diff --git a/.cvsignore b/.cvsignore index 64c495c..f1bc577 100644 --- a/.cvsignore +++ b/.cvsignore @@ -1 +1,2 @@ openssh-5.4p1-snap20100302-noacss.tar.bz2 +pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2.tar.bz2 diff --git a/openssh-3.9p1-askpass-keep-above.patch b/openssh-3.9p1-askpass-keep-above.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 1b9f48c..0000000 --- a/openssh-3.9p1-askpass-keep-above.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,11 +0,0 @@ ---- openssh-3.9p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.keep-above 2003-11-21 13:48:56.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-3.9p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c 2005-02-08 08:44:02.099739294 +0100 -@@ -119,6 +119,8 @@ - g_signal_connect(G_OBJECT(entry), "activate", - G_CALLBACK(ok_dialog), dialog); - -+ gtk_window_set_keep_above(GTK_WINDOW(dialog), TRUE); -+ - /* Grab focus */ - gtk_widget_show_now(dialog); - if (grab_pointer) { diff --git a/openssh-3.9p1.tar.gz.sig b/openssh-3.9p1.tar.gz.sig deleted file mode 100644 index 9b64804..0000000 --- a/openssh-3.9p1.tar.gz.sig +++ /dev/null @@ -1,7 +0,0 @@ ------BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- -Version: GnuPG v1.2.2 (OpenBSD) - -iD8DBQBBIgAxzo7LA4b/nEgRArlqAJ0UhIfcfbz+oAxn8AsiOeHBVMwFXwCgkXcX -hxmfq8nv/+hpiid1j9lAUx8= -=P4zN ------END PGP SIGNATURE----- diff --git a/openssh-5.0p1-pam_selinux.patch b/openssh-5.0p1-pam_selinux.patch deleted file mode 100644 index acd1611..0000000 --- a/openssh-5.0p1-pam_selinux.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,156 +0,0 @@ -diff -up openssh-5.0p1/auth-pam.h.pam_selinux openssh-5.0p1/auth-pam.h ---- openssh-5.0p1/auth-pam.h.pam_selinux 2004-09-11 14:17:26.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-5.0p1/auth-pam.h 2008-04-30 14:25:28.000000000 +0200 -@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ void do_pam_session(void); - void do_pam_set_tty(const char *); - void do_pam_setcred(int ); - void do_pam_chauthtok(void); --int do_pam_putenv(char *, char *); -+int do_pam_putenv(char *, const char *); - char ** fetch_pam_environment(void); - char ** fetch_pam_child_environment(void); - void free_pam_environment(char **); -diff -up openssh-5.0p1/auth-pam.c.pam_selinux openssh-5.0p1/auth-pam.c ---- openssh-5.0p1/auth-pam.c.pam_selinux 2008-03-11 12:58:25.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-5.0p1/auth-pam.c 2008-04-30 14:25:21.000000000 +0200 -@@ -1069,7 +1069,7 @@ is_pam_session_open(void) - * during the ssh authentication process. - */ - int --do_pam_putenv(char *name, char *value) -+do_pam_putenv(char *name, const char *value) - { - int ret = 1; - #ifdef HAVE_PAM_PUTENV -diff -up openssh-5.0p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.pam_selinux openssh-5.0p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c ---- openssh-5.0p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.pam_selinux 2008-04-07 22:01:37.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-5.0p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c 2008-04-30 14:26:17.000000000 +0200 -@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ - #include "hostfile.h" - #include "auth.h" - #include "xmalloc.h" -+#include "servconf.h" - - #include - #include -@@ -47,6 +48,7 @@ - #include - #endif - -+extern ServerOptions options; - extern Authctxt *the_authctxt; - extern int inetd_flag; - extern int rexeced_flag; -@@ -208,29 +210,38 @@ get_user_context(const char *sename, con - return -1; - } - -+static void -+ssh_selinux_get_role_level(char **role, const char **level) -+{ -+ *role = NULL; -+ *level = NULL; -+ if (the_authctxt) { -+ if (the_authctxt->role != NULL) { -+ char *slash; -+ *role = xstrdup(the_authctxt->role); -+ if ((slash = strchr(*role, '/')) != NULL) { -+ *slash = '\0'; -+ *level = slash + 1; -+ } -+ } -+ } -+} -+ - /* Return the default security context for the given username */ - static int - ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname, - security_context_t *default_sc, security_context_t *user_sc) - { - char *sename, *lvl; -- const char *reqlvl = NULL; -- char *role = NULL; -+ const char *reqlvl; -+ char *role; - int r = -1; - context_t con = NULL; - - *default_sc = NULL; - *user_sc = NULL; -- if (the_authctxt) { -- if (the_authctxt->role != NULL) { -- char *slash; -- role = xstrdup(the_authctxt->role); -- if ((slash = strchr(role, '/')) != NULL) { -- *slash = '\0'; -- reqlvl = slash + 1; -- } -- } -- } -+ -+ ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl); - - #ifdef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME - if ((r=getseuserbyname(pwname, &sename, &lvl)) != 0) { -@@ -311,6 +322,36 @@ ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname, - return (r); - } - -+/* Setup environment variables for pam_selinux */ -+static int -+ssh_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void) -+{ -+ const char *reqlvl; -+ char *role; -+ char *use_current; -+ int rv; -+ -+ debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__); -+ -+ ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl); -+ -+ rv = do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", role ? role : ""); -+ -+ if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) { -+ use_current = "1"; -+ } else { -+ use_current = ""; -+ rv = rv || do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_LEVEL_REQUESTED", reqlvl ? reqlvl: ""); -+ } -+ -+ rv = rv || do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_USE_CURRENT_RANGE", use_current); -+ -+ if (role != NULL) -+ xfree(role); -+ -+ return rv; -+} -+ - /* Set the execution context to the default for the specified user */ - void - ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname) -@@ -322,6 +363,24 @@ ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwn - if (!ssh_selinux_enabled()) - return; - -+ if (options.use_pam) { -+ /* do not compute context, just setup environment for pam_selinux */ -+ if (ssh_selinux_setup_pam_variables()) { -+ switch (security_getenforce()) { -+ case -1: -+ fatal("%s: security_getenforce() failed", __func__); -+ case 0: -+ error("%s: SELinux PAM variable setup failure. Continuing in permissive mode.", -+ __func__); -+ break; -+ default: -+ fatal("%s: SELinux PAM variable setup failure. Aborting connection.", -+ __func__); -+ } -+ } -+ return; -+ } -+ - debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__); - - r = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname, &default_ctx, &user_ctx); diff --git a/openssh-5.2p1-engine.patch b/openssh-5.2p1-engine.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 132653d..0000000 --- a/openssh-5.2p1-engine.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,9 +0,0 @@ ---- openssh-5.2p1/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c~ 2010-01-27 17:36:29.000000000 -0500 -+++ openssh-5.2p1/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c 2010-01-28 10:52:53.000000000 -0500 -@@ -58,5 +58,6 @@ - /* Enable use of crypto hardware */ - ENGINE_load_builtin_engines(); - ENGINE_register_all_complete(); -+ OPENSSL_config(NULL); - } - #endif diff --git a/openssh-5.2p1-redhat.patch b/openssh-5.2p1-redhat.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 4304065..0000000 --- a/openssh-5.2p1-redhat.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,99 +0,0 @@ -diff -up openssh-5.2p1/ssh_config.redhat openssh-5.2p1/ssh_config ---- openssh-5.2p1/ssh_config.redhat 2009-02-21 02:45:02.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-5.2p1/ssh_config 2009-08-09 08:45:11.302092427 +0200 -@@ -44,3 +44,14 @@ - # TunnelDevice any:any - # PermitLocalCommand no - # VisualHostKey no -+Host * -+ GSSAPIAuthentication yes -+# If this option is set to yes then remote X11 clients will have full access -+# to the original X11 display. As virtually no X11 client supports the untrusted -+# mode correctly we set this to yes. -+ ForwardX11Trusted yes -+# Send locale-related environment variables -+ SendEnv LANG LC_CTYPE LC_NUMERIC LC_TIME LC_COLLATE LC_MONETARY LC_MESSAGES -+ SendEnv LC_PAPER LC_NAME LC_ADDRESS LC_TELEPHONE LC_MEASUREMENT -+ SendEnv LC_IDENTIFICATION LC_ALL LANGUAGE -+ SendEnv XMODIFIERS -diff -up openssh-5.2p1/sshd_config.0.redhat openssh-5.2p1/sshd_config.0 ---- openssh-5.2p1/sshd_config.0.redhat 2009-02-23 01:18:15.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-5.2p1/sshd_config.0 2009-08-09 08:45:11.276555108 +0200 -@@ -491,9 +491,9 @@ DESCRIPTION - - SyslogFacility - Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from -- sshd(8). The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0, -- LOCAL1, LOCAL2, LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7. The de- -- fault is AUTH. -+ sshd(8). The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, AUTHPRIV, -+ LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2, LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7. -+ The default is AUTH. - - TCPKeepAlive - Specifies whether the system should send TCP keepalive messages -diff -up openssh-5.2p1/sshd_config.5.redhat openssh-5.2p1/sshd_config.5 ---- openssh-5.2p1/sshd_config.5.redhat 2009-02-23 01:00:24.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-5.2p1/sshd_config.5 2009-08-09 08:45:11.278927203 +0200 -@@ -848,7 +848,7 @@ Note that this option applies to protoco - .It Cm SyslogFacility - Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from - .Xr sshd 8 . --The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2, -+The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, AUTHPRIV, LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2, - LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7. - The default is AUTH. - .It Cm TCPKeepAlive -diff -up openssh-5.2p1/sshd_config.redhat openssh-5.2p1/sshd_config ---- openssh-5.2p1/sshd_config.redhat 2008-07-02 14:35:43.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-5.2p1/sshd_config 2009-08-09 08:47:40.850857227 +0200 -@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ Protocol 2 - # Logging - # obsoletes QuietMode and FascistLogging - #SyslogFacility AUTH -+SyslogFacility AUTHPRIV - #LogLevel INFO - - # Authentication: -@@ -60,9 +61,11 @@ Protocol 2 - # To disable tunneled clear text passwords, change to no here! - #PasswordAuthentication yes - #PermitEmptyPasswords no -+PasswordAuthentication yes - - # Change to no to disable s/key passwords - #ChallengeResponseAuthentication yes -+ChallengeResponseAuthentication no - - # Kerberos options - #KerberosAuthentication no -@@ -72,7 +75,9 @@ Protocol 2 - - # GSSAPI options - #GSSAPIAuthentication no -+GSSAPIAuthentication yes - #GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes -+GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes - - # Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing, - # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will -@@ -84,11 +89,19 @@ Protocol 2 - # PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication - # and ChallengeResponseAuthentication to 'no'. - #UsePAM no -+UsePAM yes -+ -+# Accept locale-related environment variables -+AcceptEnv LANG LC_CTYPE LC_NUMERIC LC_TIME LC_COLLATE LC_MONETARY LC_MESSAGES -+AcceptEnv LC_PAPER LC_NAME LC_ADDRESS LC_TELEPHONE LC_MEASUREMENT -+AcceptEnv LC_IDENTIFICATION LC_ALL LANGUAGE -+AcceptEnv XMODIFIERS - - #AllowAgentForwarding yes - #AllowTcpForwarding yes - #GatewayPorts no - #X11Forwarding no -+X11Forwarding yes - #X11DisplayOffset 10 - #X11UseLocalhost yes - #PrintMotd yes diff --git a/openssh-5.2p1-selinux.patch b/openssh-5.2p1-selinux.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 19cea68..0000000 --- a/openssh-5.2p1-selinux.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,394 +0,0 @@ -diff -up openssh-5.2p1/auth1.c.selinux openssh-5.2p1/auth1.c ---- openssh-5.2p1/auth1.c.selinux 2008-07-09 12:54:05.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-5.2p1/auth1.c 2009-08-11 22:43:07.918183730 +0200 -@@ -392,6 +392,9 @@ do_authentication(Authctxt *authctxt) - { - u_int ulen; - char *user, *style = NULL; -+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX -+ char *role=NULL; -+#endif - - /* Get the name of the user that we wish to log in as. */ - packet_read_expect(SSH_CMSG_USER); -@@ -400,11 +403,25 @@ do_authentication(Authctxt *authctxt) - user = packet_get_string(&ulen); - packet_check_eom(); - -+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX -+ if ((role = strchr(user, '/')) != NULL) -+ *role++ = '\0'; -+#endif -+ - if ((style = strchr(user, ':')) != NULL) - *style++ = '\0'; -+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX -+ else -+ if (role && (style = strchr(role, ':')) != NULL) -+ *style++ = '\0'; -+#endif -+ - - authctxt->user = user; - authctxt->style = style; -+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX -+ authctxt->role = role; -+#endif - - /* Verify that the user is a valid user. */ - if ((authctxt->pw = PRIVSEP(getpwnamallow(user))) != NULL) -diff -up openssh-5.2p1/auth2.c.selinux openssh-5.2p1/auth2.c ---- openssh-5.2p1/auth2.c.selinux 2008-11-05 06:20:46.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-5.2p1/auth2.c 2009-08-11 22:43:07.919756192 +0200 -@@ -216,6 +216,9 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32 - Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt; - Authmethod *m = NULL; - char *user, *service, *method, *style = NULL; -+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX -+ char *role = NULL; -+#endif - int authenticated = 0; - - if (authctxt == NULL) -@@ -227,6 +230,11 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32 - debug("userauth-request for user %s service %s method %s", user, service, method); - debug("attempt %d failures %d", authctxt->attempt, authctxt->failures); - -+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX -+ if ((role = strchr(user, '/')) != NULL) -+ *role++ = 0; -+#endif -+ - if ((style = strchr(user, ':')) != NULL) - *style++ = 0; - -@@ -252,8 +260,15 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32 - use_privsep ? " [net]" : ""); - authctxt->service = xstrdup(service); - authctxt->style = style ? xstrdup(style) : NULL; -- if (use_privsep) -+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX -+ authctxt->role = role ? xstrdup(role) : NULL; -+#endif -+ if (use_privsep) { - mm_inform_authserv(service, style); -+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX -+ mm_inform_authrole(role); -+#endif -+ } - userauth_banner(); - } else if (strcmp(user, authctxt->user) != 0 || - strcmp(service, authctxt->service) != 0) { -diff -up openssh-5.2p1/auth2-gss.c.selinux openssh-5.2p1/auth2-gss.c ---- openssh-5.2p1/auth2-gss.c.selinux 2007-12-02 12:59:45.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-5.2p1/auth2-gss.c 2009-08-11 22:43:07.921723295 +0200 -@@ -258,6 +258,7 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple - Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt; - Gssctxt *gssctxt; - int authenticated = 0; -+ char *micuser; - Buffer b; - gss_buffer_desc mic, gssbuf; - u_int len; -@@ -270,7 +271,13 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple - mic.value = packet_get_string(&len); - mic.length = len; - -- ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->user, authctxt->service, -+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX -+ if (authctxt->role && (strlen(authctxt->role) > 0)) -+ xasprintf(&micuser, "%s/%s", authctxt->user, authctxt->role); -+ else -+#endif -+ micuser = authctxt->user; -+ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, micuser, authctxt->service, - "gssapi-with-mic"); - - gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b); -@@ -282,6 +289,8 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple - logit("GSSAPI MIC check failed"); - - buffer_free(&b); -+ if (micuser != authctxt->user) -+ xfree(micuser); - xfree(mic.value); - - authctxt->postponed = 0; -diff -up openssh-5.2p1/auth2-hostbased.c.selinux openssh-5.2p1/auth2-hostbased.c ---- openssh-5.2p1/auth2-hostbased.c.selinux 2008-07-17 10:57:19.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-5.2p1/auth2-hostbased.c 2009-08-11 22:43:07.923721059 +0200 -@@ -106,7 +106,15 @@ userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *authctxt) - buffer_put_string(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len); - /* reconstruct packet */ - buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST); -- buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->user); -+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX -+ if (authctxt->role) { -+ buffer_put_int(&b, strlen(authctxt->user)+strlen(authctxt->role)+1); -+ buffer_append(&b, authctxt->user, strlen(authctxt->user)); -+ buffer_put_char(&b, '/'); -+ buffer_append(&b, authctxt->role, strlen(authctxt->role)); -+ } else -+#endif -+ buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->user); - buffer_put_cstring(&b, service); - buffer_put_cstring(&b, "hostbased"); - buffer_put_string(&b, pkalg, alen); -diff -up openssh-5.2p1/auth2-pubkey.c.selinux openssh-5.2p1/auth2-pubkey.c ---- openssh-5.2p1/auth2-pubkey.c.selinux 2008-07-04 04:54:25.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-5.2p1/auth2-pubkey.c 2009-08-11 22:43:07.925704588 +0200 -@@ -117,7 +117,15 @@ userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt) - } - /* reconstruct packet */ - buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST); -- buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->user); -+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX -+ if (authctxt->role) { -+ buffer_put_int(&b, strlen(authctxt->user)+strlen(authctxt->role)+1); -+ buffer_append(&b, authctxt->user, strlen(authctxt->user)); -+ buffer_put_char(&b, '/'); -+ buffer_append(&b, authctxt->role, strlen(authctxt->role)); -+ } else -+#endif -+ buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->user); - buffer_put_cstring(&b, - datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKSERVICE ? - "ssh-userauth" : -diff -up openssh-5.2p1/auth.h.selinux openssh-5.2p1/auth.h ---- openssh-5.2p1/auth.h.selinux 2008-11-05 06:20:46.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-5.2p1/auth.h 2009-08-11 22:43:07.927199901 +0200 -@@ -58,6 +58,9 @@ struct Authctxt { - char *service; - struct passwd *pw; /* set if 'valid' */ - char *style; -+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX -+ char *role; -+#endif - void *kbdintctxt; - void *jpake_ctx; - #ifdef BSD_AUTH -diff -up openssh-5.2p1/configure.ac.selinux openssh-5.2p1/configure.ac ---- openssh-5.2p1/configure.ac.selinux 2009-02-16 05:37:03.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-5.2p1/configure.ac 2009-08-11 22:43:07.930259052 +0200 -@@ -3335,6 +3335,7 @@ AC_ARG_WITH(selinux, - AC_CHECK_LIB(selinux, setexeccon, [ LIBSELINUX="-lselinux" ], - AC_MSG_ERROR(SELinux support requires libselinux library)) - SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS $LIBSELINUX" -+ LIBS="$LIBS $LIBSELINUX" - AC_CHECK_FUNCS(getseuserbyname get_default_context_with_level) - LIBS="$save_LIBS" - fi ] -diff -up openssh-5.2p1/monitor.c.selinux openssh-5.2p1/monitor.c ---- openssh-5.2p1/monitor.c.selinux 2009-02-14 06:33:31.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-5.2p1/monitor.c 2009-08-11 22:43:07.933623092 +0200 -@@ -135,6 +135,9 @@ int mm_answer_sign(int, Buffer *); - int mm_answer_pwnamallow(int, Buffer *); - int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(int, Buffer *); - int mm_answer_authserv(int, Buffer *); -+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX -+int mm_answer_authrole(int, Buffer *); -+#endif - int mm_answer_authpassword(int, Buffer *); - int mm_answer_bsdauthquery(int, Buffer *); - int mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(int, Buffer *); -@@ -211,6 +214,9 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] - {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sign}, - {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow}, - {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authserv}, -+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX -+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authrole}, -+#endif - {MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_auth2_read_banner}, - {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword}, - #ifdef USE_PAM -@@ -680,6 +686,9 @@ mm_answer_pwnamallow(int sock, Buffer *m - else { - /* Allow service/style information on the auth context */ - monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, 1); -+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX -+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, 1); -+#endif - monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, 1); - } - -@@ -724,6 +733,25 @@ mm_answer_authserv(int sock, Buffer *m) - return (0); - } - -+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX -+int -+mm_answer_authrole(int sock, Buffer *m) -+{ -+ monitor_permit_authentications(1); -+ -+ authctxt->role = buffer_get_string(m, NULL); -+ debug3("%s: role=%s", -+ __func__, authctxt->role); -+ -+ if (strlen(authctxt->role) == 0) { -+ xfree(authctxt->role); -+ authctxt->role = NULL; -+ } -+ -+ return (0); -+} -+#endif -+ - int - mm_answer_authpassword(int sock, Buffer *m) - { -@@ -1102,7 +1130,7 @@ static int - monitor_valid_userblob(u_char *data, u_int datalen) - { - Buffer b; -- char *p; -+ char *p, *r; - u_int len; - int fail = 0; - -@@ -1128,6 +1156,8 @@ monitor_valid_userblob(u_char *data, u_i - if (buffer_get_char(&b) != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST) - fail++; - p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL); -+ if ((r = strchr(p, '/')) != NULL) -+ *r = '\0'; - if (strcmp(authctxt->user, p) != 0) { - logit("wrong user name passed to monitor: expected %s != %.100s", - authctxt->user, p); -@@ -1159,7 +1189,7 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(u_char *data - char *chost) - { - Buffer b; -- char *p; -+ char *p, *r; - u_int len; - int fail = 0; - -@@ -1176,6 +1206,8 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(u_char *data - if (buffer_get_char(&b) != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST) - fail++; - p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL); -+ if ((r = strchr(p, '/')) != NULL) -+ *r = '\0'; - if (strcmp(authctxt->user, p) != 0) { - logit("wrong user name passed to monitor: expected %s != %.100s", - authctxt->user, p); -diff -up openssh-5.2p1/monitor.h.selinux openssh-5.2p1/monitor.h ---- openssh-5.2p1/monitor.h.selinux 2008-11-05 06:20:46.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-5.2p1/monitor.h 2009-08-11 22:43:07.935612930 +0200 -@@ -31,6 +31,9 @@ - enum monitor_reqtype { - MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, MONITOR_ANS_MODULI, - MONITOR_REQ_FREE, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, -+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX -+ MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, -+#endif - MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MONITOR_ANS_SIGN, - MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM, - MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, MONITOR_ANS_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, -diff -up openssh-5.2p1/monitor_wrap.c.selinux openssh-5.2p1/monitor_wrap.c ---- openssh-5.2p1/monitor_wrap.c.selinux 2008-11-05 06:20:47.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-5.2p1/monitor_wrap.c 2009-08-11 22:43:07.937212340 +0200 -@@ -297,6 +297,25 @@ mm_inform_authserv(char *service, char * - buffer_free(&m); - } - -+/* Inform the privileged process about role */ -+ -+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX -+void -+mm_inform_authrole(char *role) -+{ -+ Buffer m; -+ -+ debug3("%s entering", __func__); -+ -+ buffer_init(&m); -+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, role ? role : ""); -+ -+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, &m); -+ -+ buffer_free(&m); -+} -+#endif -+ - /* Do the password authentication */ - int - mm_auth_password(Authctxt *authctxt, char *password) -diff -up openssh-5.2p1/monitor_wrap.h.selinux openssh-5.2p1/monitor_wrap.h ---- openssh-5.2p1/monitor_wrap.h.selinux 2008-11-05 06:20:47.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-5.2p1/monitor_wrap.h 2009-08-11 22:43:07.938268752 +0200 -@@ -41,6 +41,9 @@ int mm_is_monitor(void); - DH *mm_choose_dh(int, int, int); - int mm_key_sign(Key *, u_char **, u_int *, u_char *, u_int); - void mm_inform_authserv(char *, char *); -+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX -+void mm_inform_authrole(char *); -+#endif - struct passwd *mm_getpwnamallow(const char *); - char *mm_auth2_read_banner(void); - int mm_auth_password(struct Authctxt *, char *); -diff -up openssh-5.2p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.selinux openssh-5.2p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c ---- openssh-5.2p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.selinux 2008-03-26 21:27:21.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-5.2p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c 2009-08-11 22:44:14.529196220 +0200 -@@ -30,11 +30,16 @@ - #ifdef WITH_SELINUX - #include "log.h" - #include "port-linux.h" -+#include "key.h" -+#include "hostfile.h" -+#include "auth.h" - - #include - #include - #include - -+extern Authctxt *the_authctxt; -+ - /* Wrapper around is_selinux_enabled() to log its return value once only */ - int - ssh_selinux_enabled(void) -@@ -53,23 +58,36 @@ ssh_selinux_enabled(void) - static security_context_t - ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname) - { -- security_context_t sc; -- char *sename = NULL, *lvl = NULL; -- int r; -+ security_context_t sc = NULL; -+ char *sename, *lvl; -+ char *role = NULL; -+ int r = 0; - -+ if (the_authctxt) -+ role=the_authctxt->role; - #ifdef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME -- if (getseuserbyname(pwname, &sename, &lvl) != 0) -- return NULL; -+ if ((r=getseuserbyname(pwname, &sename, &lvl)) != 0) { -+ sename = NULL; -+ lvl = NULL; -+ } - #else - sename = pwname; - lvl = NULL; - #endif - -+ if (r == 0) { - #ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL -- r = get_default_context_with_level(sename, lvl, NULL, &sc); -+ if (role != NULL && role[0]) -+ r = get_default_context_with_rolelevel(sename, role, lvl, NULL, &sc); -+ else -+ r = get_default_context_with_level(sename, lvl, NULL, &sc); - #else -- r = get_default_context(sename, NULL, &sc); -+ if (role != NULL && role[0]) -+ r = get_default_context_with_role(sename, role, NULL, &sc); -+ else -+ r = get_default_context(sename, NULL, &sc); - #endif -+ } - - if (r != 0) { - switch (security_getenforce()) { diff --git a/openssh-5.2p1-sesftp.patch b/openssh-5.2p1-sesftp.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 3470e8f..0000000 --- a/openssh-5.2p1-sesftp.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,64 +0,0 @@ -diff -up openssh-5.2p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.sesftp openssh-5.2p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c ---- openssh-5.2p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.sesftp 2009-08-12 00:29:37.712368892 +0200 -+++ openssh-5.2p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c 2009-08-12 00:29:37.732544890 +0200 -@@ -469,4 +469,36 @@ ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *pwname, cons - freecon(user_ctx); - debug3("%s: done", __func__); - } -+ -+void -+ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *newname) -+{ -+ int len, newlen; -+ char *oldctx, *newctx, *cx; -+ -+ if (!ssh_selinux_enabled()) -+ return; -+ -+ if (getcon((security_context_t *)&oldctx) < 0) { -+ logit("%s: getcon failed with %s", __func__, strerror (errno)); -+ return; -+ } -+ if ((cx = index(oldctx, ':')) == NULL || (cx = index(cx + 1, ':')) == NULL) { -+ logit ("%s: unparseable context %s", __func__, oldctx); -+ return; -+ } -+ -+ newlen = strlen(oldctx) + strlen(newname) + 1; -+ newctx = xmalloc(newlen); -+ len = cx - oldctx + 1; -+ memcpy(newctx, oldctx, len); -+ strlcpy(newctx + len, newname, newlen - len); -+ if ((cx = index(cx + 1, ':'))) -+ strlcat(newctx, cx, newlen); -+ debug3("%s: setting context from '%s' to '%s'", __func__, oldctx, newctx); -+ if (setcon(newctx) < 0) -+ logit("%s: setcon failed with %s", __func__, strerror (errno)); -+ xfree(oldctx); -+ xfree(newctx); -+} - #endif /* WITH_SELINUX */ -diff -up openssh-5.2p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.sesftp openssh-5.2p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h ---- openssh-5.2p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.sesftp 2008-03-26 21:27:21.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-5.2p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h 2009-08-12 00:29:37.733388083 +0200 -@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ - int ssh_selinux_enabled(void); - void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const char *); - void ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *); -+void ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *); - #endif - - #endif /* ! _PORT_LINUX_H */ -diff -up openssh-5.2p1/session.c.sesftp openssh-5.2p1/session.c ---- openssh-5.2p1/session.c.sesftp 2009-08-12 00:29:37.659250161 +0200 -+++ openssh-5.2p1/session.c 2009-08-12 00:29:37.729578695 +0200 -@@ -1798,6 +1798,9 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command - argv[i] = NULL; - optind = optreset = 1; - __progname = argv[0]; -+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX -+ ssh_selinux_change_context("sftpd_t"); -+#endif - exit(sftp_server_main(i, argv, s->pw)); - } - diff --git a/openssh-5.3p1-fips.patch b/openssh-5.3p1-fips.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 01a715c..0000000 --- a/openssh-5.3p1-fips.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,695 +0,0 @@ -diff -up openssh-5.3p1/auth2-pubkey.c.fips openssh-5.3p1/auth2-pubkey.c ---- openssh-5.3p1/auth2-pubkey.c.fips 2009-10-02 14:12:00.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-5.3p1/auth2-pubkey.c 2009-10-02 14:12:00.000000000 +0200 -@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ - #include - #include - #include -+#include - - #include "xmalloc.h" - #include "ssh.h" -@@ -240,7 +241,7 @@ user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, Key - found_key = 1; - debug("matching key found: file %s, line %lu", - file, linenum); -- fp = key_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); -+ fp = key_fingerprint(found, FIPS_mode() ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); - verbose("Found matching %s key: %s", - key_type(found), fp); - xfree(fp); -diff -up openssh-5.3p1/authfile.c.fips openssh-5.3p1/authfile.c ---- openssh-5.3p1/authfile.c.fips 2006-09-01 07:38:36.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-5.3p1/authfile.c 2009-10-02 14:12:00.000000000 +0200 -@@ -143,8 +143,14 @@ key_save_private_rsa1(Key *key, const ch - /* Allocate space for the private part of the key in the buffer. */ - cp = buffer_append_space(&encrypted, buffer_len(&buffer)); - -- cipher_set_key_string(&ciphercontext, cipher, passphrase, -- CIPHER_ENCRYPT); -+ if (cipher_set_key_string(&ciphercontext, cipher, passphrase, -+ CIPHER_ENCRYPT) < 0) { -+ error("cipher_set_key_string failed."); -+ buffer_free(&encrypted); -+ buffer_free(&buffer); -+ return 0; -+ } -+ - cipher_crypt(&ciphercontext, cp, - buffer_ptr(&buffer), buffer_len(&buffer)); - cipher_cleanup(&ciphercontext); -@@ -414,8 +420,14 @@ key_load_private_rsa1(int fd, const char - cp = buffer_append_space(&decrypted, buffer_len(&buffer)); - - /* Rest of the buffer is encrypted. Decrypt it using the passphrase. */ -- cipher_set_key_string(&ciphercontext, cipher, passphrase, -- CIPHER_DECRYPT); -+ if (cipher_set_key_string(&ciphercontext, cipher, passphrase, -+ CIPHER_DECRYPT) < 0) { -+ error("cipher_set_key_string failed."); -+ buffer_free(&decrypted); -+ buffer_free(&buffer); -+ goto fail; -+ } -+ - cipher_crypt(&ciphercontext, cp, - buffer_ptr(&buffer), buffer_len(&buffer)); - cipher_cleanup(&ciphercontext); -diff -up openssh-5.3p1/cipher.c.fips openssh-5.3p1/cipher.c ---- openssh-5.3p1/cipher.c.fips 2009-10-02 13:44:03.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-5.3p1/cipher.c 2009-10-02 14:12:00.000000000 +0200 -@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ - #include - - #include -+#include - - #include - #include -@@ -93,6 +94,22 @@ struct Cipher { - { NULL, SSH_CIPHER_INVALID, 0, 0, 0, 0, NULL } - }; - -+struct Cipher fips_ciphers[] = { -+ { "none", SSH_CIPHER_NONE, 8, 0, 0, 0, EVP_enc_null }, -+ { "3des", SSH_CIPHER_3DES, 8, 16, 0, 1, evp_ssh1_3des }, -+ -+ { "3des-cbc", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 24, 0, 1, EVP_des_ede3_cbc }, -+ { "aes128-cbc", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 16, 0, 1, EVP_aes_128_cbc }, -+ { "aes192-cbc", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 24, 0, 1, EVP_aes_192_cbc }, -+ { "aes256-cbc", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 0, 1, EVP_aes_256_cbc }, -+ { "rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se", -+ SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 0, 1, EVP_aes_256_cbc }, -+ { "aes128-ctr", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 16, 0, 0, evp_aes_128_ctr }, -+ { "aes192-ctr", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 24, 0, 0, evp_aes_128_ctr }, -+ { "aes256-ctr", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 0, 0, evp_aes_128_ctr }, -+ { NULL, SSH_CIPHER_INVALID, 0, 0, 0, 0, NULL } -+}; -+ - /*--*/ - - u_int -@@ -135,7 +152,7 @@ Cipher * - cipher_by_name(const char *name) - { - Cipher *c; -- for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++) -+ for (c = FIPS_mode() ? fips_ciphers : ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++) - if (strcmp(c->name, name) == 0) - return c; - return NULL; -@@ -145,7 +162,7 @@ Cipher * - cipher_by_number(int id) - { - Cipher *c; -- for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++) -+ for (c = FIPS_mode() ? fips_ciphers : ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++) - if (c->number == id) - return c; - return NULL; -@@ -189,7 +206,7 @@ cipher_number(const char *name) - Cipher *c; - if (name == NULL) - return -1; -- for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++) -+ for (c = FIPS_mode() ? fips_ciphers : ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++) - if (strcasecmp(c->name, name) == 0) - return c->number; - return -1; -@@ -296,14 +313,15 @@ cipher_cleanup(CipherContext *cc) - * passphrase and using the resulting 16 bytes as the key. - */ - --void -+int - cipher_set_key_string(CipherContext *cc, Cipher *cipher, - const char *passphrase, int do_encrypt) - { - MD5_CTX md; - u_char digest[16]; - -- MD5_Init(&md); -+ if (MD5_Init(&md) <= 0) -+ return -1; - MD5_Update(&md, (const u_char *)passphrase, strlen(passphrase)); - MD5_Final(digest, &md); - -@@ -311,6 +329,7 @@ cipher_set_key_string(CipherContext *cc, - - memset(digest, 0, sizeof(digest)); - memset(&md, 0, sizeof(md)); -+ return 0; - } - - /* -diff -up openssh-5.3p1/cipher-ctr.c.fips openssh-5.3p1/cipher-ctr.c ---- openssh-5.3p1/cipher-ctr.c.fips 2007-06-14 15:21:33.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-5.3p1/cipher-ctr.c 2009-10-02 14:12:00.000000000 +0200 -@@ -140,7 +140,8 @@ evp_aes_128_ctr(void) - aes_ctr.do_cipher = ssh_aes_ctr; - #ifndef SSH_OLD_EVP - aes_ctr.flags = EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE | EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH | -- EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV; -+ EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV | -+ EVP_CIPH_FLAG_FIPS; - #endif - return (&aes_ctr); - } -diff -up openssh-5.3p1/cipher.h.fips openssh-5.3p1/cipher.h ---- openssh-5.3p1/cipher.h.fips 2009-01-28 06:38:41.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-5.3p1/cipher.h 2009-10-02 14:12:00.000000000 +0200 -@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ void cipher_init(CipherContext *, Ciphe - const u_char *, u_int, int); - void cipher_crypt(CipherContext *, u_char *, const u_char *, u_int); - void cipher_cleanup(CipherContext *); --void cipher_set_key_string(CipherContext *, Cipher *, const char *, int); -+int cipher_set_key_string(CipherContext *, Cipher *, const char *, int); - u_int cipher_blocksize(const Cipher *); - u_int cipher_keylen(const Cipher *); - u_int cipher_is_cbc(const Cipher *); -diff -up openssh-5.3p1/mac.c.fips openssh-5.3p1/mac.c ---- openssh-5.3p1/mac.c.fips 2008-06-13 02:58:50.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-5.3p1/mac.c 2009-10-02 14:12:00.000000000 +0200 -@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ - #include - - #include -+#include - - #include - #include -@@ -47,14 +48,14 @@ - #define SSH_EVP 1 /* OpenSSL EVP-based MAC */ - #define SSH_UMAC 2 /* UMAC (not integrated with OpenSSL) */ - --struct { -+struct Macs { - char *name; - int type; - const EVP_MD * (*mdfunc)(void); - int truncatebits; /* truncate digest if != 0 */ - int key_len; /* just for UMAC */ - int len; /* just for UMAC */ --} macs[] = { -+} all_macs[] = { - { "hmac-sha1", SSH_EVP, EVP_sha1, 0, -1, -1 }, - { "hmac-sha1-96", SSH_EVP, EVP_sha1, 96, -1, -1 }, - { "hmac-md5", SSH_EVP, EVP_md5, 0, -1, -1 }, -@@ -65,9 +66,15 @@ struct { - { NULL, 0, NULL, 0, -1, -1 } - }; - -+struct Macs fips_macs[] = { -+ { "hmac-sha1", SSH_EVP, EVP_sha1, 0, -1, -1 }, -+ { NULL, 0, NULL, 0, -1, -1 } -+}; -+ - static void - mac_setup_by_id(Mac *mac, int which) - { -+ struct Macs *macs = FIPS_mode() ? fips_macs : all_macs; - int evp_len; - mac->type = macs[which].type; - if (mac->type == SSH_EVP) { -@@ -88,6 +95,7 @@ int - mac_setup(Mac *mac, char *name) - { - int i; -+ struct Macs *macs = FIPS_mode() ? fips_macs : all_macs; - - for (i = 0; macs[i].name; i++) { - if (strcmp(name, macs[i].name) == 0) { -diff -up openssh-5.3p1/Makefile.in.fips openssh-5.3p1/Makefile.in ---- openssh-5.3p1/Makefile.in.fips 2009-10-02 14:12:00.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-5.3p1/Makefile.in 2009-10-02 14:20:18.000000000 +0200 -@@ -136,28 +136,28 @@ libssh.a: $(LIBSSH_OBJS) - $(RANLIB) $@ - - ssh$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SSHOBJS) -- $(LD) -o $@ $(SSHOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) -+ $(LD) -o $@ $(SSHOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(LIBS) - - sshd$(EXEEXT): libssh.a $(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHDOBJS) -- $(LD) -o $@ $(SSHDOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(SSHDLIBS) $(LIBS) -+ $(LD) -o $@ $(SSHDOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(SSHDLIBS) $(LIBS) - - scp$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a scp.o progressmeter.o - $(LD) -o $@ scp.o progressmeter.o bufaux.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) - - ssh-add$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-add.o -- $(LD) -o $@ ssh-add.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) -+ $(LD) -o $@ ssh-add.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(LIBS) - - ssh-agent$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-agent.o -- $(LD) -o $@ ssh-agent.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) -+ $(LD) -o $@ ssh-agent.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(LIBS) - - ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keygen.o -- $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keygen.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) -+ $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keygen.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(LIBS) - - ssh-keysign$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keysign.o roaming_dummy.o -- $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keysign.o readconf.o roaming_dummy.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) -+ $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keysign.o readconf.o roaming_dummy.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(LIBS) - - ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keyscan.o roaming_dummy.o -- $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o roaming_dummy.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS) -+ $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o roaming_dummy.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lfipscheck $(LIBS) - - sftp-server$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a sftp.o sftp-common.o sftp-server.o sftp-server-main.o - $(LD) -o $@ sftp-server.o sftp-common.o sftp-server-main.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) -diff -up openssh-5.3p1/myproposal.h.fips openssh-5.3p1/myproposal.h ---- openssh-5.3p1/myproposal.h.fips 2009-01-28 06:33:31.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-5.3p1/myproposal.h 2009-10-02 14:12:00.000000000 +0200 -@@ -53,7 +53,12 @@ - "hmac-sha1-96,hmac-md5-96" - #define KEX_DEFAULT_COMP "none,zlib@openssh.com,zlib" - #define KEX_DEFAULT_LANG "" -- -+#define KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT \ -+ "aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr," \ -+ "aes128-cbc,3des-cbc," \ -+ "aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc,rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se" -+#define KEX_FIPS_MAC \ -+ "hmac-sha1" - - static char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { - KEX_DEFAULT_KEX, -diff -up openssh-5.3p1/nsskeys.c.fips openssh-5.3p1/nsskeys.c ---- openssh-5.3p1/nsskeys.c.fips 2009-10-02 14:12:00.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-5.3p1/nsskeys.c 2009-10-02 14:12:00.000000000 +0200 -@@ -183,8 +183,8 @@ nss_convert_pubkey(Key *k) - break; - } - -- p = key_fingerprint(k, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); -- debug("fingerprint %u %s", key_size(k), p); -+ p = key_fingerprint(k, SSH_FP_SHA1, SSH_FP_HEX); -+ debug("SHA1 fingerprint %u %s", key_size(k), p); - xfree(p); - - return 0; -diff -up openssh-5.3p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-arc4random.c.fips openssh-5.3p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-arc4random.c ---- openssh-5.3p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-arc4random.c.fips 2008-06-04 02:54:00.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-5.3p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-arc4random.c 2009-10-02 14:12:00.000000000 +0200 -@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ - static int rc4_ready = 0; - static RC4_KEY rc4; - -+#if 0 - unsigned int - arc4random(void) - { -@@ -82,6 +83,32 @@ arc4random_stir(void) - - rc4_ready = REKEY_BYTES; - } -+#else -+unsigned int -+arc4random(void) -+{ -+ unsigned int r = 0; -+ void *rp = &r; -+ -+ if (!rc4_ready) { -+ arc4random_stir(); -+ } -+ RAND_bytes(rp, sizeof(r)); -+ -+ return(r); -+} -+ -+void -+arc4random_stir(void) -+{ -+ unsigned char rand_buf[SEED_SIZE]; -+ -+ if (RAND_bytes(rand_buf, sizeof(rand_buf)) <= 0) -+ fatal("Couldn't obtain random bytes (error %ld)", -+ ERR_get_error()); -+ rc4_ready = 1; -+} -+#endif - #endif /* !HAVE_ARC4RANDOM */ - - #ifndef ARC4RANDOM_BUF -diff -up openssh-5.3p1/ssh-add.c.fips openssh-5.3p1/ssh-add.c ---- openssh-5.3p1/ssh-add.c.fips 2009-10-02 14:12:00.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-5.3p1/ssh-add.c 2009-10-02 14:12:00.000000000 +0200 -@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ - #include - - #include -+#include - #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" - - #ifdef HAVE_LIBNSS -@@ -254,7 +255,7 @@ list_identities(AuthenticationConnection - key = ssh_get_next_identity(ac, &comment, version)) { - had_identities = 1; - if (do_fp) { -- fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, -+ fp = key_fingerprint(key, FIPS_mode() ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5, - SSH_FP_HEX); - printf("%d %s %s (%s)\n", - key_size(key), fp, comment, key_type(key)); -diff -up openssh-5.3p1/ssh-agent.c.fips openssh-5.3p1/ssh-agent.c ---- openssh-5.3p1/ssh-agent.c.fips 2009-10-02 14:12:00.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-5.3p1/ssh-agent.c 2009-10-02 14:12:00.000000000 +0200 -@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ - - #include - #include -+#include - #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" - - #include -@@ -200,9 +201,9 @@ confirm_key(Identity *id) - char *p; - int ret = -1; - -- p = key_fingerprint(id->key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); -- if (ask_permission("Allow use of key %s?\nKey fingerprint %s.", -- id->comment, p)) -+ p = key_fingerprint(id->key, FIPS_mode() ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); -+ if (ask_permission("Allow use of key %s?\nKey %sfingerprint %s.", -+ id->comment, FIPS_mode() ? "SHA1 " : "", p)) - ret = 0; - xfree(p); - -diff -up openssh-5.3p1/ssh.c.fips openssh-5.3p1/ssh.c ---- openssh-5.3p1/ssh.c.fips 2009-10-02 14:12:00.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-5.3p1/ssh.c 2009-10-02 14:12:00.000000000 +0200 -@@ -72,6 +72,8 @@ - - #include - #include -+#include -+#include - #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" - #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" - -@@ -221,6 +223,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av) - sanitise_stdfd(); - - __progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]); -+ SSLeay_add_all_algorithms(); -+ if (FIPS_mode() && !FIPSCHECK_verify(NULL, NULL)) { -+ fatal("FIPS integrity verification test failed."); -+ } - init_rng(); - - /* -@@ -281,6 +287,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av) - "ACD:F:I:KL:MNO:PR:S:TVw:XYy")) != -1) { - switch (opt) { - case '1': -+ if (FIPS_mode()) { -+ fatal("Protocol 1 not allowed in the FIPS mode."); -+ } - options.protocol = SSH_PROTO_1; - break; - case '2': -@@ -552,7 +561,6 @@ main(int ac, char **av) - if (!host) - usage(); - -- SSLeay_add_all_algorithms(); - ERR_load_crypto_strings(); - - /* Initialize the command to execute on remote host. */ -@@ -638,6 +646,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av) - - seed_rng(); - -+ if (FIPS_mode()) { -+ logit("FIPS mode initialized"); -+ } -+ - if (options.user == NULL) - options.user = xstrdup(pw->pw_name); - -@@ -704,6 +716,12 @@ main(int ac, char **av) - - timeout_ms = options.connection_timeout * 1000; - -+ if (FIPS_mode()) { -+ options.protocol &= SSH_PROTO_2; -+ if (options.protocol == 0) -+ fatal("Protocol 2 disabled by configuration but required in the FIPS mode."); -+ } -+ - /* Open a connection to the remote host. */ - if (ssh_connect(host, &hostaddr, options.port, - options.address_family, options.connection_attempts, &timeout_ms, -diff -up openssh-5.3p1/sshconnect2.c.fips openssh-5.3p1/sshconnect2.c ---- openssh-5.3p1/sshconnect2.c.fips 2009-10-02 14:12:00.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-5.3p1/sshconnect2.c 2009-10-02 14:12:00.000000000 +0200 -@@ -44,6 +44,8 @@ - #include - #endif - -+#include -+ - #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" - - #include "xmalloc.h" -@@ -116,6 +118,10 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *ho - if (options.ciphers != NULL) { - myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = - myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = options.ciphers; -+ } else if (FIPS_mode()) { -+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = -+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT; -+ - } - myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = - compat_cipher_proposal(myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS]); -@@ -131,7 +137,11 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *ho - if (options.macs != NULL) { - myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] = - myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = options.macs; -+ } else if (FIPS_mode()) { -+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] = -+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = KEX_FIPS_MAC; - } -+ - if (options.hostkeyalgorithms != NULL) - myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = - options.hostkeyalgorithms; -@@ -508,8 +518,8 @@ input_userauth_pk_ok(int type, u_int32_t - key->type, pktype); - goto done; - } -- fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); -- debug2("input_userauth_pk_ok: fp %s", fp); -+ fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_SHA1, SSH_FP_HEX); -+ debug2("input_userauth_pk_ok: SHA1 fp %s", fp); - xfree(fp); - - /* -diff -up openssh-5.3p1/sshconnect.c.fips openssh-5.3p1/sshconnect.c ---- openssh-5.3p1/sshconnect.c.fips 2009-10-02 14:12:00.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-5.3p1/sshconnect.c 2009-10-02 14:12:00.000000000 +0200 -@@ -40,6 +40,8 @@ - #include - #include - -+#include -+ - #include "xmalloc.h" - #include "key.h" - #include "hostfile.h" -@@ -763,6 +765,7 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct so - goto fail; - } else if (options.strict_host_key_checking == 2) { - char msg1[1024], msg2[1024]; -+ int fips_on = FIPS_mode(); - - if (show_other_keys(host, host_key)) - snprintf(msg1, sizeof(msg1), -@@ -771,8 +774,8 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct so - else - snprintf(msg1, sizeof(msg1), "."); - /* The default */ -- fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); -- ra = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5, -+ fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, fips_on ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); -+ ra = key_fingerprint(host_key, fips_on ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5, - SSH_FP_RANDOMART); - msg2[0] = '\0'; - if (options.verify_host_key_dns) { -@@ -788,10 +791,10 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct so - snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg), - "The authenticity of host '%.200s (%s)' can't be " - "established%s\n" -- "%s key fingerprint is %s.%s%s\n%s" -+ "%s key %sfingerprint is %s.%s%s\n%s" - "Are you sure you want to continue connecting " - "(yes/no)? ", -- host, ip, msg1, type, fp, -+ host, ip, msg1, type, fips_on ? "SHA1 " : "", fp, - options.visual_host_key ? "\n" : "", - options.visual_host_key ? ra : "", - msg2); -@@ -1079,17 +1082,18 @@ show_key_from_file(const char *file, con - Key *found; - char *fp, *ra; - int line, ret; -+ int fips_on = FIPS_mode(); - - found = key_new(keytype); - if ((ret = lookup_key_in_hostfile_by_type(file, host, - keytype, found, &line))) { -- fp = key_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); -- ra = key_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_RANDOMART); -+ fp = key_fingerprint(found, fips_on ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); -+ ra = key_fingerprint(found, fips_on ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_RANDOMART); - logit("WARNING: %s key found for host %s\n" - "in %s:%d\n" -- "%s key fingerprint %s.\n%s\n", -+ "%s key %sfingerprint %s.\n%s\n", - key_type(found), host, file, line, -- key_type(found), fp, ra); -+ key_type(found), fips_on ? "SHA1 ":"", fp, ra); - xfree(ra); - xfree(fp); - } -@@ -1135,8 +1139,9 @@ warn_changed_key(Key *host_key) - { - char *fp; - const char *type = key_type(host_key); -+ int fips_on = FIPS_mode(); - -- fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); -+ fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, fips_on ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); - - error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@"); - error("@ WARNING: REMOTE HOST IDENTIFICATION HAS CHANGED! @"); -@@ -1144,8 +1149,8 @@ warn_changed_key(Key *host_key) - error("IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SOMEONE IS DOING SOMETHING NASTY!"); - error("Someone could be eavesdropping on you right now (man-in-the-middle attack)!"); - error("It is also possible that the %s host key has just been changed.", type); -- error("The fingerprint for the %s key sent by the remote host is\n%s.", -- type, fp); -+ error("The %sfingerprint for the %s key sent by the remote host is\n%s.", -+ fips_on ? "SHA1 ":"", type, fp); - error("Please contact your system administrator."); - - xfree(fp); -diff -up openssh-5.3p1/sshd.c.fips openssh-5.3p1/sshd.c ---- openssh-5.3p1/sshd.c.fips 2009-10-02 14:12:00.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-5.3p1/sshd.c 2009-10-02 14:12:00.000000000 +0200 -@@ -76,6 +76,8 @@ - #include - #include - #include -+#include -+#include - #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" - - #ifdef HAVE_SECUREWARE -@@ -1261,6 +1263,12 @@ main(int ac, char **av) - (void)set_auth_parameters(ac, av); - #endif - __progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]); -+ -+ SSLeay_add_all_algorithms(); -+ if (FIPS_mode() && !FIPSCHECK_verify(NULL, NULL)) { -+ fatal("FIPS integrity verification test failed."); -+ } -+ - init_rng(); - - /* Save argv. Duplicate so setproctitle emulation doesn't clobber it */ -@@ -1413,8 +1421,6 @@ main(int ac, char **av) - else - closefrom(REEXEC_DEVCRYPTO_RESERVED_FD); - -- SSLeay_add_all_algorithms(); -- - /* - * Force logging to stderr until we have loaded the private host - * key (unless started from inetd) -@@ -1532,6 +1538,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av) - debug("private host key: #%d type %d %s", i, key->type, - key_type(key)); - } -+ if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) && FIPS_mode()) { -+ logit("Disabling protocol version 1. Not allowed in the FIPS mode."); -+ options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_1; -+ } - if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) && !sensitive_data.have_ssh1_key) { - logit("Disabling protocol version 1. Could not load host key"); - options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_1; -@@ -1656,6 +1666,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av) - /* Initialize the random number generator. */ - arc4random_stir(); - -+ if (FIPS_mode()) { -+ logit("FIPS mode initialized"); -+ } -+ - /* Chdir to the root directory so that the current disk can be - unmounted if desired. */ - chdir("/"); -@@ -2183,6 +2197,9 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void) - if (options.ciphers != NULL) { - myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = - myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = options.ciphers; -+ } else if (FIPS_mode()) { -+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = -+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT; - } - myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = - compat_cipher_proposal(myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS]); -@@ -2192,6 +2209,9 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void) - if (options.macs != NULL) { - myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] = - myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = options.macs; -+ } else if (FIPS_mode()) { -+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] = -+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = KEX_FIPS_MAC; - } - if (options.compression == COMP_NONE) { - myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] = -diff -up openssh-5.3p1/ssh-keygen.c.fips openssh-5.3p1/ssh-keygen.c ---- openssh-5.3p1/ssh-keygen.c.fips 2009-10-02 14:12:00.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-5.3p1/ssh-keygen.c 2009-10-02 14:12:00.000000000 +0200 -@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ - - #include - #include -+#include - #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" - - #include -@@ -537,7 +538,7 @@ do_fingerprint(struct passwd *pw) - enum fp_type fptype; - struct stat st; - -- fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5; -+ fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : FIPS_mode() ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5; - rep = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE : SSH_FP_HEX; - - if (!have_identity) -@@ -1506,14 +1507,15 @@ passphrase_again: - fclose(f); - - if (!quiet) { -- char *fp = key_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); -- char *ra = key_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_MD5, -+ int fips_on = FIPS_mode(); -+ char *fp = key_fingerprint(public, fips_on ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); -+ char *ra = key_fingerprint(public, fips_on ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5, - SSH_FP_RANDOMART); - printf("Your public key has been saved in %s.\n", - identity_file); -- printf("The key fingerprint is:\n"); -+ printf("The key %sfingerprint is:\n", fips_on ? "SHA1 " : ""); - printf("%s %s\n", fp, comment); -- printf("The key's randomart image is:\n"); -+ printf("The key's %srandomart image is:\n", fips_on ? "SHA1 " :""); - printf("%s\n", ra); - xfree(ra); - xfree(fp); diff --git a/openssh-5.3p1-gsskex.patch b/openssh-5.3p1-gsskex.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 0ff0d54..0000000 --- a/openssh-5.3p1-gsskex.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,2929 +0,0 @@ -diff -up openssh-5.3p1/auth2.c.gsskex openssh-5.3p1/auth2.c ---- openssh-5.3p1/auth2.c.gsskex 2009-11-20 14:38:55.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-5.3p1/auth2.c 2009-11-20 14:39:04.000000000 +0100 -@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@ extern Authmethod method_passwd; - extern Authmethod method_kbdint; - extern Authmethod method_hostbased; - #ifdef GSSAPI -+extern Authmethod method_gsskeyex; - extern Authmethod method_gssapi; - #endif - #ifdef JPAKE -@@ -79,6 +80,7 @@ Authmethod *authmethods[] = { - &method_none, - &method_pubkey, - #ifdef GSSAPI -+ &method_gsskeyex, - &method_gssapi, - #endif - #ifdef JPAKE -@@ -289,6 +291,7 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32 - #endif - - authctxt->postponed = 0; -+ authctxt->server_caused_failure = 0; - - /* try to authenticate user */ - m = authmethod_lookup(method); -@@ -361,7 +364,8 @@ userauth_finish(Authctxt *authctxt, int - } else { - - /* Allow initial try of "none" auth without failure penalty */ -- if (authctxt->attempt > 1 || strcmp(method, "none") != 0) -+ if (!authctxt->server_caused_failure && -+ (authctxt->attempt > 1 || strcmp(method, "none") != 0)) - authctxt->failures++; - if (authctxt->failures >= options.max_authtries) { - #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS -diff -up openssh-5.3p1/auth2-gss.c.gsskex openssh-5.3p1/auth2-gss.c ---- openssh-5.3p1/auth2-gss.c.gsskex 2009-11-20 14:38:55.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-5.3p1/auth2-gss.c 2009-11-20 14:39:04.000000000 +0100 -@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ - /* $OpenBSD: auth2-gss.c,v 1.16 2007/10/29 00:52:45 dtucker Exp $ */ - - /* -- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. -+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions -@@ -52,6 +52,40 @@ static void input_gssapi_mic(int type, u - static void input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt); - static void input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, void *); - -+/* -+ * The 'gssapi_keyex' userauth mechanism. -+ */ -+static int -+userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt) -+{ -+ int authenticated = 0; -+ Buffer b; -+ gss_buffer_desc mic, gssbuf; -+ u_int len; -+ -+ mic.value = packet_get_string(&len); -+ mic.length = len; -+ -+ packet_check_eom(); -+ -+ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->user, authctxt->service, -+ "gssapi-keyex"); -+ -+ gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b); -+ gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b); -+ -+ /* gss_kex_context is NULL with privsep, so we can't check it here */ -+ if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gss_kex_context, -+ &gssbuf, &mic)))) -+ authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, -+ authctxt->pw)); -+ -+ buffer_free(&b); -+ xfree(mic.value); -+ -+ return (authenticated); -+} -+ - /* - * We only support those mechanisms that we know about (ie ones that we know - * how to check local user kuserok and the like) -@@ -102,6 +136,7 @@ userauth_gssapi(Authctxt *authctxt) - - if (!present) { - xfree(doid); -+ authctxt->server_caused_failure = 1; - return (0); - } - -@@ -109,6 +144,7 @@ userauth_gssapi(Authctxt *authctxt) - if (ctxt != NULL) - ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt); - xfree(doid); -+ authctxt->server_caused_failure = 1; - return (0); - } - -@@ -242,7 +278,8 @@ input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, - - packet_check_eom(); - -- authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user)); -+ authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, -+ authctxt->pw)); - - authctxt->postponed = 0; - dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL); -@@ -284,7 +321,8 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple - gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b); - - if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gssctxt, &gssbuf, &mic)))) -- authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user)); -+ authenticated = -+ PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw)); - else - logit("GSSAPI MIC check failed"); - -@@ -301,6 +339,12 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple - userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, "gssapi-with-mic"); - } - -+Authmethod method_gsskeyex = { -+ "gssapi-keyex", -+ userauth_gsskeyex, -+ &options.gss_authentication -+}; -+ - Authmethod method_gssapi = { - "gssapi-with-mic", - userauth_gssapi, -diff -up openssh-5.3p1/auth.h.gsskex openssh-5.3p1/auth.h ---- openssh-5.3p1/auth.h.gsskex 2009-11-20 14:38:55.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-5.3p1/auth.h 2009-11-20 14:39:04.000000000 +0100 -@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ struct Authctxt { - int valid; /* user exists and is allowed to login */ - int attempt; - int failures; -+ int server_caused_failure; - int force_pwchange; - char *user; /* username sent by the client */ - char *service; -diff -up openssh-5.3p1/auth-krb5.c.gsskex openssh-5.3p1/auth-krb5.c ---- openssh-5.3p1/auth-krb5.c.gsskex 2006-08-05 04:39:39.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-5.3p1/auth-krb5.c 2009-11-20 14:39:04.000000000 +0100 -@@ -166,8 +166,13 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, c - - len = strlen(authctxt->krb5_ticket_file) + 6; - authctxt->krb5_ccname = xmalloc(len); -+#ifdef USE_CCAPI -+ snprintf(authctxt->krb5_ccname, len, "API:%s", -+ authctxt->krb5_ticket_file); -+#else - snprintf(authctxt->krb5_ccname, len, "FILE:%s", - authctxt->krb5_ticket_file); -+#endif - - #ifdef USE_PAM - if (options.use_pam) -@@ -219,15 +224,22 @@ krb5_cleanup_proc(Authctxt *authctxt) - #ifndef HEIMDAL - krb5_error_code - ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache) { -- int tmpfd, ret; -+ int ret; - char ccname[40]; - mode_t old_umask; -+#ifdef USE_CCAPI -+ char cctemplate[] = "API:krb5cc_%d"; -+#else -+ char cctemplate[] = "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX"; -+ int tmpfd; -+#endif - - ret = snprintf(ccname, sizeof(ccname), -- "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX", geteuid()); -+ cctemplate, geteuid()); - if (ret < 0 || (size_t)ret >= sizeof(ccname)) - return ENOMEM; - -+#ifndef USE_CCAPI - old_umask = umask(0177); - tmpfd = mkstemp(ccname + strlen("FILE:")); - umask(old_umask); -@@ -242,6 +254,7 @@ ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context ctx, krb5_c - return errno; - } - close(tmpfd); -+#endif - - return (krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, ccname, ccache)); - } -diff -up /dev/null openssh-5.3p1/ChangeLog.gssapi ---- /dev/null 2009-11-13 11:29:57.672908570 +0100 -+++ openssh-5.3p1/ChangeLog.gssapi 2009-11-20 14:39:04.000000000 +0100 -@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@ -+20090615 -+ - [ gss-genr.c gss-serv.c kexgssc.c kexgsss.c monitor.c sshconnect2.c -+ sshd.c ] -+ Fix issues identified by Greg Hudson following a code review -+ Check return value of gss_indicate_mechs -+ Protect GSSAPI calls in monitor, so they can only be used if enabled -+ Check return values of bignum functions in key exchange -+ Use BN_clear_free to clear other side's DH value -+ Make ssh_gssapi_id_kex more robust -+ Only configure kex table pointers if GSSAPI is enabled -+ Don't leak mechanism list, or gss mechanism list -+ Cast data.length before printing -+ If serverkey isn't provided, use an empty string, rather than NULL -+ -+20090201 -+ - [ gss-genr.c gss-serv.c kex.h kexgssc.c readconf.c readconf.h ssh-gss.h -+ ssh_config.5 sshconnet2.c ] -+ Add support for the GSSAPIClientIdentity option, which allows the user -+ to specify which GSSAPI identity to use to contact a given server -+ -+20080404 -+ - [ gss-serv.c ] -+ Add code to actually implement GSSAPIStrictAcceptCheck, which had somehow -+ been omitted from a previous version of this patch. Reported by Borislav -+ Stoichkov -+ -+20070317 -+ - [ gss-serv-krb5.c ] -+ Remove C99ism, where new_ccname was being declared in the middle of a -+ function -+ -+20061220 -+ - [ servconf.c ] -+ Make default for GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck be Yes, to match previous, and -+ documented, behaviour. Reported by Dan Watson. -+ -+20060910 -+ - [ gss-genr.c kexgssc.c kexgsss.c kex.h monitor.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c -+ ssh-gss.h ] -+ add support for gss-group14-sha1 key exchange mechanisms -+ - [ gss-serv.c servconf.c servconf.h sshd_config sshd_config.5 ] -+ Add GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck option to allow the disabling of -+ acceptor principal checking on multi-homed machines. -+ -+ - [ sshd_config ssh_config ] -+ Add settings for GSSAPIKeyExchange and GSSAPITrustDNS to the sample -+ configuration files -+ - [ kexgss.c kegsss.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c ] -+ Code cleanup. Replace strlen/xmalloc/snprintf sequences with xasprintf() -+ Limit length of error messages displayed by client -+ -+20060909 -+ - [ gss-genr.c gss-serv.c ] -+ move ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred() and ssh_gssapi_server_ctx to be server -+ only, where they belong -+ -+ -+20060829 -+ - [ gss-serv-krb5.c ] -+ Fix CCAPI credentials cache name when creating KRB5CCNAME environment -+ variable -+ -+20060828 -+ - [ gss-genr.c ] -+ Avoid Heimdal context freeing problem -+ -+ -+20060818 -+ - [ gss-genr.c ssh-gss.h sshconnect2.c ] -+ Make sure that SPENGO is disabled -+ -+ -+20060421 -+ - [ gssgenr.c, sshconnect2.c ] -+ a few type changes (signed versus unsigned, int versus size_t) to -+ fix compiler errors/warnings -+ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu) -+ - [ kexgssc.c, sshconnect2.c ] -+ fix uninitialized variable warnings -+ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu) -+ - [ gssgenr.c ] -+ pass oid to gss_display_status (helpful when using GSSAPI mechglue) -+ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu) -+ -+ - [ gss-serv-krb5.c ] -+ #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_KRB5 should be #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_KRB5_H -+ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu) -+ -+ - [ readconf.c, readconf.h, ssh_config.5, sshconnect2.c -+ add client-side GssapiKeyExchange option -+ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu) -+ - [ sshconnect2.c ] -+ add support for GssapiTrustDns option for gssapi-with-mic -+ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu) -+ -diff -up openssh-5.3p1/clientloop.c.gsskex openssh-5.3p1/clientloop.c ---- openssh-5.3p1/clientloop.c.gsskex 2009-08-28 03:21:07.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-5.3p1/clientloop.c 2009-11-20 14:48:53.000000000 +0100 -@@ -111,6 +111,10 @@ - #include "msg.h" - #include "roaming.h" - -+#ifdef GSSAPI -+#include "ssh-gss.h" -+#endif -+ - /* import options */ - extern Options options; - -@@ -1430,6 +1434,13 @@ client_loop(int have_pty, int escape_cha - /* Do channel operations unless rekeying in progress. */ - if (!rekeying) { - channel_after_select(readset, writeset); -+ -+ if (options.gss_renewal_rekey && -+ ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)) { -+ debug("credentials updated - forcing rekey"); -+ need_rekeying = 1; -+ } -+ - if (need_rekeying || packet_need_rekeying()) { - debug("need rekeying"); - xxx_kex->done = 0; -diff -up openssh-5.3p1/configure.ac.gsskex openssh-5.3p1/configure.ac ---- openssh-5.3p1/configure.ac.gsskex 2009-11-20 14:39:02.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-5.3p1/configure.ac 2009-11-20 14:39:04.000000000 +0100 -@@ -477,6 +477,30 @@ main() { if (NSVersionOfRunTimeLibrary(" - [Use tunnel device compatibility to OpenBSD]) - AC_DEFINE(SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF, 1, - [Prepend the address family to IP tunnel traffic]) -+ AC_MSG_CHECKING(if we have the Security Authorization Session API) -+ AC_TRY_COMPILE([#include ], -+ [SessionCreate(0, 0);], -+ [ac_cv_use_security_session_api="yes" -+ AC_DEFINE(USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API, 1, -+ [platform has the Security Authorization Session API]) -+ LIBS="$LIBS -framework Security" -+ AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)], -+ [ac_cv_use_security_session_api="no" -+ AC_MSG_RESULT(no)]) -+ AC_MSG_CHECKING(if we have an in-memory credentials cache) -+ AC_TRY_COMPILE( -+ [#include ], -+ [cc_context_t c; -+ (void) cc_initialize (&c, 0, NULL, NULL);], -+ [AC_DEFINE(USE_CCAPI, 1, -+ [platform uses an in-memory credentials cache]) -+ LIBS="$LIBS -framework Security" -+ AC_MSG_RESULT(yes) -+ if test "x$ac_cv_use_security_session_api" = "xno"; then -+ AC_MSG_ERROR(*** Need a security framework to use the credentials cache API ***) -+ fi], -+ [AC_MSG_RESULT(no)] -+ ) - m4_pattern_allow(AU_IPv) - AC_CHECK_DECL(AU_IPv4, [], - AC_DEFINE(AU_IPv4, 0, [System only supports IPv4 audit records]) -diff -up openssh-5.3p1/gss-genr.c.gsskex openssh-5.3p1/gss-genr.c ---- openssh-5.3p1/gss-genr.c.gsskex 2009-06-22 08:11:07.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-5.3p1/gss-genr.c 2009-11-20 14:39:04.000000000 +0100 -@@ -39,12 +39,167 @@ - #include "buffer.h" - #include "log.h" - #include "ssh2.h" -+#include "cipher.h" -+#include "key.h" -+#include "kex.h" -+#include - - #include "ssh-gss.h" - - extern u_char *session_id2; - extern u_int session_id2_len; - -+typedef struct { -+ char *encoded; -+ gss_OID oid; -+} ssh_gss_kex_mapping; -+ -+/* -+ * XXX - It would be nice to find a more elegant way of handling the -+ * XXX passing of the key exchange context to the userauth routines -+ */ -+ -+Gssctxt *gss_kex_context = NULL; -+ -+static ssh_gss_kex_mapping *gss_enc2oid = NULL; -+ -+int -+ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok() { -+ return (gss_enc2oid != NULL); -+} -+ -+/* -+ * Return a list of the gss-group1-sha1 mechanisms supported by this program -+ * -+ * We test mechanisms to ensure that we can use them, to avoid starting -+ * a key exchange with a bad mechanism -+ */ -+ -+char * -+ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *host, const char *client) { -+ gss_OID_set gss_supported; -+ OM_uint32 min_status; -+ -+ if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &gss_supported))) -+ return NULL; -+ -+ return(ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_supported, ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism, -+ host, client)); -+} -+ -+char * -+ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set gss_supported, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *check, -+ const char *host, const char *client) { -+ Buffer buf; -+ size_t i; -+ int oidpos, enclen; -+ char *mechs, *encoded; -+ u_char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; -+ char deroid[2]; -+ const EVP_MD *evp_md = EVP_md5(); -+ EVP_MD_CTX md; -+ -+ if (gss_enc2oid != NULL) { -+ for (i = 0; gss_enc2oid[i].encoded != NULL; i++) -+ xfree(gss_enc2oid[i].encoded); -+ xfree(gss_enc2oid); -+ } -+ -+ gss_enc2oid = xmalloc(sizeof(ssh_gss_kex_mapping) * -+ (gss_supported->count + 1)); -+ -+ buffer_init(&buf); -+ -+ oidpos = 0; -+ for (i = 0; i < gss_supported->count; i++) { -+ if (gss_supported->elements[i].length < 128 && -+ (*check)(NULL, &(gss_supported->elements[i]), host, client)) { -+ -+ deroid[0] = SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE; -+ deroid[1] = gss_supported->elements[i].length; -+ -+ EVP_DigestInit(&md, evp_md); -+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, deroid, 2); -+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, -+ gss_supported->elements[i].elements, -+ gss_supported->elements[i].length); -+ EVP_DigestFinal(&md, digest, NULL); -+ -+ encoded = xmalloc(EVP_MD_size(evp_md) * 2); -+ enclen = __b64_ntop(digest, EVP_MD_size(evp_md), -+ encoded, EVP_MD_size(evp_md) * 2); -+ -+ if (oidpos != 0) -+ buffer_put_char(&buf, ','); -+ -+ buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID, -+ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID) - 1); -+ buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen); -+ buffer_put_char(&buf, ','); -+ buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID, -+ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID) - 1); -+ buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen); -+ buffer_put_char(&buf, ','); -+ buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID, -+ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID) - 1); -+ buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen); -+ -+ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].oid = &(gss_supported->elements[i]); -+ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].encoded = encoded; -+ oidpos++; -+ } -+ } -+ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].oid = NULL; -+ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].encoded = NULL; -+ -+ buffer_put_char(&buf, '\0'); -+ -+ mechs = xmalloc(buffer_len(&buf)); -+ buffer_get(&buf, mechs, buffer_len(&buf)); -+ buffer_free(&buf); -+ -+ if (strlen(mechs) == 0) { -+ xfree(mechs); -+ mechs = NULL; -+ } -+ -+ return (mechs); -+} -+ -+gss_OID -+ssh_gssapi_id_kex(Gssctxt *ctx, char *name, int kex_type) { -+ int i = 0; -+ -+ switch (kex_type) { -+ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1: -+ if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID)) -+ return GSS_C_NO_OID; -+ name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID) - 1; -+ break; -+ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1: -+ if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID)) -+ return GSS_C_NO_OID; -+ name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID) - 1; -+ break; -+ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1: -+ if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID)) -+ return GSS_C_NO_OID; -+ name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID) - 1; -+ break; -+ default: -+ return GSS_C_NO_OID; -+ } -+ -+ while (gss_enc2oid[i].encoded != NULL && -+ strcmp(name, gss_enc2oid[i].encoded) != 0) -+ i++; -+ -+ if (gss_enc2oid[i].oid != NULL && ctx != NULL) -+ ssh_gssapi_set_oid(ctx, gss_enc2oid[i].oid); -+ -+ return gss_enc2oid[i].oid; -+} -+ - /* Check that the OID in a data stream matches that in the context */ - int - ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *ctx, void *data, size_t len) -@@ -197,7 +352,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(Gssctxt *ctx, int de - } - - ctx->major = gss_init_sec_context(&ctx->minor, -- GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, &ctx->context, ctx->name, ctx->oid, -+ ctx->client_creds, &ctx->context, ctx->name, ctx->oid, - GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG | GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG | deleg_flag, - 0, NULL, recv_tok, NULL, send_tok, flags, NULL); - -@@ -227,8 +382,42 @@ ssh_gssapi_import_name(Gssctxt *ctx, con - } - - OM_uint32 -+ssh_gssapi_client_identity(Gssctxt *ctx, const char *name) -+{ -+ gss_buffer_desc gssbuf; -+ gss_name_t gssname; -+ OM_uint32 status; -+ gss_OID_set oidset; -+ -+ gssbuf.value = (void *) name; -+ gssbuf.length = strlen(gssbuf.value); -+ -+ gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset); -+ gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset); -+ -+ ctx->major = gss_import_name(&ctx->minor, &gssbuf, -+ GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME, &gssname); -+ -+ if (!ctx->major) -+ ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor, -+ gssname, 0, oidset, GSS_C_INITIATE, -+ &ctx->client_creds, NULL, NULL); -+ -+ gss_release_name(&status, &gssname); -+ gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset); -+ -+ if (ctx->major) -+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); -+ -+ return(ctx->major); -+} -+ -+OM_uint32 - ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t buffer, gss_buffer_t hash) - { -+ if (ctx == NULL) -+ return -1; -+ - if ((ctx->major = gss_get_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context, - GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, buffer, hash))) - ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); -@@ -236,6 +425,19 @@ ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer - return (ctx->major); - } - -+/* Priviledged when used by server */ -+OM_uint32 -+ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic) -+{ -+ if (ctx == NULL) -+ return -1; -+ -+ ctx->major = gss_verify_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context, -+ gssbuf, gssmic, NULL); -+ -+ return (ctx->major); -+} -+ - void - ssh_gssapi_buildmic(Buffer *b, const char *user, const char *service, - const char *context) -@@ -249,11 +451,16 @@ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(Buffer *b, const cha - } - - int --ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host) -+ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host, -+ const char *client) - { - gss_buffer_desc token = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; - OM_uint32 major, minor; - gss_OID_desc spnego_oid = {6, (void *)"\x2B\x06\x01\x05\x05\x02"}; -+ Gssctxt *intctx = NULL; -+ -+ if (ctx == NULL) -+ ctx = &intctx; - - /* RFC 4462 says we MUST NOT do SPNEGO */ - if (oid->length == spnego_oid.length && -@@ -263,6 +470,10 @@ ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx - ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(ctx); - ssh_gssapi_set_oid(*ctx, oid); - major = ssh_gssapi_import_name(*ctx, host); -+ -+ if (!GSS_ERROR(major) && client) -+ major = ssh_gssapi_client_identity(*ctx, client); -+ - if (!GSS_ERROR(major)) { - major = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(*ctx, 0, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER, &token, - NULL); -@@ -272,10 +483,67 @@ ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx - GSS_C_NO_BUFFER); - } - -- if (GSS_ERROR(major)) -+ if (GSS_ERROR(major) || intctx != NULL) - ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(ctx); - - return (!GSS_ERROR(major)); - } - -+int -+ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(Gssctxt *ctxt) { -+ static gss_name_t saved_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME; -+ static OM_uint32 saved_lifetime = 0; -+ static gss_OID saved_mech = GSS_C_NO_OID; -+ static gss_name_t name; -+ static OM_uint32 last_call = 0; -+ OM_uint32 lifetime, now, major, minor; -+ int equal; -+ gss_cred_usage_t usage = GSS_C_INITIATE; -+ -+ now = time(NULL); -+ -+ if (ctxt) { -+ debug("Rekey has happened - updating saved versions"); -+ -+ if (saved_name != GSS_C_NO_NAME) -+ gss_release_name(&minor, &saved_name); -+ -+ major = gss_inquire_cred(&minor, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, -+ &saved_name, &saved_lifetime, NULL, NULL); -+ -+ if (!GSS_ERROR(major)) { -+ saved_mech = ctxt->oid; -+ saved_lifetime+= now; -+ } else { -+ /* Handle the error */ -+ } -+ return 0; -+ } -+ -+ if (now - last_call < 10) -+ return 0; -+ -+ last_call = now; -+ -+ if (saved_mech == GSS_C_NO_OID) -+ return 0; -+ -+ major = gss_inquire_cred(&minor, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, -+ &name, &lifetime, NULL, NULL); -+ if (major == GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED) -+ return 0; -+ else if (GSS_ERROR(major)) -+ return 0; -+ -+ major = gss_compare_name(&minor, saved_name, name, &equal); -+ gss_release_name(&minor, &name); -+ if (GSS_ERROR(major)) -+ return 0; -+ -+ if (equal && (saved_lifetime < lifetime + now - 10)) -+ return 1; -+ -+ return 0; -+} -+ - #endif /* GSSAPI */ -diff -up openssh-5.3p1/gss-serv.c.gsskex openssh-5.3p1/gss-serv.c ---- openssh-5.3p1/gss-serv.c.gsskex 2008-05-19 07:05:07.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-5.3p1/gss-serv.c 2009-11-20 14:39:05.000000000 +0100 -@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ - /* $OpenBSD: gss-serv.c,v 1.22 2008/05/08 12:02:23 djm Exp $ */ - - /* -- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. -+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions -@@ -45,15 +45,20 @@ - #include "channels.h" - #include "session.h" - #include "misc.h" -+#include "servconf.h" -+#include "uidswap.h" - - #include "ssh-gss.h" -+#include "monitor_wrap.h" -+ -+extern ServerOptions options; - - static ssh_gssapi_client gssapi_client = - { GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, -- GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL}}; -+ GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, GSS_C_NO_NAME, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL}, 0, 0}; - - ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_null_mech = -- { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}; -+ { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}; - - #ifdef KRB5 - extern ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech; -@@ -81,25 +86,32 @@ ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred(Gssctxt *ctx) - char lname[MAXHOSTNAMELEN]; - gss_OID_set oidset; - -- gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset); -- gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset); -+ if (options.gss_strict_acceptor) { -+ gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset); -+ gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset); -+ -+ if (gethostname(lname, MAXHOSTNAMELEN)) { -+ gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset); -+ return (-1); -+ } - -- if (gethostname(lname, MAXHOSTNAMELEN)) { -- gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset); -- return (-1); -- } -+ if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctx, lname))) { -+ gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset); -+ return (ctx->major); -+ } -+ -+ if ((ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor, -+ ctx->name, 0, oidset, GSS_C_ACCEPT, &ctx->creds, -+ NULL, NULL))) -+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); - -- if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctx, lname))) { - gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset); - return (ctx->major); -+ } else { -+ ctx->name = GSS_C_NO_NAME; -+ ctx->creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL; - } -- -- if ((ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor, -- ctx->name, 0, oidset, GSS_C_ACCEPT, &ctx->creds, NULL, NULL))) -- ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); -- -- gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset); -- return (ctx->major); -+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE; - } - - /* Privileged */ -@@ -114,6 +126,29 @@ ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx, gss - } - - /* Unprivileged */ -+char * -+ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms() { -+ gss_OID_set supported; -+ -+ ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(&supported); -+ return (ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(supported, &ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech, -+ NULL, NULL)); -+} -+ -+/* Unprivileged */ -+int -+ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt **dum, gss_OID oid, const char *data, -+ const char *dummy) { -+ Gssctxt *ctx = NULL; -+ int res; -+ -+ res = !GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctx, oid))); -+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctx); -+ -+ return (res); -+} -+ -+/* Unprivileged */ - void - ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *oidset) - { -@@ -123,7 +158,9 @@ ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *o - gss_OID_set supported; - - gss_create_empty_oid_set(&min_status, oidset); -- gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &supported); -+ -+ if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &supported))) -+ return; - - while (supported_mechs[i]->name != NULL) { - if (GSS_ERROR(gss_test_oid_set_member(&min_status, -@@ -247,8 +284,48 @@ OM_uint32 - ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client) - { - int i = 0; -+ int equal = 0; -+ gss_name_t new_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME; -+ gss_buffer_desc ename = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; -+ -+ if (options.gss_store_rekey && client->used && ctx->client_creds) { -+ if (client->mech->oid.length != ctx->oid->length || -+ (memcmp(client->mech->oid.elements, -+ ctx->oid->elements, ctx->oid->length) !=0)) { -+ debug("Rekeyed credentials have different mechanism"); -+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE; -+ } -+ -+ if ((ctx->major = gss_inquire_cred_by_mech(&ctx->minor, -+ ctx->client_creds, ctx->oid, &new_name, -+ NULL, NULL, NULL))) { -+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); -+ return (ctx->major); -+ } -+ -+ ctx->major = gss_compare_name(&ctx->minor, client->name, -+ new_name, &equal); - -- gss_buffer_desc ename; -+ if (GSS_ERROR(ctx->major)) { -+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); -+ return (ctx->major); -+ } -+ -+ if (!equal) { -+ debug("Rekeyed credentials have different name"); -+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE; -+ } -+ -+ debug("Marking rekeyed credentials for export"); -+ -+ gss_release_name(&ctx->minor, &client->name); -+ gss_release_cred(&ctx->minor, &client->creds); -+ client->name = new_name; -+ client->creds = ctx->client_creds; -+ ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL; -+ client->updated = 1; -+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE; -+ } - - client->mech = NULL; - -@@ -263,6 +340,13 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_g - if (client->mech == NULL) - return GSS_S_FAILURE; - -+ if (ctx->client_creds && -+ (ctx->major = gss_inquire_cred_by_mech(&ctx->minor, -+ ctx->client_creds, ctx->oid, &client->name, NULL, NULL, NULL))) { -+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); -+ return (ctx->major); -+ } -+ - if ((ctx->major = gss_display_name(&ctx->minor, ctx->client, - &client->displayname, NULL))) { - ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); -@@ -280,6 +364,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_g - return (ctx->major); - } - -+ gss_release_buffer(&ctx->minor, &ename); -+ - /* We can't copy this structure, so we just move the pointer to it */ - client->creds = ctx->client_creds; - ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL; -@@ -327,7 +413,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***envp, u_int - - /* Privileged */ - int --ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user) -+ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw) - { - OM_uint32 lmin; - -@@ -337,9 +423,11 @@ ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user) - return 0; - } - if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->userok) -- if ((*gssapi_client.mech->userok)(&gssapi_client, user)) -+ if ((*gssapi_client.mech->userok)(&gssapi_client, user)) { -+ gssapi_client.used = 1; -+ gssapi_client.store.owner = pw; - return 1; -- else { -+ } else { - /* Destroy delegated credentials if userok fails */ - gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.displayname); - gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.exportedname); -@@ -352,14 +440,90 @@ ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user) - return (0); - } - --/* Privileged */ --OM_uint32 --ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic) -+/* These bits are only used for rekeying. The unpriviledged child is running -+ * as the user, the monitor is root. -+ * -+ * In the child, we want to : -+ * *) Ask the monitor to store our credentials into the store we specify -+ * *) If it succeeds, maybe do a PAM update -+ */ -+ -+/* Stuff for PAM */ -+ -+#ifdef USE_PAM -+static int ssh_gssapi_simple_conv(int n, const struct pam_message **msg, -+ struct pam_response **resp, void *data) - { -- ctx->major = gss_verify_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context, -- gssbuf, gssmic, NULL); -+ return (PAM_CONV_ERR); -+} -+#endif - -- return (ctx->major); -+void -+ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds() { -+ int ok; -+ int ret; -+#ifdef USE_PAM -+ pam_handle_t *pamh = NULL; -+ struct pam_conv pamconv = {ssh_gssapi_simple_conv, NULL}; -+ char *envstr; -+#endif -+ -+ if (gssapi_client.store.filename == NULL && -+ gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL && -+ gssapi_client.store.envvar == NULL) -+ return; -+ -+ ok = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&gssapi_client.store)); -+ -+ if (!ok) -+ return; -+ -+ debug("Rekeyed credentials stored successfully"); -+ -+ /* Actually managing to play with the ssh pam stack from here will -+ * be next to impossible. In any case, we may want different options -+ * for rekeying. So, use our own :) -+ */ -+#ifdef USE_PAM -+ if (!use_privsep) { -+ debug("Not even going to try and do PAM with privsep disabled"); -+ return; -+ } -+ -+ ret = pam_start("sshd-rekey", gssapi_client.store.owner->pw_name, -+ &pamconv, &pamh); -+ if (ret) -+ return; -+ -+ xasprintf(&envstr, "%s=%s", gssapi_client.store.envvar, -+ gssapi_client.store.envval); -+ -+ ret = pam_putenv(pamh, envstr); -+ if (!ret) -+ pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_REINITIALIZE_CRED); -+ pam_end(pamh, PAM_SUCCESS); -+#endif -+} -+ -+int -+ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store) { -+ int ok = 0; -+ -+ /* Check we've got credentials to store */ -+ if (!gssapi_client.updated) -+ return 0; -+ -+ gssapi_client.updated = 0; -+ -+ temporarily_use_uid(gssapi_client.store.owner); -+ if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->updatecreds) -+ ok = (*gssapi_client.mech->updatecreds)(store, &gssapi_client); -+ else -+ debug("No update function for this mechanism"); -+ -+ restore_uid(); -+ -+ return ok; - } - - #endif -diff -up openssh-5.3p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.gsskex openssh-5.3p1/gss-serv-krb5.c ---- openssh-5.3p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.gsskex 2006-09-01 07:38:36.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-5.3p1/gss-serv-krb5.c 2009-11-20 14:39:04.000000000 +0100 -@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ - /* $OpenBSD: gss-serv-krb5.c,v 1.7 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */ - - /* -- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. -+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions -@@ -120,6 +120,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl - krb5_principal princ; - OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status; - int len; -+ const char *new_ccname; - - if (client->creds == NULL) { - debug("No credentials stored"); -@@ -168,11 +169,16 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl - return; - } - -- client->store.filename = xstrdup(krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache)); -+ new_ccname = krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache); -+ - client->store.envvar = "KRB5CCNAME"; -- len = strlen(client->store.filename) + 6; -- client->store.envval = xmalloc(len); -- snprintf(client->store.envval, len, "FILE:%s", client->store.filename); -+#ifdef USE_CCAPI -+ xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "API:%s", new_ccname); -+ client->store.filename = NULL; -+#else -+ xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "FILE:%s", new_ccname); -+ client->store.filename = xstrdup(new_ccname); -+#endif - - #ifdef USE_PAM - if (options.use_pam) -@@ -184,6 +190,71 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl - return; - } - -+int -+ssh_gssapi_krb5_updatecreds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store, -+ ssh_gssapi_client *client) -+{ -+ krb5_ccache ccache = NULL; -+ krb5_principal principal = NULL; -+ char *name = NULL; -+ krb5_error_code problem; -+ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status; -+ -+ if ((problem = krb5_cc_resolve(krb_context, store->envval, &ccache))) { -+ logit("krb5_cc_resolve(): %.100s", -+ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem)); -+ return 0; -+ } -+ -+ /* Find out who the principal in this cache is */ -+ if ((problem = krb5_cc_get_principal(krb_context, ccache, -+ &principal))) { -+ logit("krb5_cc_get_principal(): %.100s", -+ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem)); -+ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache); -+ return 0; -+ } -+ -+ if ((problem = krb5_unparse_name(krb_context, principal, &name))) { -+ logit("krb5_unparse_name(): %.100s", -+ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem)); -+ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal); -+ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache); -+ return 0; -+ } -+ -+ -+ if (strcmp(name,client->exportedname.value)!=0) { -+ debug("Name in local credentials cache differs. Not storing"); -+ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal); -+ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache); -+ krb5_free_unparsed_name(krb_context, name); -+ return 0; -+ } -+ krb5_free_unparsed_name(krb_context, name); -+ -+ /* Name matches, so lets get on with it! */ -+ -+ if ((problem = krb5_cc_initialize(krb_context, ccache, principal))) { -+ logit("krb5_cc_initialize(): %.100s", -+ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem)); -+ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal); -+ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache); -+ return 0; -+ } -+ -+ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal); -+ -+ if ((maj_status = gss_krb5_copy_ccache(&min_status, client->creds, -+ ccache))) { -+ logit("gss_krb5_copy_ccache() failed. Sorry!"); -+ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache); -+ return 0; -+ } -+ -+ return 1; -+} -+ - ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech = { - "toWM5Slw5Ew8Mqkay+al2g==", - "Kerberos", -@@ -191,7 +262,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech = { - NULL, - &ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok, - NULL, -- &ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds -+ &ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds, -+ &ssh_gssapi_krb5_updatecreds - }; - - #endif /* KRB5 */ -diff -up openssh-5.3p1/kex.c.gsskex openssh-5.3p1/kex.c ---- openssh-5.3p1/kex.c.gsskex 2009-06-21 10:15:25.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-5.3p1/kex.c 2009-11-20 14:50:11.000000000 +0100 -@@ -49,6 +49,10 @@ - #include "dispatch.h" - #include "monitor.h" - -+#ifdef GSSAPI -+#include "ssh-gss.h" -+#endif -+ - #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L - # if defined(HAVE_EVP_SHA256) - # define evp_ssh_sha256 EVP_sha256 -@@ -325,6 +329,20 @@ choose_kex(Kex *k, char *client, char *s - k->kex_type = KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256; - k->evp_md = evp_ssh_sha256(); - #endif -+#ifdef GSSAPI -+ } else if (strncmp(k->name, KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID, -+ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID) - 1) == 0) { -+ k->kex_type = KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1; -+ k->evp_md = EVP_sha1(); -+ } else if (strncmp(k->name, KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID, -+ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID) - 1) == 0) { -+ k->kex_type = KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1; -+ k->evp_md = EVP_sha1(); -+ } else if (strncmp(k->name, KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID, -+ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID) - 1) == 0) { -+ k->kex_type = KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1; -+ k->evp_md = EVP_sha1(); -+#endif - } else - fatal("bad kex alg %s", k->name); - } -diff -up /dev/null openssh-5.3p1/kexgssc.c ---- /dev/null 2009-11-13 11:29:57.672908570 +0100 -+++ openssh-5.3p1/kexgssc.c 2009-11-20 14:39:05.000000000 +0100 -@@ -0,0 +1,334 @@ -+/* -+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. -+ * -+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without -+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions -+ * are met: -+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. -+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the -+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. -+ * -+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR -+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES -+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. -+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, -+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT -+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, -+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY -+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT -+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF -+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. -+ */ -+ -+#include "includes.h" -+ -+#ifdef GSSAPI -+ -+#include "includes.h" -+ -+#include -+#include -+ -+#include -+ -+#include "xmalloc.h" -+#include "buffer.h" -+#include "ssh2.h" -+#include "key.h" -+#include "cipher.h" -+#include "kex.h" -+#include "log.h" -+#include "packet.h" -+#include "dh.h" -+ -+#include "ssh-gss.h" -+ -+void -+kexgss_client(Kex *kex) { -+ gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; -+ gss_buffer_desc recv_tok, gssbuf, msg_tok, *token_ptr; -+ Gssctxt *ctxt; -+ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status, ret_flags; -+ u_int klen, kout, slen = 0, hashlen, strlen; -+ DH *dh; -+ BIGNUM *dh_server_pub = NULL; -+ BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL; -+ BIGNUM *p = NULL; -+ BIGNUM *g = NULL; -+ u_char *kbuf, *hash; -+ u_char *serverhostkey = NULL; -+ u_char *empty = ""; -+ char *msg; -+ char *lang; -+ int type = 0; -+ int first = 1; -+ int nbits = 0, min = DH_GRP_MIN, max = DH_GRP_MAX; -+ -+ /* Initialise our GSSAPI world */ -+ ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(&ctxt); -+ if (ssh_gssapi_id_kex(ctxt, kex->name, kex->kex_type) -+ == GSS_C_NO_OID) -+ fatal("Couldn't identify host exchange"); -+ -+ if (ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctxt, kex->gss_host)) -+ fatal("Couldn't import hostname"); -+ -+ if (kex->gss_client && -+ ssh_gssapi_client_identity(ctxt, kex->gss_client)) -+ fatal("Couldn't acquire client credentials"); -+ -+ switch (kex->kex_type) { -+ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1: -+ dh = dh_new_group1(); -+ break; -+ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1: -+ dh = dh_new_group14(); -+ break; -+ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1: -+ debug("Doing group exchange\n"); -+ nbits = dh_estimate(kex->we_need * 8); -+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ); -+ packet_put_int(min); -+ packet_put_int(nbits); -+ packet_put_int(max); -+ -+ packet_send(); -+ -+ packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP); -+ -+ if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL) -+ fatal("BN_new() failed"); -+ packet_get_bignum2(p); -+ if ((g = BN_new()) == NULL) -+ fatal("BN_new() failed"); -+ packet_get_bignum2(g); -+ packet_check_eom(); -+ -+ if (BN_num_bits(p) < min || BN_num_bits(p) > max) -+ fatal("GSSGRP_GEX group out of range: %d !< %d !< %d", -+ min, BN_num_bits(p), max); -+ -+ dh = dh_new_group(g, p); -+ break; -+ default: -+ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type); -+ } -+ -+ /* Step 1 - e is dh->pub_key */ -+ dh_gen_key(dh, kex->we_need * 8); -+ -+ /* This is f, we initialise it now to make life easier */ -+ dh_server_pub = BN_new(); -+ if (dh_server_pub == NULL) -+ fatal("dh_server_pub == NULL"); -+ -+ token_ptr = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER; -+ -+ do { -+ debug("Calling gss_init_sec_context"); -+ -+ maj_status = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(ctxt, -+ kex->gss_deleg_creds, token_ptr, &send_tok, -+ &ret_flags); -+ -+ if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) { -+ if (send_tok.length != 0) { -+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE); -+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, -+ send_tok.length); -+ } -+ fatal("gss_init_context failed"); -+ } -+ -+ /* If we've got an old receive buffer get rid of it */ -+ if (token_ptr != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER) -+ xfree(recv_tok.value); -+ -+ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) { -+ /* If mutual state flag is not true, kex fails */ -+ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG)) -+ fatal("Mutual authentication failed"); -+ -+ /* If integ avail flag is not true kex fails */ -+ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG)) -+ fatal("Integrity check failed"); -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * If we have data to send, then the last message that we -+ * received cannot have been a 'complete'. -+ */ -+ if (send_tok.length != 0) { -+ if (first) { -+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT); -+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, -+ send_tok.length); -+ packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key); -+ first = 0; -+ } else { -+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE); -+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, -+ send_tok.length); -+ } -+ packet_send(); -+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok); -+ -+ /* If we've sent them data, they should reply */ -+ do { -+ type = packet_read(); -+ if (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY) { -+ debug("Received KEXGSS_HOSTKEY"); -+ if (serverhostkey) -+ fatal("Server host key received more than once"); -+ serverhostkey = -+ packet_get_string(&slen); -+ } -+ } while (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY); -+ -+ switch (type) { -+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE: -+ debug("Received GSSAPI_CONTINUE"); -+ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) -+ fatal("GSSAPI Continue received from server when complete"); -+ recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&strlen); -+ recv_tok.length = strlen; -+ break; -+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE: -+ debug("Received GSSAPI_COMPLETE"); -+ packet_get_bignum2(dh_server_pub); -+ msg_tok.value = packet_get_string(&strlen); -+ msg_tok.length = strlen; -+ -+ /* Is there a token included? */ -+ if (packet_get_char()) { -+ recv_tok.value= -+ packet_get_string(&strlen); -+ recv_tok.length = strlen; -+ /* If we're already complete - protocol error */ -+ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) -+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: received token when complete"); -+ } else { -+ /* No token included */ -+ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE) -+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: did not receive final token"); -+ } -+ break; -+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR: -+ debug("Received Error"); -+ maj_status = packet_get_int(); -+ min_status = packet_get_int(); -+ msg = packet_get_string(NULL); -+ lang = packet_get_string(NULL); -+ fatal("GSSAPI Error: \n%.400s",msg); -+ default: -+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d", -+ type); -+ } -+ token_ptr = &recv_tok; -+ } else { -+ /* No data, and not complete */ -+ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE) -+ fatal("Not complete, and no token output"); -+ } -+ } while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED); -+ -+ /* -+ * We _must_ have received a COMPLETE message in reply from the -+ * server, which will have set dh_server_pub and msg_tok -+ */ -+ -+ if (type != SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE) -+ fatal("Didn't receive a SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE when I expected it"); -+ -+ /* Check f in range [1, p-1] */ -+ if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh_server_pub)) -+ packet_disconnect("bad server public DH value"); -+ -+ /* compute K=f^x mod p */ -+ klen = DH_size(dh); -+ kbuf = xmalloc(klen); -+ kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_server_pub, dh); -+ if (kout < 0) -+ fatal("DH_compute_key: failed"); -+ -+ shared_secret = BN_new(); -+ if (shared_secret == NULL) -+ fatal("kexgss_client: BN_new failed"); -+ -+ if (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL) -+ fatal("kexdh_client: BN_bin2bn failed"); -+ -+ memset(kbuf, 0, klen); -+ xfree(kbuf); -+ -+ switch (kex->kex_type) { -+ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1: -+ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1: -+ kex_dh_hash( kex->client_version_string, -+ kex->server_version_string, -+ buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my), -+ buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer), -+ (serverhostkey ? serverhostkey : empty), slen, -+ dh->pub_key, /* e */ -+ dh_server_pub, /* f */ -+ shared_secret, /* K */ -+ &hash, &hashlen -+ ); -+ break; -+ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1: -+ kexgex_hash( -+ kex->evp_md, -+ kex->client_version_string, -+ kex->server_version_string, -+ buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my), -+ buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer), -+ (serverhostkey ? serverhostkey : empty), slen, -+ min, nbits, max, -+ dh->p, dh->g, -+ dh->pub_key, -+ dh_server_pub, -+ shared_secret, -+ &hash, &hashlen -+ ); -+ break; -+ default: -+ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type); -+ } -+ -+ gssbuf.value = hash; -+ gssbuf.length = hashlen; -+ -+ /* Verify that the hash matches the MIC we just got. */ -+ if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(ctxt, &gssbuf, &msg_tok))) -+ packet_disconnect("Hash's MIC didn't verify"); -+ -+ xfree(msg_tok.value); -+ -+ DH_free(dh); -+ if (serverhostkey) -+ xfree(serverhostkey); -+ BN_clear_free(dh_server_pub); -+ -+ /* save session id */ -+ if (kex->session_id == NULL) { -+ kex->session_id_len = hashlen; -+ kex->session_id = xmalloc(kex->session_id_len); -+ memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len); -+ } -+ -+ if (kex->gss_deleg_creds) -+ ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(ctxt); -+ -+ if (gss_kex_context == NULL) -+ gss_kex_context = ctxt; -+ else -+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt); -+ -+ kex_derive_keys(kex, hash, hashlen, shared_secret); -+ BN_clear_free(shared_secret); -+ kex_finish(kex); -+} -+ -+#endif /* GSSAPI */ -diff -up /dev/null openssh-5.3p1/kexgsss.c ---- /dev/null 2009-11-13 11:29:57.672908570 +0100 -+++ openssh-5.3p1/kexgsss.c 2009-11-20 14:39:05.000000000 +0100 -@@ -0,0 +1,288 @@ -+/* -+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. -+ * -+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without -+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions -+ * are met: -+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. -+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the -+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. -+ * -+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR -+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES -+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. -+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, -+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT -+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, -+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY -+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT -+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF -+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. -+ */ -+ -+#include "includes.h" -+ -+#ifdef GSSAPI -+ -+#include -+ -+#include -+#include -+ -+#include "xmalloc.h" -+#include "buffer.h" -+#include "ssh2.h" -+#include "key.h" -+#include "cipher.h" -+#include "kex.h" -+#include "log.h" -+#include "packet.h" -+#include "dh.h" -+#include "ssh-gss.h" -+#include "monitor_wrap.h" -+#include "servconf.h" -+ -+extern ServerOptions options; -+ -+void -+kexgss_server(Kex *kex) -+{ -+ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status; -+ -+ /* -+ * Some GSSAPI implementations use the input value of ret_flags (an -+ * output variable) as a means of triggering mechanism specific -+ * features. Initializing it to zero avoids inadvertently -+ * activating this non-standard behaviour. -+ */ -+ -+ OM_uint32 ret_flags = 0; -+ gss_buffer_desc gssbuf, recv_tok, msg_tok; -+ gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; -+ Gssctxt *ctxt = NULL; -+ u_int slen, klen, kout, hashlen; -+ u_char *kbuf, *hash; -+ DH *dh; -+ int min = -1, max = -1, nbits = -1; -+ BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL; -+ BIGNUM *dh_client_pub = NULL; -+ int type = 0; -+ gss_OID oid; -+ char *mechs; -+ -+ /* Initialise GSSAPI */ -+ -+ /* If we're rekeying, privsep means that some of the private structures -+ * in the GSSAPI code are no longer available. This kludges them back -+ * into life -+ */ -+ if (!ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok()) -+ if ((mechs = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms())) -+ xfree(mechs); -+ -+ debug2("%s: Identifying %s", __func__, kex->name); -+ oid = ssh_gssapi_id_kex(NULL, kex->name, kex->kex_type); -+ if (oid == GSS_C_NO_OID) -+ fatal("Unknown gssapi mechanism"); -+ -+ debug2("%s: Acquiring credentials", __func__); -+ -+ if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctxt, oid)))) -+ fatal("Unable to acquire credentials for the server"); -+ -+ switch (kex->kex_type) { -+ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1: -+ dh = dh_new_group1(); -+ break; -+ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1: -+ dh = dh_new_group14(); -+ break; -+ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1: -+ debug("Doing group exchange"); -+ packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ); -+ min = packet_get_int(); -+ nbits = packet_get_int(); -+ max = packet_get_int(); -+ min = MAX(DH_GRP_MIN, min); -+ max = MIN(DH_GRP_MAX, max); -+ packet_check_eom(); -+ if (max < min || nbits < min || max < nbits) -+ fatal("GSS_GEX, bad parameters: %d !< %d !< %d", -+ min, nbits, max); -+ dh = PRIVSEP(choose_dh(min, nbits, max)); -+ if (dh == NULL) -+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: no matching group found"); -+ -+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP); -+ packet_put_bignum2(dh->p); -+ packet_put_bignum2(dh->g); -+ packet_send(); -+ -+ packet_write_wait(); -+ break; -+ default: -+ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type); -+ } -+ -+ dh_gen_key(dh, kex->we_need * 8); -+ -+ do { -+ debug("Wait SSH2_MSG_GSSAPI_INIT"); -+ type = packet_read(); -+ switch(type) { -+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT: -+ if (dh_client_pub != NULL) -+ fatal("Received KEXGSS_INIT after initialising"); -+ recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&slen); -+ recv_tok.length = slen; -+ -+ if ((dh_client_pub = BN_new()) == NULL) -+ fatal("dh_client_pub == NULL"); -+ -+ packet_get_bignum2(dh_client_pub); -+ -+ /* Send SSH_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY here, if we want */ -+ break; -+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE: -+ recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&slen); -+ recv_tok.length = slen; -+ break; -+ default: -+ packet_disconnect( -+ "Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d", -+ type); -+ } -+ -+ maj_status = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(ctxt, &recv_tok, -+ &send_tok, &ret_flags)); -+ -+ xfree(recv_tok.value); -+ -+ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE && send_tok.length == 0) -+ fatal("Zero length token output when incomplete"); -+ -+ if (dh_client_pub == NULL) -+ fatal("No client public key"); -+ -+ if (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) { -+ debug("Sending GSSAPI_CONTINUE"); -+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE); -+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length); -+ packet_send(); -+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok); -+ } -+ } while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED); -+ -+ if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) { -+ if (send_tok.length > 0) { -+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE); -+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length); -+ packet_send(); -+ } -+ fatal("accept_ctx died"); -+ } -+ -+ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG)) -+ fatal("Mutual Authentication flag wasn't set"); -+ -+ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG)) -+ fatal("Integrity flag wasn't set"); -+ -+ if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh_client_pub)) -+ packet_disconnect("bad client public DH value"); -+ -+ klen = DH_size(dh); -+ kbuf = xmalloc(klen); -+ kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_client_pub, dh); -+ if (kout < 0) -+ fatal("DH_compute_key: failed"); -+ -+ shared_secret = BN_new(); -+ if (shared_secret == NULL) -+ fatal("kexgss_server: BN_new failed"); -+ -+ if (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL) -+ fatal("kexgss_server: BN_bin2bn failed"); -+ -+ memset(kbuf, 0, klen); -+ xfree(kbuf); -+ -+ switch (kex->kex_type) { -+ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1: -+ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1: -+ kex_dh_hash( -+ kex->client_version_string, kex->server_version_string, -+ buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer), -+ buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my), -+ NULL, 0, /* Change this if we start sending host keys */ -+ dh_client_pub, dh->pub_key, shared_secret, -+ &hash, &hashlen -+ ); -+ break; -+ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1: -+ kexgex_hash( -+ kex->evp_md, -+ kex->client_version_string, kex->server_version_string, -+ buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer), -+ buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my), -+ NULL, 0, -+ min, nbits, max, -+ dh->p, dh->g, -+ dh_client_pub, -+ dh->pub_key, -+ shared_secret, -+ &hash, &hashlen -+ ); -+ break; -+ default: -+ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type); -+ } -+ -+ BN_clear_free(dh_client_pub); -+ -+ if (kex->session_id == NULL) { -+ kex->session_id_len = hashlen; -+ kex->session_id = xmalloc(kex->session_id_len); -+ memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len); -+ } -+ -+ gssbuf.value = hash; -+ gssbuf.length = hashlen; -+ -+ if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_sign(ctxt,&gssbuf,&msg_tok)))) -+ fatal("Couldn't get MIC"); -+ -+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE); -+ packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key); -+ packet_put_string(msg_tok.value,msg_tok.length); -+ -+ if (send_tok.length != 0) { -+ packet_put_char(1); /* true */ -+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length); -+ } else { -+ packet_put_char(0); /* false */ -+ } -+ packet_send(); -+ -+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok); -+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &msg_tok); -+ -+ if (gss_kex_context == NULL) -+ gss_kex_context = ctxt; -+ else -+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt); -+ -+ DH_free(dh); -+ -+ kex_derive_keys(kex, hash, hashlen, shared_secret); -+ BN_clear_free(shared_secret); -+ kex_finish(kex); -+ -+ /* If this was a rekey, then save out any delegated credentials we -+ * just exchanged. */ -+ if (options.gss_store_rekey) -+ ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds(); -+} -+#endif /* GSSAPI */ -diff -up openssh-5.3p1/kex.h.gsskex openssh-5.3p1/kex.h ---- openssh-5.3p1/kex.h.gsskex 2009-06-21 10:15:25.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-5.3p1/kex.h 2009-11-20 14:39:05.000000000 +0100 -@@ -66,6 +66,9 @@ enum kex_exchange { - KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1, - KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1, - KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256, -+ KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1, -+ KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1, -+ KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1, - KEX_MAX - }; - -@@ -121,6 +124,12 @@ struct Kex { - sig_atomic_t done; - int flags; - const EVP_MD *evp_md; -+#ifdef GSSAPI -+ int gss_deleg_creds; -+ int gss_trust_dns; -+ char *gss_host; -+ char *gss_client; -+#endif - char *client_version_string; - char *server_version_string; - int (*verify_host_key)(Key *); -@@ -143,6 +152,11 @@ void kexdh_server(Kex *); - void kexgex_client(Kex *); - void kexgex_server(Kex *); - -+#ifdef GSSAPI -+void kexgss_client(Kex *); -+void kexgss_server(Kex *); -+#endif -+ - void - kex_dh_hash(char *, char *, char *, int, char *, int, u_char *, int, - BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, u_char **, u_int *); -diff -up openssh-5.3p1/key.c.gsskex openssh-5.3p1/key.c ---- openssh-5.3p1/key.c.gsskex 2009-11-20 14:38:59.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-5.3p1/key.c 2009-11-20 14:39:05.000000000 +0100 -@@ -825,6 +825,8 @@ key_type_from_name(char *name) - return KEY_RSA; - } else if (strcmp(name, "ssh-dss") == 0) { - return KEY_DSA; -+ } else if (strcmp(name, "null") == 0) { -+ return KEY_NULL; - } - debug2("key_type_from_name: unknown key type '%s'", name); - return KEY_UNSPEC; -diff -up openssh-5.3p1/key.h.gsskex openssh-5.3p1/key.h ---- openssh-5.3p1/key.h.gsskex 2009-11-20 14:38:59.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-5.3p1/key.h 2009-11-20 14:50:59.000000000 +0100 -@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ enum types { - KEY_RSA, - KEY_DSA, - KEY_NSS, -+ KEY_NULL, - KEY_UNSPEC - }; - enum fp_type { -diff -up openssh-5.3p1/Makefile.in.gsskex openssh-5.3p1/Makefile.in ---- openssh-5.3p1/Makefile.in.gsskex 2009-11-20 14:39:02.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-5.3p1/Makefile.in 2009-11-20 15:06:44.000000000 +0100 -@@ -71,7 +71,8 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=acss.o authfd.o authfile.o b - atomicio.o key.o dispatch.o kex.o mac.o uidswap.o uuencode.o misc.o \ - monitor_fdpass.o rijndael.o ssh-dss.o ssh-rsa.o dh.o kexdh.o \ - kexgex.o kexdhc.o kexgexc.o scard.o msg.o progressmeter.o dns.o \ -- entropy.o scard-opensc.o gss-genr.o umac.o jpake.o schnorr.o nsskeys.o -+ entropy.o scard-opensc.o gss-genr.o umac.o jpake.o schnorr.o nsskeys.o \ -+ kexgssc.o - - SSHOBJS= ssh.o readconf.o clientloop.o sshtty.o \ - sshconnect.o sshconnect1.o sshconnect2.o mux.o \ -@@ -85,7 +86,7 @@ SSHDOBJS=sshd.o auth-rhosts.o auth-passw - auth2-none.o auth2-passwd.o auth2-pubkey.o auth2-jpake.o \ - monitor_mm.o monitor.o monitor_wrap.o kexdhs.o kexgexs.o \ - auth-krb5.o \ -- auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o \ -+ auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o kexgsss.o\ - loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o md5crypt.o \ - audit.o audit-bsm.o platform.o sftp-server.o sftp-common.o \ - roaming_common.o -diff -up openssh-5.3p1/monitor.c.gsskex openssh-5.3p1/monitor.c ---- openssh-5.3p1/monitor.c.gsskex 2009-11-20 14:38:55.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-5.3p1/monitor.c 2009-11-20 14:39:05.000000000 +0100 -@@ -175,6 +175,8 @@ int mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int, Buffer - int mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int, Buffer *); - int mm_answer_gss_userok(int, Buffer *); - int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int, Buffer *); -+int mm_answer_gss_sign(int, Buffer *); -+int mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(int, Buffer *); - #endif - - #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS -@@ -247,6 +249,7 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] - {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx}, - {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_gss_userok}, - {MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_checkmic}, -+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_gss_sign}, - #endif - #ifdef JPAKE - {MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_GET_PWDATA, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_jpake_get_pwdata}, -@@ -259,6 +262,12 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] - }; - - struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = { -+#ifdef GSSAPI -+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 0, mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx}, -+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx}, -+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, 0, mm_answer_gss_sign}, -+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, 0, mm_answer_gss_updatecreds}, -+#endif - {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 0, mm_answer_moduli}, - {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 0, mm_answer_sign}, - {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 0, mm_answer_pty}, -@@ -363,6 +372,10 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctx - /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */ - monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1); - monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1); -+#ifdef GSSAPI -+ /* and for the GSSAPI key exchange */ -+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 1); -+#endif - } else { - mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto15; - -@@ -449,6 +462,10 @@ monitor_child_postauth(struct monitor *p - monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1); - monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1); - monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1); -+#ifdef GSSAPI -+ /* and for the GSSAPI key exchange */ -+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 1); -+#endif - } else { - mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth15; - monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1); -@@ -1738,6 +1755,13 @@ mm_get_kex(Buffer *m) - kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_server; - kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server; - kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server; -+#ifdef GSSAPI -+ if (options.gss_keyex) { -+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server; -+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_server; -+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_server; -+ } -+#endif - kex->server = 1; - kex->hostkey_type = buffer_get_int(m); - kex->kex_type = buffer_get_int(m); -@@ -1943,6 +1967,9 @@ mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int sock, Buffer - OM_uint32 major; - u_int len; - -+ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex) -+ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled"); -+ - goid.elements = buffer_get_string(m, &len); - goid.length = len; - -@@ -1970,6 +1997,9 @@ mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int sock, Buffe - OM_uint32 flags = 0; /* GSI needs this */ - u_int len; - -+ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex) -+ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled"); -+ - in.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len); - in.length = len; - major = ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gsscontext, &in, &out, &flags); -@@ -1987,6 +2017,7 @@ mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int sock, Buffe - monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0); - monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1); - monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, 1); -+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, 1); - } - return (0); - } -@@ -1998,6 +2029,9 @@ mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int sock, Buffer - OM_uint32 ret; - u_int len; - -+ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex) -+ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled"); -+ - gssbuf.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len); - gssbuf.length = len; - mic.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len); -@@ -2024,7 +2058,11 @@ mm_answer_gss_userok(int sock, Buffer *m - { - int authenticated; - -- authenticated = authctxt->valid && ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user); -+ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex) -+ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled"); -+ -+ authenticated = authctxt->valid && -+ ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw); - - buffer_clear(m); - buffer_put_int(m, authenticated); -@@ -2037,6 +2075,74 @@ mm_answer_gss_userok(int sock, Buffer *m - /* Monitor loop will terminate if authenticated */ - return (authenticated); - } -+ -+int -+mm_answer_gss_sign(int socket, Buffer *m) -+{ -+ gss_buffer_desc data; -+ gss_buffer_desc hash = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; -+ OM_uint32 major, minor; -+ u_int len; -+ -+ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex) -+ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled"); -+ -+ data.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len); -+ data.length = len; -+ if (data.length != 20) -+ fatal("%s: data length incorrect: %d", __func__, -+ (int) data.length); -+ -+ /* Save the session ID on the first time around */ -+ if (session_id2_len == 0) { -+ session_id2_len = data.length; -+ session_id2 = xmalloc(session_id2_len); -+ memcpy(session_id2, data.value, session_id2_len); -+ } -+ major = ssh_gssapi_sign(gsscontext, &data, &hash); -+ -+ xfree(data.value); -+ -+ buffer_clear(m); -+ buffer_put_int(m, major); -+ buffer_put_string(m, hash.value, hash.length); -+ -+ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, m); -+ -+ gss_release_buffer(&minor, &hash); -+ -+ /* Turn on getpwnam permissions */ -+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1); -+ -+ /* And credential updating, for when rekeying */ -+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, 1); -+ -+ return (0); -+} -+ -+int -+mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(int socket, Buffer *m) { -+ ssh_gssapi_ccache store; -+ int ok; -+ -+ store.filename = buffer_get_string(m, NULL); -+ store.envvar = buffer_get_string(m, NULL); -+ store.envval = buffer_get_string(m, NULL); -+ -+ ok = ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&store); -+ -+ xfree(store.filename); -+ xfree(store.envvar); -+ xfree(store.envval); -+ -+ buffer_clear(m); -+ buffer_put_int(m, ok); -+ -+ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS, m); -+ -+ return(0); -+} -+ - #endif /* GSSAPI */ - - #ifdef JPAKE -diff -up openssh-5.3p1/monitor.h.gsskex openssh-5.3p1/monitor.h ---- openssh-5.3p1/monitor.h.gsskex 2009-11-20 14:38:55.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-5.3p1/monitor.h 2009-11-20 14:39:05.000000000 +0100 -@@ -56,6 +56,8 @@ enum monitor_reqtype { - MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSTEP, - MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUSEROK, - MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC, -+ MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, -+ MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS, - MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START, - MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT, - MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX, -diff -up openssh-5.3p1/monitor_wrap.c.gsskex openssh-5.3p1/monitor_wrap.c ---- openssh-5.3p1/monitor_wrap.c.gsskex 2009-11-20 14:38:55.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-5.3p1/monitor_wrap.c 2009-11-20 14:39:05.000000000 +0100 -@@ -1267,7 +1267,7 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss - } - - int --mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user) -+mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw) - { - Buffer m; - int authenticated = 0; -@@ -1284,6 +1284,51 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user) - debug3("%s: user %sauthenticated",__func__, authenticated ? "" : "not "); - return (authenticated); - } -+ -+OM_uint32 -+mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_desc *data, gss_buffer_desc *hash) -+{ -+ Buffer m; -+ OM_uint32 major; -+ u_int len; -+ -+ buffer_init(&m); -+ buffer_put_string(&m, data->value, data->length); -+ -+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, &m); -+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, &m); -+ -+ major = buffer_get_int(&m); -+ hash->value = buffer_get_string(&m, &len); -+ hash->length = len; -+ -+ buffer_free(&m); -+ -+ return(major); -+} -+ -+int -+mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store) -+{ -+ Buffer m; -+ int ok; -+ -+ buffer_init(&m); -+ -+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->filename ? store->filename : ""); -+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->envvar ? store->envvar : ""); -+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->envval ? store->envval : ""); -+ -+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, &m); -+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS, &m); -+ -+ ok = buffer_get_int(&m); -+ -+ buffer_free(&m); -+ -+ return (ok); -+} -+ - #endif /* GSSAPI */ - - #ifdef JPAKE -diff -up openssh-5.3p1/monitor_wrap.h.gsskex openssh-5.3p1/monitor_wrap.h ---- openssh-5.3p1/monitor_wrap.h.gsskex 2009-11-20 14:38:55.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-5.3p1/monitor_wrap.h 2009-11-20 14:39:05.000000000 +0100 -@@ -60,8 +60,10 @@ BIGNUM *mm_auth_rsa_generate_challenge(K - OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID); - OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *, - gss_buffer_desc *, gss_buffer_desc *, OM_uint32 *); --int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user); -+int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *); - OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t); -+OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t); -+int mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *); - #endif - - #ifdef USE_PAM -diff -up openssh-5.3p1/readconf.c.gsskex openssh-5.3p1/readconf.c ---- openssh-5.3p1/readconf.c.gsskex 2009-11-20 14:38:59.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-5.3p1/readconf.c 2009-11-20 14:39:06.000000000 +0100 -@@ -128,6 +128,7 @@ typedef enum { - oClearAllForwardings, oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost, - oEnableSSHKeysign, oRekeyLimit, oVerifyHostKeyDNS, oConnectTimeout, - oAddressFamily, oGssAuthentication, oGssDelegateCreds, -+ oGssTrustDns, oGssKeyEx, oGssClientIdentity, oGssRenewalRekey, - oServerAliveInterval, oServerAliveCountMax, oIdentitiesOnly, - oSendEnv, oControlPath, oControlMaster, oHashKnownHosts, - oTunnel, oTunnelDevice, oLocalCommand, oPermitLocalCommand, -@@ -165,10 +166,18 @@ static struct { - { "afstokenpassing", oUnsupported }, - #if defined(GSSAPI) - { "gssapiauthentication", oGssAuthentication }, -+ { "gssapikeyexchange", oGssKeyEx }, - { "gssapidelegatecredentials", oGssDelegateCreds }, -+ { "gssapitrustdns", oGssTrustDns }, -+ { "gssapiclientidentity", oGssClientIdentity }, -+ { "gssapirenewalforcesrekey", oGssRenewalRekey }, - #else - { "gssapiauthentication", oUnsupported }, -+ { "gssapikeyexchange", oUnsupported }, - { "gssapidelegatecredentials", oUnsupported }, -+ { "gssapitrustdns", oUnsupported }, -+ { "gssapiclientidentity", oUnsupported }, -+ { "gssapirenewalforcesrekey", oUnsupported }, - #endif - { "fallbacktorsh", oDeprecated }, - { "usersh", oDeprecated }, -@@ -462,10 +471,26 @@ parse_flag: - intptr = &options->gss_authentication; - goto parse_flag; - -+ case oGssKeyEx: -+ intptr = &options->gss_keyex; -+ goto parse_flag; -+ - case oGssDelegateCreds: - intptr = &options->gss_deleg_creds; - goto parse_flag; - -+ case oGssTrustDns: -+ intptr = &options->gss_trust_dns; -+ goto parse_flag; -+ -+ case oGssClientIdentity: -+ charptr = &options->gss_client_identity; -+ goto parse_string; -+ -+ case oGssRenewalRekey: -+ intptr = &options->gss_renewal_rekey; -+ goto parse_flag; -+ - case oBatchMode: - intptr = &options->batch_mode; - goto parse_flag; -@@ -1029,7 +1054,11 @@ initialize_options(Options * options) - options->pubkey_authentication = -1; - options->challenge_response_authentication = -1; - options->gss_authentication = -1; -+ options->gss_keyex = -1; - options->gss_deleg_creds = -1; -+ options->gss_trust_dns = -1; -+ options->gss_renewal_rekey = -1; -+ options->gss_client_identity = NULL; - options->password_authentication = -1; - options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1; - options->kbd_interactive_devices = NULL; -@@ -1123,8 +1152,14 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options) - options->challenge_response_authentication = 1; - if (options->gss_authentication == -1) - options->gss_authentication = 0; -+ if (options->gss_keyex == -1) -+ options->gss_keyex = 0; - if (options->gss_deleg_creds == -1) - options->gss_deleg_creds = 0; -+ if (options->gss_trust_dns == -1) -+ options->gss_trust_dns = 0; -+ if (options->gss_renewal_rekey == -1) -+ options->gss_renewal_rekey = 0; - if (options->password_authentication == -1) - options->password_authentication = 1; - if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1) -diff -up openssh-5.3p1/readconf.h.gsskex openssh-5.3p1/readconf.h ---- openssh-5.3p1/readconf.h.gsskex 2009-11-20 14:38:59.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-5.3p1/readconf.h 2009-11-20 14:39:06.000000000 +0100 -@@ -44,7 +44,11 @@ typedef struct { - int challenge_response_authentication; - /* Try S/Key or TIS, authentication. */ - int gss_authentication; /* Try GSS authentication */ -+ int gss_keyex; /* Try GSS key exchange */ - int gss_deleg_creds; /* Delegate GSS credentials */ -+ int gss_trust_dns; /* Trust DNS for GSS canonicalization */ -+ int gss_renewal_rekey; /* Credential renewal forces rekey */ -+ char *gss_client_identity; /* Principal to initiate GSSAPI with */ - int password_authentication; /* Try password - * authentication. */ - int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* Try keyboard-interactive auth. */ -diff -up openssh-5.3p1/servconf.c.gsskex openssh-5.3p1/servconf.c ---- openssh-5.3p1/servconf.c.gsskex 2009-11-20 14:39:03.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-5.3p1/servconf.c 2009-11-20 14:52:27.000000000 +0100 -@@ -92,7 +92,10 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions - options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = -1; - options->kerberos_get_afs_token = -1; - options->gss_authentication=-1; -+ options->gss_keyex = -1; - options->gss_cleanup_creds = -1; -+ options->gss_strict_acceptor = -1; -+ options->gss_store_rekey = -1; - options->password_authentication = -1; - options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1; - options->challenge_response_authentication = -1; -@@ -213,8 +216,14 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption - options->kerberos_get_afs_token = 0; - if (options->gss_authentication == -1) - options->gss_authentication = 0; -+ if (options->gss_keyex == -1) -+ options->gss_keyex = 0; - if (options->gss_cleanup_creds == -1) - options->gss_cleanup_creds = 1; -+ if (options->gss_strict_acceptor == -1) -+ options->gss_strict_acceptor = 1; -+ if (options->gss_store_rekey == -1) -+ options->gss_store_rekey = 0; - if (options->password_authentication == -1) - options->password_authentication = 1; - if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1) -@@ -308,7 +317,9 @@ typedef enum { - sBanner, sShowPatchLevel, sUseDNS, sHostbasedAuthentication, - sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, sClientAliveInterval, - sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile, sAuthorizedKeysFile2, -- sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel, -+ sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssStrictAcceptor, -+ sGssKeyEx, sGssStoreRekey, -+ sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel, - sMatch, sPermitOpen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory, - sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding, - sZeroKnowledgePasswordAuthentication, -@@ -371,9 +382,15 @@ static struct { - #ifdef GSSAPI - { "gssapiauthentication", sGssAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, - { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, -+ { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sGssStrictAcceptor, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, -+ { "gssapikeyexchange", sGssKeyEx, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, -+ { "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sGssStoreRekey, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, - #else - { "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL }, - { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, -+ { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, -+ { "gssapikeyexchange", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, -+ { "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, - #endif - { "passwordauthentication", sPasswordAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, - { "kbdinteractiveauthentication", sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, -@@ -906,10 +923,22 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions - intptr = &options->gss_authentication; - goto parse_flag; - -+ case sGssKeyEx: -+ intptr = &options->gss_keyex; -+ goto parse_flag; -+ - case sGssCleanupCreds: - intptr = &options->gss_cleanup_creds; - goto parse_flag; - -+ case sGssStrictAcceptor: -+ intptr = &options->gss_strict_acceptor; -+ goto parse_flag; -+ -+ case sGssStoreRekey: -+ intptr = &options->gss_store_rekey; -+ goto parse_flag; -+ - case sPasswordAuthentication: - intptr = &options->password_authentication; - goto parse_flag; -diff -up openssh-5.3p1/servconf.h.gsskex openssh-5.3p1/servconf.h ---- openssh-5.3p1/servconf.h.gsskex 2009-11-20 14:39:03.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-5.3p1/servconf.h 2009-11-20 14:39:06.000000000 +0100 -@@ -91,7 +91,10 @@ typedef struct { - int kerberos_get_afs_token; /* If true, try to get AFS token if - * authenticated with Kerberos. */ - int gss_authentication; /* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */ -+ int gss_keyex; /* If true, permit GSSAPI key exchange */ - int gss_cleanup_creds; /* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */ -+ int gss_strict_acceptor; /* If true, restrict the GSSAPI acceptor name */ -+ int gss_store_rekey; - int password_authentication; /* If true, permit password - * authentication. */ - int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* If true, permit */ -diff -up openssh-5.3p1/ssh_config.5.gsskex openssh-5.3p1/ssh_config.5 ---- openssh-5.3p1/ssh_config.5.gsskex 2009-02-23 00:53:58.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-5.3p1/ssh_config.5 2009-11-20 14:39:06.000000000 +0100 -@@ -478,11 +478,38 @@ Specifies whether user authentication ba - The default is - .Dq no . - Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only. -+.It Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange -+Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI may be used. When using -+GSSAPI key exchange the server need not have a host key. -+The default is -+.Dq no . -+Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only. -+.It Cm GSSAPIClientIdentity -+If set, specifies the GSSAPI client identity that ssh should use when -+connecting to the server. The default is unset, which means that the default -+identity will be used. - .It Cm GSSAPIDelegateCredentials - Forward (delegate) credentials to the server. - The default is - .Dq no . --Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only. -+Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 connections using GSSAPI. -+.It Cm GSSAPIRenewalForcesRekey -+If set to -+.Dq yes -+then renewal of the client's GSSAPI credentials will force the rekeying of the -+ssh connection. With a compatible server, this can delegate the renewed -+credentials to a session on the server. -+The default is -+.Dq no . -+.It Cm GSSAPITrustDns -+Set to -+.Dq yes to indicate that the DNS is trusted to securely canonicalize -+the name of the host being connected to. If -+.Dq no, the hostname entered on the -+command line will be passed untouched to the GSSAPI library. -+The default is -+.Dq no . -+This option only applies to protocol version 2 connections using GSSAPI. - .It Cm HashKnownHosts - Indicates that - .Xr ssh 1 -diff -up openssh-5.3p1/ssh_config.gsskex openssh-5.3p1/ssh_config ---- openssh-5.3p1/ssh_config.gsskex 2009-11-20 14:38:53.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-5.3p1/ssh_config 2009-11-20 14:39:06.000000000 +0100 -@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@ - # HostbasedAuthentication no - # GSSAPIAuthentication no - # GSSAPIDelegateCredentials no -+# GSSAPIKeyExchange no -+# GSSAPITrustDNS no - # BatchMode no - # CheckHostIP yes - # AddressFamily any -diff -up openssh-5.3p1/sshconnect2.c.gsskex openssh-5.3p1/sshconnect2.c ---- openssh-5.3p1/sshconnect2.c.gsskex 2009-11-20 14:39:01.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-5.3p1/sshconnect2.c 2009-11-20 15:05:03.000000000 +0100 -@@ -108,9 +108,34 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *ho - { - Kex *kex; - -+#ifdef GSSAPI -+ char *orig = NULL, *gss = NULL; -+ char *gss_host = NULL; -+#endif -+ - xxx_host = host; - xxx_hostaddr = hostaddr; - -+#ifdef GSSAPI -+ if (options.gss_keyex) { -+ /* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this -+ * client to the key exchange algorithm proposal */ -+ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]; -+ -+ if (options.gss_trust_dns) -+ gss_host = (char *)get_canonical_hostname(1); -+ else -+ gss_host = host; -+ -+ gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host, options.gss_client_identity); -+ if (gss) { -+ debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss); -+ xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS], -+ "%s,%s", gss, orig); -+ } -+ } -+#endif -+ - if (options.ciphers == (char *)-1) { - logit("No valid ciphers for protocol version 2 given, using defaults."); - options.ciphers = NULL; -@@ -146,6 +171,17 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *ho - myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = - options.hostkeyalgorithms; - -+#ifdef GSSAPI -+ /* If we've got GSSAPI algorithms, then we also support the -+ * 'null' hostkey, as a last resort */ -+ if (options.gss_keyex && gss) { -+ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]; -+ xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS], -+ "%s,null", orig); -+ xfree(gss); -+ } -+#endif -+ - if (options.rekey_limit) - packet_set_rekey_limit((u_int32_t)options.rekey_limit); - -@@ -155,10 +191,26 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *ho - kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_client; - kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_client; - kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_client; -+#ifdef GSSAPI -+ if (options.gss_keyex) { -+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_client; -+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_client; -+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_client; -+ } -+#endif - kex->client_version_string=client_version_string; - kex->server_version_string=server_version_string; - kex->verify_host_key=&verify_host_key_callback; - -+#ifdef GSSAPI -+ if (options.gss_keyex) { -+ kex->gss_deleg_creds = options.gss_deleg_creds; -+ kex->gss_trust_dns = options.gss_trust_dns; -+ kex->gss_client = options.gss_client_identity; -+ kex->gss_host = gss_host; -+ } -+#endif -+ - xxx_kex = kex; - - dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &kex->done, kex); -@@ -247,6 +299,7 @@ void input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int3 - void input_gssapi_hash(int type, u_int32_t, void *); - void input_gssapi_error(int, u_int32_t, void *); - void input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, void *); -+int userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt); - #endif - - void userauth(Authctxt *, char *); -@@ -262,6 +315,10 @@ static char *authmethods_get(void); - - Authmethod authmethods[] = { - #ifdef GSSAPI -+ {"gssapi-keyex", -+ userauth_gsskeyex, -+ &options.gss_authentication, -+ NULL}, - {"gssapi-with-mic", - userauth_gssapi, - NULL, -@@ -555,23 +612,35 @@ userauth_gssapi(Authctxt *authctxt) - int ok = 0; - char* remotehost = NULL; - const char* canonicalhost = get_canonical_hostname(1); -+ const char *gss_host; -+ - if ( strcmp( canonicalhost, "UNKNOWN" ) == 0 ) - remotehost = authctxt->host; - else - remotehost = canonicalhost; - -+ if (options.gss_trust_dns) -+// gss_host = get_canonical_hostname(1); -+ gss_host = remotehost; -+ else -+ gss_host = authctxt->host; -+ - /* Try one GSSAPI method at a time, rather than sending them all at - * once. */ - - if (gss_supported == NULL) -- gss_indicate_mechs(&min, &gss_supported); -+ if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min, &gss_supported))) { -+ gss_supported = NULL; -+ return 0; -+ } - - /* Check to see if the mechanism is usable before we offer it */ - while (mech < gss_supported->count && !ok) { - /* My DER encoding requires length<128 */ - if (gss_supported->elements[mech].length < 128 && - ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(&gssctxt, -- &gss_supported->elements[mech], remotehost)) { -+ &gss_supported->elements[mech], gss_host, -+ options.gss_client_identity)) { - ok = 1; /* Mechanism works */ - } else { - mech++; -@@ -668,8 +737,8 @@ input_gssapi_response(int type, u_int32_ - { - Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt; - Gssctxt *gssctxt; -- int oidlen; -- char *oidv; -+ u_int oidlen; -+ u_char *oidv; - - if (authctxt == NULL) - fatal("input_gssapi_response: no authentication context"); -@@ -779,6 +848,48 @@ input_gssapi_error(int type, u_int32_t p - xfree(msg); - xfree(lang); - } -+ -+int -+userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt) -+{ -+ Buffer b; -+ gss_buffer_desc gssbuf; -+ gss_buffer_desc mic = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; -+ OM_uint32 ms; -+ -+ static int attempt = 0; -+ if (attempt++ >= 1) -+ return (0); -+ -+ if (gss_kex_context == NULL) { -+ debug("No valid Key exchange context"); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->server_user, authctxt->service, -+ "gssapi-keyex"); -+ -+ gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b); -+ gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b); -+ -+ if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_sign(gss_kex_context, &gssbuf, &mic))) { -+ buffer_free(&b); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST); -+ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user); -+ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service); -+ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name); -+ packet_put_string(mic.value, mic.length); -+ packet_send(); -+ -+ buffer_free(&b); -+ gss_release_buffer(&ms, &mic); -+ -+ return (1); -+} -+ - #endif /* GSSAPI */ - - int -diff -up openssh-5.3p1/sshd.c.gsskex openssh-5.3p1/sshd.c ---- openssh-5.3p1/sshd.c.gsskex 2009-11-20 14:39:01.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-5.3p1/sshd.c 2009-11-20 14:53:31.000000000 +0100 -@@ -129,6 +129,10 @@ int allow_severity; - int deny_severity; - #endif /* LIBWRAP */ - -+#ifdef USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API -+#include -+#endif -+ - #ifndef O_NOCTTY - #define O_NOCTTY 0 - #endif -@@ -1546,10 +1550,13 @@ main(int ac, char **av) - logit("Disabling protocol version 1. Could not load host key"); - options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_1; - } -+#ifndef GSSAPI -+ /* The GSSAPI key exchange can run without a host key */ - if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) && !sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key) { - logit("Disabling protocol version 2. Could not load host key"); - options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_2; - } -+#endif - if (!(options.protocol & (SSH_PROTO_1|SSH_PROTO_2))) { - logit("sshd: no hostkeys available -- exiting."); - exit(1); -@@ -1837,6 +1844,60 @@ main(int ac, char **av) - /* Log the connection. */ - verbose("Connection from %.500s port %d", remote_ip, remote_port); - -+#ifdef USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API -+ /* -+ * Create a new security session for use by the new user login if -+ * the current session is the root session or we are not launched -+ * by inetd (eg: debugging mode or server mode). We do not -+ * necessarily need to create a session if we are launched from -+ * inetd because Panther xinetd will create a session for us. -+ * -+ * The only case where this logic will fail is if there is an -+ * inetd running in a non-root session which is not creating -+ * new sessions for us. Then all the users will end up in the -+ * same session (bad). -+ * -+ * When the client exits, the session will be destroyed for us -+ * automatically. -+ * -+ * We must create the session before any credentials are stored -+ * (including AFS pags, which happens a few lines below). -+ */ -+ { -+ OSStatus err = 0; -+ SecuritySessionId sid = 0; -+ SessionAttributeBits sattrs = 0; -+ -+ err = SessionGetInfo(callerSecuritySession, &sid, &sattrs); -+ if (err) -+ error("SessionGetInfo() failed with error %.8X", -+ (unsigned) err); -+ else -+ debug("Current Session ID is %.8X / Session Attributes are %.8X", -+ (unsigned) sid, (unsigned) sattrs); -+ -+ if (inetd_flag && !(sattrs & sessionIsRoot)) -+ debug("Running in inetd mode in a non-root session... " -+ "assuming inetd created the session for us."); -+ else { -+ debug("Creating new security session..."); -+ err = SessionCreate(0, sessionHasTTY | sessionIsRemote); -+ if (err) -+ error("SessionCreate() failed with error %.8X", -+ (unsigned) err); -+ -+ err = SessionGetInfo(callerSecuritySession, &sid, -+ &sattrs); -+ if (err) -+ error("SessionGetInfo() failed with error %.8X", -+ (unsigned) err); -+ else -+ debug("New Session ID is %.8X / Session Attributes are %.8X", -+ (unsigned) sid, (unsigned) sattrs); -+ } -+ } -+#endif -+ - /* - * We don't want to listen forever unless the other side - * successfully authenticates itself. So we set up an alarm which is -@@ -2223,12 +2284,61 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void) - - myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = list_hostkey_types(); - -+#ifdef GSSAPI -+ { -+ char *orig; -+ char *gss = NULL; -+ char *newstr = NULL; -+ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]; -+ -+ /* -+ * If we don't have a host key, then there's no point advertising -+ * the other key exchange algorithms -+ */ -+ -+ if (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]) == 0) -+ orig = NULL; -+ -+ if (options.gss_keyex) -+ gss = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(); -+ else -+ gss = NULL; -+ -+ if (gss && orig) -+ xasprintf(&newstr, "%s,%s", gss, orig); -+ else if (gss) -+ newstr = gss; -+ else if (orig) -+ newstr = orig; -+ -+ /* -+ * If we've got GSSAPI mechanisms, then we've got the 'null' host -+ * key alg, but we can't tell people about it unless its the only -+ * host key algorithm we support -+ */ -+ if (gss && (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS])) == 0) -+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = "null"; -+ -+ if (newstr) -+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = newstr; -+ else -+ fatal("No supported key exchange algorithms"); -+ } -+#endif -+ - /* start key exchange */ - kex = kex_setup(myproposal); - kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_server; - kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_server; - kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server; - kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server; -+#ifdef GSSAPI -+ if (options.gss_keyex) { -+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server; -+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_server; -+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_server; -+ } -+#endif - kex->server = 1; - kex->client_version_string=client_version_string; - kex->server_version_string=server_version_string; -diff -up openssh-5.3p1/sshd_config.5.gsskex openssh-5.3p1/sshd_config.5 ---- openssh-5.3p1/sshd_config.5.gsskex 2009-11-20 14:39:03.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-5.3p1/sshd_config.5 2009-11-20 14:39:06.000000000 +0100 -@@ -379,12 +379,40 @@ Specifies whether user authentication ba - The default is - .Dq no . - Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only. -+.It Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange -+Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI is allowed. GSSAPI key exchange -+doesn't rely on ssh keys to verify host identity. -+The default is -+.Dq no . -+Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only. - .It Cm GSSAPICleanupCredentials - Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's credentials cache - on logout. - The default is - .Dq yes . - Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only. -+.It Cm GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck -+Determines whether to be strict about the identity of the GSSAPI acceptor -+a client authenticates against. If -+.Dq yes -+then the client must authenticate against the -+.Pa host -+service on the current hostname. If -+.Dq no -+then the client may authenticate against any service key stored in the -+machine's default store. This facility is provided to assist with operation -+on multi homed machines. -+The default is -+.Dq yes . -+Note that this option applies only to protocol version 2 GSSAPI connections, -+and setting it to -+.Dq no -+may only work with recent Kerberos GSSAPI libraries. -+.It Cm GSSAPIStoreCredentialsOnRekey -+Controls whether the user's GSSAPI credentials should be updated following a -+successful connection rekeying. This option can be used to accepted renewed -+or updated credentials from a compatible client. The default is -+.Dq no . - .It Cm HostbasedAuthentication - Specifies whether rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication together - with successful public key client host authentication is allowed -diff -up openssh-5.3p1/sshd_config.gsskex openssh-5.3p1/sshd_config ---- openssh-5.3p1/sshd_config.gsskex 2009-11-20 14:39:04.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-5.3p1/sshd_config 2009-11-20 14:54:30.000000000 +0100 -@@ -80,6 +80,8 @@ ChallengeResponseAuthentication no - GSSAPIAuthentication yes - #GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes - GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes -+#GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck yes -+#GSSAPIKeyExchange no - - # Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing, - # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will -diff -up openssh-5.3p1/ssh-gss.h.gsskex openssh-5.3p1/ssh-gss.h ---- openssh-5.3p1/ssh-gss.h.gsskex 2007-06-12 15:40:39.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-5.3p1/ssh-gss.h 2009-11-20 14:39:06.000000000 +0100 -@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ - /* $OpenBSD: ssh-gss.h,v 1.10 2007/06/12 08:20:00 djm Exp $ */ - /* -- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. -+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions -@@ -60,10 +60,22 @@ - - #define SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE 0x06 - -+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT 30 -+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE 31 -+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE 32 -+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY 33 -+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR 34 -+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ 40 -+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP 41 -+#define KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID "gss-group1-sha1-" -+#define KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID "gss-group14-sha1-" -+#define KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID "gss-gex-sha1-" -+ - typedef struct { - char *filename; - char *envvar; - char *envval; -+ struct passwd *owner; - void *data; - } ssh_gssapi_ccache; - -@@ -71,8 +83,11 @@ typedef struct { - gss_buffer_desc displayname; - gss_buffer_desc exportedname; - gss_cred_id_t creds; -+ gss_name_t name; - struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct *mech; - ssh_gssapi_ccache store; -+ int used; -+ int updated; - } ssh_gssapi_client; - - typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct { -@@ -83,6 +98,7 @@ typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct { - int (*userok) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char *); - int (*localname) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char **); - void (*storecreds) (ssh_gssapi_client *); -+ int (*updatecreds) (ssh_gssapi_ccache *, ssh_gssapi_client *); - } ssh_gssapi_mech; - - typedef struct { -@@ -93,10 +109,11 @@ typedef struct { - gss_OID oid; /* client */ - gss_cred_id_t creds; /* server */ - gss_name_t client; /* server */ -- gss_cred_id_t client_creds; /* server */ -+ gss_cred_id_t client_creds; /* both */ - } Gssctxt; - - extern ssh_gssapi_mech *supported_mechs[]; -+extern Gssctxt *gss_kex_context; - - int ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t); - void ssh_gssapi_set_oid_data(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t); -@@ -116,16 +133,30 @@ void ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(Gssctxt **); - void ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(Gssctxt **); - OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t); - void ssh_gssapi_buildmic(Buffer *, const char *, const char *, const char *); --int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *); -+int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *, const char *); -+OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_client_identity(Gssctxt *, const char *); -+int ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(Gssctxt *); - - /* In the server */ -+typedef int ssh_gssapi_check_fn(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *, -+ const char *); -+char *ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *, const char *); -+char *ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *, const char *, -+ const char *); -+gss_OID ssh_gssapi_id_kex(Gssctxt *, char *, int); -+int ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt **,gss_OID, const char *, -+ const char *); - OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID); --int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name); -+int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name, struct passwd *); - OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t); - void ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***, u_int *); - void ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void); - void ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void); - -+char *ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(void); -+int ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok(); -+ -+int ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store); - #endif /* GSSAPI */ - - #endif /* _SSH_GSS_H */ diff --git a/openssh-5.3p1-mls.patch b/openssh-5.3p1-mls.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 451b7e8..0000000 --- a/openssh-5.3p1-mls.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,445 +0,0 @@ -diff -up openssh-5.3p1/configure.ac.mls openssh-5.3p1/configure.ac ---- openssh-5.3p1/configure.ac.mls 2009-10-02 14:04:31.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-5.3p1/configure.ac 2009-10-02 14:04:31.000000000 +0200 -@@ -3404,6 +3404,7 @@ AC_ARG_WITH(selinux, - SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS $LIBSELINUX" - LIBS="$LIBS $LIBSELINUX" - AC_CHECK_FUNCS(getseuserbyname get_default_context_with_level) -+ AC_CHECK_FUNCS(setkeycreatecon) - LIBS="$save_LIBS" - fi ] - ) -diff -up openssh-5.3p1/misc.c.mls openssh-5.3p1/misc.c ---- openssh-5.3p1/misc.c.mls 2009-02-21 22:47:02.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-5.3p1/misc.c 2009-10-02 14:04:31.000000000 +0200 -@@ -423,6 +423,7 @@ char * - colon(char *cp) - { - int flag = 0; -+ int start = 1; - - if (*cp == ':') /* Leading colon is part of file name. */ - return (0); -@@ -436,8 +437,13 @@ colon(char *cp) - return (cp+1); - if (*cp == ':' && !flag) - return (cp); -- if (*cp == '/') -- return (0); -+ if (start) { -+ /* Slash on beginning or after dots only denotes file name. */ -+ if (*cp == '/') -+ return (0); -+ if (*cp != '.') -+ start = 0; -+ } - } - return (0); - } -diff -up openssh-5.3p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.mls openssh-5.3p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c ---- openssh-5.3p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.mls 2009-10-02 14:04:31.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-5.3p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c 2009-10-02 14:04:31.000000000 +0200 -@@ -33,12 +33,23 @@ - #include "key.h" - #include "hostfile.h" - #include "auth.h" -+#include "xmalloc.h" - - #include - #include -+#include - #include -+#include -+#include -+ -+#ifdef HAVE_LINUX_AUDIT -+#include -+#include -+#endif - - extern Authctxt *the_authctxt; -+extern int inetd_flag; -+extern int rexeced_flag; - - /* Wrapper around is_selinux_enabled() to log its return value once only */ - int -@@ -54,17 +65,173 @@ ssh_selinux_enabled(void) - return (enabled); - } - -+/* Send audit message */ -+static int -+send_audit_message(int success, security_context_t default_context, -+ security_context_t selected_context) -+{ -+ int rc=0; -+#ifdef HAVE_LINUX_AUDIT -+ char *msg = NULL; -+ int audit_fd = audit_open(); -+ security_context_t default_raw=NULL; -+ security_context_t selected_raw=NULL; -+ rc = -1; -+ if (audit_fd < 0) { -+ if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT || -+ errno == EAFNOSUPPORT) -+ return 0; /* No audit support in kernel */ -+ error("Error connecting to audit system."); -+ return rc; -+ } -+ if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(default_context, &default_raw) < 0) { -+ error("Error translating default context."); -+ default_raw = NULL; -+ } -+ if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(selected_context, &selected_raw) < 0) { -+ error("Error translating selected context."); -+ selected_raw = NULL; -+ } -+ if (asprintf(&msg, "sshd: default-context=%s selected-context=%s", -+ default_raw ? default_raw : (default_context ? default_context: "?"), -+ selected_context ? selected_raw : (selected_context ? selected_context :"?")) < 0) { -+ error("Error allocating memory."); -+ goto out; -+ } -+ if (audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_ROLE_CHANGE, -+ msg, NULL, NULL, NULL, success) <= 0) { -+ error("Error sending audit message."); -+ goto out; -+ } -+ rc = 0; -+ out: -+ free(msg); -+ freecon(default_raw); -+ freecon(selected_raw); -+ close(audit_fd); -+#endif -+ return rc; -+} -+ -+static int -+mls_range_allowed(security_context_t src, security_context_t dst) -+{ -+ struct av_decision avd; -+ int retval; -+ unsigned int bit = CONTEXT__CONTAINS; -+ -+ debug("%s: src:%s dst:%s", __func__, src, dst); -+ retval = security_compute_av(src, dst, SECCLASS_CONTEXT, bit, &avd); -+ if (retval || ((bit & avd.allowed) != bit)) -+ return 0; -+ -+ return 1; -+} -+ -+static int -+get_user_context(const char *sename, const char *role, const char *lvl, -+ security_context_t *sc) { -+#ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL -+ if (lvl == NULL || lvl[0] == '\0' || get_default_context_with_level(sename, lvl, NULL, sc) != 0) { -+ /* User may have requested a level completely outside of his -+ allowed range. We get a context just for auditing as the -+ range check below will certainly fail for default context. */ -+#endif -+ if (get_default_context(sename, NULL, sc) != 0) { -+ *sc = NULL; -+ return -1; -+ } -+#ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL -+ } -+#endif -+ if (role != NULL && role[0]) { -+ context_t con; -+ char *type=NULL; -+ if (get_default_type(role, &type) != 0) { -+ error("get_default_type: failed to get default type for '%s'", -+ role); -+ goto out; -+ } -+ con = context_new(*sc); -+ if (!con) { -+ goto out; -+ } -+ context_role_set(con, role); -+ context_type_set(con, type); -+ freecon(*sc); -+ *sc = strdup(context_str(con)); -+ context_free(con); -+ if (!*sc) -+ return -1; -+ } -+#ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL -+ if (lvl != NULL && lvl[0]) { -+ /* verify that the requested range is obtained */ -+ context_t con; -+ security_context_t obtained_raw; -+ security_context_t requested_raw; -+ con = context_new(*sc); -+ if (!con) { -+ goto out; -+ } -+ context_range_set(con, lvl); -+ if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(*sc, &obtained_raw) < 0) { -+ context_free(con); -+ goto out; -+ } -+ if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(context_str(con), &requested_raw) < 0) { -+ freecon(obtained_raw); -+ context_free(con); -+ goto out; -+ } -+ -+ debug("get_user_context: obtained context '%s' requested context '%s'", -+ obtained_raw, requested_raw); -+ if (strcmp(obtained_raw, requested_raw)) { -+ /* set the context to the real requested one but fail */ -+ freecon(requested_raw); -+ freecon(obtained_raw); -+ freecon(*sc); -+ *sc = strdup(context_str(con)); -+ context_free(con); -+ return -1; -+ } -+ freecon(requested_raw); -+ freecon(obtained_raw); -+ context_free(con); -+ } -+#endif -+ return 0; -+ out: -+ freecon(*sc); -+ *sc = NULL; -+ return -1; -+} -+ - /* Return the default security context for the given username */ --static security_context_t --ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname) -+static int -+ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname, -+ security_context_t *default_sc, security_context_t *user_sc) - { -- security_context_t sc = NULL; - char *sename, *lvl; -+ const char *reqlvl = NULL; - char *role = NULL; -- int r = 0; -+ int r = -1; -+ context_t con = NULL; -+ -+ *default_sc = NULL; -+ *user_sc = NULL; -+ if (the_authctxt) { -+ if (the_authctxt->role != NULL) { -+ char *slash; -+ role = xstrdup(the_authctxt->role); -+ if ((slash = strchr(role, '/')) != NULL) { -+ *slash = '\0'; -+ reqlvl = slash + 1; -+ } -+ } -+ } - -- if (the_authctxt) -- role=the_authctxt->role; - #ifdef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME - if ((r=getseuserbyname(pwname, &sename, &lvl)) != 0) { - sename = NULL; -@@ -72,38 +239,63 @@ ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname) - } - #else - sename = pwname; -- lvl = NULL; -+ lvl = ""; - #endif - - if (r == 0) { - #ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL -- if (role != NULL && role[0]) -- r = get_default_context_with_rolelevel(sename, role, lvl, NULL, &sc); -- else -- r = get_default_context_with_level(sename, lvl, NULL, &sc); -+ r = get_default_context_with_level(sename, lvl, NULL, default_sc); - #else -- if (role != NULL && role[0]) -- r = get_default_context_with_role(sename, role, NULL, &sc); -- else -- r = get_default_context(sename, NULL, &sc); -+ r = get_default_context(sename, NULL, default_sc); - #endif - } - -- if (r != 0) { -- switch (security_getenforce()) { -- case -1: -- fatal("%s: ssh_selinux_getctxbyname: " -- "security_getenforce() failed", __func__); -- case 0: -- error("%s: Failed to get default SELinux security " -- "context for %s", __func__, pwname); -- break; -- default: -- fatal("%s: Failed to get default SELinux security " -- "context for %s (in enforcing mode)", -- __func__, pwname); -+ if (r == 0) { -+ /* If launched from xinetd, we must use current level */ -+ if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) { -+ security_context_t sshdsc=NULL; -+ -+ if (getcon_raw(&sshdsc) < 0) -+ fatal("failed to allocate security context"); -+ -+ if ((con=context_new(sshdsc)) == NULL) -+ fatal("failed to allocate selinux context"); -+ reqlvl = context_range_get(con); -+ freecon(sshdsc); -+ if (reqlvl !=NULL && lvl != NULL && strcmp(reqlvl, lvl) == 0) -+ /* we actually don't change level */ -+ reqlvl = ""; -+ -+ debug("%s: current connection level '%s'", __func__, reqlvl); -+ } -+ -+ if ((reqlvl != NULL && reqlvl[0]) || (role != NULL && role[0])) { -+ r = get_user_context(sename, role, reqlvl, user_sc); -+ -+ if (r == 0 && reqlvl != NULL && reqlvl[0]) { -+ security_context_t default_level_sc = *default_sc; -+ if (role != NULL && role[0]) { -+ if (get_user_context(sename, role, lvl, &default_level_sc) < 0) -+ default_level_sc = *default_sc; -+ } -+ /* verify that the requested range is contained in the user range */ -+ if (mls_range_allowed(default_level_sc, *user_sc)) { -+ logit("permit MLS level %s (user range %s)", reqlvl, lvl); -+ } else { -+ r = -1; -+ error("deny MLS level %s (user range %s)", reqlvl, lvl); -+ } -+ if (default_level_sc != *default_sc) -+ freecon(default_level_sc); -+ } -+ } else { -+ *user_sc = *default_sc; - } - } -+ if (r != 0) { -+ error("%s: Failed to get default SELinux security " -+ "context for %s", __func__, pwname); -+ } - - #ifdef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME - if (sename != NULL) -@@ -111,14 +303,20 @@ ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname) - if (lvl != NULL) - xfree(lvl); - #endif -+ if (role != NULL) -+ xfree(role); -+ if (con) -+ context_free(con); - -- return (sc); -+ return (r); - } - - /* Set the execution context to the default for the specified user */ - void - ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname) - { -+ int r = 0; -+ security_context_t default_ctx = NULL; - security_context_t user_ctx = NULL; - - if (!ssh_selinux_enabled()) -@@ -126,22 +324,45 @@ ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwn - - debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__); - -- user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname); -- if (setexeccon(user_ctx) != 0) { -+ r = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname, &default_ctx, &user_ctx); -+ if (r >= 0) { -+ r = setexeccon(user_ctx); -+ if (r < 0) { -+ error("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution context %s for %s", -+ __func__, user_ctx, pwname); -+ } -+#ifdef HAVE_SETKEYCREATECON -+ else if (setkeycreatecon(user_ctx) < 0) { -+ error("%s: Failed to set SELinux keyring creation context %s for %s", -+ __func__, user_ctx, pwname); -+ } -+#endif -+ } -+ if (user_ctx == NULL) { -+ user_ctx = default_ctx; -+ } -+ if (r < 0 || user_ctx != default_ctx) { -+ /* audit just the case when user changed a role or there was -+ a failure */ -+ send_audit_message(r >= 0, default_ctx, user_ctx); -+ } -+ if (r < 0) { - switch (security_getenforce()) { - case -1: - fatal("%s: security_getenforce() failed", __func__); - case 0: -- error("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution " -- "context for %s", __func__, pwname); -+ error("%s: SELinux failure. Continuing in permissive mode.", -+ __func__); - break; - default: -- fatal("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution context " -- "for %s (in enforcing mode)", __func__, pwname); -+ fatal("%s: SELinux failure. Aborting connection.", -+ __func__); - } - } -- if (user_ctx != NULL) -+ if (user_ctx != NULL && user_ctx != default_ctx) - freecon(user_ctx); -+ if (default_ctx != NULL) -+ freecon(default_ctx); - - debug3("%s: done", __func__); - } -@@ -159,7 +380,10 @@ ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *pwname, cons - - debug3("%s: setting TTY context on %s", __func__, tty); - -- user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname); -+ if (getexeccon(&user_ctx) < 0) { -+ error("%s: getexeccon: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); -+ goto out; -+ } - - /* XXX: should these calls fatal() upon failure in enforcing mode? */ - -diff -up openssh-5.3p1/session.c.mls openssh-5.3p1/session.c ---- openssh-5.3p1/session.c.mls 2009-08-20 08:20:50.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-5.3p1/session.c 2009-10-02 14:06:12.000000000 +0200 -@@ -1550,10 +1550,6 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw) - - if (getuid() != pw->pw_uid || geteuid() != pw->pw_uid) - fatal("Failed to set uids to %u.", (u_int) pw->pw_uid); -- --#ifdef WITH_SELINUX -- ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name); --#endif - } - - static void -diff -up openssh-5.3p1/sshd.c.mls openssh-5.3p1/sshd.c ---- openssh-5.3p1/sshd.c.mls 2009-10-02 14:04:31.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-5.3p1/sshd.c 2009-10-02 14:04:31.000000000 +0200 -@@ -1896,6 +1896,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av) - restore_uid(); - } - #endif -+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX -+ ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(authctxt->pw->pw_name); -+#endif - #ifdef USE_PAM - if (options.use_pam) { - do_pam_setcred(1); diff --git a/openssh-5.3p1-nss-keys.patch b/openssh-5.3p1-nss-keys.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 50a6441..0000000 --- a/openssh-5.3p1-nss-keys.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,1522 +0,0 @@ -diff -up openssh-5.3p1/authfd.c.nss-keys openssh-5.3p1/authfd.c ---- openssh-5.3p1/authfd.c.nss-keys 2006-09-01 07:38:36.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-5.3p1/authfd.c 2009-11-27 13:43:00.000000000 +0100 -@@ -626,6 +626,45 @@ ssh_update_card(AuthenticationConnection - return decode_reply(type); - } - -+int -+ssh_update_nss_key(AuthenticationConnection *auth, int add, -+ const char *tokenname, const char *keyname, -+ const char *pass, u_int life, u_int confirm) -+{ -+ Buffer msg; -+ int type, constrained = (life || confirm); -+ -+ if (add) { -+ type = constrained ? -+ SSH_AGENTC_ADD_NSS_KEY_CONSTRAINED : -+ SSH_AGENTC_ADD_NSS_KEY; -+ } else -+ type = SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_NSS_KEY; -+ -+ buffer_init(&msg); -+ buffer_put_char(&msg, type); -+ buffer_put_cstring(&msg, tokenname); -+ buffer_put_cstring(&msg, keyname); -+ buffer_put_cstring(&msg, pass); -+ -+ if (constrained) { -+ if (life != 0) { -+ buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME); -+ buffer_put_int(&msg, life); -+ } -+ if (confirm != 0) -+ buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM); -+ } -+ -+ if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &msg, &msg) == 0) { -+ buffer_free(&msg); -+ return 0; -+ } -+ type = buffer_get_char(&msg); -+ buffer_free(&msg); -+ return decode_reply(type); -+} -+ - /* - * Removes all identities from the agent. This call is not meant to be used - * by normal applications. -diff -up openssh-5.3p1/authfd.h.nss-keys openssh-5.3p1/authfd.h ---- openssh-5.3p1/authfd.h.nss-keys 2006-08-05 04:39:39.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-5.3p1/authfd.h 2009-11-27 13:43:01.000000000 +0100 -@@ -49,6 +49,12 @@ - #define SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED 25 - #define SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY_CONSTRAINED 26 - -+/* nss */ -+#define SSH_AGENTC_ADD_NSS_KEY 30 -+#define SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_NSS_KEY 31 -+#define SSH_AGENTC_ADD_NSS_KEY_CONSTRAINED 32 -+ -+ - #define SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME 1 - #define SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM 2 - -@@ -83,6 +89,8 @@ int ssh_remove_all_identities(Authentic - int ssh_lock_agent(AuthenticationConnection *, int, const char *); - int ssh_update_card(AuthenticationConnection *, int, const char *, - const char *, u_int, u_int); -+int ssh_update_nss_key(AuthenticationConnection *, int, const char *, -+ const char *, const char *, u_int, u_int); - - int - ssh_decrypt_challenge(AuthenticationConnection *, Key *, BIGNUM *, u_char[16], -diff -up openssh-5.3p1/configure.ac.nss-keys openssh-5.3p1/configure.ac ---- openssh-5.3p1/configure.ac.nss-keys 2009-11-27 13:42:57.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-5.3p1/configure.ac 2009-11-27 13:48:44.000000000 +0100 -@@ -3526,6 +3526,21 @@ AC_ARG_WITH(kerberos5, - ] - ) - -+# Check whether user wants NSS support -+LIBNSS_MSG="no" -+AC_ARG_WITH(nss, -+ [ --with-nss Enable NSS support], -+ [ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then -+ AC_DEFINE(HAVE_LIBNSS,1,[Define if you want NSS support.]) -+ LIBNSS_MSG="yes" -+ CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I/usr/include/nss3 -I/usr/include/nspr4" -+ AC_CHECK_HEADERS(pk11pub.h) -+ LIBS="$LIBS -lnss3 -lplc4" -+ AC_CHECK_DECLS([SEC_ERROR_LOCKED_PASSWORD], [], [], [#include ]) -+ fi -+ ]) -+AC_SUBST(LIBNSS) -+ - # Looking for programs, paths and files - - PRIVSEP_PATH=/var/empty -@@ -4253,6 +4269,7 @@ echo " TCP Wrappers support - echo " MD5 password support: $MD5_MSG" - echo " libedit support: $LIBEDIT_MSG" - echo " Solaris process contract support: $SPC_MSG" -+echo " NSS support: $LIBNSS_MSG" - echo " IP address in \$DISPLAY hack: $DISPLAY_HACK_MSG" - echo " Translate v4 in v6 hack: $IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG" - echo " BSD Auth support: $BSD_AUTH_MSG" -diff -up openssh-5.3p1/key.c.nss-keys openssh-5.3p1/key.c ---- openssh-5.3p1/key.c.nss-keys 2008-11-03 09:24:17.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-5.3p1/key.c 2009-11-27 13:43:01.000000000 +0100 -@@ -96,6 +96,54 @@ key_new(int type) - return k; - } - -+#ifdef HAVE_LIBNSS -+Key * -+key_new_nss(int type) -+{ -+ Key *k = key_new(type); -+ -+ k->nss = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*k->nss)); -+ k->flags = KEY_FLAG_EXT | KEY_FLAG_NSS; -+ -+ return k; -+} -+ -+Key * -+key_new_nss_copy(int type, const Key *c) -+{ -+ Key *k = key_new_nss(type); -+ -+ switch (k->type) { -+ case KEY_RSA: -+ if ((BN_copy(k->rsa->n, c->rsa->n) == NULL) || -+ (BN_copy(k->rsa->e, c->rsa->e) == NULL)) -+ fatal("key_new_nss_copy: BN_copy failed"); -+ break; -+ case KEY_DSA: -+ if ((BN_copy(k->dsa->p, c->rsa->p) == NULL) || -+ (BN_copy(k->dsa->q, c->dsa->q) == NULL) || -+ (BN_copy(k->dsa->g, c->dsa->g) == NULL) || -+ (BN_copy(k->dsa->pub_key, c->dsa->pub_key) == NULL)) -+ fatal("key_new_nss_copy: BN_copy failed"); -+ break; -+ } -+ -+ k->nss->privk = SECKEY_CopyPrivateKey(c->nss->privk); -+ if (k->nss->privk == NULL) -+ fatal("key_new_nss_copy: SECKEY_CopyPrivateKey failed"); -+ -+ k->nss->pubk = SECKEY_CopyPublicKey(c->nss->pubk); -+ if (k->nss->pubk == NULL) -+ fatal("key_new_nss_copy: SECKEY_CopyPublicKey failed"); -+ -+ if (c->nss->privk->wincx) -+ k->nss->privk->wincx = xstrdup(c->nss->privk->wincx); -+ -+ return k; -+} -+#endif -+ -+ - Key * - key_new_private(int type) - { -@@ -151,6 +199,19 @@ key_free(Key *k) - fatal("key_free: bad key type %d", k->type); - break; - } -+#ifdef HAVE_LIBNSS -+ if (k->flags & KEY_FLAG_NSS) { -+ if (k->nss->privk != NULL && k->nss->privk->wincx != NULL) { -+ memset(k->nss->privk->wincx, 0, -+ strlen(k->nss->privk->wincx)); -+ xfree(k->nss->privk->wincx); -+ k->nss->privk->wincx = NULL; -+ } -+ SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(k->nss->privk); -+ SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(k->nss->pubk); -+ xfree(k->nss); -+ } -+#endif - xfree(k); - } - -diff -up openssh-5.3p1/key.h.nss-keys openssh-5.3p1/key.h ---- openssh-5.3p1/key.h.nss-keys 2008-06-12 20:40:35.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-5.3p1/key.h 2009-11-27 13:43:01.000000000 +0100 -@@ -29,11 +29,17 @@ - #include - #include - -+#ifdef HAVE_LIBNSS -+#include -+#include -+#endif -+ - typedef struct Key Key; - enum types { - KEY_RSA1, - KEY_RSA, - KEY_DSA, -+ KEY_NSS, - KEY_UNSPEC - }; - enum fp_type { -@@ -48,16 +54,30 @@ enum fp_rep { - - /* key is stored in external hardware */ - #define KEY_FLAG_EXT 0x0001 -+#define KEY_FLAG_NSS 0x0002 -+ -+#ifdef HAVE_LIBNSS -+typedef struct NSSKey NSSKey; -+struct NSSKey { -+ SECKEYPrivateKey *privk; -+ SECKEYPublicKey *pubk; -+}; -+#endif - - struct Key { - int type; - int flags; - RSA *rsa; - DSA *dsa; -+#ifdef HAVE_LIBNSS -+ NSSKey *nss; -+#endif - }; - - Key *key_new(int); - Key *key_new_private(int); -+Key *key_new_nss(int); -+Key *key_new_nss_copy(int, const Key *); - void key_free(Key *); - Key *key_demote(const Key *); - int key_equal(const Key *, const Key *); -diff -up openssh-5.3p1/Makefile.in.nss-keys openssh-5.3p1/Makefile.in ---- openssh-5.3p1/Makefile.in.nss-keys 2009-08-28 02:47:38.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-5.3p1/Makefile.in 2009-11-27 13:43:01.000000000 +0100 -@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=acss.o authfd.o authfile.o b - atomicio.o key.o dispatch.o kex.o mac.o uidswap.o uuencode.o misc.o \ - monitor_fdpass.o rijndael.o ssh-dss.o ssh-rsa.o dh.o kexdh.o \ - kexgex.o kexdhc.o kexgexc.o scard.o msg.o progressmeter.o dns.o \ -- entropy.o scard-opensc.o gss-genr.o umac.o jpake.o schnorr.o -+ entropy.o scard-opensc.o gss-genr.o umac.o jpake.o schnorr.o nsskeys.o - - SSHOBJS= ssh.o readconf.o clientloop.o sshtty.o \ - sshconnect.o sshconnect1.o sshconnect2.o mux.o \ -diff -up /dev/null openssh-5.3p1/nsskeys.c ---- /dev/null 2009-11-27 11:08:21.619709673 +0100 -+++ openssh-5.3p1/nsskeys.c 2009-11-27 13:45:42.000000000 +0100 -@@ -0,0 +1,443 @@ -+/* -+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. -+ * Copyright (c) 2007 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved. -+ * Copyright (c) 2009 Pierre Ossman for Cendio AB -+ * -+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without -+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions -+ * are met: -+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. -+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the -+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. -+ * -+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR -+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES -+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. -+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, -+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT -+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, -+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY -+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT -+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF -+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. -+ */ -+ -+#include "includes.h" -+#ifdef HAVE_LIBNSS -+ -+#include -+ -+#include -+#include -+#include -+ -+#include -+ -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+ -+#include "xmalloc.h" -+#include "key.h" -+#include "log.h" -+#include "misc.h" -+#include "nsskeys.h" -+#include "pathnames.h" -+ -+static char * -+password_cb(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg) -+{ -+ char *password = arg; -+ if (retry || password == NULL) -+ return NULL; -+ -+ return PL_strdup(password); -+} -+ -+int -+nss_init(PK11PasswordFunc pwfn) -+{ -+ char *dbpath; -+ char buf[MAXPATHLEN]; -+ -+ if (NSS_IsInitialized()) -+ return 0; -+ -+ if ((dbpath=getenv("NSS_DB_PATH")) == NULL) { -+ struct passwd *pw; -+ if ((pw = getpwuid(getuid())) == NULL || -+ pw->pw_dir == NULL) { -+ return -1; -+ } -+ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir, -+ _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR); -+ dbpath = buf; -+ } -+ -+ if (NSS_Init(dbpath) != SECSuccess) { -+ debug("Failed to initialize NSS library. Attempting without DB..."); -+ if (NSS_NoDB_Init(NULL) != SECSuccess) -+ return -1; -+ } -+ -+ if (pwfn == NULL) { -+ pwfn = password_cb; -+ } -+ -+ PK11_SetPasswordFunc(pwfn); -+ -+ return 0; -+} -+ -+int -+nss_load_module(const char *modpath) -+{ -+ char spec[MAXPATHLEN + 40]; -+ SECMODModule *module; -+ -+ debug("loading PKCS#11 module '%s'", modpath); -+ -+ snprintf(spec, sizeof(spec), "library=\"%s\" name=\"Foobar\"", modpath); -+ module = SECMOD_LoadUserModule(spec, NULL, PR_FALSE); -+ if (!module || !module->loaded) { -+ if (module) -+ SECMOD_DestroyModule(module); -+ return -1; -+ } -+ -+ return 0; -+} -+ -+static Key * -+make_key_from_privkey(SECKEYPrivateKey *privk, char *password) -+{ -+ Key *k; -+ switch (SECKEY_GetPrivateKeyType(privk)) { -+ case rsaKey: -+ k = key_new_nss(KEY_RSA); -+ break; -+ case dsaKey: -+ k = key_new_nss(KEY_DSA); -+ break; -+ default: -+ return NULL; -+ } -+ k->nss->pubk = SECKEY_ConvertToPublicKey(privk); -+ if (k->nss->pubk != NULL) { -+ k->nss->privk = SECKEY_CopyPrivateKey(privk); -+ } -+ if (k->nss->privk != NULL) { -+ if (password != NULL) { -+ k->nss->privk->wincx = xstrdup(password); -+ } -+ return k; -+ } -+ key_free(k); -+ return NULL; -+} -+ -+static Key ** -+add_key_to_list(Key *k, Key **keys, size_t *i, size_t *allocated) -+{ -+ if (*allocated < *i + 2) { -+ *allocated += 16; -+ keys = xrealloc(keys, *allocated, sizeof(k)); -+ } -+ keys[*i] = k; -+ (*i)++; -+ keys[*i] = NULL; -+ return keys; -+} -+ -+static int -+nss_convert_pubkey(Key *k) -+{ -+ u_char *n; -+ unsigned int len; -+ char *p; -+ -+ switch (k->type) { -+ case KEY_RSA: -+ n = k->nss->pubk->u.rsa.modulus.data; -+ len = k->nss->pubk->u.rsa.modulus.len; -+ -+ if (BN_bin2bn(n, len, k->rsa->n) == NULL) { -+ fatal("nss_convert_pubkey: BN_bin2bn failed"); -+ } -+ -+ n = k->nss->pubk->u.rsa.publicExponent.data; -+ len = k->nss->pubk->u.rsa.publicExponent.len; -+ -+ if (BN_bin2bn(n, len, k->rsa->e) == NULL) { -+ fatal("nss_convert_pubkey: BN_bin2bn failed"); -+ } -+ break; -+ case KEY_DSA: -+ n = k->nss->pubk->u.dsa.params.prime.data; -+ len = k->nss->pubk->u.dsa.params.prime.len; -+ -+ if (BN_bin2bn(n, len, k->dsa->p) == NULL) { -+ fatal("nss_convert_pubkey: BN_bin2bn failed"); -+ } -+ -+ n = k->nss->pubk->u.dsa.params.subPrime.data; -+ len = k->nss->pubk->u.dsa.params.subPrime.len; -+ -+ if (BN_bin2bn(n, len, k->dsa->q) == NULL) { -+ fatal("nss_convert_pubkey: BN_bin2bn failed"); -+ } -+ -+ n = k->nss->pubk->u.dsa.params.base.data; -+ len = k->nss->pubk->u.dsa.params.base.len; -+ -+ if (BN_bin2bn(n, len, k->dsa->g) == NULL) { -+ fatal("nss_convert_pubkey: BN_bin2bn failed"); -+ } -+ -+ n = k->nss->pubk->u.dsa.publicValue.data; -+ len = k->nss->pubk->u.dsa.publicValue.len; -+ -+ if (BN_bin2bn(n, len, k->dsa->pub_key) == NULL) { -+ fatal("nss_convert_pubkey: BN_bin2bn failed"); -+ } -+ break; -+ } -+ -+ p = key_fingerprint(k, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); -+ debug("fingerprint %u %s", key_size(k), p); -+ xfree(p); -+ -+ return 0; -+} -+ -+static int -+nss_authenticate(PK11SlotInfo *slot, char *password, int pwprompts, char **output) -+{ -+ int i, quit; -+ -+ *output = NULL; -+ -+ if (!PK11_NeedLogin(slot)) -+ return 0; -+ -+ for (i = 0; i < pwprompts; i++) { -+ SECStatus rv; -+ CK_TOKEN_INFO info; -+ -+ rv = PK11_GetTokenInfo(slot, &info); -+ if (rv != SECSuccess) { -+ error("Failed to get information for token %s", -+ PK11_GetTokenName(slot)); -+ return -1; -+ } -+ -+ if (info.flags & CKF_USER_PIN_LOCKED) { -+ error("Passphrase for token %s is locked", -+ PK11_GetTokenName(slot)); -+ return -1; -+ } -+ -+ if (info.flags & CKF_USER_PIN_FINAL_TRY) -+ debug2("Final passphrase attempt for token %s", -+ PK11_GetTokenName(slot)); -+ else if (info.flags & CKF_USER_PIN_COUNT_LOW) -+ debug2("Previous failed passphrase attempt for token %s", -+ PK11_GetTokenName(slot)); -+ -+ if (password != NULL) -+ *output = xstrdup(password); -+ else { -+ char *prompt; -+ if (asprintf(&prompt, "Enter passphrase for token %s: ", -+ PK11_GetTokenName(slot)) < 0) -+ fatal("password_cb: asprintf failed"); -+ *output = read_passphrase(prompt, RP_ALLOW_STDIN); -+ } -+ -+ if (strcmp(*output, "") == 0) { -+ debug2("no passphrase given, ignoring slot"); -+ quit = 1; -+ goto cleanup; -+ } -+ -+ quit = 0; -+ -+ rv = PK11_Authenticate(slot, PR_TRUE, *output); -+ if (rv == SECSuccess) -+ return 0; -+ -+ switch (PORT_GetError()) { -+ case SEC_ERROR_BAD_PASSWORD: -+ debug2("Incorrect passphrase, try again..."); -+ break; -+ case SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS: -+ case SEC_ERROR_BAD_DATA: -+ debug2("Invalid passphrase, try again..."); -+ break; -+#if HAVE_SEC_ERROR_LOCKED_PASSWORD -+ case SEC_ERROR_LOCKED_PASSWORD: -+ error("Unable to authenticate, token passphrase is locked"); -+ quit = 1; -+ break; -+#endif -+ default: -+ error("Failure while authenticating against token"); -+ quit = 1; -+ } -+ -+cleanup: -+ memset(*output, 0, strlen(*output)); -+ xfree(*output); -+ *output = NULL; -+ -+ /* No point in retrying the same password */ -+ if (password != NULL) -+ break; -+ -+ if (quit) -+ break; -+ } -+ -+ return -1; -+} -+ -+static Key ** -+nss_find_privkeys(const char *tokenname, const char *keyname, -+ char *password, int pwprompts) -+{ -+ Key *k = NULL; -+ Key **keys = NULL; -+ PK11SlotList *slots; -+ PK11SlotListElement *sle; -+ size_t allocated = 0; -+ size_t i = 0; -+ -+ if ((slots=PK11_FindSlotsByNames(NULL, NULL, tokenname, PR_TRUE)) == NULL) { -+ if (tokenname == NULL) { -+ debug("No NSS token found"); -+ } else { -+ debug("NSS token not found: %s", tokenname); -+ } -+ return NULL; -+ } -+ -+ for (sle = slots->head; sle; sle = sle->next) { -+ SECKEYPrivateKeyList *list; -+ SECKEYPrivateKeyListNode *node; -+ char *tmppass; -+ -+ if (nss_authenticate(sle->slot, password, pwprompts, &tmppass) == -1) -+ break; -+ -+ debug("Looking for: %s:%s", tokenname, keyname); -+ list = PK11_ListPrivKeysInSlot(sle->slot, (char *)keyname, -+ tmppass); -+ if (list == NULL && keyname != NULL) { -+ char *fooname; -+ /* NSS bug workaround */ -+ if (asprintf(&fooname, "%s~", keyname) < 0) { -+ error("nss_find_privkey: asprintf failed"); -+ PK11_FreeSlotList(slots); -+ return NULL; -+ } -+ list = PK11_ListPrivKeysInSlot(sle->slot, fooname, -+ tmppass); -+ free(fooname); -+ } -+ if (list == NULL && keyname != NULL) { -+ CERTCertificate *cert; -+ SECKEYPrivateKey *privk; -+ cert = CERT_FindCertByNickname(CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(), -+ (char *)keyname); -+ if (cert == NULL) -+ goto cleanup; -+ privk = PK11_FindPrivateKeyFromCert(sle->slot, cert, tmppass); -+ CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert); -+ if (privk == NULL) -+ goto cleanup; -+ if ((k=make_key_from_privkey(privk, tmppass)) != NULL) { -+ nss_convert_pubkey(k); -+ keys = add_key_to_list(k, keys, &i, &allocated); -+ } -+ SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(privk); -+ } else { -+ if (list == NULL) -+ goto cleanup; -+ for (node=PRIVKEY_LIST_HEAD(list); !PRIVKEY_LIST_END(node, list); -+ node=PRIVKEY_LIST_NEXT(node)) -+ if ((k=make_key_from_privkey(node->key, tmppass)) != NULL) { -+ nss_convert_pubkey(k); -+ keys = add_key_to_list(k, keys, &i, &allocated); -+ } -+ SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKeyList(list); -+ } -+cleanup: -+ if (tmppass != NULL) { -+ memset(tmppass, 0, strlen(tmppass)); -+ xfree(tmppass); -+ } -+ } -+ PK11_FreeSlotList(slots); -+ -+ return keys; -+} -+ -+Key ** -+nss_get_keys(const char *tokenname, const char *keyname, -+ char *password, int pwprompts, int num_modules, const char **modules) -+{ -+ int i; -+ Key **keys; -+ -+ if (nss_init(NULL) == -1) { -+ error("Failed to initialize NSS library"); -+ return NULL; -+ } -+ -+ for (i = 0;i < num_modules;i++) { -+ if (nss_load_module(modules[i]) == -1) { -+ error("Failed to load PKCS#11 module '%s'", modules[i]); -+ return NULL; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ keys = nss_find_privkeys(tokenname, keyname, password, pwprompts); -+ if (keys == NULL && keyname != NULL) { -+ error("Cannot find key in nss, token removed"); -+ return NULL; -+ } -+#if 0 -+ keys = xcalloc(3, sizeof(Key *)); -+ -+ if (k->type == KEY_RSA) { -+ n = key_new_nss_copy(KEY_RSA1, k); -+ -+ keys[0] = n; -+ keys[1] = k; -+ keys[2] = NULL; -+ } else { -+ keys[0] = k; -+ keys[1] = NULL; -+ } -+#endif -+ return keys; -+} -+ -+char * -+nss_get_key_label(Key *key) -+{ -+ char *label, *nickname; -+ -+ nickname = PK11_GetPrivateKeyNickname(key->nss->privk); -+ label = xstrdup(nickname); -+ PORT_Free(nickname); -+ -+ return label; -+} -+ -+#endif /* HAVE_LIBNSS */ -diff -up /dev/null openssh-5.3p1/nsskeys.h ---- /dev/null 2009-11-27 11:08:21.619709673 +0100 -+++ openssh-5.3p1/nsskeys.h 2009-11-27 13:43:01.000000000 +0100 -@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ -+/* -+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. -+ * Copyright (c) 2007 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved. -+ * -+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without -+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions -+ * are met: -+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. -+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the -+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. -+ * -+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR -+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES -+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. -+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, -+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT -+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, -+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY -+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT -+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF -+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. -+ */ -+ -+#ifndef NSSKEYS_H -+#define NSSKEYS_H -+#ifdef HAVE_LIBNSS -+#include -+#include -+ -+int nss_init(PK11PasswordFunc); -+Key **nss_get_keys(const char *, const char *, char *, int , int , const char **); -+char *nss_get_key_label(Key *); -+/*void sc_close(void);*/ -+/*int sc_put_key(Key *, const char *);*/ -+ -+#endif -+#endif -diff -up openssh-5.3p1/readconf.c.nss-keys openssh-5.3p1/readconf.c ---- openssh-5.3p1/readconf.c.nss-keys 2009-07-05 23:12:27.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-5.3p1/readconf.c 2009-11-27 13:43:01.000000000 +0100 -@@ -124,6 +124,7 @@ typedef enum { - oKbdInteractiveAuthentication, oKbdInteractiveDevices, oHostKeyAlias, - oDynamicForward, oPreferredAuthentications, oHostbasedAuthentication, - oHostKeyAlgorithms, oBindAddress, oSmartcardDevice, -+ oUseNSS, oNSSToken, oNSSModule, - oClearAllForwardings, oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost, - oEnableSSHKeysign, oRekeyLimit, oVerifyHostKeyDNS, oConnectTimeout, - oAddressFamily, oGssAuthentication, oGssDelegateCreds, -@@ -210,6 +211,15 @@ static struct { - #else - { "smartcarddevice", oUnsupported }, - #endif -+#ifdef HAVE_LIBNSS -+ { "usenss", oUseNSS }, -+ { "nsstoken", oNSSToken }, -+ { "nssmodule", oNSSModule }, -+#else -+ { "usenss", oUnsupported }, -+ { "nsstoken", oNSSToken }, -+ { "nssmodule", oUnsupported }, -+#endif - { "clearallforwardings", oClearAllForwardings }, - { "enablesshkeysign", oEnableSSHKeysign }, - { "verifyhostkeydns", oVerifyHostKeyDNS }, -@@ -613,6 +623,28 @@ parse_string: - charptr = &options->smartcard_device; - goto parse_string; - -+ case oUseNSS: -+ intptr = &options->use_nss; -+ goto parse_flag; -+ -+ case oNSSToken: -+ charptr = &options->nss_token; -+ goto parse_command; -+ -+ case oNSSModule: -+ arg = strdelim(&s); -+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0') -+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); -+ if (*activep) { -+ intptr = &options->num_nss_modules; -+ if (*intptr >= SSH_MAX_NSS_MODULES) -+ fatal("%.200s line %d: Too many PKCS#11 modules specified (max %d).", -+ filename, linenum, SSH_MAX_NSS_MODULES); -+ charptr = &options->nss_modules[*intptr]; -+ *charptr = xstrdup(arg); -+ *intptr = *intptr + 1; -+ } -+ break; - case oProxyCommand: - charptr = &options->proxy_command; - parse_command: -@@ -1052,6 +1084,9 @@ initialize_options(Options * options) - options->preferred_authentications = NULL; - options->bind_address = NULL; - options->smartcard_device = NULL; -+ options->use_nss = -1; -+ options->nss_token = NULL; -+ options->num_nss_modules = 0; - options->enable_ssh_keysign = - 1; - options->no_host_authentication_for_localhost = - 1; - options->identities_only = - 1; -@@ -1183,6 +1218,8 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options) - options->no_host_authentication_for_localhost = 0; - if (options->identities_only == -1) - options->identities_only = 0; -+ if (options->use_nss == -1) -+ options->use_nss = 0; - if (options->enable_ssh_keysign == -1) - options->enable_ssh_keysign = 0; - if (options->rekey_limit == -1) -diff -up openssh-5.3p1/readconf.h.nss-keys openssh-5.3p1/readconf.h ---- openssh-5.3p1/readconf.h.nss-keys 2009-07-05 23:12:27.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-5.3p1/readconf.h 2009-11-27 13:43:01.000000000 +0100 -@@ -85,6 +85,10 @@ typedef struct { - char *preferred_authentications; - char *bind_address; /* local socket address for connection to sshd */ - char *smartcard_device; /* Smartcard reader device */ -+ int use_nss; /* Use NSS library for keys */ -+ char *nss_token; /* Look for NSS keys on token */ -+ int num_nss_modules; /* Number of PCKS#11 modules. */ -+ char *nss_modules[SSH_MAX_NSS_MODULES]; - int verify_host_key_dns; /* Verify host key using DNS */ - - int num_identity_files; /* Number of files for RSA/DSA identities. */ -diff -up openssh-5.3p1/ssh-add.c.nss-keys openssh-5.3p1/ssh-add.c ---- openssh-5.3p1/ssh-add.c.nss-keys 2008-02-28 09:13:52.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-5.3p1/ssh-add.c 2009-11-27 13:43:01.000000000 +0100 -@@ -44,6 +44,14 @@ - #include - #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" - -+#ifdef HAVE_LIBNSS -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#include -+#endif -+ - #include - #include - #include -@@ -57,6 +65,7 @@ - #include "rsa.h" - #include "log.h" - #include "key.h" -+#include "nsskeys.h" - #include "buffer.h" - #include "authfd.h" - #include "authfile.h" -@@ -307,6 +316,128 @@ do_file(AuthenticationConnection *ac, in - return 0; - } - -+#ifdef HAVE_LIBNSS -+static char * -+password_cb(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg) -+{ -+ char **passcache = arg; -+ char *password, *p2 = NULL; -+ char *prompt; -+ -+ if (retry) -+ return NULL; -+ -+ if (asprintf(&prompt, "Enter passphrase for token %s: ", -+ PK11_GetTokenName(slot)) < 0) -+ fatal("password_cb: asprintf failed"); -+ -+ password = read_passphrase(prompt, RP_ALLOW_STDIN); -+ -+ if (password != NULL && (p2=PL_strdup(password)) == NULL) { -+ memset(password, 0, strlen(password)); -+ fatal("password_cb: PL_strdup failed"); -+ } -+ -+ if (passcache != NULL) { -+ if (*passcache != NULL) { -+ memset(*passcache, 0, strlen(*passcache)); -+ xfree(*passcache); -+ } -+ *passcache = password; -+ } else { -+ memset(password, 0, strlen(password)); -+ xfree(password); -+ } -+ -+ return p2; -+} -+ -+static int -+add_slot_keys(AuthenticationConnection *ac, PK11SlotInfo *slot, int add) -+{ -+ SECKEYPrivateKeyList *list; -+ SECKEYPrivateKeyListNode *node; -+ char *passcache = NULL; -+ char *tokenname; -+ char **xkeyname = NULL; -+ -+ int count = 0; -+ int i; -+ -+ if (PK11_NeedLogin(slot)) -+ PK11_Authenticate(slot, PR_TRUE, &passcache); -+ -+ if ((list=PK11_ListPrivKeysInSlot(slot, NULL, NULL)) == NULL) { -+ return 0; -+ } -+ -+ tokenname = PK11_GetTokenName(slot); -+ -+ for (node=PRIVKEY_LIST_HEAD(list); !PRIVKEY_LIST_END(node, list); -+ node=PRIVKEY_LIST_NEXT(node)) { -+ char *keyname; -+ SECKEYPublicKey *pub; -+ -+ keyname = PK11_GetPrivateKeyNickname(node->key); -+ if (keyname == NULL || *keyname == '\0') { -+ /* no nickname to refer to */ -+ CERTCertificate *cert; -+ char *kn; -+ cert = PK11_GetCertFromPrivateKey(node->key); -+ if (cert == NULL) -+ continue; -+ kn = strchr(cert->nickname, ':'); -+ if (kn == NULL) -+ kn = cert->nickname; -+ else -+ kn++; -+ keyname = PORT_Strdup(kn); -+ CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert); -+ if (keyname == NULL) -+ continue; -+ } -+ pub = SECKEY_ConvertToPublicKey(node->key); -+ if (pub == NULL) { -+ fprintf(stderr, "No public key for: %s:%s\n", -+ tokenname, keyname); -+ continue; /* not possible to obtain public key */ -+ } -+ SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pub); -+ -+ if ((count % 10) == 0) -+ xkeyname = xrealloc (xkeyname, count + 10, sizeof (char *)); -+ -+ xkeyname[count++] = keyname; -+ } -+ -+ PK11_Logout(slot); -+ -+ for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { -+ if (ssh_update_nss_key(ac, add, tokenname, xkeyname[i], -+ passcache?passcache:"", lifetime, confirm)) { -+ fprintf(stderr, "Key %s: %s:%s\n", -+ add?"added":"removed", tokenname, xkeyname[i]); -+ } else { -+ fprintf(stderr, "Could not %s key: %s:%s\n", -+ add?"add":"remove", tokenname, xkeyname[i]); -+ } -+ PORT_Free(xkeyname[i]); -+ } -+ -+ if (xkeyname != NULL) -+ free (xkeyname); -+ -+ if (passcache != NULL) { -+ memset(passcache, 0, strlen(passcache)); -+ xfree(passcache); -+ } -+ -+ SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKeyList(list); -+ -+ return count; -+} -+#endif -+ - static void - usage(void) - { -@@ -334,6 +465,10 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) - AuthenticationConnection *ac = NULL; - char *sc_reader_id = NULL; - int i, ch, deleting = 0, ret = 0; -+#ifdef HAVE_LIBNSS -+ char *token_id = NULL; -+ int use_nss = 0; -+#endif - - /* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */ - sanitise_stdfd(); -@@ -351,7 +486,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) - "Could not open a connection to your authentication agent.\n"); - exit(2); - } -- while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "lLcdDxXe:s:t:")) != -1) { -+ while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "lLcdDnxXe:s:t:T:")) != -1) { - switch (ch) { - case 'l': - case 'L': -@@ -373,6 +508,11 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) - if (delete_all(ac) == -1) - ret = 1; - goto done; -+#ifdef HAVE_LIBNSS -+ case 'n': -+ use_nss = 1; -+ break; -+#endif - case 's': - sc_reader_id = optarg; - break; -@@ -387,6 +527,11 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) - goto done; - } - break; -+#ifdef HAVE_LIBNSS -+ case 'T': -+ token_id = optarg; -+ break; -+#endif - default: - usage(); - ret = 1; -@@ -400,6 +545,40 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) - ret = 1; - goto done; - } -+#ifdef HAVE_LIBNSS -+ if (use_nss) { -+ PK11SlotList *slots; -+ PK11SlotListElement *sle; -+ int count = 0; -+ if (nss_init(password_cb) == -1) { -+ fprintf(stderr, "Failed to initialize NSS library\n"); -+ ret = 1; -+ goto done; -+ } -+ -+ if ((slots=PK11_GetAllTokens(CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE, -+ NULL)) == NULL) { -+ fprintf(stderr, "No tokens found\n"); -+ ret = 1; -+ goto nss_done; -+ } -+ -+ for (sle = slots->head; sle; sle = sle->next) { -+ int rv; -+ if ((rv=add_slot_keys(ac, sle->slot, !deleting)) == -1) { -+ ret = 1; -+ } -+ count += rv; -+ } -+ if (count == 0) { -+ ret = 1; -+ } -+nss_done: -+ NSS_Shutdown(); -+ clear_pass(); -+ goto done; -+ } -+#endif - if (argc == 0) { - char buf[MAXPATHLEN]; - struct passwd *pw; -diff -up openssh-5.3p1/ssh-agent.c.nss-keys openssh-5.3p1/ssh-agent.c ---- openssh-5.3p1/ssh-agent.c.nss-keys 2009-06-21 09:50:15.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-5.3p1/ssh-agent.c 2009-11-27 13:43:01.000000000 +0100 -@@ -80,6 +80,10 @@ - #include "scard.h" - #endif - -+#ifdef HAVE_LIBNSS -+#include "nsskeys.h" -+#endif -+ - #if defined(HAVE_SYS_PRCTL_H) - #include /* For prctl() and PR_SET_DUMPABLE */ - #endif -@@ -714,6 +718,114 @@ send: - } - #endif /* SMARTCARD */ - -+#ifdef HAVE_LIBNSS -+static void -+process_add_nss_key (SocketEntry *e) -+{ -+ char *tokenname = NULL, *keyname = NULL, *password = NULL; -+ int i, version, success = 0, death = 0, confirm = 0; -+ Key **keys, *k; -+ Identity *id; -+ Idtab *tab; -+ -+ tokenname = buffer_get_string(&e->request, NULL); -+ keyname = buffer_get_string(&e->request, NULL); -+ password = buffer_get_string(&e->request, NULL); -+ -+ while (buffer_len(&e->request)) { -+ switch (buffer_get_char(&e->request)) { -+ case SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME: -+ death = time(NULL) + buffer_get_int(&e->request); -+ break; -+ case SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM: -+ confirm = 1; -+ break; -+ default: -+ break; -+ } -+ } -+ if (lifetime && !death) -+ death = time(NULL) + lifetime; -+ -+ keys = nss_get_keys(tokenname, keyname, password, 1, 0, NULL); -+ /* password is owned by keys[0] now */ -+ xfree(tokenname); -+ xfree(keyname); -+ -+ if (keys == NULL) { -+ memset(password, 0, strlen(password)); -+ xfree(password); -+ error("nss_get_keys failed"); -+ goto send; -+ } -+ for (i = 0; keys[i] != NULL; i++) { -+ k = keys[i]; -+ version = k->type == KEY_RSA1 ? 1 : 2; -+ tab = idtab_lookup(version); -+ if (lookup_identity(k, version) == NULL) { -+ id = xmalloc(sizeof(Identity)); -+ id->key = k; -+ id->comment = nss_get_key_label(k); -+ id->death = death; -+ id->confirm = confirm; -+ TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&tab->idlist, id, next); -+ tab->nentries++; -+ success = 1; -+ } else { -+ key_free(k); -+ } -+ keys[i] = NULL; -+ } -+ xfree(keys); -+send: -+ buffer_put_int(&e->output, 1); -+ buffer_put_char(&e->output, -+ success ? SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS : SSH_AGENT_FAILURE); -+} -+ -+static void -+process_remove_nss_key(SocketEntry *e) -+{ -+ char *tokenname = NULL, *keyname = NULL, *password = NULL; -+ int i, version, success = 0; -+ Key **keys, *k = NULL; -+ Identity *id; -+ Idtab *tab; -+ -+ tokenname = buffer_get_string(&e->request, NULL); -+ keyname = buffer_get_string(&e->request, NULL); -+ password = buffer_get_string(&e->request, NULL); -+ -+ keys = nss_get_keys(tokenname, keyname, password, 1, 0, NULL); -+ xfree(tokenname); -+ xfree(keyname); -+ xfree(password); -+ -+ if (keys == NULL || keys[0] == NULL) { -+ error("nss_get_keys failed"); -+ goto send; -+ } -+ for (i = 0; keys[i] != NULL; i++) { -+ k = keys[i]; -+ version = k->type == KEY_RSA1 ? 1 : 2; -+ if ((id = lookup_identity(k, version)) != NULL) { -+ tab = idtab_lookup(version); -+ TAILQ_REMOVE(&tab->idlist, id, next); -+ tab->nentries--; -+ free_identity(id); -+ success = 1; -+ } -+ key_free(k); -+ keys[i] = NULL; -+ } -+ xfree(keys); -+send: -+ buffer_put_int(&e->output, 1); -+ buffer_put_char(&e->output, -+ success ? SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS : SSH_AGENT_FAILURE); -+} -+#endif /* HAVE_LIBNSS */ -+ - /* dispatch incoming messages */ - - static void -@@ -806,6 +918,15 @@ process_message(SocketEntry *e) - process_remove_smartcard_key(e); - break; - #endif /* SMARTCARD */ -+#ifdef HAVE_LIBNSS -+ case SSH_AGENTC_ADD_NSS_KEY: -+ case SSH_AGENTC_ADD_NSS_KEY_CONSTRAINED: -+ process_add_nss_key(e); -+ break; -+ case SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_NSS_KEY: -+ process_remove_nss_key(e); -+ break; -+#endif /* SMARTCARD */ - default: - /* Unknown message. Respond with failure. */ - error("Unknown message %d", type); -diff -up openssh-5.3p1/ssh.c.nss-keys openssh-5.3p1/ssh.c ---- openssh-5.3p1/ssh.c.nss-keys 2009-07-05 23:16:56.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-5.3p1/ssh.c 2009-11-27 13:43:01.000000000 +0100 -@@ -105,6 +105,9 @@ - #ifdef SMARTCARD - #include "scard.h" - #endif -+#ifdef HAVE_LIBNSS -+#include "nsskeys.h" -+#endif - - extern char *__progname; - -@@ -1234,9 +1237,11 @@ load_public_identity_files(void) - int i = 0; - Key *public; - struct passwd *pw; --#ifdef SMARTCARD -+#if defined(SMARTCARD) || defined(HAVE_LIBNSS) - Key **keys; -+#endif - -+#ifdef SMARTCARD - if (options.smartcard_device != NULL && - options.num_identity_files < SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES && - (keys = sc_get_keys(options.smartcard_device, NULL)) != NULL) { -@@ -1259,6 +1264,29 @@ load_public_identity_files(void) - xfree(keys); - } - #endif /* SMARTCARD */ -+#ifdef HAVE_LIBNSS -+ if (options.use_nss && -+ options.num_identity_files < SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES && -+ (keys = nss_get_keys(options.nss_token, NULL, NULL, -+ options.number_of_password_prompts, options.num_nss_modules, -+ options.nss_modules)) != NULL) { -+ int count; -+ for (count = 0; keys[count] != NULL; count++) { -+ memmove(&options.identity_files[1], &options.identity_files[0], -+ sizeof(char *) * (SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES - 1)); -+ memmove(&options.identity_keys[1], &options.identity_keys[0], -+ sizeof(Key *) * (SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES - 1)); -+ options.num_identity_files++; -+ options.identity_keys[0] = keys[count]; -+ options.identity_files[0] = nss_get_key_label(keys[count]); -+ } -+ if (options.num_identity_files > SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES) -+ options.num_identity_files = SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES; -+ i += count; -+ xfree(keys); -+ } -+#endif /* HAVE_LIBNSS */ -+ - if ((pw = getpwuid(original_real_uid)) == NULL) - fatal("load_public_identity_files: getpwuid failed"); - pwname = xstrdup(pw->pw_name); -diff -up openssh-5.3p1/ssh-dss.c.nss-keys openssh-5.3p1/ssh-dss.c ---- openssh-5.3p1/ssh-dss.c.nss-keys 2006-11-07 13:14:42.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-5.3p1/ssh-dss.c 2009-11-27 13:43:01.000000000 +0100 -@@ -39,6 +39,10 @@ - #include "log.h" - #include "key.h" - -+#ifdef HAVE_LIBNSS -+#include -+#endif -+ - #define INTBLOB_LEN 20 - #define SIGBLOB_LEN (2*INTBLOB_LEN) - -@@ -57,6 +61,34 @@ ssh_dss_sign(const Key *key, u_char **si - error("ssh_dss_sign: no DSA key"); - return -1; - } -+#ifdef HAVE_LIBNSS -+ if (key->flags & KEY_FLAG_NSS) { -+ SECItem sigitem; -+ SECItem *rawsig; -+ -+ memset(&sigitem, 0, sizeof(sigitem)); -+ if (SEC_SignData(&sigitem, (u_char *)data, datalen, key->nss->privk, -+ SEC_OID_ANSIX9_DSA_SIGNATURE_WITH_SHA1_DIGEST) != SECSuccess) { -+ error("ssh_dss_sign: sign failed"); -+ return -1; -+ } -+ -+ if ((rawsig=DSAU_DecodeDerSig(&sigitem)) == NULL) { -+ error("ssh_dss_sign: der decode failed"); -+ SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&sigitem, PR_FALSE); -+ return -1; -+ } -+ SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&sigitem, PR_FALSE); -+ if (rawsig->len != SIGBLOB_LEN) { -+ error("ssh_dss_sign: unsupported signature length %d", -+ rawsig->len); -+ SECITEM_ZfreeItem(rawsig, PR_TRUE); -+ return -1; -+ } -+ memcpy(sigblob, rawsig->data, SIGBLOB_LEN); -+ SECITEM_ZfreeItem(rawsig, PR_TRUE); -+ } else { -+#endif - EVP_DigestInit(&md, evp_md); - EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, data, datalen); - EVP_DigestFinal(&md, digest, &dlen); -@@ -80,7 +112,9 @@ ssh_dss_sign(const Key *key, u_char **si - BN_bn2bin(sig->r, sigblob+ SIGBLOB_LEN - INTBLOB_LEN - rlen); - BN_bn2bin(sig->s, sigblob+ SIGBLOB_LEN - slen); - DSA_SIG_free(sig); -- -+#ifdef HAVE_LIBNSS -+ } -+#endif - if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB) { - if (lenp != NULL) - *lenp = SIGBLOB_LEN; -diff -up openssh-5.3p1/ssh.h.nss-keys openssh-5.3p1/ssh.h ---- openssh-5.3p1/ssh.h.nss-keys 2006-08-05 04:39:41.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-5.3p1/ssh.h 2009-11-27 13:43:01.000000000 +0100 -@@ -28,6 +28,12 @@ - #define SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES 100 - - /* -+ * Maximum number of PKCS#11 modules that can be specified in configuration -+ * files or on the command line. -+ */ -+#define SSH_MAX_NSS_MODULES 10 -+ -+/* - * Maximum length of lines in authorized_keys file. - * Current value permits 16kbit RSA and RSA1 keys and 8kbit DSA keys, with - * some room for options and comments. -diff -up openssh-5.3p1/ssh-keygen.c.nss-keys openssh-5.3p1/ssh-keygen.c ---- openssh-5.3p1/ssh-keygen.c.nss-keys 2009-06-22 08:11:07.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-5.3p1/ssh-keygen.c 2009-11-27 13:43:01.000000000 +0100 -@@ -53,6 +53,11 @@ - #include "scard.h" - #endif - -+#ifdef HAVE_LIBNSS -+#include -+#include "nsskeys.h" -+#endif -+ - /* Number of bits in the RSA/DSA key. This value can be set on the command line. */ - #define DEFAULT_BITS 2048 - #define DEFAULT_BITS_DSA 1024 -@@ -501,6 +506,26 @@ do_download(struct passwd *pw, const cha - } - #endif /* SMARTCARD */ - -+#ifdef HAVE_LIBNSS -+static void -+do_nss_download(struct passwd *pw, const char *tokenname, const char *keyname) -+{ -+ Key **keys = NULL; -+ int i; -+ -+ keys = nss_get_keys(tokenname, keyname, NULL, 1, 0, NULL); -+ if (keys == NULL) -+ fatal("cannot find public key in NSS"); -+ for (i = 0; keys[i]; i++) { -+ key_write(keys[i], stdout); -+ key_free(keys[i]); -+ fprintf(stdout, "\n"); -+ } -+ xfree(keys); -+ exit(0); -+} -+#endif /* HAVE_LIBNSS */ -+ - static void - do_fingerprint(struct passwd *pw) - { -@@ -1083,7 +1108,8 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) - Key *private, *public; - struct passwd *pw; - struct stat st; -- int opt, type, fd, download = 0; -+ int opt, type, fd, download = 1; -+ int use_nss = 0; - u_int32_t memory = 0, generator_wanted = 0, trials = 100; - int do_gen_candidates = 0, do_screen_candidates = 0; - BIGNUM *start = NULL; -@@ -1116,7 +1142,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) - } - - while ((opt = getopt(argc, argv, -- "degiqpclBHvxXyF:b:f:t:U:D:P:N:C:r:g:R:T:G:M:S:a:W:")) != -1) { -+ "degiqpclnBHvxXyF:b:f:t:U:D:P:N:C:r:g:R:T:G:M:S:a:W:")) != -1) { - switch (opt) { - case 'b': - bits = (u_int32_t)strtonum(optarg, 768, 32768, &errstr); -@@ -1156,6 +1182,10 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) - case 'g': - print_generic = 1; - break; -+ case 'n': -+ use_nss = 1; -+ download = 1; -+ break; - case 'P': - identity_passphrase = optarg; - break; -@@ -1187,10 +1217,10 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) - case 't': - key_type_name = optarg; - break; -- case 'D': -- download = 1; -- /*FALLTHROUGH*/ - case 'U': -+ download = 0; -+ /*FALLTHROUGH*/ -+ case 'D': - reader_id = optarg; - break; - case 'v': -@@ -1299,6 +1329,17 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) - exit(0); - } - } -+ -+ if (use_nss) { -+#ifdef HAVE_LIBNSS -+ if (download) -+ do_nss_download(pw, reader_id, identity_file); -+ else -+ fatal("no support for NSS key upload."); -+#else -+ fatal("no support for NSS keys."); -+#endif -+ } - if (reader_id != NULL) { - #ifdef SMARTCARD - if (download) -diff -up openssh-5.3p1/ssh-rsa.c.nss-keys openssh-5.3p1/ssh-rsa.c ---- openssh-5.3p1/ssh-rsa.c.nss-keys 2006-09-01 07:38:37.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-5.3p1/ssh-rsa.c 2009-11-27 13:43:01.000000000 +0100 -@@ -32,6 +32,10 @@ - #include "compat.h" - #include "ssh.h" - -+#ifdef HAVE_LIBNSS -+#include -+#endif -+ - static int openssh_RSA_verify(int, u_char *, u_int, u_char *, u_int, RSA *); - - /* RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 (PKCS #1 v2.0 signature) with SHA1 */ -@@ -50,6 +54,38 @@ ssh_rsa_sign(const Key *key, u_char **si - error("ssh_rsa_sign: no RSA key"); - return -1; - } -+ -+ slen = RSA_size(key->rsa); -+ sig = xmalloc(slen); -+ -+#ifdef HAVE_LIBNSS -+ if (key->flags & KEY_FLAG_NSS) { -+ SECItem sigitem; -+ SECOidTag alg; -+ -+ memset(&sigitem, 0, sizeof(sigitem)); -+ alg = (datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) ? -+ SEC_OID_PKCS1_MD5_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION : -+ SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA1_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION; -+ -+ if (SEC_SignData(&sigitem, (u_char *)data, datalen, key->nss->privk, -+ alg) != SECSuccess) { -+ error("ssh_rsa_sign: sign failed"); -+ return -1; -+ } -+ if (sigitem.len > slen) { -+ error("ssh_rsa_sign: slen %u slen2 %u", slen, sigitem.len); -+ xfree(sig); -+ SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&sigitem, PR_FALSE); -+ return -1; -+ } -+ if (sigitem.len < slen) { -+ memset(sig, 0, slen - sigitem.len); -+ } -+ memcpy(sig+slen-sigitem.len, sigitem.data, sigitem.len); -+ SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&sigitem, PR_FALSE); -+ } else { -+#endif - nid = (datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) ? NID_md5 : NID_sha1; - if ((evp_md = EVP_get_digestbynid(nid)) == NULL) { - error("ssh_rsa_sign: EVP_get_digestbynid %d failed", nid); -@@ -59,9 +95,6 @@ ssh_rsa_sign(const Key *key, u_char **si - EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, data, datalen); - EVP_DigestFinal(&md, digest, &dlen); - -- slen = RSA_size(key->rsa); -- sig = xmalloc(slen); -- - ok = RSA_sign(nid, digest, dlen, sig, &len, key->rsa); - memset(digest, 'd', sizeof(digest)); - -@@ -83,6 +116,9 @@ ssh_rsa_sign(const Key *key, u_char **si - xfree(sig); - return -1; - } -+#ifdef HAVE_LIBNSS -+ } -+#endif - /* encode signature */ - buffer_init(&b); - buffer_put_cstring(&b, "ssh-rsa"); diff --git a/openssh-5.3p1-pka.patch b/openssh-5.3p1-pka.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 0733527..0000000 --- a/openssh-5.3p1-pka.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,444 +0,0 @@ -diff -up openssh-5.3p1/auth2-pubkey.c.pka openssh-5.3p1/auth2-pubkey.c ---- openssh-5.3p1/auth2-pubkey.c.pka 2009-03-08 01:40:28.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-5.3p1/auth2-pubkey.c 2010-01-04 16:07:53.000000000 +0100 -@@ -175,26 +175,14 @@ done: - - /* return 1 if user allows given key */ - static int --user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, char *file) -+user_search_key_in_file(FILE *f, char *file, Key* key, struct passwd *pw) - { - char line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES]; - int found_key = 0; -- FILE *f; - u_long linenum = 0; - Key *found; - char *fp; - -- /* Temporarily use the user's uid. */ -- temporarily_use_uid(pw); -- -- debug("trying public key file %s", file); -- f = auth_openkeyfile(file, pw, options.strict_modes); -- -- if (!f) { -- restore_uid(); -- return 0; -- } -- - found_key = 0; - found = key_new(key->type); - -@@ -239,21 +227,160 @@ user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, Key - break; - } - } -- restore_uid(); -- fclose(f); - key_free(found); - if (!found_key) - debug2("key not found"); - return found_key; - } - --/* check whether given key is in .ssh/authorized_keys* */ -+ -+/* return 1 if user allows given key */ -+static int -+user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, char *file) -+{ -+ FILE *f; -+ int found_key = 0; -+ -+ /* Temporarily use the user's uid. */ -+ temporarily_use_uid(pw); -+ -+ debug("trying public key file %s", file); -+ f = auth_openkeyfile(file, pw, options.strict_modes); -+ -+ if (f) { -+ found_key = user_search_key_in_file (f, file, key, pw); -+ fclose(f); -+ } -+ -+ restore_uid(); -+ return found_key; -+} -+ -+#ifdef WITH_PUBKEY_AGENT -+ -+#define WHITESPACE " \t\r\n" -+ -+/* return 1 if user allows given key */ -+static int -+user_key_via_agent_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, Key *key) -+{ -+ FILE *f; -+ int found_key = 0; -+ char *pubkey_agent_string = NULL; -+ char *tmp_pubkey_agent_string = NULL; -+ char *progname; -+ char *cp; -+ struct passwd *runas_pw; -+ struct stat st; -+ -+ if (options.pubkey_agent == NULL || options.pubkey_agent[0] != '/') -+ return -1; -+ -+ /* get the run as identity from config */ -+ runas_pw = (options.pubkey_agent_runas == NULL)? pw -+ : getpwnam (options.pubkey_agent_runas); -+ if (!runas_pw) { -+ error("%s: getpwnam(\"%s\"): %s", __func__, -+ options.pubkey_agent_runas, strerror(errno)); -+ return 0; -+ } -+ -+ /* Temporarily use the specified uid. */ -+ if (runas_pw->pw_uid != 0) -+ temporarily_use_uid(runas_pw); -+ -+ pubkey_agent_string = percent_expand(options.pubkey_agent, -+ "h", pw->pw_dir, "u", pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL); -+ -+ /* Test whether agent can be modified by non root user */ -+ tmp_pubkey_agent_string = xstrdup (pubkey_agent_string); -+ progname = strtok (tmp_pubkey_agent_string, WHITESPACE); -+ -+ debug3("%s: checking program '%s'", __func__, progname); -+ -+ if (stat (progname, &st) < 0) { -+ error("%s: stat(\"%s\"): %s", __func__, -+ progname, strerror(errno)); -+ goto go_away; -+ } -+ -+ if (st.st_uid != 0 || (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) { -+ error("bad ownership or modes for pubkey agent \"%s\"", -+ progname); -+ goto go_away; -+ } -+ -+ if (!S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) { -+ error("pubkey agent \"%s\" is not a regular file", -+ progname); -+ goto go_away; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * Descend the path, checking that each component is a -+ * root-owned directory with strict permissions. -+ */ -+ do { -+ if ((cp = strrchr(progname, '/')) == NULL) -+ break; -+ else -+ *cp = '\0'; -+ -+ debug3("%s: checking component '%s'", __func__, progname); -+ -+ if (stat(progname, &st) != 0) { -+ error("%s: stat(\"%s\"): %s", __func__, -+ progname, strerror(errno)); -+ goto go_away; -+ } -+ if (st.st_uid != 0 || (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) { -+ error("bad ownership or modes for pubkey agent path component \"%s\"", -+ progname); -+ goto go_away; -+ } -+ if (!S_ISDIR(st.st_mode)) { -+ error("pubkey agent path component \"%s\" is not a directory", -+ progname); -+ goto go_away; -+ } -+ } while (0); -+ -+ /* open the pipe and read the keys */ -+ f = popen (pubkey_agent_string, "r"); -+ if (!f) { -+ error("%s: popen (\"%s\", \"r\"): %s", __func__, -+ pubkey_agent_string, strerror (errno)); -+ goto go_away; -+ } -+ -+ found_key = user_search_key_in_file (f, options.pubkey_agent, key, pw); -+ pclose (f); -+ -+go_away: -+ if (tmp_pubkey_agent_string) -+ xfree (tmp_pubkey_agent_string); -+ if (pubkey_agent_string) -+ xfree (pubkey_agent_string); -+ -+ if (runas_pw->pw_uid != 0) -+ restore_uid(); -+ return found_key; -+} -+#endif -+ -+/* check whether given key is in = 0) -+ return success; -+#endif -+ - file = authorized_keys_file(pw); - success = user_key_allowed2(pw, key, file); - xfree(file); -diff -up openssh-5.3p1/configure.pka openssh-5.3p1/configure ---- openssh-5.3p1/configure.pka 2009-10-13 19:27:51.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-5.3p1/configure 2009-10-15 06:26:33.000000000 +0200 -@@ -769,6 +769,7 @@ with_skey - with_tcp_wrappers - with_libedit - with_audit -+with_pka - with_ssl_dir - with_openssl_header_check - with_ssl_engine -@@ -1473,6 +1474,7 @@ Optional Packages: - --with-tcp-wrappers[=PATH] Enable tcpwrappers support (optionally in PATH) - --with-libedit[=PATH] Enable libedit support for sftp - --with-audit=module Enable EXPERIMENTAL audit support (modules=debug,bsm) -+ --with-pka Enable pubkey agent support - --with-ssl-dir=PATH Specify path to OpenSSL installation - --without-openssl-header-check Disable OpenSSL version consistency check - --with-ssl-engine Enable OpenSSL (hardware) ENGINE support -@@ -13443,6 +13445,25 @@ $as_echo "$as_me: error: Unknown audit m - fi - - -+# Check whether user wants pubkey agent support -+PKA_MSG="no" -+ -+# Check whether --with-pka was given. -+if test "${with_pka+set}" = set; then -+ withval=$with_pka; -+ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then -+ -+cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF -+#define WITH_PUBKEY_AGENT 1 -+_ACEOF -+ -+ PKA_MSG="yes" -+ fi -+ -+ -+fi -+ -+ - - - -@@ -32772,6 +32793,7 @@ echo " Linux audit support - echo " Smartcard support: $SCARD_MSG" - echo " S/KEY support: $SKEY_MSG" - echo " TCP Wrappers support: $TCPW_MSG" -+echo " PKA support: $PKA_MSG" - echo " MD5 password support: $MD5_MSG" - echo " libedit support: $LIBEDIT_MSG" - echo " Solaris process contract support: $SPC_MSG" -diff -up openssh-5.3p1/configure.ac.pka openssh-5.3p1/configure.ac ---- openssh-5.3p1/configure.ac.pka 2009-09-11 06:56:08.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-5.3p1/configure.ac 2010-01-04 16:07:53.000000000 +0100 -@@ -1319,6 +1319,18 @@ AC_ARG_WITH(audit, - esac ] - ) - -+# Check whether user wants pubkey agent support -+PKA_MSG="no" -+AC_ARG_WITH(pka, -+ [ --with-pka Enable pubkey agent support], -+ [ -+ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then -+ AC_DEFINE([WITH_PUBKEY_AGENT], 1, [Enable pubkey agent support]) -+ PKA_MSG="yes" -+ fi -+ ] -+) -+ - dnl Checks for library functions. Please keep in alphabetical order - AC_CHECK_FUNCS( \ - arc4random \ -@@ -4229,6 +4241,7 @@ echo " SELinux support - echo " Smartcard support: $SCARD_MSG" - echo " S/KEY support: $SKEY_MSG" - echo " TCP Wrappers support: $TCPW_MSG" -+echo " PKA support: $PKA_MSG" - echo " MD5 password support: $MD5_MSG" - echo " libedit support: $LIBEDIT_MSG" - echo " Solaris process contract support: $SPC_MSG" -diff -up openssh-5.3p1/servconf.c.pka openssh-5.3p1/servconf.c ---- openssh-5.3p1/servconf.c.pka 2009-06-21 12:26:17.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-5.3p1/servconf.c 2010-01-04 16:07:53.000000000 +0100 -@@ -127,6 +127,8 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions - options->num_permitted_opens = -1; - options->adm_forced_command = NULL; - options->chroot_directory = NULL; -+ options->pubkey_agent = NULL; -+ options->pubkey_agent_runas = NULL; - options->zero_knowledge_password_authentication = -1; - } - -@@ -306,6 +308,7 @@ typedef enum { - sMatch, sPermitOpen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory, - sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding, - sZeroKnowledgePasswordAuthentication, -+ sPubkeyAgent, sPubkeyAgentRunAs, - sDeprecated, sUnsupported - } ServerOpCodes; - -@@ -424,6 +427,13 @@ static struct { - { "permitopen", sPermitOpen, SSHCFG_ALL }, - { "forcecommand", sForceCommand, SSHCFG_ALL }, - { "chrootdirectory", sChrootDirectory, SSHCFG_ALL }, -+#ifdef WITH_PUBKEY_AGENT -+ { "pubkeyagent", sPubkeyAgent, SSHCFG_ALL }, -+ { "pubkeyagentrunas", sPubkeyAgentRunAs, SSHCFG_ALL }, -+#else -+ { "pubkeyagent", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL }, -+ { "pubkeyagentrunas", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL }, -+#endif - { NULL, sBadOption, 0 } - }; - -@@ -1294,6 +1304,20 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions - *charptr = xstrdup(arg); - break; - -+ case sPubkeyAgent: -+ len = strspn(cp, WHITESPACE); -+ if (*activep && options->pubkey_agent == NULL) -+ options->pubkey_agent = xstrdup(cp + len); -+ return 0; -+ -+ case sPubkeyAgentRunAs: -+ charptr = &options->pubkey_agent_runas; -+ -+ arg = strdelim(&cp); -+ if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) -+ *charptr = xstrdup(arg); -+ break; -+ - case sDeprecated: - logit("%s line %d: Deprecated option %s", - filename, linenum, arg); -@@ -1387,6 +1411,8 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *d - M_CP_INTOPT(gss_authentication); - M_CP_INTOPT(rsa_authentication); - M_CP_INTOPT(pubkey_authentication); -+ M_CP_STROPT(pubkey_agent); -+ M_CP_STROPT(pubkey_agent_runas); - M_CP_INTOPT(kerberos_authentication); - M_CP_INTOPT(hostbased_authentication); - M_CP_INTOPT(kbd_interactive_authentication); -@@ -1626,6 +1652,10 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o) - dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedKeysFile, o->authorized_keys_file); - dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedKeysFile2, o->authorized_keys_file2); - dump_cfg_string(sForceCommand, o->adm_forced_command); -+#ifdef WITH_PUBKEY_AGENT -+ dump_cfg_string(sPubkeyAgent, o->pubkey_agent); -+ dump_cfg_string(sPubkeyAgentRunAs, o->pubkey_agent_runas); -+#endif - - /* string arguments requiring a lookup */ - dump_cfg_string(sLogLevel, log_level_name(o->log_level)); -diff -up openssh-5.3p1/servconf.h.pka openssh-5.3p1/servconf.h ---- openssh-5.3p1/servconf.h.pka 2009-01-28 06:31:23.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-5.3p1/servconf.h 2010-01-04 16:07:53.000000000 +0100 -@@ -151,6 +151,8 @@ typedef struct { - int num_permitted_opens; - - char *chroot_directory; -+ char *pubkey_agent; -+ char *pubkey_agent_runas; - } ServerOptions; - - void initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *); -diff -up openssh-5.3p1/sshd_config.0.pka openssh-5.3p1/sshd_config.0 ---- openssh-5.3p1/sshd_config.0.pka 2009-09-26 08:31:16.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-5.3p1/sshd_config.0 2010-01-04 16:07:53.000000000 +0100 -@@ -344,10 +344,11 @@ DESCRIPTION - AllowTcpForwarding, Banner, ChrootDirectory, ForceCommand, - GatewayPorts, GSSAPIAuthentication, HostbasedAuthentication, - KbdInteractiveAuthentication, KerberosAuthentication, -- MaxAuthTries, MaxSessions, PasswordAuthentication, -- PermitEmptyPasswords, PermitOpen, PermitRootLogin, -- RhostsRSAAuthentication, RSAAuthentication, X11DisplayOffset, -- X11Forwarding and X11UseLocalHost. -+ MaxAuthTries, MaxSessions, PubkeyAuthentication, PubkeyAgent, -+ PubkeyAgentRunAs, PasswordAuthentication, PermitEmptyPasswords, -+ PermitOpen, PermitRootLogin, RhostsRSAAuthentication, -+ RSAAuthentication, X11DisplayOffset, X11Forwarding and -+ X11UseLocalHost. - - MaxAuthTries - Specifies the maximum number of authentication attempts permitted -@@ -455,6 +456,17 @@ DESCRIPTION - fault is ``yes''. Note that this option applies to protocol ver- - sion 2 only. - -+ PubkeyAgent -+ Specifies which agent is used for lookup of the user's public -+ keys. Empty string means to use the authorized_keys file. By -+ default there is no PubkeyAgent set. Note that this option has -+ an effect only with PubkeyAuthentication switched on. -+ -+ PubkeyAgentRunAs -+ Specifies the user under whose account the PubkeyAgent is run. -+ Empty string (the default value) means the user being authorized -+ is used. -+ - RhostsRSAAuthentication - Specifies whether rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication to- - gether with successful RSA host authentication is allowed. The -diff -up openssh-5.3p1/sshd_config.pka openssh-5.3p1/sshd_config ---- openssh-5.3p1/sshd_config.pka 2008-07-02 14:35:43.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-5.3p1/sshd_config 2010-01-04 16:07:53.000000000 +0100 -@@ -46,6 +46,8 @@ Protocol 2 - #RSAAuthentication yes - #PubkeyAuthentication yes - #AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys -+#PubkeyAgent none -+#PubkeyAgentRunAs nobody - - # For this to work you will also need host keys in /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts - #RhostsRSAAuthentication no -diff -up openssh-5.3p1/sshd_config.5.pka openssh-5.3p1/sshd_config.5 ---- openssh-5.3p1/sshd_config.5.pka 2009-08-28 02:27:08.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-5.3p1/sshd_config.5 2010-01-04 16:07:53.000000000 +0100 -@@ -610,6 +610,9 @@ Available keywords are - .Cm KerberosAuthentication , - .Cm MaxAuthTries , - .Cm MaxSessions , -+.Cm PubkeyAuthentication , -+.Cm PubkeyAgent , -+.Cm PubkeyAgentRunAs , - .Cm PasswordAuthentication , - .Cm PermitEmptyPasswords , - .Cm PermitOpen , -@@ -805,6 +808,16 @@ Specifies whether public key authenticat - The default is - .Dq yes . - Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only. -+.It Cm PubkeyAgent -+Specifies which agent is used for lookup of the user's public -+keys. Empty string means to use the authorized_keys file. -+By default there is no PubkeyAgent set. -+Note that this option has an effect only with PubkeyAuthentication -+switched on. -+.It Cm PubkeyAgentRunAs -+Specifies the user under whose account the PubkeyAgent is run. Empty -+string (the default value) means the user being authorized is used. -+.Dq - .It Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication - Specifies whether rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication together - with successful RSA host authentication is allowed. diff --git a/openssh-5.4p1-0.beta1.fc14.src.rpm b/openssh-5.4p1-0.beta1.fc14.src.rpm deleted file mode 100644 index 8d5379b..0000000 Binary files a/openssh-5.4p1-0.beta1.fc14.src.rpm and /dev/null differ diff --git a/openssh-5.4p1-1.fc14.src.rpm b/openssh-5.4p1-1.fc14.src.rpm deleted file mode 100644 index d4251e2..0000000 Binary files a/openssh-5.4p1-1.fc14.src.rpm and /dev/null differ diff --git a/openssh-5.4p1-23.fc14.src.rpm b/openssh-5.4p1-23.fc14.src.rpm deleted file mode 100644 index f456db7..0000000 Binary files a/openssh-5.4p1-23.fc14.src.rpm and /dev/null differ diff --git a/openssh-5.4p1-fips.patch b/openssh-5.4p1-fips.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..943ab0f --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh-5.4p1-fips.patch @@ -0,0 +1,684 @@ +diff -up openssh-5.4p1/auth2-pubkey.c.fips openssh-5.4p1/auth2-pubkey.c +--- openssh-5.4p1/auth2-pubkey.c.fips 2010-03-01 17:55:26.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-5.4p1/auth2-pubkey.c 2010-03-01 17:57:56.000000000 +0100 +@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ + #include + #include + #include ++#include + + #include "xmalloc.h" + #include "ssh.h" +@@ -269,7 +270,7 @@ user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, Key + found_key = 1; + debug("matching key found: file %s, line %lu", + file, linenum); +- fp = key_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); ++ fp = key_fingerprint(found, FIPS_mode() ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); + verbose("Found matching %s key: %s", + key_type(found), fp); + xfree(fp); +diff -up openssh-5.4p1/authfile.c.fips openssh-5.4p1/authfile.c +--- openssh-5.4p1/authfile.c.fips 2010-01-12 09:42:29.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-5.4p1/authfile.c 2010-03-01 17:55:28.000000000 +0100 +@@ -146,8 +146,14 @@ key_save_private_rsa1(Key *key, const ch + /* Allocate space for the private part of the key in the buffer. */ + cp = buffer_append_space(&encrypted, buffer_len(&buffer)); + +- cipher_set_key_string(&ciphercontext, cipher, passphrase, +- CIPHER_ENCRYPT); ++ if (cipher_set_key_string(&ciphercontext, cipher, passphrase, ++ CIPHER_ENCRYPT) < 0) { ++ error("cipher_set_key_string failed."); ++ buffer_free(&encrypted); ++ buffer_free(&buffer); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ + cipher_crypt(&ciphercontext, cp, + buffer_ptr(&buffer), buffer_len(&buffer)); + cipher_cleanup(&ciphercontext); +@@ -421,8 +427,14 @@ key_load_private_rsa1(int fd, const char + cp = buffer_append_space(&decrypted, buffer_len(&buffer)); + + /* Rest of the buffer is encrypted. Decrypt it using the passphrase. */ +- cipher_set_key_string(&ciphercontext, cipher, passphrase, +- CIPHER_DECRYPT); ++ if (cipher_set_key_string(&ciphercontext, cipher, passphrase, ++ CIPHER_DECRYPT) < 0) { ++ error("cipher_set_key_string failed."); ++ buffer_free(&decrypted); ++ buffer_free(&buffer); ++ goto fail; ++ } ++ + cipher_crypt(&ciphercontext, cp, + buffer_ptr(&buffer), buffer_len(&buffer)); + cipher_cleanup(&ciphercontext); +diff -up openssh-5.4p1/cipher.c.fips openssh-5.4p1/cipher.c +--- openssh-5.4p1/cipher.c.fips 2010-03-01 15:09:22.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-5.4p1/cipher.c 2010-03-01 17:55:28.000000000 +0100 +@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ + #include + + #include ++#include + + #include + #include +@@ -93,6 +94,22 @@ struct Cipher { + { NULL, SSH_CIPHER_INVALID, 0, 0, 0, 0, NULL } + }; + ++struct Cipher fips_ciphers[] = { ++ { "none", SSH_CIPHER_NONE, 8, 0, 0, 0, EVP_enc_null }, ++ { "3des", SSH_CIPHER_3DES, 8, 16, 0, 1, evp_ssh1_3des }, ++ ++ { "3des-cbc", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 24, 0, 1, EVP_des_ede3_cbc }, ++ { "aes128-cbc", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 16, 0, 1, EVP_aes_128_cbc }, ++ { "aes192-cbc", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 24, 0, 1, EVP_aes_192_cbc }, ++ { "aes256-cbc", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 0, 1, EVP_aes_256_cbc }, ++ { "rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se", ++ SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 0, 1, EVP_aes_256_cbc }, ++ { "aes128-ctr", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 16, 0, 0, evp_aes_128_ctr }, ++ { "aes192-ctr", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 24, 0, 0, evp_aes_128_ctr }, ++ { "aes256-ctr", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 0, 0, evp_aes_128_ctr }, ++ { NULL, SSH_CIPHER_INVALID, 0, 0, 0, 0, NULL } ++}; ++ + /*--*/ + + u_int +@@ -135,7 +152,7 @@ Cipher * + cipher_by_name(const char *name) + { + Cipher *c; +- for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++) ++ for (c = FIPS_mode() ? fips_ciphers : ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++) + if (strcmp(c->name, name) == 0) + return c; + return NULL; +@@ -145,7 +162,7 @@ Cipher * + cipher_by_number(int id) + { + Cipher *c; +- for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++) ++ for (c = FIPS_mode() ? fips_ciphers : ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++) + if (c->number == id) + return c; + return NULL; +@@ -189,7 +206,7 @@ cipher_number(const char *name) + Cipher *c; + if (name == NULL) + return -1; +- for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++) ++ for (c = FIPS_mode() ? fips_ciphers : ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++) + if (strcasecmp(c->name, name) == 0) + return c->number; + return -1; +@@ -296,14 +313,15 @@ cipher_cleanup(CipherContext *cc) + * passphrase and using the resulting 16 bytes as the key. + */ + +-void ++int + cipher_set_key_string(CipherContext *cc, Cipher *cipher, + const char *passphrase, int do_encrypt) + { + MD5_CTX md; + u_char digest[16]; + +- MD5_Init(&md); ++ if (MD5_Init(&md) <= 0) ++ return -1; + MD5_Update(&md, (const u_char *)passphrase, strlen(passphrase)); + MD5_Final(digest, &md); + +@@ -311,6 +329,7 @@ cipher_set_key_string(CipherContext *cc, + + memset(digest, 0, sizeof(digest)); + memset(&md, 0, sizeof(md)); ++ return 0; + } + + /* +diff -up openssh-5.4p1/cipher-ctr.c.fips openssh-5.4p1/cipher-ctr.c +--- openssh-5.4p1/cipher-ctr.c.fips 2007-06-14 15:21:33.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-5.4p1/cipher-ctr.c 2010-03-01 17:55:28.000000000 +0100 +@@ -140,7 +140,8 @@ evp_aes_128_ctr(void) + aes_ctr.do_cipher = ssh_aes_ctr; + #ifndef SSH_OLD_EVP + aes_ctr.flags = EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE | EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH | +- EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV; ++ EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV | ++ EVP_CIPH_FLAG_FIPS; + #endif + return (&aes_ctr); + } +diff -up openssh-5.4p1/cipher.h.fips openssh-5.4p1/cipher.h +--- openssh-5.4p1/cipher.h.fips 2009-01-28 06:38:41.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-5.4p1/cipher.h 2010-03-01 17:55:28.000000000 +0100 +@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ void cipher_init(CipherContext *, Ciphe + const u_char *, u_int, int); + void cipher_crypt(CipherContext *, u_char *, const u_char *, u_int); + void cipher_cleanup(CipherContext *); +-void cipher_set_key_string(CipherContext *, Cipher *, const char *, int); ++int cipher_set_key_string(CipherContext *, Cipher *, const char *, int); + u_int cipher_blocksize(const Cipher *); + u_int cipher_keylen(const Cipher *); + u_int cipher_is_cbc(const Cipher *); +diff -up openssh-5.4p1/mac.c.fips openssh-5.4p1/mac.c +--- openssh-5.4p1/mac.c.fips 2008-06-13 02:58:50.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-5.4p1/mac.c 2010-03-01 17:55:28.000000000 +0100 +@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ + #include + + #include ++#include + + #include + #include +@@ -47,14 +48,14 @@ + #define SSH_EVP 1 /* OpenSSL EVP-based MAC */ + #define SSH_UMAC 2 /* UMAC (not integrated with OpenSSL) */ + +-struct { ++struct Macs { + char *name; + int type; + const EVP_MD * (*mdfunc)(void); + int truncatebits; /* truncate digest if != 0 */ + int key_len; /* just for UMAC */ + int len; /* just for UMAC */ +-} macs[] = { ++} all_macs[] = { + { "hmac-sha1", SSH_EVP, EVP_sha1, 0, -1, -1 }, + { "hmac-sha1-96", SSH_EVP, EVP_sha1, 96, -1, -1 }, + { "hmac-md5", SSH_EVP, EVP_md5, 0, -1, -1 }, +@@ -65,9 +66,15 @@ struct { + { NULL, 0, NULL, 0, -1, -1 } + }; + ++struct Macs fips_macs[] = { ++ { "hmac-sha1", SSH_EVP, EVP_sha1, 0, -1, -1 }, ++ { NULL, 0, NULL, 0, -1, -1 } ++}; ++ + static void + mac_setup_by_id(Mac *mac, int which) + { ++ struct Macs *macs = FIPS_mode() ? fips_macs : all_macs; + int evp_len; + mac->type = macs[which].type; + if (mac->type == SSH_EVP) { +@@ -88,6 +95,7 @@ int + mac_setup(Mac *mac, char *name) + { + int i; ++ struct Macs *macs = FIPS_mode() ? fips_macs : all_macs; + + for (i = 0; macs[i].name; i++) { + if (strcmp(name, macs[i].name) == 0) { +diff -up openssh-5.4p1/Makefile.in.fips openssh-5.4p1/Makefile.in +--- openssh-5.4p1/Makefile.in.fips 2010-02-24 08:18:51.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-5.4p1/Makefile.in 2010-03-01 17:55:28.000000000 +0100 +@@ -139,31 +139,31 @@ libssh.a: $(LIBSSH_OBJS) + $(RANLIB) $@ + + ssh$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SSHOBJS) +- $(LD) -o $@ $(SSHOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) ++ $(LD) -o $@ $(SSHOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(LIBS) + + sshd$(EXEEXT): libssh.a $(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHDOBJS) +- $(LD) -o $@ $(SSHDOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(SSHDLIBS) $(LIBS) ++ $(LD) -o $@ $(SSHDOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(SSHDLIBS) $(LIBS) + + scp$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a scp.o progressmeter.o + $(LD) -o $@ scp.o progressmeter.o bufaux.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) + + ssh-add$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-add.o +- $(LD) -o $@ ssh-add.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) ++ $(LD) -o $@ ssh-add.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(LIBS) + + ssh-agent$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-agent.o ssh-pkcs11-client.o +- $(LD) -o $@ ssh-agent.o ssh-pkcs11-client.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) ++ $(LD) -o $@ ssh-agent.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(LIBS) + + ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keygen.o +- $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keygen.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) ++ $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keygen.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(LIBS) + + ssh-keysign$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keysign.o roaming_dummy.o readconf.o +- $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keysign.o readconf.o roaming_dummy.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) ++ $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keysign.o readconf.o roaming_dummy.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lfipscheck $(LIBS) + + ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-pkcs11-helper.o ssh-pkcs11.o + $(LD) -o $@ ssh-pkcs11-helper.o ssh-pkcs11.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) + + ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keyscan.o roaming_dummy.o +- $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o roaming_dummy.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS) ++ $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o roaming_dummy.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lfipscheck $(LIBS) + + sftp-server$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a sftp.o sftp-common.o sftp-server.o sftp-server-main.o + $(LD) -o $@ sftp-server.o sftp-common.o sftp-server-main.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) +diff -up openssh-5.4p1/myproposal.h.fips openssh-5.4p1/myproposal.h +--- openssh-5.4p1/myproposal.h.fips 2010-02-26 21:55:05.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-5.4p1/myproposal.h 2010-03-01 17:55:28.000000000 +0100 +@@ -55,7 +55,12 @@ + "hmac-sha1-96,hmac-md5-96" + #define KEX_DEFAULT_COMP "none,zlib@openssh.com,zlib" + #define KEX_DEFAULT_LANG "" +- ++#define KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT \ ++ "aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr," \ ++ "aes128-cbc,3des-cbc," \ ++ "aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc,rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se" ++#define KEX_FIPS_MAC \ ++ "hmac-sha1" + + static char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { + KEX_DEFAULT_KEX, +diff -up openssh-5.4p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-arc4random.c.fips openssh-5.4p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-arc4random.c +--- openssh-5.4p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-arc4random.c.fips 2008-06-04 02:54:00.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-5.4p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-arc4random.c 2010-03-01 17:55:28.000000000 +0100 +@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ + static int rc4_ready = 0; + static RC4_KEY rc4; + ++#if 0 + unsigned int + arc4random(void) + { +@@ -82,6 +83,32 @@ arc4random_stir(void) + + rc4_ready = REKEY_BYTES; + } ++#else ++unsigned int ++arc4random(void) ++{ ++ unsigned int r = 0; ++ void *rp = &r; ++ ++ if (!rc4_ready) { ++ arc4random_stir(); ++ } ++ RAND_bytes(rp, sizeof(r)); ++ ++ return(r); ++} ++ ++void ++arc4random_stir(void) ++{ ++ unsigned char rand_buf[SEED_SIZE]; ++ ++ if (RAND_bytes(rand_buf, sizeof(rand_buf)) <= 0) ++ fatal("Couldn't obtain random bytes (error %ld)", ++ ERR_get_error()); ++ rc4_ready = 1; ++} ++#endif + #endif /* !HAVE_ARC4RANDOM */ + + #ifndef ARC4RANDOM_BUF +diff -up openssh-5.4p1/ssh-add.c.fips openssh-5.4p1/ssh-add.c +--- openssh-5.4p1/ssh-add.c.fips 2010-02-26 21:55:06.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-5.4p1/ssh-add.c 2010-03-01 17:55:28.000000000 +0100 +@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ + #include + + #include ++#include + #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" + + #include +@@ -270,7 +271,7 @@ list_identities(AuthenticationConnection + key = ssh_get_next_identity(ac, &comment, version)) { + had_identities = 1; + if (do_fp) { +- fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, ++ fp = key_fingerprint(key, FIPS_mode() ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5, + SSH_FP_HEX); + printf("%d %s %s (%s)\n", + key_size(key), fp, comment, key_type(key)); +diff -up openssh-5.4p1/ssh-agent.c.fips openssh-5.4p1/ssh-agent.c +--- openssh-5.4p1/ssh-agent.c.fips 2010-02-26 21:55:06.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-5.4p1/ssh-agent.c 2010-03-01 17:55:28.000000000 +0100 +@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ + + #include + #include ++#include + #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" + + #include +@@ -199,9 +200,9 @@ confirm_key(Identity *id) + char *p; + int ret = -1; + +- p = key_fingerprint(id->key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); +- if (ask_permission("Allow use of key %s?\nKey fingerprint %s.", +- id->comment, p)) ++ p = key_fingerprint(id->key, FIPS_mode() ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); ++ if (ask_permission("Allow use of key %s?\nKey %sfingerprint %s.", ++ id->comment, FIPS_mode() ? "SHA1 " : "", p)) + ret = 0; + xfree(p); + +diff -up openssh-5.4p1/ssh.c.fips openssh-5.4p1/ssh.c +--- openssh-5.4p1/ssh.c.fips 2010-02-26 21:55:06.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-5.4p1/ssh.c 2010-03-01 17:55:28.000000000 +0100 +@@ -72,6 +72,8 @@ + + #include + #include ++#include ++#include + #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" + #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" + +@@ -225,6 +227,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av) + sanitise_stdfd(); + + __progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]); ++ SSLeay_add_all_algorithms(); ++ if (FIPS_mode() && !FIPSCHECK_verify(NULL, NULL)) { ++ fatal("FIPS integrity verification test failed."); ++ } + init_rng(); + + /* +@@ -285,6 +291,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av) + "ACD:F:I:KL:MNO:PR:S:TVw:W:XYy")) != -1) { + switch (opt) { + case '1': ++ if (FIPS_mode()) { ++ fatal("Protocol 1 not allowed in the FIPS mode."); ++ } + options.protocol = SSH_PROTO_1; + break; + case '2': +@@ -581,7 +590,6 @@ main(int ac, char **av) + if (!host) + usage(); + +- SSLeay_add_all_algorithms(); + ERR_load_crypto_strings(); + + /* Initialize the command to execute on remote host. */ +@@ -667,6 +675,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av) + + seed_rng(); + ++ if (FIPS_mode()) { ++ logit("FIPS mode initialized"); ++ } ++ + if (options.user == NULL) + options.user = xstrdup(pw->pw_name); + +@@ -733,6 +745,12 @@ main(int ac, char **av) + + timeout_ms = options.connection_timeout * 1000; + ++ if (FIPS_mode()) { ++ options.protocol &= SSH_PROTO_2; ++ if (options.protocol == 0) ++ fatal("Protocol 2 disabled by configuration but required in the FIPS mode."); ++ } ++ + /* Open a connection to the remote host. */ + if (ssh_connect(host, &hostaddr, options.port, + options.address_family, options.connection_attempts, &timeout_ms, +diff -up openssh-5.4p1/sshconnect2.c.fips openssh-5.4p1/sshconnect2.c +--- openssh-5.4p1/sshconnect2.c.fips 2010-03-01 17:55:28.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-5.4p1/sshconnect2.c 2010-03-01 17:55:29.000000000 +0100 +@@ -44,6 +44,8 @@ + #include + #endif + ++#include ++ + #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" + + #include "xmalloc.h" +@@ -116,6 +118,10 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *ho + if (options.ciphers != NULL) { + myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = + myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = options.ciphers; ++ } else if (FIPS_mode()) { ++ myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = ++ myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT; ++ + } + myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = + compat_cipher_proposal(myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS]); +@@ -131,7 +137,11 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *ho + if (options.macs != NULL) { + myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] = + myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = options.macs; ++ } else if (FIPS_mode()) { ++ myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] = ++ myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = KEX_FIPS_MAC; + } ++ + if (options.hostkeyalgorithms != NULL) + myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = + options.hostkeyalgorithms; +@@ -529,8 +539,8 @@ input_userauth_pk_ok(int type, u_int32_t + key->type, pktype); + goto done; + } +- fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); +- debug2("input_userauth_pk_ok: fp %s", fp); ++ fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_SHA1, SSH_FP_HEX); ++ debug2("input_userauth_pk_ok: SHA1 fp %s", fp); + xfree(fp); + + /* +diff -up openssh-5.4p1/sshconnect.c.fips openssh-5.4p1/sshconnect.c +--- openssh-5.4p1/sshconnect.c.fips 2010-02-26 21:55:06.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-5.4p1/sshconnect.c 2010-03-01 17:55:29.000000000 +0100 +@@ -40,6 +40,8 @@ + #include + #include + ++#include ++ + #include "xmalloc.h" + #include "key.h" + #include "hostfile.h" +@@ -789,6 +791,7 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct so + goto fail; + } else if (options.strict_host_key_checking == 2) { + char msg1[1024], msg2[1024]; ++ int fips_on = FIPS_mode(); + + if (show_other_keys(host, host_key)) + snprintf(msg1, sizeof(msg1), +@@ -797,8 +800,8 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct so + else + snprintf(msg1, sizeof(msg1), "."); + /* The default */ +- fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); +- ra = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5, ++ fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, fips_on ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); ++ ra = key_fingerprint(host_key, fips_on ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5, + SSH_FP_RANDOMART); + msg2[0] = '\0'; + if (options.verify_host_key_dns) { +@@ -814,10 +817,10 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct so + snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg), + "The authenticity of host '%.200s (%s)' can't be " + "established%s\n" +- "%s key fingerprint is %s.%s%s\n%s" ++ "%s key %sfingerprint is %s.%s%s\n%s" + "Are you sure you want to continue connecting " + "(yes/no)? ", +- host, ip, msg1, type, fp, ++ host, ip, msg1, type, fips_on ? "SHA1 " : "", fp, + options.visual_host_key ? "\n" : "", + options.visual_host_key ? ra : "", + msg2); +@@ -1131,17 +1134,18 @@ show_key_from_file(const char *file, con + Key *found; + char *fp, *ra; + int line, ret; ++ int fips_on = FIPS_mode(); + + found = key_new(keytype); + if ((ret = lookup_key_in_hostfile_by_type(file, host, + keytype, found, &line))) { +- fp = key_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); +- ra = key_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_RANDOMART); ++ fp = key_fingerprint(found, fips_on ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); ++ ra = key_fingerprint(found, fips_on ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_RANDOMART); + logit("WARNING: %s key found for host %s\n" + "in %s:%d\n" +- "%s key fingerprint %s.\n%s\n", ++ "%s key %sfingerprint %s.\n%s\n", + key_type(found), host, file, line, +- key_type(found), fp, ra); ++ key_type(found), fips_on ? "SHA1 ":"", fp, ra); + xfree(ra); + xfree(fp); + } +@@ -1187,8 +1191,9 @@ warn_changed_key(Key *host_key) + { + char *fp; + const char *type = key_type(host_key); ++ int fips_on = FIPS_mode(); + +- fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); ++ fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, fips_on ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); + + error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@"); + error("@ WARNING: REMOTE HOST IDENTIFICATION HAS CHANGED! @"); +@@ -1196,8 +1201,8 @@ warn_changed_key(Key *host_key) + error("IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SOMEONE IS DOING SOMETHING NASTY!"); + error("Someone could be eavesdropping on you right now (man-in-the-middle attack)!"); + error("It is also possible that the %s host key has just been changed.", type); +- error("The fingerprint for the %s key sent by the remote host is\n%s.", +- type, fp); ++ error("The %sfingerprint for the %s key sent by the remote host is\n%s.", ++ fips_on ? "SHA1 ":"", type, fp); + error("Please contact your system administrator."); + + xfree(fp); +diff -up openssh-5.4p1/sshd.c.fips openssh-5.4p1/sshd.c +--- openssh-5.4p1/sshd.c.fips 2010-03-01 17:55:27.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-5.4p1/sshd.c 2010-03-01 17:55:29.000000000 +0100 +@@ -76,6 +76,8 @@ + #include + #include + #include ++#include ++#include + #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" + + #ifdef HAVE_SECUREWARE +@@ -1298,6 +1300,12 @@ main(int ac, char **av) + (void)set_auth_parameters(ac, av); + #endif + __progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]); ++ ++ SSLeay_add_all_algorithms(); ++ if (FIPS_mode() && !FIPSCHECK_verify(NULL, NULL)) { ++ fatal("FIPS integrity verification test failed."); ++ } ++ + init_rng(); + + /* Save argv. Duplicate so setproctitle emulation doesn't clobber it */ +@@ -1459,8 +1467,6 @@ main(int ac, char **av) + else + closefrom(REEXEC_DEVCRYPTO_RESERVED_FD); + +- SSLeay_add_all_algorithms(); +- + /* + * Force logging to stderr until we have loaded the private host + * key (unless started from inetd) +@@ -1578,6 +1584,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av) + debug("private host key: #%d type %d %s", i, key->type, + key_type(key)); + } ++ if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) && FIPS_mode()) { ++ logit("Disabling protocol version 1. Not allowed in the FIPS mode."); ++ options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_1; ++ } + if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) && !sensitive_data.have_ssh1_key) { + logit("Disabling protocol version 1. Could not load host key"); + options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_1; +@@ -1742,6 +1752,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av) + /* Initialize the random number generator. */ + arc4random_stir(); + ++ if (FIPS_mode()) { ++ logit("FIPS mode initialized"); ++ } ++ + /* Chdir to the root directory so that the current disk can be + unmounted if desired. */ + chdir("/"); +@@ -2274,6 +2288,9 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void) + if (options.ciphers != NULL) { + myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = + myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = options.ciphers; ++ } else if (FIPS_mode()) { ++ myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = ++ myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT; + } + myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = + compat_cipher_proposal(myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS]); +@@ -2283,6 +2300,9 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void) + if (options.macs != NULL) { + myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] = + myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = options.macs; ++ } else if (FIPS_mode()) { ++ myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] = ++ myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = KEX_FIPS_MAC; + } + if (options.compression == COMP_NONE) { + myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] = +diff -up openssh-5.4p1/ssh-keygen.c.fips openssh-5.4p1/ssh-keygen.c +--- openssh-5.4p1/ssh-keygen.c.fips 2010-02-26 21:55:06.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-5.4p1/ssh-keygen.c 2010-03-01 17:55:29.000000000 +0100 +@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ + + #include + #include ++#include + #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" + + #include +@@ -524,7 +525,7 @@ do_fingerprint(struct passwd *pw) + enum fp_type fptype; + struct stat st; + +- fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5; ++ fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : FIPS_mode() ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5; + rep = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE : SSH_FP_HEX; + + if (!have_identity) +@@ -1808,14 +1809,15 @@ passphrase_again: + fclose(f); + + if (!quiet) { +- char *fp = key_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); +- char *ra = key_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_MD5, ++ int fips_on = FIPS_mode(); ++ char *fp = key_fingerprint(public, fips_on ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); ++ char *ra = key_fingerprint(public, fips_on ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5, + SSH_FP_RANDOMART); + printf("Your public key has been saved in %s.\n", + identity_file); +- printf("The key fingerprint is:\n"); ++ printf("The key %sfingerprint is:\n", fips_on ? "SHA1 " : ""); + printf("%s %s\n", fp, comment); +- printf("The key's randomart image is:\n"); ++ printf("The key's %srandomart image is:\n", fips_on ? "SHA1 " :""); + printf("%s\n", ra); + xfree(ra); + xfree(fp); diff --git a/openssh-5.4p1-gsskex.patch b/openssh-5.4p1-gsskex.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8a626a4 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh-5.4p1-gsskex.patch @@ -0,0 +1,2933 @@ +diff -up openssh-5.4p1/auth2.c.gsskex openssh-5.4p1/auth2.c +--- openssh-5.4p1/auth2.c.gsskex 2010-03-01 18:14:24.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-5.4p1/auth2.c 2010-03-01 18:14:28.000000000 +0100 +@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@ extern Authmethod method_passwd; + extern Authmethod method_kbdint; + extern Authmethod method_hostbased; + #ifdef GSSAPI ++extern Authmethod method_gsskeyex; + extern Authmethod method_gssapi; + #endif + #ifdef JPAKE +@@ -79,6 +80,7 @@ Authmethod *authmethods[] = { + &method_none, + &method_pubkey, + #ifdef GSSAPI ++ &method_gsskeyex, + &method_gssapi, + #endif + #ifdef JPAKE +@@ -289,6 +291,7 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32 + #endif + + authctxt->postponed = 0; ++ authctxt->server_caused_failure = 0; + + /* try to authenticate user */ + m = authmethod_lookup(method); +@@ -361,7 +364,8 @@ userauth_finish(Authctxt *authctxt, int + } else { + + /* Allow initial try of "none" auth without failure penalty */ +- if (authctxt->attempt > 1 || strcmp(method, "none") != 0) ++ if (!authctxt->server_caused_failure && ++ (authctxt->attempt > 1 || strcmp(method, "none") != 0)) + authctxt->failures++; + if (authctxt->failures >= options.max_authtries) { + #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS +diff -up openssh-5.4p1/auth2-gss.c.gsskex openssh-5.4p1/auth2-gss.c +--- openssh-5.4p1/auth2-gss.c.gsskex 2010-03-01 18:14:24.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-5.4p1/auth2-gss.c 2010-03-01 18:14:28.000000000 +0100 +@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ + /* $OpenBSD: auth2-gss.c,v 1.16 2007/10/29 00:52:45 dtucker Exp $ */ + + /* +- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. ++ * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +@@ -52,6 +52,40 @@ static void input_gssapi_mic(int type, u + static void input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt); + static void input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, void *); + ++/* ++ * The 'gssapi_keyex' userauth mechanism. ++ */ ++static int ++userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt) ++{ ++ int authenticated = 0; ++ Buffer b; ++ gss_buffer_desc mic, gssbuf; ++ u_int len; ++ ++ mic.value = packet_get_string(&len); ++ mic.length = len; ++ ++ packet_check_eom(); ++ ++ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->user, authctxt->service, ++ "gssapi-keyex"); ++ ++ gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b); ++ gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b); ++ ++ /* gss_kex_context is NULL with privsep, so we can't check it here */ ++ if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gss_kex_context, ++ &gssbuf, &mic)))) ++ authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, ++ authctxt->pw)); ++ ++ buffer_free(&b); ++ xfree(mic.value); ++ ++ return (authenticated); ++} ++ + /* + * We only support those mechanisms that we know about (ie ones that we know + * how to check local user kuserok and the like) +@@ -102,6 +136,7 @@ userauth_gssapi(Authctxt *authctxt) + + if (!present) { + xfree(doid); ++ authctxt->server_caused_failure = 1; + return (0); + } + +@@ -109,6 +144,7 @@ userauth_gssapi(Authctxt *authctxt) + if (ctxt != NULL) + ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt); + xfree(doid); ++ authctxt->server_caused_failure = 1; + return (0); + } + +@@ -242,7 +278,8 @@ input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, + + packet_check_eom(); + +- authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user)); ++ authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, ++ authctxt->pw)); + + authctxt->postponed = 0; + dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL); +@@ -284,7 +321,8 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple + gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b); + + if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gssctxt, &gssbuf, &mic)))) +- authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user)); ++ authenticated = ++ PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw)); + else + logit("GSSAPI MIC check failed"); + +@@ -301,6 +339,12 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple + userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, "gssapi-with-mic"); + } + ++Authmethod method_gsskeyex = { ++ "gssapi-keyex", ++ userauth_gsskeyex, ++ &options.gss_authentication ++}; ++ + Authmethod method_gssapi = { + "gssapi-with-mic", + userauth_gssapi, +diff -up openssh-5.4p1/auth.h.gsskex openssh-5.4p1/auth.h +--- openssh-5.4p1/auth.h.gsskex 2010-03-01 18:14:25.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-5.4p1/auth.h 2010-03-01 18:14:28.000000000 +0100 +@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ struct Authctxt { + int valid; /* user exists and is allowed to login */ + int attempt; + int failures; ++ int server_caused_failure; + int force_pwchange; + char *user; /* username sent by the client */ + char *service; +diff -up openssh-5.4p1/auth-krb5.c.gsskex openssh-5.4p1/auth-krb5.c +--- openssh-5.4p1/auth-krb5.c.gsskex 2009-12-21 00:49:22.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-5.4p1/auth-krb5.c 2010-03-01 18:14:28.000000000 +0100 +@@ -170,8 +170,13 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, c + + len = strlen(authctxt->krb5_ticket_file) + 6; + authctxt->krb5_ccname = xmalloc(len); ++#ifdef USE_CCAPI ++ snprintf(authctxt->krb5_ccname, len, "API:%s", ++ authctxt->krb5_ticket_file); ++#else + snprintf(authctxt->krb5_ccname, len, "FILE:%s", + authctxt->krb5_ticket_file); ++#endif + + #ifdef USE_PAM + if (options.use_pam) +@@ -226,15 +231,22 @@ krb5_cleanup_proc(Authctxt *authctxt) + #ifndef HEIMDAL + krb5_error_code + ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache) { +- int tmpfd, ret; ++ int ret; + char ccname[40]; + mode_t old_umask; ++#ifdef USE_CCAPI ++ char cctemplate[] = "API:krb5cc_%d"; ++#else ++ char cctemplate[] = "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX"; ++ int tmpfd; ++#endif + + ret = snprintf(ccname, sizeof(ccname), +- "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX", geteuid()); ++ cctemplate, geteuid()); + if (ret < 0 || (size_t)ret >= sizeof(ccname)) + return ENOMEM; + ++#ifndef USE_CCAPI + old_umask = umask(0177); + tmpfd = mkstemp(ccname + strlen("FILE:")); + umask(old_umask); +@@ -249,6 +261,7 @@ ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context ctx, krb5_c + return errno; + } + close(tmpfd); ++#endif + + return (krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, ccname, ccache)); + } +diff -up openssh-5.4p1/ChangeLog.gssapi.gsskex openssh-5.4p1/ChangeLog.gssapi +--- openssh-5.4p1/ChangeLog.gssapi.gsskex 2010-03-01 18:14:28.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-5.4p1/ChangeLog.gssapi 2010-03-01 18:14:28.000000000 +0100 +@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@ ++20090615 ++ - [ gss-genr.c gss-serv.c kexgssc.c kexgsss.c monitor.c sshconnect2.c ++ sshd.c ] ++ Fix issues identified by Greg Hudson following a code review ++ Check return value of gss_indicate_mechs ++ Protect GSSAPI calls in monitor, so they can only be used if enabled ++ Check return values of bignum functions in key exchange ++ Use BN_clear_free to clear other side's DH value ++ Make ssh_gssapi_id_kex more robust ++ Only configure kex table pointers if GSSAPI is enabled ++ Don't leak mechanism list, or gss mechanism list ++ Cast data.length before printing ++ If serverkey isn't provided, use an empty string, rather than NULL ++ ++20090201 ++ - [ gss-genr.c gss-serv.c kex.h kexgssc.c readconf.c readconf.h ssh-gss.h ++ ssh_config.5 sshconnet2.c ] ++ Add support for the GSSAPIClientIdentity option, which allows the user ++ to specify which GSSAPI identity to use to contact a given server ++ ++20080404 ++ - [ gss-serv.c ] ++ Add code to actually implement GSSAPIStrictAcceptCheck, which had somehow ++ been omitted from a previous version of this patch. Reported by Borislav ++ Stoichkov ++ ++20070317 ++ - [ gss-serv-krb5.c ] ++ Remove C99ism, where new_ccname was being declared in the middle of a ++ function ++ ++20061220 ++ - [ servconf.c ] ++ Make default for GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck be Yes, to match previous, and ++ documented, behaviour. Reported by Dan Watson. ++ ++20060910 ++ - [ gss-genr.c kexgssc.c kexgsss.c kex.h monitor.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c ++ ssh-gss.h ] ++ add support for gss-group14-sha1 key exchange mechanisms ++ - [ gss-serv.c servconf.c servconf.h sshd_config sshd_config.5 ] ++ Add GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck option to allow the disabling of ++ acceptor principal checking on multi-homed machines. ++ ++ - [ sshd_config ssh_config ] ++ Add settings for GSSAPIKeyExchange and GSSAPITrustDNS to the sample ++ configuration files ++ - [ kexgss.c kegsss.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c ] ++ Code cleanup. Replace strlen/xmalloc/snprintf sequences with xasprintf() ++ Limit length of error messages displayed by client ++ ++20060909 ++ - [ gss-genr.c gss-serv.c ] ++ move ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred() and ssh_gssapi_server_ctx to be server ++ only, where they belong ++ ++ ++20060829 ++ - [ gss-serv-krb5.c ] ++ Fix CCAPI credentials cache name when creating KRB5CCNAME environment ++ variable ++ ++20060828 ++ - [ gss-genr.c ] ++ Avoid Heimdal context freeing problem ++ ++ ++20060818 ++ - [ gss-genr.c ssh-gss.h sshconnect2.c ] ++ Make sure that SPENGO is disabled ++ ++ ++20060421 ++ - [ gssgenr.c, sshconnect2.c ] ++ a few type changes (signed versus unsigned, int versus size_t) to ++ fix compiler errors/warnings ++ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu) ++ - [ kexgssc.c, sshconnect2.c ] ++ fix uninitialized variable warnings ++ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu) ++ - [ gssgenr.c ] ++ pass oid to gss_display_status (helpful when using GSSAPI mechglue) ++ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu) ++ ++ - [ gss-serv-krb5.c ] ++ #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_KRB5 should be #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_KRB5_H ++ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu) ++ ++ - [ readconf.c, readconf.h, ssh_config.5, sshconnect2.c ++ add client-side GssapiKeyExchange option ++ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu) ++ - [ sshconnect2.c ] ++ add support for GssapiTrustDns option for gssapi-with-mic ++ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu) ++ +diff -up openssh-5.4p1/clientloop.c.gsskex openssh-5.4p1/clientloop.c +--- openssh-5.4p1/clientloop.c.gsskex 2010-01-30 07:28:35.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-5.4p1/clientloop.c 2010-03-01 18:14:28.000000000 +0100 +@@ -111,6 +111,10 @@ + #include "msg.h" + #include "roaming.h" + ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++#include "ssh-gss.h" ++#endif ++ + /* import options */ + extern Options options; + +@@ -1431,6 +1435,13 @@ client_loop(int have_pty, int escape_cha + /* Do channel operations unless rekeying in progress. */ + if (!rekeying) { + channel_after_select(readset, writeset); ++ ++ if (options.gss_renewal_rekey && ++ ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)) { ++ debug("credentials updated - forcing rekey"); ++ need_rekeying = 1; ++ } ++ + if (need_rekeying || packet_need_rekeying()) { + debug("need rekeying"); + xxx_kex->done = 0; +diff -up openssh-5.4p1/configure.ac.gsskex openssh-5.4p1/configure.ac +--- openssh-5.4p1/configure.ac.gsskex 2010-03-01 18:14:27.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-5.4p1/configure.ac 2010-03-01 18:14:28.000000000 +0100 +@@ -477,6 +477,30 @@ main() { if (NSVersionOfRunTimeLibrary(" + [Use tunnel device compatibility to OpenBSD]) + AC_DEFINE(SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF, 1, + [Prepend the address family to IP tunnel traffic]) ++ AC_MSG_CHECKING(if we have the Security Authorization Session API) ++ AC_TRY_COMPILE([#include ], ++ [SessionCreate(0, 0);], ++ [ac_cv_use_security_session_api="yes" ++ AC_DEFINE(USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API, 1, ++ [platform has the Security Authorization Session API]) ++ LIBS="$LIBS -framework Security" ++ AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)], ++ [ac_cv_use_security_session_api="no" ++ AC_MSG_RESULT(no)]) ++ AC_MSG_CHECKING(if we have an in-memory credentials cache) ++ AC_TRY_COMPILE( ++ [#include ], ++ [cc_context_t c; ++ (void) cc_initialize (&c, 0, NULL, NULL);], ++ [AC_DEFINE(USE_CCAPI, 1, ++ [platform uses an in-memory credentials cache]) ++ LIBS="$LIBS -framework Security" ++ AC_MSG_RESULT(yes) ++ if test "x$ac_cv_use_security_session_api" = "xno"; then ++ AC_MSG_ERROR(*** Need a security framework to use the credentials cache API ***) ++ fi], ++ [AC_MSG_RESULT(no)] ++ ) + m4_pattern_allow(AU_IPv) + AC_CHECK_DECL(AU_IPv4, [], + AC_DEFINE(AU_IPv4, 0, [System only supports IPv4 audit records]) +diff -up openssh-5.4p1/gss-genr.c.gsskex openssh-5.4p1/gss-genr.c +--- openssh-5.4p1/gss-genr.c.gsskex 2009-06-22 08:11:07.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-5.4p1/gss-genr.c 2010-03-01 18:14:28.000000000 +0100 +@@ -39,12 +39,167 @@ + #include "buffer.h" + #include "log.h" + #include "ssh2.h" ++#include "cipher.h" ++#include "key.h" ++#include "kex.h" ++#include + + #include "ssh-gss.h" + + extern u_char *session_id2; + extern u_int session_id2_len; + ++typedef struct { ++ char *encoded; ++ gss_OID oid; ++} ssh_gss_kex_mapping; ++ ++/* ++ * XXX - It would be nice to find a more elegant way of handling the ++ * XXX passing of the key exchange context to the userauth routines ++ */ ++ ++Gssctxt *gss_kex_context = NULL; ++ ++static ssh_gss_kex_mapping *gss_enc2oid = NULL; ++ ++int ++ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok() { ++ return (gss_enc2oid != NULL); ++} ++ ++/* ++ * Return a list of the gss-group1-sha1 mechanisms supported by this program ++ * ++ * We test mechanisms to ensure that we can use them, to avoid starting ++ * a key exchange with a bad mechanism ++ */ ++ ++char * ++ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *host, const char *client) { ++ gss_OID_set gss_supported; ++ OM_uint32 min_status; ++ ++ if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &gss_supported))) ++ return NULL; ++ ++ return(ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_supported, ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism, ++ host, client)); ++} ++ ++char * ++ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set gss_supported, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *check, ++ const char *host, const char *client) { ++ Buffer buf; ++ size_t i; ++ int oidpos, enclen; ++ char *mechs, *encoded; ++ u_char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; ++ char deroid[2]; ++ const EVP_MD *evp_md = EVP_md5(); ++ EVP_MD_CTX md; ++ ++ if (gss_enc2oid != NULL) { ++ for (i = 0; gss_enc2oid[i].encoded != NULL; i++) ++ xfree(gss_enc2oid[i].encoded); ++ xfree(gss_enc2oid); ++ } ++ ++ gss_enc2oid = xmalloc(sizeof(ssh_gss_kex_mapping) * ++ (gss_supported->count + 1)); ++ ++ buffer_init(&buf); ++ ++ oidpos = 0; ++ for (i = 0; i < gss_supported->count; i++) { ++ if (gss_supported->elements[i].length < 128 && ++ (*check)(NULL, &(gss_supported->elements[i]), host, client)) { ++ ++ deroid[0] = SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE; ++ deroid[1] = gss_supported->elements[i].length; ++ ++ EVP_DigestInit(&md, evp_md); ++ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, deroid, 2); ++ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, ++ gss_supported->elements[i].elements, ++ gss_supported->elements[i].length); ++ EVP_DigestFinal(&md, digest, NULL); ++ ++ encoded = xmalloc(EVP_MD_size(evp_md) * 2); ++ enclen = __b64_ntop(digest, EVP_MD_size(evp_md), ++ encoded, EVP_MD_size(evp_md) * 2); ++ ++ if (oidpos != 0) ++ buffer_put_char(&buf, ','); ++ ++ buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID, ++ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID) - 1); ++ buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen); ++ buffer_put_char(&buf, ','); ++ buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID, ++ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID) - 1); ++ buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen); ++ buffer_put_char(&buf, ','); ++ buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID, ++ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID) - 1); ++ buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen); ++ ++ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].oid = &(gss_supported->elements[i]); ++ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].encoded = encoded; ++ oidpos++; ++ } ++ } ++ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].oid = NULL; ++ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].encoded = NULL; ++ ++ buffer_put_char(&buf, '\0'); ++ ++ mechs = xmalloc(buffer_len(&buf)); ++ buffer_get(&buf, mechs, buffer_len(&buf)); ++ buffer_free(&buf); ++ ++ if (strlen(mechs) == 0) { ++ xfree(mechs); ++ mechs = NULL; ++ } ++ ++ return (mechs); ++} ++ ++gss_OID ++ssh_gssapi_id_kex(Gssctxt *ctx, char *name, int kex_type) { ++ int i = 0; ++ ++ switch (kex_type) { ++ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1: ++ if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID)) ++ return GSS_C_NO_OID; ++ name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID) - 1; ++ break; ++ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1: ++ if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID)) ++ return GSS_C_NO_OID; ++ name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID) - 1; ++ break; ++ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1: ++ if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID)) ++ return GSS_C_NO_OID; ++ name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID) - 1; ++ break; ++ default: ++ return GSS_C_NO_OID; ++ } ++ ++ while (gss_enc2oid[i].encoded != NULL && ++ strcmp(name, gss_enc2oid[i].encoded) != 0) ++ i++; ++ ++ if (gss_enc2oid[i].oid != NULL && ctx != NULL) ++ ssh_gssapi_set_oid(ctx, gss_enc2oid[i].oid); ++ ++ return gss_enc2oid[i].oid; ++} ++ + /* Check that the OID in a data stream matches that in the context */ + int + ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *ctx, void *data, size_t len) +@@ -197,7 +352,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(Gssctxt *ctx, int de + } + + ctx->major = gss_init_sec_context(&ctx->minor, +- GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, &ctx->context, ctx->name, ctx->oid, ++ ctx->client_creds, &ctx->context, ctx->name, ctx->oid, + GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG | GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG | deleg_flag, + 0, NULL, recv_tok, NULL, send_tok, flags, NULL); + +@@ -227,8 +382,42 @@ ssh_gssapi_import_name(Gssctxt *ctx, con + } + + OM_uint32 ++ssh_gssapi_client_identity(Gssctxt *ctx, const char *name) ++{ ++ gss_buffer_desc gssbuf; ++ gss_name_t gssname; ++ OM_uint32 status; ++ gss_OID_set oidset; ++ ++ gssbuf.value = (void *) name; ++ gssbuf.length = strlen(gssbuf.value); ++ ++ gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset); ++ gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset); ++ ++ ctx->major = gss_import_name(&ctx->minor, &gssbuf, ++ GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME, &gssname); ++ ++ if (!ctx->major) ++ ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor, ++ gssname, 0, oidset, GSS_C_INITIATE, ++ &ctx->client_creds, NULL, NULL); ++ ++ gss_release_name(&status, &gssname); ++ gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset); ++ ++ if (ctx->major) ++ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); ++ ++ return(ctx->major); ++} ++ ++OM_uint32 + ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t buffer, gss_buffer_t hash) + { ++ if (ctx == NULL) ++ return -1; ++ + if ((ctx->major = gss_get_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context, + GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, buffer, hash))) + ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); +@@ -236,6 +425,19 @@ ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer + return (ctx->major); + } + ++/* Priviledged when used by server */ ++OM_uint32 ++ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic) ++{ ++ if (ctx == NULL) ++ return -1; ++ ++ ctx->major = gss_verify_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context, ++ gssbuf, gssmic, NULL); ++ ++ return (ctx->major); ++} ++ + void + ssh_gssapi_buildmic(Buffer *b, const char *user, const char *service, + const char *context) +@@ -249,11 +451,16 @@ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(Buffer *b, const cha + } + + int +-ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host) ++ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host, ++ const char *client) + { + gss_buffer_desc token = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; + OM_uint32 major, minor; + gss_OID_desc spnego_oid = {6, (void *)"\x2B\x06\x01\x05\x05\x02"}; ++ Gssctxt *intctx = NULL; ++ ++ if (ctx == NULL) ++ ctx = &intctx; + + /* RFC 4462 says we MUST NOT do SPNEGO */ + if (oid->length == spnego_oid.length && +@@ -263,6 +470,10 @@ ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx + ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(ctx); + ssh_gssapi_set_oid(*ctx, oid); + major = ssh_gssapi_import_name(*ctx, host); ++ ++ if (!GSS_ERROR(major) && client) ++ major = ssh_gssapi_client_identity(*ctx, client); ++ + if (!GSS_ERROR(major)) { + major = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(*ctx, 0, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER, &token, + NULL); +@@ -272,10 +483,67 @@ ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx + GSS_C_NO_BUFFER); + } + +- if (GSS_ERROR(major)) ++ if (GSS_ERROR(major) || intctx != NULL) + ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(ctx); + + return (!GSS_ERROR(major)); + } + ++int ++ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(Gssctxt *ctxt) { ++ static gss_name_t saved_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME; ++ static OM_uint32 saved_lifetime = 0; ++ static gss_OID saved_mech = GSS_C_NO_OID; ++ static gss_name_t name; ++ static OM_uint32 last_call = 0; ++ OM_uint32 lifetime, now, major, minor; ++ int equal; ++ gss_cred_usage_t usage = GSS_C_INITIATE; ++ ++ now = time(NULL); ++ ++ if (ctxt) { ++ debug("Rekey has happened - updating saved versions"); ++ ++ if (saved_name != GSS_C_NO_NAME) ++ gss_release_name(&minor, &saved_name); ++ ++ major = gss_inquire_cred(&minor, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, ++ &saved_name, &saved_lifetime, NULL, NULL); ++ ++ if (!GSS_ERROR(major)) { ++ saved_mech = ctxt->oid; ++ saved_lifetime+= now; ++ } else { ++ /* Handle the error */ ++ } ++ return 0; ++ } ++ ++ if (now - last_call < 10) ++ return 0; ++ ++ last_call = now; ++ ++ if (saved_mech == GSS_C_NO_OID) ++ return 0; ++ ++ major = gss_inquire_cred(&minor, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, ++ &name, &lifetime, NULL, NULL); ++ if (major == GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED) ++ return 0; ++ else if (GSS_ERROR(major)) ++ return 0; ++ ++ major = gss_compare_name(&minor, saved_name, name, &equal); ++ gss_release_name(&minor, &name); ++ if (GSS_ERROR(major)) ++ return 0; ++ ++ if (equal && (saved_lifetime < lifetime + now - 10)) ++ return 1; ++ ++ return 0; ++} ++ + #endif /* GSSAPI */ +diff -up openssh-5.4p1/gss-serv.c.gsskex openssh-5.4p1/gss-serv.c +--- openssh-5.4p1/gss-serv.c.gsskex 2008-05-19 07:05:07.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-5.4p1/gss-serv.c 2010-03-01 18:14:28.000000000 +0100 +@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ + /* $OpenBSD: gss-serv.c,v 1.22 2008/05/08 12:02:23 djm Exp $ */ + + /* +- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. ++ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +@@ -45,15 +45,20 @@ + #include "channels.h" + #include "session.h" + #include "misc.h" ++#include "servconf.h" ++#include "uidswap.h" + + #include "ssh-gss.h" ++#include "monitor_wrap.h" ++ ++extern ServerOptions options; + + static ssh_gssapi_client gssapi_client = + { GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, +- GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL}}; ++ GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, GSS_C_NO_NAME, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL}, 0, 0}; + + ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_null_mech = +- { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}; ++ { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}; + + #ifdef KRB5 + extern ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech; +@@ -81,25 +86,32 @@ ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred(Gssctxt *ctx) + char lname[MAXHOSTNAMELEN]; + gss_OID_set oidset; + +- gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset); +- gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset); ++ if (options.gss_strict_acceptor) { ++ gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset); ++ gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset); ++ ++ if (gethostname(lname, MAXHOSTNAMELEN)) { ++ gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset); ++ return (-1); ++ } + +- if (gethostname(lname, MAXHOSTNAMELEN)) { +- gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset); +- return (-1); +- } ++ if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctx, lname))) { ++ gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset); ++ return (ctx->major); ++ } ++ ++ if ((ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor, ++ ctx->name, 0, oidset, GSS_C_ACCEPT, &ctx->creds, ++ NULL, NULL))) ++ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); + +- if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctx, lname))) { + gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset); + return (ctx->major); ++ } else { ++ ctx->name = GSS_C_NO_NAME; ++ ctx->creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL; + } +- +- if ((ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor, +- ctx->name, 0, oidset, GSS_C_ACCEPT, &ctx->creds, NULL, NULL))) +- ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); +- +- gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset); +- return (ctx->major); ++ return GSS_S_COMPLETE; + } + + /* Privileged */ +@@ -114,6 +126,29 @@ ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx, gss + } + + /* Unprivileged */ ++char * ++ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms() { ++ gss_OID_set supported; ++ ++ ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(&supported); ++ return (ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(supported, &ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech, ++ NULL, NULL)); ++} ++ ++/* Unprivileged */ ++int ++ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt **dum, gss_OID oid, const char *data, ++ const char *dummy) { ++ Gssctxt *ctx = NULL; ++ int res; ++ ++ res = !GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctx, oid))); ++ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctx); ++ ++ return (res); ++} ++ ++/* Unprivileged */ + void + ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *oidset) + { +@@ -123,7 +158,9 @@ ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *o + gss_OID_set supported; + + gss_create_empty_oid_set(&min_status, oidset); +- gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &supported); ++ ++ if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &supported))) ++ return; + + while (supported_mechs[i]->name != NULL) { + if (GSS_ERROR(gss_test_oid_set_member(&min_status, +@@ -247,8 +284,48 @@ OM_uint32 + ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client) + { + int i = 0; ++ int equal = 0; ++ gss_name_t new_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME; ++ gss_buffer_desc ename = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; ++ ++ if (options.gss_store_rekey && client->used && ctx->client_creds) { ++ if (client->mech->oid.length != ctx->oid->length || ++ (memcmp(client->mech->oid.elements, ++ ctx->oid->elements, ctx->oid->length) !=0)) { ++ debug("Rekeyed credentials have different mechanism"); ++ return GSS_S_COMPLETE; ++ } ++ ++ if ((ctx->major = gss_inquire_cred_by_mech(&ctx->minor, ++ ctx->client_creds, ctx->oid, &new_name, ++ NULL, NULL, NULL))) { ++ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); ++ return (ctx->major); ++ } ++ ++ ctx->major = gss_compare_name(&ctx->minor, client->name, ++ new_name, &equal); + +- gss_buffer_desc ename; ++ if (GSS_ERROR(ctx->major)) { ++ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); ++ return (ctx->major); ++ } ++ ++ if (!equal) { ++ debug("Rekeyed credentials have different name"); ++ return GSS_S_COMPLETE; ++ } ++ ++ debug("Marking rekeyed credentials for export"); ++ ++ gss_release_name(&ctx->minor, &client->name); ++ gss_release_cred(&ctx->minor, &client->creds); ++ client->name = new_name; ++ client->creds = ctx->client_creds; ++ ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL; ++ client->updated = 1; ++ return GSS_S_COMPLETE; ++ } + + client->mech = NULL; + +@@ -263,6 +340,13 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_g + if (client->mech == NULL) + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + ++ if (ctx->client_creds && ++ (ctx->major = gss_inquire_cred_by_mech(&ctx->minor, ++ ctx->client_creds, ctx->oid, &client->name, NULL, NULL, NULL))) { ++ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); ++ return (ctx->major); ++ } ++ + if ((ctx->major = gss_display_name(&ctx->minor, ctx->client, + &client->displayname, NULL))) { + ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); +@@ -280,6 +364,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_g + return (ctx->major); + } + ++ gss_release_buffer(&ctx->minor, &ename); ++ + /* We can't copy this structure, so we just move the pointer to it */ + client->creds = ctx->client_creds; + ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL; +@@ -327,7 +413,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***envp, u_int + + /* Privileged */ + int +-ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user) ++ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw) + { + OM_uint32 lmin; + +@@ -337,9 +423,11 @@ ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user) + return 0; + } + if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->userok) +- if ((*gssapi_client.mech->userok)(&gssapi_client, user)) ++ if ((*gssapi_client.mech->userok)(&gssapi_client, user)) { ++ gssapi_client.used = 1; ++ gssapi_client.store.owner = pw; + return 1; +- else { ++ } else { + /* Destroy delegated credentials if userok fails */ + gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.displayname); + gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.exportedname); +@@ -352,14 +440,90 @@ ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user) + return (0); + } + +-/* Privileged */ +-OM_uint32 +-ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic) ++/* These bits are only used for rekeying. The unpriviledged child is running ++ * as the user, the monitor is root. ++ * ++ * In the child, we want to : ++ * *) Ask the monitor to store our credentials into the store we specify ++ * *) If it succeeds, maybe do a PAM update ++ */ ++ ++/* Stuff for PAM */ ++ ++#ifdef USE_PAM ++static int ssh_gssapi_simple_conv(int n, const struct pam_message **msg, ++ struct pam_response **resp, void *data) + { +- ctx->major = gss_verify_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context, +- gssbuf, gssmic, NULL); ++ return (PAM_CONV_ERR); ++} ++#endif + +- return (ctx->major); ++void ++ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds() { ++ int ok; ++ int ret; ++#ifdef USE_PAM ++ pam_handle_t *pamh = NULL; ++ struct pam_conv pamconv = {ssh_gssapi_simple_conv, NULL}; ++ char *envstr; ++#endif ++ ++ if (gssapi_client.store.filename == NULL && ++ gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL && ++ gssapi_client.store.envvar == NULL) ++ return; ++ ++ ok = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&gssapi_client.store)); ++ ++ if (!ok) ++ return; ++ ++ debug("Rekeyed credentials stored successfully"); ++ ++ /* Actually managing to play with the ssh pam stack from here will ++ * be next to impossible. In any case, we may want different options ++ * for rekeying. So, use our own :) ++ */ ++#ifdef USE_PAM ++ if (!use_privsep) { ++ debug("Not even going to try and do PAM with privsep disabled"); ++ return; ++ } ++ ++ ret = pam_start("sshd-rekey", gssapi_client.store.owner->pw_name, ++ &pamconv, &pamh); ++ if (ret) ++ return; ++ ++ xasprintf(&envstr, "%s=%s", gssapi_client.store.envvar, ++ gssapi_client.store.envval); ++ ++ ret = pam_putenv(pamh, envstr); ++ if (!ret) ++ pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_REINITIALIZE_CRED); ++ pam_end(pamh, PAM_SUCCESS); ++#endif ++} ++ ++int ++ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store) { ++ int ok = 0; ++ ++ /* Check we've got credentials to store */ ++ if (!gssapi_client.updated) ++ return 0; ++ ++ gssapi_client.updated = 0; ++ ++ temporarily_use_uid(gssapi_client.store.owner); ++ if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->updatecreds) ++ ok = (*gssapi_client.mech->updatecreds)(store, &gssapi_client); ++ else ++ debug("No update function for this mechanism"); ++ ++ restore_uid(); ++ ++ return ok; + } + + #endif +diff -up openssh-5.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.gsskex openssh-5.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c +--- openssh-5.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.gsskex 2006-09-01 07:38:36.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-5.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c 2010-03-01 18:14:28.000000000 +0100 +@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ + /* $OpenBSD: gss-serv-krb5.c,v 1.7 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */ + + /* +- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. ++ * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +@@ -120,6 +120,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl + krb5_principal princ; + OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status; + int len; ++ const char *new_ccname; + + if (client->creds == NULL) { + debug("No credentials stored"); +@@ -168,11 +169,16 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl + return; + } + +- client->store.filename = xstrdup(krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache)); ++ new_ccname = krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache); ++ + client->store.envvar = "KRB5CCNAME"; +- len = strlen(client->store.filename) + 6; +- client->store.envval = xmalloc(len); +- snprintf(client->store.envval, len, "FILE:%s", client->store.filename); ++#ifdef USE_CCAPI ++ xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "API:%s", new_ccname); ++ client->store.filename = NULL; ++#else ++ xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "FILE:%s", new_ccname); ++ client->store.filename = xstrdup(new_ccname); ++#endif + + #ifdef USE_PAM + if (options.use_pam) +@@ -184,6 +190,71 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl + return; + } + ++int ++ssh_gssapi_krb5_updatecreds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store, ++ ssh_gssapi_client *client) ++{ ++ krb5_ccache ccache = NULL; ++ krb5_principal principal = NULL; ++ char *name = NULL; ++ krb5_error_code problem; ++ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status; ++ ++ if ((problem = krb5_cc_resolve(krb_context, store->envval, &ccache))) { ++ logit("krb5_cc_resolve(): %.100s", ++ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem)); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ ++ /* Find out who the principal in this cache is */ ++ if ((problem = krb5_cc_get_principal(krb_context, ccache, ++ &principal))) { ++ logit("krb5_cc_get_principal(): %.100s", ++ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem)); ++ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ ++ if ((problem = krb5_unparse_name(krb_context, principal, &name))) { ++ logit("krb5_unparse_name(): %.100s", ++ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem)); ++ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal); ++ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ ++ ++ if (strcmp(name,client->exportedname.value)!=0) { ++ debug("Name in local credentials cache differs. Not storing"); ++ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal); ++ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache); ++ krb5_free_unparsed_name(krb_context, name); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ krb5_free_unparsed_name(krb_context, name); ++ ++ /* Name matches, so lets get on with it! */ ++ ++ if ((problem = krb5_cc_initialize(krb_context, ccache, principal))) { ++ logit("krb5_cc_initialize(): %.100s", ++ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem)); ++ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal); ++ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ ++ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal); ++ ++ if ((maj_status = gss_krb5_copy_ccache(&min_status, client->creds, ++ ccache))) { ++ logit("gss_krb5_copy_ccache() failed. Sorry!"); ++ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ ++ return 1; ++} ++ + ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech = { + "toWM5Slw5Ew8Mqkay+al2g==", + "Kerberos", +@@ -191,7 +262,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech = { + NULL, + &ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok, + NULL, +- &ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds ++ &ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds, ++ &ssh_gssapi_krb5_updatecreds + }; + + #endif /* KRB5 */ +diff -up openssh-5.4p1/kex.c.gsskex openssh-5.4p1/kex.c +--- openssh-5.4p1/kex.c.gsskex 2010-01-08 06:50:41.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-5.4p1/kex.c 2010-03-01 18:18:42.000000000 +0100 +@@ -50,6 +50,10 @@ + #include "monitor.h" + #include "roaming.h" + ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++#include "ssh-gss.h" ++#endif ++ + #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L + # if defined(HAVE_EVP_SHA256) + # define evp_ssh_sha256 EVP_sha256 +@@ -326,6 +330,20 @@ choose_kex(Kex *k, char *client, char *s + k->kex_type = KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256; + k->evp_md = evp_ssh_sha256(); + #endif ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ } else if (strncmp(k->name, KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID, ++ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID) - 1) == 0) { ++ k->kex_type = KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1; ++ k->evp_md = EVP_sha1(); ++ } else if (strncmp(k->name, KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID, ++ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID) - 1) == 0) { ++ k->kex_type = KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1; ++ k->evp_md = EVP_sha1(); ++ } else if (strncmp(k->name, KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID, ++ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID) - 1) == 0) { ++ k->kex_type = KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1; ++ k->evp_md = EVP_sha1(); ++#endif + } else + fatal("bad kex alg %s", k->name); + } +diff -up openssh-5.4p1/kexgssc.c.gsskex openssh-5.4p1/kexgssc.c +--- openssh-5.4p1/kexgssc.c.gsskex 2010-03-01 18:14:28.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-5.4p1/kexgssc.c 2010-03-01 18:14:28.000000000 +0100 +@@ -0,0 +1,334 @@ ++/* ++ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. ++ * ++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without ++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions ++ * are met: ++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright ++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. ++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright ++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the ++ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. ++ * ++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR ++ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES ++ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. ++ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, ++ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT ++ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, ++ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY ++ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT ++ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF ++ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. ++ */ ++ ++#include "includes.h" ++ ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ ++#include "includes.h" ++ ++#include ++#include ++ ++#include ++ ++#include "xmalloc.h" ++#include "buffer.h" ++#include "ssh2.h" ++#include "key.h" ++#include "cipher.h" ++#include "kex.h" ++#include "log.h" ++#include "packet.h" ++#include "dh.h" ++ ++#include "ssh-gss.h" ++ ++void ++kexgss_client(Kex *kex) { ++ gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; ++ gss_buffer_desc recv_tok, gssbuf, msg_tok, *token_ptr; ++ Gssctxt *ctxt; ++ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status, ret_flags; ++ u_int klen, kout, slen = 0, hashlen, strlen; ++ DH *dh; ++ BIGNUM *dh_server_pub = NULL; ++ BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL; ++ BIGNUM *p = NULL; ++ BIGNUM *g = NULL; ++ u_char *kbuf, *hash; ++ u_char *serverhostkey = NULL; ++ u_char *empty = ""; ++ char *msg; ++ char *lang; ++ int type = 0; ++ int first = 1; ++ int nbits = 0, min = DH_GRP_MIN, max = DH_GRP_MAX; ++ ++ /* Initialise our GSSAPI world */ ++ ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(&ctxt); ++ if (ssh_gssapi_id_kex(ctxt, kex->name, kex->kex_type) ++ == GSS_C_NO_OID) ++ fatal("Couldn't identify host exchange"); ++ ++ if (ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctxt, kex->gss_host)) ++ fatal("Couldn't import hostname"); ++ ++ if (kex->gss_client && ++ ssh_gssapi_client_identity(ctxt, kex->gss_client)) ++ fatal("Couldn't acquire client credentials"); ++ ++ switch (kex->kex_type) { ++ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1: ++ dh = dh_new_group1(); ++ break; ++ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1: ++ dh = dh_new_group14(); ++ break; ++ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1: ++ debug("Doing group exchange\n"); ++ nbits = dh_estimate(kex->we_need * 8); ++ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ); ++ packet_put_int(min); ++ packet_put_int(nbits); ++ packet_put_int(max); ++ ++ packet_send(); ++ ++ packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP); ++ ++ if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL) ++ fatal("BN_new() failed"); ++ packet_get_bignum2(p); ++ if ((g = BN_new()) == NULL) ++ fatal("BN_new() failed"); ++ packet_get_bignum2(g); ++ packet_check_eom(); ++ ++ if (BN_num_bits(p) < min || BN_num_bits(p) > max) ++ fatal("GSSGRP_GEX group out of range: %d !< %d !< %d", ++ min, BN_num_bits(p), max); ++ ++ dh = dh_new_group(g, p); ++ break; ++ default: ++ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type); ++ } ++ ++ /* Step 1 - e is dh->pub_key */ ++ dh_gen_key(dh, kex->we_need * 8); ++ ++ /* This is f, we initialise it now to make life easier */ ++ dh_server_pub = BN_new(); ++ if (dh_server_pub == NULL) ++ fatal("dh_server_pub == NULL"); ++ ++ token_ptr = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER; ++ ++ do { ++ debug("Calling gss_init_sec_context"); ++ ++ maj_status = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(ctxt, ++ kex->gss_deleg_creds, token_ptr, &send_tok, ++ &ret_flags); ++ ++ if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) { ++ if (send_tok.length != 0) { ++ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE); ++ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, ++ send_tok.length); ++ } ++ fatal("gss_init_context failed"); ++ } ++ ++ /* If we've got an old receive buffer get rid of it */ ++ if (token_ptr != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER) ++ xfree(recv_tok.value); ++ ++ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) { ++ /* If mutual state flag is not true, kex fails */ ++ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG)) ++ fatal("Mutual authentication failed"); ++ ++ /* If integ avail flag is not true kex fails */ ++ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG)) ++ fatal("Integrity check failed"); ++ } ++ ++ /* ++ * If we have data to send, then the last message that we ++ * received cannot have been a 'complete'. ++ */ ++ if (send_tok.length != 0) { ++ if (first) { ++ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT); ++ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, ++ send_tok.length); ++ packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key); ++ first = 0; ++ } else { ++ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE); ++ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, ++ send_tok.length); ++ } ++ packet_send(); ++ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok); ++ ++ /* If we've sent them data, they should reply */ ++ do { ++ type = packet_read(); ++ if (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY) { ++ debug("Received KEXGSS_HOSTKEY"); ++ if (serverhostkey) ++ fatal("Server host key received more than once"); ++ serverhostkey = ++ packet_get_string(&slen); ++ } ++ } while (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY); ++ ++ switch (type) { ++ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE: ++ debug("Received GSSAPI_CONTINUE"); ++ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) ++ fatal("GSSAPI Continue received from server when complete"); ++ recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&strlen); ++ recv_tok.length = strlen; ++ break; ++ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE: ++ debug("Received GSSAPI_COMPLETE"); ++ packet_get_bignum2(dh_server_pub); ++ msg_tok.value = packet_get_string(&strlen); ++ msg_tok.length = strlen; ++ ++ /* Is there a token included? */ ++ if (packet_get_char()) { ++ recv_tok.value= ++ packet_get_string(&strlen); ++ recv_tok.length = strlen; ++ /* If we're already complete - protocol error */ ++ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) ++ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: received token when complete"); ++ } else { ++ /* No token included */ ++ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE) ++ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: did not receive final token"); ++ } ++ break; ++ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR: ++ debug("Received Error"); ++ maj_status = packet_get_int(); ++ min_status = packet_get_int(); ++ msg = packet_get_string(NULL); ++ lang = packet_get_string(NULL); ++ fatal("GSSAPI Error: \n%.400s",msg); ++ default: ++ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d", ++ type); ++ } ++ token_ptr = &recv_tok; ++ } else { ++ /* No data, and not complete */ ++ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE) ++ fatal("Not complete, and no token output"); ++ } ++ } while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED); ++ ++ /* ++ * We _must_ have received a COMPLETE message in reply from the ++ * server, which will have set dh_server_pub and msg_tok ++ */ ++ ++ if (type != SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE) ++ fatal("Didn't receive a SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE when I expected it"); ++ ++ /* Check f in range [1, p-1] */ ++ if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh_server_pub)) ++ packet_disconnect("bad server public DH value"); ++ ++ /* compute K=f^x mod p */ ++ klen = DH_size(dh); ++ kbuf = xmalloc(klen); ++ kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_server_pub, dh); ++ if (kout < 0) ++ fatal("DH_compute_key: failed"); ++ ++ shared_secret = BN_new(); ++ if (shared_secret == NULL) ++ fatal("kexgss_client: BN_new failed"); ++ ++ if (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL) ++ fatal("kexdh_client: BN_bin2bn failed"); ++ ++ memset(kbuf, 0, klen); ++ xfree(kbuf); ++ ++ switch (kex->kex_type) { ++ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1: ++ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1: ++ kex_dh_hash( kex->client_version_string, ++ kex->server_version_string, ++ buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my), ++ buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer), ++ (serverhostkey ? serverhostkey : empty), slen, ++ dh->pub_key, /* e */ ++ dh_server_pub, /* f */ ++ shared_secret, /* K */ ++ &hash, &hashlen ++ ); ++ break; ++ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1: ++ kexgex_hash( ++ kex->evp_md, ++ kex->client_version_string, ++ kex->server_version_string, ++ buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my), ++ buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer), ++ (serverhostkey ? serverhostkey : empty), slen, ++ min, nbits, max, ++ dh->p, dh->g, ++ dh->pub_key, ++ dh_server_pub, ++ shared_secret, ++ &hash, &hashlen ++ ); ++ break; ++ default: ++ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type); ++ } ++ ++ gssbuf.value = hash; ++ gssbuf.length = hashlen; ++ ++ /* Verify that the hash matches the MIC we just got. */ ++ if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(ctxt, &gssbuf, &msg_tok))) ++ packet_disconnect("Hash's MIC didn't verify"); ++ ++ xfree(msg_tok.value); ++ ++ DH_free(dh); ++ if (serverhostkey) ++ xfree(serverhostkey); ++ BN_clear_free(dh_server_pub); ++ ++ /* save session id */ ++ if (kex->session_id == NULL) { ++ kex->session_id_len = hashlen; ++ kex->session_id = xmalloc(kex->session_id_len); ++ memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len); ++ } ++ ++ if (kex->gss_deleg_creds) ++ ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(ctxt); ++ ++ if (gss_kex_context == NULL) ++ gss_kex_context = ctxt; ++ else ++ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt); ++ ++ kex_derive_keys(kex, hash, hashlen, shared_secret); ++ BN_clear_free(shared_secret); ++ kex_finish(kex); ++} ++ ++#endif /* GSSAPI */ +diff -up openssh-5.4p1/kexgsss.c.gsskex openssh-5.4p1/kexgsss.c +--- openssh-5.4p1/kexgsss.c.gsskex 2010-03-01 18:14:28.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-5.4p1/kexgsss.c 2010-03-01 18:14:28.000000000 +0100 +@@ -0,0 +1,288 @@ ++/* ++ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. ++ * ++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without ++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions ++ * are met: ++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright ++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. ++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright ++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the ++ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. ++ * ++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR ++ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES ++ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. ++ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, ++ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT ++ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, ++ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY ++ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT ++ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF ++ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. ++ */ ++ ++#include "includes.h" ++ ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ ++#include ++ ++#include ++#include ++ ++#include "xmalloc.h" ++#include "buffer.h" ++#include "ssh2.h" ++#include "key.h" ++#include "cipher.h" ++#include "kex.h" ++#include "log.h" ++#include "packet.h" ++#include "dh.h" ++#include "ssh-gss.h" ++#include "monitor_wrap.h" ++#include "servconf.h" ++ ++extern ServerOptions options; ++ ++void ++kexgss_server(Kex *kex) ++{ ++ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status; ++ ++ /* ++ * Some GSSAPI implementations use the input value of ret_flags (an ++ * output variable) as a means of triggering mechanism specific ++ * features. Initializing it to zero avoids inadvertently ++ * activating this non-standard behaviour. ++ */ ++ ++ OM_uint32 ret_flags = 0; ++ gss_buffer_desc gssbuf, recv_tok, msg_tok; ++ gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; ++ Gssctxt *ctxt = NULL; ++ u_int slen, klen, kout, hashlen; ++ u_char *kbuf, *hash; ++ DH *dh; ++ int min = -1, max = -1, nbits = -1; ++ BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL; ++ BIGNUM *dh_client_pub = NULL; ++ int type = 0; ++ gss_OID oid; ++ char *mechs; ++ ++ /* Initialise GSSAPI */ ++ ++ /* If we're rekeying, privsep means that some of the private structures ++ * in the GSSAPI code are no longer available. This kludges them back ++ * into life ++ */ ++ if (!ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok()) ++ if ((mechs = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms())) ++ xfree(mechs); ++ ++ debug2("%s: Identifying %s", __func__, kex->name); ++ oid = ssh_gssapi_id_kex(NULL, kex->name, kex->kex_type); ++ if (oid == GSS_C_NO_OID) ++ fatal("Unknown gssapi mechanism"); ++ ++ debug2("%s: Acquiring credentials", __func__); ++ ++ if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctxt, oid)))) ++ fatal("Unable to acquire credentials for the server"); ++ ++ switch (kex->kex_type) { ++ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1: ++ dh = dh_new_group1(); ++ break; ++ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1: ++ dh = dh_new_group14(); ++ break; ++ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1: ++ debug("Doing group exchange"); ++ packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ); ++ min = packet_get_int(); ++ nbits = packet_get_int(); ++ max = packet_get_int(); ++ min = MAX(DH_GRP_MIN, min); ++ max = MIN(DH_GRP_MAX, max); ++ packet_check_eom(); ++ if (max < min || nbits < min || max < nbits) ++ fatal("GSS_GEX, bad parameters: %d !< %d !< %d", ++ min, nbits, max); ++ dh = PRIVSEP(choose_dh(min, nbits, max)); ++ if (dh == NULL) ++ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: no matching group found"); ++ ++ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP); ++ packet_put_bignum2(dh->p); ++ packet_put_bignum2(dh->g); ++ packet_send(); ++ ++ packet_write_wait(); ++ break; ++ default: ++ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type); ++ } ++ ++ dh_gen_key(dh, kex->we_need * 8); ++ ++ do { ++ debug("Wait SSH2_MSG_GSSAPI_INIT"); ++ type = packet_read(); ++ switch(type) { ++ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT: ++ if (dh_client_pub != NULL) ++ fatal("Received KEXGSS_INIT after initialising"); ++ recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&slen); ++ recv_tok.length = slen; ++ ++ if ((dh_client_pub = BN_new()) == NULL) ++ fatal("dh_client_pub == NULL"); ++ ++ packet_get_bignum2(dh_client_pub); ++ ++ /* Send SSH_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY here, if we want */ ++ break; ++ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE: ++ recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&slen); ++ recv_tok.length = slen; ++ break; ++ default: ++ packet_disconnect( ++ "Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d", ++ type); ++ } ++ ++ maj_status = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(ctxt, &recv_tok, ++ &send_tok, &ret_flags)); ++ ++ xfree(recv_tok.value); ++ ++ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE && send_tok.length == 0) ++ fatal("Zero length token output when incomplete"); ++ ++ if (dh_client_pub == NULL) ++ fatal("No client public key"); ++ ++ if (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) { ++ debug("Sending GSSAPI_CONTINUE"); ++ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE); ++ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length); ++ packet_send(); ++ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok); ++ } ++ } while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED); ++ ++ if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) { ++ if (send_tok.length > 0) { ++ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE); ++ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length); ++ packet_send(); ++ } ++ fatal("accept_ctx died"); ++ } ++ ++ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG)) ++ fatal("Mutual Authentication flag wasn't set"); ++ ++ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG)) ++ fatal("Integrity flag wasn't set"); ++ ++ if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh_client_pub)) ++ packet_disconnect("bad client public DH value"); ++ ++ klen = DH_size(dh); ++ kbuf = xmalloc(klen); ++ kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_client_pub, dh); ++ if (kout < 0) ++ fatal("DH_compute_key: failed"); ++ ++ shared_secret = BN_new(); ++ if (shared_secret == NULL) ++ fatal("kexgss_server: BN_new failed"); ++ ++ if (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL) ++ fatal("kexgss_server: BN_bin2bn failed"); ++ ++ memset(kbuf, 0, klen); ++ xfree(kbuf); ++ ++ switch (kex->kex_type) { ++ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1: ++ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1: ++ kex_dh_hash( ++ kex->client_version_string, kex->server_version_string, ++ buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer), ++ buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my), ++ NULL, 0, /* Change this if we start sending host keys */ ++ dh_client_pub, dh->pub_key, shared_secret, ++ &hash, &hashlen ++ ); ++ break; ++ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1: ++ kexgex_hash( ++ kex->evp_md, ++ kex->client_version_string, kex->server_version_string, ++ buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer), ++ buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my), ++ NULL, 0, ++ min, nbits, max, ++ dh->p, dh->g, ++ dh_client_pub, ++ dh->pub_key, ++ shared_secret, ++ &hash, &hashlen ++ ); ++ break; ++ default: ++ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type); ++ } ++ ++ BN_clear_free(dh_client_pub); ++ ++ if (kex->session_id == NULL) { ++ kex->session_id_len = hashlen; ++ kex->session_id = xmalloc(kex->session_id_len); ++ memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len); ++ } ++ ++ gssbuf.value = hash; ++ gssbuf.length = hashlen; ++ ++ if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_sign(ctxt,&gssbuf,&msg_tok)))) ++ fatal("Couldn't get MIC"); ++ ++ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE); ++ packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key); ++ packet_put_string(msg_tok.value,msg_tok.length); ++ ++ if (send_tok.length != 0) { ++ packet_put_char(1); /* true */ ++ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length); ++ } else { ++ packet_put_char(0); /* false */ ++ } ++ packet_send(); ++ ++ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok); ++ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &msg_tok); ++ ++ if (gss_kex_context == NULL) ++ gss_kex_context = ctxt; ++ else ++ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt); ++ ++ DH_free(dh); ++ ++ kex_derive_keys(kex, hash, hashlen, shared_secret); ++ BN_clear_free(shared_secret); ++ kex_finish(kex); ++ ++ /* If this was a rekey, then save out any delegated credentials we ++ * just exchanged. */ ++ if (options.gss_store_rekey) ++ ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds(); ++} ++#endif /* GSSAPI */ +diff -up openssh-5.4p1/kex.h.gsskex openssh-5.4p1/kex.h +--- openssh-5.4p1/kex.h.gsskex 2010-02-26 21:55:05.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-5.4p1/kex.h 2010-03-01 18:14:28.000000000 +0100 +@@ -67,6 +67,9 @@ enum kex_exchange { + KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1, + KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1, + KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256, ++ KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1, ++ KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1, ++ KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1, + KEX_MAX + }; + +@@ -123,6 +126,12 @@ struct Kex { + sig_atomic_t done; + int flags; + const EVP_MD *evp_md; ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ int gss_deleg_creds; ++ int gss_trust_dns; ++ char *gss_host; ++ char *gss_client; ++#endif + char *client_version_string; + char *server_version_string; + int (*verify_host_key)(Key *); +@@ -146,6 +155,11 @@ void kexdh_server(Kex *); + void kexgex_client(Kex *); + void kexgex_server(Kex *); + ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++void kexgss_client(Kex *); ++void kexgss_server(Kex *); ++#endif ++ + void + kex_dh_hash(char *, char *, char *, int, char *, int, u_char *, int, + BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, u_char **, u_int *); +diff -up openssh-5.4p1/key.c.gsskex openssh-5.4p1/key.c +--- openssh-5.4p1/key.c.gsskex 2010-02-26 21:55:05.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-5.4p1/key.c 2010-03-01 18:20:43.000000000 +0100 +@@ -969,6 +969,8 @@ key_type_from_name(char *name) + return KEY_RSA_CERT; + } else if (strcmp(name, "ssh-dss-cert-v00@openssh.com") == 0) { + return KEY_DSA_CERT; ++ } else if (strcmp(name, "null") == 0) { ++ return KEY_NULL; + } + debug2("key_type_from_name: unknown key type '%s'", name); + return KEY_UNSPEC; +diff -up openssh-5.4p1/key.h.gsskex openssh-5.4p1/key.h +--- openssh-5.4p1/key.h.gsskex 2010-02-26 21:55:05.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-5.4p1/key.h 2010-03-01 18:21:22.000000000 +0100 +@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ enum types { + KEY_DSA, + KEY_RSA_CERT, + KEY_DSA_CERT, ++ KEY_NULL, + KEY_UNSPEC + }; + enum fp_type { +diff -up openssh-5.4p1/Makefile.in.gsskex openssh-5.4p1/Makefile.in +--- openssh-5.4p1/Makefile.in.gsskex 2010-03-01 18:14:27.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-5.4p1/Makefile.in 2010-03-01 18:23:31.000000000 +0100 +@@ -74,11 +74,11 @@ + monitor_fdpass.o rijndael.o ssh-dss.o ssh-rsa.o dh.o kexdh.o \ + kexgex.o kexdhc.o kexgexc.o msg.o progressmeter.o dns.o \ + entropy.o gss-genr.o umac.o jpake.o schnorr.o \ +- ssh-pkcs11.o ++ ssh-pkcs11.o kexgssc.o + + SSHOBJS= ssh.o readconf.o clientloop.o sshtty.o \ + sshconnect.o sshconnect1.o sshconnect2.o mux.o \ +- roaming_common.o roaming_client.o ++ roaming_common.o roaming_client.o kexgssc.o + + SSHDOBJS=sshd.o auth-rhosts.o auth-passwd.o auth-rsa.o auth-rh-rsa.o \ + sshpty.o sshlogin.o servconf.o serverloop.o \ +@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ + auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o \ + loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o md5crypt.o \ + audit.o audit-bsm.o platform.o sftp-server.o sftp-common.o \ +- roaming_common.o roaming_serv.o ++ roaming_common.o roaming_serv.o kexgsss.o + + MANPAGES = moduli.5.out scp.1.out ssh-add.1.out ssh-agent.1.out ssh-keygen.1.out ssh-keyscan.1.out ssh.1.out sshd.8.out sftp-server.8.out sftp.1.out ssh-rand-helper.8.out ssh-keysign.8.out ssh-pkcs11-helper.8.out sshd_config.5.out ssh_config.5.out + MANPAGES_IN = moduli.5 scp.1 ssh-add.1 ssh-agent.1 ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keyscan.1 ssh.1 sshd.8 sftp-server.8 sftp.1 ssh-rand-helper.8 ssh-keysign.8 ssh-pkcs11-helper.8 sshd_config.5 ssh_config.5 +diff -up openssh-5.4p1/monitor.c.gsskex openssh-5.4p1/monitor.c +--- openssh-5.4p1/monitor.c.gsskex 2010-03-01 18:14:25.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-5.4p1/monitor.c 2010-03-01 18:14:29.000000000 +0100 +@@ -175,6 +175,8 @@ int mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int, Buffer + int mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int, Buffer *); + int mm_answer_gss_userok(int, Buffer *); + int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int, Buffer *); ++int mm_answer_gss_sign(int, Buffer *); ++int mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(int, Buffer *); + #endif + + #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS +@@ -247,6 +249,7 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] + {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx}, + {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_gss_userok}, + {MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_checkmic}, ++ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_gss_sign}, + #endif + #ifdef JPAKE + {MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_GET_PWDATA, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_jpake_get_pwdata}, +@@ -259,6 +262,12 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] + }; + + struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = { ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 0, mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx}, ++ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx}, ++ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, 0, mm_answer_gss_sign}, ++ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, 0, mm_answer_gss_updatecreds}, ++#endif + {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 0, mm_answer_moduli}, + {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 0, mm_answer_sign}, + {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 0, mm_answer_pty}, +@@ -363,6 +372,10 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctx + /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */ + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1); + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1); ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ /* and for the GSSAPI key exchange */ ++ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 1); ++#endif + } else { + mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto15; + +@@ -449,6 +462,10 @@ monitor_child_postauth(struct monitor *p + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1); + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1); + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1); ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ /* and for the GSSAPI key exchange */ ++ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 1); ++#endif + } else { + mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth15; + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1); +@@ -1738,6 +1755,13 @@ mm_get_kex(Buffer *m) + kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_server; + kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server; + kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server; ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ if (options.gss_keyex) { ++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server; ++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_server; ++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_server; ++ } ++#endif + kex->server = 1; + kex->hostkey_type = buffer_get_int(m); + kex->kex_type = buffer_get_int(m); +@@ -1944,6 +1968,9 @@ mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int sock, Buffer + OM_uint32 major; + u_int len; + ++ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex) ++ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled"); ++ + goid.elements = buffer_get_string(m, &len); + goid.length = len; + +@@ -1971,6 +1998,9 @@ mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int sock, Buffe + OM_uint32 flags = 0; /* GSI needs this */ + u_int len; + ++ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex) ++ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled"); ++ + in.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len); + in.length = len; + major = ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gsscontext, &in, &out, &flags); +@@ -1988,6 +2018,7 @@ mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int sock, Buffe + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0); + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1); + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, 1); ++ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, 1); + } + return (0); + } +@@ -1999,6 +2030,9 @@ mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int sock, Buffer + OM_uint32 ret; + u_int len; + ++ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex) ++ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled"); ++ + gssbuf.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len); + gssbuf.length = len; + mic.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len); +@@ -2025,7 +2059,11 @@ mm_answer_gss_userok(int sock, Buffer *m + { + int authenticated; + +- authenticated = authctxt->valid && ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user); ++ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex) ++ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled"); ++ ++ authenticated = authctxt->valid && ++ ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw); + + buffer_clear(m); + buffer_put_int(m, authenticated); +@@ -2038,6 +2076,74 @@ mm_answer_gss_userok(int sock, Buffer *m + /* Monitor loop will terminate if authenticated */ + return (authenticated); + } ++ ++int ++mm_answer_gss_sign(int socket, Buffer *m) ++{ ++ gss_buffer_desc data; ++ gss_buffer_desc hash = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; ++ OM_uint32 major, minor; ++ u_int len; ++ ++ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex) ++ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled"); ++ ++ data.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len); ++ data.length = len; ++ if (data.length != 20) ++ fatal("%s: data length incorrect: %d", __func__, ++ (int) data.length); ++ ++ /* Save the session ID on the first time around */ ++ if (session_id2_len == 0) { ++ session_id2_len = data.length; ++ session_id2 = xmalloc(session_id2_len); ++ memcpy(session_id2, data.value, session_id2_len); ++ } ++ major = ssh_gssapi_sign(gsscontext, &data, &hash); ++ ++ xfree(data.value); ++ ++ buffer_clear(m); ++ buffer_put_int(m, major); ++ buffer_put_string(m, hash.value, hash.length); ++ ++ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, m); ++ ++ gss_release_buffer(&minor, &hash); ++ ++ /* Turn on getpwnam permissions */ ++ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1); ++ ++ /* And credential updating, for when rekeying */ ++ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, 1); ++ ++ return (0); ++} ++ ++int ++mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(int socket, Buffer *m) { ++ ssh_gssapi_ccache store; ++ int ok; ++ ++ store.filename = buffer_get_string(m, NULL); ++ store.envvar = buffer_get_string(m, NULL); ++ store.envval = buffer_get_string(m, NULL); ++ ++ ok = ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&store); ++ ++ xfree(store.filename); ++ xfree(store.envvar); ++ xfree(store.envval); ++ ++ buffer_clear(m); ++ buffer_put_int(m, ok); ++ ++ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS, m); ++ ++ return(0); ++} ++ + #endif /* GSSAPI */ + + #ifdef JPAKE +diff -up openssh-5.4p1/monitor.h.gsskex openssh-5.4p1/monitor.h +--- openssh-5.4p1/monitor.h.gsskex 2010-03-01 18:14:25.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-5.4p1/monitor.h 2010-03-01 18:14:29.000000000 +0100 +@@ -56,6 +56,8 @@ enum monitor_reqtype { + MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSTEP, + MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUSEROK, + MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC, ++ MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, ++ MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS, + MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START, + MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT, + MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX, +diff -up openssh-5.4p1/monitor_wrap.c.gsskex openssh-5.4p1/monitor_wrap.c +--- openssh-5.4p1/monitor_wrap.c.gsskex 2010-03-01 18:14:25.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-5.4p1/monitor_wrap.c 2010-03-01 18:14:29.000000000 +0100 +@@ -1267,7 +1267,7 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss + } + + int +-mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user) ++mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw) + { + Buffer m; + int authenticated = 0; +@@ -1284,6 +1284,51 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user) + debug3("%s: user %sauthenticated",__func__, authenticated ? "" : "not "); + return (authenticated); + } ++ ++OM_uint32 ++mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_desc *data, gss_buffer_desc *hash) ++{ ++ Buffer m; ++ OM_uint32 major; ++ u_int len; ++ ++ buffer_init(&m); ++ buffer_put_string(&m, data->value, data->length); ++ ++ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, &m); ++ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, &m); ++ ++ major = buffer_get_int(&m); ++ hash->value = buffer_get_string(&m, &len); ++ hash->length = len; ++ ++ buffer_free(&m); ++ ++ return(major); ++} ++ ++int ++mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store) ++{ ++ Buffer m; ++ int ok; ++ ++ buffer_init(&m); ++ ++ buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->filename ? store->filename : ""); ++ buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->envvar ? store->envvar : ""); ++ buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->envval ? store->envval : ""); ++ ++ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, &m); ++ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS, &m); ++ ++ ok = buffer_get_int(&m); ++ ++ buffer_free(&m); ++ ++ return (ok); ++} ++ + #endif /* GSSAPI */ + + #ifdef JPAKE +diff -up openssh-5.4p1/monitor_wrap.h.gsskex openssh-5.4p1/monitor_wrap.h +--- openssh-5.4p1/monitor_wrap.h.gsskex 2010-03-01 18:14:25.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-5.4p1/monitor_wrap.h 2010-03-01 18:14:29.000000000 +0100 +@@ -60,8 +60,10 @@ BIGNUM *mm_auth_rsa_generate_challenge(K + OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID); + OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *, + gss_buffer_desc *, gss_buffer_desc *, OM_uint32 *); +-int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user); ++int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *); + OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t); ++OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t); ++int mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *); + #endif + + #ifdef USE_PAM +diff -up openssh-5.4p1/readconf.c.gsskex openssh-5.4p1/readconf.c +--- openssh-5.4p1/readconf.c.gsskex 2010-02-11 23:21:03.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-5.4p1/readconf.c 2010-03-01 18:14:29.000000000 +0100 +@@ -127,6 +127,7 @@ typedef enum { + oClearAllForwardings, oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost, + oEnableSSHKeysign, oRekeyLimit, oVerifyHostKeyDNS, oConnectTimeout, + oAddressFamily, oGssAuthentication, oGssDelegateCreds, ++ oGssTrustDns, oGssKeyEx, oGssClientIdentity, oGssRenewalRekey, + oServerAliveInterval, oServerAliveCountMax, oIdentitiesOnly, + oSendEnv, oControlPath, oControlMaster, oHashKnownHosts, + oTunnel, oTunnelDevice, oLocalCommand, oPermitLocalCommand, +@@ -164,10 +165,18 @@ static struct { + { "afstokenpassing", oUnsupported }, + #if defined(GSSAPI) + { "gssapiauthentication", oGssAuthentication }, ++ { "gssapikeyexchange", oGssKeyEx }, + { "gssapidelegatecredentials", oGssDelegateCreds }, ++ { "gssapitrustdns", oGssTrustDns }, ++ { "gssapiclientidentity", oGssClientIdentity }, ++ { "gssapirenewalforcesrekey", oGssRenewalRekey }, + #else + { "gssapiauthentication", oUnsupported }, ++ { "gssapikeyexchange", oUnsupported }, + { "gssapidelegatecredentials", oUnsupported }, ++ { "gssapitrustdns", oUnsupported }, ++ { "gssapiclientidentity", oUnsupported }, ++ { "gssapirenewalforcesrekey", oUnsupported }, + #endif + { "fallbacktorsh", oDeprecated }, + { "usersh", oDeprecated }, +@@ -456,10 +465,26 @@ parse_flag: + intptr = &options->gss_authentication; + goto parse_flag; + ++ case oGssKeyEx: ++ intptr = &options->gss_keyex; ++ goto parse_flag; ++ + case oGssDelegateCreds: + intptr = &options->gss_deleg_creds; + goto parse_flag; + ++ case oGssTrustDns: ++ intptr = &options->gss_trust_dns; ++ goto parse_flag; ++ ++ case oGssClientIdentity: ++ charptr = &options->gss_client_identity; ++ goto parse_string; ++ ++ case oGssRenewalRekey: ++ intptr = &options->gss_renewal_rekey; ++ goto parse_flag; ++ + case oBatchMode: + intptr = &options->batch_mode; + goto parse_flag; +@@ -1015,7 +1040,11 @@ initialize_options(Options * options) + options->pubkey_authentication = -1; + options->challenge_response_authentication = -1; + options->gss_authentication = -1; ++ options->gss_keyex = -1; + options->gss_deleg_creds = -1; ++ options->gss_trust_dns = -1; ++ options->gss_renewal_rekey = -1; ++ options->gss_client_identity = NULL; + options->password_authentication = -1; + options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1; + options->kbd_interactive_devices = NULL; +@@ -1107,8 +1136,14 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options) + options->challenge_response_authentication = 1; + if (options->gss_authentication == -1) + options->gss_authentication = 0; ++ if (options->gss_keyex == -1) ++ options->gss_keyex = 0; + if (options->gss_deleg_creds == -1) + options->gss_deleg_creds = 0; ++ if (options->gss_trust_dns == -1) ++ options->gss_trust_dns = 0; ++ if (options->gss_renewal_rekey == -1) ++ options->gss_renewal_rekey = 0; + if (options->password_authentication == -1) + options->password_authentication = 1; + if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1) +diff -up openssh-5.4p1/readconf.h.gsskex openssh-5.4p1/readconf.h +--- openssh-5.4p1/readconf.h.gsskex 2010-02-11 23:21:03.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-5.4p1/readconf.h 2010-03-01 18:14:29.000000000 +0100 +@@ -44,7 +44,11 @@ typedef struct { + int challenge_response_authentication; + /* Try S/Key or TIS, authentication. */ + int gss_authentication; /* Try GSS authentication */ ++ int gss_keyex; /* Try GSS key exchange */ + int gss_deleg_creds; /* Delegate GSS credentials */ ++ int gss_trust_dns; /* Trust DNS for GSS canonicalization */ ++ int gss_renewal_rekey; /* Credential renewal forces rekey */ ++ char *gss_client_identity; /* Principal to initiate GSSAPI with */ + int password_authentication; /* Try password + * authentication. */ + int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* Try keyboard-interactive auth. */ +diff -up openssh-5.4p1/servconf.c.gsskex openssh-5.4p1/servconf.c +--- openssh-5.4p1/servconf.c.gsskex 2010-03-01 18:14:28.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-5.4p1/servconf.c 2010-03-01 18:25:32.000000000 +0100 +@@ -93,7 +93,10 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions + options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = -1; + options->kerberos_get_afs_token = -1; + options->gss_authentication=-1; ++ options->gss_keyex = -1; + options->gss_cleanup_creds = -1; ++ options->gss_strict_acceptor = -1; ++ options->gss_store_rekey = -1; + options->password_authentication = -1; + options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1; + options->challenge_response_authentication = -1; +@@ -215,8 +218,14 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption + options->kerberos_get_afs_token = 0; + if (options->gss_authentication == -1) + options->gss_authentication = 0; ++ if (options->gss_keyex == -1) ++ options->gss_keyex = 0; + if (options->gss_cleanup_creds == -1) + options->gss_cleanup_creds = 1; ++ if (options->gss_strict_acceptor == -1) ++ options->gss_strict_acceptor = 1; ++ if (options->gss_store_rekey == -1) ++ options->gss_store_rekey = 0; + if (options->password_authentication == -1) + options->password_authentication = 1; + if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1) +@@ -310,7 +319,9 @@ typedef enum { + sBanner, sShowPatchLevel, sUseDNS, sHostbasedAuthentication, + sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, sClientAliveInterval, + sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile, sAuthorizedKeysFile2, +- sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel, ++ sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssStrictAcceptor, ++ sGssKeyEx, sGssStoreRekey, ++ sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel, + sMatch, sPermitOpen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory, + sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding, + sZeroKnowledgePasswordAuthentication, sHostCertificate, +@@ -373,9 +384,15 @@ static struct { + #ifdef GSSAPI + { "gssapiauthentication", sGssAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, ++ { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sGssStrictAcceptor, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, ++ { "gssapikeyexchange", sGssKeyEx, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, ++ { "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sGssStoreRekey, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + #else + { "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, ++ { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, ++ { "gssapikeyexchange", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, ++ { "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + #endif + { "passwordauthentication", sPasswordAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "kbdinteractiveauthentication", sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, +@@ -935,10 +952,22 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions + intptr = &options->gss_authentication; + goto parse_flag; + ++ case sGssKeyEx: ++ intptr = &options->gss_keyex; ++ goto parse_flag; ++ + case sGssCleanupCreds: + intptr = &options->gss_cleanup_creds; + goto parse_flag; + ++ case sGssStrictAcceptor: ++ intptr = &options->gss_strict_acceptor; ++ goto parse_flag; ++ ++ case sGssStoreRekey: ++ intptr = &options->gss_store_rekey; ++ goto parse_flag; ++ + case sPasswordAuthentication: + intptr = &options->password_authentication; + goto parse_flag; +diff -up openssh-5.4p1/servconf.h.gsskex openssh-5.4p1/servconf.h +--- openssh-5.4p1/servconf.h.gsskex 2010-03-01 18:14:28.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-5.4p1/servconf.h 2010-03-01 18:14:29.000000000 +0100 +@@ -94,7 +94,10 @@ typedef struct { + int kerberos_get_afs_token; /* If true, try to get AFS token if + * authenticated with Kerberos. */ + int gss_authentication; /* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */ ++ int gss_keyex; /* If true, permit GSSAPI key exchange */ + int gss_cleanup_creds; /* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */ ++ int gss_strict_acceptor; /* If true, restrict the GSSAPI acceptor name */ ++ int gss_store_rekey; + int password_authentication; /* If true, permit password + * authentication. */ + int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* If true, permit */ +diff -up openssh-5.4p1/ssh_config.5.gsskex openssh-5.4p1/ssh_config.5 +--- openssh-5.4p1/ssh_config.5.gsskex 2010-02-11 23:26:02.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-5.4p1/ssh_config.5 2010-03-01 18:14:29.000000000 +0100 +@@ -478,11 +478,38 @@ Specifies whether user authentication ba + The default is + .Dq no . + Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only. ++.It Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange ++Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI may be used. When using ++GSSAPI key exchange the server need not have a host key. ++The default is ++.Dq no . ++Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only. ++.It Cm GSSAPIClientIdentity ++If set, specifies the GSSAPI client identity that ssh should use when ++connecting to the server. The default is unset, which means that the default ++identity will be used. + .It Cm GSSAPIDelegateCredentials + Forward (delegate) credentials to the server. + The default is + .Dq no . +-Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only. ++Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 connections using GSSAPI. ++.It Cm GSSAPIRenewalForcesRekey ++If set to ++.Dq yes ++then renewal of the client's GSSAPI credentials will force the rekeying of the ++ssh connection. With a compatible server, this can delegate the renewed ++credentials to a session on the server. ++The default is ++.Dq no . ++.It Cm GSSAPITrustDns ++Set to ++.Dq yes to indicate that the DNS is trusted to securely canonicalize ++the name of the host being connected to. If ++.Dq no, the hostname entered on the ++command line will be passed untouched to the GSSAPI library. ++The default is ++.Dq no . ++This option only applies to protocol version 2 connections using GSSAPI. + .It Cm HashKnownHosts + Indicates that + .Xr ssh 1 +diff -up openssh-5.4p1/ssh_config.gsskex openssh-5.4p1/ssh_config +--- openssh-5.4p1/ssh_config.gsskex 2010-03-01 18:14:24.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-5.4p1/ssh_config 2010-03-01 18:14:29.000000000 +0100 +@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@ + # HostbasedAuthentication no + # GSSAPIAuthentication no + # GSSAPIDelegateCredentials no ++# GSSAPIKeyExchange no ++# GSSAPITrustDNS no + # BatchMode no + # CheckHostIP yes + # AddressFamily any +diff -up openssh-5.4p1/sshconnect2.c.gsskex openssh-5.4p1/sshconnect2.c +--- openssh-5.4p1/sshconnect2.c.gsskex 2010-03-01 18:14:27.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-5.4p1/sshconnect2.c 2010-03-01 18:14:29.000000000 +0100 +@@ -108,9 +108,34 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *ho + { + Kex *kex; + ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ char *orig = NULL, *gss = NULL; ++ char *gss_host = NULL; ++#endif ++ + xxx_host = host; + xxx_hostaddr = hostaddr; + ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ if (options.gss_keyex) { ++ /* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this ++ * client to the key exchange algorithm proposal */ ++ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]; ++ ++ if (options.gss_trust_dns) ++ gss_host = (char *)get_canonical_hostname(1); ++ else ++ gss_host = host; ++ ++ gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host, options.gss_client_identity); ++ if (gss) { ++ debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss); ++ xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS], ++ "%s,%s", gss, orig); ++ } ++ } ++#endif ++ + if (options.ciphers == (char *)-1) { + logit("No valid ciphers for protocol version 2 given, using defaults."); + options.ciphers = NULL; +@@ -146,6 +171,17 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *ho + myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = + options.hostkeyalgorithms; + ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ /* If we've got GSSAPI algorithms, then we also support the ++ * 'null' hostkey, as a last resort */ ++ if (options.gss_keyex && gss) { ++ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]; ++ xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS], ++ "%s,null", orig); ++ xfree(gss); ++ } ++#endif ++ + if (options.rekey_limit) + packet_set_rekey_limit((u_int32_t)options.rekey_limit); + +@@ -155,10 +191,26 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *ho + kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_client; + kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_client; + kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_client; ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ if (options.gss_keyex) { ++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_client; ++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_client; ++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_client; ++ } ++#endif + kex->client_version_string=client_version_string; + kex->server_version_string=server_version_string; + kex->verify_host_key=&verify_host_key_callback; + ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ if (options.gss_keyex) { ++ kex->gss_deleg_creds = options.gss_deleg_creds; ++ kex->gss_trust_dns = options.gss_trust_dns; ++ kex->gss_client = options.gss_client_identity; ++ kex->gss_host = gss_host; ++ } ++#endif ++ + xxx_kex = kex; + + dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &kex->done, kex); +@@ -253,6 +305,7 @@ void input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int3 + void input_gssapi_hash(int type, u_int32_t, void *); + void input_gssapi_error(int, u_int32_t, void *); + void input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, void *); ++int userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt); + #endif + + void userauth(Authctxt *, char *); +@@ -268,6 +321,10 @@ static char *authmethods_get(void); + + Authmethod authmethods[] = { + #ifdef GSSAPI ++ {"gssapi-keyex", ++ userauth_gsskeyex, ++ &options.gss_authentication, ++ NULL}, + {"gssapi-with-mic", + userauth_gssapi, + NULL, +@@ -576,23 +633,35 @@ userauth_gssapi(Authctxt *authctxt) + int ok = 0; + char* remotehost = NULL; + const char* canonicalhost = get_canonical_hostname(1); ++ const char *gss_host; ++ + if ( strcmp( canonicalhost, "UNKNOWN" ) == 0 ) + remotehost = authctxt->host; + else + remotehost = canonicalhost; + ++ if (options.gss_trust_dns) ++// gss_host = get_canonical_hostname(1); ++ gss_host = remotehost; ++ else ++ gss_host = authctxt->host; ++ + /* Try one GSSAPI method at a time, rather than sending them all at + * once. */ + + if (gss_supported == NULL) +- gss_indicate_mechs(&min, &gss_supported); ++ if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min, &gss_supported))) { ++ gss_supported = NULL; ++ return 0; ++ } + + /* Check to see if the mechanism is usable before we offer it */ + while (mech < gss_supported->count && !ok) { + /* My DER encoding requires length<128 */ + if (gss_supported->elements[mech].length < 128 && + ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(&gssctxt, +- &gss_supported->elements[mech], remotehost)) { ++ &gss_supported->elements[mech], gss_host, ++ options.gss_client_identity)) { + ok = 1; /* Mechanism works */ + } else { + mech++; +@@ -689,8 +758,8 @@ input_gssapi_response(int type, u_int32_ + { + Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt; + Gssctxt *gssctxt; +- int oidlen; +- char *oidv; ++ u_int oidlen; ++ u_char *oidv; + + if (authctxt == NULL) + fatal("input_gssapi_response: no authentication context"); +@@ -800,6 +869,48 @@ input_gssapi_error(int type, u_int32_t p + xfree(msg); + xfree(lang); + } ++ ++int ++userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt) ++{ ++ Buffer b; ++ gss_buffer_desc gssbuf; ++ gss_buffer_desc mic = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; ++ OM_uint32 ms; ++ ++ static int attempt = 0; ++ if (attempt++ >= 1) ++ return (0); ++ ++ if (gss_kex_context == NULL) { ++ debug("No valid Key exchange context"); ++ return (0); ++ } ++ ++ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->server_user, authctxt->service, ++ "gssapi-keyex"); ++ ++ gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b); ++ gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b); ++ ++ if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_sign(gss_kex_context, &gssbuf, &mic))) { ++ buffer_free(&b); ++ return (0); ++ } ++ ++ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST); ++ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user); ++ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service); ++ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name); ++ packet_put_string(mic.value, mic.length); ++ packet_send(); ++ ++ buffer_free(&b); ++ gss_release_buffer(&ms, &mic); ++ ++ return (1); ++} ++ + #endif /* GSSAPI */ + + int +diff -up openssh-5.4p1/sshd.c.gsskex openssh-5.4p1/sshd.c +--- openssh-5.4p1/sshd.c.gsskex 2010-03-01 18:14:27.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-5.4p1/sshd.c 2010-03-01 18:14:29.000000000 +0100 +@@ -129,6 +129,10 @@ int allow_severity; + int deny_severity; + #endif /* LIBWRAP */ + ++#ifdef USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API ++#include ++#endif ++ + #ifndef O_NOCTTY + #define O_NOCTTY 0 + #endif +@@ -1592,10 +1596,13 @@ main(int ac, char **av) + logit("Disabling protocol version 1. Could not load host key"); + options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_1; + } ++#ifndef GSSAPI ++ /* The GSSAPI key exchange can run without a host key */ + if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) && !sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key) { + logit("Disabling protocol version 2. Could not load host key"); + options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_2; + } ++#endif + if (!(options.protocol & (SSH_PROTO_1|SSH_PROTO_2))) { + logit("sshd: no hostkeys available -- exiting."); + exit(1); +@@ -1928,6 +1935,60 @@ main(int ac, char **av) + /* Log the connection. */ + verbose("Connection from %.500s port %d", remote_ip, remote_port); + ++#ifdef USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API ++ /* ++ * Create a new security session for use by the new user login if ++ * the current session is the root session or we are not launched ++ * by inetd (eg: debugging mode or server mode). We do not ++ * necessarily need to create a session if we are launched from ++ * inetd because Panther xinetd will create a session for us. ++ * ++ * The only case where this logic will fail is if there is an ++ * inetd running in a non-root session which is not creating ++ * new sessions for us. Then all the users will end up in the ++ * same session (bad). ++ * ++ * When the client exits, the session will be destroyed for us ++ * automatically. ++ * ++ * We must create the session before any credentials are stored ++ * (including AFS pags, which happens a few lines below). ++ */ ++ { ++ OSStatus err = 0; ++ SecuritySessionId sid = 0; ++ SessionAttributeBits sattrs = 0; ++ ++ err = SessionGetInfo(callerSecuritySession, &sid, &sattrs); ++ if (err) ++ error("SessionGetInfo() failed with error %.8X", ++ (unsigned) err); ++ else ++ debug("Current Session ID is %.8X / Session Attributes are %.8X", ++ (unsigned) sid, (unsigned) sattrs); ++ ++ if (inetd_flag && !(sattrs & sessionIsRoot)) ++ debug("Running in inetd mode in a non-root session... " ++ "assuming inetd created the session for us."); ++ else { ++ debug("Creating new security session..."); ++ err = SessionCreate(0, sessionHasTTY | sessionIsRemote); ++ if (err) ++ error("SessionCreate() failed with error %.8X", ++ (unsigned) err); ++ ++ err = SessionGetInfo(callerSecuritySession, &sid, ++ &sattrs); ++ if (err) ++ error("SessionGetInfo() failed with error %.8X", ++ (unsigned) err); ++ else ++ debug("New Session ID is %.8X / Session Attributes are %.8X", ++ (unsigned) sid, (unsigned) sattrs); ++ } ++ } ++#endif ++ + /* + * We don't want to listen forever unless the other side + * successfully authenticates itself. So we set up an alarm which is +@@ -2314,12 +2375,61 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void) + + myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = list_hostkey_types(); + ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ { ++ char *orig; ++ char *gss = NULL; ++ char *newstr = NULL; ++ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]; ++ ++ /* ++ * If we don't have a host key, then there's no point advertising ++ * the other key exchange algorithms ++ */ ++ ++ if (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]) == 0) ++ orig = NULL; ++ ++ if (options.gss_keyex) ++ gss = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(); ++ else ++ gss = NULL; ++ ++ if (gss && orig) ++ xasprintf(&newstr, "%s,%s", gss, orig); ++ else if (gss) ++ newstr = gss; ++ else if (orig) ++ newstr = orig; ++ ++ /* ++ * If we've got GSSAPI mechanisms, then we've got the 'null' host ++ * key alg, but we can't tell people about it unless its the only ++ * host key algorithm we support ++ */ ++ if (gss && (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS])) == 0) ++ myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = "null"; ++ ++ if (newstr) ++ myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = newstr; ++ else ++ fatal("No supported key exchange algorithms"); ++ } ++#endif ++ + /* start key exchange */ + kex = kex_setup(myproposal); + kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_server; + kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_server; + kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server; + kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server; ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ if (options.gss_keyex) { ++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server; ++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_server; ++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_server; ++ } ++#endif + kex->server = 1; + kex->client_version_string=client_version_string; + kex->server_version_string=server_version_string; +diff -up openssh-5.4p1/sshd_config.5.gsskex openssh-5.4p1/sshd_config.5 +--- openssh-5.4p1/sshd_config.5.gsskex 2010-03-01 18:14:28.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-5.4p1/sshd_config.5 2010-03-01 18:14:29.000000000 +0100 +@@ -379,12 +379,40 @@ Specifies whether user authentication ba + The default is + .Dq no . + Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only. ++.It Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange ++Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI is allowed. GSSAPI key exchange ++doesn't rely on ssh keys to verify host identity. ++The default is ++.Dq no . ++Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only. + .It Cm GSSAPICleanupCredentials + Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's credentials cache + on logout. + The default is + .Dq yes . + Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only. ++.It Cm GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck ++Determines whether to be strict about the identity of the GSSAPI acceptor ++a client authenticates against. If ++.Dq yes ++then the client must authenticate against the ++.Pa host ++service on the current hostname. If ++.Dq no ++then the client may authenticate against any service key stored in the ++machine's default store. This facility is provided to assist with operation ++on multi homed machines. ++The default is ++.Dq yes . ++Note that this option applies only to protocol version 2 GSSAPI connections, ++and setting it to ++.Dq no ++may only work with recent Kerberos GSSAPI libraries. ++.It Cm GSSAPIStoreCredentialsOnRekey ++Controls whether the user's GSSAPI credentials should be updated following a ++successful connection rekeying. This option can be used to accepted renewed ++or updated credentials from a compatible client. The default is ++.Dq no . + .It Cm HostbasedAuthentication + Specifies whether rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication together + with successful public key client host authentication is allowed +diff -up openssh-5.4p1/sshd_config.gsskex openssh-5.4p1/sshd_config +--- openssh-5.4p1/sshd_config.gsskex 2010-03-01 18:14:28.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-5.4p1/sshd_config 2010-03-01 18:14:29.000000000 +0100 +@@ -78,6 +78,8 @@ ChallengeResponseAuthentication no + GSSAPIAuthentication yes + #GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes + GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes ++#GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck yes ++#GSSAPIKeyExchange no + + # Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing, + # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will +diff -up openssh-5.4p1/ssh-gss.h.gsskex openssh-5.4p1/ssh-gss.h +--- openssh-5.4p1/ssh-gss.h.gsskex 2007-06-12 15:40:39.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-5.4p1/ssh-gss.h 2010-03-01 18:14:30.000000000 +0100 +@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ + /* $OpenBSD: ssh-gss.h,v 1.10 2007/06/12 08:20:00 djm Exp $ */ + /* +- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. ++ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +@@ -60,10 +60,22 @@ + + #define SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE 0x06 + ++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT 30 ++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE 31 ++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE 32 ++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY 33 ++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR 34 ++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ 40 ++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP 41 ++#define KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID "gss-group1-sha1-" ++#define KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID "gss-group14-sha1-" ++#define KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID "gss-gex-sha1-" ++ + typedef struct { + char *filename; + char *envvar; + char *envval; ++ struct passwd *owner; + void *data; + } ssh_gssapi_ccache; + +@@ -71,8 +83,11 @@ typedef struct { + gss_buffer_desc displayname; + gss_buffer_desc exportedname; + gss_cred_id_t creds; ++ gss_name_t name; + struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct *mech; + ssh_gssapi_ccache store; ++ int used; ++ int updated; + } ssh_gssapi_client; + + typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct { +@@ -83,6 +98,7 @@ typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct { + int (*userok) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char *); + int (*localname) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char **); + void (*storecreds) (ssh_gssapi_client *); ++ int (*updatecreds) (ssh_gssapi_ccache *, ssh_gssapi_client *); + } ssh_gssapi_mech; + + typedef struct { +@@ -93,10 +109,11 @@ typedef struct { + gss_OID oid; /* client */ + gss_cred_id_t creds; /* server */ + gss_name_t client; /* server */ +- gss_cred_id_t client_creds; /* server */ ++ gss_cred_id_t client_creds; /* both */ + } Gssctxt; + + extern ssh_gssapi_mech *supported_mechs[]; ++extern Gssctxt *gss_kex_context; + + int ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t); + void ssh_gssapi_set_oid_data(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t); +@@ -116,16 +133,30 @@ void ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(Gssctxt **); + void ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(Gssctxt **); + OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t); + void ssh_gssapi_buildmic(Buffer *, const char *, const char *, const char *); +-int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *); ++int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *, const char *); ++OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_client_identity(Gssctxt *, const char *); ++int ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(Gssctxt *); + + /* In the server */ ++typedef int ssh_gssapi_check_fn(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *, ++ const char *); ++char *ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *, const char *); ++char *ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *, const char *, ++ const char *); ++gss_OID ssh_gssapi_id_kex(Gssctxt *, char *, int); ++int ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt **,gss_OID, const char *, ++ const char *); + OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID); +-int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name); ++int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name, struct passwd *); + OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t); + void ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***, u_int *); + void ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void); + void ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void); + ++char *ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(void); ++int ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok(); ++ ++int ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store); + #endif /* GSSAPI */ + + #endif /* _SSH_GSS_H */ diff --git a/openssh-5.4p1-mls.patch b/openssh-5.4p1-mls.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2fb3ee5 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh-5.4p1-mls.patch @@ -0,0 +1,446 @@ +diff -up openssh-5.4p1/configure.ac.mls openssh-5.4p1/configure.ac +--- openssh-5.4p1/configure.ac.mls 2010-03-01 15:24:27.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-5.4p1/configure.ac 2010-03-01 15:24:28.000000000 +0100 +@@ -3360,6 +3360,7 @@ AC_ARG_WITH(selinux, + SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS $LIBSELINUX" + LIBS="$LIBS $LIBSELINUX" + AC_CHECK_FUNCS(getseuserbyname get_default_context_with_level) ++ AC_CHECK_FUNCS(setkeycreatecon) + LIBS="$save_LIBS" + fi ] + ) +diff -up openssh-5.4p1/misc.c.mls openssh-5.4p1/misc.c +--- openssh-5.4p1/misc.c.mls 2010-01-10 00:31:12.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-5.4p1/misc.c 2010-03-01 15:24:28.000000000 +0100 +@@ -423,6 +423,7 @@ char * + colon(char *cp) + { + int flag = 0; ++ int start = 1; + + if (*cp == ':') /* Leading colon is part of file name. */ + return (0); +@@ -436,8 +437,13 @@ colon(char *cp) + return (cp+1); + if (*cp == ':' && !flag) + return (cp); +- if (*cp == '/') +- return (0); ++ if (start) { ++ /* Slash on beginning or after dots only denotes file name. */ ++ if (*cp == '/') ++ return (0); ++ if (*cp != '.') ++ start = 0; ++ } + } + return (0); + } +diff -up openssh-5.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.mls openssh-5.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c +--- openssh-5.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.mls 2010-03-01 15:24:27.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-5.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c 2010-03-01 15:25:50.000000000 +0100 +@@ -35,13 +35,24 @@ + #include "key.h" + #include "hostfile.h" + #include "auth.h" ++#include "xmalloc.h" + + #ifdef WITH_SELINUX + #include + #include ++#include + #include ++#include ++#include ++ ++#ifdef HAVE_LINUX_AUDIT ++#include ++#include ++#endif + + extern Authctxt *the_authctxt; ++extern int inetd_flag; ++extern int rexeced_flag; + + /* Wrapper around is_selinux_enabled() to log its return value once only */ + int +@@ -57,17 +68,173 @@ ssh_selinux_enabled(void) + return (enabled); + } + ++/* Send audit message */ ++static int ++send_audit_message(int success, security_context_t default_context, ++ security_context_t selected_context) ++{ ++ int rc=0; ++#ifdef HAVE_LINUX_AUDIT ++ char *msg = NULL; ++ int audit_fd = audit_open(); ++ security_context_t default_raw=NULL; ++ security_context_t selected_raw=NULL; ++ rc = -1; ++ if (audit_fd < 0) { ++ if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT || ++ errno == EAFNOSUPPORT) ++ return 0; /* No audit support in kernel */ ++ error("Error connecting to audit system."); ++ return rc; ++ } ++ if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(default_context, &default_raw) < 0) { ++ error("Error translating default context."); ++ default_raw = NULL; ++ } ++ if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(selected_context, &selected_raw) < 0) { ++ error("Error translating selected context."); ++ selected_raw = NULL; ++ } ++ if (asprintf(&msg, "sshd: default-context=%s selected-context=%s", ++ default_raw ? default_raw : (default_context ? default_context: "?"), ++ selected_context ? selected_raw : (selected_context ? selected_context :"?")) < 0) { ++ error("Error allocating memory."); ++ goto out; ++ } ++ if (audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_ROLE_CHANGE, ++ msg, NULL, NULL, NULL, success) <= 0) { ++ error("Error sending audit message."); ++ goto out; ++ } ++ rc = 0; ++ out: ++ free(msg); ++ freecon(default_raw); ++ freecon(selected_raw); ++ close(audit_fd); ++#endif ++ return rc; ++} ++ ++static int ++mls_range_allowed(security_context_t src, security_context_t dst) ++{ ++ struct av_decision avd; ++ int retval; ++ unsigned int bit = CONTEXT__CONTAINS; ++ ++ debug("%s: src:%s dst:%s", __func__, src, dst); ++ retval = security_compute_av(src, dst, SECCLASS_CONTEXT, bit, &avd); ++ if (retval || ((bit & avd.allowed) != bit)) ++ return 0; ++ ++ return 1; ++} ++ ++static int ++get_user_context(const char *sename, const char *role, const char *lvl, ++ security_context_t *sc) { ++#ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL ++ if (lvl == NULL || lvl[0] == '\0' || get_default_context_with_level(sename, lvl, NULL, sc) != 0) { ++ /* User may have requested a level completely outside of his ++ allowed range. We get a context just for auditing as the ++ range check below will certainly fail for default context. */ ++#endif ++ if (get_default_context(sename, NULL, sc) != 0) { ++ *sc = NULL; ++ return -1; ++ } ++#ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL ++ } ++#endif ++ if (role != NULL && role[0]) { ++ context_t con; ++ char *type=NULL; ++ if (get_default_type(role, &type) != 0) { ++ error("get_default_type: failed to get default type for '%s'", ++ role); ++ goto out; ++ } ++ con = context_new(*sc); ++ if (!con) { ++ goto out; ++ } ++ context_role_set(con, role); ++ context_type_set(con, type); ++ freecon(*sc); ++ *sc = strdup(context_str(con)); ++ context_free(con); ++ if (!*sc) ++ return -1; ++ } ++#ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL ++ if (lvl != NULL && lvl[0]) { ++ /* verify that the requested range is obtained */ ++ context_t con; ++ security_context_t obtained_raw; ++ security_context_t requested_raw; ++ con = context_new(*sc); ++ if (!con) { ++ goto out; ++ } ++ context_range_set(con, lvl); ++ if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(*sc, &obtained_raw) < 0) { ++ context_free(con); ++ goto out; ++ } ++ if (selinux_trans_to_raw_context(context_str(con), &requested_raw) < 0) { ++ freecon(obtained_raw); ++ context_free(con); ++ goto out; ++ } ++ ++ debug("get_user_context: obtained context '%s' requested context '%s'", ++ obtained_raw, requested_raw); ++ if (strcmp(obtained_raw, requested_raw)) { ++ /* set the context to the real requested one but fail */ ++ freecon(requested_raw); ++ freecon(obtained_raw); ++ freecon(*sc); ++ *sc = strdup(context_str(con)); ++ context_free(con); ++ return -1; ++ } ++ freecon(requested_raw); ++ freecon(obtained_raw); ++ context_free(con); ++ } ++#endif ++ return 0; ++ out: ++ freecon(*sc); ++ *sc = NULL; ++ return -1; ++} ++ + /* Return the default security context for the given username */ +-static security_context_t +-ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname) ++static int ++ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname, ++ security_context_t *default_sc, security_context_t *user_sc) + { +- security_context_t sc = NULL; + char *sename, *lvl; ++ const char *reqlvl = NULL; + char *role = NULL; +- int r = 0; ++ int r = -1; ++ context_t con = NULL; ++ ++ *default_sc = NULL; ++ *user_sc = NULL; ++ if (the_authctxt) { ++ if (the_authctxt->role != NULL) { ++ char *slash; ++ role = xstrdup(the_authctxt->role); ++ if ((slash = strchr(role, '/')) != NULL) { ++ *slash = '\0'; ++ reqlvl = slash + 1; ++ } ++ } ++ } + +- if (the_authctxt) +- role=the_authctxt->role; + #ifdef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME + if ((r=getseuserbyname(pwname, &sename, &lvl)) != 0) { + sename = NULL; +@@ -75,38 +242,63 @@ ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname) + } + #else + sename = pwname; +- lvl = NULL; ++ lvl = ""; + #endif + + if (r == 0) { + #ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL +- if (role != NULL && role[0]) +- r = get_default_context_with_rolelevel(sename, role, lvl, NULL, &sc); +- else +- r = get_default_context_with_level(sename, lvl, NULL, &sc); ++ r = get_default_context_with_level(sename, lvl, NULL, default_sc); + #else +- if (role != NULL && role[0]) +- r = get_default_context_with_role(sename, role, NULL, &sc); +- else +- r = get_default_context(sename, NULL, &sc); ++ r = get_default_context(sename, NULL, default_sc); + #endif + } + +- if (r != 0) { +- switch (security_getenforce()) { +- case -1: +- fatal("%s: ssh_selinux_getctxbyname: " +- "security_getenforce() failed", __func__); +- case 0: +- error("%s: Failed to get default SELinux security " +- "context for %s", __func__, pwname); +- break; +- default: +- fatal("%s: Failed to get default SELinux security " +- "context for %s (in enforcing mode)", +- __func__, pwname); ++ if (r == 0) { ++ /* If launched from xinetd, we must use current level */ ++ if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) { ++ security_context_t sshdsc=NULL; ++ ++ if (getcon_raw(&sshdsc) < 0) ++ fatal("failed to allocate security context"); ++ ++ if ((con=context_new(sshdsc)) == NULL) ++ fatal("failed to allocate selinux context"); ++ reqlvl = context_range_get(con); ++ freecon(sshdsc); ++ if (reqlvl !=NULL && lvl != NULL && strcmp(reqlvl, lvl) == 0) ++ /* we actually don't change level */ ++ reqlvl = ""; ++ ++ debug("%s: current connection level '%s'", __func__, reqlvl); ++ } ++ ++ if ((reqlvl != NULL && reqlvl[0]) || (role != NULL && role[0])) { ++ r = get_user_context(sename, role, reqlvl, user_sc); ++ ++ if (r == 0 && reqlvl != NULL && reqlvl[0]) { ++ security_context_t default_level_sc = *default_sc; ++ if (role != NULL && role[0]) { ++ if (get_user_context(sename, role, lvl, &default_level_sc) < 0) ++ default_level_sc = *default_sc; ++ } ++ /* verify that the requested range is contained in the user range */ ++ if (mls_range_allowed(default_level_sc, *user_sc)) { ++ logit("permit MLS level %s (user range %s)", reqlvl, lvl); ++ } else { ++ r = -1; ++ error("deny MLS level %s (user range %s)", reqlvl, lvl); ++ } ++ if (default_level_sc != *default_sc) ++ freecon(default_level_sc); ++ } ++ } else { ++ *user_sc = *default_sc; + } + } ++ if (r != 0) { ++ error("%s: Failed to get default SELinux security " ++ "context for %s", __func__, pwname); ++ } + + #ifdef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME + if (sename != NULL) +@@ -114,14 +306,20 @@ ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname) + if (lvl != NULL) + xfree(lvl); + #endif ++ if (role != NULL) ++ xfree(role); ++ if (con) ++ context_free(con); + +- return (sc); ++ return (r); + } + + /* Set the execution context to the default for the specified user */ + void + ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname) + { ++ int r = 0; ++ security_context_t default_ctx = NULL; + security_context_t user_ctx = NULL; + + if (!ssh_selinux_enabled()) +@@ -129,22 +327,45 @@ ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwn + + debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__); + +- user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname); +- if (setexeccon(user_ctx) != 0) { ++ r = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname, &default_ctx, &user_ctx); ++ if (r >= 0) { ++ r = setexeccon(user_ctx); ++ if (r < 0) { ++ error("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution context %s for %s", ++ __func__, user_ctx, pwname); ++ } ++#ifdef HAVE_SETKEYCREATECON ++ else if (setkeycreatecon(user_ctx) < 0) { ++ error("%s: Failed to set SELinux keyring creation context %s for %s", ++ __func__, user_ctx, pwname); ++ } ++#endif ++ } ++ if (user_ctx == NULL) { ++ user_ctx = default_ctx; ++ } ++ if (r < 0 || user_ctx != default_ctx) { ++ /* audit just the case when user changed a role or there was ++ a failure */ ++ send_audit_message(r >= 0, default_ctx, user_ctx); ++ } ++ if (r < 0) { + switch (security_getenforce()) { + case -1: + fatal("%s: security_getenforce() failed", __func__); + case 0: +- error("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution " +- "context for %s", __func__, pwname); ++ error("%s: SELinux failure. Continuing in permissive mode.", ++ __func__); + break; + default: +- fatal("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution context " +- "for %s (in enforcing mode)", __func__, pwname); ++ fatal("%s: SELinux failure. Aborting connection.", ++ __func__); + } + } +- if (user_ctx != NULL) ++ if (user_ctx != NULL && user_ctx != default_ctx) + freecon(user_ctx); ++ if (default_ctx != NULL) ++ freecon(default_ctx); + + debug3("%s: done", __func__); + } +@@ -162,7 +383,10 @@ ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *pwname, cons + + debug3("%s: setting TTY context on %s", __func__, tty); + +- user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname); ++ if (getexeccon(&user_ctx) < 0) { ++ error("%s: getexeccon: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); ++ goto out; ++ } + + /* XXX: should these calls fatal() upon failure in enforcing mode? */ + +diff -up openssh-5.4p1/session.c.mls openssh-5.4p1/session.c +--- openssh-5.4p1/session.c.mls 2010-01-12 09:51:48.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-5.4p1/session.c 2010-03-01 15:24:28.000000000 +0100 +@@ -1559,10 +1559,6 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw) + + if (getuid() != pw->pw_uid || geteuid() != pw->pw_uid) + fatal("Failed to set uids to %u.", (u_int) pw->pw_uid); +- +-#ifdef WITH_SELINUX +- ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name); +-#endif + } + + static void +diff -up openssh-5.4p1/sshd.c.mls openssh-5.4p1/sshd.c +--- openssh-5.4p1/sshd.c.mls 2010-03-01 15:24:27.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-5.4p1/sshd.c 2010-03-01 15:24:28.000000000 +0100 +@@ -1987,6 +1987,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av) + restore_uid(); + } + #endif ++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX ++ ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(authctxt->pw->pw_name); ++#endif + #ifdef USE_PAM + if (options.use_pam) { + do_pam_setcred(1); diff --git a/openssh-5.4p1-noacss.tar.bz2 b/openssh-5.4p1-noacss.tar.bz2 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1b80b47 Binary files /dev/null and b/openssh-5.4p1-noacss.tar.bz2 differ diff --git a/openssh-5.4p1-nss-keys.patch b/openssh-5.4p1-nss-keys.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7321816 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh-5.4p1-nss-keys.patch @@ -0,0 +1,1526 @@ +diff -up openssh-5.3p1/authfd.c.nss-keys openssh-5.3p1/authfd.c +--- openssh-5.3p1/authfd.c.nss-keys 2006-09-01 07:38:36.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-5.3p1/authfd.c 2009-11-27 13:43:00.000000000 +0100 +@@ -626,6 +626,45 @@ ssh_update_card(AuthenticationConnection + return decode_reply(type); + } + ++int ++ssh_update_nss_key(AuthenticationConnection *auth, int add, ++ const char *tokenname, const char *keyname, ++ const char *pass, u_int life, u_int confirm) ++{ ++ Buffer msg; ++ int type, constrained = (life || confirm); ++ ++ if (add) { ++ type = constrained ? ++ SSH_AGENTC_ADD_NSS_KEY_CONSTRAINED : ++ SSH_AGENTC_ADD_NSS_KEY; ++ } else ++ type = SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_NSS_KEY; ++ ++ buffer_init(&msg); ++ buffer_put_char(&msg, type); ++ buffer_put_cstring(&msg, tokenname); ++ buffer_put_cstring(&msg, keyname); ++ buffer_put_cstring(&msg, pass); ++ ++ if (constrained) { ++ if (life != 0) { ++ buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME); ++ buffer_put_int(&msg, life); ++ } ++ if (confirm != 0) ++ buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM); ++ } ++ ++ if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &msg, &msg) == 0) { ++ buffer_free(&msg); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ type = buffer_get_char(&msg); ++ buffer_free(&msg); ++ return decode_reply(type); ++} ++ + /* + * Removes all identities from the agent. This call is not meant to be used + * by normal applications. +diff -up openssh-5.3p1/authfd.h.nss-keys openssh-5.3p1/authfd.h +--- openssh-5.3p1/authfd.h.nss-keys 2006-08-05 04:39:39.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-5.3p1/authfd.h 2009-11-27 13:43:01.000000000 +0100 +@@ -49,6 +49,12 @@ + #define SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED 25 + #define SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY_CONSTRAINED 26 + ++/* nss */ ++#define SSH_AGENTC_ADD_NSS_KEY 30 ++#define SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_NSS_KEY 31 ++#define SSH_AGENTC_ADD_NSS_KEY_CONSTRAINED 32 ++ ++ + #define SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME 1 + #define SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM 2 + +@@ -83,6 +89,8 @@ int ssh_remove_all_identities(Authentic + int ssh_lock_agent(AuthenticationConnection *, int, const char *); + int ssh_update_card(AuthenticationConnection *, int, const char *, + const char *, u_int, u_int); ++int ssh_update_nss_key(AuthenticationConnection *, int, const char *, ++ const char *, const char *, u_int, u_int); + + int + ssh_decrypt_challenge(AuthenticationConnection *, Key *, BIGNUM *, u_char[16], +diff -up openssh-5.3p1/configure.ac.nss-keys openssh-5.3p1/configure.ac +--- openssh-5.3p1/configure.ac.nss-keys 2009-11-27 13:42:57.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-5.3p1/configure.ac 2009-11-27 13:48:44.000000000 +0100 +@@ -3526,6 +3526,21 @@ AC_ARG_WITH(kerberos5, + ] + ) + ++# Check whether user wants NSS support ++LIBNSS_MSG="no" ++AC_ARG_WITH(nss, ++ [ --with-nss Enable NSS support], ++ [ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then ++ AC_DEFINE(HAVE_LIBNSS,1,[Define if you want NSS support.]) ++ LIBNSS_MSG="yes" ++ CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I/usr/include/nss3 -I/usr/include/nspr4" ++ AC_CHECK_HEADERS(pk11pub.h) ++ LIBS="$LIBS -lnss3 -lplc4" ++ AC_CHECK_DECLS([SEC_ERROR_LOCKED_PASSWORD], [], [], [#include ]) ++ fi ++ ]) ++AC_SUBST(LIBNSS) ++ + # Looking for programs, paths and files + + PRIVSEP_PATH=/var/empty +@@ -4253,6 +4269,7 @@ echo " TCP Wrappers support + echo " MD5 password support: $MD5_MSG" + echo " libedit support: $LIBEDIT_MSG" + echo " Solaris process contract support: $SPC_MSG" ++echo " NSS support: $LIBNSS_MSG" + echo " IP address in \$DISPLAY hack: $DISPLAY_HACK_MSG" + echo " Translate v4 in v6 hack: $IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG" + echo " BSD Auth support: $BSD_AUTH_MSG" +diff -up openssh-5.3p1/key.c.nss-keys openssh-5.3p1/key.c +--- openssh-5.3p1/key.c.nss-keys 2008-11-03 09:24:17.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-5.3p1/key.c 2009-11-27 13:43:01.000000000 +0100 +@@ -96,6 +96,54 @@ key_new(int type) + return k; + } + ++#ifdef HAVE_LIBNSS ++Key * ++key_new_nss(int type) ++{ ++ Key *k = key_new(type); ++ ++ k->nss = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*k->nss)); ++ k->flags = KEY_FLAG_EXT | KEY_FLAG_NSS; ++ ++ return k; ++} ++ ++Key * ++key_new_nss_copy(int type, const Key *c) ++{ ++ Key *k = key_new_nss(type); ++ ++ switch (k->type) { ++ case KEY_RSA: ++ if ((BN_copy(k->rsa->n, c->rsa->n) == NULL) || ++ (BN_copy(k->rsa->e, c->rsa->e) == NULL)) ++ fatal("key_new_nss_copy: BN_copy failed"); ++ break; ++ case KEY_DSA: ++ if ((BN_copy(k->dsa->p, c->rsa->p) == NULL) || ++ (BN_copy(k->dsa->q, c->dsa->q) == NULL) || ++ (BN_copy(k->dsa->g, c->dsa->g) == NULL) || ++ (BN_copy(k->dsa->pub_key, c->dsa->pub_key) == NULL)) ++ fatal("key_new_nss_copy: BN_copy failed"); ++ break; ++ } ++ ++ k->nss->privk = SECKEY_CopyPrivateKey(c->nss->privk); ++ if (k->nss->privk == NULL) ++ fatal("key_new_nss_copy: SECKEY_CopyPrivateKey failed"); ++ ++ k->nss->pubk = SECKEY_CopyPublicKey(c->nss->pubk); ++ if (k->nss->pubk == NULL) ++ fatal("key_new_nss_copy: SECKEY_CopyPublicKey failed"); ++ ++ if (c->nss->privk->wincx) ++ k->nss->privk->wincx = xstrdup(c->nss->privk->wincx); ++ ++ return k; ++} ++#endif ++ ++ + Key * + key_new_private(int type) + { +@@ -151,6 +199,19 @@ key_free(Key *k) + fatal("key_free: bad key type %d", k->type); + break; + } ++#ifdef HAVE_LIBNSS ++ if (k->flags & KEY_FLAG_NSS) { ++ if (k->nss->privk != NULL && k->nss->privk->wincx != NULL) { ++ memset(k->nss->privk->wincx, 0, ++ strlen(k->nss->privk->wincx)); ++ xfree(k->nss->privk->wincx); ++ k->nss->privk->wincx = NULL; ++ } ++ SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(k->nss->privk); ++ SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(k->nss->pubk); ++ xfree(k->nss); ++ } ++#endif + xfree(k); + } + +diff -up openssh-5.3p1/key.h.nss-keys openssh-5.3p1/key.h +--- openssh-5.3p1/key.h.nss-keys 2008-06-12 20:40:35.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-5.3p1/key.h 2009-11-27 13:43:01.000000000 +0100 +@@ -30,6 +30,11 @@ + #include + #include + ++#ifdef HAVE_LIBNSS ++#include ++#include ++#endif ++ + typedef struct Key Key; + enum types { + KEY_RSA1, +@@ -37,6 +42,7 @@ + KEY_DSA, + KEY_RSA_CERT, + KEY_DSA_CERT, ++ KEY_NSS, + KEY_UNSPEC + }; + enum fp_type { +@@ -51,6 +57,15 @@ + + /* key is stored in external hardware */ + #define KEY_FLAG_EXT 0x0001 ++#define KEY_FLAG_NSS 0x0002 ++ ++#ifdef HAVE_LIBNSS ++typedef struct NSSKey NSSKey; ++struct NSSKey { ++ SECKEYPrivateKey *privk; ++ SECKEYPublicKey *pubk; ++}; ++#endif + + #define CERT_MAX_PRINCIPALS 256 + struct KeyCert { +@@ -70,11 +85,16 @@ + RSA *rsa; + DSA *dsa; + struct KeyCert *cert; ++#ifdef HAVE_LIBNSS ++ NSSKey *nss; ++#endif + }; + + Key *key_new(int); + void key_add_private(Key *); + Key *key_new_private(int); ++Key *key_new_nss(int); ++Key *key_new_nss_copy(int, const Key *); + void key_free(Key *); + Key *key_demote(const Key *); + int key_equal_public(const Key *, const Key *); +diff -up openssh-5.3p1/Makefile.in.nss-keys openssh-5.3p1/Makefile.in +--- openssh-5.3p1/Makefile.in.nss-keys 2009-08-28 02:47:38.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-5.3p1/Makefile.in 2009-11-27 13:43:01.000000000 +0100 +@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=acss.o authfd.o authfile.o b + atomicio.o key.o dispatch.o kex.o mac.o uidswap.o uuencode.o misc.o \ + monitor_fdpass.o rijndael.o ssh-dss.o ssh-rsa.o dh.o kexdh.o \ + kexgex.o kexdhc.o kexgexc.o scard.o msg.o progressmeter.o dns.o \ +- entropy.o scard-opensc.o gss-genr.o umac.o jpake.o schnorr.o ++ entropy.o scard-opensc.o gss-genr.o umac.o jpake.o schnorr.o nsskeys.o + + SSHOBJS= ssh.o readconf.o clientloop.o sshtty.o \ + sshconnect.o sshconnect1.o sshconnect2.o mux.o \ +diff -up /dev/null openssh-5.3p1/nsskeys.c +--- /dev/null 2009-11-27 11:08:21.619709673 +0100 ++++ openssh-5.3p1/nsskeys.c 2009-11-27 13:45:42.000000000 +0100 +@@ -0,0 +1,443 @@ ++/* ++ * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. ++ * Copyright (c) 2007 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved. ++ * Copyright (c) 2009 Pierre Ossman for Cendio AB ++ * ++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without ++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions ++ * are met: ++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright ++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. ++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright ++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the ++ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. ++ * ++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR ++ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES ++ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. ++ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, ++ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT ++ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, ++ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY ++ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT ++ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF ++ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. ++ */ ++ ++#include "includes.h" ++#ifdef HAVE_LIBNSS ++ ++#include ++ ++#include ++#include ++#include ++ ++#include ++ ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++ ++#include "xmalloc.h" ++#include "key.h" ++#include "log.h" ++#include "misc.h" ++#include "nsskeys.h" ++#include "pathnames.h" ++ ++static char * ++password_cb(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg) ++{ ++ char *password = arg; ++ if (retry || password == NULL) ++ return NULL; ++ ++ return PL_strdup(password); ++} ++ ++int ++nss_init(PK11PasswordFunc pwfn) ++{ ++ char *dbpath; ++ char buf[MAXPATHLEN]; ++ ++ if (NSS_IsInitialized()) ++ return 0; ++ ++ if ((dbpath=getenv("NSS_DB_PATH")) == NULL) { ++ struct passwd *pw; ++ if ((pw = getpwuid(getuid())) == NULL || ++ pw->pw_dir == NULL) { ++ return -1; ++ } ++ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir, ++ _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR); ++ dbpath = buf; ++ } ++ ++ if (NSS_Init(dbpath) != SECSuccess) { ++ debug("Failed to initialize NSS library. Attempting without DB..."); ++ if (NSS_NoDB_Init(NULL) != SECSuccess) ++ return -1; ++ } ++ ++ if (pwfn == NULL) { ++ pwfn = password_cb; ++ } ++ ++ PK11_SetPasswordFunc(pwfn); ++ ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++int ++nss_load_module(const char *modpath) ++{ ++ char spec[MAXPATHLEN + 40]; ++ SECMODModule *module; ++ ++ debug("loading PKCS#11 module '%s'", modpath); ++ ++ snprintf(spec, sizeof(spec), "library=\"%s\" name=\"Foobar\"", modpath); ++ module = SECMOD_LoadUserModule(spec, NULL, PR_FALSE); ++ if (!module || !module->loaded) { ++ if (module) ++ SECMOD_DestroyModule(module); ++ return -1; ++ } ++ ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++static Key * ++make_key_from_privkey(SECKEYPrivateKey *privk, char *password) ++{ ++ Key *k; ++ switch (SECKEY_GetPrivateKeyType(privk)) { ++ case rsaKey: ++ k = key_new_nss(KEY_RSA); ++ break; ++ case dsaKey: ++ k = key_new_nss(KEY_DSA); ++ break; ++ default: ++ return NULL; ++ } ++ k->nss->pubk = SECKEY_ConvertToPublicKey(privk); ++ if (k->nss->pubk != NULL) { ++ k->nss->privk = SECKEY_CopyPrivateKey(privk); ++ } ++ if (k->nss->privk != NULL) { ++ if (password != NULL) { ++ k->nss->privk->wincx = xstrdup(password); ++ } ++ return k; ++ } ++ key_free(k); ++ return NULL; ++} ++ ++static Key ** ++add_key_to_list(Key *k, Key **keys, size_t *i, size_t *allocated) ++{ ++ if (*allocated < *i + 2) { ++ *allocated += 16; ++ keys = xrealloc(keys, *allocated, sizeof(k)); ++ } ++ keys[*i] = k; ++ (*i)++; ++ keys[*i] = NULL; ++ return keys; ++} ++ ++static int ++nss_convert_pubkey(Key *k) ++{ ++ u_char *n; ++ unsigned int len; ++ char *p; ++ ++ switch (k->type) { ++ case KEY_RSA: ++ n = k->nss->pubk->u.rsa.modulus.data; ++ len = k->nss->pubk->u.rsa.modulus.len; ++ ++ if (BN_bin2bn(n, len, k->rsa->n) == NULL) { ++ fatal("nss_convert_pubkey: BN_bin2bn failed"); ++ } ++ ++ n = k->nss->pubk->u.rsa.publicExponent.data; ++ len = k->nss->pubk->u.rsa.publicExponent.len; ++ ++ if (BN_bin2bn(n, len, k->rsa->e) == NULL) { ++ fatal("nss_convert_pubkey: BN_bin2bn failed"); ++ } ++ break; ++ case KEY_DSA: ++ n = k->nss->pubk->u.dsa.params.prime.data; ++ len = k->nss->pubk->u.dsa.params.prime.len; ++ ++ if (BN_bin2bn(n, len, k->dsa->p) == NULL) { ++ fatal("nss_convert_pubkey: BN_bin2bn failed"); ++ } ++ ++ n = k->nss->pubk->u.dsa.params.subPrime.data; ++ len = k->nss->pubk->u.dsa.params.subPrime.len; ++ ++ if (BN_bin2bn(n, len, k->dsa->q) == NULL) { ++ fatal("nss_convert_pubkey: BN_bin2bn failed"); ++ } ++ ++ n = k->nss->pubk->u.dsa.params.base.data; ++ len = k->nss->pubk->u.dsa.params.base.len; ++ ++ if (BN_bin2bn(n, len, k->dsa->g) == NULL) { ++ fatal("nss_convert_pubkey: BN_bin2bn failed"); ++ } ++ ++ n = k->nss->pubk->u.dsa.publicValue.data; ++ len = k->nss->pubk->u.dsa.publicValue.len; ++ ++ if (BN_bin2bn(n, len, k->dsa->pub_key) == NULL) { ++ fatal("nss_convert_pubkey: BN_bin2bn failed"); ++ } ++ break; ++ } ++ ++ p = key_fingerprint(k, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); ++ debug("fingerprint %u %s", key_size(k), p); ++ xfree(p); ++ ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++static int ++nss_authenticate(PK11SlotInfo *slot, char *password, int pwprompts, char **output) ++{ ++ int i, quit; ++ ++ *output = NULL; ++ ++ if (!PK11_NeedLogin(slot)) ++ return 0; ++ ++ for (i = 0; i < pwprompts; i++) { ++ SECStatus rv; ++ CK_TOKEN_INFO info; ++ ++ rv = PK11_GetTokenInfo(slot, &info); ++ if (rv != SECSuccess) { ++ error("Failed to get information for token %s", ++ PK11_GetTokenName(slot)); ++ return -1; ++ } ++ ++ if (info.flags & CKF_USER_PIN_LOCKED) { ++ error("Passphrase for token %s is locked", ++ PK11_GetTokenName(slot)); ++ return -1; ++ } ++ ++ if (info.flags & CKF_USER_PIN_FINAL_TRY) ++ debug2("Final passphrase attempt for token %s", ++ PK11_GetTokenName(slot)); ++ else if (info.flags & CKF_USER_PIN_COUNT_LOW) ++ debug2("Previous failed passphrase attempt for token %s", ++ PK11_GetTokenName(slot)); ++ ++ if (password != NULL) ++ *output = xstrdup(password); ++ else { ++ char *prompt; ++ if (asprintf(&prompt, "Enter passphrase for token %s: ", ++ PK11_GetTokenName(slot)) < 0) ++ fatal("password_cb: asprintf failed"); ++ *output = read_passphrase(prompt, RP_ALLOW_STDIN); ++ } ++ ++ if (strcmp(*output, "") == 0) { ++ debug2("no passphrase given, ignoring slot"); ++ quit = 1; ++ goto cleanup; ++ } ++ ++ quit = 0; ++ ++ rv = PK11_Authenticate(slot, PR_TRUE, *output); ++ if (rv == SECSuccess) ++ return 0; ++ ++ switch (PORT_GetError()) { ++ case SEC_ERROR_BAD_PASSWORD: ++ debug2("Incorrect passphrase, try again..."); ++ break; ++ case SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS: ++ case SEC_ERROR_BAD_DATA: ++ debug2("Invalid passphrase, try again..."); ++ break; ++#if HAVE_SEC_ERROR_LOCKED_PASSWORD ++ case SEC_ERROR_LOCKED_PASSWORD: ++ error("Unable to authenticate, token passphrase is locked"); ++ quit = 1; ++ break; ++#endif ++ default: ++ error("Failure while authenticating against token"); ++ quit = 1; ++ } ++ ++cleanup: ++ memset(*output, 0, strlen(*output)); ++ xfree(*output); ++ *output = NULL; ++ ++ /* No point in retrying the same password */ ++ if (password != NULL) ++ break; ++ ++ if (quit) ++ break; ++ } ++ ++ return -1; ++} ++ ++static Key ** ++nss_find_privkeys(const char *tokenname, const char *keyname, ++ char *password, int pwprompts) ++{ ++ Key *k = NULL; ++ Key **keys = NULL; ++ PK11SlotList *slots; ++ PK11SlotListElement *sle; ++ size_t allocated = 0; ++ size_t i = 0; ++ ++ if ((slots=PK11_FindSlotsByNames(NULL, NULL, tokenname, PR_TRUE)) == NULL) { ++ if (tokenname == NULL) { ++ debug("No NSS token found"); ++ } else { ++ debug("NSS token not found: %s", tokenname); ++ } ++ return NULL; ++ } ++ ++ for (sle = slots->head; sle; sle = sle->next) { ++ SECKEYPrivateKeyList *list; ++ SECKEYPrivateKeyListNode *node; ++ char *tmppass; ++ ++ if (nss_authenticate(sle->slot, password, pwprompts, &tmppass) == -1) ++ break; ++ ++ debug("Looking for: %s:%s", tokenname, keyname); ++ list = PK11_ListPrivKeysInSlot(sle->slot, (char *)keyname, ++ tmppass); ++ if (list == NULL && keyname != NULL) { ++ char *fooname; ++ /* NSS bug workaround */ ++ if (asprintf(&fooname, "%s~", keyname) < 0) { ++ error("nss_find_privkey: asprintf failed"); ++ PK11_FreeSlotList(slots); ++ return NULL; ++ } ++ list = PK11_ListPrivKeysInSlot(sle->slot, fooname, ++ tmppass); ++ free(fooname); ++ } ++ if (list == NULL && keyname != NULL) { ++ CERTCertificate *cert; ++ SECKEYPrivateKey *privk; ++ cert = CERT_FindCertByNickname(CERT_GetDefaultCertDB(), ++ (char *)keyname); ++ if (cert == NULL) ++ goto cleanup; ++ privk = PK11_FindPrivateKeyFromCert(sle->slot, cert, tmppass); ++ CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert); ++ if (privk == NULL) ++ goto cleanup; ++ if ((k=make_key_from_privkey(privk, tmppass)) != NULL) { ++ nss_convert_pubkey(k); ++ keys = add_key_to_list(k, keys, &i, &allocated); ++ } ++ SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(privk); ++ } else { ++ if (list == NULL) ++ goto cleanup; ++ for (node=PRIVKEY_LIST_HEAD(list); !PRIVKEY_LIST_END(node, list); ++ node=PRIVKEY_LIST_NEXT(node)) ++ if ((k=make_key_from_privkey(node->key, tmppass)) != NULL) { ++ nss_convert_pubkey(k); ++ keys = add_key_to_list(k, keys, &i, &allocated); ++ } ++ SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKeyList(list); ++ } ++cleanup: ++ if (tmppass != NULL) { ++ memset(tmppass, 0, strlen(tmppass)); ++ xfree(tmppass); ++ } ++ } ++ PK11_FreeSlotList(slots); ++ ++ return keys; ++} ++ ++Key ** ++nss_get_keys(const char *tokenname, const char *keyname, ++ char *password, int pwprompts, int num_modules, const char **modules) ++{ ++ int i; ++ Key **keys; ++ ++ if (nss_init(NULL) == -1) { ++ error("Failed to initialize NSS library"); ++ return NULL; ++ } ++ ++ for (i = 0;i < num_modules;i++) { ++ if (nss_load_module(modules[i]) == -1) { ++ error("Failed to load PKCS#11 module '%s'", modules[i]); ++ return NULL; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ keys = nss_find_privkeys(tokenname, keyname, password, pwprompts); ++ if (keys == NULL && keyname != NULL) { ++ error("Cannot find key in nss, token removed"); ++ return NULL; ++ } ++#if 0 ++ keys = xcalloc(3, sizeof(Key *)); ++ ++ if (k->type == KEY_RSA) { ++ n = key_new_nss_copy(KEY_RSA1, k); ++ ++ keys[0] = n; ++ keys[1] = k; ++ keys[2] = NULL; ++ } else { ++ keys[0] = k; ++ keys[1] = NULL; ++ } ++#endif ++ return keys; ++} ++ ++char * ++nss_get_key_label(Key *key) ++{ ++ char *label, *nickname; ++ ++ nickname = PK11_GetPrivateKeyNickname(key->nss->privk); ++ label = xstrdup(nickname); ++ PORT_Free(nickname); ++ ++ return label; ++} ++ ++#endif /* HAVE_LIBNSS */ +diff -up /dev/null openssh-5.3p1/nsskeys.h +--- /dev/null 2009-11-27 11:08:21.619709673 +0100 ++++ openssh-5.3p1/nsskeys.h 2009-11-27 13:43:01.000000000 +0100 +@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ ++/* ++ * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. ++ * Copyright (c) 2007 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved. ++ * ++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without ++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions ++ * are met: ++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright ++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. ++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright ++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the ++ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. ++ * ++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR ++ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES ++ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. ++ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, ++ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT ++ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, ++ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY ++ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT ++ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF ++ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. ++ */ ++ ++#ifndef NSSKEYS_H ++#define NSSKEYS_H ++#ifdef HAVE_LIBNSS ++#include ++#include ++ ++int nss_init(PK11PasswordFunc); ++Key **nss_get_keys(const char *, const char *, char *, int , int , const char **); ++char *nss_get_key_label(Key *); ++/*void sc_close(void);*/ ++/*int sc_put_key(Key *, const char *);*/ ++ ++#endif ++#endif +diff -up openssh-5.3p1/readconf.c.nss-keys openssh-5.3p1/readconf.c +--- openssh-5.3p1/readconf.c.nss-keys 2009-07-05 23:12:27.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-5.3p1/readconf.c 2009-11-27 13:43:01.000000000 +0100 +@@ -124,6 +124,7 @@ typedef enum { + oKbdInteractiveAuthentication, oKbdInteractiveDevices, oHostKeyAlias, + oDynamicForward, oPreferredAuthentications, oHostbasedAuthentication, + oHostKeyAlgorithms, oBindAddress, oSmartcardDevice, ++ oUseNSS, oNSSToken, oNSSModule, + oClearAllForwardings, oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost, + oEnableSSHKeysign, oRekeyLimit, oVerifyHostKeyDNS, oConnectTimeout, + oAddressFamily, oGssAuthentication, oGssDelegateCreds, +@@ -210,6 +211,15 @@ static struct { + #else + { "smartcarddevice", oUnsupported }, + #endif ++#ifdef HAVE_LIBNSS ++ { "usenss", oUseNSS }, ++ { "nsstoken", oNSSToken }, ++ { "nssmodule", oNSSModule }, ++#else ++ { "usenss", oUnsupported }, ++ { "nsstoken", oNSSToken }, ++ { "nssmodule", oUnsupported }, ++#endif + { "clearallforwardings", oClearAllForwardings }, + { "enablesshkeysign", oEnableSSHKeysign }, + { "verifyhostkeydns", oVerifyHostKeyDNS }, +@@ -613,6 +623,28 @@ parse_string: + charptr = &options->smartcard_device; + goto parse_string; + ++ case oUseNSS: ++ intptr = &options->use_nss; ++ goto parse_flag; ++ ++ case oNSSToken: ++ charptr = &options->nss_token; ++ goto parse_command; ++ ++ case oNSSModule: ++ arg = strdelim(&s); ++ if (!arg || *arg == '\0') ++ fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); ++ if (*activep) { ++ intptr = &options->num_nss_modules; ++ if (*intptr >= SSH_MAX_NSS_MODULES) ++ fatal("%.200s line %d: Too many PKCS#11 modules specified (max %d).", ++ filename, linenum, SSH_MAX_NSS_MODULES); ++ charptr = &options->nss_modules[*intptr]; ++ *charptr = xstrdup(arg); ++ *intptr = *intptr + 1; ++ } ++ break; + case oProxyCommand: + charptr = &options->proxy_command; + parse_command: +@@ -1052,6 +1084,9 @@ initialize_options(Options * options) + options->preferred_authentications = NULL; + options->bind_address = NULL; + options->smartcard_device = NULL; ++ options->use_nss = -1; ++ options->nss_token = NULL; ++ options->num_nss_modules = 0; + options->enable_ssh_keysign = - 1; + options->no_host_authentication_for_localhost = - 1; + options->identities_only = - 1; +@@ -1183,6 +1218,8 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options) + options->no_host_authentication_for_localhost = 0; + if (options->identities_only == -1) + options->identities_only = 0; ++ if (options->use_nss == -1) ++ options->use_nss = 0; + if (options->enable_ssh_keysign == -1) + options->enable_ssh_keysign = 0; + if (options->rekey_limit == -1) +diff -up openssh-5.3p1/readconf.h.nss-keys openssh-5.3p1/readconf.h +--- openssh-5.3p1/readconf.h.nss-keys 2009-07-05 23:12:27.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-5.3p1/readconf.h 2009-11-27 13:43:01.000000000 +0100 +@@ -85,6 +85,10 @@ typedef struct { + char *preferred_authentications; + char *bind_address; /* local socket address for connection to sshd */ + char *smartcard_device; /* Smartcard reader device */ ++ int use_nss; /* Use NSS library for keys */ ++ char *nss_token; /* Look for NSS keys on token */ ++ int num_nss_modules; /* Number of PCKS#11 modules. */ ++ char *nss_modules[SSH_MAX_NSS_MODULES]; + int verify_host_key_dns; /* Verify host key using DNS */ + + int num_identity_files; /* Number of files for RSA/DSA identities. */ +diff -up openssh-5.3p1/ssh-add.c.nss-keys openssh-5.3p1/ssh-add.c +--- openssh-5.3p1/ssh-add.c.nss-keys 2008-02-28 09:13:52.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-5.3p1/ssh-add.c 2009-11-27 13:43:01.000000000 +0100 +@@ -44,6 +44,14 @@ + #include + #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" + ++#ifdef HAVE_LIBNSS ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#endif ++ + #include + #include + #include +@@ -57,6 +65,7 @@ + #include "rsa.h" + #include "log.h" + #include "key.h" ++#include "nsskeys.h" + #include "buffer.h" + #include "authfd.h" + #include "authfile.h" +@@ -307,6 +316,128 @@ do_file(AuthenticationConnection *ac, in + return 0; + } + ++#ifdef HAVE_LIBNSS ++static char * ++password_cb(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void *arg) ++{ ++ char **passcache = arg; ++ char *password, *p2 = NULL; ++ char *prompt; ++ ++ if (retry) ++ return NULL; ++ ++ if (asprintf(&prompt, "Enter passphrase for token %s: ", ++ PK11_GetTokenName(slot)) < 0) ++ fatal("password_cb: asprintf failed"); ++ ++ password = read_passphrase(prompt, RP_ALLOW_STDIN); ++ ++ if (password != NULL && (p2=PL_strdup(password)) == NULL) { ++ memset(password, 0, strlen(password)); ++ fatal("password_cb: PL_strdup failed"); ++ } ++ ++ if (passcache != NULL) { ++ if (*passcache != NULL) { ++ memset(*passcache, 0, strlen(*passcache)); ++ xfree(*passcache); ++ } ++ *passcache = password; ++ } else { ++ memset(password, 0, strlen(password)); ++ xfree(password); ++ } ++ ++ return p2; ++} ++ ++static int ++add_slot_keys(AuthenticationConnection *ac, PK11SlotInfo *slot, int add) ++{ ++ SECKEYPrivateKeyList *list; ++ SECKEYPrivateKeyListNode *node; ++ char *passcache = NULL; ++ char *tokenname; ++ char **xkeyname = NULL; ++ ++ int count = 0; ++ int i; ++ ++ if (PK11_NeedLogin(slot)) ++ PK11_Authenticate(slot, PR_TRUE, &passcache); ++ ++ if ((list=PK11_ListPrivKeysInSlot(slot, NULL, NULL)) == NULL) { ++ return 0; ++ } ++ ++ tokenname = PK11_GetTokenName(slot); ++ ++ for (node=PRIVKEY_LIST_HEAD(list); !PRIVKEY_LIST_END(node, list); ++ node=PRIVKEY_LIST_NEXT(node)) { ++ char *keyname; ++ SECKEYPublicKey *pub; ++ ++ keyname = PK11_GetPrivateKeyNickname(node->key); ++ if (keyname == NULL || *keyname == '\0') { ++ /* no nickname to refer to */ ++ CERTCertificate *cert; ++ char *kn; ++ cert = PK11_GetCertFromPrivateKey(node->key); ++ if (cert == NULL) ++ continue; ++ kn = strchr(cert->nickname, ':'); ++ if (kn == NULL) ++ kn = cert->nickname; ++ else ++ kn++; ++ keyname = PORT_Strdup(kn); ++ CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert); ++ if (keyname == NULL) ++ continue; ++ } ++ pub = SECKEY_ConvertToPublicKey(node->key); ++ if (pub == NULL) { ++ fprintf(stderr, "No public key for: %s:%s\n", ++ tokenname, keyname); ++ continue; /* not possible to obtain public key */ ++ } ++ SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pub); ++ ++ if ((count % 10) == 0) ++ xkeyname = xrealloc (xkeyname, count + 10, sizeof (char *)); ++ ++ xkeyname[count++] = keyname; ++ } ++ ++ PK11_Logout(slot); ++ ++ for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { ++ if (ssh_update_nss_key(ac, add, tokenname, xkeyname[i], ++ passcache?passcache:"", lifetime, confirm)) { ++ fprintf(stderr, "Key %s: %s:%s\n", ++ add?"added":"removed", tokenname, xkeyname[i]); ++ } else { ++ fprintf(stderr, "Could not %s key: %s:%s\n", ++ add?"add":"remove", tokenname, xkeyname[i]); ++ } ++ PORT_Free(xkeyname[i]); ++ } ++ ++ if (xkeyname != NULL) ++ free (xkeyname); ++ ++ if (passcache != NULL) { ++ memset(passcache, 0, strlen(passcache)); ++ xfree(passcache); ++ } ++ ++ SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKeyList(list); ++ ++ return count; ++} ++#endif ++ + static void + usage(void) + { +@@ -334,6 +465,10 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) + AuthenticationConnection *ac = NULL; + char *sc_reader_id = NULL; + int i, ch, deleting = 0, ret = 0; ++#ifdef HAVE_LIBNSS ++ char *token_id = NULL; ++ int use_nss = 0; ++#endif + + /* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */ + sanitise_stdfd(); +@@ -351,7 +486,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) + "Could not open a connection to your authentication agent.\n"); + exit(2); + } +- while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "lLcdDxXe:s:t:")) != -1) { ++ while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "lLcdDnxXe:s:t:T:")) != -1) { + switch (ch) { + case 'l': + case 'L': +@@ -373,6 +508,11 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) + if (delete_all(ac) == -1) + ret = 1; + goto done; ++#ifdef HAVE_LIBNSS ++ case 'n': ++ use_nss = 1; ++ break; ++#endif + case 's': + sc_reader_id = optarg; + break; +@@ -387,6 +527,11 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) + goto done; + } + break; ++#ifdef HAVE_LIBNSS ++ case 'T': ++ token_id = optarg; ++ break; ++#endif + default: + usage(); + ret = 1; +@@ -400,6 +545,40 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) + ret = 1; + goto done; + } ++#ifdef HAVE_LIBNSS ++ if (use_nss) { ++ PK11SlotList *slots; ++ PK11SlotListElement *sle; ++ int count = 0; ++ if (nss_init(password_cb) == -1) { ++ fprintf(stderr, "Failed to initialize NSS library\n"); ++ ret = 1; ++ goto done; ++ } ++ ++ if ((slots=PK11_GetAllTokens(CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE, ++ NULL)) == NULL) { ++ fprintf(stderr, "No tokens found\n"); ++ ret = 1; ++ goto nss_done; ++ } ++ ++ for (sle = slots->head; sle; sle = sle->next) { ++ int rv; ++ if ((rv=add_slot_keys(ac, sle->slot, !deleting)) == -1) { ++ ret = 1; ++ } ++ count += rv; ++ } ++ if (count == 0) { ++ ret = 1; ++ } ++nss_done: ++ NSS_Shutdown(); ++ clear_pass(); ++ goto done; ++ } ++#endif + if (argc == 0) { + char buf[MAXPATHLEN]; + struct passwd *pw; +diff -up openssh-5.3p1/ssh-agent.c.nss-keys openssh-5.3p1/ssh-agent.c +--- openssh-5.3p1/ssh-agent.c.nss-keys 2009-06-21 09:50:15.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-5.3p1/ssh-agent.c 2009-11-27 13:43:01.000000000 +0100 +@@ -80,6 +80,10 @@ + #include "scard.h" + #endif + ++#ifdef HAVE_LIBNSS ++#include "nsskeys.h" ++#endif ++ + #if defined(HAVE_SYS_PRCTL_H) + #include /* For prctl() and PR_SET_DUMPABLE */ + #endif +@@ -714,6 +718,114 @@ send: + } + #endif /* SMARTCARD */ + ++#ifdef HAVE_LIBNSS ++static void ++process_add_nss_key (SocketEntry *e) ++{ ++ char *tokenname = NULL, *keyname = NULL, *password = NULL; ++ int i, version, success = 0, death = 0, confirm = 0; ++ Key **keys, *k; ++ Identity *id; ++ Idtab *tab; ++ ++ tokenname = buffer_get_string(&e->request, NULL); ++ keyname = buffer_get_string(&e->request, NULL); ++ password = buffer_get_string(&e->request, NULL); ++ ++ while (buffer_len(&e->request)) { ++ switch (buffer_get_char(&e->request)) { ++ case SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME: ++ death = time(NULL) + buffer_get_int(&e->request); ++ break; ++ case SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM: ++ confirm = 1; ++ break; ++ default: ++ break; ++ } ++ } ++ if (lifetime && !death) ++ death = time(NULL) + lifetime; ++ ++ keys = nss_get_keys(tokenname, keyname, password, 1, 0, NULL); ++ /* password is owned by keys[0] now */ ++ xfree(tokenname); ++ xfree(keyname); ++ ++ if (keys == NULL) { ++ memset(password, 0, strlen(password)); ++ xfree(password); ++ error("nss_get_keys failed"); ++ goto send; ++ } ++ for (i = 0; keys[i] != NULL; i++) { ++ k = keys[i]; ++ version = k->type == KEY_RSA1 ? 1 : 2; ++ tab = idtab_lookup(version); ++ if (lookup_identity(k, version) == NULL) { ++ id = xmalloc(sizeof(Identity)); ++ id->key = k; ++ id->comment = nss_get_key_label(k); ++ id->death = death; ++ id->confirm = confirm; ++ TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&tab->idlist, id, next); ++ tab->nentries++; ++ success = 1; ++ } else { ++ key_free(k); ++ } ++ keys[i] = NULL; ++ } ++ xfree(keys); ++send: ++ buffer_put_int(&e->output, 1); ++ buffer_put_char(&e->output, ++ success ? SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS : SSH_AGENT_FAILURE); ++} ++ ++static void ++process_remove_nss_key(SocketEntry *e) ++{ ++ char *tokenname = NULL, *keyname = NULL, *password = NULL; ++ int i, version, success = 0; ++ Key **keys, *k = NULL; ++ Identity *id; ++ Idtab *tab; ++ ++ tokenname = buffer_get_string(&e->request, NULL); ++ keyname = buffer_get_string(&e->request, NULL); ++ password = buffer_get_string(&e->request, NULL); ++ ++ keys = nss_get_keys(tokenname, keyname, password, 1, 0, NULL); ++ xfree(tokenname); ++ xfree(keyname); ++ xfree(password); ++ ++ if (keys == NULL || keys[0] == NULL) { ++ error("nss_get_keys failed"); ++ goto send; ++ } ++ for (i = 0; keys[i] != NULL; i++) { ++ k = keys[i]; ++ version = k->type == KEY_RSA1 ? 1 : 2; ++ if ((id = lookup_identity(k, version)) != NULL) { ++ tab = idtab_lookup(version); ++ TAILQ_REMOVE(&tab->idlist, id, next); ++ tab->nentries--; ++ free_identity(id); ++ success = 1; ++ } ++ key_free(k); ++ keys[i] = NULL; ++ } ++ xfree(keys); ++send: ++ buffer_put_int(&e->output, 1); ++ buffer_put_char(&e->output, ++ success ? SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS : SSH_AGENT_FAILURE); ++} ++#endif /* HAVE_LIBNSS */ ++ + /* dispatch incoming messages */ + + static void +@@ -806,6 +918,15 @@ process_message(SocketEntry *e) + process_remove_smartcard_key(e); + break; + #endif /* SMARTCARD */ ++#ifdef HAVE_LIBNSS ++ case SSH_AGENTC_ADD_NSS_KEY: ++ case SSH_AGENTC_ADD_NSS_KEY_CONSTRAINED: ++ process_add_nss_key(e); ++ break; ++ case SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_NSS_KEY: ++ process_remove_nss_key(e); ++ break; ++#endif /* SMARTCARD */ + default: + /* Unknown message. Respond with failure. */ + error("Unknown message %d", type); +diff -up openssh-5.3p1/ssh.c.nss-keys openssh-5.3p1/ssh.c +--- openssh-5.3p1/ssh.c.nss-keys 2009-07-05 23:16:56.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-5.3p1/ssh.c 2009-11-27 13:43:01.000000000 +0100 +@@ -105,6 +105,9 @@ + #ifdef SMARTCARD + #include "scard.h" + #endif ++#ifdef HAVE_LIBNSS ++#include "nsskeys.h" ++#endif + + extern char *__progname; + +@@ -1234,9 +1237,11 @@ load_public_identity_files(void) + int i = 0; + Key *public; + struct passwd *pw; +-#ifdef SMARTCARD ++#if defined(SMARTCARD) || defined(HAVE_LIBNSS) + Key **keys; ++#endif + ++#ifdef SMARTCARD + if (options.smartcard_device != NULL && + options.num_identity_files < SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES && + (keys = sc_get_keys(options.smartcard_device, NULL)) != NULL) { +@@ -1259,6 +1264,29 @@ load_public_identity_files(void) + xfree(keys); + } + #endif /* SMARTCARD */ ++#ifdef HAVE_LIBNSS ++ if (options.use_nss && ++ options.num_identity_files < SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES && ++ (keys = nss_get_keys(options.nss_token, NULL, NULL, ++ options.number_of_password_prompts, options.num_nss_modules, ++ options.nss_modules)) != NULL) { ++ int count; ++ for (count = 0; keys[count] != NULL; count++) { ++ memmove(&options.identity_files[1], &options.identity_files[0], ++ sizeof(char *) * (SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES - 1)); ++ memmove(&options.identity_keys[1], &options.identity_keys[0], ++ sizeof(Key *) * (SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES - 1)); ++ options.num_identity_files++; ++ options.identity_keys[0] = keys[count]; ++ options.identity_files[0] = nss_get_key_label(keys[count]); ++ } ++ if (options.num_identity_files > SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES) ++ options.num_identity_files = SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES; ++ i += count; ++ xfree(keys); ++ } ++#endif /* HAVE_LIBNSS */ ++ + if ((pw = getpwuid(original_real_uid)) == NULL) + fatal("load_public_identity_files: getpwuid failed"); + pwname = xstrdup(pw->pw_name); +diff -up openssh-5.3p1/ssh-dss.c.nss-keys openssh-5.3p1/ssh-dss.c +--- openssh-5.3p1/ssh-dss.c.nss-keys 2006-11-07 13:14:42.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-5.3p1/ssh-dss.c 2009-11-27 13:43:01.000000000 +0100 +@@ -39,6 +39,10 @@ + #include "log.h" + #include "key.h" + ++#ifdef HAVE_LIBNSS ++#include ++#endif ++ + #define INTBLOB_LEN 20 + #define SIGBLOB_LEN (2*INTBLOB_LEN) + +@@ -57,6 +61,34 @@ ssh_dss_sign(const Key *key, u_char **si + error("ssh_dss_sign: no DSA key"); + return -1; + } ++#ifdef HAVE_LIBNSS ++ if (key->flags & KEY_FLAG_NSS) { ++ SECItem sigitem; ++ SECItem *rawsig; ++ ++ memset(&sigitem, 0, sizeof(sigitem)); ++ if (SEC_SignData(&sigitem, (u_char *)data, datalen, key->nss->privk, ++ SEC_OID_ANSIX9_DSA_SIGNATURE_WITH_SHA1_DIGEST) != SECSuccess) { ++ error("ssh_dss_sign: sign failed"); ++ return -1; ++ } ++ ++ if ((rawsig=DSAU_DecodeDerSig(&sigitem)) == NULL) { ++ error("ssh_dss_sign: der decode failed"); ++ SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&sigitem, PR_FALSE); ++ return -1; ++ } ++ SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&sigitem, PR_FALSE); ++ if (rawsig->len != SIGBLOB_LEN) { ++ error("ssh_dss_sign: unsupported signature length %d", ++ rawsig->len); ++ SECITEM_ZfreeItem(rawsig, PR_TRUE); ++ return -1; ++ } ++ memcpy(sigblob, rawsig->data, SIGBLOB_LEN); ++ SECITEM_ZfreeItem(rawsig, PR_TRUE); ++ } else { ++#endif + EVP_DigestInit(&md, evp_md); + EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, data, datalen); + EVP_DigestFinal(&md, digest, &dlen); +@@ -80,7 +112,9 @@ ssh_dss_sign(const Key *key, u_char **si + BN_bn2bin(sig->r, sigblob+ SIGBLOB_LEN - INTBLOB_LEN - rlen); + BN_bn2bin(sig->s, sigblob+ SIGBLOB_LEN - slen); + DSA_SIG_free(sig); +- ++#ifdef HAVE_LIBNSS ++ } ++#endif + if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB) { + if (lenp != NULL) + *lenp = SIGBLOB_LEN; +diff -up openssh-5.3p1/ssh.h.nss-keys openssh-5.3p1/ssh.h +--- openssh-5.3p1/ssh.h.nss-keys 2006-08-05 04:39:41.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-5.3p1/ssh.h 2009-11-27 13:43:01.000000000 +0100 +@@ -28,6 +28,12 @@ + #define SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES 100 + + /* ++ * Maximum number of PKCS#11 modules that can be specified in configuration ++ * files or on the command line. ++ */ ++#define SSH_MAX_NSS_MODULES 10 ++ ++/* + * Maximum length of lines in authorized_keys file. + * Current value permits 16kbit RSA and RSA1 keys and 8kbit DSA keys, with + * some room for options and comments. +diff -up openssh-5.3p1/ssh-keygen.c.nss-keys openssh-5.3p1/ssh-keygen.c +--- openssh-5.3p1/ssh-keygen.c.nss-keys 2009-06-22 08:11:07.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-5.3p1/ssh-keygen.c 2009-11-27 13:43:01.000000000 +0100 +@@ -53,6 +53,11 @@ + #include "scard.h" + #endif + ++#ifdef HAVE_LIBNSS ++#include ++#include "nsskeys.h" ++#endif ++ + /* Number of bits in the RSA/DSA key. This value can be set on the command line. */ + #define DEFAULT_BITS 2048 + #define DEFAULT_BITS_DSA 1024 +@@ -501,6 +506,26 @@ do_download(struct passwd *pw, const cha + } + #endif /* SMARTCARD */ + ++#ifdef HAVE_LIBNSS ++static void ++do_nss_download(struct passwd *pw, const char *tokenname, const char *keyname) ++{ ++ Key **keys = NULL; ++ int i; ++ ++ keys = nss_get_keys(tokenname, keyname, NULL, 1, 0, NULL); ++ if (keys == NULL) ++ fatal("cannot find public key in NSS"); ++ for (i = 0; keys[i]; i++) { ++ key_write(keys[i], stdout); ++ key_free(keys[i]); ++ fprintf(stdout, "\n"); ++ } ++ xfree(keys); ++ exit(0); ++} ++#endif /* HAVE_LIBNSS */ ++ + static void + do_fingerprint(struct passwd *pw) + { +@@ -1083,7 +1108,8 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) + Key *private, *public; + struct passwd *pw; + struct stat st; +- int opt, type, fd, download = 0; ++ int opt, type, fd, download = 1; ++ int use_nss = 0; + u_int32_t memory = 0, generator_wanted = 0, trials = 100; + int do_gen_candidates = 0, do_screen_candidates = 0; + BIGNUM *start = NULL; +@@ -1116,7 +1142,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) + } + + while ((opt = getopt(argc, argv, +- "degiqpclBHvxXyF:b:f:t:U:D:P:N:C:r:g:R:T:G:M:S:a:W:")) != -1) { ++ "degiqpclnBHvxXyF:b:f:t:U:D:P:N:C:r:g:R:T:G:M:S:a:W:")) != -1) { + switch (opt) { + case 'b': + bits = (u_int32_t)strtonum(optarg, 768, 32768, &errstr); +@@ -1156,6 +1182,10 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) + case 'g': + print_generic = 1; + break; ++ case 'n': ++ use_nss = 1; ++ download = 1; ++ break; + case 'P': + identity_passphrase = optarg; + break; +@@ -1187,10 +1217,10 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) + case 't': + key_type_name = optarg; + break; +- case 'D': +- download = 1; +- /*FALLTHROUGH*/ + case 'U': ++ download = 0; ++ /*FALLTHROUGH*/ ++ case 'D': + reader_id = optarg; + break; + case 'v': +@@ -1299,6 +1329,17 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) + exit(0); + } + } ++ ++ if (use_nss) { ++#ifdef HAVE_LIBNSS ++ if (download) ++ do_nss_download(pw, reader_id, identity_file); ++ else ++ fatal("no support for NSS key upload."); ++#else ++ fatal("no support for NSS keys."); ++#endif ++ } + if (reader_id != NULL) { + #ifdef SMARTCARD + if (download) +diff -up openssh-5.3p1/ssh-rsa.c.nss-keys openssh-5.3p1/ssh-rsa.c +--- openssh-5.3p1/ssh-rsa.c.nss-keys 2006-09-01 07:38:37.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-5.3p1/ssh-rsa.c 2009-11-27 13:43:01.000000000 +0100 +@@ -32,6 +32,10 @@ + #include "compat.h" + #include "ssh.h" + ++#ifdef HAVE_LIBNSS ++#include ++#endif ++ + static int openssh_RSA_verify(int, u_char *, u_int, u_char *, u_int, RSA *); + + /* RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 (PKCS #1 v2.0 signature) with SHA1 */ +@@ -50,6 +54,38 @@ ssh_rsa_sign(const Key *key, u_char **si + error("ssh_rsa_sign: no RSA key"); + return -1; + } ++ ++ slen = RSA_size(key->rsa); ++ sig = xmalloc(slen); ++ ++#ifdef HAVE_LIBNSS ++ if (key->flags & KEY_FLAG_NSS) { ++ SECItem sigitem; ++ SECOidTag alg; ++ ++ memset(&sigitem, 0, sizeof(sigitem)); ++ alg = (datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) ? ++ SEC_OID_PKCS1_MD5_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION : ++ SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA1_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION; ++ ++ if (SEC_SignData(&sigitem, (u_char *)data, datalen, key->nss->privk, ++ alg) != SECSuccess) { ++ error("ssh_rsa_sign: sign failed"); ++ return -1; ++ } ++ if (sigitem.len > slen) { ++ error("ssh_rsa_sign: slen %u slen2 %u", slen, sigitem.len); ++ xfree(sig); ++ SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&sigitem, PR_FALSE); ++ return -1; ++ } ++ if (sigitem.len < slen) { ++ memset(sig, 0, slen - sigitem.len); ++ } ++ memcpy(sig+slen-sigitem.len, sigitem.data, sigitem.len); ++ SECITEM_ZfreeItem(&sigitem, PR_FALSE); ++ } else { ++#endif + nid = (datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) ? NID_md5 : NID_sha1; + if ((evp_md = EVP_get_digestbynid(nid)) == NULL) { + error("ssh_rsa_sign: EVP_get_digestbynid %d failed", nid); +@@ -59,9 +95,6 @@ ssh_rsa_sign(const Key *key, u_char **si + EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, data, datalen); + EVP_DigestFinal(&md, digest, &dlen); + +- slen = RSA_size(key->rsa); +- sig = xmalloc(slen); +- + ok = RSA_sign(nid, digest, dlen, sig, &len, key->rsa); + memset(digest, 'd', sizeof(digest)); + +@@ -83,6 +116,9 @@ ssh_rsa_sign(const Key *key, u_char **si + xfree(sig); + return -1; + } ++#ifdef HAVE_LIBNSS ++ } ++#endif + /* encode signature */ + buffer_init(&b); + buffer_put_cstring(&b, "ssh-rsa"); diff --git a/openssh-5.4p1-pam_selinux.patch b/openssh-5.4p1-pam_selinux.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6b601da --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh-5.4p1-pam_selinux.patch @@ -0,0 +1,156 @@ +diff -up openssh-5.4p1/auth-pam.c.pam_selinux openssh-5.4p1/auth-pam.c +--- openssh-5.4p1/auth-pam.c.pam_selinux 2009-07-12 14:07:21.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-5.4p1/auth-pam.c 2010-03-01 15:27:23.000000000 +0100 +@@ -1069,7 +1069,7 @@ is_pam_session_open(void) + * during the ssh authentication process. + */ + int +-do_pam_putenv(char *name, char *value) ++do_pam_putenv(char *name, const char *value) + { + int ret = 1; + #ifdef HAVE_PAM_PUTENV +diff -up openssh-5.4p1/auth-pam.h.pam_selinux openssh-5.4p1/auth-pam.h +--- openssh-5.4p1/auth-pam.h.pam_selinux 2004-09-11 14:17:26.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-5.4p1/auth-pam.h 2010-03-01 15:27:23.000000000 +0100 +@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ void do_pam_session(void); + void do_pam_set_tty(const char *); + void do_pam_setcred(int ); + void do_pam_chauthtok(void); +-int do_pam_putenv(char *, char *); ++int do_pam_putenv(char *, const char *); + char ** fetch_pam_environment(void); + char ** fetch_pam_child_environment(void); + void free_pam_environment(char **); +diff -up openssh-5.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.pam_selinux openssh-5.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c +--- openssh-5.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.pam_selinux 2010-03-01 15:27:22.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-5.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c 2010-03-01 15:27:53.000000000 +0100 +@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ + #include "hostfile.h" + #include "auth.h" + #include "xmalloc.h" ++#include "servconf.h" + + #ifdef WITH_SELINUX + #include +@@ -50,6 +51,7 @@ + #include + #endif + ++extern ServerOptions options; + extern Authctxt *the_authctxt; + extern int inetd_flag; + extern int rexeced_flag; +@@ -211,29 +213,38 @@ get_user_context(const char *sename, con + return -1; + } + ++static void ++ssh_selinux_get_role_level(char **role, const char **level) ++{ ++ *role = NULL; ++ *level = NULL; ++ if (the_authctxt) { ++ if (the_authctxt->role != NULL) { ++ char *slash; ++ *role = xstrdup(the_authctxt->role); ++ if ((slash = strchr(*role, '/')) != NULL) { ++ *slash = '\0'; ++ *level = slash + 1; ++ } ++ } ++ } ++} ++ + /* Return the default security context for the given username */ + static int + ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname, + security_context_t *default_sc, security_context_t *user_sc) + { + char *sename, *lvl; +- const char *reqlvl = NULL; +- char *role = NULL; ++ const char *reqlvl; ++ char *role; + int r = -1; + context_t con = NULL; + + *default_sc = NULL; + *user_sc = NULL; +- if (the_authctxt) { +- if (the_authctxt->role != NULL) { +- char *slash; +- role = xstrdup(the_authctxt->role); +- if ((slash = strchr(role, '/')) != NULL) { +- *slash = '\0'; +- reqlvl = slash + 1; +- } +- } +- } ++ ++ ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl); + + #ifdef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME + if ((r=getseuserbyname(pwname, &sename, &lvl)) != 0) { +@@ -314,6 +325,36 @@ ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname, + return (r); + } + ++/* Setup environment variables for pam_selinux */ ++static int ++ssh_selinux_setup_pam_variables(void) ++{ ++ const char *reqlvl; ++ char *role; ++ char *use_current; ++ int rv; ++ ++ debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__); ++ ++ ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl); ++ ++ rv = do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", role ? role : ""); ++ ++ if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) { ++ use_current = "1"; ++ } else { ++ use_current = ""; ++ rv = rv || do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_LEVEL_REQUESTED", reqlvl ? reqlvl: ""); ++ } ++ ++ rv = rv || do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_USE_CURRENT_RANGE", use_current); ++ ++ if (role != NULL) ++ xfree(role); ++ ++ return rv; ++} ++ + /* Set the execution context to the default for the specified user */ + void + ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname) +@@ -325,6 +366,24 @@ ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwn + if (!ssh_selinux_enabled()) + return; + ++ if (options.use_pam) { ++ /* do not compute context, just setup environment for pam_selinux */ ++ if (ssh_selinux_setup_pam_variables()) { ++ switch (security_getenforce()) { ++ case -1: ++ fatal("%s: security_getenforce() failed", __func__); ++ case 0: ++ error("%s: SELinux PAM variable setup failure. Continuing in permissive mode.", ++ __func__); ++ break; ++ default: ++ fatal("%s: SELinux PAM variable setup failure. Aborting connection.", ++ __func__); ++ } ++ } ++ return; ++ } ++ + debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__); + + r = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname, &default_ctx, &user_ctx); diff --git a/openssh-5.4p1-pka.patch b/openssh-5.4p1-pka.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b2e50ac --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh-5.4p1-pka.patch @@ -0,0 +1,386 @@ +diff -up openssh-5.4p1/auth2-pubkey.c.pka openssh-5.4p1/auth2-pubkey.c +--- openssh-5.4p1/auth2-pubkey.c.pka 2010-03-01 18:10:48.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-5.4p1/auth2-pubkey.c 2010-03-01 18:10:50.000000000 +0100 +@@ -186,27 +186,15 @@ done: + + /* return 1 if user allows given key */ + static int +-user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, char *file) ++user_search_key_in_file(FILE *f, char *file, Key* key, struct passwd *pw) + { + char line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES]; + const char *reason; + int found_key = 0; +- FILE *f; + u_long linenum = 0; + Key *found; + char *fp; + +- /* Temporarily use the user's uid. */ +- temporarily_use_uid(pw); +- +- debug("trying public key file %s", file); +- f = auth_openkeyfile(file, pw, options.strict_modes); +- +- if (!f) { +- restore_uid(); +- return 0; +- } +- + found_key = 0; + found = key_new(key_is_cert(key) ? KEY_UNSPEC : key->type); + +@@ -277,21 +265,160 @@ user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, Key + break; + } + } +- restore_uid(); +- fclose(f); + key_free(found); + if (!found_key) + debug2("key not found"); + return found_key; + } + +-/* check whether given key is in .ssh/authorized_keys* */ ++ ++/* return 1 if user allows given key */ ++static int ++user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, char *file) ++{ ++ FILE *f; ++ int found_key = 0; ++ ++ /* Temporarily use the user's uid. */ ++ temporarily_use_uid(pw); ++ ++ debug("trying public key file %s", file); ++ f = auth_openkeyfile(file, pw, options.strict_modes); ++ ++ if (f) { ++ found_key = user_search_key_in_file (f, file, key, pw); ++ fclose(f); ++ } ++ ++ restore_uid(); ++ return found_key; ++} ++ ++#ifdef WITH_PUBKEY_AGENT ++ ++#define WHITESPACE " \t\r\n" ++ ++/* return 1 if user allows given key */ ++static int ++user_key_via_agent_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, Key *key) ++{ ++ FILE *f; ++ int found_key = 0; ++ char *pubkey_agent_string = NULL; ++ char *tmp_pubkey_agent_string = NULL; ++ char *progname; ++ char *cp; ++ struct passwd *runas_pw; ++ struct stat st; ++ ++ if (options.pubkey_agent == NULL || options.pubkey_agent[0] != '/') ++ return -1; ++ ++ /* get the run as identity from config */ ++ runas_pw = (options.pubkey_agent_runas == NULL)? pw ++ : getpwnam (options.pubkey_agent_runas); ++ if (!runas_pw) { ++ error("%s: getpwnam(\"%s\"): %s", __func__, ++ options.pubkey_agent_runas, strerror(errno)); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ ++ /* Temporarily use the specified uid. */ ++ if (runas_pw->pw_uid != 0) ++ temporarily_use_uid(runas_pw); ++ ++ pubkey_agent_string = percent_expand(options.pubkey_agent, ++ "h", pw->pw_dir, "u", pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL); ++ ++ /* Test whether agent can be modified by non root user */ ++ tmp_pubkey_agent_string = xstrdup (pubkey_agent_string); ++ progname = strtok (tmp_pubkey_agent_string, WHITESPACE); ++ ++ debug3("%s: checking program '%s'", __func__, progname); ++ ++ if (stat (progname, &st) < 0) { ++ error("%s: stat(\"%s\"): %s", __func__, ++ progname, strerror(errno)); ++ goto go_away; ++ } ++ ++ if (st.st_uid != 0 || (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) { ++ error("bad ownership or modes for pubkey agent \"%s\"", ++ progname); ++ goto go_away; ++ } ++ ++ if (!S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) { ++ error("pubkey agent \"%s\" is not a regular file", ++ progname); ++ goto go_away; ++ } ++ ++ /* ++ * Descend the path, checking that each component is a ++ * root-owned directory with strict permissions. ++ */ ++ do { ++ if ((cp = strrchr(progname, '/')) == NULL) ++ break; ++ else ++ *cp = '\0'; ++ ++ debug3("%s: checking component '%s'", __func__, progname); ++ ++ if (stat(progname, &st) != 0) { ++ error("%s: stat(\"%s\"): %s", __func__, ++ progname, strerror(errno)); ++ goto go_away; ++ } ++ if (st.st_uid != 0 || (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) { ++ error("bad ownership or modes for pubkey agent path component \"%s\"", ++ progname); ++ goto go_away; ++ } ++ if (!S_ISDIR(st.st_mode)) { ++ error("pubkey agent path component \"%s\" is not a directory", ++ progname); ++ goto go_away; ++ } ++ } while (0); ++ ++ /* open the pipe and read the keys */ ++ f = popen (pubkey_agent_string, "r"); ++ if (!f) { ++ error("%s: popen (\"%s\", \"r\"): %s", __func__, ++ pubkey_agent_string, strerror (errno)); ++ goto go_away; ++ } ++ ++ found_key = user_search_key_in_file (f, options.pubkey_agent, key, pw); ++ pclose (f); ++ ++go_away: ++ if (tmp_pubkey_agent_string) ++ xfree (tmp_pubkey_agent_string); ++ if (pubkey_agent_string) ++ xfree (pubkey_agent_string); ++ ++ if (runas_pw->pw_uid != 0) ++ restore_uid(); ++ return found_key; ++} ++#endif ++ ++/* check whether given key is in = 0) ++ return success; ++#endif ++ + file = authorized_keys_file(pw); + success = user_key_allowed2(pw, key, file); + xfree(file); +diff -up openssh-5.4p1/configure.ac.pka openssh-5.4p1/configure.ac +--- openssh-5.4p1/configure.ac.pka 2010-03-01 18:10:47.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-5.4p1/configure.ac 2010-03-01 18:10:50.000000000 +0100 +@@ -1323,6 +1323,18 @@ AC_ARG_WITH(audit, + esac ] + ) + ++# Check whether user wants pubkey agent support ++PKA_MSG="no" ++AC_ARG_WITH(pka, ++ [ --with-pka Enable pubkey agent support], ++ [ ++ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then ++ AC_DEFINE([WITH_PUBKEY_AGENT], 1, [Enable pubkey agent support]) ++ PKA_MSG="yes" ++ fi ++ ] ++) ++ + dnl Checks for library functions. Please keep in alphabetical order + AC_CHECK_FUNCS( \ + arc4random \ +@@ -4206,6 +4218,7 @@ echo " Linux audit support + echo " Smartcard support: $SCARD_MSG" + echo " S/KEY support: $SKEY_MSG" + echo " TCP Wrappers support: $TCPW_MSG" ++echo " PKA support: $PKA_MSG" + echo " MD5 password support: $MD5_MSG" + echo " libedit support: $LIBEDIT_MSG" + echo " Solaris process contract support: $SPC_MSG" +diff -up openssh-5.4p1/servconf.c.pka openssh-5.4p1/servconf.c +--- openssh-5.4p1/servconf.c.pka 2010-03-01 18:10:46.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-5.4p1/servconf.c 2010-03-01 18:13:23.000000000 +0100 +@@ -129,6 +129,8 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions + options->num_permitted_opens = -1; + options->adm_forced_command = NULL; + options->chroot_directory = NULL; ++ options->pubkey_agent = NULL; ++ options->pubkey_agent_runas = NULL; + options->zero_knowledge_password_authentication = -1; + } + +@@ -312,6 +314,7 @@ typedef enum { + sMatch, sPermitOpen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory, + sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding, + sZeroKnowledgePasswordAuthentication, sHostCertificate, ++ sPubkeyAgent, sPubkeyAgentRunAs, + sDeprecated, sUnsupported + } ServerOpCodes; + +@@ -432,6 +435,13 @@ static struct { + { "forcecommand", sForceCommand, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "chrootdirectory", sChrootDirectory, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "hostcertificate", sHostCertificate, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, ++#ifdef WITH_PUBKEY_AGENT ++ { "pubkeyagent", sPubkeyAgent, SSHCFG_ALL }, ++ { "pubkeyagentrunas", sPubkeyAgentRunAs, SSHCFG_ALL }, ++#else ++ { "pubkeyagent", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL }, ++ { "pubkeyagentrunas", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL }, ++#endif + { NULL, sBadOption, 0 } + }; + +@@ -1332,6 +1342,20 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions + *charptr = xstrdup(arg); + break; + ++ case sPubkeyAgent: ++ len = strspn(cp, WHITESPACE); ++ if (*activep && options->pubkey_agent == NULL) ++ options->pubkey_agent = xstrdup(cp + len); ++ return 0; ++ ++ case sPubkeyAgentRunAs: ++ charptr = &options->pubkey_agent_runas; ++ ++ arg = strdelim(&cp); ++ if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) ++ *charptr = xstrdup(arg); ++ break; ++ + case sDeprecated: + logit("%s line %d: Deprecated option %s", + filename, linenum, arg); +@@ -1425,6 +1449,8 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *d + M_CP_INTOPT(gss_authentication); + M_CP_INTOPT(rsa_authentication); + M_CP_INTOPT(pubkey_authentication); ++ M_CP_STROPT(pubkey_agent); ++ M_CP_STROPT(pubkey_agent_runas); + M_CP_INTOPT(kerberos_authentication); + M_CP_INTOPT(hostbased_authentication); + M_CP_INTOPT(kbd_interactive_authentication); +@@ -1666,6 +1692,10 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o) + dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedKeysFile2, o->authorized_keys_file2); + dump_cfg_string(sForceCommand, o->adm_forced_command); + dump_cfg_string(sChrootDirectory, o->chroot_directory); ++#ifdef WITH_PUBKEY_AGENT ++ dump_cfg_string(sPubkeyAgent, o->pubkey_agent); ++ dump_cfg_string(sPubkeyAgentRunAs, o->pubkey_agent_runas); ++#endif + + /* string arguments requiring a lookup */ + dump_cfg_string(sLogLevel, log_level_name(o->log_level)); +diff -up openssh-5.4p1/servconf.h.pka openssh-5.4p1/servconf.h +--- openssh-5.4p1/servconf.h.pka 2010-03-01 18:10:46.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-5.4p1/servconf.h 2010-03-01 18:10:50.000000000 +0100 +@@ -155,6 +155,8 @@ typedef struct { + int num_permitted_opens; + + char *chroot_directory; ++ char *pubkey_agent; ++ char *pubkey_agent_runas; + } ServerOptions; + + void initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *); +diff -up openssh-5.4p1/sshd_config.0.pka openssh-5.4p1/sshd_config.0 +--- openssh-5.4p1/sshd_config.0.pka 2010-03-01 18:10:46.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-5.4p1/sshd_config.0 2010-03-01 18:10:50.000000000 +0100 +@@ -352,7 +352,8 @@ DESCRIPTION + KbdInteractiveAuthentication, KerberosAuthentication, + MaxAuthTries, MaxSessions, PasswordAuthentication, + PermitEmptyPasswords, PermitOpen, PermitRootLogin, +- PubkeyAuthentication, RhostsRSAAuthentication, RSAAuthentication, ++ PubkeyAuthentication, PubkeyAgent, PubkeyAgentRunAs, ++ RhostsRSAAuthentication, RSAAuthentication, + X11DisplayOffset, X11Forwarding and X11UseLocalHost. + + MaxAuthTries +@@ -461,6 +462,17 @@ DESCRIPTION + fault is ``yes''. Note that this option applies to protocol ver- + sion 2 only. + ++ PubkeyAgent ++ Specifies which agent is used for lookup of the user's public ++ keys. Empty string means to use the authorized_keys file. By ++ default there is no PubkeyAgent set. Note that this option has ++ an effect only with PubkeyAuthentication switched on. ++ ++ PubkeyAgentRunAs ++ Specifies the user under whose account the PubkeyAgent is run. ++ Empty string (the default value) means the user being authorized ++ is used. ++ + RhostsRSAAuthentication + Specifies whether rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication to- + gether with successful RSA host authentication is allowed. The +diff -up openssh-5.4p1/sshd_config.5.pka openssh-5.4p1/sshd_config.5 +--- openssh-5.4p1/sshd_config.5.pka 2010-03-01 18:10:46.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-5.4p1/sshd_config.5 2010-03-01 18:10:50.000000000 +0100 +@@ -618,6 +618,9 @@ Available keywords are + .Cm KerberosAuthentication , + .Cm MaxAuthTries , + .Cm MaxSessions , ++.Cm PubkeyAuthentication , ++.Cm PubkeyAgent , ++.Cm PubkeyAgentRunAs , + .Cm PasswordAuthentication , + .Cm PermitEmptyPasswords , + .Cm PermitOpen , +@@ -814,6 +817,16 @@ Specifies whether public key authenticat + The default is + .Dq yes . + Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only. ++.It Cm PubkeyAgent ++Specifies which agent is used for lookup of the user's public ++keys. Empty string means to use the authorized_keys file. ++By default there is no PubkeyAgent set. ++Note that this option has an effect only with PubkeyAuthentication ++switched on. ++.It Cm PubkeyAgentRunAs ++Specifies the user under whose account the PubkeyAgent is run. Empty ++string (the default value) means the user being authorized is used. ++.Dq + .It Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication + Specifies whether rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication together + with successful RSA host authentication is allowed. +diff -up openssh-5.4p1/sshd_config.pka openssh-5.4p1/sshd_config +--- openssh-5.4p1/sshd_config.pka 2010-03-01 18:10:46.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-5.4p1/sshd_config 2010-03-01 18:10:50.000000000 +0100 +@@ -45,6 +45,8 @@ SyslogFacility AUTHPRIV + #RSAAuthentication yes + #PubkeyAuthentication yes + #AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys ++#PubkeyAgent none ++#PubkeyAgentRunAs nobody + + # For this to work you will also need host keys in /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts + #RhostsRSAAuthentication no diff --git a/openssh-5.4p1-redhat.patch b/openssh-5.4p1-redhat.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..bd2ad80 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh-5.4p1-redhat.patch @@ -0,0 +1,99 @@ +diff -up openssh-5.4p1/ssh_config.redhat openssh-5.4p1/ssh_config +--- openssh-5.4p1/ssh_config.redhat 2010-01-12 09:40:27.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-5.4p1/ssh_config 2010-03-01 15:15:51.000000000 +0100 +@@ -45,3 +45,14 @@ + # PermitLocalCommand no + # VisualHostKey no + # ProxyCommand ssh -q -W %h:%p gateway.example.com ++Host * ++ GSSAPIAuthentication yes ++# If this option is set to yes then remote X11 clients will have full access ++# to the original X11 display. As virtually no X11 client supports the untrusted ++# mode correctly we set this to yes. ++ ForwardX11Trusted yes ++# Send locale-related environment variables ++ SendEnv LANG LC_CTYPE LC_NUMERIC LC_TIME LC_COLLATE LC_MONETARY LC_MESSAGES ++ SendEnv LC_PAPER LC_NAME LC_ADDRESS LC_TELEPHONE LC_MEASUREMENT ++ SendEnv LC_IDENTIFICATION LC_ALL LANGUAGE ++ SendEnv XMODIFIERS +diff -up openssh-5.4p1/sshd_config.0.redhat openssh-5.4p1/sshd_config.0 +--- openssh-5.4p1/sshd_config.0.redhat 2010-03-01 14:30:04.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-5.4p1/sshd_config.0 2010-03-01 15:14:13.000000000 +0100 +@@ -501,9 +501,9 @@ DESCRIPTION + + SyslogFacility + Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from +- sshd(8). The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0, +- LOCAL1, LOCAL2, LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7. The de- +- fault is AUTH. ++ sshd(8). The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, AUTHPRIV, ++ LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2, LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7. ++ The default is AUTH. + + TCPKeepAlive + Specifies whether the system should send TCP keepalive messages +diff -up openssh-5.4p1/sshd_config.5.redhat openssh-5.4p1/sshd_config.5 +--- openssh-5.4p1/sshd_config.5.redhat 2010-02-26 21:55:06.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-5.4p1/sshd_config.5 2010-03-01 15:14:14.000000000 +0100 +@@ -865,7 +865,7 @@ Note that this option applies to protoco + .It Cm SyslogFacility + Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from + .Xr sshd 8 . +-The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2, ++The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, AUTHPRIV, LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2, + LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7. + The default is AUTH. + .It Cm TCPKeepAlive +diff -up openssh-5.4p1/sshd_config.redhat openssh-5.4p1/sshd_config +--- openssh-5.4p1/sshd_config.redhat 2009-10-11 12:51:09.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-5.4p1/sshd_config 2010-03-01 15:14:14.000000000 +0100 +@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ + # Logging + # obsoletes QuietMode and FascistLogging + #SyslogFacility AUTH ++SyslogFacility AUTHPRIV + #LogLevel INFO + + # Authentication: +@@ -58,9 +59,11 @@ + # To disable tunneled clear text passwords, change to no here! + #PasswordAuthentication yes + #PermitEmptyPasswords no ++PasswordAuthentication yes + + # Change to no to disable s/key passwords + #ChallengeResponseAuthentication yes ++ChallengeResponseAuthentication no + + # Kerberos options + #KerberosAuthentication no +@@ -70,7 +73,9 @@ + + # GSSAPI options + #GSSAPIAuthentication no ++GSSAPIAuthentication yes + #GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes ++GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes + + # Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing, + # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will +@@ -82,11 +87,19 @@ + # PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication + # and ChallengeResponseAuthentication to 'no'. + #UsePAM no ++UsePAM yes ++ ++# Accept locale-related environment variables ++AcceptEnv LANG LC_CTYPE LC_NUMERIC LC_TIME LC_COLLATE LC_MONETARY LC_MESSAGES ++AcceptEnv LC_PAPER LC_NAME LC_ADDRESS LC_TELEPHONE LC_MEASUREMENT ++AcceptEnv LC_IDENTIFICATION LC_ALL LANGUAGE ++AcceptEnv XMODIFIERS + + #AllowAgentForwarding yes + #AllowTcpForwarding yes + #GatewayPorts no + #X11Forwarding no ++X11Forwarding yes + #X11DisplayOffset 10 + #X11UseLocalhost yes + #PrintMotd yes diff --git a/openssh-5.4p1-selinux.patch b/openssh-5.4p1-selinux.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..465811f --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh-5.4p1-selinux.patch @@ -0,0 +1,395 @@ +diff -up openssh-5.4p1/auth1.c.selinux openssh-5.4p1/auth1.c +--- openssh-5.4p1/auth1.c.selinux 2010-03-01 15:19:56.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-5.4p1/auth1.c 2010-03-01 15:19:57.000000000 +0100 +@@ -384,6 +384,9 @@ do_authentication(Authctxt *authctxt) + { + u_int ulen; + char *user, *style = NULL; ++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX ++ char *role=NULL; ++#endif + + /* Get the name of the user that we wish to log in as. */ + packet_read_expect(SSH_CMSG_USER); +@@ -392,11 +395,25 @@ do_authentication(Authctxt *authctxt) + user = packet_get_string(&ulen); + packet_check_eom(); + ++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX ++ if ((role = strchr(user, '/')) != NULL) ++ *role++ = '\0'; ++#endif ++ + if ((style = strchr(user, ':')) != NULL) + *style++ = '\0'; ++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX ++ else ++ if (role && (style = strchr(role, ':')) != NULL) ++ *style++ = '\0'; ++#endif ++ + + authctxt->user = user; + authctxt->style = style; ++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX ++ authctxt->role = role; ++#endif + + /* Verify that the user is a valid user. */ + if ((authctxt->pw = PRIVSEP(getpwnamallow(user))) != NULL) +diff -up openssh-5.4p1/auth2.c.selinux openssh-5.4p1/auth2.c +--- openssh-5.4p1/auth2.c.selinux 2009-06-22 08:11:07.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-5.4p1/auth2.c 2010-03-01 15:19:57.000000000 +0100 +@@ -216,6 +216,9 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32 + Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt; + Authmethod *m = NULL; + char *user, *service, *method, *style = NULL; ++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX ++ char *role = NULL; ++#endif + int authenticated = 0; + + if (authctxt == NULL) +@@ -227,6 +230,11 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32 + debug("userauth-request for user %s service %s method %s", user, service, method); + debug("attempt %d failures %d", authctxt->attempt, authctxt->failures); + ++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX ++ if ((role = strchr(user, '/')) != NULL) ++ *role++ = 0; ++#endif ++ + if ((style = strchr(user, ':')) != NULL) + *style++ = 0; + +@@ -252,8 +260,15 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32 + use_privsep ? " [net]" : ""); + authctxt->service = xstrdup(service); + authctxt->style = style ? xstrdup(style) : NULL; +- if (use_privsep) ++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX ++ authctxt->role = role ? xstrdup(role) : NULL; ++#endif ++ if (use_privsep) { + mm_inform_authserv(service, style); ++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX ++ mm_inform_authrole(role); ++#endif ++ } + userauth_banner(); + } else if (strcmp(user, authctxt->user) != 0 || + strcmp(service, authctxt->service) != 0) { +diff -up openssh-5.4p1/auth2-gss.c.selinux openssh-5.4p1/auth2-gss.c +--- openssh-5.4p1/auth2-gss.c.selinux 2007-12-02 12:59:45.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-5.4p1/auth2-gss.c 2010-03-01 15:19:57.000000000 +0100 +@@ -258,6 +258,7 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple + Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt; + Gssctxt *gssctxt; + int authenticated = 0; ++ char *micuser; + Buffer b; + gss_buffer_desc mic, gssbuf; + u_int len; +@@ -270,7 +271,13 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple + mic.value = packet_get_string(&len); + mic.length = len; + +- ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->user, authctxt->service, ++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX ++ if (authctxt->role && (strlen(authctxt->role) > 0)) ++ xasprintf(&micuser, "%s/%s", authctxt->user, authctxt->role); ++ else ++#endif ++ micuser = authctxt->user; ++ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, micuser, authctxt->service, + "gssapi-with-mic"); + + gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b); +@@ -282,6 +289,8 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple + logit("GSSAPI MIC check failed"); + + buffer_free(&b); ++ if (micuser != authctxt->user) ++ xfree(micuser); + xfree(mic.value); + + authctxt->postponed = 0; +diff -up openssh-5.4p1/auth2-hostbased.c.selinux openssh-5.4p1/auth2-hostbased.c +--- openssh-5.4p1/auth2-hostbased.c.selinux 2008-07-17 10:57:19.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-5.4p1/auth2-hostbased.c 2010-03-01 15:19:57.000000000 +0100 +@@ -106,7 +106,15 @@ userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *authctxt) + buffer_put_string(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len); + /* reconstruct packet */ + buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST); +- buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->user); ++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX ++ if (authctxt->role) { ++ buffer_put_int(&b, strlen(authctxt->user)+strlen(authctxt->role)+1); ++ buffer_append(&b, authctxt->user, strlen(authctxt->user)); ++ buffer_put_char(&b, '/'); ++ buffer_append(&b, authctxt->role, strlen(authctxt->role)); ++ } else ++#endif ++ buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->user); + buffer_put_cstring(&b, service); + buffer_put_cstring(&b, "hostbased"); + buffer_put_string(&b, pkalg, alen); +diff -up openssh-5.4p1/auth2-pubkey.c.selinux openssh-5.4p1/auth2-pubkey.c +--- openssh-5.4p1/auth2-pubkey.c.selinux 2010-02-26 21:55:05.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-5.4p1/auth2-pubkey.c 2010-03-01 15:19:57.000000000 +0100 +@@ -119,7 +119,15 @@ userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt) + } + /* reconstruct packet */ + buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST); +- buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->user); ++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX ++ if (authctxt->role) { ++ buffer_put_int(&b, strlen(authctxt->user)+strlen(authctxt->role)+1); ++ buffer_append(&b, authctxt->user, strlen(authctxt->user)); ++ buffer_put_char(&b, '/'); ++ buffer_append(&b, authctxt->role, strlen(authctxt->role)); ++ } else ++#endif ++ buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->user); + buffer_put_cstring(&b, + datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKSERVICE ? + "ssh-userauth" : +diff -up openssh-5.4p1/auth.h.selinux openssh-5.4p1/auth.h +--- openssh-5.4p1/auth.h.selinux 2010-02-26 21:55:05.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-5.4p1/auth.h 2010-03-01 15:19:57.000000000 +0100 +@@ -58,6 +58,9 @@ struct Authctxt { + char *service; + struct passwd *pw; /* set if 'valid' */ + char *style; ++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX ++ char *role; ++#endif + void *kbdintctxt; + void *jpake_ctx; + #ifdef BSD_AUTH +diff -up openssh-5.4p1/configure.ac.selinux openssh-5.4p1/configure.ac +--- openssh-5.4p1/configure.ac.selinux 2010-03-01 15:19:57.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-5.4p1/configure.ac 2010-03-01 15:21:12.000000000 +0100 +@@ -3358,6 +3358,7 @@ AC_ARG_WITH(selinux, + ], + AC_MSG_ERROR(SELinux support requires libselinux library)) + SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS $LIBSELINUX" ++ LIBS="$LIBS $LIBSELINUX" + AC_CHECK_FUNCS(getseuserbyname get_default_context_with_level) + LIBS="$save_LIBS" + fi ] +diff -up openssh-5.4p1/monitor.c.selinux openssh-5.4p1/monitor.c +--- openssh-5.4p1/monitor.c.selinux 2010-02-26 21:55:05.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-5.4p1/monitor.c 2010-03-01 15:19:57.000000000 +0100 +@@ -137,6 +137,9 @@ int mm_answer_sign(int, Buffer *); + int mm_answer_pwnamallow(int, Buffer *); + int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(int, Buffer *); + int mm_answer_authserv(int, Buffer *); ++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX ++int mm_answer_authrole(int, Buffer *); ++#endif + int mm_answer_authpassword(int, Buffer *); + int mm_answer_bsdauthquery(int, Buffer *); + int mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(int, Buffer *); +@@ -213,6 +216,9 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] + {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sign}, + {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow}, + {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authserv}, ++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX ++ {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authrole}, ++#endif + {MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_auth2_read_banner}, + {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword}, + #ifdef USE_PAM +@@ -682,6 +688,9 @@ mm_answer_pwnamallow(int sock, Buffer *m + else { + /* Allow service/style information on the auth context */ + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, 1); ++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX ++ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, 1); ++#endif + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, 1); + } + +@@ -726,6 +735,25 @@ mm_answer_authserv(int sock, Buffer *m) + return (0); + } + ++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX ++int ++mm_answer_authrole(int sock, Buffer *m) ++{ ++ monitor_permit_authentications(1); ++ ++ authctxt->role = buffer_get_string(m, NULL); ++ debug3("%s: role=%s", ++ __func__, authctxt->role); ++ ++ if (strlen(authctxt->role) == 0) { ++ xfree(authctxt->role); ++ authctxt->role = NULL; ++ } ++ ++ return (0); ++} ++#endif ++ + int + mm_answer_authpassword(int sock, Buffer *m) + { +@@ -1104,7 +1132,7 @@ static int + monitor_valid_userblob(u_char *data, u_int datalen) + { + Buffer b; +- char *p; ++ char *p, *r; + u_int len; + int fail = 0; + +@@ -1130,6 +1158,8 @@ monitor_valid_userblob(u_char *data, u_i + if (buffer_get_char(&b) != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST) + fail++; + p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL); ++ if ((r = strchr(p, '/')) != NULL) ++ *r = '\0'; + if (strcmp(authctxt->user, p) != 0) { + logit("wrong user name passed to monitor: expected %s != %.100s", + authctxt->user, p); +@@ -1161,7 +1191,7 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(u_char *data + char *chost) + { + Buffer b; +- char *p; ++ char *p, *r; + u_int len; + int fail = 0; + +@@ -1178,6 +1208,8 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(u_char *data + if (buffer_get_char(&b) != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST) + fail++; + p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL); ++ if ((r = strchr(p, '/')) != NULL) ++ *r = '\0'; + if (strcmp(authctxt->user, p) != 0) { + logit("wrong user name passed to monitor: expected %s != %.100s", + authctxt->user, p); +diff -up openssh-5.4p1/monitor.h.selinux openssh-5.4p1/monitor.h +--- openssh-5.4p1/monitor.h.selinux 2008-11-05 06:20:46.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-5.4p1/monitor.h 2010-03-01 15:19:57.000000000 +0100 +@@ -31,6 +31,9 @@ + enum monitor_reqtype { + MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, MONITOR_ANS_MODULI, + MONITOR_REQ_FREE, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, ++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX ++ MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, ++#endif + MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MONITOR_ANS_SIGN, + MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM, + MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, MONITOR_ANS_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, +diff -up openssh-5.4p1/monitor_wrap.c.selinux openssh-5.4p1/monitor_wrap.c +--- openssh-5.4p1/monitor_wrap.c.selinux 2009-06-22 08:11:07.000000000 +0200 ++++ openssh-5.4p1/monitor_wrap.c 2010-03-01 15:19:57.000000000 +0100 +@@ -297,6 +297,25 @@ mm_inform_authserv(char *service, char * + buffer_free(&m); + } + ++/* Inform the privileged process about role */ ++ ++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX ++void ++mm_inform_authrole(char *role) ++{ ++ Buffer m; ++ ++ debug3("%s entering", __func__); ++ ++ buffer_init(&m); ++ buffer_put_cstring(&m, role ? role : ""); ++ ++ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, &m); ++ ++ buffer_free(&m); ++} ++#endif ++ + /* Do the password authentication */ + int + mm_auth_password(Authctxt *authctxt, char *password) +diff -up openssh-5.4p1/monitor_wrap.h.selinux openssh-5.4p1/monitor_wrap.h +--- openssh-5.4p1/monitor_wrap.h.selinux 2009-03-05 14:58:22.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-5.4p1/monitor_wrap.h 2010-03-01 15:19:57.000000000 +0100 +@@ -41,6 +41,9 @@ int mm_is_monitor(void); + DH *mm_choose_dh(int, int, int); + int mm_key_sign(Key *, u_char **, u_int *, u_char *, u_int); + void mm_inform_authserv(char *, char *); ++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX ++void mm_inform_authrole(char *); ++#endif + struct passwd *mm_getpwnamallow(const char *); + char *mm_auth2_read_banner(void); + int mm_auth_password(struct Authctxt *, char *); +diff -up openssh-5.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.selinux openssh-5.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c +--- openssh-5.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.selinux 2010-03-01 05:52:50.000000000 +0100 ++++ openssh-5.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c 2010-03-01 15:22:19.000000000 +0100 +@@ -32,12 +32,17 @@ + #include "log.h" + #include "xmalloc.h" + #include "port-linux.h" ++#include "key.h" ++#include "hostfile.h" ++#include "auth.h" + + #ifdef WITH_SELINUX + #include + #include + #include + ++extern Authctxt *the_authctxt; ++ + /* Wrapper around is_selinux_enabled() to log its return value once only */ + int + ssh_selinux_enabled(void) +@@ -56,23 +61,36 @@ ssh_selinux_enabled(void) + static security_context_t + ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname) + { +- security_context_t sc; +- char *sename = NULL, *lvl = NULL; +- int r; ++ security_context_t sc = NULL; ++ char *sename, *lvl; ++ char *role = NULL; ++ int r = 0; + ++ if (the_authctxt) ++ role=the_authctxt->role; + #ifdef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME +- if (getseuserbyname(pwname, &sename, &lvl) != 0) +- return NULL; ++ if ((r=getseuserbyname(pwname, &sename, &lvl)) != 0) { ++ sename = NULL; ++ lvl = NULL; ++ } + #else + sename = pwname; + lvl = NULL; + #endif + ++ if (r == 0) { + #ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL +- r = get_default_context_with_level(sename, lvl, NULL, &sc); ++ if (role != NULL && role[0]) ++ r = get_default_context_with_rolelevel(sename, role, lvl, NULL, &sc); ++ else ++ r = get_default_context_with_level(sename, lvl, NULL, &sc); + #else +- r = get_default_context(sename, NULL, &sc); ++ if (role != NULL && role[0]) ++ r = get_default_context_with_role(sename, role, NULL, &sc); ++ else ++ r = get_default_context(sename, NULL, &sc); + #endif ++ } + + if (r != 0) { + switch (security_getenforce()) { diff --git a/openssh.spec b/openssh.spec index 6988819..243d816 100644 --- a/openssh.spec +++ b/openssh.spec @@ -27,7 +27,8 @@ %define libedit 1 # Do we want NSS tokens support -%define nss 1 +#NSS support is broken from 5.4p1 +%define nss 0 # Whether or not /sbin/nologin exists. %define nologin 1 @@ -68,10 +69,10 @@ Summary: An open source implementation of SSH protocol versions 1 and 2 Name: openssh -Version: 5.3p1 +Version: 5.4p1 # Do not rewind release to 1 on version upgrades unless the pam_ssh_agent_auth # is updated as well. -Release: 22%{?dist}%{?rescue_rel} +Release: 0.snap20100302.1%{?dist}%{?rescue_rel} URL: http://www.openssh.com/portable.html #URL1: http://pamsshagentauth.sourceforge.net #Source0: ftp://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-%{version}.tar.gz @@ -79,39 +80,37 @@ URL: http://www.openssh.com/portable.html # This package differs from the upstream OpenSSH tarball in that # the ACSS cipher is removed by running openssh-nukeacss.sh in # the unpacked source directory. -Source0: openssh-%{version}-noacss.tar.bz2 +Source0: openssh-%{version}-snap20100302-noacss.tar.bz2 Source1: openssh-nukeacss.sh Source2: sshd.pam Source3: sshd.init Source4: http://prdownloads.sourceforge.net/pamsshagentauth/pam_ssh_agent_auth/pam_ssh_agent_auth-%{pam_ssh_agent_ver}.tar.bz2 Source5: pam_ssh_agent-rmheaders -Patch0: openssh-5.2p1-redhat.patch +Patch0: openssh-5.4p1-redhat.patch Patch2: openssh-5.3p1-skip-initial.patch Patch4: openssh-5.2p1-vendor.patch -Patch5: openssh-5.2p1-engine.patch Patch10: pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9-build.patch -Patch12: openssh-5.2p1-selinux.patch -Patch13: openssh-5.3p1-mls.patch +Patch12: openssh-5.4p1-selinux.patch +Patch13: openssh-5.4p1-mls.patch Patch16: openssh-5.3p1-audit.patch -Patch18: openssh-5.0p1-pam_selinux.patch -Patch19: openssh-5.2p1-sesftp.patch -Patch22: openssh-3.9p1-askpass-keep-above.patch +Patch18: openssh-5.4p1-pam_selinux.patch Patch24: openssh-4.3p1-fromto-remote.patch Patch27: openssh-5.1p1-log-in-chroot.patch Patch30: openssh-4.0p1-exit-deadlock.patch Patch35: openssh-5.1p1-askpass-progress.patch Patch38: openssh-4.3p2-askpass-grab-info.patch +#??? - 201594 Patch39: openssh-4.3p2-no-v6only.patch Patch44: openssh-5.2p1-allow-ip-opts.patch Patch49: openssh-4.3p2-gssapi-canohost.patch -Patch51: openssh-5.3p1-nss-keys.patch -Patch55: openssh-5.1p1-cloexec.patch +#??? +Patch51: openssh-5.4p1-nss-keys.patch Patch62: openssh-5.1p1-scp-manpage.patch -Patch65: openssh-5.3p1-fips.patch +Patch65: openssh-5.4p1-fips.patch Patch69: openssh-5.3p1-selabel.patch Patch71: openssh-5.2p1-edns.patch -Patch72: openssh-5.3p1-pka.patch -Patch73: openssh-5.3p1-gsskex.patch +Patch72: openssh-5.4p1-pka.patch +Patch73: openssh-5.4p1-gsskex.patch Patch74: openssh-5.3p1-randclean.patch Patch75: openssh-5.3p1-dso.patch @@ -189,6 +188,7 @@ Provides: openssh-askpass-gnome Summary: PAM module for authentication with ssh-agent Group: System Environment/Base Version: %{pam_ssh_agent_ver} +Release: 23%{?dist}%{?rescue_rel} License: BSD %description @@ -234,7 +234,6 @@ The module is most useful for su and sudo service stacks. %patch0 -p1 -b .redhat %patch2 -p1 -b .skip-initial %patch4 -p1 -b .vendor -%patch5 -p1 -b .engine %if %{pam_ssh_agent} pushd pam_ssh_agent_auth-%{pam_ssh_agent_ver} @@ -250,20 +249,17 @@ popd %patch13 -p1 -b .mls %patch16 -p1 -b .audit %patch18 -p1 -b .pam_selinux -%patch19 -p1 -b .sesftp %endif -%patch22 -p1 -b .keep-above %patch24 -p1 -b .fromto-remote %patch27 -p1 -b .log-chroot %patch30 -p1 -b .exit-deadlock %patch35 -p1 -b .progress %patch38 -p1 -b .grab-info -%patch39 -p1 -b .no-v6only +#???%patch39 -p1 -b .no-v6only %patch44 -p1 -b .ip-opts %patch49 -p1 -b .canohost -%patch51 -p1 -b .nss-keys -%patch55 -p1 -b .cloexec +#???%patch51 -p1 -b .nss-keys %patch62 -p1 -b .manpage %patch65 -p1 -b .fips %patch69 -p1 -b .selabel @@ -316,6 +312,7 @@ fi --disable-strip \ --without-zlib-version-check \ --with-ssl-engine \ + --with-pka \ %if %{nss} --with-nss \ %endif @@ -489,11 +486,13 @@ fi %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-keyscan %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/sftp %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-copy-id +%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-pkcs11-helper %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-agent.1* %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-add.1* %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-keyscan.1* %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/sftp.1* %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-copy-id.1* +%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8* %endif %if ! %{rescue} @@ -529,6 +528,9 @@ fi %endif %changelog +* Wed Mar 3 2010 Jan F. Chadima - 5.4p1-0.snap20100302.1 +- Prepare update to 5.4p1 + * Mon Feb 15 2010 Jan F. Chadima - 5.3p1-22 - ImplicitDSOLinking (#564824) diff --git a/sources b/sources index af5cd52..74abcc8 100644 --- a/sources +++ b/sources @@ -1,3 +1,2 @@ -89f85c1da83c24ca0b10c05344f7c93c openssh-5.3p1-noacss.tar.bz2 b68f1c385d7885fbe2c3626bf77aa3d6 pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2.tar.bz2 fea6e6ac9b5dda1d48af3f2676e8166c openssh-5.4p1-snap20100302-noacss.tar.bz2