From 51ca3be245ced6624aef56460db4580087d69802 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Petr Lautrbach Date: Sep 15 2012 11:28:23 +0000 Subject: use DIR: kerberos cache type (#848228) --- diff --git a/openssh-5.9p1-gsskex.patch b/openssh-5.9p1-gsskex.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 52418e0..0000000 --- a/openssh-5.9p1-gsskex.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,2932 +0,0 @@ -diff -up openssh-5.9p1/auth-krb5.c.gsskex openssh-5.9p1/auth-krb5.c ---- openssh-5.9p1/auth-krb5.c.gsskex 2009-12-21 00:49:22.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-5.9p1/auth-krb5.c 2012-02-06 17:38:19.166867405 +0100 -@@ -170,8 +170,13 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, c - - len = strlen(authctxt->krb5_ticket_file) + 6; - authctxt->krb5_ccname = xmalloc(len); -+#ifdef USE_CCAPI -+ snprintf(authctxt->krb5_ccname, len, "API:%s", -+ authctxt->krb5_ticket_file); -+#else - snprintf(authctxt->krb5_ccname, len, "FILE:%s", - authctxt->krb5_ticket_file); -+#endif - - #ifdef USE_PAM - if (options.use_pam) -@@ -226,15 +231,22 @@ krb5_cleanup_proc(Authctxt *authctxt) - #ifndef HEIMDAL - krb5_error_code - ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache) { -- int tmpfd, ret; -+ int ret; - char ccname[40]; - mode_t old_umask; -+#ifdef USE_CCAPI -+ char cctemplate[] = "API:krb5cc_%d"; -+#else -+ char cctemplate[] = "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX"; -+ int tmpfd; -+#endif - - ret = snprintf(ccname, sizeof(ccname), -- "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX", geteuid()); -+ cctemplate, geteuid()); - if (ret < 0 || (size_t)ret >= sizeof(ccname)) - return ENOMEM; - -+#ifndef USE_CCAPI - old_umask = umask(0177); - tmpfd = mkstemp(ccname + strlen("FILE:")); - umask(old_umask); -@@ -249,6 +261,7 @@ ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context ctx, krb5_c - return errno; - } - close(tmpfd); -+#endif - - return (krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, ccname, ccache)); - } -diff -up openssh-5.9p1/auth2.c.gsskex openssh-5.9p1/auth2.c ---- openssh-5.9p1/auth2.c.gsskex 2012-02-06 17:38:19.046907913 +0100 -+++ openssh-5.9p1/auth2.c 2012-02-06 17:38:19.169220866 +0100 -@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@ extern Authmethod method_passwd; - extern Authmethod method_kbdint; - extern Authmethod method_hostbased; - #ifdef GSSAPI -+extern Authmethod method_gsskeyex; - extern Authmethod method_gssapi; - #endif - #ifdef JPAKE -@@ -79,6 +80,7 @@ Authmethod *authmethods[] = { - &method_none, - &method_pubkey, - #ifdef GSSAPI -+ &method_gsskeyex, - &method_gssapi, - #endif - #ifdef JPAKE -diff -up openssh-5.9p1/auth2-gss.c.gsskex openssh-5.9p1/auth2-gss.c ---- openssh-5.9p1/auth2-gss.c.gsskex 2012-02-06 17:38:19.046907913 +0100 -+++ openssh-5.9p1/auth2-gss.c 2012-02-06 17:41:33.656381846 +0100 -@@ -52,6 +52,40 @@ static void input_gssapi_mic(int type, u - static void input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt); - static void input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, void *); - -+/* -+ * The 'gssapi_keyex' userauth mechanism. -+ */ -+static int -+userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt) -+{ -+ int authenticated = 0; -+ Buffer b; -+ gss_buffer_desc mic, gssbuf; -+ u_int len; -+ -+ mic.value = packet_get_string(&len); -+ mic.length = len; -+ -+ packet_check_eom(); -+ -+ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->user, authctxt->service, -+ "gssapi-keyex"); -+ -+ gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b); -+ gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b); -+ -+ /* gss_kex_context is NULL with privsep, so we can't check it here */ -+ if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gss_kex_context, -+ &gssbuf, &mic)))) -+ authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, -+ authctxt->pw)); -+ -+ buffer_free(&b); -+ xfree(mic.value); -+ -+ return (authenticated); -+} -+ - /* - * We only support those mechanisms that we know about (ie ones that we know - * how to check local user kuserok and the like) -@@ -244,7 +278,8 @@ input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, - - packet_check_eom(); - -- authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user)); -+ authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, -+ authctxt->pw)); - - authctxt->postponed = 0; - dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL); -@@ -286,7 +321,8 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple - gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b); - - if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gssctxt, &gssbuf, &mic)))) -- authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user)); -+ authenticated = -+ PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw)); - else - logit("GSSAPI MIC check failed"); - -@@ -303,6 +339,12 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple - userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, "gssapi-with-mic", NULL); - } - -+Authmethod method_gsskeyex = { -+ "gssapi-keyex", -+ userauth_gsskeyex, -+ &options.gss_authentication -+}; -+ - Authmethod method_gssapi = { - "gssapi-with-mic", - userauth_gssapi, -diff -up openssh-5.9p1/clientloop.c.gsskex openssh-5.9p1/clientloop.c ---- openssh-5.9p1/clientloop.c.gsskex 2012-02-06 17:38:18.919095717 +0100 -+++ openssh-5.9p1/clientloop.c 2012-02-06 17:38:19.170220176 +0100 -@@ -111,6 +111,10 @@ - #include "msg.h" - #include "roaming.h" - -+#ifdef GSSAPI -+#include "ssh-gss.h" -+#endif -+ - /* import options */ - extern Options options; - -@@ -1508,6 +1512,15 @@ client_loop(int have_pty, int escape_cha - /* Do channel operations unless rekeying in progress. */ - if (!rekeying) { - channel_after_select(readset, writeset); -+ -+#ifdef GSSAPI -+ if (options.gss_renewal_rekey && -+ ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)) { -+ debug("credentials updated - forcing rekey"); -+ need_rekeying = 1; -+ } -+#endif -+ - if (need_rekeying || packet_need_rekeying()) { - debug("need rekeying"); - xxx_kex->done = 0; -diff -up openssh-5.9p1/configure.ac.gsskex openssh-5.9p1/configure.ac ---- openssh-5.9p1/configure.ac.gsskex 2012-02-06 17:38:19.151008987 +0100 -+++ openssh-5.9p1/configure.ac 2012-02-06 17:38:19.171220137 +0100 -@@ -515,6 +515,30 @@ main() { if (NSVersionOfRunTimeLibrary(" - [Use tunnel device compatibility to OpenBSD]) - AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF], [1], - [Prepend the address family to IP tunnel traffic]) -+ AC_MSG_CHECKING(if we have the Security Authorization Session API) -+ AC_TRY_COMPILE([#include ], -+ [SessionCreate(0, 0);], -+ [ac_cv_use_security_session_api="yes" -+ AC_DEFINE(USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API, 1, -+ [platform has the Security Authorization Session API]) -+ LIBS="$LIBS -framework Security" -+ AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)], -+ [ac_cv_use_security_session_api="no" -+ AC_MSG_RESULT(no)]) -+ AC_MSG_CHECKING(if we have an in-memory credentials cache) -+ AC_TRY_COMPILE( -+ [#include ], -+ [cc_context_t c; -+ (void) cc_initialize (&c, 0, NULL, NULL);], -+ [AC_DEFINE(USE_CCAPI, 1, -+ [platform uses an in-memory credentials cache]) -+ LIBS="$LIBS -framework Security" -+ AC_MSG_RESULT(yes) -+ if test "x$ac_cv_use_security_session_api" = "xno"; then -+ AC_MSG_ERROR(*** Need a security framework to use the credentials cache API ***) -+ fi], -+ [AC_MSG_RESULT(no)] -+ ) - m4_pattern_allow([AU_IPv]) - AC_CHECK_DECL([AU_IPv4], [], - AC_DEFINE([AU_IPv4], [0], [System only supports IPv4 audit records]) -diff -up openssh-5.9p1/gss-genr.c.gsskex openssh-5.9p1/gss-genr.c ---- openssh-5.9p1/gss-genr.c.gsskex 2009-06-22 08:11:07.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-5.9p1/gss-genr.c 2012-02-06 17:38:19.172078790 +0100 -@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ - /* $OpenBSD: gss-genr.c,v 1.20 2009/06/22 05:39:28 dtucker Exp $ */ - - /* -- * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. -+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions -@@ -39,12 +39,167 @@ - #include "buffer.h" - #include "log.h" - #include "ssh2.h" -+#include "cipher.h" -+#include "key.h" -+#include "kex.h" -+#include - - #include "ssh-gss.h" - - extern u_char *session_id2; - extern u_int session_id2_len; - -+typedef struct { -+ char *encoded; -+ gss_OID oid; -+} ssh_gss_kex_mapping; -+ -+/* -+ * XXX - It would be nice to find a more elegant way of handling the -+ * XXX passing of the key exchange context to the userauth routines -+ */ -+ -+Gssctxt *gss_kex_context = NULL; -+ -+static ssh_gss_kex_mapping *gss_enc2oid = NULL; -+ -+int -+ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok() { -+ return (gss_enc2oid != NULL); -+} -+ -+/* -+ * Return a list of the gss-group1-sha1 mechanisms supported by this program -+ * -+ * We test mechanisms to ensure that we can use them, to avoid starting -+ * a key exchange with a bad mechanism -+ */ -+ -+char * -+ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *host, const char *client) { -+ gss_OID_set gss_supported; -+ OM_uint32 min_status; -+ -+ if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &gss_supported))) -+ return NULL; -+ -+ return(ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_supported, ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism, -+ host, client)); -+} -+ -+char * -+ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set gss_supported, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *check, -+ const char *host, const char *client) { -+ Buffer buf; -+ size_t i; -+ int oidpos, enclen; -+ char *mechs, *encoded; -+ u_char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; -+ char deroid[2]; -+ const EVP_MD *evp_md = EVP_md5(); -+ EVP_MD_CTX md; -+ -+ if (gss_enc2oid != NULL) { -+ for (i = 0; gss_enc2oid[i].encoded != NULL; i++) -+ xfree(gss_enc2oid[i].encoded); -+ xfree(gss_enc2oid); -+ } -+ -+ gss_enc2oid = xmalloc(sizeof(ssh_gss_kex_mapping) * -+ (gss_supported->count + 1)); -+ -+ buffer_init(&buf); -+ -+ oidpos = 0; -+ for (i = 0; i < gss_supported->count; i++) { -+ if (gss_supported->elements[i].length < 128 && -+ (*check)(NULL, &(gss_supported->elements[i]), host, client)) { -+ -+ deroid[0] = SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE; -+ deroid[1] = gss_supported->elements[i].length; -+ -+ EVP_DigestInit(&md, evp_md); -+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, deroid, 2); -+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, -+ gss_supported->elements[i].elements, -+ gss_supported->elements[i].length); -+ EVP_DigestFinal(&md, digest, NULL); -+ -+ encoded = xmalloc(EVP_MD_size(evp_md) * 2); -+ enclen = __b64_ntop(digest, EVP_MD_size(evp_md), -+ encoded, EVP_MD_size(evp_md) * 2); -+ -+ if (oidpos != 0) -+ buffer_put_char(&buf, ','); -+ -+ buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID, -+ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID) - 1); -+ buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen); -+ buffer_put_char(&buf, ','); -+ buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID, -+ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID) - 1); -+ buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen); -+ buffer_put_char(&buf, ','); -+ buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID, -+ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID) - 1); -+ buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen); -+ -+ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].oid = &(gss_supported->elements[i]); -+ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].encoded = encoded; -+ oidpos++; -+ } -+ } -+ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].oid = NULL; -+ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].encoded = NULL; -+ -+ buffer_put_char(&buf, '\0'); -+ -+ mechs = xmalloc(buffer_len(&buf)); -+ buffer_get(&buf, mechs, buffer_len(&buf)); -+ buffer_free(&buf); -+ -+ if (strlen(mechs) == 0) { -+ xfree(mechs); -+ mechs = NULL; -+ } -+ -+ return (mechs); -+} -+ -+gss_OID -+ssh_gssapi_id_kex(Gssctxt *ctx, char *name, int kex_type) { -+ int i = 0; -+ -+ switch (kex_type) { -+ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1: -+ if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID)) -+ return GSS_C_NO_OID; -+ name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID) - 1; -+ break; -+ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1: -+ if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID)) -+ return GSS_C_NO_OID; -+ name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID) - 1; -+ break; -+ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1: -+ if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID)) -+ return GSS_C_NO_OID; -+ name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID) - 1; -+ break; -+ default: -+ return GSS_C_NO_OID; -+ } -+ -+ while (gss_enc2oid[i].encoded != NULL && -+ strcmp(name, gss_enc2oid[i].encoded) != 0) -+ i++; -+ -+ if (gss_enc2oid[i].oid != NULL && ctx != NULL) -+ ssh_gssapi_set_oid(ctx, gss_enc2oid[i].oid); -+ -+ return gss_enc2oid[i].oid; -+} -+ - /* Check that the OID in a data stream matches that in the context */ - int - ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *ctx, void *data, size_t len) -@@ -197,7 +352,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(Gssctxt *ctx, int de - } - - ctx->major = gss_init_sec_context(&ctx->minor, -- GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, &ctx->context, ctx->name, ctx->oid, -+ ctx->client_creds, &ctx->context, ctx->name, ctx->oid, - GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG | GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG | deleg_flag, - 0, NULL, recv_tok, NULL, send_tok, flags, NULL); - -@@ -227,8 +382,42 @@ ssh_gssapi_import_name(Gssctxt *ctx, con - } - - OM_uint32 -+ssh_gssapi_client_identity(Gssctxt *ctx, const char *name) -+{ -+ gss_buffer_desc gssbuf; -+ gss_name_t gssname; -+ OM_uint32 status; -+ gss_OID_set oidset; -+ -+ gssbuf.value = (void *) name; -+ gssbuf.length = strlen(gssbuf.value); -+ -+ gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset); -+ gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset); -+ -+ ctx->major = gss_import_name(&ctx->minor, &gssbuf, -+ GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME, &gssname); -+ -+ if (!ctx->major) -+ ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor, -+ gssname, 0, oidset, GSS_C_INITIATE, -+ &ctx->client_creds, NULL, NULL); -+ -+ gss_release_name(&status, &gssname); -+ gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset); -+ -+ if (ctx->major) -+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); -+ -+ return(ctx->major); -+} -+ -+OM_uint32 - ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t buffer, gss_buffer_t hash) - { -+ if (ctx == NULL) -+ return -1; -+ - if ((ctx->major = gss_get_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context, - GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, buffer, hash))) - ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); -@@ -236,6 +425,19 @@ ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer - return (ctx->major); - } - -+/* Priviledged when used by server */ -+OM_uint32 -+ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic) -+{ -+ if (ctx == NULL) -+ return -1; -+ -+ ctx->major = gss_verify_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context, -+ gssbuf, gssmic, NULL); -+ -+ return (ctx->major); -+} -+ - void - ssh_gssapi_buildmic(Buffer *b, const char *user, const char *service, - const char *context) -@@ -249,11 +451,16 @@ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(Buffer *b, const cha - } - - int --ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host) -+ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host, -+ const char *client) - { - gss_buffer_desc token = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; - OM_uint32 major, minor; - gss_OID_desc spnego_oid = {6, (void *)"\x2B\x06\x01\x05\x05\x02"}; -+ Gssctxt *intctx = NULL; -+ -+ if (ctx == NULL) -+ ctx = &intctx; - - /* RFC 4462 says we MUST NOT do SPNEGO */ - if (oid->length == spnego_oid.length && -@@ -263,6 +470,10 @@ ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx - ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(ctx); - ssh_gssapi_set_oid(*ctx, oid); - major = ssh_gssapi_import_name(*ctx, host); -+ -+ if (!GSS_ERROR(major) && client) -+ major = ssh_gssapi_client_identity(*ctx, client); -+ - if (!GSS_ERROR(major)) { - major = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(*ctx, 0, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER, &token, - NULL); -@@ -272,10 +483,67 @@ ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx - GSS_C_NO_BUFFER); - } - -- if (GSS_ERROR(major)) -+ if (GSS_ERROR(major) || intctx != NULL) - ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(ctx); - - return (!GSS_ERROR(major)); - } - -+int -+ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(Gssctxt *ctxt) { -+ static gss_name_t saved_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME; -+ static OM_uint32 saved_lifetime = 0; -+ static gss_OID saved_mech = GSS_C_NO_OID; -+ static gss_name_t name; -+ static OM_uint32 last_call = 0; -+ OM_uint32 lifetime, now, major, minor; -+ int equal; -+ gss_cred_usage_t usage = GSS_C_INITIATE; -+ -+ now = time(NULL); -+ -+ if (ctxt) { -+ debug("Rekey has happened - updating saved versions"); -+ -+ if (saved_name != GSS_C_NO_NAME) -+ gss_release_name(&minor, &saved_name); -+ -+ major = gss_inquire_cred(&minor, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, -+ &saved_name, &saved_lifetime, NULL, NULL); -+ -+ if (!GSS_ERROR(major)) { -+ saved_mech = ctxt->oid; -+ saved_lifetime+= now; -+ } else { -+ /* Handle the error */ -+ } -+ return 0; -+ } -+ -+ if (now - last_call < 10) -+ return 0; -+ -+ last_call = now; -+ -+ if (saved_mech == GSS_C_NO_OID) -+ return 0; -+ -+ major = gss_inquire_cred(&minor, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, -+ &name, &lifetime, NULL, NULL); -+ if (major == GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED) -+ return 0; -+ else if (GSS_ERROR(major)) -+ return 0; -+ -+ major = gss_compare_name(&minor, saved_name, name, &equal); -+ gss_release_name(&minor, &name); -+ if (GSS_ERROR(major)) -+ return 0; -+ -+ if (equal && (saved_lifetime < lifetime + now - 10)) -+ return 1; -+ -+ return 0; -+} -+ - #endif /* GSSAPI */ -diff -up openssh-5.9p1/gss-serv.c.gsskex openssh-5.9p1/gss-serv.c ---- openssh-5.9p1/gss-serv.c.gsskex 2011-08-05 22:16:46.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-5.9p1/gss-serv.c 2012-02-06 17:38:19.174112917 +0100 -@@ -45,15 +45,20 @@ - #include "channels.h" - #include "session.h" - #include "misc.h" -+#include "servconf.h" -+#include "uidswap.h" - - #include "ssh-gss.h" -+#include "monitor_wrap.h" -+ -+extern ServerOptions options; - - static ssh_gssapi_client gssapi_client = - { GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, -- GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL}}; -+ GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, GSS_C_NO_NAME, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL}, 0, 0}; - - ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_null_mech = -- { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}; -+ { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}; - - #ifdef KRB5 - extern ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech; -@@ -81,25 +86,32 @@ ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred(Gssctxt *ctx) - char lname[MAXHOSTNAMELEN]; - gss_OID_set oidset; - -- gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset); -- gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset); -+ if (options.gss_strict_acceptor) { -+ gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset); -+ gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset); -+ -+ if (gethostname(lname, MAXHOSTNAMELEN)) { -+ gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset); -+ return (-1); -+ } - -- if (gethostname(lname, MAXHOSTNAMELEN)) { -- gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset); -- return (-1); -- } -+ if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctx, lname))) { -+ gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset); -+ return (ctx->major); -+ } -+ -+ if ((ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor, -+ ctx->name, 0, oidset, GSS_C_ACCEPT, &ctx->creds, -+ NULL, NULL))) -+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); - -- if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctx, lname))) { - gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset); - return (ctx->major); -+ } else { -+ ctx->name = GSS_C_NO_NAME; -+ ctx->creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL; - } -- -- if ((ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor, -- ctx->name, 0, oidset, GSS_C_ACCEPT, &ctx->creds, NULL, NULL))) -- ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); -- -- gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset); -- return (ctx->major); -+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE; - } - - /* Privileged */ -@@ -114,6 +126,29 @@ ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx, gss - } - - /* Unprivileged */ -+char * -+ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms() { -+ gss_OID_set supported; -+ -+ ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(&supported); -+ return (ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(supported, &ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech, -+ NULL, NULL)); -+} -+ -+/* Unprivileged */ -+int -+ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt **dum, gss_OID oid, const char *data, -+ const char *dummy) { -+ Gssctxt *ctx = NULL; -+ int res; -+ -+ res = !GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctx, oid))); -+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctx); -+ -+ return (res); -+} -+ -+/* Unprivileged */ - void - ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *oidset) - { -@@ -123,7 +158,9 @@ ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *o - gss_OID_set supported; - - gss_create_empty_oid_set(&min_status, oidset); -- gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &supported); -+ -+ if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &supported))) -+ return; - - while (supported_mechs[i]->name != NULL) { - if (GSS_ERROR(gss_test_oid_set_member(&min_status, -@@ -249,8 +286,48 @@ OM_uint32 - ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client) - { - int i = 0; -+ int equal = 0; -+ gss_name_t new_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME; -+ gss_buffer_desc ename = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; -+ -+ if (options.gss_store_rekey && client->used && ctx->client_creds) { -+ if (client->mech->oid.length != ctx->oid->length || -+ (memcmp(client->mech->oid.elements, -+ ctx->oid->elements, ctx->oid->length) !=0)) { -+ debug("Rekeyed credentials have different mechanism"); -+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE; -+ } -+ -+ if ((ctx->major = gss_inquire_cred_by_mech(&ctx->minor, -+ ctx->client_creds, ctx->oid, &new_name, -+ NULL, NULL, NULL))) { -+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); -+ return (ctx->major); -+ } -+ -+ ctx->major = gss_compare_name(&ctx->minor, client->name, -+ new_name, &equal); -+ -+ if (GSS_ERROR(ctx->major)) { -+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); -+ return (ctx->major); -+ } -+ -+ if (!equal) { -+ debug("Rekeyed credentials have different name"); -+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE; -+ } -+ -+ debug("Marking rekeyed credentials for export"); - -- gss_buffer_desc ename; -+ gss_release_name(&ctx->minor, &client->name); -+ gss_release_cred(&ctx->minor, &client->creds); -+ client->name = new_name; -+ client->creds = ctx->client_creds; -+ ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL; -+ client->updated = 1; -+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE; -+ } - - client->mech = NULL; - -@@ -265,6 +342,13 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_g - if (client->mech == NULL) - return GSS_S_FAILURE; - -+ if (ctx->client_creds && -+ (ctx->major = gss_inquire_cred_by_mech(&ctx->minor, -+ ctx->client_creds, ctx->oid, &client->name, NULL, NULL, NULL))) { -+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); -+ return (ctx->major); -+ } -+ - if ((ctx->major = gss_display_name(&ctx->minor, ctx->client, - &client->displayname, NULL))) { - ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); -@@ -282,6 +366,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_g - return (ctx->major); - } - -+ gss_release_buffer(&ctx->minor, &ename); -+ - /* We can't copy this structure, so we just move the pointer to it */ - client->creds = ctx->client_creds; - ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL; -@@ -329,7 +415,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***envp, u_int - - /* Privileged */ - int --ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user) -+ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw) - { - OM_uint32 lmin; - -@@ -339,9 +425,11 @@ ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user) - return 0; - } - if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->userok) -- if ((*gssapi_client.mech->userok)(&gssapi_client, user)) -+ if ((*gssapi_client.mech->userok)(&gssapi_client, user)) { -+ gssapi_client.used = 1; -+ gssapi_client.store.owner = pw; - return 1; -- else { -+ } else { - /* Destroy delegated credentials if userok fails */ - gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.displayname); - gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.exportedname); -@@ -354,14 +442,90 @@ ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user) - return (0); - } - --/* Privileged */ --OM_uint32 --ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic) -+/* These bits are only used for rekeying. The unpriviledged child is running -+ * as the user, the monitor is root. -+ * -+ * In the child, we want to : -+ * *) Ask the monitor to store our credentials into the store we specify -+ * *) If it succeeds, maybe do a PAM update -+ */ -+ -+/* Stuff for PAM */ -+ -+#ifdef USE_PAM -+static int ssh_gssapi_simple_conv(int n, const struct pam_message **msg, -+ struct pam_response **resp, void *data) - { -- ctx->major = gss_verify_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context, -- gssbuf, gssmic, NULL); -+ return (PAM_CONV_ERR); -+} -+#endif - -- return (ctx->major); -+void -+ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds() { -+ int ok; -+ int ret; -+#ifdef USE_PAM -+ pam_handle_t *pamh = NULL; -+ struct pam_conv pamconv = {ssh_gssapi_simple_conv, NULL}; -+ char *envstr; -+#endif -+ -+ if (gssapi_client.store.filename == NULL && -+ gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL && -+ gssapi_client.store.envvar == NULL) -+ return; -+ -+ ok = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&gssapi_client.store)); -+ -+ if (!ok) -+ return; -+ -+ debug("Rekeyed credentials stored successfully"); -+ -+ /* Actually managing to play with the ssh pam stack from here will -+ * be next to impossible. In any case, we may want different options -+ * for rekeying. So, use our own :) -+ */ -+#ifdef USE_PAM -+ if (!use_privsep) { -+ debug("Not even going to try and do PAM with privsep disabled"); -+ return; -+ } -+ -+ ret = pam_start("sshd-rekey", gssapi_client.store.owner->pw_name, -+ &pamconv, &pamh); -+ if (ret) -+ return; -+ -+ xasprintf(&envstr, "%s=%s", gssapi_client.store.envvar, -+ gssapi_client.store.envval); -+ -+ ret = pam_putenv(pamh, envstr); -+ if (!ret) -+ pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_REINITIALIZE_CRED); -+ pam_end(pamh, PAM_SUCCESS); -+#endif -+} -+ -+int -+ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store) { -+ int ok = 0; -+ -+ /* Check we've got credentials to store */ -+ if (!gssapi_client.updated) -+ return 0; -+ -+ gssapi_client.updated = 0; -+ -+ temporarily_use_uid(gssapi_client.store.owner); -+ if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->updatecreds) -+ ok = (*gssapi_client.mech->updatecreds)(store, &gssapi_client); -+ else -+ debug("No update function for this mechanism"); -+ -+ restore_uid(); -+ -+ return ok; - } - - #endif -diff -up openssh-5.9p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.gsskex openssh-5.9p1/gss-serv-krb5.c ---- openssh-5.9p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.gsskex 2006-09-01 07:38:36.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-5.9p1/gss-serv-krb5.c 2012-02-06 17:38:19.173095956 +0100 -@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ - /* $OpenBSD: gss-serv-krb5.c,v 1.7 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */ - - /* -- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. -+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions -@@ -120,6 +120,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl - krb5_principal princ; - OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status; - int len; -+ const char *new_ccname; - - if (client->creds == NULL) { - debug("No credentials stored"); -@@ -168,11 +169,16 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl - return; - } - -- client->store.filename = xstrdup(krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache)); -+ new_ccname = krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache); -+ - client->store.envvar = "KRB5CCNAME"; -- len = strlen(client->store.filename) + 6; -- client->store.envval = xmalloc(len); -- snprintf(client->store.envval, len, "FILE:%s", client->store.filename); -+#ifdef USE_CCAPI -+ xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "API:%s", new_ccname); -+ client->store.filename = NULL; -+#else -+ xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "FILE:%s", new_ccname); -+ client->store.filename = xstrdup(new_ccname); -+#endif - - #ifdef USE_PAM - if (options.use_pam) -@@ -184,6 +190,71 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl - return; - } - -+int -+ssh_gssapi_krb5_updatecreds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store, -+ ssh_gssapi_client *client) -+{ -+ krb5_ccache ccache = NULL; -+ krb5_principal principal = NULL; -+ char *name = NULL; -+ krb5_error_code problem; -+ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status; -+ -+ if ((problem = krb5_cc_resolve(krb_context, store->envval, &ccache))) { -+ logit("krb5_cc_resolve(): %.100s", -+ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem)); -+ return 0; -+ } -+ -+ /* Find out who the principal in this cache is */ -+ if ((problem = krb5_cc_get_principal(krb_context, ccache, -+ &principal))) { -+ logit("krb5_cc_get_principal(): %.100s", -+ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem)); -+ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache); -+ return 0; -+ } -+ -+ if ((problem = krb5_unparse_name(krb_context, principal, &name))) { -+ logit("krb5_unparse_name(): %.100s", -+ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem)); -+ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal); -+ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache); -+ return 0; -+ } -+ -+ -+ if (strcmp(name,client->exportedname.value)!=0) { -+ debug("Name in local credentials cache differs. Not storing"); -+ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal); -+ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache); -+ krb5_free_unparsed_name(krb_context, name); -+ return 0; -+ } -+ krb5_free_unparsed_name(krb_context, name); -+ -+ /* Name matches, so lets get on with it! */ -+ -+ if ((problem = krb5_cc_initialize(krb_context, ccache, principal))) { -+ logit("krb5_cc_initialize(): %.100s", -+ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem)); -+ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal); -+ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache); -+ return 0; -+ } -+ -+ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal); -+ -+ if ((maj_status = gss_krb5_copy_ccache(&min_status, client->creds, -+ ccache))) { -+ logit("gss_krb5_copy_ccache() failed. Sorry!"); -+ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache); -+ return 0; -+ } -+ -+ return 1; -+} -+ - ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech = { - "toWM5Slw5Ew8Mqkay+al2g==", - "Kerberos", -@@ -191,7 +262,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech = { - NULL, - &ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok, - NULL, -- &ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds -+ &ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds, -+ &ssh_gssapi_krb5_updatecreds - }; - - #endif /* KRB5 */ -diff -up openssh-5.9p1/ChangeLog.gssapi.gsskex openssh-5.9p1/ChangeLog.gssapi ---- openssh-5.9p1/ChangeLog.gssapi.gsskex 2012-02-06 17:38:19.166867405 +0100 -+++ openssh-5.9p1/ChangeLog.gssapi 2012-02-06 17:38:19.166867405 +0100 -@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@ -+20110101 -+ - Finally update for OpenSSH 5.6p1 -+ - Add GSSAPIServerIdentity option from Jim Basney -+ -+20100308 -+ - [ Makefile.in, key.c, key.h ] -+ Updates for OpenSSH 5.4p1 -+ - [ servconf.c ] -+ Include GSSAPI options in the sshd -T configuration dump, and flag -+ some older configuration options as being unsupported. Thanks to Colin -+ Watson. -+ - -+ -+20100124 -+ - [ sshconnect2.c ] -+ Adapt to deal with additional element in Authmethod structure. Thanks to -+ Colin Watson -+ -+20090615 -+ - [ gss-genr.c gss-serv.c kexgssc.c kexgsss.c monitor.c sshconnect2.c -+ sshd.c ] -+ Fix issues identified by Greg Hudson following a code review -+ Check return value of gss_indicate_mechs -+ Protect GSSAPI calls in monitor, so they can only be used if enabled -+ Check return values of bignum functions in key exchange -+ Use BN_clear_free to clear other side's DH value -+ Make ssh_gssapi_id_kex more robust -+ Only configure kex table pointers if GSSAPI is enabled -+ Don't leak mechanism list, or gss mechanism list -+ Cast data.length before printing -+ If serverkey isn't provided, use an empty string, rather than NULL -+ -+20090201 -+ - [ gss-genr.c gss-serv.c kex.h kexgssc.c readconf.c readconf.h ssh-gss.h -+ ssh_config.5 sshconnet2.c ] -+ Add support for the GSSAPIClientIdentity option, which allows the user -+ to specify which GSSAPI identity to use to contact a given server -+ -+20080404 -+ - [ gss-serv.c ] -+ Add code to actually implement GSSAPIStrictAcceptCheck, which had somehow -+ been omitted from a previous version of this patch. Reported by Borislav -+ Stoichkov -+ -+20070317 -+ - [ gss-serv-krb5.c ] -+ Remove C99ism, where new_ccname was being declared in the middle of a -+ function -+ -+20061220 -+ - [ servconf.c ] -+ Make default for GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck be Yes, to match previous, and -+ documented, behaviour. Reported by Dan Watson. -+ -+20060910 -+ - [ gss-genr.c kexgssc.c kexgsss.c kex.h monitor.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c -+ ssh-gss.h ] -+ add support for gss-group14-sha1 key exchange mechanisms -+ - [ gss-serv.c servconf.c servconf.h sshd_config sshd_config.5 ] -+ Add GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck option to allow the disabling of -+ acceptor principal checking on multi-homed machines. -+ -+ - [ sshd_config ssh_config ] -+ Add settings for GSSAPIKeyExchange and GSSAPITrustDNS to the sample -+ configuration files -+ - [ kexgss.c kegsss.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c ] -+ Code cleanup. Replace strlen/xmalloc/snprintf sequences with xasprintf() -+ Limit length of error messages displayed by client -+ -+20060909 -+ - [ gss-genr.c gss-serv.c ] -+ move ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred() and ssh_gssapi_server_ctx to be server -+ only, where they belong -+ -+ -+20060829 -+ - [ gss-serv-krb5.c ] -+ Fix CCAPI credentials cache name when creating KRB5CCNAME environment -+ variable -+ -+20060828 -+ - [ gss-genr.c ] -+ Avoid Heimdal context freeing problem -+ -+ -+20060818 -+ - [ gss-genr.c ssh-gss.h sshconnect2.c ] -+ Make sure that SPENGO is disabled -+ -+ -+20060421 -+ - [ gssgenr.c, sshconnect2.c ] -+ a few type changes (signed versus unsigned, int versus size_t) to -+ fix compiler errors/warnings -+ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu) -+ - [ kexgssc.c, sshconnect2.c ] -+ fix uninitialized variable warnings -+ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu) -+ - [ gssgenr.c ] -+ pass oid to gss_display_status (helpful when using GSSAPI mechglue) -+ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu) -+ -+ - [ gss-serv-krb5.c ] -+ #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_KRB5 should be #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_KRB5_H -+ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu) -+ -+ - [ readconf.c, readconf.h, ssh_config.5, sshconnect2.c -+ add client-side GssapiKeyExchange option -+ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu) -+ - [ sshconnect2.c ] -+ add support for GssapiTrustDns option for gssapi-with-mic -+ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu) -+ -diff -up openssh-5.9p1/kex.c.gsskex openssh-5.9p1/kex.c ---- openssh-5.9p1/kex.c.gsskex 2012-02-06 17:38:19.014845863 +0100 -+++ openssh-5.9p1/kex.c 2012-02-06 17:38:19.174112917 +0100 -@@ -51,6 +51,10 @@ - #include "roaming.h" - #include "audit.h" - -+#ifdef GSSAPI -+#include "ssh-gss.h" -+#endif -+ - #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L - # if defined(HAVE_EVP_SHA256) - # define evp_ssh_sha256 EVP_sha256 -@@ -371,6 +375,20 @@ choose_kex(Kex *k, char *client, char *s - k->kex_type = KEX_ECDH_SHA2; - k->evp_md = kex_ecdh_name_to_evpmd(k->name); - #endif -+#ifdef GSSAPI -+ } else if (strncmp(k->name, KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID, -+ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID) - 1) == 0) { -+ k->kex_type = KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1; -+ k->evp_md = EVP_sha1(); -+ } else if (strncmp(k->name, KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID, -+ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID) - 1) == 0) { -+ k->kex_type = KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1; -+ k->evp_md = EVP_sha1(); -+ } else if (strncmp(k->name, KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID, -+ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID) - 1) == 0) { -+ k->kex_type = KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1; -+ k->evp_md = EVP_sha1(); -+#endif - } else - fatal("bad kex alg %s", k->name); - } -diff -up openssh-5.9p1/kexgssc.c.gsskex openssh-5.9p1/kexgssc.c ---- openssh-5.9p1/kexgssc.c.gsskex 2012-02-06 17:38:19.175129606 +0100 -+++ openssh-5.9p1/kexgssc.c 2012-02-06 17:38:19.175129606 +0100 -@@ -0,0 +1,334 @@ -+/* -+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. -+ * -+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without -+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions -+ * are met: -+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. -+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the -+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. -+ * -+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR -+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES -+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. -+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, -+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT -+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, -+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY -+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT -+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF -+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. -+ */ -+ -+#include "includes.h" -+ -+#ifdef GSSAPI -+ -+#include "includes.h" -+ -+#include -+#include -+ -+#include -+ -+#include "xmalloc.h" -+#include "buffer.h" -+#include "ssh2.h" -+#include "key.h" -+#include "cipher.h" -+#include "kex.h" -+#include "log.h" -+#include "packet.h" -+#include "dh.h" -+ -+#include "ssh-gss.h" -+ -+void -+kexgss_client(Kex *kex) { -+ gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; -+ gss_buffer_desc recv_tok, gssbuf, msg_tok, *token_ptr; -+ Gssctxt *ctxt; -+ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status, ret_flags; -+ u_int klen, kout, slen = 0, hashlen, strlen; -+ DH *dh; -+ BIGNUM *dh_server_pub = NULL; -+ BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL; -+ BIGNUM *p = NULL; -+ BIGNUM *g = NULL; -+ u_char *kbuf, *hash; -+ u_char *serverhostkey = NULL; -+ u_char *empty = ""; -+ char *msg; -+ char *lang; -+ int type = 0; -+ int first = 1; -+ int nbits = 0, min = DH_GRP_MIN, max = DH_GRP_MAX; -+ -+ /* Initialise our GSSAPI world */ -+ ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(&ctxt); -+ if (ssh_gssapi_id_kex(ctxt, kex->name, kex->kex_type) -+ == GSS_C_NO_OID) -+ fatal("Couldn't identify host exchange"); -+ -+ if (ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctxt, kex->gss_host)) -+ fatal("Couldn't import hostname"); -+ -+ if (kex->gss_client && -+ ssh_gssapi_client_identity(ctxt, kex->gss_client)) -+ fatal("Couldn't acquire client credentials"); -+ -+ switch (kex->kex_type) { -+ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1: -+ dh = dh_new_group1(); -+ break; -+ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1: -+ dh = dh_new_group14(); -+ break; -+ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1: -+ debug("Doing group exchange\n"); -+ nbits = dh_estimate(kex->we_need * 8); -+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ); -+ packet_put_int(min); -+ packet_put_int(nbits); -+ packet_put_int(max); -+ -+ packet_send(); -+ -+ packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP); -+ -+ if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL) -+ fatal("BN_new() failed"); -+ packet_get_bignum2(p); -+ if ((g = BN_new()) == NULL) -+ fatal("BN_new() failed"); -+ packet_get_bignum2(g); -+ packet_check_eom(); -+ -+ if (BN_num_bits(p) < min || BN_num_bits(p) > max) -+ fatal("GSSGRP_GEX group out of range: %d !< %d !< %d", -+ min, BN_num_bits(p), max); -+ -+ dh = dh_new_group(g, p); -+ break; -+ default: -+ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type); -+ } -+ -+ /* Step 1 - e is dh->pub_key */ -+ dh_gen_key(dh, kex->we_need * 8); -+ -+ /* This is f, we initialise it now to make life easier */ -+ dh_server_pub = BN_new(); -+ if (dh_server_pub == NULL) -+ fatal("dh_server_pub == NULL"); -+ -+ token_ptr = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER; -+ -+ do { -+ debug("Calling gss_init_sec_context"); -+ -+ maj_status = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(ctxt, -+ kex->gss_deleg_creds, token_ptr, &send_tok, -+ &ret_flags); -+ -+ if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) { -+ if (send_tok.length != 0) { -+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE); -+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, -+ send_tok.length); -+ } -+ fatal("gss_init_context failed"); -+ } -+ -+ /* If we've got an old receive buffer get rid of it */ -+ if (token_ptr != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER) -+ xfree(recv_tok.value); -+ -+ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) { -+ /* If mutual state flag is not true, kex fails */ -+ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG)) -+ fatal("Mutual authentication failed"); -+ -+ /* If integ avail flag is not true kex fails */ -+ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG)) -+ fatal("Integrity check failed"); -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * If we have data to send, then the last message that we -+ * received cannot have been a 'complete'. -+ */ -+ if (send_tok.length != 0) { -+ if (first) { -+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT); -+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, -+ send_tok.length); -+ packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key); -+ first = 0; -+ } else { -+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE); -+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, -+ send_tok.length); -+ } -+ packet_send(); -+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok); -+ -+ /* If we've sent them data, they should reply */ -+ do { -+ type = packet_read(); -+ if (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY) { -+ debug("Received KEXGSS_HOSTKEY"); -+ if (serverhostkey) -+ fatal("Server host key received more than once"); -+ serverhostkey = -+ packet_get_string(&slen); -+ } -+ } while (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY); -+ -+ switch (type) { -+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE: -+ debug("Received GSSAPI_CONTINUE"); -+ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) -+ fatal("GSSAPI Continue received from server when complete"); -+ recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&strlen); -+ recv_tok.length = strlen; -+ break; -+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE: -+ debug("Received GSSAPI_COMPLETE"); -+ packet_get_bignum2(dh_server_pub); -+ msg_tok.value = packet_get_string(&strlen); -+ msg_tok.length = strlen; -+ -+ /* Is there a token included? */ -+ if (packet_get_char()) { -+ recv_tok.value= -+ packet_get_string(&strlen); -+ recv_tok.length = strlen; -+ /* If we're already complete - protocol error */ -+ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) -+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: received token when complete"); -+ } else { -+ /* No token included */ -+ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE) -+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: did not receive final token"); -+ } -+ break; -+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR: -+ debug("Received Error"); -+ maj_status = packet_get_int(); -+ min_status = packet_get_int(); -+ msg = packet_get_string(NULL); -+ lang = packet_get_string(NULL); -+ fatal("GSSAPI Error: \n%.400s",msg); -+ default: -+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d", -+ type); -+ } -+ token_ptr = &recv_tok; -+ } else { -+ /* No data, and not complete */ -+ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE) -+ fatal("Not complete, and no token output"); -+ } -+ } while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED); -+ -+ /* -+ * We _must_ have received a COMPLETE message in reply from the -+ * server, which will have set dh_server_pub and msg_tok -+ */ -+ -+ if (type != SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE) -+ fatal("Didn't receive a SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE when I expected it"); -+ -+ /* Check f in range [1, p-1] */ -+ if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh_server_pub)) -+ packet_disconnect("bad server public DH value"); -+ -+ /* compute K=f^x mod p */ -+ klen = DH_size(dh); -+ kbuf = xmalloc(klen); -+ kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_server_pub, dh); -+ if ((int)kout < 0) -+ fatal("DH_compute_key: failed"); -+ -+ shared_secret = BN_new(); -+ if (shared_secret == NULL) -+ fatal("kexgss_client: BN_new failed"); -+ -+ if (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL) -+ fatal("kexdh_client: BN_bin2bn failed"); -+ -+ memset(kbuf, 0, klen); -+ xfree(kbuf); -+ -+ switch (kex->kex_type) { -+ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1: -+ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1: -+ kex_dh_hash( kex->client_version_string, -+ kex->server_version_string, -+ buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my), -+ buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer), -+ (serverhostkey ? serverhostkey : empty), slen, -+ dh->pub_key, /* e */ -+ dh_server_pub, /* f */ -+ shared_secret, /* K */ -+ &hash, &hashlen -+ ); -+ break; -+ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1: -+ kexgex_hash( -+ kex->evp_md, -+ kex->client_version_string, -+ kex->server_version_string, -+ buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my), -+ buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer), -+ (serverhostkey ? serverhostkey : empty), slen, -+ min, nbits, max, -+ dh->p, dh->g, -+ dh->pub_key, -+ dh_server_pub, -+ shared_secret, -+ &hash, &hashlen -+ ); -+ break; -+ default: -+ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type); -+ } -+ -+ gssbuf.value = hash; -+ gssbuf.length = hashlen; -+ -+ /* Verify that the hash matches the MIC we just got. */ -+ if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(ctxt, &gssbuf, &msg_tok))) -+ packet_disconnect("Hash's MIC didn't verify"); -+ -+ xfree(msg_tok.value); -+ -+ DH_free(dh); -+ if (serverhostkey) -+ xfree(serverhostkey); -+ BN_clear_free(dh_server_pub); -+ -+ /* save session id */ -+ if (kex->session_id == NULL) { -+ kex->session_id_len = hashlen; -+ kex->session_id = xmalloc(kex->session_id_len); -+ memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len); -+ } -+ -+ if (kex->gss_deleg_creds) -+ ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(ctxt); -+ -+ if (gss_kex_context == NULL) -+ gss_kex_context = ctxt; -+ else -+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt); -+ -+ kex_derive_keys(kex, hash, hashlen, shared_secret); -+ BN_clear_free(shared_secret); -+ kex_finish(kex); -+} -+ -+#endif /* GSSAPI */ -diff -up openssh-5.9p1/kexgsss.c.gsskex openssh-5.9p1/kexgsss.c ---- openssh-5.9p1/kexgsss.c.gsskex 2012-02-06 17:38:19.176145304 +0100 -+++ openssh-5.9p1/kexgsss.c 2012-02-06 17:38:19.176145304 +0100 -@@ -0,0 +1,288 @@ -+/* -+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. -+ * -+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without -+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions -+ * are met: -+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. -+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the -+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. -+ * -+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR -+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES -+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. -+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, -+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT -+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, -+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY -+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT -+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF -+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. -+ */ -+ -+#include "includes.h" -+ -+#ifdef GSSAPI -+ -+#include -+ -+#include -+#include -+ -+#include "xmalloc.h" -+#include "buffer.h" -+#include "ssh2.h" -+#include "key.h" -+#include "cipher.h" -+#include "kex.h" -+#include "log.h" -+#include "packet.h" -+#include "dh.h" -+#include "ssh-gss.h" -+#include "monitor_wrap.h" -+#include "servconf.h" -+ -+extern ServerOptions options; -+ -+void -+kexgss_server(Kex *kex) -+{ -+ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status; -+ -+ /* -+ * Some GSSAPI implementations use the input value of ret_flags (an -+ * output variable) as a means of triggering mechanism specific -+ * features. Initializing it to zero avoids inadvertently -+ * activating this non-standard behaviour. -+ */ -+ -+ OM_uint32 ret_flags = 0; -+ gss_buffer_desc gssbuf, recv_tok, msg_tok; -+ gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; -+ Gssctxt *ctxt = NULL; -+ u_int slen, klen, kout, hashlen; -+ u_char *kbuf, *hash; -+ DH *dh; -+ int min = -1, max = -1, nbits = -1; -+ BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL; -+ BIGNUM *dh_client_pub = NULL; -+ int type = 0; -+ gss_OID oid; -+ char *mechs; -+ -+ /* Initialise GSSAPI */ -+ -+ /* If we're rekeying, privsep means that some of the private structures -+ * in the GSSAPI code are no longer available. This kludges them back -+ * into life -+ */ -+ if (!ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok()) -+ if ((mechs = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms())) -+ xfree(mechs); -+ -+ debug2("%s: Identifying %s", __func__, kex->name); -+ oid = ssh_gssapi_id_kex(NULL, kex->name, kex->kex_type); -+ if (oid == GSS_C_NO_OID) -+ fatal("Unknown gssapi mechanism"); -+ -+ debug2("%s: Acquiring credentials", __func__); -+ -+ if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctxt, oid)))) -+ fatal("Unable to acquire credentials for the server"); -+ -+ switch (kex->kex_type) { -+ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1: -+ dh = dh_new_group1(); -+ break; -+ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1: -+ dh = dh_new_group14(); -+ break; -+ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1: -+ debug("Doing group exchange"); -+ packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ); -+ min = packet_get_int(); -+ nbits = packet_get_int(); -+ max = packet_get_int(); -+ min = MAX(DH_GRP_MIN, min); -+ max = MIN(DH_GRP_MAX, max); -+ packet_check_eom(); -+ if (max < min || nbits < min || max < nbits) -+ fatal("GSS_GEX, bad parameters: %d !< %d !< %d", -+ min, nbits, max); -+ dh = PRIVSEP(choose_dh(min, nbits, max)); -+ if (dh == NULL) -+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: no matching group found"); -+ -+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP); -+ packet_put_bignum2(dh->p); -+ packet_put_bignum2(dh->g); -+ packet_send(); -+ -+ packet_write_wait(); -+ break; -+ default: -+ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type); -+ } -+ -+ dh_gen_key(dh, kex->we_need * 8); -+ -+ do { -+ debug("Wait SSH2_MSG_GSSAPI_INIT"); -+ type = packet_read(); -+ switch(type) { -+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT: -+ if (dh_client_pub != NULL) -+ fatal("Received KEXGSS_INIT after initialising"); -+ recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&slen); -+ recv_tok.length = slen; -+ -+ if ((dh_client_pub = BN_new()) == NULL) -+ fatal("dh_client_pub == NULL"); -+ -+ packet_get_bignum2(dh_client_pub); -+ -+ /* Send SSH_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY here, if we want */ -+ break; -+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE: -+ recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&slen); -+ recv_tok.length = slen; -+ break; -+ default: -+ packet_disconnect( -+ "Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d", -+ type); -+ } -+ -+ maj_status = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(ctxt, &recv_tok, -+ &send_tok, &ret_flags)); -+ -+ xfree(recv_tok.value); -+ -+ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE && send_tok.length == 0) -+ fatal("Zero length token output when incomplete"); -+ -+ if (dh_client_pub == NULL) -+ fatal("No client public key"); -+ -+ if (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) { -+ debug("Sending GSSAPI_CONTINUE"); -+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE); -+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length); -+ packet_send(); -+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok); -+ } -+ } while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED); -+ -+ if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) { -+ if (send_tok.length > 0) { -+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE); -+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length); -+ packet_send(); -+ } -+ fatal("accept_ctx died"); -+ } -+ -+ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG)) -+ fatal("Mutual Authentication flag wasn't set"); -+ -+ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG)) -+ fatal("Integrity flag wasn't set"); -+ -+ if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh_client_pub)) -+ packet_disconnect("bad client public DH value"); -+ -+ klen = DH_size(dh); -+ kbuf = xmalloc(klen); -+ kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_client_pub, dh); -+ if ((int)kout < 0) -+ fatal("DH_compute_key: failed"); -+ -+ shared_secret = BN_new(); -+ if (shared_secret == NULL) -+ fatal("kexgss_server: BN_new failed"); -+ -+ if (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL) -+ fatal("kexgss_server: BN_bin2bn failed"); -+ -+ memset(kbuf, 0, klen); -+ xfree(kbuf); -+ -+ switch (kex->kex_type) { -+ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1: -+ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1: -+ kex_dh_hash( -+ kex->client_version_string, kex->server_version_string, -+ buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer), -+ buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my), -+ NULL, 0, /* Change this if we start sending host keys */ -+ dh_client_pub, dh->pub_key, shared_secret, -+ &hash, &hashlen -+ ); -+ break; -+ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1: -+ kexgex_hash( -+ kex->evp_md, -+ kex->client_version_string, kex->server_version_string, -+ buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer), -+ buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my), -+ NULL, 0, -+ min, nbits, max, -+ dh->p, dh->g, -+ dh_client_pub, -+ dh->pub_key, -+ shared_secret, -+ &hash, &hashlen -+ ); -+ break; -+ default: -+ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type); -+ } -+ -+ BN_clear_free(dh_client_pub); -+ -+ if (kex->session_id == NULL) { -+ kex->session_id_len = hashlen; -+ kex->session_id = xmalloc(kex->session_id_len); -+ memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len); -+ } -+ -+ gssbuf.value = hash; -+ gssbuf.length = hashlen; -+ -+ if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_sign(ctxt,&gssbuf,&msg_tok)))) -+ fatal("Couldn't get MIC"); -+ -+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE); -+ packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key); -+ packet_put_string(msg_tok.value,msg_tok.length); -+ -+ if (send_tok.length != 0) { -+ packet_put_char(1); /* true */ -+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length); -+ } else { -+ packet_put_char(0); /* false */ -+ } -+ packet_send(); -+ -+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok); -+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &msg_tok); -+ -+ if (gss_kex_context == NULL) -+ gss_kex_context = ctxt; -+ else -+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt); -+ -+ DH_free(dh); -+ -+ kex_derive_keys(kex, hash, hashlen, shared_secret); -+ BN_clear_free(shared_secret); -+ kex_finish(kex); -+ -+ /* If this was a rekey, then save out any delegated credentials we -+ * just exchanged. */ -+ if (options.gss_store_rekey) -+ ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds(); -+} -+#endif /* GSSAPI */ -diff -up openssh-5.9p1/kex.h.gsskex openssh-5.9p1/kex.h ---- openssh-5.9p1/kex.h.gsskex 2012-02-06 17:38:19.015845746 +0100 -+++ openssh-5.9p1/kex.h 2012-02-06 17:38:19.175129606 +0100 -@@ -73,6 +73,9 @@ enum kex_exchange { - KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1, - KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256, - KEX_ECDH_SHA2, -+ KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1, -+ KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1, -+ KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1, - KEX_MAX - }; - -@@ -129,6 +132,12 @@ struct Kex { - sig_atomic_t done; - int flags; - const EVP_MD *evp_md; -+#ifdef GSSAPI -+ int gss_deleg_creds; -+ int gss_trust_dns; -+ char *gss_host; -+ char *gss_client; -+#endif - char *client_version_string; - char *server_version_string; - int (*verify_host_key)(Key *); -@@ -156,6 +165,11 @@ void kexgex_server(Kex *); - void kexecdh_client(Kex *); - void kexecdh_server(Kex *); - -+#ifdef GSSAPI -+void kexgss_client(Kex *); -+void kexgss_server(Kex *); -+#endif -+ - void newkeys_destroy(Newkeys *newkeys); - - void -diff -up openssh-5.9p1/key.c.gsskex openssh-5.9p1/key.c ---- openssh-5.9p1/key.c.gsskex 2012-02-06 17:38:19.121787795 +0100 -+++ openssh-5.9p1/key.c 2012-02-06 17:38:19.176793341 +0100 -@@ -1006,6 +1006,8 @@ key_ssh_name_from_type_nid(int type, int - } - break; - #endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ -+ case KEY_NULL: -+ return "null"; - } - return "ssh-unknown"; - } -@@ -1311,6 +1313,8 @@ key_type_from_name(char *name) - strcmp(name, "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com") == 0) { - return KEY_ECDSA_CERT; - #endif -+ } else if (strcmp(name, "null") == 0) { -+ return KEY_NULL; - } - - debug2("key_type_from_name: unknown key type '%s'", name); -diff -up openssh-5.9p1/key.h.gsskex openssh-5.9p1/key.h ---- openssh-5.9p1/key.h.gsskex 2012-02-06 17:38:19.029850894 +0100 -+++ openssh-5.9p1/key.h 2012-02-06 17:38:19.177807852 +0100 -@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ enum types { - KEY_ECDSA_CERT, - KEY_RSA_CERT_V00, - KEY_DSA_CERT_V00, -+ KEY_NULL, - KEY_UNSPEC - }; - enum fp_type { -diff -up openssh-5.9p1/Makefile.in.gsskex openssh-5.9p1/Makefile.in ---- openssh-5.9p1/Makefile.in.gsskex 2012-02-06 17:38:19.164220442 +0100 -+++ openssh-5.9p1/Makefile.in 2012-02-06 17:38:19.166867405 +0100 -@@ -75,6 +75,7 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=acss.o authfd.o authfile.o b - atomicio.o key.o dispatch.o kex.o mac.o uidswap.o uuencode.o misc.o \ - monitor_fdpass.o rijndael.o ssh-dss.o ssh-ecdsa.o ssh-rsa.o dh.o \ - kexdh.o kexgex.o kexdhc.o kexgexc.o bufec.o kexecdh.o kexecdhc.o \ -+ kexgssc.o \ - msg.o progressmeter.o dns.o entropy.o gss-genr.o umac.o jpake.o \ - schnorr.o ssh-pkcs11.o auditstub.o - -@@ -91,7 +92,7 @@ SSHDOBJS=sshd.o auth-rhosts.o auth-passw - auth2-none.o auth2-passwd.o auth2-pubkey.o auth2-jpake.o \ - monitor_mm.o monitor.o monitor_wrap.o kexdhs.o kexgexs.o kexecdhs.o \ - auth-krb5.o \ -- auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o \ -+ auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o kexgsss.o\ - loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o md5crypt.o \ - sftp-server.o sftp-common.o \ - roaming_common.o roaming_serv.o \ -diff -up openssh-5.9p1/monitor.c.gsskex openssh-5.9p1/monitor.c ---- openssh-5.9p1/monitor.c.gsskex 2012-02-06 17:38:19.048914842 +0100 -+++ openssh-5.9p1/monitor.c 2012-02-06 17:48:43.113815884 +0100 -@@ -186,6 +186,8 @@ int mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int, Buffer - int mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int, Buffer *); - int mm_answer_gss_userok(int, Buffer *); - int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int, Buffer *); -+int mm_answer_gss_sign(int, Buffer *); -+int mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(int, Buffer *); - #endif - - #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS -@@ -270,6 +272,7 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] - {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx}, - {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_gss_userok}, - {MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_checkmic}, -+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_gss_sign}, - #endif - #ifdef JPAKE - {MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_GET_PWDATA, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_jpake_get_pwdata}, -@@ -282,6 +285,12 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] - }; - - struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = { -+#ifdef GSSAPI -+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 0, mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx}, -+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx}, -+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, 0, mm_answer_gss_sign}, -+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, 0, mm_answer_gss_updatecreds}, -+#endif - {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 0, mm_answer_moduli}, - {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 0, mm_answer_sign}, - {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 0, mm_answer_pty}, -@@ -406,6 +415,10 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctx - /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */ - monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1); - monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1); -+#ifdef GSSAPI -+ /* and for the GSSAPI key exchange */ -+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 1); -+#endif - } else { - mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto15; - req_auth = &options.required_auth1; -@@ -514,6 +527,10 @@ monitor_child_postauth(struct monitor *p - monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1); - monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1); - monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1); -+#ifdef GSSAPI -+ /* and for the GSSAPI key exchange */ -+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 1); -+#endif - } else { - mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth15; - monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1); -@@ -1943,6 +1960,13 @@ mm_get_kex(Buffer *m) - kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server; - kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server; - kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_server; -+#ifdef GSSAPI -+ if (options.gss_keyex) { -+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server; -+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_server; -+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_server; -+ } -+#endif - kex->server = 1; - kex->hostkey_type = buffer_get_int(m); - kex->kex_type = buffer_get_int(m); -@@ -2166,6 +2190,9 @@ mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int sock, Buffer - OM_uint32 major; - u_int len; - -+ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex) -+ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled"); -+ - goid.elements = buffer_get_string(m, &len); - goid.length = len; - -@@ -2193,6 +2220,9 @@ mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int sock, Buffe - OM_uint32 flags = 0; /* GSI needs this */ - u_int len; - -+ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex) -+ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled"); -+ - in.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len); - in.length = len; - major = ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gsscontext, &in, &out, &flags); -@@ -2210,6 +2240,7 @@ mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int sock, Buffe - monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0); - monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1); - monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, 1); -+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, 1); - } - return (0); - } -@@ -2221,6 +2252,9 @@ mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int sock, Buffer - OM_uint32 ret; - u_int len; - -+ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex) -+ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled"); -+ - gssbuf.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len); - gssbuf.length = len; - mic.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len); -@@ -2247,7 +2281,11 @@ mm_answer_gss_userok(int sock, Buffer *m - { - int authenticated; - -- authenticated = authctxt->valid && ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user); -+ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex) -+ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled"); -+ -+ authenticated = authctxt->valid && -+ ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw); - - buffer_clear(m); - buffer_put_int(m, authenticated); -@@ -2261,6 +2299,74 @@ mm_answer_gss_userok(int sock, Buffer *m - /* Monitor loop will terminate if authenticated */ - return (authenticated); - } -+ -+int -+mm_answer_gss_sign(int socket, Buffer *m) -+{ -+ gss_buffer_desc data; -+ gss_buffer_desc hash = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; -+ OM_uint32 major, minor; -+ u_int len; -+ -+ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex) -+ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled"); -+ -+ data.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len); -+ data.length = len; -+ if (data.length != 20) -+ fatal("%s: data length incorrect: %d", __func__, -+ (int) data.length); -+ -+ /* Save the session ID on the first time around */ -+ if (session_id2_len == 0) { -+ session_id2_len = data.length; -+ session_id2 = xmalloc(session_id2_len); -+ memcpy(session_id2, data.value, session_id2_len); -+ } -+ major = ssh_gssapi_sign(gsscontext, &data, &hash); -+ -+ xfree(data.value); -+ -+ buffer_clear(m); -+ buffer_put_int(m, major); -+ buffer_put_string(m, hash.value, hash.length); -+ -+ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, m); -+ -+ gss_release_buffer(&minor, &hash); -+ -+ /* Turn on getpwnam permissions */ -+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1); -+ -+ /* And credential updating, for when rekeying */ -+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, 1); -+ -+ return (0); -+} -+ -+int -+mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(int socket, Buffer *m) { -+ ssh_gssapi_ccache store; -+ int ok; -+ -+ store.filename = buffer_get_string(m, NULL); -+ store.envvar = buffer_get_string(m, NULL); -+ store.envval = buffer_get_string(m, NULL); -+ -+ ok = ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&store); -+ -+ xfree(store.filename); -+ xfree(store.envvar); -+ xfree(store.envval); -+ -+ buffer_clear(m); -+ buffer_put_int(m, ok); -+ -+ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS, m); -+ -+ return(0); -+} -+ - #endif /* GSSAPI */ - - #ifdef JPAKE -diff -up openssh-5.9p1/monitor.h.gsskex openssh-5.9p1/monitor.h ---- openssh-5.9p1/monitor.h.gsskex 2012-02-06 17:38:19.049917992 +0100 -+++ openssh-5.9p1/monitor.h 2012-02-06 17:38:19.178823232 +0100 -@@ -56,6 +56,8 @@ enum monitor_reqtype { - MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSTEP, - MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUSEROK, - MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC, -+ MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, -+ MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS, - MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START, - MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT, - MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX, -diff -up openssh-5.9p1/monitor_wrap.c.gsskex openssh-5.9p1/monitor_wrap.c ---- openssh-5.9p1/monitor_wrap.c.gsskex 2012-02-06 17:38:19.050803985 +0100 -+++ openssh-5.9p1/monitor_wrap.c 2012-02-06 17:38:19.179838373 +0100 -@@ -1326,7 +1326,7 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss - } - - int --mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user) -+mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw) - { - Buffer m; - int authenticated = 0; -@@ -1343,6 +1343,51 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user) - debug3("%s: user %sauthenticated",__func__, authenticated ? "" : "not "); - return (authenticated); - } -+ -+OM_uint32 -+mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_desc *data, gss_buffer_desc *hash) -+{ -+ Buffer m; -+ OM_uint32 major; -+ u_int len; -+ -+ buffer_init(&m); -+ buffer_put_string(&m, data->value, data->length); -+ -+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, &m); -+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, &m); -+ -+ major = buffer_get_int(&m); -+ hash->value = buffer_get_string(&m, &len); -+ hash->length = len; -+ -+ buffer_free(&m); -+ -+ return(major); -+} -+ -+int -+mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store) -+{ -+ Buffer m; -+ int ok; -+ -+ buffer_init(&m); -+ -+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->filename ? store->filename : ""); -+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->envvar ? store->envvar : ""); -+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->envval ? store->envval : ""); -+ -+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, &m); -+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS, &m); -+ -+ ok = buffer_get_int(&m); -+ -+ buffer_free(&m); -+ -+ return (ok); -+} -+ - #endif /* GSSAPI */ - - #ifdef JPAKE -diff -up openssh-5.9p1/monitor_wrap.h.gsskex openssh-5.9p1/monitor_wrap.h ---- openssh-5.9p1/monitor_wrap.h.gsskex 2012-02-06 17:38:19.050803985 +0100 -+++ openssh-5.9p1/monitor_wrap.h 2012-02-06 17:38:19.180853859 +0100 -@@ -62,8 +62,10 @@ BIGNUM *mm_auth_rsa_generate_challenge(K - OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID); - OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *, - gss_buffer_desc *, gss_buffer_desc *, OM_uint32 *); --int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user); -+int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *); - OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t); -+OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t); -+int mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *); - #endif - - #ifdef USE_PAM -diff -up openssh-5.9p1/readconf.c.gsskex openssh-5.9p1/readconf.c ---- openssh-5.9p1/readconf.c.gsskex 2011-05-29 13:42:31.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-5.9p1/readconf.c 2012-02-06 17:38:19.181868712 +0100 -@@ -129,6 +129,8 @@ typedef enum { - oClearAllForwardings, oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost, - oEnableSSHKeysign, oRekeyLimit, oVerifyHostKeyDNS, oConnectTimeout, - oAddressFamily, oGssAuthentication, oGssDelegateCreds, -+ oGssTrustDns, oGssKeyEx, oGssClientIdentity, oGssRenewalRekey, -+ oGssServerIdentity, - oServerAliveInterval, oServerAliveCountMax, oIdentitiesOnly, - oSendEnv, oControlPath, oControlMaster, oControlPersist, - oHashKnownHosts, -@@ -169,10 +171,19 @@ static struct { - { "afstokenpassing", oUnsupported }, - #if defined(GSSAPI) - { "gssapiauthentication", oGssAuthentication }, -+ { "gssapikeyexchange", oGssKeyEx }, - { "gssapidelegatecredentials", oGssDelegateCreds }, -+ { "gssapitrustdns", oGssTrustDns }, -+ { "gssapiclientidentity", oGssClientIdentity }, -+ { "gssapiserveridentity", oGssServerIdentity }, -+ { "gssapirenewalforcesrekey", oGssRenewalRekey }, - #else - { "gssapiauthentication", oUnsupported }, -+ { "gssapikeyexchange", oUnsupported }, - { "gssapidelegatecredentials", oUnsupported }, -+ { "gssapitrustdns", oUnsupported }, -+ { "gssapiclientidentity", oUnsupported }, -+ { "gssapirenewalforcesrekey", oUnsupported }, - #endif - { "fallbacktorsh", oDeprecated }, - { "usersh", oDeprecated }, -@@ -482,10 +493,30 @@ parse_flag: - intptr = &options->gss_authentication; - goto parse_flag; - -+ case oGssKeyEx: -+ intptr = &options->gss_keyex; -+ goto parse_flag; -+ - case oGssDelegateCreds: - intptr = &options->gss_deleg_creds; - goto parse_flag; - -+ case oGssTrustDns: -+ intptr = &options->gss_trust_dns; -+ goto parse_flag; -+ -+ case oGssClientIdentity: -+ charptr = &options->gss_client_identity; -+ goto parse_string; -+ -+ case oGssServerIdentity: -+ charptr = &options->gss_server_identity; -+ goto parse_string; -+ -+ case oGssRenewalRekey: -+ intptr = &options->gss_renewal_rekey; -+ goto parse_flag; -+ - case oBatchMode: - intptr = &options->batch_mode; - goto parse_flag; -@@ -1138,7 +1169,12 @@ initialize_options(Options * options) - options->pubkey_authentication = -1; - options->challenge_response_authentication = -1; - options->gss_authentication = -1; -+ options->gss_keyex = -1; - options->gss_deleg_creds = -1; -+ options->gss_trust_dns = -1; -+ options->gss_renewal_rekey = -1; -+ options->gss_client_identity = NULL; -+ options->gss_server_identity = NULL; - options->password_authentication = -1; - options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1; - options->kbd_interactive_devices = NULL; -@@ -1238,8 +1274,14 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options) - options->challenge_response_authentication = 1; - if (options->gss_authentication == -1) - options->gss_authentication = 0; -+ if (options->gss_keyex == -1) -+ options->gss_keyex = 0; - if (options->gss_deleg_creds == -1) - options->gss_deleg_creds = 0; -+ if (options->gss_trust_dns == -1) -+ options->gss_trust_dns = 0; -+ if (options->gss_renewal_rekey == -1) -+ options->gss_renewal_rekey = 0; - if (options->password_authentication == -1) - options->password_authentication = 1; - if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1) -diff -up openssh-5.9p1/readconf.h.gsskex openssh-5.9p1/readconf.h ---- openssh-5.9p1/readconf.h.gsskex 2011-05-29 13:42:33.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-5.9p1/readconf.h 2012-02-06 17:38:19.181868712 +0100 -@@ -47,7 +47,12 @@ typedef struct { - int challenge_response_authentication; - /* Try S/Key or TIS, authentication. */ - int gss_authentication; /* Try GSS authentication */ -+ int gss_keyex; /* Try GSS key exchange */ - int gss_deleg_creds; /* Delegate GSS credentials */ -+ int gss_trust_dns; /* Trust DNS for GSS canonicalization */ -+ int gss_renewal_rekey; /* Credential renewal forces rekey */ -+ char *gss_client_identity; /* Principal to initiate GSSAPI with */ -+ char *gss_server_identity; /* GSSAPI target principal */ - int password_authentication; /* Try password - * authentication. */ - int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* Try keyboard-interactive auth. */ -diff -up openssh-5.9p1/servconf.c.gsskex openssh-5.9p1/servconf.c ---- openssh-5.9p1/servconf.c.gsskex 2012-02-06 17:38:19.152024134 +0100 -+++ openssh-5.9p1/servconf.c 2012-02-06 17:51:50.815868372 +0100 -@@ -99,7 +99,10 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions - options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = -1; - options->kerberos_get_afs_token = -1; - options->gss_authentication=-1; -+ options->gss_keyex = -1; - options->gss_cleanup_creds = -1; -+ options->gss_strict_acceptor = -1; -+ options->gss_store_rekey = -1; - options->password_authentication = -1; - options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1; - options->challenge_response_authentication = -1; -@@ -232,8 +235,14 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption - options->kerberos_get_afs_token = 0; - if (options->gss_authentication == -1) - options->gss_authentication = 0; -+ if (options->gss_keyex == -1) -+ options->gss_keyex = 0; - if (options->gss_cleanup_creds == -1) - options->gss_cleanup_creds = 1; -+ if (options->gss_strict_acceptor == -1) -+ options->gss_strict_acceptor = 1; -+ if (options->gss_store_rekey == -1) -+ options->gss_store_rekey = 0; - if (options->password_authentication == -1) - options->password_authentication = 1; - if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1) -@@ -327,7 +336,9 @@ typedef enum { - sBanner, sShowPatchLevel, sUseDNS, sHostbasedAuthentication, - sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, sClientAliveInterval, - sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile, -- sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel, -+ sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssStrictAcceptor, -+ sGssKeyEx, sGssStoreRekey, -+ sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel, - sRequiredAuthentications1, sRequiredAuthentications2, - sMatch, sPermitOpen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory, - sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding, -@@ -393,10 +404,20 @@ static struct { - #ifdef GSSAPI - { "gssapiauthentication", sGssAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, - { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, -+ { "gssapicleanupcreds", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, -+ { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sGssStrictAcceptor, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, -+ { "gssapikeyexchange", sGssKeyEx, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, -+ { "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sGssStoreRekey, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, - #else - { "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL }, - { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, -+ { "gssapicleanupcreds", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, -+ { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, -+ { "gssapikeyexchange", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, -+ { "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, - #endif -+ { "gssusesessionccache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, -+ { "gssapiusesessioncredcache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, - { "passwordauthentication", sPasswordAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, - { "kbdinteractiveauthentication", sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, - { "challengeresponseauthentication", sChallengeResponseAuthentication, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, -@@ -983,10 +1004,22 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions - intptr = &options->gss_authentication; - goto parse_flag; - -+ case sGssKeyEx: -+ intptr = &options->gss_keyex; -+ goto parse_flag; -+ - case sGssCleanupCreds: - intptr = &options->gss_cleanup_creds; - goto parse_flag; - -+ case sGssStrictAcceptor: -+ intptr = &options->gss_strict_acceptor; -+ goto parse_flag; -+ -+ case sGssStoreRekey: -+ intptr = &options->gss_store_rekey; -+ goto parse_flag; -+ - case sPasswordAuthentication: - intptr = &options->password_authentication; - goto parse_flag; -@@ -1794,6 +1827,9 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o) - #ifdef GSSAPI - dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication); - dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssCleanupCreds, o->gss_cleanup_creds); -+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssKeyEx, o->gss_keyex); -+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStrictAcceptor, o->gss_strict_acceptor); -+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStoreRekey, o->gss_store_rekey); - #endif - #ifdef JPAKE - dump_cfg_fmtint(sZeroKnowledgePasswordAuthentication, -diff -up openssh-5.9p1/servconf.h.gsskex openssh-5.9p1/servconf.h ---- openssh-5.9p1/servconf.h.gsskex 2012-02-06 17:38:19.153039971 +0100 -+++ openssh-5.9p1/servconf.h 2012-02-06 17:38:19.183899042 +0100 -@@ -103,7 +103,10 @@ typedef struct { - int kerberos_get_afs_token; /* If true, try to get AFS token if - * authenticated with Kerberos. */ - int gss_authentication; /* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */ -+ int gss_keyex; /* If true, permit GSSAPI key exchange */ - int gss_cleanup_creds; /* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */ -+ int gss_strict_acceptor; /* If true, restrict the GSSAPI acceptor name */ -+ int gss_store_rekey; - int password_authentication; /* If true, permit password - * authentication. */ - int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* If true, permit */ -diff -up openssh-5.9p1/ssh_config.gsskex openssh-5.9p1/ssh_config ---- openssh-5.9p1/ssh_config.gsskex 2012-02-06 17:38:19.140228679 +0100 -+++ openssh-5.9p1/ssh_config 2012-02-06 17:38:19.185931798 +0100 -@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@ - # HostbasedAuthentication no - # GSSAPIAuthentication no - # GSSAPIDelegateCredentials no -+# GSSAPIKeyExchange no -+# GSSAPITrustDNS no - # BatchMode no - # CheckHostIP yes - # AddressFamily any -diff -up openssh-5.9p1/ssh_config.5.gsskex openssh-5.9p1/ssh_config.5 ---- openssh-5.9p1/ssh_config.5.gsskex 2011-08-05 22:17:32.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-5.9p1/ssh_config.5 2012-02-06 17:38:19.184919538 +0100 -@@ -527,11 +527,43 @@ Specifies whether user authentication ba - The default is - .Dq no . - Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only. -+.It Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange -+Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI may be used. When using -+GSSAPI key exchange the server need not have a host key. -+The default is -+.Dq no . -+Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only. -+.It Cm GSSAPIClientIdentity -+If set, specifies the GSSAPI client identity that ssh should use when -+connecting to the server. The default is unset, which means that the default -+identity will be used. -+.It Cm GSSAPIServerIdentity -+If set, specifies the GSSAPI server identity that ssh should expect when -+connecting to the server. The default is unset, which means that the -+expected GSSAPI server identity will be determined from the target -+hostname. - .It Cm GSSAPIDelegateCredentials - Forward (delegate) credentials to the server. - The default is - .Dq no . --Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only. -+Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 connections using GSSAPI. -+.It Cm GSSAPIRenewalForcesRekey -+If set to -+.Dq yes -+then renewal of the client's GSSAPI credentials will force the rekeying of the -+ssh connection. With a compatible server, this can delegate the renewed -+credentials to a session on the server. -+The default is -+.Dq no . -+.It Cm GSSAPITrustDns -+Set to -+.Dq yes to indicate that the DNS is trusted to securely canonicalize -+the name of the host being connected to. If -+.Dq no, the hostname entered on the -+command line will be passed untouched to the GSSAPI library. -+The default is -+.Dq no . -+This option only applies to protocol version 2 connections using GSSAPI. - .It Cm HashKnownHosts - Indicates that - .Xr ssh 1 -diff -up openssh-5.9p1/sshconnect2.c.gsskex openssh-5.9p1/sshconnect2.c ---- openssh-5.9p1/sshconnect2.c.gsskex 2012-02-06 17:38:19.125220406 +0100 -+++ openssh-5.9p1/sshconnect2.c 2012-02-06 17:38:19.186899323 +0100 -@@ -162,9 +162,34 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *ho - { - Kex *kex; - -+#ifdef GSSAPI -+ char *orig = NULL, *gss = NULL; -+ char *gss_host = NULL; -+#endif -+ - xxx_host = host; - xxx_hostaddr = hostaddr; - -+#ifdef GSSAPI -+ if (options.gss_keyex) { -+ /* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this -+ * client to the key exchange algorithm proposal */ -+ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]; -+ -+ if (options.gss_trust_dns) -+ gss_host = (char *)get_canonical_hostname(1); -+ else -+ gss_host = host; -+ -+ gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host, options.gss_client_identity); -+ if (gss) { -+ debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss); -+ xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS], -+ "%s,%s", gss, orig); -+ } -+ } -+#endif -+ - if (options.ciphers == (char *)-1) { - logit("No valid ciphers for protocol version 2 given, using defaults."); - options.ciphers = NULL; -@@ -207,6 +232,17 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *ho - if (options.kex_algorithms != NULL) - myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = options.kex_algorithms; - -+#ifdef GSSAPI -+ /* If we've got GSSAPI algorithms, then we also support the -+ * 'null' hostkey, as a last resort */ -+ if (options.gss_keyex && gss) { -+ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]; -+ xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS], -+ "%s,null", orig); -+ xfree(gss); -+ } -+#endif -+ - if (options.rekey_limit) - packet_set_rekey_limit((u_int32_t)options.rekey_limit); - -@@ -217,10 +253,30 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *ho - kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_client; - kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_client; - kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_client; -+#ifdef GSSAPI -+ if (options.gss_keyex) { -+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_client; -+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_client; -+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_client; -+ } -+#endif - kex->client_version_string=client_version_string; - kex->server_version_string=server_version_string; - kex->verify_host_key=&verify_host_key_callback; - -+#ifdef GSSAPI -+ if (options.gss_keyex) { -+ kex->gss_deleg_creds = options.gss_deleg_creds; -+ kex->gss_trust_dns = options.gss_trust_dns; -+ kex->gss_client = options.gss_client_identity; -+ if (options.gss_server_identity) { -+ kex->gss_host = options.gss_server_identity; -+ } else { -+ kex->gss_host = gss_host; -+ } -+ } -+#endif -+ - xxx_kex = kex; - - dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &kex->done, kex); -@@ -315,6 +371,7 @@ void input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int3 - void input_gssapi_hash(int type, u_int32_t, void *); - void input_gssapi_error(int, u_int32_t, void *); - void input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, void *); -+int userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt); - #endif - - void userauth(Authctxt *, char *); -@@ -330,6 +387,11 @@ static char *authmethods_get(void); - - Authmethod authmethods[] = { - #ifdef GSSAPI -+ {"gssapi-keyex", -+ userauth_gsskeyex, -+ NULL, -+ &options.gss_authentication, -+ NULL}, - {"gssapi-with-mic", - userauth_gssapi, - NULL, -@@ -637,19 +699,31 @@ userauth_gssapi(Authctxt *authctxt) - static u_int mech = 0; - OM_uint32 min; - int ok = 0; -+ const char *gss_host; -+ -+ if (options.gss_server_identity) -+ gss_host = options.gss_server_identity; -+ else if (options.gss_trust_dns) -+ gss_host = get_canonical_hostname(1); -+ else -+ gss_host = authctxt->host; - - /* Try one GSSAPI method at a time, rather than sending them all at - * once. */ - - if (gss_supported == NULL) -- gss_indicate_mechs(&min, &gss_supported); -+ if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min, &gss_supported))) { -+ gss_supported = NULL; -+ return 0; -+ } - - /* Check to see if the mechanism is usable before we offer it */ - while (mech < gss_supported->count && !ok) { - /* My DER encoding requires length<128 */ - if (gss_supported->elements[mech].length < 128 && - ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(&gssctxt, -- &gss_supported->elements[mech], authctxt->host)) { -+ &gss_supported->elements[mech], gss_host, -+ options.gss_client_identity)) { - ok = 1; /* Mechanism works */ - } else { - mech++; -@@ -746,8 +820,8 @@ input_gssapi_response(int type, u_int32_ - { - Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt; - Gssctxt *gssctxt; -- int oidlen; -- char *oidv; -+ u_int oidlen; -+ u_char *oidv; - - if (authctxt == NULL) - fatal("input_gssapi_response: no authentication context"); -@@ -857,6 +931,48 @@ input_gssapi_error(int type, u_int32_t p - xfree(msg); - xfree(lang); - } -+ -+int -+userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt) -+{ -+ Buffer b; -+ gss_buffer_desc gssbuf; -+ gss_buffer_desc mic = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; -+ OM_uint32 ms; -+ -+ static int attempt = 0; -+ if (attempt++ >= 1) -+ return (0); -+ -+ if (gss_kex_context == NULL) { -+ debug("No valid Key exchange context"); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->server_user, authctxt->service, -+ "gssapi-keyex"); -+ -+ gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b); -+ gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b); -+ -+ if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_sign(gss_kex_context, &gssbuf, &mic))) { -+ buffer_free(&b); -+ return (0); -+ } -+ -+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST); -+ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user); -+ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service); -+ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name); -+ packet_put_string(mic.value, mic.length); -+ packet_send(); -+ -+ buffer_free(&b); -+ gss_release_buffer(&ms, &mic); -+ -+ return (1); -+} -+ - #endif /* GSSAPI */ - - int -diff -up openssh-5.9p1/sshd.c.gsskex openssh-5.9p1/sshd.c ---- openssh-5.9p1/sshd.c.gsskex 2012-02-06 17:38:19.160220812 +0100 -+++ openssh-5.9p1/sshd.c 2012-02-06 17:38:19.187965866 +0100 -@@ -124,6 +124,10 @@ - #include "ssh-sandbox.h" - #include "version.h" - -+#ifdef USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API -+#include -+#endif -+ - #ifdef LIBWRAP - #include - #include -@@ -1691,10 +1695,13 @@ main(int ac, char **av) - logit("Disabling protocol version 1. Could not load host key"); - options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_1; - } -+#ifndef GSSAPI -+ /* The GSSAPI key exchange can run without a host key */ - if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) && !sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key) { - logit("Disabling protocol version 2. Could not load host key"); - options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_2; - } -+#endif - if (!(options.protocol & (SSH_PROTO_1|SSH_PROTO_2))) { - logit("sshd: no hostkeys available -- exiting."); - exit(1); -@@ -2027,6 +2034,60 @@ main(int ac, char **av) - /* Log the connection. */ - verbose("Connection from %.500s port %d", remote_ip, remote_port); - -+#ifdef USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API -+ /* -+ * Create a new security session for use by the new user login if -+ * the current session is the root session or we are not launched -+ * by inetd (eg: debugging mode or server mode). We do not -+ * necessarily need to create a session if we are launched from -+ * inetd because Panther xinetd will create a session for us. -+ * -+ * The only case where this logic will fail is if there is an -+ * inetd running in a non-root session which is not creating -+ * new sessions for us. Then all the users will end up in the -+ * same session (bad). -+ * -+ * When the client exits, the session will be destroyed for us -+ * automatically. -+ * -+ * We must create the session before any credentials are stored -+ * (including AFS pags, which happens a few lines below). -+ */ -+ { -+ OSStatus err = 0; -+ SecuritySessionId sid = 0; -+ SessionAttributeBits sattrs = 0; -+ -+ err = SessionGetInfo(callerSecuritySession, &sid, &sattrs); -+ if (err) -+ error("SessionGetInfo() failed with error %.8X", -+ (unsigned) err); -+ else -+ debug("Current Session ID is %.8X / Session Attributes are %.8X", -+ (unsigned) sid, (unsigned) sattrs); -+ -+ if (inetd_flag && !(sattrs & sessionIsRoot)) -+ debug("Running in inetd mode in a non-root session... " -+ "assuming inetd created the session for us."); -+ else { -+ debug("Creating new security session..."); -+ err = SessionCreate(0, sessionHasTTY | sessionIsRemote); -+ if (err) -+ error("SessionCreate() failed with error %.8X", -+ (unsigned) err); -+ -+ err = SessionGetInfo(callerSecuritySession, &sid, -+ &sattrs); -+ if (err) -+ error("SessionGetInfo() failed with error %.8X", -+ (unsigned) err); -+ else -+ debug("New Session ID is %.8X / Session Attributes are %.8X", -+ (unsigned) sid, (unsigned) sattrs); -+ } -+ } -+#endif -+ - /* - * We don't want to listen forever unless the other side - * successfully authenticates itself. So we set up an alarm which is -@@ -2425,6 +2486,48 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void) - - myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = list_hostkey_types(); - -+#ifdef GSSAPI -+ { -+ char *orig; -+ char *gss = NULL; -+ char *newstr = NULL; -+ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]; -+ -+ /* -+ * If we don't have a host key, then there's no point advertising -+ * the other key exchange algorithms -+ */ -+ -+ if (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]) == 0) -+ orig = NULL; -+ -+ if (options.gss_keyex) -+ gss = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(); -+ else -+ gss = NULL; -+ -+ if (gss && orig) -+ xasprintf(&newstr, "%s,%s", gss, orig); -+ else if (gss) -+ newstr = gss; -+ else if (orig) -+ newstr = orig; -+ -+ /* -+ * If we've got GSSAPI mechanisms, then we've got the 'null' host -+ * key alg, but we can't tell people about it unless its the only -+ * host key algorithm we support -+ */ -+ if (gss && (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS])) == 0) -+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = "null"; -+ -+ if (newstr) -+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = newstr; -+ else -+ fatal("No supported key exchange algorithms"); -+ } -+#endif -+ - /* start key exchange */ - kex = kex_setup(myproposal); - kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_server; -@@ -2432,6 +2535,13 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void) - kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server; - kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server; - kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_server; -+#ifdef GSSAPI -+ if (options.gss_keyex) { -+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server; -+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_server; -+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_server; -+ } -+#endif - kex->server = 1; - kex->client_version_string=client_version_string; - kex->server_version_string=server_version_string; -diff -up openssh-5.9p1/sshd_config.gsskex openssh-5.9p1/sshd_config ---- openssh-5.9p1/sshd_config.gsskex 2012-02-06 17:38:19.160220812 +0100 -+++ openssh-5.9p1/sshd_config 2012-02-06 17:38:19.189998533 +0100 -@@ -83,6 +83,8 @@ ChallengeResponseAuthentication no - GSSAPIAuthentication yes - #GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes - GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes -+#GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck yes -+#GSSAPIKeyExchange no - - # Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing, - # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will -diff -up openssh-5.9p1/sshd_config.5.gsskex openssh-5.9p1/sshd_config.5 ---- openssh-5.9p1/sshd_config.5.gsskex 2012-02-06 17:38:19.154809764 +0100 -+++ openssh-5.9p1/sshd_config.5 2012-02-06 17:38:19.188982680 +0100 -@@ -424,12 +424,40 @@ Specifies whether user authentication ba - The default is - .Dq no . - Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only. -+.It Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange -+Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI is allowed. GSSAPI key exchange -+doesn't rely on ssh keys to verify host identity. -+The default is -+.Dq no . -+Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only. - .It Cm GSSAPICleanupCredentials - Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's credentials cache - on logout. - The default is - .Dq yes . - Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only. -+.It Cm GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck -+Determines whether to be strict about the identity of the GSSAPI acceptor -+a client authenticates against. If -+.Dq yes -+then the client must authenticate against the -+.Pa host -+service on the current hostname. If -+.Dq no -+then the client may authenticate against any service key stored in the -+machine's default store. This facility is provided to assist with operation -+on multi homed machines. -+The default is -+.Dq yes . -+Note that this option applies only to protocol version 2 GSSAPI connections, -+and setting it to -+.Dq no -+may only work with recent Kerberos GSSAPI libraries. -+.It Cm GSSAPIStoreCredentialsOnRekey -+Controls whether the user's GSSAPI credentials should be updated following a -+successful connection rekeying. This option can be used to accepted renewed -+or updated credentials from a compatible client. The default is -+.Dq no . - .It Cm HostbasedAuthentication - Specifies whether rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication together - with successful public key client host authentication is allowed -diff -up openssh-5.9p1/ssh-gss.h.gsskex openssh-5.9p1/ssh-gss.h ---- openssh-5.9p1/ssh-gss.h.gsskex 2007-06-12 15:40:39.000000000 +0200 -+++ openssh-5.9p1/ssh-gss.h 2012-02-06 17:38:19.184919538 +0100 -@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ - /* $OpenBSD: ssh-gss.h,v 1.10 2007/06/12 08:20:00 djm Exp $ */ - /* -- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. -+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions -@@ -60,10 +60,22 @@ - - #define SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE 0x06 - -+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT 30 -+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE 31 -+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE 32 -+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY 33 -+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR 34 -+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ 40 -+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP 41 -+#define KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID "gss-group1-sha1-" -+#define KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID "gss-group14-sha1-" -+#define KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID "gss-gex-sha1-" -+ - typedef struct { - char *filename; - char *envvar; - char *envval; -+ struct passwd *owner; - void *data; - } ssh_gssapi_ccache; - -@@ -71,8 +83,11 @@ typedef struct { - gss_buffer_desc displayname; - gss_buffer_desc exportedname; - gss_cred_id_t creds; -+ gss_name_t name; - struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct *mech; - ssh_gssapi_ccache store; -+ int used; -+ int updated; - } ssh_gssapi_client; - - typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct { -@@ -83,6 +98,7 @@ typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct { - int (*userok) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char *); - int (*localname) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char **); - void (*storecreds) (ssh_gssapi_client *); -+ int (*updatecreds) (ssh_gssapi_ccache *, ssh_gssapi_client *); - } ssh_gssapi_mech; - - typedef struct { -@@ -93,10 +109,11 @@ typedef struct { - gss_OID oid; /* client */ - gss_cred_id_t creds; /* server */ - gss_name_t client; /* server */ -- gss_cred_id_t client_creds; /* server */ -+ gss_cred_id_t client_creds; /* both */ - } Gssctxt; - - extern ssh_gssapi_mech *supported_mechs[]; -+extern Gssctxt *gss_kex_context; - - int ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t); - void ssh_gssapi_set_oid_data(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t); -@@ -116,16 +133,30 @@ void ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(Gssctxt **); - void ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(Gssctxt **); - OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t); - void ssh_gssapi_buildmic(Buffer *, const char *, const char *, const char *); --int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *); -+int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *, const char *); -+OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_client_identity(Gssctxt *, const char *); -+int ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(Gssctxt *); - - /* In the server */ -+typedef int ssh_gssapi_check_fn(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *, -+ const char *); -+char *ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *, const char *); -+char *ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *, const char *, -+ const char *); -+gss_OID ssh_gssapi_id_kex(Gssctxt *, char *, int); -+int ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt **,gss_OID, const char *, -+ const char *); - OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID); --int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name); -+int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name, struct passwd *); - OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t); - void ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***, u_int *); - void ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void); - void ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void); - -+char *ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(void); -+int ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok(); -+ -+int ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store); - #endif /* GSSAPI */ - - #endif /* _SSH_GSS_H */ diff --git a/openssh-6.0p1-gsskex.patch b/openssh-6.0p1-gsskex.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..be2aed2 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssh-6.0p1-gsskex.patch @@ -0,0 +1,3025 @@ +diff -up openssh-6.0p1/auth2.c.gsskex openssh-6.0p1/auth2.c +--- openssh-6.0p1/auth2.c.gsskex 2012-09-12 15:32:19.110689080 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.0p1/auth2.c 2012-09-12 15:32:28.309651601 +0200 +@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@ extern Authmethod method_passwd; + extern Authmethod method_kbdint; + extern Authmethod method_hostbased; + #ifdef GSSAPI ++extern Authmethod method_gsskeyex; + extern Authmethod method_gssapi; + #endif + #ifdef JPAKE +@@ -79,6 +80,7 @@ Authmethod *authmethods[] = { + &method_none, + &method_pubkey, + #ifdef GSSAPI ++ &method_gsskeyex, + &method_gssapi, + #endif + #ifdef JPAKE +diff -up openssh-6.0p1/auth2-gss.c.gsskex openssh-6.0p1/auth2-gss.c +--- openssh-6.0p1/auth2-gss.c.gsskex 2012-09-12 15:32:19.126689015 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.0p1/auth2-gss.c 2012-09-12 15:32:28.309651601 +0200 +@@ -52,6 +52,40 @@ static void input_gssapi_mic(int type, u + static void input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt); + static void input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, void *); + ++/* ++ * The 'gssapi_keyex' userauth mechanism. ++ */ ++static int ++userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt) ++{ ++ int authenticated = 0; ++ Buffer b; ++ gss_buffer_desc mic, gssbuf; ++ u_int len; ++ ++ mic.value = packet_get_string(&len); ++ mic.length = len; ++ ++ packet_check_eom(); ++ ++ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->user, authctxt->service, ++ "gssapi-keyex"); ++ ++ gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b); ++ gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b); ++ ++ /* gss_kex_context is NULL with privsep, so we can't check it here */ ++ if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gss_kex_context, ++ &gssbuf, &mic)))) ++ authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, ++ authctxt->pw)); ++ ++ buffer_free(&b); ++ xfree(mic.value); ++ ++ return (authenticated); ++} ++ + /* + * We only support those mechanisms that we know about (ie ones that we know + * how to check local user kuserok and the like) +@@ -244,7 +278,8 @@ input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, + + packet_check_eom(); + +- authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user)); ++ authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, ++ authctxt->pw)); + + authctxt->postponed = 0; + dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL); +@@ -286,7 +321,8 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple + gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b); + + if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gssctxt, &gssbuf, &mic)))) +- authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user)); ++ authenticated = ++ PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw)); + else + logit("GSSAPI MIC check failed"); + +@@ -303,6 +339,12 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple + userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, "gssapi-with-mic", NULL); + } + ++Authmethod method_gsskeyex = { ++ "gssapi-keyex", ++ userauth_gsskeyex, ++ &options.gss_authentication ++}; ++ + Authmethod method_gssapi = { + "gssapi-with-mic", + userauth_gssapi, +diff -up openssh-6.0p1/auth-krb5.c.gsskex openssh-6.0p1/auth-krb5.c +--- openssh-6.0p1/auth-krb5.c.gsskex 2012-09-12 15:32:19.118689046 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.0p1/auth-krb5.c 2012-09-12 16:03:22.216097657 +0200 +@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ + #include + #include + #include ++#include + #include + + extern ServerOptions options; +@@ -170,8 +171,13 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, c + + len = strlen(authctxt->krb5_ticket_file) + 6; + authctxt->krb5_ccname = xmalloc(len); +- snprintf(authctxt->krb5_ccname, len, "FILE:%s", ++#ifdef USE_CCAPI ++ snprintf(authctxt->krb5_ccname, len, "API:%s", + authctxt->krb5_ticket_file); ++#else ++ snprintf(authctxt->krb5_ccname, len, "DIR:%s", ++ authctxt->krb5_ticket_file); ++#endif + + #ifdef USE_PAM + if (options.use_pam) +@@ -208,10 +214,33 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, c + void + krb5_cleanup_proc(Authctxt *authctxt) + { ++ struct stat krb5_ccname_stat; ++ char krb5_ccname[128], *krb5_ccname_dir_end; ++ + debug("krb5_cleanup_proc called"); + if (authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache) { + krb5_cc_destroy(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache); + authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache = NULL; ++ ++ /* assume ticket cache type DIR - DIR::/tmp/krb5cc_876600005_T9eDKSQvzb/tkt */ ++ strncpy(krb5_ccname, authctxt->krb5_ccname + strlen("DIR::"), sizeof(krb5_ccname) - 10); ++ ++ krb5_ccname_dir_end = strrchr(krb5_ccname, '/'); ++ if (krb5_ccname_dir_end != NULL) { ++ strcpy(krb5_ccname_dir_end, "/primary"); ++ ++ if (stat(krb5_ccname, &krb5_ccname_stat) == 0) { ++ if (unlink(krb5_ccname) == 0) { ++ *krb5_ccname_dir_end = '\0'; ++ if (rmdir(krb5_ccname) == -1) ++ debug("cache dir '%s' remove failed: %s", krb5_ccname, strerror(errno)); ++ } ++ else ++ debug("cache primary file '%s', remove failed: %s", ++ krb5_ccname, strerror(errno) ++ ); ++ } ++ } + } + if (authctxt->krb5_user) { + krb5_free_principal(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user); +@@ -226,29 +255,35 @@ krb5_cleanup_proc(Authctxt *authctxt) + #ifndef HEIMDAL + krb5_error_code + ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache) { +- int tmpfd, ret; ++ int ret; + char ccname[40]; + mode_t old_umask; ++#ifdef USE_CCAPI ++ char cctemplate[] = "API:krb5cc_%d"; ++#else ++ char cctemplate[] = "DIR:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX"; ++ char *tmpdir; ++#endif + + ret = snprintf(ccname, sizeof(ccname), +- "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX", geteuid()); ++ cctemplate, geteuid()); + if (ret < 0 || (size_t)ret >= sizeof(ccname)) + return ENOMEM; + +- old_umask = umask(0177); +- tmpfd = mkstemp(ccname + strlen("FILE:")); ++#ifndef USE_CCAPI ++ old_umask = umask(0077); ++ tmpdir = mkdtemp(ccname + strlen("DIR:")); + umask(old_umask); +- if (tmpfd == -1) { +- logit("mkstemp(): %.100s", strerror(errno)); ++ if (tmpdir == NULL) { ++ logit("mkdtemp(): %.100s", strerror(errno)); + return errno; + } +- +- if (fchmod(tmpfd,S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR) == -1) { +- logit("fchmod(): %.100s", strerror(errno)); +- close(tmpfd); ++ if (chmod(tmpdir, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR | S_IXUSR) == -1) { ++ logit("chmod(): %.100s", strerror(errno)); + return errno; + } +- close(tmpfd); ++ ++#endif + + return (krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, ccname, ccache)); + } +diff -up openssh-6.0p1/ChangeLog.gssapi.gsskex openssh-6.0p1/ChangeLog.gssapi +--- openssh-6.0p1/ChangeLog.gssapi.gsskex 2012-09-12 15:32:19.106689094 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.0p1/ChangeLog.gssapi 2012-09-12 15:32:28.310651598 +0200 +@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@ ++20110101 ++ - Finally update for OpenSSH 5.6p1 ++ - Add GSSAPIServerIdentity option from Jim Basney ++ ++20100308 ++ - [ Makefile.in, key.c, key.h ] ++ Updates for OpenSSH 5.4p1 ++ - [ servconf.c ] ++ Include GSSAPI options in the sshd -T configuration dump, and flag ++ some older configuration options as being unsupported. Thanks to Colin ++ Watson. ++ - ++ ++20100124 ++ - [ sshconnect2.c ] ++ Adapt to deal with additional element in Authmethod structure. Thanks to ++ Colin Watson ++ ++20090615 ++ - [ gss-genr.c gss-serv.c kexgssc.c kexgsss.c monitor.c sshconnect2.c ++ sshd.c ] ++ Fix issues identified by Greg Hudson following a code review ++ Check return value of gss_indicate_mechs ++ Protect GSSAPI calls in monitor, so they can only be used if enabled ++ Check return values of bignum functions in key exchange ++ Use BN_clear_free to clear other side's DH value ++ Make ssh_gssapi_id_kex more robust ++ Only configure kex table pointers if GSSAPI is enabled ++ Don't leak mechanism list, or gss mechanism list ++ Cast data.length before printing ++ If serverkey isn't provided, use an empty string, rather than NULL ++ ++20090201 ++ - [ gss-genr.c gss-serv.c kex.h kexgssc.c readconf.c readconf.h ssh-gss.h ++ ssh_config.5 sshconnet2.c ] ++ Add support for the GSSAPIClientIdentity option, which allows the user ++ to specify which GSSAPI identity to use to contact a given server ++ ++20080404 ++ - [ gss-serv.c ] ++ Add code to actually implement GSSAPIStrictAcceptCheck, which had somehow ++ been omitted from a previous version of this patch. Reported by Borislav ++ Stoichkov ++ ++20070317 ++ - [ gss-serv-krb5.c ] ++ Remove C99ism, where new_ccname was being declared in the middle of a ++ function ++ ++20061220 ++ - [ servconf.c ] ++ Make default for GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck be Yes, to match previous, and ++ documented, behaviour. Reported by Dan Watson. ++ ++20060910 ++ - [ gss-genr.c kexgssc.c kexgsss.c kex.h monitor.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c ++ ssh-gss.h ] ++ add support for gss-group14-sha1 key exchange mechanisms ++ - [ gss-serv.c servconf.c servconf.h sshd_config sshd_config.5 ] ++ Add GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck option to allow the disabling of ++ acceptor principal checking on multi-homed machines. ++ ++ - [ sshd_config ssh_config ] ++ Add settings for GSSAPIKeyExchange and GSSAPITrustDNS to the sample ++ configuration files ++ - [ kexgss.c kegsss.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c ] ++ Code cleanup. Replace strlen/xmalloc/snprintf sequences with xasprintf() ++ Limit length of error messages displayed by client ++ ++20060909 ++ - [ gss-genr.c gss-serv.c ] ++ move ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred() and ssh_gssapi_server_ctx to be server ++ only, where they belong ++ ++ ++20060829 ++ - [ gss-serv-krb5.c ] ++ Fix CCAPI credentials cache name when creating KRB5CCNAME environment ++ variable ++ ++20060828 ++ - [ gss-genr.c ] ++ Avoid Heimdal context freeing problem ++ ++ ++20060818 ++ - [ gss-genr.c ssh-gss.h sshconnect2.c ] ++ Make sure that SPENGO is disabled ++ ++ ++20060421 ++ - [ gssgenr.c, sshconnect2.c ] ++ a few type changes (signed versus unsigned, int versus size_t) to ++ fix compiler errors/warnings ++ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu) ++ - [ kexgssc.c, sshconnect2.c ] ++ fix uninitialized variable warnings ++ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu) ++ - [ gssgenr.c ] ++ pass oid to gss_display_status (helpful when using GSSAPI mechglue) ++ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu) ++ ++ - [ gss-serv-krb5.c ] ++ #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_KRB5 should be #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_KRB5_H ++ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu) ++ ++ - [ readconf.c, readconf.h, ssh_config.5, sshconnect2.c ++ add client-side GssapiKeyExchange option ++ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu) ++ - [ sshconnect2.c ] ++ add support for GssapiTrustDns option for gssapi-with-mic ++ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu) ++ +diff -up openssh-6.0p1/clientloop.c.gsskex openssh-6.0p1/clientloop.c +--- openssh-6.0p1/clientloop.c.gsskex 2012-09-12 15:32:19.113689067 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.0p1/clientloop.c 2012-09-12 15:32:28.311651595 +0200 +@@ -111,6 +111,10 @@ + #include "msg.h" + #include "roaming.h" + ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++#include "ssh-gss.h" ++#endif ++ + /* import options */ + extern Options options; + +@@ -1540,6 +1544,15 @@ client_loop(int have_pty, int escape_cha + /* Do channel operations unless rekeying in progress. */ + if (!rekeying) { + channel_after_select(readset, writeset); ++ ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ if (options.gss_renewal_rekey && ++ ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)) { ++ debug("credentials updated - forcing rekey"); ++ need_rekeying = 1; ++ } ++#endif ++ + if (need_rekeying || packet_need_rekeying()) { + debug("need rekeying"); + xxx_kex->done = 0; +diff -up openssh-6.0p1/configure.ac.gsskex openssh-6.0p1/configure.ac +--- openssh-6.0p1/configure.ac.gsskex 2012-09-12 15:32:19.085689183 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.0p1/configure.ac 2012-09-12 15:32:28.312651591 +0200 +@@ -545,6 +545,30 @@ main() { if (NSVersionOfRunTimeLibrary(" + [Use tunnel device compatibility to OpenBSD]) + AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF], [1], + [Prepend the address family to IP tunnel traffic]) ++ AC_MSG_CHECKING(if we have the Security Authorization Session API) ++ AC_TRY_COMPILE([#include ], ++ [SessionCreate(0, 0);], ++ [ac_cv_use_security_session_api="yes" ++ AC_DEFINE(USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API, 1, ++ [platform has the Security Authorization Session API]) ++ LIBS="$LIBS -framework Security" ++ AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)], ++ [ac_cv_use_security_session_api="no" ++ AC_MSG_RESULT(no)]) ++ AC_MSG_CHECKING(if we have an in-memory credentials cache) ++ AC_TRY_COMPILE( ++ [#include ], ++ [cc_context_t c; ++ (void) cc_initialize (&c, 0, NULL, NULL);], ++ [AC_DEFINE(USE_CCAPI, 1, ++ [platform uses an in-memory credentials cache]) ++ LIBS="$LIBS -framework Security" ++ AC_MSG_RESULT(yes) ++ if test "x$ac_cv_use_security_session_api" = "xno"; then ++ AC_MSG_ERROR(*** Need a security framework to use the credentials cache API ***) ++ fi], ++ [AC_MSG_RESULT(no)] ++ ) + m4_pattern_allow([AU_IPv]) + AC_CHECK_DECL([AU_IPv4], [], + AC_DEFINE([AU_IPv4], [0], [System only supports IPv4 audit records]) +diff -up openssh-6.0p1/gss-genr.c.gsskex openssh-6.0p1/gss-genr.c +--- openssh-6.0p1/gss-genr.c.gsskex 2012-09-12 15:32:19.097689132 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.0p1/gss-genr.c 2012-09-12 15:32:28.313651587 +0200 +@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ + /* $OpenBSD: gss-genr.c,v 1.20 2009/06/22 05:39:28 dtucker Exp $ */ + + /* +- * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. ++ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +@@ -39,12 +39,167 @@ + #include "buffer.h" + #include "log.h" + #include "ssh2.h" ++#include "cipher.h" ++#include "key.h" ++#include "kex.h" ++#include + + #include "ssh-gss.h" + + extern u_char *session_id2; + extern u_int session_id2_len; + ++typedef struct { ++ char *encoded; ++ gss_OID oid; ++} ssh_gss_kex_mapping; ++ ++/* ++ * XXX - It would be nice to find a more elegant way of handling the ++ * XXX passing of the key exchange context to the userauth routines ++ */ ++ ++Gssctxt *gss_kex_context = NULL; ++ ++static ssh_gss_kex_mapping *gss_enc2oid = NULL; ++ ++int ++ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok() { ++ return (gss_enc2oid != NULL); ++} ++ ++/* ++ * Return a list of the gss-group1-sha1 mechanisms supported by this program ++ * ++ * We test mechanisms to ensure that we can use them, to avoid starting ++ * a key exchange with a bad mechanism ++ */ ++ ++char * ++ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *host, const char *client) { ++ gss_OID_set gss_supported; ++ OM_uint32 min_status; ++ ++ if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &gss_supported))) ++ return NULL; ++ ++ return(ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_supported, ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism, ++ host, client)); ++} ++ ++char * ++ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set gss_supported, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *check, ++ const char *host, const char *client) { ++ Buffer buf; ++ size_t i; ++ int oidpos, enclen; ++ char *mechs, *encoded; ++ u_char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; ++ char deroid[2]; ++ const EVP_MD *evp_md = EVP_md5(); ++ EVP_MD_CTX md; ++ ++ if (gss_enc2oid != NULL) { ++ for (i = 0; gss_enc2oid[i].encoded != NULL; i++) ++ xfree(gss_enc2oid[i].encoded); ++ xfree(gss_enc2oid); ++ } ++ ++ gss_enc2oid = xmalloc(sizeof(ssh_gss_kex_mapping) * ++ (gss_supported->count + 1)); ++ ++ buffer_init(&buf); ++ ++ oidpos = 0; ++ for (i = 0; i < gss_supported->count; i++) { ++ if (gss_supported->elements[i].length < 128 && ++ (*check)(NULL, &(gss_supported->elements[i]), host, client)) { ++ ++ deroid[0] = SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE; ++ deroid[1] = gss_supported->elements[i].length; ++ ++ EVP_DigestInit(&md, evp_md); ++ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, deroid, 2); ++ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, ++ gss_supported->elements[i].elements, ++ gss_supported->elements[i].length); ++ EVP_DigestFinal(&md, digest, NULL); ++ ++ encoded = xmalloc(EVP_MD_size(evp_md) * 2); ++ enclen = __b64_ntop(digest, EVP_MD_size(evp_md), ++ encoded, EVP_MD_size(evp_md) * 2); ++ ++ if (oidpos != 0) ++ buffer_put_char(&buf, ','); ++ ++ buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID, ++ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID) - 1); ++ buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen); ++ buffer_put_char(&buf, ','); ++ buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID, ++ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID) - 1); ++ buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen); ++ buffer_put_char(&buf, ','); ++ buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID, ++ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID) - 1); ++ buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen); ++ ++ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].oid = &(gss_supported->elements[i]); ++ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].encoded = encoded; ++ oidpos++; ++ } ++ } ++ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].oid = NULL; ++ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].encoded = NULL; ++ ++ buffer_put_char(&buf, '\0'); ++ ++ mechs = xmalloc(buffer_len(&buf)); ++ buffer_get(&buf, mechs, buffer_len(&buf)); ++ buffer_free(&buf); ++ ++ if (strlen(mechs) == 0) { ++ xfree(mechs); ++ mechs = NULL; ++ } ++ ++ return (mechs); ++} ++ ++gss_OID ++ssh_gssapi_id_kex(Gssctxt *ctx, char *name, int kex_type) { ++ int i = 0; ++ ++ switch (kex_type) { ++ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1: ++ if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID)) ++ return GSS_C_NO_OID; ++ name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID) - 1; ++ break; ++ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1: ++ if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID)) ++ return GSS_C_NO_OID; ++ name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID) - 1; ++ break; ++ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1: ++ if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID)) ++ return GSS_C_NO_OID; ++ name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID) - 1; ++ break; ++ default: ++ return GSS_C_NO_OID; ++ } ++ ++ while (gss_enc2oid[i].encoded != NULL && ++ strcmp(name, gss_enc2oid[i].encoded) != 0) ++ i++; ++ ++ if (gss_enc2oid[i].oid != NULL && ctx != NULL) ++ ssh_gssapi_set_oid(ctx, gss_enc2oid[i].oid); ++ ++ return gss_enc2oid[i].oid; ++} ++ + /* Check that the OID in a data stream matches that in the context */ + int + ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *ctx, void *data, size_t len) +@@ -197,7 +352,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(Gssctxt *ctx, int de + } + + ctx->major = gss_init_sec_context(&ctx->minor, +- GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, &ctx->context, ctx->name, ctx->oid, ++ ctx->client_creds, &ctx->context, ctx->name, ctx->oid, + GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG | GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG | deleg_flag, + 0, NULL, recv_tok, NULL, send_tok, flags, NULL); + +@@ -227,8 +382,42 @@ ssh_gssapi_import_name(Gssctxt *ctx, con + } + + OM_uint32 ++ssh_gssapi_client_identity(Gssctxt *ctx, const char *name) ++{ ++ gss_buffer_desc gssbuf; ++ gss_name_t gssname; ++ OM_uint32 status; ++ gss_OID_set oidset; ++ ++ gssbuf.value = (void *) name; ++ gssbuf.length = strlen(gssbuf.value); ++ ++ gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset); ++ gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset); ++ ++ ctx->major = gss_import_name(&ctx->minor, &gssbuf, ++ GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME, &gssname); ++ ++ if (!ctx->major) ++ ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor, ++ gssname, 0, oidset, GSS_C_INITIATE, ++ &ctx->client_creds, NULL, NULL); ++ ++ gss_release_name(&status, &gssname); ++ gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset); ++ ++ if (ctx->major) ++ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); ++ ++ return(ctx->major); ++} ++ ++OM_uint32 + ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t buffer, gss_buffer_t hash) + { ++ if (ctx == NULL) ++ return -1; ++ + if ((ctx->major = gss_get_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context, + GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, buffer, hash))) + ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); +@@ -236,6 +425,19 @@ ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer + return (ctx->major); + } + ++/* Priviledged when used by server */ ++OM_uint32 ++ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic) ++{ ++ if (ctx == NULL) ++ return -1; ++ ++ ctx->major = gss_verify_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context, ++ gssbuf, gssmic, NULL); ++ ++ return (ctx->major); ++} ++ + void + ssh_gssapi_buildmic(Buffer *b, const char *user, const char *service, + const char *context) +@@ -249,11 +451,16 @@ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(Buffer *b, const cha + } + + int +-ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host) ++ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host, ++ const char *client) + { + gss_buffer_desc token = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; + OM_uint32 major, minor; + gss_OID_desc spnego_oid = {6, (void *)"\x2B\x06\x01\x05\x05\x02"}; ++ Gssctxt *intctx = NULL; ++ ++ if (ctx == NULL) ++ ctx = &intctx; + + /* RFC 4462 says we MUST NOT do SPNEGO */ + if (oid->length == spnego_oid.length && +@@ -263,6 +470,10 @@ ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx + ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(ctx); + ssh_gssapi_set_oid(*ctx, oid); + major = ssh_gssapi_import_name(*ctx, host); ++ ++ if (!GSS_ERROR(major) && client) ++ major = ssh_gssapi_client_identity(*ctx, client); ++ + if (!GSS_ERROR(major)) { + major = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(*ctx, 0, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER, &token, + NULL); +@@ -272,10 +483,67 @@ ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx + GSS_C_NO_BUFFER); + } + +- if (GSS_ERROR(major)) ++ if (GSS_ERROR(major) || intctx != NULL) + ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(ctx); + + return (!GSS_ERROR(major)); + } + ++int ++ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(Gssctxt *ctxt) { ++ static gss_name_t saved_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME; ++ static OM_uint32 saved_lifetime = 0; ++ static gss_OID saved_mech = GSS_C_NO_OID; ++ static gss_name_t name; ++ static OM_uint32 last_call = 0; ++ OM_uint32 lifetime, now, major, minor; ++ int equal; ++ gss_cred_usage_t usage = GSS_C_INITIATE; ++ ++ now = time(NULL); ++ ++ if (ctxt) { ++ debug("Rekey has happened - updating saved versions"); ++ ++ if (saved_name != GSS_C_NO_NAME) ++ gss_release_name(&minor, &saved_name); ++ ++ major = gss_inquire_cred(&minor, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, ++ &saved_name, &saved_lifetime, NULL, NULL); ++ ++ if (!GSS_ERROR(major)) { ++ saved_mech = ctxt->oid; ++ saved_lifetime+= now; ++ } else { ++ /* Handle the error */ ++ } ++ return 0; ++ } ++ ++ if (now - last_call < 10) ++ return 0; ++ ++ last_call = now; ++ ++ if (saved_mech == GSS_C_NO_OID) ++ return 0; ++ ++ major = gss_inquire_cred(&minor, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, ++ &name, &lifetime, NULL, NULL); ++ if (major == GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED) ++ return 0; ++ else if (GSS_ERROR(major)) ++ return 0; ++ ++ major = gss_compare_name(&minor, saved_name, name, &equal); ++ gss_release_name(&minor, &name); ++ if (GSS_ERROR(major)) ++ return 0; ++ ++ if (equal && (saved_lifetime < lifetime + now - 10)) ++ return 1; ++ ++ return 0; ++} ++ + #endif /* GSSAPI */ +diff -up openssh-6.0p1/gss-serv.c.gsskex openssh-6.0p1/gss-serv.c +--- openssh-6.0p1/gss-serv.c.gsskex 2012-09-12 15:32:19.123689027 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.0p1/gss-serv.c 2012-09-12 15:53:27.719520213 +0200 +@@ -45,15 +45,20 @@ + #include "channels.h" + #include "session.h" + #include "misc.h" ++#include "servconf.h" ++#include "uidswap.h" + + #include "ssh-gss.h" ++#include "monitor_wrap.h" ++ ++extern ServerOptions options; + + static ssh_gssapi_client gssapi_client = + { GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, +- GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL}}; ++ GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, GSS_C_NO_NAME, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL}, 0, 0}; + + ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_null_mech = +- { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}; ++ { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}; + + #ifdef KRB5 + extern ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech; +@@ -81,25 +86,32 @@ ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred(Gssctxt *ctx) + char lname[MAXHOSTNAMELEN]; + gss_OID_set oidset; + +- gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset); +- gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset); ++ if (options.gss_strict_acceptor) { ++ gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset); ++ gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset); ++ ++ if (gethostname(lname, MAXHOSTNAMELEN)) { ++ gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset); ++ return (-1); ++ } + +- if (gethostname(lname, MAXHOSTNAMELEN)) { +- gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset); +- return (-1); +- } ++ if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctx, lname))) { ++ gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset); ++ return (ctx->major); ++ } ++ ++ if ((ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor, ++ ctx->name, 0, oidset, GSS_C_ACCEPT, &ctx->creds, ++ NULL, NULL))) ++ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); + +- if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctx, lname))) { + gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset); + return (ctx->major); ++ } else { ++ ctx->name = GSS_C_NO_NAME; ++ ctx->creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL; + } +- +- if ((ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor, +- ctx->name, 0, oidset, GSS_C_ACCEPT, &ctx->creds, NULL, NULL))) +- ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); +- +- gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset); +- return (ctx->major); ++ return GSS_S_COMPLETE; + } + + /* Privileged */ +@@ -114,6 +126,29 @@ ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx, gss + } + + /* Unprivileged */ ++char * ++ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms() { ++ gss_OID_set supported; ++ ++ ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(&supported); ++ return (ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(supported, &ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech, ++ NULL, NULL)); ++} ++ ++/* Unprivileged */ ++int ++ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt **dum, gss_OID oid, const char *data, ++ const char *dummy) { ++ Gssctxt *ctx = NULL; ++ int res; ++ ++ res = !GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctx, oid))); ++ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctx); ++ ++ return (res); ++} ++ ++/* Unprivileged */ + void + ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *oidset) + { +@@ -123,7 +158,9 @@ ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *o + gss_OID_set supported; + + gss_create_empty_oid_set(&min_status, oidset); +- gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &supported); ++ ++ if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &supported))) ++ return; + + while (supported_mechs[i]->name != NULL) { + if (GSS_ERROR(gss_test_oid_set_member(&min_status, +@@ -249,8 +286,48 @@ OM_uint32 + ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client) + { + int i = 0; ++ int equal = 0; ++ gss_name_t new_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME; ++ gss_buffer_desc ename = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; ++ ++ if (options.gss_store_rekey && client->used && ctx->client_creds) { ++ if (client->mech->oid.length != ctx->oid->length || ++ (memcmp(client->mech->oid.elements, ++ ctx->oid->elements, ctx->oid->length) !=0)) { ++ debug("Rekeyed credentials have different mechanism"); ++ return GSS_S_COMPLETE; ++ } ++ ++ if ((ctx->major = gss_inquire_cred_by_mech(&ctx->minor, ++ ctx->client_creds, ctx->oid, &new_name, ++ NULL, NULL, NULL))) { ++ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); ++ return (ctx->major); ++ } + +- gss_buffer_desc ename; ++ ctx->major = gss_compare_name(&ctx->minor, client->name, ++ new_name, &equal); ++ ++ if (GSS_ERROR(ctx->major)) { ++ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); ++ return (ctx->major); ++ } ++ ++ if (!equal) { ++ debug("Rekeyed credentials have different name"); ++ return GSS_S_COMPLETE; ++ } ++ ++ debug("Marking rekeyed credentials for export"); ++ ++ gss_release_name(&ctx->minor, &client->name); ++ gss_release_cred(&ctx->minor, &client->creds); ++ client->name = new_name; ++ client->creds = ctx->client_creds; ++ ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL; ++ client->updated = 1; ++ return GSS_S_COMPLETE; ++ } + + client->mech = NULL; + +@@ -265,6 +342,13 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_g + if (client->mech == NULL) + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + ++ if (ctx->client_creds && ++ (ctx->major = gss_inquire_cred_by_mech(&ctx->minor, ++ ctx->client_creds, ctx->oid, &client->name, NULL, NULL, NULL))) { ++ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); ++ return (ctx->major); ++ } ++ + if ((ctx->major = gss_display_name(&ctx->minor, ctx->client, + &client->displayname, NULL))) { + ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); +@@ -282,6 +366,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_g + return (ctx->major); + } + ++ gss_release_buffer(&ctx->minor, &ename); ++ + /* We can't copy this structure, so we just move the pointer to it */ + client->creds = ctx->client_creds; + ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL; +@@ -292,11 +378,33 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_g + void + ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void) + { ++ struct stat krb5_ccname_stat; ++ char krb5_ccname[128], *krb5_ccname_dir_end; ++ + if (gssapi_client.store.filename != NULL) { + /* Unlink probably isn't sufficient */ + debug("removing gssapi cred file\"%s\"", + gssapi_client.store.filename); + unlink(gssapi_client.store.filename); ++ ++ /* Ticket cache: DIR::/tmp/krb5cc_876600005_T9eDKSQvzb/tkt */ ++ /* same code as in auth-krb5.c:krb5_cleanup_proc */ ++ strncpy(krb5_ccname, gssapi_client.store.filename, sizeof(krb5_ccname) - 10); ++ krb5_ccname_dir_end = strrchr(krb5_ccname, '/'); ++ if (krb5_ccname_dir_end != NULL) ++ strcpy(krb5_ccname_dir_end, "/primary"); ++ ++ if (stat(krb5_ccname, &krb5_ccname_stat) == 0) { ++ if (unlink(krb5_ccname) == 0) { ++ *krb5_ccname_dir_end = '\0'; ++ if (rmdir(krb5_ccname) == -1) ++ debug("cache dir '%s' remove failed: %s", krb5_ccname, strerror(errno)); ++ } ++ else ++ debug("cache primary file '%s', remove failed: %s", ++ krb5_ccname, strerror(errno) ++ ); ++ } + } + } + +@@ -329,7 +437,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***envp, u_int + + /* Privileged */ + int +-ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user) ++ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw) + { + OM_uint32 lmin; + +@@ -339,9 +447,11 @@ ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user) + return 0; + } + if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->userok) +- if ((*gssapi_client.mech->userok)(&gssapi_client, user)) ++ if ((*gssapi_client.mech->userok)(&gssapi_client, user)) { ++ gssapi_client.used = 1; ++ gssapi_client.store.owner = pw; + return 1; +- else { ++ } else { + /* Destroy delegated credentials if userok fails */ + gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.displayname); + gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.exportedname); +@@ -354,14 +464,90 @@ ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user) + return (0); + } + +-/* Privileged */ +-OM_uint32 +-ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic) ++/* These bits are only used for rekeying. The unpriviledged child is running ++ * as the user, the monitor is root. ++ * ++ * In the child, we want to : ++ * *) Ask the monitor to store our credentials into the store we specify ++ * *) If it succeeds, maybe do a PAM update ++ */ ++ ++/* Stuff for PAM */ ++ ++#ifdef USE_PAM ++static int ssh_gssapi_simple_conv(int n, const struct pam_message **msg, ++ struct pam_response **resp, void *data) + { +- ctx->major = gss_verify_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context, +- gssbuf, gssmic, NULL); ++ return (PAM_CONV_ERR); ++} ++#endif + +- return (ctx->major); ++void ++ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds() { ++ int ok; ++ int ret; ++#ifdef USE_PAM ++ pam_handle_t *pamh = NULL; ++ struct pam_conv pamconv = {ssh_gssapi_simple_conv, NULL}; ++ char *envstr; ++#endif ++ ++ if (gssapi_client.store.filename == NULL && ++ gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL && ++ gssapi_client.store.envvar == NULL) ++ return; ++ ++ ok = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&gssapi_client.store)); ++ ++ if (!ok) ++ return; ++ ++ debug("Rekeyed credentials stored successfully"); ++ ++ /* Actually managing to play with the ssh pam stack from here will ++ * be next to impossible. In any case, we may want different options ++ * for rekeying. So, use our own :) ++ */ ++#ifdef USE_PAM ++ if (!use_privsep) { ++ debug("Not even going to try and do PAM with privsep disabled"); ++ return; ++ } ++ ++ ret = pam_start("sshd-rekey", gssapi_client.store.owner->pw_name, ++ &pamconv, &pamh); ++ if (ret) ++ return; ++ ++ xasprintf(&envstr, "%s=%s", gssapi_client.store.envvar, ++ gssapi_client.store.envval); ++ ++ ret = pam_putenv(pamh, envstr); ++ if (!ret) ++ pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_REINITIALIZE_CRED); ++ pam_end(pamh, PAM_SUCCESS); ++#endif ++} ++ ++int ++ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store) { ++ int ok = 0; ++ ++ /* Check we've got credentials to store */ ++ if (!gssapi_client.updated) ++ return 0; ++ ++ gssapi_client.updated = 0; ++ ++ temporarily_use_uid(gssapi_client.store.owner); ++ if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->updatecreds) ++ ok = (*gssapi_client.mech->updatecreds)(store, &gssapi_client); ++ else ++ debug("No update function for this mechanism"); ++ ++ restore_uid(); ++ ++ return ok; + } + + #endif +diff -up openssh-6.0p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.gsskex openssh-6.0p1/gss-serv-krb5.c +--- openssh-6.0p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.gsskex 2012-09-12 15:32:19.115689059 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.0p1/gss-serv-krb5.c 2012-09-12 16:36:15.768054426 +0200 +@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ + /* $OpenBSD: gss-serv-krb5.c,v 1.7 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */ + + /* +- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. ++ * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +@@ -120,6 +120,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl + krb5_principal princ; + OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status; + int len; ++ const char *new_ccname; + + if (client->creds == NULL) { + debug("No credentials stored"); +@@ -168,11 +169,18 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl + return; + } + +- client->store.filename = xstrdup(krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache)); ++ new_ccname = krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache); ++ + client->store.envvar = "KRB5CCNAME"; +- len = strlen(client->store.filename) + 6; +- client->store.envval = xmalloc(len); +- snprintf(client->store.envval, len, "FILE:%s", client->store.filename); ++#ifdef USE_CCAPI ++ xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "API:%s", new_ccname); ++ client->store.filename = NULL; ++#else ++ xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "DIR:%s", new_ccname); ++ if (new_ccname[0] == ':') ++ new_ccname++; ++ client->store.filename = xstrdup(new_ccname); ++#endif + + #ifdef USE_PAM + if (options.use_pam) +@@ -184,6 +192,71 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl + return; + } + ++int ++ssh_gssapi_krb5_updatecreds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store, ++ ssh_gssapi_client *client) ++{ ++ krb5_ccache ccache = NULL; ++ krb5_principal principal = NULL; ++ char *name = NULL; ++ krb5_error_code problem; ++ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status; ++ ++ if ((problem = krb5_cc_resolve(krb_context, store->envval, &ccache))) { ++ logit("krb5_cc_resolve(): %.100s", ++ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem)); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ ++ /* Find out who the principal in this cache is */ ++ if ((problem = krb5_cc_get_principal(krb_context, ccache, ++ &principal))) { ++ logit("krb5_cc_get_principal(): %.100s", ++ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem)); ++ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ ++ if ((problem = krb5_unparse_name(krb_context, principal, &name))) { ++ logit("krb5_unparse_name(): %.100s", ++ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem)); ++ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal); ++ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ ++ ++ if (strcmp(name,client->exportedname.value)!=0) { ++ debug("Name in local credentials cache differs. Not storing"); ++ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal); ++ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache); ++ krb5_free_unparsed_name(krb_context, name); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ krb5_free_unparsed_name(krb_context, name); ++ ++ /* Name matches, so lets get on with it! */ ++ ++ if ((problem = krb5_cc_initialize(krb_context, ccache, principal))) { ++ logit("krb5_cc_initialize(): %.100s", ++ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem)); ++ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal); ++ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ ++ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal); ++ ++ if ((maj_status = gss_krb5_copy_ccache(&min_status, client->creds, ++ ccache))) { ++ logit("gss_krb5_copy_ccache() failed. Sorry!"); ++ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ ++ return 1; ++} ++ + ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech = { + "toWM5Slw5Ew8Mqkay+al2g==", + "Kerberos", +@@ -191,7 +264,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech = { + NULL, + &ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok, + NULL, +- &ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds ++ &ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds, ++ &ssh_gssapi_krb5_updatecreds + }; + + #endif /* KRB5 */ +diff -up openssh-6.0p1/kex.c.gsskex openssh-6.0p1/kex.c +--- openssh-6.0p1/kex.c.gsskex 2012-09-12 15:32:19.096689136 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.0p1/kex.c 2012-09-12 15:32:28.315651579 +0200 +@@ -51,6 +51,10 @@ + #include "roaming.h" + #include "audit.h" + ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++#include "ssh-gss.h" ++#endif ++ + #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L + # if defined(HAVE_EVP_SHA256) + # define evp_ssh_sha256 EVP_sha256 +@@ -371,6 +375,20 @@ choose_kex(Kex *k, char *client, char *s + k->kex_type = KEX_ECDH_SHA2; + k->evp_md = kex_ecdh_name_to_evpmd(k->name); + #endif ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ } else if (strncmp(k->name, KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID, ++ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID) - 1) == 0) { ++ k->kex_type = KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1; ++ k->evp_md = EVP_sha1(); ++ } else if (strncmp(k->name, KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID, ++ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID) - 1) == 0) { ++ k->kex_type = KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1; ++ k->evp_md = EVP_sha1(); ++ } else if (strncmp(k->name, KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID, ++ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID) - 1) == 0) { ++ k->kex_type = KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1; ++ k->evp_md = EVP_sha1(); ++#endif + } else + fatal("bad kex alg %s", k->name); + } +diff -up openssh-6.0p1/kexgssc.c.gsskex openssh-6.0p1/kexgssc.c +--- openssh-6.0p1/kexgssc.c.gsskex 2012-09-12 15:32:19.105689098 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.0p1/kexgssc.c 2012-09-12 15:32:28.315651579 +0200 +@@ -0,0 +1,334 @@ ++/* ++ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. ++ * ++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without ++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions ++ * are met: ++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright ++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. ++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright ++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the ++ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. ++ * ++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR ++ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES ++ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. ++ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, ++ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT ++ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, ++ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY ++ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT ++ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF ++ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. ++ */ ++ ++#include "includes.h" ++ ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ ++#include "includes.h" ++ ++#include ++#include ++ ++#include ++ ++#include "xmalloc.h" ++#include "buffer.h" ++#include "ssh2.h" ++#include "key.h" ++#include "cipher.h" ++#include "kex.h" ++#include "log.h" ++#include "packet.h" ++#include "dh.h" ++ ++#include "ssh-gss.h" ++ ++void ++kexgss_client(Kex *kex) { ++ gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; ++ gss_buffer_desc recv_tok, gssbuf, msg_tok, *token_ptr; ++ Gssctxt *ctxt; ++ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status, ret_flags; ++ u_int klen, kout, slen = 0, hashlen, strlen; ++ DH *dh; ++ BIGNUM *dh_server_pub = NULL; ++ BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL; ++ BIGNUM *p = NULL; ++ BIGNUM *g = NULL; ++ u_char *kbuf, *hash; ++ u_char *serverhostkey = NULL; ++ u_char *empty = ""; ++ char *msg; ++ char *lang; ++ int type = 0; ++ int first = 1; ++ int nbits = 0, min = DH_GRP_MIN, max = DH_GRP_MAX; ++ ++ /* Initialise our GSSAPI world */ ++ ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(&ctxt); ++ if (ssh_gssapi_id_kex(ctxt, kex->name, kex->kex_type) ++ == GSS_C_NO_OID) ++ fatal("Couldn't identify host exchange"); ++ ++ if (ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctxt, kex->gss_host)) ++ fatal("Couldn't import hostname"); ++ ++ if (kex->gss_client && ++ ssh_gssapi_client_identity(ctxt, kex->gss_client)) ++ fatal("Couldn't acquire client credentials"); ++ ++ switch (kex->kex_type) { ++ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1: ++ dh = dh_new_group1(); ++ break; ++ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1: ++ dh = dh_new_group14(); ++ break; ++ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1: ++ debug("Doing group exchange\n"); ++ nbits = dh_estimate(kex->we_need * 8); ++ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ); ++ packet_put_int(min); ++ packet_put_int(nbits); ++ packet_put_int(max); ++ ++ packet_send(); ++ ++ packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP); ++ ++ if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL) ++ fatal("BN_new() failed"); ++ packet_get_bignum2(p); ++ if ((g = BN_new()) == NULL) ++ fatal("BN_new() failed"); ++ packet_get_bignum2(g); ++ packet_check_eom(); ++ ++ if (BN_num_bits(p) < min || BN_num_bits(p) > max) ++ fatal("GSSGRP_GEX group out of range: %d !< %d !< %d", ++ min, BN_num_bits(p), max); ++ ++ dh = dh_new_group(g, p); ++ break; ++ default: ++ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type); ++ } ++ ++ /* Step 1 - e is dh->pub_key */ ++ dh_gen_key(dh, kex->we_need * 8); ++ ++ /* This is f, we initialise it now to make life easier */ ++ dh_server_pub = BN_new(); ++ if (dh_server_pub == NULL) ++ fatal("dh_server_pub == NULL"); ++ ++ token_ptr = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER; ++ ++ do { ++ debug("Calling gss_init_sec_context"); ++ ++ maj_status = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(ctxt, ++ kex->gss_deleg_creds, token_ptr, &send_tok, ++ &ret_flags); ++ ++ if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) { ++ if (send_tok.length != 0) { ++ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE); ++ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, ++ send_tok.length); ++ } ++ fatal("gss_init_context failed"); ++ } ++ ++ /* If we've got an old receive buffer get rid of it */ ++ if (token_ptr != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER) ++ xfree(recv_tok.value); ++ ++ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) { ++ /* If mutual state flag is not true, kex fails */ ++ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG)) ++ fatal("Mutual authentication failed"); ++ ++ /* If integ avail flag is not true kex fails */ ++ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG)) ++ fatal("Integrity check failed"); ++ } ++ ++ /* ++ * If we have data to send, then the last message that we ++ * received cannot have been a 'complete'. ++ */ ++ if (send_tok.length != 0) { ++ if (first) { ++ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT); ++ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, ++ send_tok.length); ++ packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key); ++ first = 0; ++ } else { ++ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE); ++ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, ++ send_tok.length); ++ } ++ packet_send(); ++ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok); ++ ++ /* If we've sent them data, they should reply */ ++ do { ++ type = packet_read(); ++ if (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY) { ++ debug("Received KEXGSS_HOSTKEY"); ++ if (serverhostkey) ++ fatal("Server host key received more than once"); ++ serverhostkey = ++ packet_get_string(&slen); ++ } ++ } while (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY); ++ ++ switch (type) { ++ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE: ++ debug("Received GSSAPI_CONTINUE"); ++ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) ++ fatal("GSSAPI Continue received from server when complete"); ++ recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&strlen); ++ recv_tok.length = strlen; ++ break; ++ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE: ++ debug("Received GSSAPI_COMPLETE"); ++ packet_get_bignum2(dh_server_pub); ++ msg_tok.value = packet_get_string(&strlen); ++ msg_tok.length = strlen; ++ ++ /* Is there a token included? */ ++ if (packet_get_char()) { ++ recv_tok.value= ++ packet_get_string(&strlen); ++ recv_tok.length = strlen; ++ /* If we're already complete - protocol error */ ++ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) ++ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: received token when complete"); ++ } else { ++ /* No token included */ ++ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE) ++ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: did not receive final token"); ++ } ++ break; ++ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR: ++ debug("Received Error"); ++ maj_status = packet_get_int(); ++ min_status = packet_get_int(); ++ msg = packet_get_string(NULL); ++ lang = packet_get_string(NULL); ++ fatal("GSSAPI Error: \n%.400s",msg); ++ default: ++ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d", ++ type); ++ } ++ token_ptr = &recv_tok; ++ } else { ++ /* No data, and not complete */ ++ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE) ++ fatal("Not complete, and no token output"); ++ } ++ } while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED); ++ ++ /* ++ * We _must_ have received a COMPLETE message in reply from the ++ * server, which will have set dh_server_pub and msg_tok ++ */ ++ ++ if (type != SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE) ++ fatal("Didn't receive a SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE when I expected it"); ++ ++ /* Check f in range [1, p-1] */ ++ if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh_server_pub)) ++ packet_disconnect("bad server public DH value"); ++ ++ /* compute K=f^x mod p */ ++ klen = DH_size(dh); ++ kbuf = xmalloc(klen); ++ kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_server_pub, dh); ++ if ((int)kout < 0) ++ fatal("DH_compute_key: failed"); ++ ++ shared_secret = BN_new(); ++ if (shared_secret == NULL) ++ fatal("kexgss_client: BN_new failed"); ++ ++ if (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL) ++ fatal("kexdh_client: BN_bin2bn failed"); ++ ++ memset(kbuf, 0, klen); ++ xfree(kbuf); ++ ++ switch (kex->kex_type) { ++ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1: ++ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1: ++ kex_dh_hash( kex->client_version_string, ++ kex->server_version_string, ++ buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my), ++ buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer), ++ (serverhostkey ? serverhostkey : empty), slen, ++ dh->pub_key, /* e */ ++ dh_server_pub, /* f */ ++ shared_secret, /* K */ ++ &hash, &hashlen ++ ); ++ break; ++ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1: ++ kexgex_hash( ++ kex->evp_md, ++ kex->client_version_string, ++ kex->server_version_string, ++ buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my), ++ buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer), ++ (serverhostkey ? serverhostkey : empty), slen, ++ min, nbits, max, ++ dh->p, dh->g, ++ dh->pub_key, ++ dh_server_pub, ++ shared_secret, ++ &hash, &hashlen ++ ); ++ break; ++ default: ++ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type); ++ } ++ ++ gssbuf.value = hash; ++ gssbuf.length = hashlen; ++ ++ /* Verify that the hash matches the MIC we just got. */ ++ if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(ctxt, &gssbuf, &msg_tok))) ++ packet_disconnect("Hash's MIC didn't verify"); ++ ++ xfree(msg_tok.value); ++ ++ DH_free(dh); ++ if (serverhostkey) ++ xfree(serverhostkey); ++ BN_clear_free(dh_server_pub); ++ ++ /* save session id */ ++ if (kex->session_id == NULL) { ++ kex->session_id_len = hashlen; ++ kex->session_id = xmalloc(kex->session_id_len); ++ memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len); ++ } ++ ++ if (kex->gss_deleg_creds) ++ ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(ctxt); ++ ++ if (gss_kex_context == NULL) ++ gss_kex_context = ctxt; ++ else ++ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt); ++ ++ kex_derive_keys(kex, hash, hashlen, shared_secret); ++ BN_clear_free(shared_secret); ++ kex_finish(kex); ++} ++ ++#endif /* GSSAPI */ +diff -up openssh-6.0p1/kexgsss.c.gsskex openssh-6.0p1/kexgsss.c +--- openssh-6.0p1/kexgsss.c.gsskex 2012-09-12 15:32:19.116689055 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.0p1/kexgsss.c 2012-09-12 15:32:28.316651574 +0200 +@@ -0,0 +1,288 @@ ++/* ++ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. ++ * ++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without ++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions ++ * are met: ++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright ++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. ++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright ++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the ++ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. ++ * ++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR ++ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES ++ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. ++ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, ++ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT ++ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, ++ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY ++ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT ++ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF ++ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. ++ */ ++ ++#include "includes.h" ++ ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ ++#include ++ ++#include ++#include ++ ++#include "xmalloc.h" ++#include "buffer.h" ++#include "ssh2.h" ++#include "key.h" ++#include "cipher.h" ++#include "kex.h" ++#include "log.h" ++#include "packet.h" ++#include "dh.h" ++#include "ssh-gss.h" ++#include "monitor_wrap.h" ++#include "servconf.h" ++ ++extern ServerOptions options; ++ ++void ++kexgss_server(Kex *kex) ++{ ++ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status; ++ ++ /* ++ * Some GSSAPI implementations use the input value of ret_flags (an ++ * output variable) as a means of triggering mechanism specific ++ * features. Initializing it to zero avoids inadvertently ++ * activating this non-standard behaviour. ++ */ ++ ++ OM_uint32 ret_flags = 0; ++ gss_buffer_desc gssbuf, recv_tok, msg_tok; ++ gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; ++ Gssctxt *ctxt = NULL; ++ u_int slen, klen, kout, hashlen; ++ u_char *kbuf, *hash; ++ DH *dh; ++ int min = -1, max = -1, nbits = -1; ++ BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL; ++ BIGNUM *dh_client_pub = NULL; ++ int type = 0; ++ gss_OID oid; ++ char *mechs; ++ ++ /* Initialise GSSAPI */ ++ ++ /* If we're rekeying, privsep means that some of the private structures ++ * in the GSSAPI code are no longer available. This kludges them back ++ * into life ++ */ ++ if (!ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok()) ++ if ((mechs = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms())) ++ xfree(mechs); ++ ++ debug2("%s: Identifying %s", __func__, kex->name); ++ oid = ssh_gssapi_id_kex(NULL, kex->name, kex->kex_type); ++ if (oid == GSS_C_NO_OID) ++ fatal("Unknown gssapi mechanism"); ++ ++ debug2("%s: Acquiring credentials", __func__); ++ ++ if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctxt, oid)))) ++ fatal("Unable to acquire credentials for the server"); ++ ++ switch (kex->kex_type) { ++ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1: ++ dh = dh_new_group1(); ++ break; ++ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1: ++ dh = dh_new_group14(); ++ break; ++ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1: ++ debug("Doing group exchange"); ++ packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ); ++ min = packet_get_int(); ++ nbits = packet_get_int(); ++ max = packet_get_int(); ++ min = MAX(DH_GRP_MIN, min); ++ max = MIN(DH_GRP_MAX, max); ++ packet_check_eom(); ++ if (max < min || nbits < min || max < nbits) ++ fatal("GSS_GEX, bad parameters: %d !< %d !< %d", ++ min, nbits, max); ++ dh = PRIVSEP(choose_dh(min, nbits, max)); ++ if (dh == NULL) ++ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: no matching group found"); ++ ++ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP); ++ packet_put_bignum2(dh->p); ++ packet_put_bignum2(dh->g); ++ packet_send(); ++ ++ packet_write_wait(); ++ break; ++ default: ++ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type); ++ } ++ ++ dh_gen_key(dh, kex->we_need * 8); ++ ++ do { ++ debug("Wait SSH2_MSG_GSSAPI_INIT"); ++ type = packet_read(); ++ switch(type) { ++ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT: ++ if (dh_client_pub != NULL) ++ fatal("Received KEXGSS_INIT after initialising"); ++ recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&slen); ++ recv_tok.length = slen; ++ ++ if ((dh_client_pub = BN_new()) == NULL) ++ fatal("dh_client_pub == NULL"); ++ ++ packet_get_bignum2(dh_client_pub); ++ ++ /* Send SSH_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY here, if we want */ ++ break; ++ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE: ++ recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&slen); ++ recv_tok.length = slen; ++ break; ++ default: ++ packet_disconnect( ++ "Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d", ++ type); ++ } ++ ++ maj_status = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(ctxt, &recv_tok, ++ &send_tok, &ret_flags)); ++ ++ xfree(recv_tok.value); ++ ++ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE && send_tok.length == 0) ++ fatal("Zero length token output when incomplete"); ++ ++ if (dh_client_pub == NULL) ++ fatal("No client public key"); ++ ++ if (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) { ++ debug("Sending GSSAPI_CONTINUE"); ++ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE); ++ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length); ++ packet_send(); ++ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok); ++ } ++ } while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED); ++ ++ if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) { ++ if (send_tok.length > 0) { ++ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE); ++ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length); ++ packet_send(); ++ } ++ fatal("accept_ctx died"); ++ } ++ ++ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG)) ++ fatal("Mutual Authentication flag wasn't set"); ++ ++ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG)) ++ fatal("Integrity flag wasn't set"); ++ ++ if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh_client_pub)) ++ packet_disconnect("bad client public DH value"); ++ ++ klen = DH_size(dh); ++ kbuf = xmalloc(klen); ++ kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_client_pub, dh); ++ if ((int)kout < 0) ++ fatal("DH_compute_key: failed"); ++ ++ shared_secret = BN_new(); ++ if (shared_secret == NULL) ++ fatal("kexgss_server: BN_new failed"); ++ ++ if (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL) ++ fatal("kexgss_server: BN_bin2bn failed"); ++ ++ memset(kbuf, 0, klen); ++ xfree(kbuf); ++ ++ switch (kex->kex_type) { ++ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1: ++ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1: ++ kex_dh_hash( ++ kex->client_version_string, kex->server_version_string, ++ buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer), ++ buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my), ++ NULL, 0, /* Change this if we start sending host keys */ ++ dh_client_pub, dh->pub_key, shared_secret, ++ &hash, &hashlen ++ ); ++ break; ++ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1: ++ kexgex_hash( ++ kex->evp_md, ++ kex->client_version_string, kex->server_version_string, ++ buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer), ++ buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my), ++ NULL, 0, ++ min, nbits, max, ++ dh->p, dh->g, ++ dh_client_pub, ++ dh->pub_key, ++ shared_secret, ++ &hash, &hashlen ++ ); ++ break; ++ default: ++ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type); ++ } ++ ++ BN_clear_free(dh_client_pub); ++ ++ if (kex->session_id == NULL) { ++ kex->session_id_len = hashlen; ++ kex->session_id = xmalloc(kex->session_id_len); ++ memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len); ++ } ++ ++ gssbuf.value = hash; ++ gssbuf.length = hashlen; ++ ++ if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_sign(ctxt,&gssbuf,&msg_tok)))) ++ fatal("Couldn't get MIC"); ++ ++ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE); ++ packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key); ++ packet_put_string(msg_tok.value,msg_tok.length); ++ ++ if (send_tok.length != 0) { ++ packet_put_char(1); /* true */ ++ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length); ++ } else { ++ packet_put_char(0); /* false */ ++ } ++ packet_send(); ++ ++ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok); ++ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &msg_tok); ++ ++ if (gss_kex_context == NULL) ++ gss_kex_context = ctxt; ++ else ++ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt); ++ ++ DH_free(dh); ++ ++ kex_derive_keys(kex, hash, hashlen, shared_secret); ++ BN_clear_free(shared_secret); ++ kex_finish(kex); ++ ++ /* If this was a rekey, then save out any delegated credentials we ++ * just exchanged. */ ++ if (options.gss_store_rekey) ++ ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds(); ++} ++#endif /* GSSAPI */ +diff -up openssh-6.0p1/kex.h.gsskex openssh-6.0p1/kex.h +--- openssh-6.0p1/kex.h.gsskex 2012-09-12 15:32:19.093689148 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.0p1/kex.h 2012-09-12 15:32:28.316651574 +0200 +@@ -73,6 +73,9 @@ enum kex_exchange { + KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1, + KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256, + KEX_ECDH_SHA2, ++ KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1, ++ KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1, ++ KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1, + KEX_MAX + }; + +@@ -129,6 +132,12 @@ struct Kex { + sig_atomic_t done; + int flags; + const EVP_MD *evp_md; ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ int gss_deleg_creds; ++ int gss_trust_dns; ++ char *gss_host; ++ char *gss_client; ++#endif + char *client_version_string; + char *server_version_string; + int (*verify_host_key)(Key *); +@@ -156,6 +165,11 @@ void kexgex_server(Kex *); + void kexecdh_client(Kex *); + void kexecdh_server(Kex *); + ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++void kexgss_client(Kex *); ++void kexgss_server(Kex *); ++#endif ++ + void newkeys_destroy(Newkeys *newkeys); + + void +diff -up openssh-6.0p1/key.c.gsskex openssh-6.0p1/key.c +--- openssh-6.0p1/key.c.gsskex 2012-09-12 15:32:19.103689108 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.0p1/key.c 2012-09-12 15:32:28.317651570 +0200 +@@ -1006,6 +1006,8 @@ key_ssh_name_from_type_nid(int type, int + } + break; + #endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ ++ case KEY_NULL: ++ return "null"; + } + return "ssh-unknown"; + } +@@ -1311,6 +1313,8 @@ key_type_from_name(char *name) + strcmp(name, "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com") == 0) { + return KEY_ECDSA_CERT; + #endif ++ } else if (strcmp(name, "null") == 0) { ++ return KEY_NULL; + } + + debug2("key_type_from_name: unknown key type '%s'", name); +diff -up openssh-6.0p1/key.h.gsskex openssh-6.0p1/key.h +--- openssh-6.0p1/key.h.gsskex 2012-09-12 15:32:19.094689144 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.0p1/key.h 2012-09-12 15:32:28.318651566 +0200 +@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ enum types { + KEY_ECDSA_CERT, + KEY_RSA_CERT_V00, + KEY_DSA_CERT_V00, ++ KEY_NULL, + KEY_UNSPEC + }; + enum fp_type { +diff -up openssh-6.0p1/Makefile.in.gsskex openssh-6.0p1/Makefile.in +--- openssh-6.0p1/Makefile.in.gsskex 2012-09-12 15:32:19.128689006 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.0p1/Makefile.in 2012-09-12 15:32:28.318651566 +0200 +@@ -75,6 +75,7 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=acss.o authfd.o authfile.o b + atomicio.o key.o dispatch.o kex.o mac.o uidswap.o uuencode.o misc.o \ + monitor_fdpass.o rijndael.o ssh-dss.o ssh-ecdsa.o ssh-rsa.o dh.o \ + kexdh.o kexgex.o kexdhc.o kexgexc.o bufec.o kexecdh.o kexecdhc.o \ ++ kexgssc.o \ + msg.o progressmeter.o dns.o entropy.o gss-genr.o umac.o jpake.o \ + schnorr.o ssh-pkcs11.o auditstub.o + +@@ -91,7 +92,7 @@ SSHDOBJS=sshd.o auth-rhosts.o auth-passw + auth2-none.o auth2-passwd.o auth2-pubkey.o auth2-jpake.o \ + monitor_mm.o monitor.o monitor_wrap.o kexdhs.o kexgexs.o kexecdhs.o \ + auth-krb5.o \ +- auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o \ ++ auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o kexgsss.o\ + loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o md5crypt.o \ + sftp-server.o sftp-common.o \ + roaming_common.o roaming_serv.o \ +diff -up openssh-6.0p1/monitor.c.gsskex openssh-6.0p1/monitor.c +--- openssh-6.0p1/monitor.c.gsskex 2012-09-12 15:32:19.112689072 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.0p1/monitor.c 2012-09-12 15:32:28.319651562 +0200 +@@ -186,6 +186,8 @@ int mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int, Buffer + int mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int, Buffer *); + int mm_answer_gss_userok(int, Buffer *); + int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int, Buffer *); ++int mm_answer_gss_sign(int, Buffer *); ++int mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(int, Buffer *); + #endif + + #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS +@@ -270,6 +272,7 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] + {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx}, + {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_gss_userok}, + {MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_checkmic}, ++ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_gss_sign}, + #endif + #ifdef JPAKE + {MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_GET_PWDATA, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_jpake_get_pwdata}, +@@ -282,6 +285,12 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] + }; + + struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = { ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 0, mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx}, ++ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx}, ++ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, 0, mm_answer_gss_sign}, ++ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, 0, mm_answer_gss_updatecreds}, ++#endif + {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 0, mm_answer_moduli}, + {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 0, mm_answer_sign}, + {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 0, mm_answer_pty}, +@@ -406,6 +415,10 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctx + /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */ + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1); + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1); ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ /* and for the GSSAPI key exchange */ ++ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 1); ++#endif + } else { + mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto15; + req_auth = &options.required_auth1; +@@ -512,6 +525,10 @@ monitor_child_postauth(struct monitor *p + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1); + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1); + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1); ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ /* and for the GSSAPI key exchange */ ++ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 1); ++#endif + } else { + mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth15; + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1); +@@ -1942,6 +1959,13 @@ mm_get_kex(Buffer *m) + kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server; + kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server; + kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_server; ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ if (options.gss_keyex) { ++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server; ++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_server; ++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_server; ++ } ++#endif + kex->server = 1; + kex->hostkey_type = buffer_get_int(m); + kex->kex_type = buffer_get_int(m); +@@ -2165,6 +2189,9 @@ mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int sock, Buffer + OM_uint32 major; + u_int len; + ++ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex) ++ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled"); ++ + goid.elements = buffer_get_string(m, &len); + goid.length = len; + +@@ -2192,6 +2219,9 @@ mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int sock, Buffe + OM_uint32 flags = 0; /* GSI needs this */ + u_int len; + ++ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex) ++ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled"); ++ + in.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len); + in.length = len; + major = ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gsscontext, &in, &out, &flags); +@@ -2209,6 +2239,7 @@ mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int sock, Buffe + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0); + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1); + monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, 1); ++ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, 1); + } + return (0); + } +@@ -2220,6 +2251,9 @@ mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int sock, Buffer + OM_uint32 ret; + u_int len; + ++ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex) ++ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled"); ++ + gssbuf.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len); + gssbuf.length = len; + mic.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len); +@@ -2246,7 +2280,11 @@ mm_answer_gss_userok(int sock, Buffer *m + { + int authenticated; + +- authenticated = authctxt->valid && ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user); ++ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex) ++ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled"); ++ ++ authenticated = authctxt->valid && ++ ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw); + + buffer_clear(m); + buffer_put_int(m, authenticated); +@@ -2260,6 +2298,74 @@ mm_answer_gss_userok(int sock, Buffer *m + /* Monitor loop will terminate if authenticated */ + return (authenticated); + } ++ ++int ++mm_answer_gss_sign(int socket, Buffer *m) ++{ ++ gss_buffer_desc data; ++ gss_buffer_desc hash = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; ++ OM_uint32 major, minor; ++ u_int len; ++ ++ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex) ++ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled"); ++ ++ data.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len); ++ data.length = len; ++ if (data.length != 20) ++ fatal("%s: data length incorrect: %d", __func__, ++ (int) data.length); ++ ++ /* Save the session ID on the first time around */ ++ if (session_id2_len == 0) { ++ session_id2_len = data.length; ++ session_id2 = xmalloc(session_id2_len); ++ memcpy(session_id2, data.value, session_id2_len); ++ } ++ major = ssh_gssapi_sign(gsscontext, &data, &hash); ++ ++ xfree(data.value); ++ ++ buffer_clear(m); ++ buffer_put_int(m, major); ++ buffer_put_string(m, hash.value, hash.length); ++ ++ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, m); ++ ++ gss_release_buffer(&minor, &hash); ++ ++ /* Turn on getpwnam permissions */ ++ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1); ++ ++ /* And credential updating, for when rekeying */ ++ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, 1); ++ ++ return (0); ++} ++ ++int ++mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(int socket, Buffer *m) { ++ ssh_gssapi_ccache store; ++ int ok; ++ ++ store.filename = buffer_get_string(m, NULL); ++ store.envvar = buffer_get_string(m, NULL); ++ store.envval = buffer_get_string(m, NULL); ++ ++ ok = ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&store); ++ ++ xfree(store.filename); ++ xfree(store.envvar); ++ xfree(store.envval); ++ ++ buffer_clear(m); ++ buffer_put_int(m, ok); ++ ++ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS, m); ++ ++ return(0); ++} ++ + #endif /* GSSAPI */ + + #ifdef JPAKE +diff -up openssh-6.0p1/monitor.h.gsskex openssh-6.0p1/monitor.h +--- openssh-6.0p1/monitor.h.gsskex 2012-09-12 15:32:19.119689041 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.0p1/monitor.h 2012-09-12 15:32:28.319651562 +0200 +@@ -56,6 +56,8 @@ enum monitor_reqtype { + MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSTEP, + MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUSEROK, + MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC, ++ MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, ++ MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS, + MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START, + MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT, + MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX, +diff -up openssh-6.0p1/monitor_wrap.c.gsskex openssh-6.0p1/monitor_wrap.c +--- openssh-6.0p1/monitor_wrap.c.gsskex 2012-09-12 15:32:19.122689031 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.0p1/monitor_wrap.c 2012-09-12 15:32:28.320651557 +0200 +@@ -1326,7 +1326,7 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss + } + + int +-mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user) ++mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw) + { + Buffer m; + int authenticated = 0; +@@ -1343,6 +1343,51 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user) + debug3("%s: user %sauthenticated",__func__, authenticated ? "" : "not "); + return (authenticated); + } ++ ++OM_uint32 ++mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_desc *data, gss_buffer_desc *hash) ++{ ++ Buffer m; ++ OM_uint32 major; ++ u_int len; ++ ++ buffer_init(&m); ++ buffer_put_string(&m, data->value, data->length); ++ ++ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, &m); ++ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, &m); ++ ++ major = buffer_get_int(&m); ++ hash->value = buffer_get_string(&m, &len); ++ hash->length = len; ++ ++ buffer_free(&m); ++ ++ return(major); ++} ++ ++int ++mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store) ++{ ++ Buffer m; ++ int ok; ++ ++ buffer_init(&m); ++ ++ buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->filename ? store->filename : ""); ++ buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->envvar ? store->envvar : ""); ++ buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->envval ? store->envval : ""); ++ ++ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, &m); ++ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS, &m); ++ ++ ok = buffer_get_int(&m); ++ ++ buffer_free(&m); ++ ++ return (ok); ++} ++ + #endif /* GSSAPI */ + + #ifdef JPAKE +diff -up openssh-6.0p1/monitor_wrap.h.gsskex openssh-6.0p1/monitor_wrap.h +--- openssh-6.0p1/monitor_wrap.h.gsskex 2012-09-12 15:32:19.107689091 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.0p1/monitor_wrap.h 2012-09-12 15:32:28.321651552 +0200 +@@ -62,8 +62,10 @@ BIGNUM *mm_auth_rsa_generate_challenge(K + OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID); + OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *, + gss_buffer_desc *, gss_buffer_desc *, OM_uint32 *); +-int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user); ++int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *); + OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t); ++OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t); ++int mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *); + #endif + + #ifdef USE_PAM +diff -up openssh-6.0p1/readconf.c.gsskex openssh-6.0p1/readconf.c +--- openssh-6.0p1/readconf.c.gsskex 2012-09-12 15:32:19.100689120 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.0p1/readconf.c 2012-09-12 15:32:28.321651552 +0200 +@@ -129,6 +129,8 @@ typedef enum { + oClearAllForwardings, oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost, + oEnableSSHKeysign, oRekeyLimit, oVerifyHostKeyDNS, oConnectTimeout, + oAddressFamily, oGssAuthentication, oGssDelegateCreds, ++ oGssTrustDns, oGssKeyEx, oGssClientIdentity, oGssRenewalRekey, ++ oGssServerIdentity, + oServerAliveInterval, oServerAliveCountMax, oIdentitiesOnly, + oSendEnv, oControlPath, oControlMaster, oControlPersist, + oHashKnownHosts, +@@ -169,10 +171,19 @@ static struct { + { "afstokenpassing", oUnsupported }, + #if defined(GSSAPI) + { "gssapiauthentication", oGssAuthentication }, ++ { "gssapikeyexchange", oGssKeyEx }, + { "gssapidelegatecredentials", oGssDelegateCreds }, ++ { "gssapitrustdns", oGssTrustDns }, ++ { "gssapiclientidentity", oGssClientIdentity }, ++ { "gssapiserveridentity", oGssServerIdentity }, ++ { "gssapirenewalforcesrekey", oGssRenewalRekey }, + #else + { "gssapiauthentication", oUnsupported }, ++ { "gssapikeyexchange", oUnsupported }, + { "gssapidelegatecredentials", oUnsupported }, ++ { "gssapitrustdns", oUnsupported }, ++ { "gssapiclientidentity", oUnsupported }, ++ { "gssapirenewalforcesrekey", oUnsupported }, + #endif + { "fallbacktorsh", oDeprecated }, + { "usersh", oDeprecated }, +@@ -483,10 +494,30 @@ parse_flag: + intptr = &options->gss_authentication; + goto parse_flag; + ++ case oGssKeyEx: ++ intptr = &options->gss_keyex; ++ goto parse_flag; ++ + case oGssDelegateCreds: + intptr = &options->gss_deleg_creds; + goto parse_flag; + ++ case oGssTrustDns: ++ intptr = &options->gss_trust_dns; ++ goto parse_flag; ++ ++ case oGssClientIdentity: ++ charptr = &options->gss_client_identity; ++ goto parse_string; ++ ++ case oGssServerIdentity: ++ charptr = &options->gss_server_identity; ++ goto parse_string; ++ ++ case oGssRenewalRekey: ++ intptr = &options->gss_renewal_rekey; ++ goto parse_flag; ++ + case oBatchMode: + intptr = &options->batch_mode; + goto parse_flag; +@@ -1139,7 +1170,12 @@ initialize_options(Options * options) + options->pubkey_authentication = -1; + options->challenge_response_authentication = -1; + options->gss_authentication = -1; ++ options->gss_keyex = -1; + options->gss_deleg_creds = -1; ++ options->gss_trust_dns = -1; ++ options->gss_renewal_rekey = -1; ++ options->gss_client_identity = NULL; ++ options->gss_server_identity = NULL; + options->password_authentication = -1; + options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1; + options->kbd_interactive_devices = NULL; +@@ -1239,8 +1275,14 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options) + options->challenge_response_authentication = 1; + if (options->gss_authentication == -1) + options->gss_authentication = 0; ++ if (options->gss_keyex == -1) ++ options->gss_keyex = 0; + if (options->gss_deleg_creds == -1) + options->gss_deleg_creds = 0; ++ if (options->gss_trust_dns == -1) ++ options->gss_trust_dns = 0; ++ if (options->gss_renewal_rekey == -1) ++ options->gss_renewal_rekey = 0; + if (options->password_authentication == -1) + options->password_authentication = 1; + if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1) +diff -up openssh-6.0p1/readconf.h.gsskex openssh-6.0p1/readconf.h +--- openssh-6.0p1/readconf.h.gsskex 2012-09-12 15:32:19.125689019 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.0p1/readconf.h 2012-09-12 15:32:28.322651548 +0200 +@@ -48,7 +48,12 @@ typedef struct { + int challenge_response_authentication; + /* Try S/Key or TIS, authentication. */ + int gss_authentication; /* Try GSS authentication */ ++ int gss_keyex; /* Try GSS key exchange */ + int gss_deleg_creds; /* Delegate GSS credentials */ ++ int gss_trust_dns; /* Trust DNS for GSS canonicalization */ ++ int gss_renewal_rekey; /* Credential renewal forces rekey */ ++ char *gss_client_identity; /* Principal to initiate GSSAPI with */ ++ char *gss_server_identity; /* GSSAPI target principal */ + int password_authentication; /* Try password + * authentication. */ + int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* Try keyboard-interactive auth. */ +diff -up openssh-6.0p1/servconf.c.gsskex openssh-6.0p1/servconf.c +--- openssh-6.0p1/servconf.c.gsskex 2012-09-12 15:32:19.088689170 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.0p1/servconf.c 2012-09-12 15:32:28.323651545 +0200 +@@ -99,7 +99,10 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions + options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = -1; + options->kerberos_get_afs_token = -1; + options->gss_authentication=-1; ++ options->gss_keyex = -1; + options->gss_cleanup_creds = -1; ++ options->gss_strict_acceptor = -1; ++ options->gss_store_rekey = -1; + options->password_authentication = -1; + options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1; + options->challenge_response_authentication = -1; +@@ -232,8 +235,14 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption + options->kerberos_get_afs_token = 0; + if (options->gss_authentication == -1) + options->gss_authentication = 0; ++ if (options->gss_keyex == -1) ++ options->gss_keyex = 0; + if (options->gss_cleanup_creds == -1) + options->gss_cleanup_creds = 1; ++ if (options->gss_strict_acceptor == -1) ++ options->gss_strict_acceptor = 1; ++ if (options->gss_store_rekey == -1) ++ options->gss_store_rekey = 0; + if (options->password_authentication == -1) + options->password_authentication = 1; + if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1) +@@ -327,7 +336,9 @@ typedef enum { + sBanner, sShowPatchLevel, sUseDNS, sHostbasedAuthentication, + sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, sClientAliveInterval, + sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile, +- sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel, ++ sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssStrictAcceptor, ++ sGssKeyEx, sGssStoreRekey, ++ sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel, + sRequiredAuthentications1, sRequiredAuthentications2, + sMatch, sPermitOpen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory, + sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding, +@@ -393,10 +404,20 @@ static struct { + #ifdef GSSAPI + { "gssapiauthentication", sGssAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, ++ { "gssapicleanupcreds", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, ++ { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sGssStrictAcceptor, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, ++ { "gssapikeyexchange", sGssKeyEx, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, ++ { "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sGssStoreRekey, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + #else + { "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, ++ { "gssapicleanupcreds", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, ++ { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, ++ { "gssapikeyexchange", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, ++ { "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + #endif ++ { "gssusesessionccache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, ++ { "gssapiusesessioncredcache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "passwordauthentication", sPasswordAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "kbdinteractiveauthentication", sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "challengeresponseauthentication", sChallengeResponseAuthentication, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, +@@ -983,10 +1004,22 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions + intptr = &options->gss_authentication; + goto parse_flag; + ++ case sGssKeyEx: ++ intptr = &options->gss_keyex; ++ goto parse_flag; ++ + case sGssCleanupCreds: + intptr = &options->gss_cleanup_creds; + goto parse_flag; + ++ case sGssStrictAcceptor: ++ intptr = &options->gss_strict_acceptor; ++ goto parse_flag; ++ ++ case sGssStoreRekey: ++ intptr = &options->gss_store_rekey; ++ goto parse_flag; ++ + case sPasswordAuthentication: + intptr = &options->password_authentication; + goto parse_flag; +@@ -1794,6 +1827,9 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o) + #ifdef GSSAPI + dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication); + dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssCleanupCreds, o->gss_cleanup_creds); ++ dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssKeyEx, o->gss_keyex); ++ dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStrictAcceptor, o->gss_strict_acceptor); ++ dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStoreRekey, o->gss_store_rekey); + #endif + #ifdef JPAKE + dump_cfg_fmtint(sZeroKnowledgePasswordAuthentication, +diff -up openssh-6.0p1/servconf.h.gsskex openssh-6.0p1/servconf.h +--- openssh-6.0p1/servconf.h.gsskex 2012-09-12 15:32:19.121689034 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.0p1/servconf.h 2012-09-12 15:32:28.323651545 +0200 +@@ -103,7 +103,10 @@ typedef struct { + int kerberos_get_afs_token; /* If true, try to get AFS token if + * authenticated with Kerberos. */ + int gss_authentication; /* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */ ++ int gss_keyex; /* If true, permit GSSAPI key exchange */ + int gss_cleanup_creds; /* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */ ++ int gss_strict_acceptor; /* If true, restrict the GSSAPI acceptor name */ ++ int gss_store_rekey; + int password_authentication; /* If true, permit password + * authentication. */ + int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* If true, permit */ +diff -up openssh-6.0p1/ssh_config.5.gsskex openssh-6.0p1/ssh_config.5 +--- openssh-6.0p1/ssh_config.5.gsskex 2012-09-12 15:32:19.091689156 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.0p1/ssh_config.5 2012-09-12 15:32:28.324651542 +0200 +@@ -527,11 +527,43 @@ Specifies whether user authentication ba + The default is + .Dq no . + Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only. ++.It Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange ++Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI may be used. When using ++GSSAPI key exchange the server need not have a host key. ++The default is ++.Dq no . ++Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only. ++.It Cm GSSAPIClientIdentity ++If set, specifies the GSSAPI client identity that ssh should use when ++connecting to the server. The default is unset, which means that the default ++identity will be used. ++.It Cm GSSAPIServerIdentity ++If set, specifies the GSSAPI server identity that ssh should expect when ++connecting to the server. The default is unset, which means that the ++expected GSSAPI server identity will be determined from the target ++hostname. + .It Cm GSSAPIDelegateCredentials + Forward (delegate) credentials to the server. + The default is + .Dq no . +-Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only. ++Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 connections using GSSAPI. ++.It Cm GSSAPIRenewalForcesRekey ++If set to ++.Dq yes ++then renewal of the client's GSSAPI credentials will force the rekeying of the ++ssh connection. With a compatible server, this can delegate the renewed ++credentials to a session on the server. ++The default is ++.Dq no . ++.It Cm GSSAPITrustDns ++Set to ++.Dq yes to indicate that the DNS is trusted to securely canonicalize ++the name of the host being connected to. If ++.Dq no, the hostname entered on the ++command line will be passed untouched to the GSSAPI library. ++The default is ++.Dq no . ++This option only applies to protocol version 2 connections using GSSAPI. + .It Cm HashKnownHosts + Indicates that + .Xr ssh 1 +diff -up openssh-6.0p1/ssh_config.gsskex openssh-6.0p1/ssh_config +--- openssh-6.0p1/ssh_config.gsskex 2012-09-12 15:32:19.087689174 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.0p1/ssh_config 2012-09-12 15:32:28.324651542 +0200 +@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@ + # HostbasedAuthentication no + # GSSAPIAuthentication no + # GSSAPIDelegateCredentials no ++# GSSAPIKeyExchange no ++# GSSAPITrustDNS no + # BatchMode no + # CheckHostIP yes + # AddressFamily any +diff -up openssh-6.0p1/sshconnect2.c.gsskex openssh-6.0p1/sshconnect2.c +--- openssh-6.0p1/sshconnect2.c.gsskex 2012-09-12 15:32:19.099689124 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.0p1/sshconnect2.c 2012-09-12 15:32:28.325651538 +0200 +@@ -162,9 +162,34 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *ho + { + Kex *kex; + ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ char *orig = NULL, *gss = NULL; ++ char *gss_host = NULL; ++#endif ++ + xxx_host = host; + xxx_hostaddr = hostaddr; + ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ if (options.gss_keyex) { ++ /* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this ++ * client to the key exchange algorithm proposal */ ++ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]; ++ ++ if (options.gss_trust_dns) ++ gss_host = (char *)get_canonical_hostname(1); ++ else ++ gss_host = host; ++ ++ gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host, options.gss_client_identity); ++ if (gss) { ++ debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss); ++ xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS], ++ "%s,%s", gss, orig); ++ } ++ } ++#endif ++ + if (options.ciphers == (char *)-1) { + logit("No valid ciphers for protocol version 2 given, using defaults."); + options.ciphers = NULL; +@@ -207,6 +232,17 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *ho + if (options.kex_algorithms != NULL) + myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = options.kex_algorithms; + ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ /* If we've got GSSAPI algorithms, then we also support the ++ * 'null' hostkey, as a last resort */ ++ if (options.gss_keyex && gss) { ++ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]; ++ xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS], ++ "%s,null", orig); ++ xfree(gss); ++ } ++#endif ++ + if (options.rekey_limit) + packet_set_rekey_limit((u_int32_t)options.rekey_limit); + +@@ -217,10 +253,30 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *ho + kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_client; + kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_client; + kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_client; ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ if (options.gss_keyex) { ++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_client; ++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_client; ++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_client; ++ } ++#endif + kex->client_version_string=client_version_string; + kex->server_version_string=server_version_string; + kex->verify_host_key=&verify_host_key_callback; + ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ if (options.gss_keyex) { ++ kex->gss_deleg_creds = options.gss_deleg_creds; ++ kex->gss_trust_dns = options.gss_trust_dns; ++ kex->gss_client = options.gss_client_identity; ++ if (options.gss_server_identity) { ++ kex->gss_host = options.gss_server_identity; ++ } else { ++ kex->gss_host = gss_host; ++ } ++ } ++#endif ++ + xxx_kex = kex; + + dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &kex->done, kex); +@@ -315,6 +371,7 @@ void input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int3 + void input_gssapi_hash(int type, u_int32_t, void *); + void input_gssapi_error(int, u_int32_t, void *); + void input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, void *); ++int userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt); + #endif + + void userauth(Authctxt *, char *); +@@ -330,6 +387,11 @@ static char *authmethods_get(void); + + Authmethod authmethods[] = { + #ifdef GSSAPI ++ {"gssapi-keyex", ++ userauth_gsskeyex, ++ NULL, ++ &options.gss_authentication, ++ NULL}, + {"gssapi-with-mic", + userauth_gssapi, + NULL, +@@ -637,19 +699,31 @@ userauth_gssapi(Authctxt *authctxt) + static u_int mech = 0; + OM_uint32 min; + int ok = 0; ++ const char *gss_host; ++ ++ if (options.gss_server_identity) ++ gss_host = options.gss_server_identity; ++ else if (options.gss_trust_dns) ++ gss_host = get_canonical_hostname(1); ++ else ++ gss_host = authctxt->host; + + /* Try one GSSAPI method at a time, rather than sending them all at + * once. */ + + if (gss_supported == NULL) +- gss_indicate_mechs(&min, &gss_supported); ++ if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min, &gss_supported))) { ++ gss_supported = NULL; ++ return 0; ++ } + + /* Check to see if the mechanism is usable before we offer it */ + while (mech < gss_supported->count && !ok) { + /* My DER encoding requires length<128 */ + if (gss_supported->elements[mech].length < 128 && + ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(&gssctxt, +- &gss_supported->elements[mech], authctxt->host)) { ++ &gss_supported->elements[mech], gss_host, ++ options.gss_client_identity)) { + ok = 1; /* Mechanism works */ + } else { + mech++; +@@ -746,8 +820,8 @@ input_gssapi_response(int type, u_int32_ + { + Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt; + Gssctxt *gssctxt; +- int oidlen; +- char *oidv; ++ u_int oidlen; ++ u_char *oidv; + + if (authctxt == NULL) + fatal("input_gssapi_response: no authentication context"); +@@ -857,6 +931,48 @@ input_gssapi_error(int type, u_int32_t p + xfree(msg); + xfree(lang); + } ++ ++int ++userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt) ++{ ++ Buffer b; ++ gss_buffer_desc gssbuf; ++ gss_buffer_desc mic = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; ++ OM_uint32 ms; ++ ++ static int attempt = 0; ++ if (attempt++ >= 1) ++ return (0); ++ ++ if (gss_kex_context == NULL) { ++ debug("No valid Key exchange context"); ++ return (0); ++ } ++ ++ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->server_user, authctxt->service, ++ "gssapi-keyex"); ++ ++ gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b); ++ gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b); ++ ++ if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_sign(gss_kex_context, &gssbuf, &mic))) { ++ buffer_free(&b); ++ return (0); ++ } ++ ++ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST); ++ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user); ++ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service); ++ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name); ++ packet_put_string(mic.value, mic.length); ++ packet_send(); ++ ++ buffer_free(&b); ++ gss_release_buffer(&ms, &mic); ++ ++ return (1); ++} ++ + #endif /* GSSAPI */ + + int +diff -up openssh-6.0p1/sshd.c.gsskex openssh-6.0p1/sshd.c +--- openssh-6.0p1/sshd.c.gsskex 2012-09-12 15:32:19.130688998 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.0p1/sshd.c 2012-09-12 15:32:28.326651534 +0200 +@@ -124,6 +124,10 @@ + #include "ssh-sandbox.h" + #include "version.h" + ++#ifdef USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API ++#include ++#endif ++ + #ifdef LIBWRAP + #include + #include +@@ -1701,10 +1705,13 @@ main(int ac, char **av) + logit("Disabling protocol version 1. Could not load host key"); + options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_1; + } ++#ifndef GSSAPI ++ /* The GSSAPI key exchange can run without a host key */ + if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) && !sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key) { + logit("Disabling protocol version 2. Could not load host key"); + options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_2; + } ++#endif + if (!(options.protocol & (SSH_PROTO_1|SSH_PROTO_2))) { + logit("sshd: no hostkeys available -- exiting."); + exit(1); +@@ -2037,6 +2044,60 @@ main(int ac, char **av) + /* Log the connection. */ + verbose("Connection from %.500s port %d", remote_ip, remote_port); + ++#ifdef USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API ++ /* ++ * Create a new security session for use by the new user login if ++ * the current session is the root session or we are not launched ++ * by inetd (eg: debugging mode or server mode). We do not ++ * necessarily need to create a session if we are launched from ++ * inetd because Panther xinetd will create a session for us. ++ * ++ * The only case where this logic will fail is if there is an ++ * inetd running in a non-root session which is not creating ++ * new sessions for us. Then all the users will end up in the ++ * same session (bad). ++ * ++ * When the client exits, the session will be destroyed for us ++ * automatically. ++ * ++ * We must create the session before any credentials are stored ++ * (including AFS pags, which happens a few lines below). ++ */ ++ { ++ OSStatus err = 0; ++ SecuritySessionId sid = 0; ++ SessionAttributeBits sattrs = 0; ++ ++ err = SessionGetInfo(callerSecuritySession, &sid, &sattrs); ++ if (err) ++ error("SessionGetInfo() failed with error %.8X", ++ (unsigned) err); ++ else ++ debug("Current Session ID is %.8X / Session Attributes are %.8X", ++ (unsigned) sid, (unsigned) sattrs); ++ ++ if (inetd_flag && !(sattrs & sessionIsRoot)) ++ debug("Running in inetd mode in a non-root session... " ++ "assuming inetd created the session for us."); ++ else { ++ debug("Creating new security session..."); ++ err = SessionCreate(0, sessionHasTTY | sessionIsRemote); ++ if (err) ++ error("SessionCreate() failed with error %.8X", ++ (unsigned) err); ++ ++ err = SessionGetInfo(callerSecuritySession, &sid, ++ &sattrs); ++ if (err) ++ error("SessionGetInfo() failed with error %.8X", ++ (unsigned) err); ++ else ++ debug("New Session ID is %.8X / Session Attributes are %.8X", ++ (unsigned) sid, (unsigned) sattrs); ++ } ++ } ++#endif ++ + /* + * We don't want to listen forever unless the other side + * successfully authenticates itself. So we set up an alarm which is +@@ -2435,6 +2496,48 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void) + + myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = list_hostkey_types(); + ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ { ++ char *orig; ++ char *gss = NULL; ++ char *newstr = NULL; ++ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]; ++ ++ /* ++ * If we don't have a host key, then there's no point advertising ++ * the other key exchange algorithms ++ */ ++ ++ if (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]) == 0) ++ orig = NULL; ++ ++ if (options.gss_keyex) ++ gss = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(); ++ else ++ gss = NULL; ++ ++ if (gss && orig) ++ xasprintf(&newstr, "%s,%s", gss, orig); ++ else if (gss) ++ newstr = gss; ++ else if (orig) ++ newstr = orig; ++ ++ /* ++ * If we've got GSSAPI mechanisms, then we've got the 'null' host ++ * key alg, but we can't tell people about it unless its the only ++ * host key algorithm we support ++ */ ++ if (gss && (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS])) == 0) ++ myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = "null"; ++ ++ if (newstr) ++ myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = newstr; ++ else ++ fatal("No supported key exchange algorithms"); ++ } ++#endif ++ + /* start key exchange */ + kex = kex_setup(myproposal); + kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_server; +@@ -2442,6 +2545,13 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void) + kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server; + kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server; + kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_server; ++#ifdef GSSAPI ++ if (options.gss_keyex) { ++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server; ++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_server; ++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_server; ++ } ++#endif + kex->server = 1; + kex->client_version_string=client_version_string; + kex->server_version_string=server_version_string; +diff -up openssh-6.0p1/sshd_config.5.gsskex openssh-6.0p1/sshd_config.5 +--- openssh-6.0p1/sshd_config.5.gsskex 2012-09-12 15:32:19.109689084 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.0p1/sshd_config.5 2012-09-12 15:32:28.327651530 +0200 +@@ -437,12 +437,40 @@ Specifies whether user authentication ba + The default is + .Dq no . + Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only. ++.It Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange ++Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI is allowed. GSSAPI key exchange ++doesn't rely on ssh keys to verify host identity. ++The default is ++.Dq no . ++Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only. + .It Cm GSSAPICleanupCredentials + Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's credentials cache + on logout. + The default is + .Dq yes . + Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only. ++.It Cm GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck ++Determines whether to be strict about the identity of the GSSAPI acceptor ++a client authenticates against. If ++.Dq yes ++then the client must authenticate against the ++.Pa host ++service on the current hostname. If ++.Dq no ++then the client may authenticate against any service key stored in the ++machine's default store. This facility is provided to assist with operation ++on multi homed machines. ++The default is ++.Dq yes . ++Note that this option applies only to protocol version 2 GSSAPI connections, ++and setting it to ++.Dq no ++may only work with recent Kerberos GSSAPI libraries. ++.It Cm GSSAPIStoreCredentialsOnRekey ++Controls whether the user's GSSAPI credentials should be updated following a ++successful connection rekeying. This option can be used to accepted renewed ++or updated credentials from a compatible client. The default is ++.Dq no . + .It Cm HostbasedAuthentication + Specifies whether rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication together + with successful public key client host authentication is allowed +diff -up openssh-6.0p1/sshd_config.gsskex openssh-6.0p1/sshd_config +--- openssh-6.0p1/sshd_config.gsskex 2012-09-12 15:32:19.102689112 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.0p1/sshd_config 2012-09-12 15:32:28.327651530 +0200 +@@ -83,6 +83,8 @@ ChallengeResponseAuthentication no + GSSAPIAuthentication yes + #GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes + GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes ++#GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck yes ++#GSSAPIKeyExchange no + + # Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing, + # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will +diff -up openssh-6.0p1/ssh-gss.h.gsskex openssh-6.0p1/ssh-gss.h +--- openssh-6.0p1/ssh-gss.h.gsskex 2012-09-12 15:32:19.090689160 +0200 ++++ openssh-6.0p1/ssh-gss.h 2012-09-12 15:32:28.328651526 +0200 +@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ + /* $OpenBSD: ssh-gss.h,v 1.10 2007/06/12 08:20:00 djm Exp $ */ + /* +- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. ++ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +@@ -60,10 +60,22 @@ + + #define SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE 0x06 + ++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT 30 ++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE 31 ++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE 32 ++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY 33 ++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR 34 ++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ 40 ++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP 41 ++#define KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID "gss-group1-sha1-" ++#define KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID "gss-group14-sha1-" ++#define KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID "gss-gex-sha1-" ++ + typedef struct { + char *filename; + char *envvar; + char *envval; ++ struct passwd *owner; + void *data; + } ssh_gssapi_ccache; + +@@ -71,8 +83,11 @@ typedef struct { + gss_buffer_desc displayname; + gss_buffer_desc exportedname; + gss_cred_id_t creds; ++ gss_name_t name; + struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct *mech; + ssh_gssapi_ccache store; ++ int used; ++ int updated; + } ssh_gssapi_client; + + typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct { +@@ -83,6 +98,7 @@ typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct { + int (*userok) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char *); + int (*localname) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char **); + void (*storecreds) (ssh_gssapi_client *); ++ int (*updatecreds) (ssh_gssapi_ccache *, ssh_gssapi_client *); + } ssh_gssapi_mech; + + typedef struct { +@@ -93,10 +109,11 @@ typedef struct { + gss_OID oid; /* client */ + gss_cred_id_t creds; /* server */ + gss_name_t client; /* server */ +- gss_cred_id_t client_creds; /* server */ ++ gss_cred_id_t client_creds; /* both */ + } Gssctxt; + + extern ssh_gssapi_mech *supported_mechs[]; ++extern Gssctxt *gss_kex_context; + + int ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t); + void ssh_gssapi_set_oid_data(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t); +@@ -116,16 +133,30 @@ void ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(Gssctxt **); + void ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(Gssctxt **); + OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t); + void ssh_gssapi_buildmic(Buffer *, const char *, const char *, const char *); +-int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *); ++int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *, const char *); ++OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_client_identity(Gssctxt *, const char *); ++int ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(Gssctxt *); + + /* In the server */ ++typedef int ssh_gssapi_check_fn(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *, ++ const char *); ++char *ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *, const char *); ++char *ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *, const char *, ++ const char *); ++gss_OID ssh_gssapi_id_kex(Gssctxt *, char *, int); ++int ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt **,gss_OID, const char *, ++ const char *); + OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID); +-int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name); ++int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name, struct passwd *); + OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t); + void ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***, u_int *); + void ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void); + void ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void); + ++char *ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(void); ++int ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok(); ++ ++int ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store); + #endif /* GSSAPI */ + + #endif /* _SSH_GSS_H */ diff --git a/openssh.spec b/openssh.spec index 449160d..c909026 100644 --- a/openssh.spec +++ b/openssh.spec @@ -210,7 +210,8 @@ Patch714: openssh-5.9p1-null-xcrypt.patch #http://www.sxw.org.uk/computing/patches/openssh.html -Patch800: openssh-5.9p1-gsskex.patch +#changed cache storage type - #848228 +Patch800: openssh-6.0p1-gsskex.patch #http://www.mail-archive.com/kerberos@mit.edu/msg17591.html Patch801: openssh-5.8p2-force_krb.patch