diff -up openssh-5.9p1/audit-bsm.c.audit4 openssh-5.9p1/audit-bsm.c

--- openssh-5.9p1/audit-bsm.c.audit4	2012-02-06 17:15:01.574908126 +0100

+++ openssh-5.9p1/audit-bsm.c	2012-02-06 17:15:21.656095559 +0100

@@ -408,4 +408,10 @@ audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char

 {

 	/* not implemented */

 }

+

+void

+audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)

+{

+	/* not implemented */

+}

 #endif /* BSM */

diff -up openssh-5.9p1/audit.c.audit4 openssh-5.9p1/audit.c

--- openssh-5.9p1/audit.c.audit4	2012-02-06 17:15:01.576787216 +0100

+++ openssh-5.9p1/audit.c	2012-02-06 17:15:21.690032906 +0100

@@ -143,6 +143,12 @@ audit_kex(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac

 	PRIVSEP(audit_kex_body(ctos, enc, mac, comp, getpid(), getuid()));

 }

+void

+audit_session_key_free(int ctos)

+{

+	PRIVSEP(audit_session_key_free_body(ctos, getpid(), getuid()));

+}

+

 # ifndef CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS

 /*

  * Null implementations of audit functions.

@@ -274,5 +280,15 @@ audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char

 		(unsigned)geteuid(), ctos, enc, mac, compress, (long)pid,

 	        (unsigned)uid);

 }

+

+/*

+ * This will be called on succesfull session key discard

+ */

+void

+audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)

+{

+	debug("audit session key discard euid %u direction %d from pid %ld uid %u",

+		(unsigned)geteuid(), ctos, (long)pid, (unsigned)uid);

+}

 # endif  /* !defined CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */

 #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */

diff -up openssh-5.9p1/audit.h.audit4 openssh-5.9p1/audit.h

--- openssh-5.9p1/audit.h.audit4	2012-02-06 17:15:01.576787216 +0100

+++ openssh-5.9p1/audit.h	2012-02-06 17:15:21.690876254 +0100

@@ -62,5 +62,7 @@ void	audit_unsupported(int);

 void	audit_kex(int, char *, char *, char *);

 void	audit_unsupported_body(int);

 void	audit_kex_body(int, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t);

+void	audit_session_key_free(int ctos);

+void	audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t, uid_t);

 #endif /* _SSH_AUDIT_H */

diff -up openssh-5.9p1/audit-linux.c.audit4 openssh-5.9p1/audit-linux.c

--- openssh-5.9p1/audit-linux.c.audit4	2012-02-06 17:15:01.575908525 +0100

+++ openssh-5.9p1/audit-linux.c	2012-02-06 17:15:21.682001323 +0100

@@ -294,6 +294,8 @@ audit_unsupported_body(int what)

 #endif

 }

+const static char *direction[] = { "from-server", "from-client", "both" };

+

 void

 audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress, pid_t pid,

 	       uid_t uid)

@@ -301,7 +303,6 @@ audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char

 #ifdef AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION

 	char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE];

 	int audit_fd, audit_ok;

-	const static char *direction[] = { "from-server", "from-client", "both" };

 	Cipher *cipher = cipher_by_name(enc);

 	char *s;

@@ -327,4 +328,32 @@ audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char

 #endif

 }

+void

+audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)

+{

+	char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE];

+	int audit_fd, audit_ok;

+	char *s;

+

+	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=destroy kind=session fp=? direction=%s spid=%jd suid=%jd rport=%d laddr=%s lport=%d ",

+		 direction[ctos], (intmax_t)pid, (intmax_t)uid,

+		 get_remote_port(),

+		 (s = get_local_ipaddr(packet_get_connection_in())),

+		 get_local_port());

+	xfree(s);

+	audit_fd = audit_open();

+	if (audit_fd < 0) {

+		if (errno != EINVAL && errno != EPROTONOSUPPORT &&

+					 errno != EAFNOSUPPORT)

+			error("cannot open audit");

+		return;

+	}

+	audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_KEY_USER,

+			buf, NULL, get_remote_ipaddr(), NULL, 1);

+	audit_close(audit_fd);

+	/* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */

+	if ((audit_ok < 0) && ((audit_ok != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))

+		error("cannot write into audit");

+}

+

 #endif /* USE_LINUX_AUDIT */

diff -up openssh-5.9p1/auditstub.c.audit4 openssh-5.9p1/auditstub.c

--- openssh-5.9p1/auditstub.c.audit4	2012-02-06 17:15:01.576787216 +0100

+++ openssh-5.9p1/auditstub.c	2012-02-06 17:15:21.690876254 +0100

@@ -27,6 +27,8 @@

  * Red Hat author: Jan F. Chadima <jchadima@redhat.com>

  */

+#include <sys/types.h>

+

 void

 audit_unsupported(int n)

 {

@@ -37,3 +39,12 @@ audit_kex(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac

 {

 }

+void

+audit_session_key_free(int ctos)

+{

+}

+

+void

+audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)

+{

+}

diff -up openssh-5.9p1/kex.c.audit4 openssh-5.9p1/kex.c

--- openssh-5.9p1/kex.c.audit4	2012-02-06 17:15:01.578907640 +0100

+++ openssh-5.9p1/kex.c	2012-02-06 17:15:21.691785656 +0100

@@ -624,3 +624,34 @@ dump_digest(char *msg, u_char *digest, i

 	fprintf(stderr, "\n");

 }

 #endif

+

+static void

+enc_destroy(Enc *enc)

+{

+	if (enc == NULL)

+		return;

+

+	if (enc->key) {

+		memset(enc->key, 0, enc->key_len);

+		xfree(enc->key);

+	}

+

+	if (enc->iv) {

+		memset(enc->iv,  0, enc->block_size);

+		xfree(enc->iv);

+	}

+

+	memset(enc, 0, sizeof(*enc));

+}

+

+void

+newkeys_destroy(Newkeys *newkeys)

+{

+	if (newkeys == NULL)

+		return;

+

+	enc_destroy(&newkeys->enc);

+	mac_destroy(&newkeys->mac);

+	memset(&newkeys->comp, 0, sizeof(newkeys->comp));

+}

+

diff -up openssh-5.9p1/kex.h.audit4 openssh-5.9p1/kex.h

--- openssh-5.9p1/kex.h.audit4	2010-09-24 14:11:14.000000000 +0200

+++ openssh-5.9p1/kex.h	2012-02-06 17:15:21.691785656 +0100

@@ -156,6 +156,8 @@ void	 kexgex_server(Kex *);

 void	 kexecdh_client(Kex *);

 void	 kexecdh_server(Kex *);

+void	newkeys_destroy(Newkeys *newkeys);

+

 void

 kex_dh_hash(char *, char *, char *, int, char *, int, u_char *, int,

     BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, u_char **, u_int *);

diff -up openssh-5.9p1/mac.c.audit4 openssh-5.9p1/mac.c

--- openssh-5.9p1/mac.c.audit4	2011-08-17 02:29:03.000000000 +0200

+++ openssh-5.9p1/mac.c	2012-02-06 17:15:21.692918961 +0100

@@ -168,6 +168,20 @@ mac_clear(Mac *mac)

 	mac->umac_ctx = NULL;

 }

+void

+mac_destroy(Mac *mac)

+{

+	if (mac == NULL)

+		return;

+

+	if (mac->key) {

+		memset(mac->key, 0, mac->key_len);

+		xfree(mac->key);

+	}

+

+	memset(mac, 0, sizeof(*mac));

+}

+

 /* XXX copied from ciphers_valid */

 #define	MAC_SEP	","

 int

diff -up openssh-5.9p1/mac.h.audit4 openssh-5.9p1/mac.h

--- openssh-5.9p1/mac.h.audit4	2007-06-11 06:01:42.000000000 +0200

+++ openssh-5.9p1/mac.h	2012-02-06 17:15:21.692918961 +0100

@@ -28,3 +28,4 @@ int	 mac_setup(Mac *, char *);

 int	 mac_init(Mac *);

 u_char	*mac_compute(Mac *, u_int32_t, u_char *, int);

 void	 mac_clear(Mac *);

+void	 mac_destroy(Mac *);

diff -up openssh-5.9p1/monitor.c.audit4 openssh-5.9p1/monitor.c

--- openssh-5.9p1/monitor.c.audit4	2012-02-06 17:15:01.579896475 +0100

+++ openssh-5.9p1/monitor.c	2012-02-06 17:16:32.405783810 +0100

@@ -189,6 +189,7 @@ int mm_answer_audit_command(int, Buffer 

 int mm_answer_audit_end_command(int, Buffer *);

 int mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body(int, Buffer *);

 int mm_answer_audit_kex_body(int, Buffer *);

+int mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body(int, Buffer *);

 #endif

 static int monitor_read_log(struct monitor *);

@@ -242,6 +243,7 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] 

     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},

     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body},

     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body},

+    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body},

 #endif

 #ifdef BSD_AUTH

     {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery},

@@ -281,6 +283,7 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20

     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_end_command},

     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body},

     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body},

+    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body},

 #endif

     {0, 0, NULL}

 };

@@ -314,6 +317,7 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto15[] 

     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},

     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body},

     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body},

+    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body},

 #endif

     {0, 0, NULL}

 };

@@ -328,6 +332,7 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth15

     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_end_command},

     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body},

     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body},

+    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body},

 #endif

     {0, 0, NULL}

 };

@@ -451,10 +456,6 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctx

 #endif

 	}

-	/* Drain any buffered messages from the child */

-	while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd >= 0 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)

-		;

-

 	if (!authctxt->valid)

 		fatal("%s: authenticated invalid user", __func__);

 	if (strcmp(auth_method, "unknown") == 0)

@@ -1954,11 +1955,13 @@ mm_get_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor

 	blob = buffer_get_string(&m, &bloblen);

 	current_keys[MODE_OUT] = mm_newkeys_from_blob(blob, bloblen);

+	memset(blob, 0, bloblen);

 	xfree(blob);

 	debug3("%s: Waiting for second key", __func__);

 	blob = buffer_get_string(&m, &bloblen);

 	current_keys[MODE_IN] = mm_newkeys_from_blob(blob, bloblen);

+	memset(blob, 0, bloblen);

 	xfree(blob);

 	/* Now get sequence numbers for the packets */

@@ -2004,6 +2007,21 @@ mm_get_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor

 	}

 	buffer_free(&m);

+

+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS

+	if (compat20) {

+		buffer_init(&m);

+		mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_sendfd,

+					  MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, &m);

+		mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body(pmonitor->m_sendfd, &m);

+		buffer_free(&m);

+	}

+#endif

+

+	/* Drain any buffered messages from the child */

+	while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd >= 0 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)

+		;

+

 }

@@ -2450,4 +2468,22 @@ mm_answer_audit_kex_body(int sock, Buffe

 	return 0;

 }

+int

+mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body(int sock, Buffer *m)

+{

+	int ctos;

+	pid_t pid;

+	uid_t uid;

+

+	ctos = buffer_get_int(m);

+	pid = buffer_get_int64(m);

+	uid = buffer_get_int64(m);

+

+	audit_session_key_free_body(ctos, pid, uid);

+

+	buffer_clear(m);

+

+	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, m);

+	return 0;

+}

 #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */

diff -up openssh-5.9p1/monitor.h.audit4 openssh-5.9p1/monitor.h

--- openssh-5.9p1/monitor.h.audit4	2012-02-06 17:15:01.580908188 +0100

+++ openssh-5.9p1/monitor.h	2012-02-06 17:15:21.695033617 +0100

@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ enum monitor_reqtype {

 	MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_COMMAND, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND,

 	MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED,

 	MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_KEX,

+	MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE,

 	MONITOR_REQ_TERM,

 	MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_STEP1, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_STEP1,

 	MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_GET_PWDATA, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_GET_PWDATA,

diff -up openssh-5.9p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit4 openssh-5.9p1/monitor_wrap.c

--- openssh-5.9p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit4	2012-02-06 17:15:01.581802928 +0100

+++ openssh-5.9p1/monitor_wrap.c	2012-02-06 17:15:21.696033353 +0100

@@ -653,12 +653,14 @@ mm_send_keystate(struct monitor *monitor

 		fatal("%s: conversion of newkeys failed", __func__);

 	buffer_put_string(&m, blob, bloblen);

+	memset(blob, 0, bloblen);

 	xfree(blob);

 	if (!mm_newkeys_to_blob(MODE_IN, &blob, &bloblen))

 		fatal("%s: conversion of newkeys failed", __func__);

 	buffer_put_string(&m, blob, bloblen);

+	memset(blob, 0, bloblen);

 	xfree(blob);

 	packet_get_state(MODE_OUT, &seqnr, &blocks, &packets, &bytes);

@@ -1522,4 +1524,19 @@ mm_audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *cipher

 	buffer_free(&m);

 }

+

+void

+mm_audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)

+{

+	Buffer m;

+

+	buffer_init(&m);

+	buffer_put_int(&m, ctos);

+	buffer_put_int64(&m, pid);

+	buffer_put_int64(&m, uid);

+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, &m);

+	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE,

+				  &m);

+	buffer_free(&m);

+}

 #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */

diff -up openssh-5.9p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit4 openssh-5.9p1/monitor_wrap.h

--- openssh-5.9p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit4	2012-02-06 17:15:01.582908343 +0100

+++ openssh-5.9p1/monitor_wrap.h	2012-02-06 17:15:21.696033353 +0100

@@ -79,6 +79,7 @@ int mm_audit_run_command(const char *);

 void mm_audit_end_command(int, const char *);

 void mm_audit_unsupported_body(int);

 void mm_audit_kex_body(int, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t);

+void mm_audit_session_key_free_body(int, pid_t, uid_t);

 #endif

 struct Session;

diff -up openssh-5.9p1/packet.c.audit4 openssh-5.9p1/packet.c

--- openssh-5.9p1/packet.c.audit4	2012-02-06 17:15:01.545908387 +0100

+++ openssh-5.9p1/packet.c	2012-02-06 17:15:21.696886524 +0100

@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@

 #include <signal.h>

 #include "xmalloc.h"

+#include "audit.h"

 #include "buffer.h"

 #include "packet.h"

 #include "crc32.h"

@@ -472,6 +473,13 @@ packet_get_connection_out(void)

 	return active_state->connection_out;

 }

+static int

+packet_state_has_keys (const struct session_state *state)

+{

+	return state != NULL &&

+		(state->newkeys[MODE_IN] != NULL || state->newkeys[MODE_OUT] != NULL);

+}

+

 /* Closes the connection and clears and frees internal data structures. */

 void

@@ -480,13 +488,6 @@ packet_close(void)

 	if (!active_state->initialized)

 		return;

 	active_state->initialized = 0;

-	if (active_state->connection_in == active_state->connection_out) {

-		shutdown(active_state->connection_out, SHUT_RDWR);

-		close(active_state->connection_out);

-	} else {

-		close(active_state->connection_in);

-		close(active_state->connection_out);

-	}

 	buffer_free(&active_state->input);

 	buffer_free(&active_state->output);

 	buffer_free(&active_state->outgoing_packet);

@@ -495,8 +496,18 @@ packet_close(void)

 		buffer_free(&active_state->compression_buffer);

 		buffer_compress_uninit();

 	}

-	cipher_cleanup(&active_state->send_context);

-	cipher_cleanup(&active_state->receive_context);

+	if (packet_state_has_keys(active_state)) {

+		cipher_cleanup(&active_state->send_context);

+		cipher_cleanup(&active_state->receive_context);

+		audit_session_key_free(2);

+	}

+	if (active_state->connection_in == active_state->connection_out) {

+		shutdown(active_state->connection_out, SHUT_RDWR);

+		close(active_state->connection_out);

+	} else {

+		close(active_state->connection_in);

+		close(active_state->connection_out);

+	}

 }

 /* Sets remote side protocol flags. */

@@ -731,6 +742,23 @@ packet_send1(void)

 	 */

 }

+static void

+newkeys_destroy_and_free(Newkeys *newkeys)

+{

+	if (newkeys == NULL)

+		return;

+

+	xfree(newkeys->enc.name);

+

+	mac_clear(&newkeys->mac);

+	xfree(newkeys->mac.name);

+

+	xfree(newkeys->comp.name);

+

+	newkeys_destroy(newkeys);

+	xfree(newkeys);

+}

+

 void

 set_newkeys(int mode)

 {

@@ -756,18 +784,9 @@ set_newkeys(int mode)

 	}

 	if (active_state->newkeys[mode] != NULL) {

 		debug("set_newkeys: rekeying");

+		audit_session_key_free(mode);

 		cipher_cleanup(cc);

-		enc  = &active_state->newkeys[mode]->enc;

-		mac  = &active_state->newkeys[mode]->mac;

-		comp = &active_state->newkeys[mode]->comp;

-		mac_clear(mac);

-		xfree(enc->name);

-		xfree(enc->iv);

-		xfree(enc->key);

-		xfree(mac->name);

-		xfree(mac->key);

-		xfree(comp->name);

-		xfree(active_state->newkeys[mode]);

+		newkeys_destroy_and_free(active_state->newkeys[mode]);

 	}

 	active_state->newkeys[mode] = kex_get_newkeys(mode);

 	if (active_state->newkeys[mode] == NULL)

@@ -1927,6 +1946,47 @@ packet_get_newkeys(int mode)

 	return (void *)active_state->newkeys[mode];

 }

+static void

+packet_destroy_state(struct session_state *state)

+{

+	if (state == NULL)

+		return;

+

+	cipher_cleanup(&state->receive_context);

+	cipher_cleanup(&state->send_context);

+

+	buffer_free(&state->input);

+	buffer_free(&state->output);

+	buffer_free(&state->outgoing_packet);

+	buffer_free(&state->incoming_packet);

+	buffer_free(&state->compression_buffer);

+	newkeys_destroy_and_free(state->newkeys[MODE_IN]);

+	state->newkeys[MODE_IN] = NULL;

+	newkeys_destroy_and_free(state->newkeys[MODE_OUT]);

+	state->newkeys[MODE_OUT] = NULL;

+	mac_destroy(state->packet_discard_mac);

+//	TAILQ_HEAD(, packet) outgoing;

+//	memset(state, 0, sizeof(state));

+}

+

+void

+packet_destroy_all(int audit_it, int privsep)

+{

+	if (audit_it)

+		audit_it = packet_state_has_keys (active_state) ||

+			packet_state_has_keys (backup_state);

+	packet_destroy_state(active_state);

+	packet_destroy_state(backup_state);

+	if (audit_it) {

+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS

+		if (privsep)

+			audit_session_key_free(2);

+		else

+			audit_session_key_free_body(2, getpid(), getuid());

+#endif

+	}

+}

+

 /*

  * Save the state for the real connection, and use a separate state when

  * resuming a suspended connection.

@@ -1934,18 +1994,12 @@ packet_get_newkeys(int mode)

 void

 packet_backup_state(void)

 {

-	struct session_state *tmp;

-

 	close(active_state->connection_in);

 	active_state->connection_in = -1;

 	close(active_state->connection_out);

 	active_state->connection_out = -1;

-	if (backup_state)

-		tmp = backup_state;

-	else

-		tmp = alloc_session_state();

 	backup_state = active_state;

-	active_state = tmp;

+	active_state = alloc_session_state();

 }

 /*

@@ -1962,9 +2016,7 @@ packet_restore_state(void)

 	backup_state = active_state;

 	active_state = tmp;

 	active_state->connection_in = backup_state->connection_in;

-	backup_state->connection_in = -1;

 	active_state->connection_out = backup_state->connection_out;

-	backup_state->connection_out = -1;

 	len = buffer_len(&backup_state->input);

 	if (len > 0) {

 		buf = buffer_ptr(&backup_state->input);

@@ -1972,4 +2024,10 @@ packet_restore_state(void)

 		buffer_clear(&backup_state->input);

 		add_recv_bytes(len);

 	}

+	backup_state->connection_in = -1;

+	backup_state->connection_out = -1;

+	packet_destroy_state(backup_state);

+	xfree(backup_state);

+	backup_state = NULL;

 }

+

diff -up openssh-5.9p1/packet.h.audit4 openssh-5.9p1/packet.h

--- openssh-5.9p1/packet.h.audit4	2011-05-15 00:43:13.000000000 +0200

+++ openssh-5.9p1/packet.h	2012-02-06 17:15:21.697874825 +0100

@@ -124,4 +124,5 @@ void	 packet_restore_state(void);

 void	*packet_get_input(void);

 void	*packet_get_output(void);

+void	 packet_destroy_all(int, int);

 #endif				/* PACKET_H */

diff -up openssh-5.9p1/session.c.audit4 openssh-5.9p1/session.c

--- openssh-5.9p1/session.c.audit4	2012-02-06 17:15:01.562908533 +0100

+++ openssh-5.9p1/session.c	2012-02-06 17:15:21.697874825 +0100

@@ -1634,6 +1634,9 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command

 	/* remove hostkey from the child's memory */

 	destroy_sensitive_data();

+	/* Don't audit this - both us and the parent would be talking to the

+	   monitor over a single socket, with no synchronization. */

+	packet_destroy_all(0, 1);

 	/* Force a password change */

 	if (s->authctxt->force_pwchange) {

diff -up openssh-5.9p1/sshd.c.audit4 openssh-5.9p1/sshd.c

--- openssh-5.9p1/sshd.c.audit4	2012-02-06 17:15:01.583866459 +0100

+++ openssh-5.9p1/sshd.c	2012-02-06 17:15:21.699033720 +0100

@@ -686,6 +686,8 @@ privsep_preauth(Authctxt *authctxt)

 	}

 }

+extern Newkeys *current_keys[];

+

 static void

 privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)

 {

@@ -710,6 +712,10 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)

 	else if (pmonitor->m_pid != 0) {

 		verbose("User child is on pid %ld", (long)pmonitor->m_pid);

 		buffer_clear(&loginmsg);

+ 		newkeys_destroy(current_keys[MODE_OUT]);

+		newkeys_destroy(current_keys[MODE_IN]);

+		audit_session_key_free_body(2, getpid(), getuid());

+		packet_destroy_all(0, 0);

 		monitor_child_postauth(pmonitor);

 		/* NEVERREACHED */

@@ -2001,6 +2007,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)

 	 */

 	if (use_privsep) {

 		mm_send_keystate(pmonitor);

+		packet_destroy_all(1, 1);

 		exit(0);

 	}

@@ -2053,6 +2060,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)

 	do_authenticated(authctxt);

 	/* The connection has been terminated. */

+	packet_destroy_all(1, 1);

+

 	packet_get_state(MODE_IN, NULL, NULL, NULL, &ibytes);

 	packet_get_state(MODE_OUT, NULL, NULL, NULL, &obytes);

 	verbose("Transferred: sent %llu, received %llu bytes",

@@ -2370,8 +2379,20 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void)

 void

 cleanup_exit(int i)

 {

+	static int in_cleanup = 0;

+	int is_privsep_child;

+

+	/* cleanup_exit can be called at the very least from the privsep

+	   wrappers used for auditing.  Make sure we don't recurse

+	   indefinitely. */

+	if (in_cleanup)

+		_exit(i);

+	in_cleanup = 1;

+

 	if (the_authctxt)

 		do_cleanup(the_authctxt);

+	is_privsep_child = use_privsep && pmonitor != NULL && !mm_is_monitor();

+	packet_destroy_all(1, is_privsep_child);

 #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS

 	/* done after do_cleanup so it can cancel the PAM auth 'thread' */

 	if ((the_authctxt == NULL || !the_authctxt->authenticated) &&