diff -up openssh-6.1p1/auth2-pubkey.c.akc openssh-6.1p1/auth2-pubkey.c

--- openssh-6.1p1/auth2-pubkey.c.akc	2012-09-14 20:20:48.459445650 +0200

+++ openssh-6.1p1/auth2-pubkey.c	2012-09-14 20:20:48.520446072 +0200

@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@

 #include <sys/types.h>

 #include <sys/stat.h>

+#include <sys/wait.h>

 #include <fcntl.h>

 #include <pwd.h>

@@ -277,27 +278,15 @@ match_principals_file(char *file, struct

 /* return 1 if user allows given key */

 static int

-user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, char *file)

+user_search_key_in_file(FILE *f, char *file, Key* key, struct passwd *pw)

 {

 	char line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES];

 	const char *reason;

 	int found_key = 0;

-	FILE *f;

 	u_long linenum = 0;

 	Key *found;

 	char *fp;

-	/* Temporarily use the user's uid. */

-	temporarily_use_uid(pw);

-

-	debug("trying public key file %s", file);

-	f = auth_openkeyfile(file, pw, options.strict_modes);

-

-	if (!f) {

-		restore_uid();

-		return 0;

-	}

-

 	found_key = 0;

 	found = key_new(key_is_cert(key) ? KEY_UNSPEC : key->type);

@@ -390,8 +379,6 @@ user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, Key

 			break;

 		}

 	}

-	restore_uid();

-	fclose(f);

 	key_free(found);

 	if (!found_key)

 		debug2("key not found");

@@ -453,13 +440,191 @@ user_cert_trusted_ca(struct passwd *pw,

 	return ret;

 }

-/* check whether given key is in .ssh/authorized_keys* */

+/* return 1 if user allows given key */

+static int

+user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, char *file)

+{

+	FILE *f;

+	int found_key = 0;

+

+	/* Temporarily use the user's uid. */

+	temporarily_use_uid(pw);

+

+	debug("trying public key file %s", file);

+	f = auth_openkeyfile(file, pw, options.strict_modes);

+

+ 	if (f) {

+ 		found_key = user_search_key_in_file (f, file, key, pw);

+		fclose(f);

+	}

+

+	restore_uid();

+	return found_key;

+}

+

+#ifdef WITH_AUTHORIZED_KEYS_COMMAND

+

+#define WHITESPACE " \t\r\n"

+

+/* return 1 if user allows given key */

+static int

+user_key_via_command_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, Key *key)

+{

+	FILE *f;

+	int found_key = 0;

+	char *progname = NULL;

+	char *cp;

+	struct passwd *runas_pw;

+	struct stat st;

+	int childdescriptors[2], i;

+	pid_t pstat, pid, child;

+

+	if (options.authorized_keys_command == NULL || options.authorized_keys_command[0] != '/')

+		return 0;

+

+	/* get the run as identity from config */

+	runas_pw = (options.authorized_keys_command_runas == NULL)? pw

+	    : getpwnam (options.authorized_keys_command_runas);

+	if (!runas_pw) {

+		error("%s: getpwnam(\"%s\"): %s", __func__,

+		    options.authorized_keys_command_runas, strerror(errno));

+		return 0;

+	}

+

+	/* Temporarily use the specified uid. */

+	if (runas_pw->pw_uid != 0)

+		temporarily_use_uid(runas_pw);

+

+	progname = xstrdup(options.authorized_keys_command);

+

+	debug3("%s: checking program '%s'", __func__, progname);

+

+	if (stat (progname, &st) < 0) {

+		error("%s: stat(\"%s\"): %s", __func__,

+		    progname, strerror(errno));

+		goto go_away;

+	}

+

+	if (st.st_uid != 0 || (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) {

+		error("bad ownership or modes for AuthorizedKeysCommand \"%s\"",

+		    progname);

+		goto go_away;

+	}

+

+	if (!S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) {

+		error("AuthorizedKeysCommand \"%s\" is not a regular file",

+		    progname);

+		goto go_away;

+	}

+

+	/*

+	 * Descend the path, checking that each component is a

+	 * root-owned directory with strict permissions.

+	 */

+	do {

+		if ((cp = strrchr(progname, '/')) == NULL)

+			break;

+		else

+			*cp = '\0';

+	

+		debug3("%s: checking component '%s'", __func__, (*progname == '\0' ? "/" : progname));

+

+		if (stat((*progname == '\0' ? "/" : progname), &st) != 0) {

+			error("%s: stat(\"%s\"): %s", __func__,

+			    progname, strerror(errno));

+			goto go_away;

+		}

+		if (st.st_uid != 0 || (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) {

+			error("bad ownership or modes for AuthorizedKeysCommand path component \"%s\"",

+			    progname);

+			goto go_away;

+		}

+		if (!S_ISDIR(st.st_mode)) {

+			error("AuthorizedKeysCommand path component \"%s\" is not a directory",

+			    progname);

+			goto go_away;

+		}

+	} while (1);

+

+	/* open the pipe and read the keys */

+	if (pipe(childdescriptors)) {

+		error("failed to pipe(2) for AuthorizedKeysCommand: %s",

+		    strerror(errno));

+		goto go_away;

+	}

+

+	child = fork();

+	if (child == -1) {

+		error("failed to fork(2) for AuthorizedKeysCommand: %s",

+		    strerror(errno));

+		goto go_away;

+	} else if (child == 0) {

+		/* we're in the child process here -- we should never return from this block. */

+		/* permanently drop privs in child process */

+		if (runas_pw->pw_uid != 0) {

+			restore_uid();

+			permanently_set_uid(runas_pw);

+	  	}

+

+		close(childdescriptors[0]);

+		/* put the write end of the pipe on stdout (FD 1) */

+		if (dup2(childdescriptors[1], 1) == -1) {

+			error("failed to dup2(2) from AuthorizedKeysCommand: %s",

+			    strerror(errno));

+			_exit(127);

+		}

+

+		debug3("about to execl() AuthorizedKeysCommand: \"%s\" \"%s\"", options.authorized_keys_command, pw->pw_name);

+		/* see session.c:child_close_fds() */

+		for (i = 3; i < 64; ++i) {

+			close(i);

+		}

+

+		execl(options.authorized_keys_command, options.authorized_keys_command, pw->pw_name, NULL);

+

+		/* if we got here, it didn't work */

+		error("failed to execl AuthorizedKeysCommand: %s", strerror(errno)); /* this won't work because we closed the fds above */

+		_exit(127);

+	}

+	

+	close(childdescriptors[1]);

+	f = fdopen(childdescriptors[0], "r");

+	if (!f) {

+		error("%s: could not buffer FDs from AuthorizedKeysCommand (\"%s\", \"r\"): %s", __func__,

+		    options.authorized_keys_command, strerror (errno));

+		goto go_away;

+	}

+

+	found_key = user_search_key_in_file (f, options.authorized_keys_command, key, pw);

+	fclose (f);

+	do {

+		pid = waitpid(child, &pstat, 0);

+	} while (pid == -1 && errno == EINTR);

+

+	/* what about the return value from the child process? */

+go_away:

+	if (progname)

+		xfree (progname);

+

+	if (runas_pw->pw_uid != 0)

+		restore_uid();

+	return found_key;

+}

+#endif

+

+/* check whether given key is in 

 int

 user_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, Key *key)

 {

 	u_int success, i;

 	char *file;

+#ifdef WITH_AUTHORIZED_KEYS_COMMAND

+	success = user_key_via_command_allowed2(pw, key);

+	if (success > 0)

+		return success;

+#endif

+

 	if (auth_key_is_revoked(key))

 		return 0;

 	if (key_is_cert(key) && auth_key_is_revoked(key->cert->signature_key))

diff -up openssh-6.1p1/configure.ac.akc openssh-6.1p1/configure.ac

--- openssh-6.1p1/configure.ac.akc	2012-07-06 03:49:29.000000000 +0200

+++ openssh-6.1p1/configure.ac	2012-09-14 20:20:48.525446106 +0200

@@ -1512,6 +1512,18 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([audit],

 	esac ]

 )

+# Check whether user wants AuthorizedKeysCommand support

+AKC_MSG="no"

+AC_ARG_WITH(authorized-keys-command,

+	[  --with-authorized-keys-command      Enable AuthorizedKeysCommand support],

+	[

+		if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then

+			AC_DEFINE([WITH_AUTHORIZED_KEYS_COMMAND], 1, [Enable AuthorizedKeysCommand support])

+			AKC_MSG="yes"

+		fi

+	]

+)

+

 dnl    Checks for library functions. Please keep in alphabetical order

 AC_CHECK_FUNCS([ \

 	arc4random \

@@ -4407,6 +4419,7 @@ echo "                   SELinux support

 echo "                 Smartcard support: $SCARD_MSG"

 echo "                     S/KEY support: $SKEY_MSG"

 echo "              TCP Wrappers support: $TCPW_MSG"

+echo "     AuthorizedKeysCommand support: $AKC_MSG"

 echo "              MD5 password support: $MD5_MSG"

 echo "                   libedit support: $LIBEDIT_MSG"

 echo "  Solaris process contract support: $SPC_MSG"

diff -up openssh-6.1p1/servconf.c.akc openssh-6.1p1/servconf.c

--- openssh-6.1p1/servconf.c.akc	2012-09-14 20:20:48.138443423 +0200

+++ openssh-6.1p1/servconf.c	2012-09-14 20:27:34.546107295 +0200

@@ -139,6 +139,8 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions

 	options->num_permitted_opens = -1;

 	options->adm_forced_command = NULL;

 	options->chroot_directory = NULL;

+	options->authorized_keys_command = NULL;

+	options->authorized_keys_command_runas = NULL;

 	options->zero_knowledge_password_authentication = -1;

 	options->revoked_keys_file = NULL;

 	options->trusted_user_ca_keys = NULL;

@@ -334,6 +336,7 @@ typedef enum {

 	sZeroKnowledgePasswordAuthentication, sHostCertificate,

 	sRevokedKeys, sTrustedUserCAKeys, sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile,

 	sKexAlgorithms, sIPQoS, sVersionAddendum,

+	sAuthorizedKeysCommand, sAuthorizedKeysCommandRunAs,

 	sDeprecated, sUnsupported

 } ServerOpCodes;

@@ -461,6 +464,14 @@ static struct {

 	{ "requiredauthentications2", sRequiredAuthentications2, SSHCFG_ALL },

 	{ "ipqos", sIPQoS, SSHCFG_ALL },

 	{ "versionaddendum", sVersionAddendum, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },

+#ifdef WITH_AUTHORIZED_KEYS_COMMAND

+	{ "authorizedkeyscommand", sAuthorizedKeysCommand, SSHCFG_ALL },

+	{ "authorizedkeyscommandrunas", sAuthorizedKeysCommandRunAs, SSHCFG_ALL },

+#else

+	{ "authorizedkeyscommand", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },

+	{ "authorizedkeyscommandrunas", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },

+#endif

+

 	{ NULL, sBadOption, 0 }

 };

@@ -1532,6 +1543,24 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions

 		}

 		return 0;

+	case sAuthorizedKeysCommand:

+		len = strspn(cp, WHITESPACE);

+		if (*activep && options->authorized_keys_command == NULL)

+			options->authorized_keys_command = xstrdup(cp + len);

+		return 0;

+

+	case sAuthorizedKeysCommandRunAs:

+		charptr = &options->authorized_keys_command_runas;

+

+		arg = strdelim(&cp;;

+		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')

+			fatal("%s line %d: missing account.",

+			    filename, linenum);

+

+		if (*activep && *charptr == NULL)

+			*charptr = xstrdup(arg);

+		break;

+

 	case sDeprecated:

 		logit("%s line %d: Deprecated option %s",

 		    filename, linenum, arg);

@@ -1682,6 +1711,8 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *d

 	M_CP_INTOPT(hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only);

 	M_CP_INTOPT(kbd_interactive_authentication);

 	M_CP_INTOPT(zero_knowledge_password_authentication);

+	M_CP_STROPT(authorized_keys_command);

+	M_CP_STROPT(authorized_keys_command_runas);

 	M_CP_INTOPT(permit_root_login);

 	M_CP_INTOPT(permit_empty_passwd);

@@ -1942,6 +1973,8 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)

 	dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile,

 	    o->authorized_principals_file);

 	dump_cfg_string(sVersionAddendum, o->version_addendum);

+	dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedKeysCommand, o->authorized_keys_command);

+	dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedKeysCommandRunAs, o->authorized_keys_command_runas);

 	/* string arguments requiring a lookup */

 	dump_cfg_string(sLogLevel, log_level_name(o->log_level));

diff -up openssh-6.1p1/servconf.h.akc openssh-6.1p1/servconf.h

--- openssh-6.1p1/servconf.h.akc	2012-09-14 20:20:48.000000000 +0200

+++ openssh-6.1p1/servconf.h	2012-09-14 20:23:16.691844577 +0200

@@ -169,6 +169,8 @@ typedef struct {

 	char   *revoked_keys_file;

 	char   *trusted_user_ca_keys;

 	char   *authorized_principals_file;

+	char   *authorized_keys_command;

+	char   *authorized_keys_command_runas;

 	char   *version_addendum;	/* Appended to SSH banner */

 }       ServerOptions;

diff -up openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.akc openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config

--- openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.akc	2012-07-31 04:21:34.000000000 +0200

+++ openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config	2012-09-14 20:30:46.950095769 +0200

@@ -49,6 +49,9 @@

 # but this is overridden so installations will only check .ssh/authorized_keys

 AuthorizedKeysFile	.ssh/authorized_keys

+#AuthorizedKeysCommand none

+#AuthorizedKeysCommandRunAs nobody

+

 #AuthorizedPrincipalsFile none

 # For this to work you will also need host keys in /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts

diff -up openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.0.akc openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.0

--- openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.0.akc	2012-08-29 02:53:04.000000000 +0200

+++ openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.0	2012-09-14 20:32:23.539624859 +0200

@@ -71,6 +71,23 @@ DESCRIPTION

              See PATTERNS in ssh_config(5) for more information on patterns.

+     AuthorizedKeysCommand

+

+             Specifies a program to be used for lookup of the user's

+	     public keys.  The program will be invoked with its first

+	     argument the name of the user being authorized, and should produce

+	     on standard output AuthorizedKeys lines (see AUTHORIZED_KEYS

+	     in sshd(8)).  By default (or when set to the empty string) there is no

+	     AuthorizedKeysCommand run.  If the AuthorizedKeysCommand does not successfully

+	     authorize the user, authorization falls through to the

+	     AuthorizedKeysFile.  Note that this option has an effect

+	     only with PubkeyAuthentication turned on.

+

+     AuthorizedKeysCommandRunAs

+             Specifies the user under whose account the AuthorizedKeysCommand is run.

+             Empty string (the default value) means the user being authorized

+             is used.

+

      AuthorizedKeysFile

              Specifies the file that contains the public keys that can be used

              for user authentication.  The format is described in the

@@ -402,7 +419,8 @@ DESCRIPTION

              Only a subset of keywords may be used on the lines following a

              Match keyword.  Available keywords are AcceptEnv,

              AllowAgentForwarding, AllowGroups, AllowTcpForwarding,

-             AllowUsers, AuthorizedKeysFile, AuthorizedPrincipalsFile, Banner,

+             AllowUsers, AuthorizedKeysFile, AuthorizedKeysCommand,

+             AuthorizedKeysCommandRunAs, AuthorizedPrincipalsFile, Banner,

              ChrootDirectory, DenyGroups, DenyUsers, ForceCommand,

              GatewayPorts, GSSAPIAuthentication, HostbasedAuthentication,

              HostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, KbdInteractiveAuthentication,

diff -up openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.5.akc openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.5

--- openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.5.akc	2012-09-14 20:20:48.142443448 +0200

+++ openssh-6.1p1/sshd_config.5	2012-09-14 20:29:56.003873873 +0200

@@ -151,6 +151,19 @@ See

 in

 .Xr ssh_config 5

 for more information on patterns.

+.It Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand

+Specifies a program to be used for lookup of the user's

+public keys.  The program will be invoked with its first

+argument the name of the user being authorized, and should produce

+on standard output AuthorizedKeys lines (see AUTHORIZED_KEYS

+in sshd(8)).  By default (or when set to the empty string) there is no

+AuthorizedKeysCommand run.  If the AuthorizedKeysCommand does not successfully

+authorize the user, authorization falls through to the

+AuthorizedKeysFile.  Note that this option has an effect

+only with PubkeyAuthentication turned on.

+.It Cm AuthorizedKeysCommandRunAs

+Specifies the user under whose account the AuthorizedKeysCommand is run. Empty

+string (the default value) means the user being authorized is used.

 .It Cm AuthorizedKeysFile

 Specifies the file that contains the public keys that can be used

 for user authentication.

@@ -712,6 +725,8 @@ Available keywords are

 .Cm AllowTcpForwarding ,

 .Cm AllowUsers ,

 .Cm AuthorizedKeysFile ,

+.Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand ,

+.Cm AuthorizedKeysCommandRunAs ,

 .Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile ,

 .Cm Banner ,

 .Cm ChrootDirectory ,

@@ -726,6 +741,7 @@ Available keywords are

 .Cm KerberosAuthentication ,

 .Cm MaxAuthTries ,

 .Cm MaxSessions ,

+.Cm PubkeyAuthentication ,

 .Cm PasswordAuthentication ,

 .Cm PermitEmptyPasswords ,

 .Cm PermitOpen ,