session_pty_cleanup(s); +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + if (s->command) + session_end_command(s); +#endif free(s->term); free(s->display); free(s->x11_chanids); @@ -2753,6 +2810,15 @@ do_authenticated2(Authctxt *authctxt) server_loop2(authctxt); } +static void +do_cleanup_one_session(Session *s) +{ + session_pty_cleanup2(s); +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + session_end_command2(s); +#endif +} + void do_cleanup(Authctxt *authctxt) { @@ -2801,5 +2867,5 @@ do_cleanup(Authctxt *authctxt) * or if running in monitor. */ if (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()) - session_destroy_all(session_pty_cleanup2); + session_destroy_all(do_cleanup_one_session); } diff --git a/session.h b/session.h index 6a2f35e..e9b312e 100644 --- a/session.h +++ b/session.h @@ -61,6 +61,12 @@ struct Session { char *name; char *val; } *env; + + /* exec */ +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + int command_handle; + char *command; +#endif }; void do_authenticated(Authctxt *); @@ -73,8 +79,10 @@ void session_close_by_pid(pid_t, int); void session_close_by_channel(int, void *); void session_destroy_all(void (*)(Session *)); void session_pty_cleanup2(Session *); +void session_end_command2(Session *); Session *session_new(void); +Session *session_by_id(int); Session *session_by_tty(char *); void session_close(Session *); void do_setusercontext(struct passwd *); diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c index ca55d7f..db23ce2 100644 --- a/sshd.c +++ b/sshd.c @@ -120,6 +120,7 @@ #endif #include "monitor_wrap.h" #include "roaming.h" +#include "audit.h" #include "ssh-sandbox.h" #include "version.h" @@ -254,7 +255,7 @@ Buffer loginmsg; struct passwd *privsep_pw = NULL; /* Prototypes for various functions defined later in this file. */ -void destroy_sensitive_data(void); +void destroy_sensitive_data(int); void demote_sensitive_data(void); #ifdef WITH_SSH1 @@ -275,6 +276,15 @@ close_listen_socks(void) num_listen_socks = -1; } +/* + * Is this process listening for clients (i.e. not specific to any specific + * client connection?) + */ +int listening_for_clients(void) +{ + return num_listen_socks > 0; +} + static void close_startup_pipes(void) { @@ -554,22 +564,45 @@ sshd_exchange_identification(int sock_in, int sock_out) } } -/* Destroy the host and server keys. They will no longer be needed. */ +/* + * Destroy the host and server keys. They will no longer be needed. Careful, + * this can be called from cleanup_exit() - i.e. from just about anywhere. + */ void -destroy_sensitive_data(void) +destroy_sensitive_data(int privsep) { int i; + pid_t pid; + uid_t uid; if (sensitive_data.server_key) { key_free(sensitive_data.server_key); sensitive_data.server_key = NULL; } + pid = getpid(); + uid = getuid(); for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) { + char *fp; + + if (key_is_private(sensitive_data.host_keys[i])) + fp = key_fingerprint(sensitive_data.host_keys[i], options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_HEX); + else + fp = NULL; key_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]); sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL; + if (fp != NULL) { + if (privsep) + PRIVSEP(audit_destroy_sensitive_data(fp, + pid, uid)); + else + audit_destroy_sensitive_data(fp, + pid, uid); + free(fp); + } } - if (sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]) { + if (sensitive_data.host_certificates + && sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]) { key_free(sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]); sensitive_data.host_certificates[i] = NULL; } @@ -583,6 +616,8 @@ void demote_sensitive_data(void) { Key *tmp; + pid_t pid; + uid_t uid; int i; if (sensitive_data.server_key) { @@ -591,13 +626,25 @@ demote_sensitive_data(void) sensitive_data.server_key = tmp; } + pid = getpid(); + uid = getuid(); for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) { + char *fp; + + if (key_is_private(sensitive_data.host_keys[i])) + fp = key_fingerprint(sensitive_data.host_keys[i], options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_HEX); + else + fp = NULL; tmp = key_demote(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]); key_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]); sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = tmp; if (tmp->type == KEY_RSA1) sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = tmp; + if (fp != NULL) { + audit_destroy_sensitive_data(fp, pid, uid); + free(fp); + } } /* Certs do not need demotion */ } @@ -667,7 +714,7 @@ privsep_preauth(Authctxt *authctxt) if (use_privsep == PRIVSEP_ON) box = ssh_sandbox_init(pmonitor); - pid = fork(); + pmonitor->m_pid = pid = fork(); if (pid == -1) { fatal("fork of unprivileged child failed"); } else if (pid != 0) { @@ -721,6 +768,8 @@ privsep_preauth(Authctxt *authctxt) } } +extern Newkeys *current_keys[]; + static void privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt) { @@ -745,6 +794,10 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt) else if (pmonitor->m_pid != 0) { verbose("User child is on pid %ld", (long)pmonitor->m_pid); buffer_clear(&loginmsg); + newkeys_destroy(current_keys[MODE_OUT]); + newkeys_destroy(current_keys[MODE_IN]); + audit_session_key_free_body(2, getpid(), getuid()); + packet_destroy_all(0, 0); monitor_child_postauth(pmonitor); /* NEVERREACHED */ @@ -1222,6 +1275,7 @@ server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *sock_out, int *newsock, int *config_s) if (received_sigterm) { logit("Received signal %d; terminating.", (int) received_sigterm); + destroy_sensitive_data(0); close_listen_socks(); unlink(options.pid_file); exit(received_sigterm == SIGTERM ? 0 : 255); @@ -2141,6 +2195,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av) */ if (use_privsep) { mm_send_keystate(pmonitor); + packet_destroy_all(1, 1); exit(0); } @@ -2186,7 +2241,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av) privsep_postauth(authctxt); /* the monitor process [priv] will not return */ if (!compat20) - destroy_sensitive_data(); + destroy_sensitive_data(0); } packet_set_timeout(options.client_alive_interval, @@ -2196,6 +2251,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av) do_authenticated(authctxt); /* The connection has been terminated. */ + packet_destroy_all(1, 1); + destroy_sensitive_data(1); + packet_get_state(MODE_IN, NULL, NULL, NULL, &ibytes); packet_get_state(MODE_OUT, NULL, NULL, NULL, &obytes); verbose("Transferred: sent %llu, received %llu bytes", @@ -2355,6 +2413,10 @@ do_ssh1_kex(void) if (cookie[i] != packet_get_char()) packet_disconnect("IP Spoofing check bytes do not match."); +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + audit_kex(2, cipher_name(cipher_type), "crc", "none", "none"); +#endif + debug("Encryption type: %.200s", cipher_name(cipher_type)); /* Get the encrypted integer. */ @@ -2427,7 +2489,7 @@ do_ssh1_kex(void) session_id[i] = session_key[i] ^ session_key[i + 16]; } /* Destroy the private and public keys. No longer. */ - destroy_sensitive_data(); + destroy_sensitive_data(0); if (use_privsep) mm_ssh1_session_id(session_id); @@ -2598,6 +2660,16 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void) void cleanup_exit(int i) { + static int in_cleanup = 0; + int is_privsep_child; + + /* cleanup_exit can be called at the very least from the privsep + wrappers used for auditing. Make sure we don't recurse + indefinitely. */ + if (in_cleanup) + _exit(i); + in_cleanup = 1; + if (the_authctxt) { do_cleanup(the_authctxt); if (use_privsep && privsep_is_preauth && @@ -2609,9 +2681,14 @@ cleanup_exit(int i) pmonitor->m_pid, strerror(errno)); } } + is_privsep_child = use_privsep && pmonitor != NULL && pmonitor->m_pid == 0; + if (sensitive_data.host_keys != NULL) + destroy_sensitive_data(is_privsep_child); + packet_destroy_all(1, is_privsep_child); #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS /* done after do_cleanup so it can cancel the PAM auth 'thread' */ - if (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()) + if ((the_authctxt == NULL || !the_authctxt->authenticated) && + (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor())) audit_event(SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON); #endif _exit(i); diff --git a/sshkey.c b/sshkey.c index 70df758..f078e11 100644 --- a/sshkey.c +++ b/sshkey.c @@ -291,6 +291,33 @@ sshkey_type_is_valid_ca(int type) } int +sshkey_is_private(const struct sshkey *k) +{ + switch (k->type) { + case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00: + case KEY_RSA_CERT: + case KEY_RSA1: + case KEY_RSA: + return k->rsa->d != NULL; + case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00: + case KEY_DSA_CERT: + case KEY_DSA: + return k->dsa->priv_key != NULL; +#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC + case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: + case KEY_ECDSA: + return EC_KEY_get0_private_key(k->ecdsa) != NULL; +#endif + case KEY_ED25519_CERT: + case KEY_ED25519: + return (k->ed25519_pk != NULL); + default: + /* fatal("key_is_private: bad key type %d", k->type); */ + return 0; + } +} + +int sshkey_is_cert(const struct sshkey *k) { if (k == NULL) diff --git a/sshkey.h b/sshkey.h index 4554b09..226a494 100644 --- a/sshkey.h +++ b/sshkey.h @@ -134,6 +134,7 @@ u_int sshkey_size(const struct sshkey *); int sshkey_generate(int type, u_int bits, struct sshkey **keyp); int sshkey_from_private(const struct sshkey *, struct sshkey **); int sshkey_type_from_name(const char *); +int sshkey_is_private(const struct sshkey *); int sshkey_is_cert(const struct sshkey *); int sshkey_type_is_cert(int); int sshkey_type_plain(int); diff -U3 openssh-6.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c openssh-6.6p1.seccomp/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c --- openssh-6.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c 2014-02-06 01:17:50.000000000 +0100 +++ openssh-6.6p1.seccomp/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c 2015-02-11 09:07:10.885000000 +0100 @@ -95,6 +95,12 @@ #ifdef __NR_time /* not defined on EABI ARM */ SC_ALLOW(time), #endif +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS + SC_ALLOW(getuid), +#ifdef __NR_getuid32 /* not defined on x86_64 */ + SC_ALLOW(getuid32), +#endif +#endif SC_ALLOW(read), SC_ALLOW(write), SC_ALLOW(close),